zerodds-bridge-security 1.0.0-rc.1

Gemeinsamer Security-Layer für ZeroDDS Bridge-Daemons (ws/mqtt/coap/amqp/grpc/corba): §7.1 TLS (rustls), §7.2 Auth-Modes (none/bearer/jwt/mtls/sasl), §7.3 ACL pro Topic.
Documentation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
// Copyright 2026 ZeroDDS Contributors

//! §7.2 Auth-Modes — `none|bearer|jwt|mtls|sasl`.
//!
//! Eingangspunkt: [`AuthMode::validate`] → [`AuthSubject`] oder
//! [`AuthError`]. Pro Bridge wird der Aufruf an die jeweilige
//! Connection-Phase gehängt:
//!
//! * HTTP-basiert (ws/grpc): nach dem Request-Header-Lesen.
//! * MQTT: in der CONNECT-Packet-Auswertung.
//! * AMQP: nach SASL-PLAIN-Negotiation.
//! * CORBA: aus dem CSIv2-Token-Parsing oder dem TLS-Layer (mtls).

use std::collections::HashMap;

/// Auth-Subject — wird nach erfolgreichem [`AuthMode::validate`] an
/// nachfolgende ACL-Prüfungen (`§7.3`) gereicht.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AuthSubject {
    /// Stable Identity (e.g. JWT `sub`, Bearer-Mapping, mTLS-CN, SASL-User).
    pub name: String,
    /// Group-Memberships (z.B. JWT `groups`-Claim).
    pub groups: Vec<String>,
    /// Free-form Claims (jeder String-Wert).
    pub claims: HashMap<String, String>,
}

impl AuthSubject {
    /// Anonymous-Subject für `AuthMode::None`.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn anonymous() -> Self {
        Self {
            name: "anonymous".to_string(),
            groups: Vec::new(),
            claims: HashMap::new(),
        }
    }

    /// Plain-Constructor.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn new(name: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        Self {
            name: name.into(),
            groups: Vec::new(),
            claims: HashMap::new(),
        }
    }

    /// Fluent-Add Group.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn with_group(mut self, g: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        self.groups.push(g.into());
        self
    }

    /// Fluent-Add Claim.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn with_claim(mut self, k: impl Into<String>, v: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        self.claims.insert(k.into(), v.into());
        self
    }
}

/// Fehler bei der Auth-Validation.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum AuthError {
    /// Header / Frame fehlt komplett (z.B. kein `Authorization`).
    MissingCredentials,
    /// Header-Format invalid (z.B. `Authorization` ohne `Bearer `).
    MalformedCredentials(String),
    /// Token nicht akzeptiert (Bearer mismatch / JWT-Signature fail / ...).
    Rejected(String),
    /// Konfiguration broken (z.B. JWT-Public-Key kann nicht geladen werden).
    Misconfigured(String),
}

impl core::fmt::Display for AuthError {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
        match self {
            Self::MissingCredentials => f.write_str("missing credentials"),
            Self::MalformedCredentials(m) => write!(f, "malformed credentials: {m}"),
            Self::Rejected(m) => write!(f, "credentials rejected: {m}"),
            Self::Misconfigured(m) => write!(f, "auth misconfigured: {m}"),
        }
    }
}

impl std::error::Error for AuthError {}

/// Auth-Mode pro Daemon (CLI `--auth-mode <MODE>`).
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum AuthMode {
    /// Keine Auth. Subject = "anonymous".
    None,
    /// Bearer-Token-Vergleich (HTTP-Header `Authorization: Bearer …`).
    /// Multi-Token via Map `token → subject`.
    Bearer {
        /// Mapping vom Token-String auf das resultierende Subject.
        tokens: HashMap<String, AuthSubject>,
    },
    /// JWT — RS256-Signature-Validation gegen RSA-Public-Key (DER-Bytes
    /// wie aus `RsaPublicKey::to_pkcs1_der`).
    Jwt {
        /// PKCS#1-DER des RSA-Public-Keys.
        pkcs1_pubkey_der: Vec<u8>,
        /// Optional Issuer-Match (`iss`-Claim).
        expected_issuer: Option<String>,
    },
    /// mTLS — Identity wird vom TLS-Layer (Client-Cert) geliefert,
    /// nicht von dieser Funktion. [`AuthMode::validate`] mit `Mtls`
    /// erwartet `presented_subject = Some(...)`.
    Mtls,
    /// SASL-PLAIN — `username\0username\0password`-Frame, mit Map
    /// `username → password`.
    SaslPlain {
        /// Mapping `user → password`.
        users: HashMap<String, String>,
    },
}

