zakura-client-backend 0.1.0-rc2

//! # Functions for creating Zcash transactions that spend funds belonging to the wallet
//!
//!
//! This module contains several different ways of creating Zcash transactions. This module is
//! designed around the idea that a Zcash wallet holds its funds in notes in either the Orchard
//! or Sapling shielded pool. In order to better preserve users' privacy, it does not provide any
//! functionality that allows users to directly spend transparent funds except by sending them to a
//! shielded internal address belonging to their wallet.
//!
//! The important high-level operations provided by this module are [`propose_transfer`],
//! and [`create_proposed_transactions`].
//!
//! [`propose_transfer`] takes a [`TransactionRequest`] object, selects inputs notes and
//! computes the fees required to satisfy that request, and returns a [`Proposal`] object that
//! describes the transaction to be made.
//!
//! [`create_proposed_transactions`] constructs one or more Zcash [`Transaction`]s based upon a
//! provided [`Proposal`], stores them to the wallet database, and returns the [`TxId`] for each
//! constructed transaction to the caller. The caller can then use the
//! [`WalletRead::get_transaction`] method to retrieve the newly constructed transactions. It is
//! the responsibility of the caller to retrieve and serialize the transactions and submit them for
//! inclusion into the Zcash blockchain.
//!
#![cfg_attr(
    feature = "transparent-inputs",
    doc = "
Another important high-level operation provided by this module is [`propose_shielding`], which
takes a set of transparent source addresses, and constructs a [`Proposal`] to send those funds
to a wallet-internal shielded address, as described in [ZIP 316](https://zips.z.cash/zip-0316).

[`propose_shielding`]: crate::data_api::wallet::propose_shielding
"
)]
//! [`TransactionRequest`]: crate::zip321::TransactionRequest
//! [`propose_transfer`]: crate::data_api::wallet::propose_transfer

use nonempty::NonEmpty;
use rand::{rand_core::UnwrapErr, rngs::SysRng};
use std::{
    num::NonZeroU32,
    ops::{Add, Sub},
};

use shardtree::error::{QueryError, ShardTreeError};

pub use super::locking::{LockRequest, unlock_proposal_inputs};
use super::{InputSource, locking::lock_proposal_inputs};
use crate::{
    data_api::{
        Account, MaxSpendMode, NoteCommitmentTree, SentTransaction, SentTransactionOutput,
        WalletCommitmentTrees, WalletRead, WalletWrite, error::Error,
        wallet::input_selection::propose_send_max,
    },
    decrypt_transaction,
    fees::{
        ChangeStrategy, DustOutputPolicy, StandardFeeRule, standard::SingleOutputChangeStrategy,
    },
    proposal::{Proposal, ProposalError, Step, StepOutputIndex},
    wallet::{Note, OvkPolicy, Recipient},
};
use sapling::{
    note_encryption::{PreparedIncomingViewingKey, try_sapling_note_decryption},
    prover::{OutputProver, SpendProver},
};
use transparent::{address::TransparentAddress, builder::TransparentSigningSet, bundle::OutPoint};
use zcash_address::ZcashAddress;
use zcash_keys::{
    address::Address,
    keys::{UnifiedFullViewingKey, UnifiedSpendingKey},
};
use zcash_primitives::transaction::{
    Transaction, TxId, TxVersion,
    builder::{BuildConfig, BuildResult, Builder, BundlePadding},
    components::sapling::zip212_enforcement,
    fees::FeeRule,
};
use zcash_protocol::{
    PoolType, ShieldedPool,
    consensus::{self, BlockHeight},
    memo::MemoBytes,
    value::Zatoshis,
    zip318::AnchorBucketInterval,
};
use zip32::Scope;
use zip321::Payment;
#[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
use {
    crate::data_api::anchor_retention::PoolMigrationParams,
    zcash_protocol::{consensus::NetworkUpgrade, zip318::PoolMigrationConstants},
};

#[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
use {
    super::CoinbaseFilter,
    crate::{
        fees::ChangeValue,
        proposal::StepOutput,
        wallet::{TransparentAddressMetadata, TransparentAddressSource},
    },
    core::convert::Infallible,
    input_selection::ShieldingSelector,
    std::collections::HashMap,
    transparent::bundle::TxOut,
};

#[cfg(feature = "transparent-key-import")]
use zcash_script::script::{self as zs_script, Evaluable};

#[cfg(feature = "pczt")]
use {
    crate::data_api::error::PcztError,
    bip32::ChildNumber,
    orchard::note_encryption::{IronwoodDomain, OrchardDomain},
    pczt::roles::{
        creator::Creator, io_finalizer::IoFinalizer, redactor::Redactor,
        spend_finalizer::SpendFinalizer, tx_extractor::TransactionExtractor, updater::Updater,
    },
    sapling::note_encryption::SaplingDomain,
    serde::{Deserialize, Serialize},
    std::collections::BTreeMap,
    transparent::pczt::Bip32Derivation,
    zcash_note_encryption::{
        Domain, ENC_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE, ShieldedOutput, try_output_recovery_with_pkd_esk,
    },
    zcash_protocol::{consensus::NetworkConstants, value::BalanceError},
};

pub mod input_selection;
use input_selection::{
    GreedyInputSelector, GreedyInputSelectorError, InputSelector, InputSelectorError,
};

#[cfg(feature = "pczt")]
const PROPRIETARY_PROPOSAL_INFO: &str = "zcash_client_backend:proposal_info";
#[cfg(feature = "pczt")]
const PROPRIETARY_OUTPUT_INFO: &str = "zcash_client_backend:output_info";

#[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
fn ironwood_active_at<ParamsT: consensus::Parameters, H: Into<BlockHeight>>(
    params: &ParamsT,
    target_height: H,
) -> bool {
    params.is_nu_active(NetworkUpgrade::Nu6_3, target_height.into())
}

#[cfg(feature = "pczt")]
fn serialize_target_height<S>(
    target_height: &TargetHeight,
    serializer: S,
) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
where
    S: serde::Serializer,
{
    let u: u32 = BlockHeight::from(*target_height).into();
    u.serialize(serializer)
}

#[cfg(feature = "pczt")]
fn deserialize_target_height<'de, D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<TargetHeight, D::Error>
where
    D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
    let u = u32::deserialize(deserializer)?;
    Ok(BlockHeight::from_u32(u).into())
}

/// Information about the proposal from which a PCZT was created.
///
/// Stored under the proprietary field `PROPRIETARY_PROPOSAL_INFO`.
#[cfg(feature = "pczt")]
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct ProposalInfo<AccountId> {
    from_account: AccountId,
    #[serde(
        serialize_with = "serialize_target_height",
        deserialize_with = "deserialize_target_height"
    )]
    target_height: TargetHeight,
}

/// Reduced version of [`Recipient`] stored inside a PCZT.
///
/// Stored under the proprietary field `PROPRIETARY_OUTPUT_INFO`.
#[cfg(feature = "pczt")]
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
enum PcztRecipient<AccountId> {
    External,
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    EphemeralTransparent {
        receiving_account: AccountId,
    },
    InternalShielded {
        receiving_account: AccountId,
    },
    // This variant is placed at the end of the enum in order to preserve the encoded
    // representation of the prior variants.
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    InternalTransparent {
        receiving_account: AccountId,
    },
}

#[cfg(feature = "pczt")]
impl<AccountId: Copy> PcztRecipient<AccountId> {
    fn from_shielded_recipient(
        recipient: ShieldedBuildRecipient<AccountId>,
    ) -> (Self, Option<ZcashAddress>) {
        match recipient {
            ShieldedBuildRecipient::External {
                recipient_address, ..
            } => (PcztRecipient::External, Some(recipient_address)),
            ShieldedBuildRecipient::InternalShielded {
                receiving_account,
                external_address,
            } => (
                PcztRecipient::InternalShielded { receiving_account },
                external_address,
            ),
        }
    }

    fn from_transparent_recipient(
        recipient: TransparentBuildRecipient<AccountId>,
    ) -> (Self, Option<ZcashAddress>) {
        match recipient {
            TransparentBuildRecipient::External {
                recipient_address, ..
            } => (PcztRecipient::External, Some(recipient_address)),
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
            TransparentBuildRecipient::EphemeralTransparent {
                receiving_account, ..
            } => (
                PcztRecipient::EphemeralTransparent { receiving_account },
                None,
            ),
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
            TransparentBuildRecipient::InternalTransparent {
                receiving_account, ..
            } => (
                PcztRecipient::InternalTransparent { receiving_account },
                None,
            ),
        }
    }
}

