codex-network-proxy

codex-network-proxy is Codex's local network policy enforcement proxy. It runs:

• an HTTP proxy (default 127.0.0.1:3128)
• a SOCKS5 proxy (default 127.0.0.1:8081, enabled by default)

It enforces an allow/deny policy and a "limited" mode intended for read-only network access.

Quickstart

1) Configure

codex-network-proxy reads from Codex's merged config.toml (via codex-core config loading).

Network settings live under the selected permissions profile. Example config:

default_permissions = "workspace"

[permissions.workspace.network]
enabled = true
proxy_url = "http://127.0.0.1:3128"
# SOCKS5 listener (enabled by default).
enable_socks5 = true
socks_url = "http://127.0.0.1:8081"
enable_socks5_udp = true
# When `enabled` is false, the proxy no-ops and does not bind listeners.
# When true, respect HTTP(S)_PROXY/ALL_PROXY for upstream requests (HTTP(S) proxies only),
# including CONNECT tunnels in full mode.
allow_upstream_proxy = true
# By default, non-loopback binds are clamped to loopback for safety.
# If you want to expose these listeners beyond localhost, you must opt in explicitly.
dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxy = false
mode = "full" # default when unset; use "limited" for read-only mode
# When true, HTTPS CONNECT can be terminated so limited-mode method policy still applies.
mitm = false
# CA cert/key are managed internally under $CODEX_HOME/proxy/ (ca.pem + ca.key).

# If false, local/private networking is rejected. Explicit allowlisting of local IP literals
# (or `localhost`) is required to permit them.
# Hostnames that resolve to local/private IPs are still blocked even if allowlisted.
allow_local_binding = false

# DANGEROUS (macOS-only): bypasses unix socket allowlisting and permits any
# absolute socket path from `x-unix-socket`.
dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets = false

# Hosts must match the allowlist (unless denied).
# Use exact hosts or scoped wildcards like `*.openai.com` or `**.openai.com`.
# The global `*` wildcard is rejected.
# If no domain entries are marked `allow`, the proxy blocks requests until an allowlist is configured.
[permissions.workspace.network.domains]
"*.openai.com" = "allow"
"localhost" = "allow"
"127.0.0.1" = "allow"
"::1" = "allow"
"evil.example" = "deny"

# macOS-only: allows proxying to a unix socket when request includes `x-unix-socket: /path`.
[permissions.workspace.network.unix_sockets]
"/tmp/example.sock" = "allow"

2) Run the proxy

cargo run -p codex-network-proxy --

3) Point a client at it

For HTTP(S) traffic:

export HTTP_PROXY="http://127.0.0.1:3128"
export HTTPS_PROXY="http://127.0.0.1:3128"
export WS_PROXY="http://127.0.0.1:3128"
export WSS_PROXY="http://127.0.0.1:3128"

For SOCKS5 traffic (when enable_socks5 = true):

export ALL_PROXY="socks5h://127.0.0.1:8081"

4) Understand blocks / debugging

When a request is blocked, the proxy responds with 403 and includes:

• x-proxy-error: one of:
  • blocked-by-allowlist
  • blocked-by-denylist
  • blocked-by-method-policy
  • blocked-by-policy

In "limited" mode, only GET, HEAD, and OPTIONS are allowed. HTTPS CONNECT requests require MITM to enforce limited-mode method policy; otherwise they are blocked. SOCKS5 remains blocked in limited mode.

Websocket clients typically tunnel wss:// through HTTPS CONNECT; those CONNECT targets still go through the same host allowlist/denylist checks.

Library API

codex-network-proxy can be embedded as a library with a thin API:

use codex_network_proxy::{NetworkProxy, NetworkDecision, NetworkPolicyRequest};

let proxy = NetworkProxy::builder()
    .http_addr("127.0.0.1:8080".parse()?)
    .policy_decider(|request: NetworkPolicyRequest| async move {
        // Example: auto-allow when exec policy already approved a command prefix.
        if let Some(command) = request.command.as_deref() {
            if command.starts_with("curl ") {
                return NetworkDecision::Allow;
            }
        }
        NetworkDecision::Deny {
            reason: "policy_denied".to_string(),
        }
    })
    .build()
    .await?;

let handle = proxy.run().await?;
handle.shutdown().await?;

When unix socket proxying is enabled (unix_sockets or dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets), proxy bind overrides are still clamped to loopback to avoid turning the proxy into a remote bridge to local daemons.

