zeph-core 0.22.2

// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Andrei G <bug-ops>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0

//! Concrete cryptographic backing for the durable execution layer.
//!
//! `zeph-durable` defines the durable execution *contract* as a pure Layer-0 abstraction and
//! deliberately carries no cryptographic dependency (INV-1). This module supplies the concrete
//! [`XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher`] that satisfies [`zeph_durable::PayloadCipher`]. The binary
//! constructs it from the vault-resolved `ZEPH_DURABLE_KEY` and injects it into a backend as
//! `Option<Arc<dyn PayloadCipher>>`, exactly as a database pool is handed in.
//!
//! `XChaCha20-Poly1305` is chosen for its 192-bit extended nonce: a fresh random nonce per seal
//! (INV-7) has a negligible collision probability even across the lifetime of a long-lived key, so
//! no nonce-sequencing state has to be persisted.
//!
//! # Examples
//!
//! ```
//! use zeph_core::durable::XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher;
//! use zeph_durable::{ExecutionId, StepId, PayloadCipher};
//! use zeph_durable::cipher::{EntryKindTag, PayloadAad};
//!
//! let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::new(0, [7u8; 32]);
//! let aad = PayloadAad::new(ExecutionId::new(), StepId::new(0), EntryKindTag::StepResult, None);
//!
//! let sealed = cipher.seal(b"tool result", &aad).unwrap();
//! assert_eq!(cipher.open(&sealed, &aad).unwrap(), b"tool result");
//! ```

use chacha20poly1305::{
    Key, KeyInit, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
    aead::{Aead, Generate, Payload},
};
use zeph_durable::{CipherError, PayloadAad, PayloadCipher};
use zeroize::Zeroize;

/// `XChaCha20-Poly1305` key size, in bytes.
const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
/// `XChaCha20` extended nonce size, in bytes.
const NONCE_LEN: usize = 24;
/// `Poly1305` authentication tag size, in bytes.
const TAG_LEN: usize = 16;
/// Length of the leading key-id selector byte.
const KEY_ID_LEN: usize = 1;
/// Offset one past the nonce, where the ciphertext begins.
const NONCE_END: usize = KEY_ID_LEN + NONCE_LEN;
/// Smallest valid sealed blob: `key_id || nonce || tag` (empty ciphertext).
const MIN_SEALED_LEN: usize = NONCE_END + TAG_LEN;

/// The key-id byte stamped on every payload sealed with the current `ZEPH_DURABLE_KEY`.
///
/// `seal` writes this as the leading byte and `open` selects the current key by it. Both the
/// agent-loop engine and the `zeph durable --reveal` CLI build the cipher with this id so a sealed
/// blob round-trips. Rotating to a fresh key bumps the id and registers the old one as the previous
/// slot ([`XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::with_previous`]).
pub const DURABLE_KEY_ID: u8 = 0;

/// Failure constructing an [`XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher`] from raw vault bytes.
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum CipherKeyError {
    /// The vault-resolved key was not exactly 32 bytes.
    #[error("durable cipher key must be {expected} bytes, got {actual}")]
    InvalidKeyLength {
        /// The required key length in bytes (32).
        expected: usize,
        /// The length of the supplied key material.
        actual: usize,
    },
    /// The vault-resolved key string was not valid base64.
    #[error("durable cipher key is not valid base64")]
    MalformedEncoding,
}

/// One key registered with the cipher, addressed by its on-disk key-id byte.
struct KeySlot {
    key_id: u8,
    cipher: XChaCha20Poly1305,
}

impl KeySlot {
    /// Build a slot, copying the key into the AEAD state and zeroizing the transient input.
    fn new(key_id: u8, mut key: [u8; KEY_LEN]) -> Self {
        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new((&key).into());
        key.zeroize();
        Self { key_id, cipher }
    }
}