/// Scans a [`Transaction`] for any information that can be decrypted by the accounts in
/// the wallet, and saves it to the wallet.
pub fn decrypt_and_store_transaction<ParamsT, DbT>(
    params: &ParamsT,
    data: &mut DbT,
    tx: &Transaction,
    mined_height: Option<BlockHeight>,
) -> Result<(), <DbT as WalletRead>::Error>
where
    ParamsT: consensus::Parameters,
    DbT: WalletWrite,
{
    // Fetch the UnifiedFullViewingKeys we are tracking
    let ufvks = data.get_unified_full_viewing_keys()?;

    data.store_decrypted_tx(decrypt_transaction(
        params,
        mined_height.map_or_else(|| data.get_tx_height(tx.txid()), |h| Ok(Some(h)))?,
        data.chain_height()?,
        tx,
        &ufvks,
    ))?;

    Ok(())
}

/// Errors that may be generated in construction of proposals for shielded->shielded or
/// shielded->transparent transfers.
pub type ProposeTransferErrT<DbT, CommitmentTreeErrT, InputsT, ChangeT> = Error<
    <DbT as WalletRead>::Error,
    CommitmentTreeErrT,
    <InputsT as InputSelector>::Error,
    <<ChangeT as ChangeStrategy>::FeeRule as FeeRule>::Error,
    <ChangeT as ChangeStrategy>::Error,
    <<InputsT as InputSelector>::InputSource as InputSource>::NoteRef,
>;

/// Errors that may be generated in construction of proposals for shielded->shielded or
/// shielded->transparent transactions that transfer the maximum value available within an account
/// and do not produce change outputs.
pub type ProposeSendMaxErrT<DbT, CommitmentTreeErrT, FeeRuleT> = Error<
    <DbT as WalletRead>::Error,
    CommitmentTreeErrT,
    GreedyInputSelectorError,
    <FeeRuleT as FeeRule>::Error,
    <FeeRuleT as FeeRule>::Error,
    <DbT as InputSource>::NoteRef,
>;

/// Errors that may be generated in construction of proposals for transparent->shielded
/// wallet-internal transfers.
#[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
pub type ProposeShieldingErrT<DbT, CommitmentTreeErrT, InputsT, ChangeT> = Error<
    <DbT as WalletRead>::Error,
    CommitmentTreeErrT,
    <InputsT as ShieldingSelector>::Error,
    <<ChangeT as ChangeStrategy>::FeeRule as FeeRule>::Error,
    <ChangeT as ChangeStrategy>::Error,
    Infallible,
>;

/// Errors that may be generated in combined creation and execution of transaction proposals.
pub type CreateErrT<DbT, InputsErrT, FeeRuleT, ChangeErrT, N> = Error<
    <DbT as WalletRead>::Error,
    <DbT as WalletCommitmentTrees>::Error,
    InputsErrT,
    <FeeRuleT as FeeRule>::Error,
    ChangeErrT,
    N,
>;

/// Errors that may be generated in the execution of proposals that may send shielded inputs.
pub type TransferErrT<DbT, InputsT, ChangeT> = Error<
    <DbT as WalletRead>::Error,
    <DbT as WalletCommitmentTrees>::Error,
    <InputsT as InputSelector>::Error,
    <<ChangeT as ChangeStrategy>::FeeRule as FeeRule>::Error,
    <ChangeT as ChangeStrategy>::Error,
    <<InputsT as InputSelector>::InputSource as InputSource>::NoteRef,
>;

/// Errors that may be generated in the execution of shielding proposals.
#[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
pub type ShieldErrT<DbT, InputsT, ChangeT> = Error<
    <DbT as WalletRead>::Error,
    <DbT as WalletCommitmentTrees>::Error,
    <InputsT as ShieldingSelector>::Error,
    <<ChangeT as ChangeStrategy>::FeeRule as FeeRule>::Error,
    <ChangeT as ChangeStrategy>::Error,
    Infallible,
>;

/// Errors that may be generated when extracting a transaction from a PCZT.
#[cfg(feature = "pczt")]
pub type ExtractErrT<DbT, N> = Error<
    <DbT as WalletRead>::Error,
    <DbT as WalletCommitmentTrees>::Error,
    Infallible,
    Infallible,
    Infallible,
    N,
>;

/// A wrapper type around [`BlockHeight`] that represents the _next_ chain tip.
///
/// Addition and subtraction are provided by proxying to [`BlockHeight`].
#[repr(transparent)]
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)]
pub struct TargetHeight(BlockHeight);

impl TargetHeight {
    /// Subtracts the provided value from this height, returning [`zcash_protocol::consensus::H0`]
    /// if this would result in underflow of the wrapped `u32`.
    pub fn saturating_sub(self, value: u32) -> BlockHeight {
        self.0.saturating_sub(value)
    }
}

impl From<BlockHeight> for TargetHeight {
    fn from(value: BlockHeight) -> Self {
        TargetHeight(value)
    }
}

impl From<TargetHeight> for BlockHeight {
    fn from(value: TargetHeight) -> Self {
        value.0
    }
}

impl From<TargetHeight> for u32 {
    fn from(value: TargetHeight) -> Self {
        u32::from(value.0)
    }
}

impl From<u32> for TargetHeight {
    fn from(value: u32) -> Self {
        TargetHeight(BlockHeight::from_u32(value))
    }
}

impl<I> Add<I> for TargetHeight
where
    BlockHeight: Add<I>,
{
    type Output = <BlockHeight as Add<I>>::Output;

    fn add(self, rhs: I) -> Self::Output {
        self.0 + rhs
    }
}

impl<I> Sub<I> for TargetHeight
where
    BlockHeight: Sub<I>,
{
    type Output = <BlockHeight as Sub<I>>::Output;

    fn sub(self, rhs: I) -> Self::Output {
        self.0 - rhs
    }
}

/// A description of the policy that is used to determine what notes are available for spending,
/// based upon the number of confirmations (the number of blocks in the chain since and including
/// the block in which a note was produced.)
///
/// See [`ZIP 315`] for details including the definitions of "trusted" and "untrusted" notes.
///
/// An error indicating that a [`ConfirmationsPolicy`] could not be constructed because the
/// trusted confirmation count exceeds the untrusted confirmation count.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ConfirmationsPolicyError;

impl core::fmt::Display for ConfirmationsPolicyError {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
        write!(
            f,
            "Trusted confirmations must not exceed untrusted confirmations"
        )
    }
}

/// [`ZIP 315`]: https://zips.z.cash/zip-0315
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ConfirmationsPolicy {
    trusted: NonZeroU32,
    untrusted: NonZeroU32,
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    allow_zero_conf_shielding: bool,
}

/// The default confirmations policy according to [`ZIP 315`].
///
/// * Require 3 confirmations for "trusted" transaction outputs (outputs produced by the wallet)
/// * Require 10 confirmations for "untrusted" outputs (those sent to the wallet by external/third
///   parties)
/// * Allow zero-conf shielding of transparent UTXOs irrespective of their origin, but treat the
///   resulting shielding transaction's outputs as though the original transparent UTXOs had
///   instead been received as untrusted shielded outputs.
///
/// [`ZIP 315`]: https://zips.z.cash/zip-0315
impl Default for ConfirmationsPolicy {
    fn default() -> Self {
        ConfirmationsPolicy {
            // 3
            trusted: NonZeroU32::MIN.saturating_add(2),
            // 10
            untrusted: NonZeroU32::MIN.saturating_add(9),
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
            allow_zero_conf_shielding: true,
        }
    }
}

impl ConfirmationsPolicy {
    /// A policy to use the minimum number of confirmations possible: 1 confirmation for shielded
    /// notes irrespective of origin, and 0 confirmations for spends of transparent UTXOs in
    /// wallet-internal shielding transactions.
    pub const MIN: Self = ConfirmationsPolicy {
        trusted: NonZeroU32::MIN,
        untrusted: NonZeroU32::MIN,
        #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
        allow_zero_conf_shielding: true,
    };

    /// Constructs a new `ConfirmationsPolicy` with `trusted` and `untrusted` fields set to the
    /// provided values.
    ///
    /// The number of confirmations required for trusted notes must be less than or equal to the
    /// number of confirmations required for untrusted notes; this returns an error if this
    /// invariant is violated.
    ///
    /// WARNING: This should only be used with great care to avoid problems of transaction
    /// distinguishability; prefer [`ConfirmationsPolicy::default()`] instead.
    pub fn new(
        trusted: NonZeroU32,
        untrusted: NonZeroU32,
        #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")] allow_zero_conf_shielding: bool,
    ) -> Result<Self, ConfirmationsPolicyError> {
        if trusted > untrusted {
            Err(ConfirmationsPolicyError)
        } else {
            Ok(Self {
                trusted,
                untrusted,
                #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
                allow_zero_conf_shielding,
            })
        }
    }