/// Was der Caller (Daemon) für `validate` mitbringt.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct AuthInput<'a> {
    /// Bearer/JWT: Inhalt des `Authorization`-Headers (komplett).
    pub authorization_header: Option<&'a str>,
    /// SASL-PLAIN: Raw-Frame-Bytes (`user\0user\0pass`).
    pub sasl_plain_blob: Option<&'a [u8]>,
    /// mTLS: vom rustls-Connection bereits validiertes Subject (z.B.
    /// Cert-CN). Wenn mTLS aber kein Cert präsentiert wurde: `None`.
    pub mtls_subject: Option<AuthSubject>,
}

impl AuthMode {
    /// Validate. Liefert das Subject oder einen [`AuthError`].
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// [`AuthError`] mit Sub-Variante.
    pub fn validate(&self, input: &AuthInput<'_>) -> Result<AuthSubject, AuthError> {
        match self {
            Self::None => Ok(AuthSubject::anonymous()),
            Self::Bearer { tokens } => {
                let hdr = input
                    .authorization_header
                    .ok_or(AuthError::MissingCredentials)?;
                let token = strip_bearer(hdr)?;
                tokens
                    .get(token)
                    .cloned()
                    .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::Rejected("unknown bearer token".to_string()))
            }
            Self::Jwt {
                pkcs1_pubkey_der,
                expected_issuer,
            } => {
                let hdr = input
                    .authorization_header
                    .ok_or(AuthError::MissingCredentials)?;
                let token = strip_bearer(hdr)?;
                validate_jwt_rs256(token, pkcs1_pubkey_der, expected_issuer.as_deref())
            }
            Self::Mtls => input
                .mtls_subject
                .clone()
                .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::Rejected("mTLS expected client cert".to_string())),
            Self::SaslPlain { users } => {
                let blob = input.sasl_plain_blob.ok_or(AuthError::MissingCredentials)?;
                let (user, pass) = parse_sasl_plain(blob)?;
                let stored = users
                    .get(user)
                    .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::Rejected("unknown user".to_string()))?;
                if stored == pass {
                    Ok(AuthSubject::new(user))
                } else {
                    Err(AuthError::Rejected("password mismatch".to_string()))
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

fn strip_bearer(hdr: &str) -> Result<&str, AuthError> {
    let trimmed = hdr.trim();
    let prefix = "Bearer ";
    if trimmed.len() < prefix.len()
        || !trimmed
            .get(..prefix.len())
            .is_some_and(|p| p.eq_ignore_ascii_case(prefix))
    {
        return Err(AuthError::MalformedCredentials(
            "expected `Bearer …`".to_string(),
        ));
    }
    Ok(trimmed[prefix.len()..].trim())
}

fn parse_sasl_plain(blob: &[u8]) -> Result<(&str, &str), AuthError> {
    // Format: `[authzid]\0authcid\0passwd` (RFC 4616).
    let mut parts = blob.splitn(3, |b| *b == 0);
    let _authzid = parts
        .next()
        .ok_or(AuthError::MalformedCredentials("sasl-plain empty".into()))?;
    let authcid = parts
        .next()
        .ok_or(AuthError::MalformedCredentials("sasl-plain no user".into()))?;
    let passwd = parts
        .next()
        .ok_or(AuthError::MalformedCredentials("sasl-plain no pass".into()))?;
    let user = core::str::from_utf8(authcid)
        .map_err(|_| AuthError::MalformedCredentials("sasl-plain user utf8".into()))?;
    let pass = core::str::from_utf8(passwd)
        .map_err(|_| AuthError::MalformedCredentials("sasl-plain pass utf8".into()))?;
    if user.is_empty() {
        return Err(AuthError::MalformedCredentials(
            "sasl-plain empty user".into(),
        ));
    }
    Ok((user, pass))
}