/// A vault-keyed `XChaCha20-Poly1305` [`PayloadCipher`] with a one-key rotation window.
///
/// The cipher holds a *current* key used for all seals, plus an optional *previous* key that
/// [`open`](PayloadCipher::open) can still select during a rotation window. The on-disk layout
/// `key_id(1) || nonce(24) || ciphertext || tag(16)` lets `open` pick the right key by its leading
/// byte; an unrecognized key-id fails closed with [`CipherError::UnknownKeyId`].
///
/// Key rotation is otherwise drain-based: see `book` vault documentation for the operational
/// policy. See [`zeph_durable::PayloadCipher`] for the full contract.
pub struct XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher {
    current: KeySlot,
    previous: Option<KeySlot>,
}

impl XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher {
    /// Construct a cipher with a single current key identified by `key_id`.
    ///
    /// The `key` array is zeroized once copied into the AEAD state.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn new(key_id: u8, key: [u8; KEY_LEN]) -> Self {
        Self {
            current: KeySlot::new(key_id, key),
            previous: None,
        }
    }

    /// Construct a cipher from vault-resolved key bytes, validating the length.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    ///
    /// Returns [`CipherKeyError::InvalidKeyLength`] when `key` is not exactly 32 bytes.
    ///
    /// # Examples
    ///
    /// ```
    /// use zeph_core::durable::XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher;
    ///
    /// assert!(XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::from_vault_bytes(0, &[0u8; 32]).is_ok());
    /// assert!(XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::from_vault_bytes(0, b"too short").is_err());
    /// ```
    pub fn from_vault_bytes(key_id: u8, key: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, CipherKeyError> {
        let array: [u8; KEY_LEN] =
            key.try_into()
                .map_err(|_| CipherKeyError::InvalidKeyLength {
                    expected: KEY_LEN,
                    actual: key.len(),
                })?;
        Ok(Self::new(key_id, array))
    }

    /// Construct the current cipher from the base64-encoded `ZEPH_DURABLE_KEY` vault value.
    ///
    /// This is the single decode path shared by the agent-loop engine and the `zeph durable
    /// --reveal` CLI; both use [`DURABLE_KEY_ID`] so a sealed blob round-trips. The key is generated
    /// in this same encoding by [`generate_durable_key_b64`].
    ///
    /// # Errors
    ///
    /// Returns [`CipherKeyError::MalformedEncoding`] when `b64_key` is not valid base64, or
    /// [`CipherKeyError::InvalidKeyLength`] when the decoded key is not exactly 32 bytes.
    ///
    /// # Examples
    ///
    /// ```
    /// use zeph_core::durable::{XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher, generate_durable_key_b64};
    ///
    /// let key = generate_durable_key_b64();
    /// assert!(XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::from_vault_b64(&key).is_ok());
    /// assert!(XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::from_vault_b64("not base64!").is_err());
    /// ```
    pub fn from_vault_b64(b64_key: &str) -> Result<Self, CipherKeyError> {
        Self::from_vault_b64_with_id(DURABLE_KEY_ID, b64_key)
    }

    /// Construct the current cipher from a base64-encoded vault value with an explicit `key_id`.
    ///
    /// Like [`from_vault_b64`](Self::from_vault_b64) but for an operator-controlled `key_id`
    /// (`[durable].key_id`, `zeph durable rotate-key`, #6447) rather than the hardcoded
    /// [`DURABLE_KEY_ID`] default — the current cipher's decode path used by
    /// `load_durable_cipher` once a rotation has bumped the config's `key_id`.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    ///
    /// Returns [`CipherKeyError::MalformedEncoding`] when `b64_key` is not valid base64, or
    /// [`CipherKeyError::InvalidKeyLength`] when the decoded key is not exactly 32 bytes.
    ///
    /// # Examples
    ///
    /// ```
    /// use zeph_core::durable::{XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher, generate_durable_key_b64};
    ///
    /// let key = generate_durable_key_b64();
    /// assert!(XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::from_vault_b64_with_id(1, &key).is_ok());
    /// ```
    pub fn from_vault_b64_with_id(key_id: u8, b64_key: &str) -> Result<Self, CipherKeyError> {
        let bytes = decode_vault_key_bytes(b64_key)?;
        Ok(Self::new(key_id, bytes))
    }