    /// Constructs a new `ConfirmationsPolicy` with `trusted` and `untrusted` fields both
    /// set to `min_confirmations`.
    ///
    /// WARNING: This should only be used with great care to avoid problems of transaction
    /// distinguishability; prefer [`ConfirmationsPolicy::default()`] instead.
    pub fn new_symmetrical(
        min_confirmations: NonZeroU32,
        #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")] allow_zero_conf_shielding: bool,
    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            trusted: min_confirmations,
            untrusted: min_confirmations,
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
            allow_zero_conf_shielding,
        }
    }

    /// Constructs a new `ConfirmationsPolicy` with `trusted` and `untrusted` fields set to the
    /// provided values, which must both be nonzero. The number of trusted confirmations required
    /// must be less than or equal to the number of untrusted confirmations required.
    ///
    /// # Panics
    /// Panics if `trusted > untrusted` or either argument value is zero.
    #[cfg(any(test, feature = "test-dependencies"))]
    pub fn new_unchecked(
        trusted: u32,
        untrusted: u32,
        #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")] allow_zero_conf_shielding: bool,
    ) -> Self {
        Self::new(
            NonZeroU32::new(trusted).expect("trusted must be nonzero"),
            NonZeroU32::new(untrusted).expect("untrusted must be nonzero"),
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
            allow_zero_conf_shielding,
        )
        .expect("trusted must be <= untrusted")
    }

    /// Constructs a new `ConfirmationsPolicy` with `trusted` and `untrusted` fields both
    /// set to `min_confirmations`.
    ///
    /// # Panics
    /// Panics if `min_confirmations == 0`
    #[cfg(any(test, feature = "test-dependencies"))]
    pub fn new_symmetrical_unchecked(
        min_confirmations: u32,
        #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")] allow_zero_conf_shielding: bool,
    ) -> Self {
        Self::new_symmetrical(
            NonZeroU32::new(min_confirmations).expect("min_confirmations must be nonzero"),
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
            allow_zero_conf_shielding,
        )
    }

    /// Returns the number of confirmations required before trusted notes may be spent.
    ///
    /// See [`ZIP 315`] for details.
    ///
    /// [`ZIP 315`]: https://zips.z.cash/zip-0315#trusted-and-untrusted-txos
    pub fn trusted(&self) -> NonZeroU32 {
        self.trusted
    }

    /// Returns the number of confirmations required before untrusted notes may be spent.
    ///
    /// See [`ZIP 315`] for details.
    ///
    /// [`ZIP 315`]: https://zips.z.cash/zip-0315#trusted-and-untrusted-txos
    pub fn untrusted(&self) -> NonZeroU32 {
        self.untrusted
    }

    /// Returns the shielded anchor height to use for a transaction targeting `target_height` under
    /// this policy: `target_height` less the number of required trusted confirmations.
    ///
    /// This is the anchor used to interpret a proposal step that carries no explicit anchor height —
    /// a purely transparent step, whose anchor is unused (see
    /// [`crate::proposal::Step::anchor_height`]).
    pub fn anchor_height(&self, target_height: TargetHeight) -> BlockHeight {
        target_height.saturating_sub(u32::from(self.trusted()))
    }

    /// Returns this policy adjusted so that the shielded anchor for `target_height` lands on a
    /// boundary of `interval`, or `None` if no boundary is reachable.
    ///
    /// A [ZIP 318] pool crossing is proved against a boundary block rather than the chain tip, so
    /// that many wallets' crossings share a small set of anchors instead of each pinning a unique
    /// recent block.
    ///
    /// Bucketing is expressed as a RAISED CONFIRMATION REQUIREMENT rather than as a separately
    /// lowered anchor, because the anchor and the bound on which notes may be spent are the same
    /// quantity: `target_height` less the required confirmations. Moving that one number moves
    /// both together, which is what makes it impossible to select a note having no witness at the
    /// bucketed anchor. Lowering the anchor on its own would leave two numbers free to drift.
    ///
    /// The untrusted requirement is raised to match when it would otherwise fall below the trusted
    /// one, preserving this type's `trusted <= untrusted` invariant.
    ///
    /// The boundary chosen is one interval BELOW the most recent one — an anchor age of 1, the
    /// smallest ZIP 318 admits. Anchoring to the most recent boundary would be an age of 0, which
    /// no migration transfer uses.
    ///
    /// `activation_height` is the activation of the pool being crossed into; the chosen boundary
    /// must lie strictly above it.
    ///
    /// Returns `None` when no usable boundary is reachable: when the ordinary anchor lies below the
    /// first boundary after `activation_height`, or where the required confirmations would reach
    /// back past the genesis block. Reporting that as "unable to bucket" is what lets a caller fall
    /// back, rather than build a proposal that is bound to fail.
    ///
    /// [ZIP 318]: https://zips.z.cash/zip-0318
    pub fn bucketed(
        &self,
        interval: AnchorBucketInterval,
        target_height: TargetHeight,
        activation_height: BlockHeight,
    ) -> Option<Self> {
        // ZIP 318 draws an anchor of AGE `a` in `[1, ANCHOR_AGE_CAP]` boundaries behind the most
        // recent one, so the chosen boundary is always strictly below it. Age 1 is taken here: the
        // newest admissible boundary, and the modal age under the migration's `Geometric(1/2)`
        // draw. Anchoring to the most recent boundary instead would be an age of 0, which no
        // migration transfer ever uses.
        let most_recent = interval.boundary_at_or_below(self.anchor_height(target_height));
        let boundary = BlockHeight::from_u32(
            u32::from(most_recent).checked_sub(interval.block_count().get())?,
        );

        // The boundary must lie strictly above the activation of the pool being crossed into.
        // Rounding down can otherwise land on a PRE-ACTIVATION boundary in the window between
        // activation and the first boundary after it, and ZIP 318's candidate set contains no such
        // height — anchoring there would be distinguishable rather than shared. Height zero is
        // excluded by the same bound, its note commitment tree being empty.
        if boundary <= activation_height {
            return None;
        }
        let bucketed = u32::from(target_height).checked_sub(u32::from(boundary))?;
        let trusted = NonZeroU32::new(bucketed)?;
        Self::new(
            trusted,
            core::cmp::max(self.untrusted(), trusted),
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
            self.allow_zero_conf_shielding(),
        )
        .ok()
    }

    /// Returns whether or not transparent inputs may be spent with zero confirmations in shielding
    /// transactions.
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    pub fn allow_zero_conf_shielding(&self) -> bool {
        self.allow_zero_conf_shielding
    }

    /// Returns the number of confirmations until a transaction output is considered spendable,
    /// given information about the output and the inputs to the transaction that produced it.
    ///
    /// # Parameters
    /// - `target_height`: The minimum height at which the output will be potentially spent.
    /// - `pool_type`: The Zcash pool that the output was received into.
    /// - `receiving_key_scope`: The ZIP 32 [`Scope`] of the key that received the output,
    ///   or `None` if the scope is unknown or corresponds to the ephemeral transparent
    ///   key scope.
    /// - `mined_height`: The block height at which the transaction that produced the output was
    ///   mined, if any.
    /// - `tx_trusted`: A boolean flag indicating whether the received transaction has been
    ///   explicitly marked as trusted by the user.
    /// - `max_shielding_input_height`: For outputs that are the result of wallet-internal
    ///   shielding transactions, the maximum height at which any transparent input to that
    ///   transaction was received.
    /// - `tx_shielding_inputs_trusted`: For outputs that are the result of wallet-internal
    ///   shielding transactions, a flag indicating whether all transparent inputs to that
    ///   transaction have been explicitly marked as trusted by the user.
    #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
    pub fn confirmations_until_spendable(
        &self,
        target_height: TargetHeight,
        pool_type: PoolType,
        receiving_key_scope: Option<Scope>,
        mined_height: Option<BlockHeight>,
        tx_trusted: bool,
        max_shielding_input_height: Option<BlockHeight>,
        tx_shielding_inputs_trusted: bool,
    ) -> u32 {
        // Trusted outputs of transactions mined at heights greater than `trusted_height` will not
        // be treated as spendable.
        let trusted_height = target_height.saturating_sub(u32::from(self.trusted));
        // Untrusted outputs of transactions mined at heights greater than `untrusted_height` will
        // not be treated as spendable.
        let untrusted_height = target_height.saturating_sub(u32::from(self.untrusted));