Policy hook (exec-policy mapping)

The proxy exposes a policy hook (NetworkPolicyDecider) that can override allowlist-only blocks. It receives command and exec_policy_hint fields when supplied by the embedding app. This lets core map exec approvals to network access, e.g. if a user already approved curl * for a session, the decider can auto-allow network requests originating from that command.

Important: Explicit deny rules still win. The decider only gets a chance to override not_allowed (allowlist misses), not denied or not_allowed_local.

OTEL Audit Events (embedded/managed)

When codex-network-proxy is embedded in managed Codex runtime, policy decisions emit structured OTEL-compatible events with target=codex_otel.network_proxy.

Event name:

• codex.network_proxy.policy_decision
  • emitted for each policy decision (domain and non_domain).
  • network.policy.scope = "domain" for host-policy evaluations (evaluate_host_policy).
  • network.policy.scope = "non_domain" for mode-guard/proxy-state checks (including unix-socket guard paths and unix-socket allow decisions).

Common fields:

• event.name
• event.timestamp (RFC3339 UTC, millisecond precision)
• optional metadata:
  • conversation.id
  • app.version
  • user.account_id
• policy/network:
  • network.policy.scope (domain or non_domain)
  • network.policy.decision (allow, deny, or ask)
  • network.policy.source (baseline_policy, mode_guard, proxy_state, decider)
  • network.policy.reason
  • network.transport.protocol
  • server.address
  • server.port
  • http.request.method (defaults to "none" when absent)
  • client.address (defaults to "unknown" when absent)
  • network.policy.override (true only when decider-allow overrides baseline not_allowed)

Unix-socket block-path audits use sentinel endpoint values:

• server.address = "unix-socket"
• server.port = 0

Audit events intentionally avoid logging full URL/path/query data.

Platform notes

• Unix socket proxying via the x-unix-socket header is macOS-only; other platforms will reject unix socket requests.
• HTTPS tunneling uses rustls via Rama's rama-tls-rustls; this avoids BoringSSL/OpenSSL symbol collisions in mixed TLS dependency graphs.

Security notes (important)

This section documents the protections implemented by codex-network-proxy, and the boundaries of what it can reasonably guarantee.

• Allowlist-first policy: if domains has no allow entries, requests are blocked until an allowlist is configured.

• Domain patterns: exact hosts are supported, *.example.com matches subdomains only, and **.example.com matches the apex plus subdomains; the global * wildcard is only accepted when explicitly enabled for allowlist compilation and is otherwise rejected.

• Deny wins: domains entries marked deny always override the allowlist.

• Local/private network protection: when allow_local_binding = false, the proxy blocks loopback and common private/link-local ranges. Explicit allowlisting of local IP literals (or localhost) is required to permit them; hostnames that resolve to local/private IPs are still blocked even if allowlisted (best-effort DNS lookup).

• Limited mode enforcement:

  • only GET, HEAD, and OPTIONS are allowed
  • HTTPS CONNECT remains a tunnel; limited-mode method enforcement does not apply to HTTPS

• Listener safety defaults:

  • the HTTP proxy listener clamps non-loopback binds unless explicitly enabled via dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxy

• when unix socket proxying is enabled, all proxy listeners are forced to loopback to avoid turning the proxy into a remote bridge into local daemons.

• dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets = true bypasses the unix socket allowlist entirely (still macOS-only and absolute-path-only). Use only in tightly controlled environments.

• enabled is enforced at runtime; when false the proxy no-ops and does not bind listeners. Limitations:

• DNS rebinding is hard to fully prevent without pinning the resolved IP(s) all the way down to the transport layer. If your threat model includes hostile DNS, enforce network egress at a lower layer too (e.g., firewall / VPC / corporate proxy policies).