    /// Register a previous key for the rotation window.
    ///
    /// `open` will select this key for blobs whose leading key-id byte matches `key_id`; `seal`
    /// always uses the current key. Use this so in-flight executions sealed under the old key can
    /// still be replayed after a rotation.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn with_previous(mut self, key_id: u8, key: [u8; KEY_LEN]) -> Self {
        self.previous = Some(KeySlot::new(key_id, key));
        self
    }

    /// Select the AEAD state for a given on-disk key-id.
    fn select(&self, key_id: u8) -> Option<&XChaCha20Poly1305> {
        if key_id == self.current.key_id {
            Some(&self.current.cipher)
        } else {
            self.previous
                .as_ref()
                .filter(|slot| slot.key_id == key_id)
                .map(|slot| &slot.cipher)
        }
    }
}

/// Domain-separation context for deriving the control-entry HMAC key (INV-8) from
/// `ZEPH_DURABLE_KEY` via BLAKE3 `derive_key`.
const CONTROL_HMAC_CONTEXT: &str = "zeph-durable v1 control-entry HMAC key 2026";

/// Derive the row-level control-entry HMAC key (INV-8) from the base64-encoded `ZEPH_DURABLE_KEY`
/// vault value.
///
/// The HMAC key is not a separate vault secret: it is a BLAKE3 `derive_key` subkey of the same
/// `ZEPH_DURABLE_KEY` used for the AEAD payload cipher, domain-separated by a fixed context string
/// so the two keys are cryptographically independent even though they share one root secret —
/// the same pattern used for the promise resolver-token hash in `zeph-durable`'s `promise.rs`.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns [`CipherKeyError::MalformedEncoding`] when `b64_key` is not valid base64, or
/// [`CipherKeyError::InvalidKeyLength`] when the decoded key is not exactly 32 bytes.
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// use zeph_core::durable::{derive_control_hmac_key_b64, generate_durable_key_b64};
///
/// let key = generate_durable_key_b64();
/// assert!(derive_control_hmac_key_b64(&key).is_ok());
/// assert!(derive_control_hmac_key_b64("not base64!").is_err());
/// ```
pub fn derive_control_hmac_key_b64(b64_key: &str) -> Result<[u8; KEY_LEN], CipherKeyError> {
    use base64::Engine as _;
    let bytes = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
        .decode(b64_key.trim())
        .map_err(|_| CipherKeyError::MalformedEncoding)?;
    if bytes.len() != KEY_LEN {
        return Err(CipherKeyError::InvalidKeyLength {
            expected: KEY_LEN,
            actual: bytes.len(),
        });
    }
    Ok(blake3::derive_key(CONTROL_HMAC_CONTEXT, &bytes))
}

/// Domain-separation context for deriving the high-water-mark HMAC key (issue #6360) from
/// `ZEPH_DURABLE_KEY` via BLAKE3 `derive_key`.
const HWM_CONTEXT: &str = "zeph-durable v1 execution high-water-mark HMAC key 2026";

/// Derive the high-water-mark key (issue #6360) from the base64-encoded `ZEPH_DURABLE_KEY` vault
/// value.
///
/// Not a separate vault secret: it is a BLAKE3 `derive_key` subkey of the same `ZEPH_DURABLE_KEY`
/// used for the AEAD payload cipher and the control-entry HMAC, domain-separated by a fixed
/// context string distinct from the control-entry HMAC's own context so all three keys are
/// cryptographically independent despite sharing one root secret — the same pattern
/// [`derive_control_hmac_key_b64`] already establishes.
///
/// Unlike [`derive_control_hmac_key_b64`] (attached only on a declared/detected shared database),
/// the high-water-mark key is meant to be attached unconditionally (FR-009): it is the only
/// mechanism that detects deletion of a committed `StepResult` row, a threat the AEAD payload seal
/// and the row HMAC do not cover on any deployment, single-user local included.
///
/// This function derives only the key bytes; the non-secret rotation epoch stamped alongside them
/// (FR-008) is `config.durable.key_id` (current) / `previous_key_id` (previous) — the same
/// `rotate-key`-driven lifecycle the AEAD cipher's `key_id` uses — resolved by the caller
/// (`load_write_hwm_key` in `src/commands/durable.rs`), not by this module.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns [`CipherKeyError::MalformedEncoding`] when `b64_key` is not valid base64, or
/// [`CipherKeyError::InvalidKeyLength`] when the decoded key is not exactly 32 bytes.
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// use zeph_core::durable::{derive_hwm_key_b64, generate_durable_key_b64};
///
/// let key = generate_durable_key_b64();
/// assert!(derive_hwm_key_b64(&key).is_ok());
/// assert!(derive_hwm_key_b64("not base64!").is_err());
/// ```
pub fn derive_hwm_key_b64(b64_key: &str) -> Result<[u8; KEY_LEN], CipherKeyError> {
    use base64::Engine as _;
    let bytes = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
        .decode(b64_key.trim())
        .map_err(|_| CipherKeyError::MalformedEncoding)?;
    if bytes.len() != KEY_LEN {
        return Err(CipherKeyError::InvalidKeyLength {
            expected: KEY_LEN,
            actual: bytes.len(),
        });
    }
    Ok(blake3::derive_key(HWM_CONTEXT, &bytes))
}