        // Calculate the possible options for confirmations.
        // - If the output's tx is unmined, we are constantly waiting for the maximum number of
        //   confirmations.
        // - If the output's tx is mined, the required number of confirmations decreases to a floor
        //   of zero.
        let confs_for_trusted =
            mined_height.map_or(u32::from(self.trusted), |h| h - trusted_height);
        let confs_for_untrusted =
            mined_height.map_or(u32::from(self.untrusted), |h| h - untrusted_height);
        match pool_type {
            PoolType::Transparent => {
                #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
                let zc_shielding = self.allow_zero_conf_shielding;
                #[cfg(not(feature = "transparent-inputs"))]
                let zc_shielding = false;

                if zc_shielding {
                    0
                } else if tx_trusted || receiving_key_scope == Some(Scope::Internal) {
                    confs_for_trusted
                } else {
                    confs_for_untrusted
                }
            }
            PoolType::Shielded(_) => {
                if tx_trusted {
                    confs_for_trusted
                } else if receiving_key_scope == Some(Scope::Internal) {
                    // If the note was the output of a shielding transaction, we use the mined
                    // height of the transparent source funds & their trust status instead of the
                    // height at which the shielding transaction was mined.
                    if let Some(h) = max_shielding_input_height {
                        if tx_shielding_inputs_trusted {
                            h - trusted_height
                        } else {
                            h - untrusted_height
                        }
                    } else {
                        confs_for_trusted
                    }
                } else {
                    confs_for_untrusted
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

/// Select transaction inputs, compute fees, and construct a proposal for a transaction or series
/// of transactions that can then be authorized and made ready for submission to the network with
/// [`create_proposed_transactions`].
///
/// When `lock_inputs` is `Some(request)`, every input selected by the returned proposal is
/// locked via [`OutputLockStore::lock_outputs`] on behalf of the request's [`LockOwner`], with an
/// expiry height of `target_height + request.for_blocks()`, so that the inputs are excluded from
/// selection by subsequent proposals until that height is reached (or until they are explicitly
/// released; see below). When it is `None`, no locking is performed.
///
/// This is the owner- and height-based generalization of the `lock_notes: bool` parameter
/// originally proposed in [zcash/librustzcash#2161].
///
/// # Concurrency
///
/// Locking is how overlapping proposals for the same account are kept from selecting the same
/// inputs. If a concurrent caller (a different [`LockOwner`]) has already locked one of the
/// inputs this proposal selected (a check-then-lock race resolved at the storage layer), locking
/// fails and the error surfaces as [`ProposalError::InputsLocked`] identifying the conflicting
/// output; the losing caller should treat this as "the account is busy" and retry. Re-locking
/// under the SAME owner succeeds (an idempotent acquire/extend), so a flow that crashed after
/// locking may safely retry with its original owner token. A caller that abandons a proposal
/// whose inputs it locked should release them with [`unlock_proposal_inputs`] under the same
/// owner; locks are otherwise cleared automatically when the inputs are recorded as spent by
/// [`WalletWrite::store_transactions_to_be_sent`], when their expiry height is reached, or via
/// [`OutputLockStore::clear_locked_outputs`].
///
/// Note that expiry re-opens the race the lock exists to prevent: if building and proving the
/// transaction takes longer than the requested lock window, the lock expires and a concurrent
/// proposal may select and spend the same inputs. Choose the window conservatively with respect
/// to the worst-case time between proposal creation and transaction storage.
///
/// [`LockOwner`]: crate::wallet::LockOwner
/// [`OutputLockStore::lock_outputs`]: crate::data_api::OutputLockStore::lock_outputs
/// [`WalletWrite::store_transactions_to_be_sent`]: crate::data_api::WalletWrite::store_transactions_to_be_sent
/// [`OutputLockStore::clear_locked_outputs`]: crate::data_api::OutputLockStore::clear_locked_outputs
/// [zcash/librustzcash#2161]: https://github.com/zcash/librustzcash/issues/2161
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
pub fn propose_transfer<DbT, ParamsT, InputsT, ChangeT, CommitmentTreeErrT>(
    wallet_db: &mut DbT,
    params: &ParamsT,
    spend_from_account: <DbT as InputSource>::AccountId,
    input_selector: &InputsT,
    change_strategy: &ChangeT,
    request: zip321::TransactionRequest,
    confirmations_policy: ConfirmationsPolicy,
    spend_policy: &input_selection::SpendPolicy,
    lock_inputs: Option<LockRequest>,
    proposed_version: Option<TxVersion>,
) -> Result<
    Proposal<ChangeT::FeeRule, <DbT as InputSource>::NoteRef>,
    ProposeTransferErrT<DbT, CommitmentTreeErrT, InputsT, ChangeT>,
>
where
    DbT: WalletWrite + InputSource<Error = <DbT as WalletRead>::Error>,
    <DbT as InputSource>::NoteRef: Copy + Eq + Ord,
    ParamsT: consensus::Parameters + Clone,
    InputsT: InputSelector<InputSource = DbT>,
    ChangeT: ChangeStrategy<MetaSource = DbT>,
{
    // Using the trusted confirmations results in an anchor_height that will
    // include the maximum number of notes being selected, and we can filter
    // later based on the input source (whether it's trusted or not) and the
    // number of confirmations
    let maybe_intial_heights = wallet_db
        .get_target_and_anchor_heights(confirmations_policy.trusted)
        .map_err(InputSelectorError::DataSource)?;
    let (target_height, anchor_height) =
        maybe_intial_heights.ok_or_else(|| InputSelectorError::SyncRequired)?;

    // The ZIP 318 parameters in force for THIS wallet. The anchor bucket grid must come from the
    // wallet rather than the network defaults: the wallet is the side that retains the
    // checkpoints, so its grid is the only one a crossing can actually be proved against, and
    // every decision below that depends on the grid consults this one value.
    let zip318 = wallet_db.pool_migration_params();

    // A payment of a canonical ZIP 318 denomination across the Orchard turnstile is proposed
    // against a BUCKETED anchor and funded from a single Orchard note, so that the resulting
    // transaction is indistinguishable from a ZIP 318 migration transfer (see
    // `Step::is_canonical_crossing`). Whether that is achievable is decided here, before any
    // proposal is kept, rather than discovered by failure: the common miss is not insufficient
    // funds but a SUCCESSFUL multi-note selection, which funds perfectly well yet is not a
    // canonical crossing. Falling back only on insufficient funds would leave such a transaction
    // carrying a bucketed anchor — up to one interval of extra confirmations on its inputs — while
    // still being built padded, which is worse than never having tried.
    //
    // Selection is restricted to the Orchard pool for the attempt. That is not merely a
    // preference: a canonical crossing admits no Ironwood spends, and the ordinary selector
    // prefers to avoid crossing pools, so for an Ironwood-destined payment it reaches for Ironwood
    // notes whenever the wallet holds them. Without the restriction, a user migrating their own
    // funds by sending themselves canonical amounts would stall as soon as the first crossing
    // produced Ironwood notes: every later payment would be funded from Ironwood, crossing
    // nothing, and no further value would ever leave the Orchard pool.
    //
    // The canonical fee for the shape, under the parameters and target height this transaction
    // will actually be built against. The STANDARD ZIP 317 rule is asked, not the caller's: a
    // proposal built on a fixed non-standard rule would otherwise be compared against its own fee
    // and always agree, which is precisely the case ZIP 318 forbids.
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let canonical_fee = crate::fees::canonical_crossing_fee(params, target_height.into()).ok();

    // The whole attempt is Orchard-gated: without that feature there is no Ironwood pool to cross
    // into, so there is no canonical crossing to construct.
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let bucketed_policy = canonical_crossing_candidate(params, &zip318, &request, target_height)
        .then(|| params.activation_height(NetworkUpgrade::Nu6_3))
        .flatten()
        .and_then(|activation| {
            confirmations_policy.bucketed(
                zip318.anchor_bucket_interval(),
                target_height,
                activation,
            )
        })
        // A canonical crossing spends an Orchard note; if the caller forbids that, there is no
        // canonical path to attempt.
        .filter(|_| spend_policy.permits_shielded(ShieldedPool::Orchard));