// ---------- JWT RS256 ----------------------------------------------------

fn validate_jwt_rs256(
    token: &str,
    pkcs1_pubkey_der: &[u8],
    expected_issuer: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<AuthSubject, AuthError> {
    use base64::Engine as _;
    let engine = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;

    let mut parts = token.split('.');
    let h_b64 = parts
        .next()
        .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::MalformedCredentials("jwt: no header".into()))?;
    let p_b64 = parts
        .next()
        .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::MalformedCredentials("jwt: no payload".into()))?;
    let s_b64 = parts
        .next()
        .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::MalformedCredentials("jwt: no sig".into()))?;
    if parts.next().is_some() {
        return Err(AuthError::MalformedCredentials(
            "jwt: too many segments".into(),
        ));
    }

    let header_bytes = engine
        .decode(h_b64)
        .map_err(|e| AuthError::MalformedCredentials(format!("jwt header b64: {e}")))?;
    let payload_bytes = engine
        .decode(p_b64)
        .map_err(|e| AuthError::MalformedCredentials(format!("jwt payload b64: {e}")))?;
    let sig_bytes = engine
        .decode(s_b64)
        .map_err(|e| AuthError::MalformedCredentials(format!("jwt sig b64: {e}")))?;

    // Header muss alg=RS256 sagen.
    let header_str = core::str::from_utf8(&header_bytes)
        .map_err(|_| AuthError::MalformedCredentials("jwt header utf8".into()))?;
    if !json_field_eq(header_str, "alg", "RS256") {
        return Err(AuthError::Rejected("jwt: alg must be RS256".into()));
    }

    // Signature über `<h_b64>.<p_b64>` mit RSA-PKCS#1-v1.5-SHA256 prüfen.
    let signed = {
        let mut v = Vec::with_capacity(h_b64.len() + 1 + p_b64.len());
        v.extend_from_slice(h_b64.as_bytes());
        v.push(b'.');
        v.extend_from_slice(p_b64.as_bytes());
        v
    };
    let pubkey = ring::signature::UnparsedPublicKey::new(
        &ring::signature::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA256,
        pkcs1_pubkey_der,
    );
    pubkey
        .verify(&signed, &sig_bytes)
        .map_err(|_| AuthError::Rejected("jwt: signature invalid".into()))?;

    // Payload-Claims extrahieren.
    let payload_str = core::str::from_utf8(&payload_bytes)
        .map_err(|_| AuthError::MalformedCredentials("jwt payload utf8".into()))?;
    let sub = json_field(payload_str, "sub")
        .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::Rejected("jwt: no sub claim".into()))?;

    if let Some(expected) = expected_issuer {
        let iss = json_field(payload_str, "iss")
            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::Rejected("jwt: no iss claim".into()))?;
        if iss != expected {
            return Err(AuthError::Rejected(format!("jwt: iss != {expected}")));
        }
    }

    let mut subj = AuthSubject::new(sub);
    if let Some(groups_raw) = json_array(payload_str, "groups") {
        for g in groups_raw {
            subj.groups.push(g);
        }
    }
    Ok(subj)
}

/// Mini-JSON-Field-Extractor für die JWT-Header- und Payload-Maps.
/// Akzeptiert flach-strukturiertes JSON wie es JWT-Libraries emittieren.
/// Keine vollständige JSON-Parser-Implementation — Spec §7.2 sagt
/// JWT-Lib darf kompakter Subset sein.
fn json_field(src: &str, key: &str) -> Option<String> {
    let pat = format!("\"{key}\"");
    let pos = src.find(&pat)?;
    let after = &src[pos + pat.len()..];
    let colon = after.find(':')?;
    let rest = after[colon + 1..].trim_start();
    if let Some(stripped) = rest.strip_prefix('"') {
        let end = stripped.find('"')?;
        Some(stripped[..end].to_string())
    } else {
        // Numeric / bool — wir nehmen bis zum nächsten , oder }.
        let end = rest
            .find(|c: char| c == ',' || c == '}' || c.is_whitespace())
            .unwrap_or(rest.len());
        Some(rest[..end].to_string())
    }
}

fn json_field_eq(src: &str, key: &str, expected: &str) -> bool {
    json_field(src, key).is_some_and(|v| v == expected)
}

fn json_array(src: &str, key: &str) -> Option<Vec<String>> {
    let pat = format!("\"{key}\"");
    let pos = src.find(&pat)?;
    let after = &src[pos + pat.len()..];
    let colon = after.find(':')?;
    let rest = after[colon + 1..].trim_start();
    let stripped = rest.strip_prefix('[')?;
    let end = stripped.find(']')?;
    let inside = &stripped[..end];
    let mut out = Vec::new();
    for piece in inside.split(',') {
        let p = piece.trim().trim_matches('"');
        if !p.is_empty() {
            out.push(p.to_string());
        }
    }
    Some(out)
}