/// Generate a fresh random 32-byte durable payload key, base64-encoded for vault storage.
///
/// Stored under `ZEPH_DURABLE_KEY` (never inline in TOML); decode it back with
/// [`XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::from_vault_b64`]. Drawn from the OS CSPRNG.
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// use zeph_core::durable::{generate_durable_key_b64, XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher};
///
/// let key = generate_durable_key_b64();
/// assert!(XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::from_vault_b64(&key).is_ok());
/// ```
#[must_use]
pub fn generate_durable_key_b64() -> String {
    use base64::Engine as _;
    let key = Key::generate();
    base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(key.as_slice())
}

/// Decode a base64-encoded 32-byte vault key value into raw key bytes.
///
/// Shared by [`XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::from_vault_b64_with_id`] and callers that need to
/// register a previous key for [`XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::with_previous`] directly — e.g. `zeph
/// durable rotate-key`'s `load_durable_cipher` chokepoint decoding `ZEPH_DURABLE_KEY_PREVIOUS`
/// (#6447) — so the base64 decode path is not duplicated outside this module.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns [`CipherKeyError::MalformedEncoding`] when `b64_key` is not valid base64, or
/// [`CipherKeyError::InvalidKeyLength`] when the decoded key is not exactly 32 bytes.
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// use zeph_core::durable::{decode_vault_key_bytes, generate_durable_key_b64};
///
/// let key = generate_durable_key_b64();
/// assert_eq!(decode_vault_key_bytes(&key).unwrap().len(), 32);
/// assert!(decode_vault_key_bytes("not base64!").is_err());
/// ```
pub fn decode_vault_key_bytes(b64_key: &str) -> Result<[u8; KEY_LEN], CipherKeyError> {
    use base64::Engine as _;
    let bytes = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
        .decode(b64_key.trim())
        .map_err(|_| CipherKeyError::MalformedEncoding)?;
    bytes
        .as_slice()
        .try_into()
        .map_err(|_| CipherKeyError::InvalidKeyLength {
            expected: KEY_LEN,
            actual: bytes.len(),
        })
}

impl PayloadCipher for XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher {
    fn seal(&self, plaintext: &[u8], aad: &PayloadAad) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CipherError> {
        let aad_bytes = aad.canonical_bytes();
        let nonce = XNonce::generate();
        let ciphertext = self
            .current
            .cipher
            .encrypt(
                &nonce,
                Payload {
                    msg: plaintext,
                    aad: &aad_bytes,
                },
            )
            .map_err(|_| CipherError::Authentication)?;

        let mut blob = Vec::with_capacity(KEY_ID_LEN + NONCE_LEN + ciphertext.len());
        blob.push(self.current.key_id);
        blob.extend_from_slice(nonce.as_slice());
        blob.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext);
        Ok(blob)
    }