    // An anchor must be COMPUTABLE at the chosen boundary, not merely arithmetically valid: the
    // data source must be able to produce the Orchard tree root there. A wallet that scanned
    // past NU6.3 activation before boundary checkpointing was repaired is permanently missing
    // the boundaries whose blocks carried no shielded outputs, and the hole cannot be backfilled
    // from local state. Abandoning the attempt here degrades to an ordinary crossing — the same
    // fallback taken when no sufficiently-old note exists — rather than proposing a transaction
    // whose build must fail with `AnchorNotFound`. Under repaired retention the miss is
    // temporary: freshly scanned boundaries rotate into the age-1 position within about a grid
    // interval of upgrading.
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let bucketed_policy = match bucketed_policy {
        Some(policy) => wallet_db
            .anchor_computable(ShieldedPool::Orchard, policy.anchor_height(target_height))
            .map_err(|e| Error::from(InputSelectorError::DataSource(e)))?
            .then_some(policy),
        None => None,
    };

    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let canonical_attempt = bucketed_policy.map(|bucketed_policy| {
        // Single-note funding is PREFERRED, not merely hoped for: a migration transfer
        // spends exactly one note, and accumulation reaches the target through several
        // small notes whenever the oldest notes are small — funding perfectly well while
        // losing the canonical shape. Preferring the oldest single covering note makes the
        // canonical outcome the common one; when no single note covers the payment, the
        // fallback accumulation funds it and the shape check below discards the attempt,
        // exactly as before.
        let orchard_only = input_selection::SpendPolicy::shielded_pools([ShieldedPool::Orchard])
            .with_locked_input_policy(spend_policy.locked_input_policy().clone())
            .with_note_selection(input_selection::NoteSelection::PreferSingle);

        input_selector.propose_transaction(
            params,
            wallet_db,
            target_height,
            bucketed_policy.anchor_height(target_height),
            &zip318,
            bucketed_policy,
            spend_from_account,
            request.clone(),
            change_strategy,
            &orchard_only,
            proposed_version,
        )
    });

    // Only two outcomes justify falling back to an ordinary proposal: the wallet cannot fund the
    // payment under the stricter policy, or it funded one that is not in fact canonical. Every
    // other error — data source, selection, change computation, proposal construction, address
    // parsing, sync state — describes a condition the ordinary attempt would meet just the same,
    // so suppressing it here would replace a precise diagnosis with a silently different
    // transaction, or with an identical failure reported from a second, wasted selection pass.
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let canonical_proposal = match canonical_attempt {
        Some(Ok(proposal)) => {
            // The authoritative test is the one the builder will also apply, so that there is
            // exactly one definition of "canonical" and the two cannot disagree. A proposal that
            // funded successfully but not from a single Orchard note fails it here and is
            // discarded, costing a selection pass but no extra confirmations.
            let is_canonical = proposal.steps().len() == 1
                && canonical_fee.is_some_and(|fee| {
                    proposal.steps().first().is_canonical_crossing(&zip318, fee)
                });
            is_canonical.then_some(proposal)
        }
        Some(Err(InputSelectorError::InsufficientFunds { .. })) | None => None,
        Some(Err(other)) => return Err(other.into()),
    };

    #[cfg(not(feature = "orchard"))]
    let canonical_proposal = None;

    let proposal = match canonical_proposal {
        Some(proposal) => proposal,
        None => input_selector.propose_transaction(
            params,
            wallet_db,
            target_height,
            anchor_height,
            &zip318,
            confirmations_policy,
            spend_from_account,
            request,
            change_strategy,
            spend_policy,
            proposed_version,
        )?,
    };
    if let Some(request) = lock_inputs {
        let lock_expiry_height = target_height + request.for_blocks();
        lock_proposal_inputs(wallet_db, &proposal, request.owner(), lock_expiry_height)?;
    }

    // Record the requested version on the proposal so that it is carried through to transaction
    // building; when `None`, building falls back to the version implied by the target height.
    Ok(proposal.with_proposed_version(proposed_version))
}

/// Returns whether `request` is worth attempting as a canonical ZIP 318 crossing: a single
/// payment, of a canonical denomination, at a height where the Ironwood pool exists.
///
/// This is a cheap gate, not a decision. It deliberately does not resolve the recipient address to
/// an output pool, nor consider which notes are available: those depend on input selection, which
/// has not run yet. The authoritative test is [`Step::is_canonical_crossing`] applied to the
/// resulting proposal, so a request that passes here but produces a non-canonical proposal is
/// simply discarded. Keeping the gate loose avoids duplicating address-resolution logic that would
/// then have to be kept in step with input selection.
#[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
fn canonical_crossing_candidate<ParamsT: consensus::Parameters>(
    params: &ParamsT,
    zip318: &PoolMigrationParams,
    request: &zip321::TransactionRequest,
    target_height: TargetHeight,
) -> bool {
    params.is_nu_active(NetworkUpgrade::Nu6_3, target_height.into())
        && match request.payments().values().collect::<Vec<_>>()[..] {
            [payment] => payment
                .amount()
                .is_some_and(|amount| zip318.is_canonical_denomination(amount)),
            _ => false,
        }
}

/// Returns whether `step` will be built as a canonical ZIP 318 crossing, under the ZIP 318
/// parameters `wallet_db` reports and the fee the canonical shape costs at `target_height`.
///
/// Shared by every path that builds a proposal, so that each asks the same question of the same
/// data. `create_pczt_from_proposal` in particular applies its expiry override after the builder
/// has run, and so cannot rely on the check inside `build_proposed_transaction`.
#[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
fn step_is_canonical_crossing<DbT, ParamsT, N>(
    wallet_db: &DbT,
    params: &ParamsT,
    step: &Step<N>,
    target_height: TargetHeight,
) -> bool
where
    DbT: WalletRead,
    ParamsT: consensus::Parameters,
{
    crate::fees::canonical_crossing_fee(params, target_height.into())
        .is_ok_and(|fee| step.is_canonical_crossing(&wallet_db.pool_migration_params(), fee))
}

/// Proposes making a payment to the specified address from the given account.
///
/// Returns the proposal, which may then be executed using [`create_proposed_transactions`].
/// Depending upon the recipient address, more than one transaction may be constructed
/// in the execution of the returned proposal.
///
/// This method uses the basic [`GreedyInputSelector`] for input selection.
///
/// Parameters:
/// * `wallet_db`: A read/write reference to the wallet database.
/// * `params`: Consensus parameters.
/// * `fee_rule`: The fee rule to use in creating the transaction.
/// * `spend_from_account`: The unified account that controls the funds that will be spent
///   in the resulting transaction. This procedure will return an error if the
///   account ID does not correspond to an account known to the wallet.
/// * `confirmations_policy`: The minimum number of confirmations that a previously
///   received note must have in the blockchain in order to be considered for being
///   spent. A value of 10 confirmations is recommended and 0-conf transactions are
///   not supported.
/// * `to`: The address to which `amount` will be paid.
/// * `amount`: The amount to send.
/// * `memo`: A memo to be included in the output to the recipient.
/// * `change_memo`: A memo to be included in any change output that is created.
/// * `fallback_change_pool`: The shielded pool to which change should be sent if
///   automatic change pool determination fails.
/// * `lock_inputs`: When `Some(request)`, the inputs selected by the proposal are locked on
///   behalf of the request's owner until `target_height + request.for_blocks()` to prevent
///   concurrent proposals from selecting them; when `None`, no locking is performed. See
///   [`propose_transfer`] for the full semantics and concurrency behavior.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
pub fn propose_standard_transfer_to_address<DbT, ParamsT, CommitmentTreeErrT>(
    wallet_db: &mut DbT,
    params: &ParamsT,
    fee_rule: StandardFeeRule,
    spend_from_account: <DbT as InputSource>::AccountId,
    confirmations_policy: ConfirmationsPolicy,
    to: &Address,
    amount: Zatoshis,
    memo: Option<MemoBytes>,
    change_memo: Option<MemoBytes>,
    fallback_change_pool: ShieldedPool,
    lock_inputs: Option<LockRequest>,
    proposed_version: Option<TxVersion>,
) -> Result<
    Proposal<StandardFeeRule, DbT::NoteRef>,
    ProposeTransferErrT<
        DbT,
        CommitmentTreeErrT,
        GreedyInputSelector<DbT>,
        SingleOutputChangeStrategy<DbT>,
    >,
>
where
    ParamsT: consensus::Parameters + Clone,
    DbT: InputSource,
    DbT: WalletWrite,
    DbT: WalletRead<Error = <DbT as InputSource>::Error, AccountId = <DbT as InputSource>::AccountId>,
    DbT::NoteRef: Copy + Eq + Ord,
{
    let request = zip321::TransactionRequest::new(vec![
        Payment::new(
            to.to_zcash_address(params),
            Some(amount),
            memo,
            None,
            None,
            vec![],
        )
        .map_err(Error::Payment)?,
    ])
    .expect(
        "It should not be possible for this to violate ZIP 321 request construction invariants.",
    );

    let input_selector = GreedyInputSelector::<DbT>::new();
    let change_strategy = SingleOutputChangeStrategy::<DbT>::new(
        fee_rule,
        change_memo,
        fallback_change_pool,
        DustOutputPolicy::default(),
    );

    propose_transfer(
        wallet_db,
        params,
        spend_from_account,
        &input_selector,
        &change_strategy,
        request,
        confirmations_policy,
        &input_selection::SpendPolicy::default(),
        lock_inputs,
        proposed_version,
    )
}