#[cfg(test)]
#[allow(clippy::expect_used, clippy::unwrap_used)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn none_mode_yields_anonymous() {
        let m = AuthMode::None;
        let s = m.validate(&AuthInput::default()).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(s.name, "anonymous");
    }

    #[test]
    fn bearer_valid_token_accepted() {
        let mut tokens = HashMap::new();
        tokens.insert("secret123".to_string(), AuthSubject::new("alice"));
        let m = AuthMode::Bearer { tokens };
        let s = m
            .validate(&AuthInput {
                authorization_header: Some("Bearer secret123"),
                ..Default::default()
            })
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(s.name, "alice");
    }

    #[test]
    fn bearer_invalid_token_rejected() {
        let m = AuthMode::Bearer {
            tokens: HashMap::new(),
        };
        let err = m
            .validate(&AuthInput {
                authorization_header: Some("Bearer wrong"),
                ..Default::default()
            })
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, AuthError::Rejected(_)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn bearer_missing_header_returns_missing() {
        let m = AuthMode::Bearer {
            tokens: HashMap::new(),
        };
        let err = m.validate(&AuthInput::default()).unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, AuthError::MissingCredentials));
    }

    #[test]
    fn bearer_malformed_header_returns_malformed() {
        let m = AuthMode::Bearer {
            tokens: HashMap::new(),
        };
        let err = m
            .validate(&AuthInput {
                authorization_header: Some("Basic xx"),
                ..Default::default()
            })
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, AuthError::MalformedCredentials(_)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn mtls_with_subject_accepted() {
        let m = AuthMode::Mtls;
        let s = m
            .validate(&AuthInput {
                mtls_subject: Some(AuthSubject::new("CN=alice")),
                ..Default::default()
            })
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(s.name, "CN=alice");
    }

    #[test]
    fn mtls_without_subject_rejected() {
        let m = AuthMode::Mtls;
        let err = m.validate(&AuthInput::default()).unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, AuthError::Rejected(_)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sasl_plain_valid_pair_accepted() {
        let mut users = HashMap::new();
        users.insert("alice".to_string(), "wonderland".to_string());
        let m = AuthMode::SaslPlain { users };
        let blob = b"\0alice\0wonderland";
        let s = m
            .validate(&AuthInput {
                sasl_plain_blob: Some(blob),
                ..Default::default()
            })
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(s.name, "alice");
    }

    #[test]
    fn sasl_plain_wrong_password_rejected() {
        let mut users = HashMap::new();
        users.insert("alice".to_string(), "wonderland".to_string());
        let m = AuthMode::SaslPlain { users };
        let blob = b"\0alice\0wrong";
        let err = m
            .validate(&AuthInput {
                sasl_plain_blob: Some(blob),
                ..Default::default()
            })
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, AuthError::Rejected(_)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn json_field_extracts_string() {
        let s = r#"{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}"#;
        assert_eq!(json_field(s, "alg").as_deref(), Some("RS256"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn json_array_extracts_groups() {
        let s = r#"{"sub":"a","groups":["eng","ops"]}"#;
        let g = json_array(s, "groups").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(g, vec!["eng".to_string(), "ops".to_string()]);
    }

    #[test]
    fn jwt_invalid_signature_rejected() {
        // Bogus pubkey + bogus token. Wir testen nur den Reject-Pfad —
        // ein voll-signierter Round-Trip-Test braucht eine RSA-Key-Gen
        // Lib (rcgen kann das nicht für JWT). Der Code-Pfad selbst ist
        // gegen `ring::signature::UnparsedPublicKey::verify` gefahren.
        let m = AuthMode::Jwt {
            pkcs1_pubkey_der: vec![0u8; 32],
            expected_issuer: None,
        };
        // base64url("{\"alg\":\"RS256\"}") = "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9"
        // base64url("{\"sub\":\"a\"}") = "eyJzdWIiOiJhIn0"
        let token = "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJhIn0.AAAA";
        let err = m
            .validate(&AuthInput {
                authorization_header: Some(&format!("Bearer {token}")),
                ..Default::default()
            })
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, AuthError::Rejected(_)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn jwt_wrong_alg_rejected() {
        let m = AuthMode::Jwt {
            pkcs1_pubkey_der: vec![0u8; 32],
            expected_issuer: None,
        };
        // base64url("{\"alg\":\"HS256\"}") = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9"
        let token = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJhIn0.AAAA";
        let err = m
            .validate(&AuthInput {
                authorization_header: Some(&format!("Bearer {token}")),
                ..Default::default()
            })
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, AuthError::Rejected(_)));
    }
}