    fn open(&self, sealed: &[u8], aad: &PayloadAad) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CipherError> {
        if sealed.len() < MIN_SEALED_LEN {
            return Err(CipherError::Malformed {
                context: "sealed blob shorter than key-id + nonce + tag",
            });
        }
        let key_id = sealed[0];
        let cipher = self
            .select(key_id)
            .ok_or(CipherError::UnknownKeyId { key_id })?;

        let nonce = XNonce::try_from(&sealed[KEY_ID_LEN..NONCE_END]).map_err(|_| {
            CipherError::Malformed {
                context: "nonce slice is not exactly NONCE_LEN bytes",
            }
        })?;
        let ciphertext = &sealed[NONCE_END..];
        let aad_bytes = aad.canonical_bytes();

        cipher
            .decrypt(
                &nonce,
                Payload {
                    msg: ciphertext,
                    aad: &aad_bytes,
                },
            )
            .map_err(|_| CipherError::Authentication)
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use std::assert_matches;
    use std::collections::HashSet;

    use zeph_durable::cipher::EntryKindTag;
    use zeph_durable::{DurableError, ExecutionId, StepId};

    use super::*;

    fn aad_for(exec: ExecutionId, step: u32) -> PayloadAad {
        PayloadAad::new(exec, StepId::new(step), EntryKindTag::StepResult, None)
    }

    #[test]
    fn seal_open_round_trip() {
        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::new(0, [1u8; 32]);
        let aad = aad_for(ExecutionId::new(), 0);
        for plaintext in [
            b"".as_slice(),
            b"x",
            b"a longer journaled tool result payload",
        ] {
            let sealed = cipher.seal(plaintext, &aad).unwrap();
            assert_eq!(cipher.open(&sealed, &aad).unwrap(), plaintext);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn sealed_blob_uses_key_id_nonce_tag_layout() {
        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::new(3, [2u8; 32]);
        let aad = aad_for(ExecutionId::new(), 0);
        let sealed = cipher.seal(b"", &aad).unwrap();
        // key-id byte, then 24-byte nonce, then a 16-byte tag for empty plaintext.
        assert_eq!(sealed.len(), KEY_ID_LEN + NONCE_LEN + TAG_LEN);
        assert_eq!(sealed[0], 3, "leading byte is the current key-id");
    }

    #[test]
    fn nonce_is_fresh_per_seal() {
        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::new(0, [9u8; 32]);
        let aad = aad_for(ExecutionId::new(), 0);
        let a = cipher.seal(b"same", &aad).unwrap();
        let b = cipher.seal(b"same", &aad).unwrap();
        // Identical plaintext + identical AAD must still yield distinct nonces (and ciphertext).
        assert_ne!(a[KEY_ID_LEN..NONCE_END], b[KEY_ID_LEN..NONCE_END]);
        assert_ne!(a, b);
    }

    // NFR-DE-06: a CSPRNG nonce of 192 bits must not repeat across 10^6 seals.
    #[test]
    #[ignore = "slow: 1M seal iterations — run explicitly or in integration suite"]
    fn one_million_seals_produce_distinct_nonces() {
        const SEALS: usize = 1_000_000;
        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::new(0, [4u8; 32]);
        let aad = aad_for(ExecutionId::new(), 0);
        let mut nonces: HashSet<[u8; NONCE_LEN]> = HashSet::with_capacity(SEALS);
        for _ in 0..SEALS {
            let sealed = cipher.seal(b"", &aad).unwrap();
            let mut nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
            nonce.copy_from_slice(&sealed[KEY_ID_LEN..NONCE_END]);
            assert!(nonces.insert(nonce), "nonce reuse detected");
        }
        assert_eq!(nonces.len(), SEALS);
    }

    #[test]
    fn open_under_different_step_fails_replay_integrity() {
        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::new(0, [5u8; 32]);
        let exec = ExecutionId::new();
        let sealed = cipher.seal(b"result", &aad_for(exec, 7)).unwrap();

        let err = cipher.open(&sealed, &aad_for(exec, 8)).unwrap_err();
        assert_matches!(err, CipherError::Authentication);
        assert_matches!(DurableError::from(err), DurableError::ReplayIntegrity);
    }