/// Proposes spending the maximum available value from the given shielded pools, sending it
/// to a single recipient.
///
/// Returns the proposal, which may then be executed using [`create_proposed_transactions`].
/// Depending upon the recipient address, more than one transaction may be constructed in the
/// execution of the returned proposal.
///
/// Unlike [`propose_transfer`], the caller does not choose an amount. The value sent is
/// whatever remains once the fee for the selected inputs is covered, and that fee is not
/// knowable in advance because it depends on which inputs the selector picks. This is the
/// reason to prefer this function over computing "balance minus fee" in the caller: only
/// input selection knows the fee, so only it can leave nothing behind.
///
/// The wallet must have been scanned far enough to establish target and anchor heights;
/// otherwise [`InputSelectorError::SyncRequired`] is returned.
///
/// Parameters:
/// * `wallet_db`: A read/write reference to the wallet database.
/// * `params`: Consensus parameters.
/// * `spend_from_account`: The unified account that controls the funds that will be spent
///   in the resulting transaction. This procedure will return an error if the account ID
///   does not correspond to an account known to the wallet.
/// * `spend_pools`: The shielded pools that may be drawn upon. Funds in any pool outside
///   this set are left untouched, so this is what makes the function usable for moving a
///   single pool rather than emptying the account. Transparent funds are never selected.
/// * `fee_rule`: The fee rule to use in creating the transaction.
/// * `recipient`: The address to which the spendable value will be paid.
/// * `memo`: A memo to be included in the output to the recipient. Supplying a memo for a
///   recipient that cannot receive one returns [`zip321::PaymentError::TransparentMemo`].
/// * `mode`: How to treat funds in `spend_pools` that are not currently spendable, for
///   example because a note lacks confirmations or its witness is not yet available.
///   [`MaxSpendMode::MaxSpendable`] skips such notes and proposes a transaction spending
///   the rest; [`MaxSpendMode::Everything`] returns an error instead, so that a caller who
///   needs the pools genuinely emptied cannot be handed a partial result that looks like a
///   complete one.
/// * `confirmations_policy`: The minimum number of confirmations that a previously
///   received note must have in the blockchain in order to be considered for being
///   spent. A value of 10 confirmations is recommended and 0-conf transactions are
///   not supported.
/// * `locked_input_policy`: Whether a locked note may be drawn upon to reach the requested
///   amount, exactly as [`input_selection::SpendPolicy::locked_input_policy`] does for
///   [`propose_transfer`]; pass `&LockedInputPolicy::Exclude` (its default) to never select
///   a locked note.
/// * `lock_inputs`: When `Some(request)`, the inputs selected by the proposal are locked on
///   behalf of the request's owner until `target_height + request.for_blocks()` to prevent
///   concurrent proposals from selecting them; when `None`, no locking is performed. See
///   [`propose_transfer`] for the full semantics and concurrency behavior.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
pub fn propose_send_max_transfer<DbT, ParamsT, FeeRuleT, CommitmentTreeErrT>(
    wallet_db: &mut DbT,
    params: &ParamsT,
    spend_from_account: <DbT as InputSource>::AccountId,
    spend_pools: &[ShieldedPool],
    fee_rule: &FeeRuleT,
    recipient: ZcashAddress,
    memo: Option<MemoBytes>,
    mode: MaxSpendMode,
    confirmations_policy: ConfirmationsPolicy,
    locked_input_policy: &input_selection::LockedInputPolicy,
    lock_inputs: Option<LockRequest>,
) -> Result<
    Proposal<FeeRuleT, <DbT as InputSource>::NoteRef>,
    ProposeSendMaxErrT<DbT, CommitmentTreeErrT, FeeRuleT>,
>
where
    DbT: WalletWrite + InputSource<Error = <DbT as WalletRead>::Error>,
    <DbT as InputSource>::NoteRef: Copy + Eq + Ord,
    ParamsT: consensus::Parameters + Clone,
    FeeRuleT: FeeRule + Clone,
{
    let (target_height, anchor_height) = wallet_db
        .get_target_and_anchor_heights(confirmations_policy.trusted())
        .map_err(|e| Error::from(InputSelectorError::DataSource(e)))?
        .ok_or_else(|| Error::from(InputSelectorError::SyncRequired))?;

    if memo.is_some() && !recipient.can_receive_memo() {
        return Err(Error::Payment(zip321::PaymentError::TransparentMemo));
    }

    let proposal = propose_send_max(
        params,
        wallet_db,
        fee_rule,
        spend_from_account,
        spend_pools,
        target_height,
        anchor_height,
        mode,
        confirmations_policy,
        recipient,
        memo,
        locked_input_policy,
    )?;

    if let Some(request) = lock_inputs {
        let lock_expiry_height = target_height + request.for_blocks();
        lock_proposal_inputs(wallet_db, &proposal, request.owner(), lock_expiry_height)?;
    }

    Ok(proposal)
}

/// Constructs a proposal to shield all of the funds belonging to the provided set of
/// addresses.
///
/// The `output_filter` parameter controls which transparent outputs are eligible for
/// inclusion in the proposal. See [`CoinbaseFilter`] for details.
///
/// When `lock_inputs` is `Some(request)`, the inputs selected by the proposal are locked on
/// behalf of the request's owner until `target_height + request.for_blocks()` to prevent
/// concurrent proposals from selecting them; when `None`, no locking is performed. See
/// [`propose_transfer`] for the full semantics and concurrency behavior.
#[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
pub fn propose_shielding<DbT, ParamsT, InputsT, ChangeT, CommitmentTreeErrT>(
    wallet_db: &mut DbT,
    params: &ParamsT,
    input_selector: &InputsT,
    change_strategy: &ChangeT,
    shielding_threshold: Zatoshis,
    from_addrs: &[TransparentAddress],
    to_account: <DbT as InputSource>::AccountId,
    confirmations_policy: ConfirmationsPolicy,
    output_filter: CoinbaseFilter,
    lock_inputs: Option<LockRequest>,
) -> Result<
    Proposal<ChangeT::FeeRule, Infallible>,
    ProposeShieldingErrT<DbT, CommitmentTreeErrT, InputsT, ChangeT>,
>
where
    ParamsT: consensus::Parameters,
    DbT: WalletWrite + InputSource<Error = <DbT as WalletRead>::Error>,
    InputsT: ShieldingSelector<InputSource = DbT>,
    ChangeT: ChangeStrategy<MetaSource = DbT>,
{
    let (target_height, anchor_height) = wallet_db
        .get_target_and_anchor_heights(confirmations_policy.trusted)
        .map_err(|e| Error::from(InputSelectorError::DataSource(e)))?
        .ok_or_else(|| Error::from(InputSelectorError::SyncRequired))?;

    let proposal = input_selector
        .propose_shielding(
            params,
            wallet_db,
            change_strategy,
            shielding_threshold,
            from_addrs,
            to_account,
            target_height,
            anchor_height,
            &wallet_db.pool_migration_params(),
            confirmations_policy,
            output_filter,
        )
        .map_err(Error::from)?;

    if let Some(request) = lock_inputs {
        let lock_expiry_height = target_height + request.for_blocks();
        lock_proposal_inputs(wallet_db, &proposal, request.owner(), lock_expiry_height)?;
    }

    Ok(proposal)
}

/// Errors that may be generated in construction of proposals for shielding coinbase
/// transparent outputs to an arbitrary shielded recipient via
/// [`propose_shielding_coinbase`].
#[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
pub type ProposeShieldingCoinbaseErrT<DbT, CommitmentTreeErrT, InputsT, FeeRuleT> = Error<
    <DbT as WalletRead>::Error,
    CommitmentTreeErrT,
    <InputsT as ShieldingSelector>::Error,
    <FeeRuleT as FeeRule>::Error,
    <FeeRuleT as FeeRule>::Error,
    Infallible,
>;

/// Constructs a proposal to shield one or more coinbase transparent outputs to an
/// arbitrary shielded recipient.
///
/// Unlike [`propose_shielding`], this method:
///
/// - Restricts input selection to coinbase outputs only. The restriction is enforced
///   at the API boundary; it cannot be overridden by callers. Coinbase outputs have
///   no prior transparent transaction graph, which is what makes it acceptable to
///   send them to an arbitrary shielded recipient.
/// - Requires `to_address` to be a shielded address (Sapling, or a Unified Address
///   with a shielded receiver). Transparent and TEX destinations are rejected with
///   [`ProposalError::ShieldingRequiresShieldedRecipient`]. The address may belong
///   to an account outside the caller's wallet.
/// - Accepts an optional `memo` to be attached to the shielded payment.
/// - Accepts an optional `limit` capping the number of transparent inputs to at
///   most `n`, keeping the highest-value UTXOs (with a stable tiebreaker by
///   outpoint). `Some(0)` selects no inputs and therefore returns
///   [`InputSelectorError::InsufficientFunds`].
///
/// When `lock_inputs` is `Some(request)`, the coinbase inputs selected by the proposal are
/// locked on behalf of the request's owner until `target_height + request.for_blocks()` to
/// prevent concurrent proposals from selecting them; when `None`, no locking is performed. See
/// [`propose_transfer`] for the full semantics and concurrency behavior.
///
/// The resulting proposal carries an explicit ZIP-321 payment to `to_address` for
/// `input_total - fee`. **No change is produced**, in either the transparent or any
/// shielded pool: a shielded change output would let the recipient (or any chain
/// observer) learn the sender's total selected-coinbase value by summing the public
/// transparent input values and subtracting the visible payment amount.
///
/// [`InputSelectorError::InsufficientFunds`]: crate::data_api::wallet::input_selection::InputSelectorError::InsufficientFunds
/// [`ProposalError::ShieldingRequiresShieldedRecipient`]: crate::proposal::ProposalError::ShieldingRequiresShieldedRecipient
#[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
pub fn propose_shielding_coinbase<DbT, ParamsT, InputsT, FeeRuleT, CommitmentTreeErrT>(
    wallet_db: &mut DbT,
    params: &ParamsT,
    input_selector: &InputsT,
    fee_rule: &FeeRuleT,
    shielding_threshold: Zatoshis,
    from_addrs: &[TransparentAddress],
    to_address: ZcashAddress,
    memo: Option<MemoBytes>,
    limit: Option<usize>,
    lock_inputs: Option<LockRequest>,
) -> Result<
    Proposal<FeeRuleT, Infallible>,
    ProposeShieldingCoinbaseErrT<DbT, CommitmentTreeErrT, InputsT, FeeRuleT>,
>
where
    ParamsT: consensus::Parameters,
    DbT: WalletWrite + InputSource<Error = <DbT as WalletRead>::Error>,
    InputsT: ShieldingSelector<InputSource = DbT>,
    FeeRuleT: FeeRule + Clone,
{
    let (target_height, anchor_height) = wallet_db
        .get_target_and_anchor_heights(ConfirmationsPolicy::default().trusted)
        .map_err(|e| Error::from(InputSelectorError::DataSource(e)))?
        .ok_or_else(|| Error::from(InputSelectorError::SyncRequired))?;

    let proposal = input_selector
        .propose_shielding_coinbase(
            params,
            wallet_db,
            fee_rule,
            shielding_threshold,
            from_addrs,
            to_address,
            memo,
            limit,
            target_height,
            anchor_height,
        )
        .map_err(Error::from)?;

    if let Some(request) = lock_inputs {
        let lock_expiry_height = target_height + request.for_blocks();
        lock_proposal_inputs(wallet_db, &proposal, request.owner(), lock_expiry_height)?;
    }

    Ok(proposal)
}

struct StepResult<AccountId> {
    build_result: BuildResult,
    outputs: Vec<SentTransactionOutput<AccountId>>,
    fee_amount: Zatoshis,
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    utxos_spent: Vec<OutPoint>,
}

/// A set of spending keys for an account, for use in execution of transaction proposals.
///
/// This consists of a [`UnifiedSpendingKey`], plus (if the `transparent-key-import` feature is
/// enabled) a set of standalone transparent spending keys corresponding to inputs being spent in a
/// transaction under construction.
pub struct SpendingKeys {
    usk: UnifiedSpendingKey,
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-key-import")]
    standalone_transparent_keys: HashMap<TransparentAddress, Vec<secp256k1::SecretKey>>,
}

impl SpendingKeys {
    /// Constructs a new [`SpendingKeys`] value from its constituent parts.
    pub fn new(
        usk: UnifiedSpendingKey,
        #[cfg(feature = "transparent-key-import")] standalone_transparent_keys: HashMap<
            TransparentAddress,
            Vec<secp256k1::SecretKey>,
        >,
    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            usk,
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-key-import")]
            standalone_transparent_keys,
        }
    }

    /// Constructs a new [`SpendingKeys`] value from a [`UnifiedSpendingKey`],
    /// without standalone spending keys.
    pub fn from_unified_spending_key(usk: UnifiedSpendingKey) -> Self {
        Self {
            usk,
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-key-import")]
            standalone_transparent_keys: HashMap::new(),
        }
    }
}

/// Construct, prove, and sign a transaction or series of transactions using the inputs supplied by
/// the given proposal, and persist it to the wallet database.
///
/// Returns the database identifier for each newly constructed transaction, or an error if
/// an error occurs in transaction construction, proving, or signing.
///
/// When evaluating multi-step proposals, only transparent outputs of any given step may be spent
/// in later steps; attempting to spend a shielded note (including change) output by an earlier
/// step is not supported, because the ultimate positions of those notes in the global note
/// commitment tree cannot be known until the transaction that produces those notes is mined,
/// and therefore the required spend proofs for such notes cannot be constructed.
///
/// `expiry_height`, when set, replaces the builder-derived expiry for every step's
/// transaction before it is built and signed.
///
/// A nonzero `expiry_height` below the proposal's
/// [`min_target_height`](Proposal::min_target_height) is rejected with
/// [`Error::ExpiryHeightBelowTargetHeight`]. An `expiry_height` of zero,
/// which disables expiry, is exempt from this check.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
pub fn create_proposed_transactions<DbT, ParamsT, InputsErrT, FeeRuleT, ChangeErrT, N>(
    wallet_db: &mut DbT,
    params: &ParamsT,
    spend_prover: &impl SpendProver,
    output_prover: &impl OutputProver,
    spending_keys: &SpendingKeys,
    ovk_policy: OvkPolicy,
    proposal: &Proposal<FeeRuleT, N>,
    expiry_height: Option<BlockHeight>,
) -> Result<NonEmpty<TxId>, CreateErrT<DbT, InputsErrT, FeeRuleT, ChangeErrT, N>>
where
    DbT: WalletWrite + WalletCommitmentTrees,
    ParamsT: consensus::Parameters + Clone,
    FeeRuleT: FeeRule,
{
    // The transaction version is carried on the proposal, chosen when the proposal was
    // constructed; `None` builds at the version implied by the target height.
    let proposed_version = proposal.proposed_version();

    if let Some(expiry_height) = expiry_height {
        let min_target_height = BlockHeight::from(proposal.min_target_height());
        if expiry_height != consensus::H0 && expiry_height < min_target_height {
            return Err(Error::ExpiryHeightBelowTargetHeight {
                expiry_height,
                min_target_height,
            });
        }
    }

    // The set of transparent `StepOutput`s available and unused from prior steps.
    // When a transparent `StepOutput` is created, it is added to the map. When it
    // is consumed, it is removed from the map.
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    let mut unused_transparent_outputs = HashMap::new();

    let account_id = wallet_db
        .get_account_for_ufvk(&spending_keys.usk.to_unified_full_viewing_key())
        .map_err(Error::DataSource)?
        .ok_or(Error::KeyNotRecognized)?
        .id();

    let mut step_results = Vec::with_capacity(proposal.steps().len());
    for step in proposal.steps() {
        let step_result: StepResult<_> = create_proposed_transaction(
            wallet_db,
            params,
            spend_prover,
            output_prover,
            spending_keys,
            account_id,
            ovk_policy.clone(),
            proposal.fee_rule(),
            proposal.min_target_height(),
            proposal.confirmations_policy(),
            &step_results,
            step,
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
            &mut unused_transparent_outputs,
            proposed_version,
            expiry_height,
        )?;
        step_results.push((step, step_result));
    }