    #[test]
    fn open_under_different_execution_fails_replay_integrity() {
        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::new(0, [6u8; 32]);
        let sealed = cipher
            .seal(b"result", &aad_for(ExecutionId::new(), 0))
            .unwrap();

        let err = cipher
            .open(&sealed, &aad_for(ExecutionId::new(), 0))
            .unwrap_err();
        assert_matches!(DurableError::from(err), DurableError::ReplayIntegrity);
    }

    #[test]
    fn tampered_ciphertext_fails_authentication() {
        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::new(0, [7u8; 32]);
        let aad = aad_for(ExecutionId::new(), 0);
        let mut sealed = cipher.seal(b"result", &aad).unwrap();
        let last = sealed.len() - 1;
        sealed[last] ^= 0xFF;
        assert_matches!(
            cipher.open(&sealed, &aad).unwrap_err(),
            CipherError::Authentication
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn short_blob_is_malformed() {
        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::new(0, [0u8; 32]);
        let aad = aad_for(ExecutionId::new(), 0);
        let err = cipher.open(&[0u8; MIN_SEALED_LEN - 1], &aad).unwrap_err();
        assert_matches!(err, CipherError::Malformed { .. });
        assert_matches!(DurableError::from(err), DurableError::Decode { .. });
    }

    #[test]
    fn unknown_key_id_fails_closed() {
        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::new(0, [1u8; 32]);
        let aad = aad_for(ExecutionId::new(), 0);
        let mut sealed = cipher.seal(b"x", &aad).unwrap();
        sealed[0] = 200; // no key registered under id 200
        assert_matches!(
            cipher.open(&sealed, &aad).unwrap_err(),
            CipherError::UnknownKeyId { key_id: 200 }
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn previous_key_opens_during_rotation_window() {
        // Seal under the old key (id 0), then rotate: current is id 1, previous is id 0.
        let old = XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::new(0, [1u8; 32]);
        let aad = aad_for(ExecutionId::new(), 0);
        let sealed = old.seal(b"in-flight", &aad).unwrap();

        let rotated = XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::new(1, [2u8; 32]).with_previous(0, [1u8; 32]);
        // The old blob still opens via the previous key...
        assert_eq!(rotated.open(&sealed, &aad).unwrap(), b"in-flight");
        // ...while new seals use the current key-id.
        assert_eq!(rotated.seal(b"new", &aad).unwrap()[0], 1);
    }

    #[test]
    fn from_vault_bytes_validates_length() {
        assert!(XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::from_vault_bytes(0, &[0u8; 32]).is_ok());
        // The cipher deliberately does not implement `Debug` (it holds key material), so match on
        // the `Result` directly rather than calling `unwrap_err`.
        assert!(matches!(
            XChaCha20Poly1305Cipher::from_vault_bytes(0, b"short"),
            Err(CipherKeyError::InvalidKeyLength {
                expected: 32,
                actual: 5
            })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn control_hmac_key_derives_deterministically_and_independently_of_the_aead_key() {
        use base64::Engine as _;

        let vault_key = generate_durable_key_b64();
        let hmac_key = derive_control_hmac_key_b64(&vault_key).unwrap();

        // Deterministic: the same vault value always derives the same subkey.
        assert_eq!(derive_control_hmac_key_b64(&vault_key).unwrap(), hmac_key);

        // Cryptographically independent of the raw AEAD key material (domain separation via a
        // fixed `derive_key` context distinct from the AEAD cipher's own use of the raw bytes).
        let raw_aead_key = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
            .decode(vault_key.trim())
            .unwrap();
        assert_ne!(hmac_key.as_slice(), raw_aead_key.as_slice());
    }

    #[test]
    fn control_hmac_key_rejects_malformed_or_mislength_input() {
        use base64::Engine as _;

        assert!(matches!(
            derive_control_hmac_key_b64("not base64!"),
            Err(CipherKeyError::MalformedEncoding)
        ));
        let short = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(b"too short");
        assert!(matches!(
            derive_control_hmac_key_b64(&short),
            Err(CipherKeyError::InvalidKeyLength {
                expected: 32,
                actual: 9
            })
        ));
    }
}