    // Ephemeral outputs must be referenced exactly once.
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    for so in unused_transparent_outputs.into_keys() {
        if let StepOutputIndex::Change(i) = so.output_index() {
            // references have already been checked
            if step_results[so.step_index()].0.balance().proposed_change()[i].is_ephemeral() {
                return Err(ProposalError::EphemeralOutputLeftUnspent(so).into());
            }
        }
    }

    // TODO: This should be provided by a `Clock`
    let created = time::OffsetDateTime::now_utc();

    // Store the transactions only after creating all of them. This avoids undesired
    // retransmissions in case a transaction is stored and the creation of a subsequent
    // transaction fails.
    let mut transactions = Vec::with_capacity(step_results.len());
    let mut txids = Vec::with_capacity(step_results.len());
    #[allow(unused_variables)]
    for (_, step_result) in step_results.iter() {
        let tx = step_result.build_result.transaction();
        transactions.push(SentTransaction::new(
            tx,
            created,
            proposal.min_target_height(),
            account_id,
            &step_result.outputs,
            step_result.fee_amount,
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
            &step_result.utxos_spent,
        ));
        txids.push(tx.txid());
    }

    wallet_db
        .store_transactions_to_be_sent(&transactions)
        .map_err(Error::DataSource)?;

    Ok(NonEmpty::from_vec(txids).expect("proposal.steps is NonEmpty"))
}

/// A recipient of a shielded output under construction, awaiting the decrypted [`Note`]
/// that [`ShieldedBuildRecipient::into_recipient`] will attach to produce a [`Recipient`].
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
enum ShieldedBuildRecipient<AccountId> {
    External {
        recipient_address: ZcashAddress,
        output_pool: PoolType,
    },
    InternalShielded {
        receiving_account: AccountId,
        external_address: Option<ZcashAddress>,
    },
}

impl<AccountId> ShieldedBuildRecipient<AccountId> {
    fn into_recipient(self, note: impl FnOnce() -> Note) -> Recipient<AccountId> {
        match self {
            ShieldedBuildRecipient::External {
                recipient_address,
                output_pool,
            } => Recipient::External {
                recipient_address,
                output_pool,
            },
            ShieldedBuildRecipient::InternalShielded {
                receiving_account,
                external_address,
            } => Recipient::InternalShielded {
                receiving_account,
                external_address,
                note: Box::new(note()),
            },
        }
    }
}

/// A recipient of a transparent output under construction, awaiting the [`OutPoint`] (for
/// ephemeral outputs only) that [`TransparentBuildRecipient::into_recipient`] will attach
/// to produce a [`Recipient`].
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
enum TransparentBuildRecipient<AccountId> {
    External {
        recipient_address: ZcashAddress,
        output_pool: PoolType,
    },
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    EphemeralTransparent {
        receiving_account: AccountId,
        ephemeral_address: TransparentAddress,
    },
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    InternalTransparent {
        receiving_account: AccountId,
        recipient_address: TransparentAddress,
    },
    /// Never constructed. Present only so that `AccountId` remains a used type parameter
    /// when `transparent-inputs` is disabled, in which case the two variants above (the
    /// only ones that otherwise reference it) do not exist. The uninhabited
    /// [`core::convert::Infallible`] field lets every match on this type prove, rather than
    /// assert, that this arm is unreachable.
    #[cfg(not(feature = "transparent-inputs"))]
    #[doc(hidden)]
    #[allow(dead_code)]
    Unconstructible(
        core::marker::PhantomData<AccountId>,
        core::convert::Infallible,
    ),
}

impl<AccountId> TransparentBuildRecipient<AccountId> {
    fn into_recipient(
        self,
        #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")] outpoint: OutPoint,
    ) -> Recipient<AccountId> {
        match self {
            TransparentBuildRecipient::External {
                recipient_address,
                output_pool,
            } => Recipient::External {
                recipient_address,
                output_pool,
            },
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
            TransparentBuildRecipient::EphemeralTransparent {
                receiving_account,
                ephemeral_address,
            } => Recipient::EphemeralTransparent {
                receiving_account,
                ephemeral_address,
                outpoint,
            },
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
            TransparentBuildRecipient::InternalTransparent {
                receiving_account,
                recipient_address,
            } => Recipient::InternalTransparent {
                receiving_account,
                recipient_address,
            },
            #[cfg(not(feature = "transparent-inputs"))]
            TransparentBuildRecipient::Unconstructible(_, absurd) => match absurd {},
        }
    }
}

#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
struct BuildState<P, AccountId> {
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    step_index: usize,
    builder: Builder<P, ()>,
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    transparent_input_addresses: HashMap<TransparentAddress, TransparentAddressMetadata>,
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    orchard_output_meta: Vec<(
        ShieldedBuildRecipient<AccountId>,
        Zatoshis,
        Option<MemoBytes>,
    )>,
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    ironwood_output_meta: Vec<(
        ShieldedBuildRecipient<AccountId>,
        Zatoshis,
        Option<MemoBytes>,
    )>,
    sapling_output_meta: Vec<(
        ShieldedBuildRecipient<AccountId>,
        Zatoshis,
        Option<MemoBytes>,
    )>,
    transparent_output_meta: Vec<(
        TransparentBuildRecipient<AccountId>,
        TransparentAddress,
        Zatoshis,
        StepOutputIndex,
    )>,
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    utxos_spent: Vec<OutPoint>,
}

// `unused_transparent_outputs` maps `StepOutput`s for transparent outputs
// that have not been consumed so far, to the corresponding pair of
// `TransparentAddress` and `Outpoint`.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
fn build_proposed_transaction<DbT, ParamsT, InputsErrT, FeeRuleT, ChangeErrT, N>(
    wallet_db: &mut DbT,
    params: &ParamsT,
    ufvk: &UnifiedFullViewingKey,
    account_id: <DbT as WalletRead>::AccountId,
    ovk_policy: OvkPolicy,
    min_target_height: TargetHeight,
    confirmations_policy: ConfirmationsPolicy,
    prior_step_results: &[(&Step<N>, StepResult<<DbT as WalletRead>::AccountId>)],
    proposal_step: &Step<N>,
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")] unused_transparent_outputs: &mut HashMap<
        StepOutput,
        (TransparentAddress, OutPoint),
    >,
    proposed_version: Option<TxVersion>,
    // The transactional bundle padding for the Orchard and Ironwood bundles; the PCZT path
    // threads the proposal's configured padding here, other callers pass
    // `BundlePadding::DEFAULT`.
    orchard_pool_padding: BundlePadding,
    // Overrides the builder-derived expiry height, when set. Applied immediately after
    // `Builder::new` below, before any inputs are added or signatures/proofs are produced.
    expiry_height: Option<BlockHeight>,
) -> Result<
    BuildState<ParamsT, <DbT as WalletRead>::AccountId>,
    CreateErrT<DbT, InputsErrT, FeeRuleT, ChangeErrT, N>,
>
where
    DbT: WalletWrite + WalletCommitmentTrees,
    ParamsT: consensus::Parameters + Clone,
    FeeRuleT: FeeRule,
{
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    let step_index = prior_step_results.len();

    // We only support spending transparent payments or transparent ephemeral outputs from a
    // prior step (when "transparent-inputs" is enabled).
    #[allow(clippy::never_loop)]
    for input_ref in proposal_step.prior_step_inputs() {
        let (prior_step, _) = prior_step_results
            .get(input_ref.step_index())
            .ok_or(ProposalError::ReferenceError(*input_ref))?;

        #[allow(unused_variables)]
        let output_pool = match input_ref.output_index() {
            StepOutputIndex::Payment(i) => prior_step.payment_pools().get(&i).cloned(),
            StepOutputIndex::Change(i) => match prior_step.balance().proposed_change().get(i) {
                Some(change) if !change.is_ephemeral() => {
                    return Err(ProposalError::SpendsChange(*input_ref).into());
                }
                other => other.map(|change| change.output_pool()),
            },
        }
        .ok_or(ProposalError::ReferenceError(*input_ref))?;

        // Return an error on trying to spend a prior output that is not supported.
        #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
        if output_pool != PoolType::TRANSPARENT {
            return Err(Error::ProposalNotSupported);
        }
        #[cfg(not(feature = "transparent-inputs"))]
        return Err(Error::ProposalNotSupported);
    }

    // Every shielded-tree lookup for this step is bound to a single anchor height, so that a
    // transaction with only routed shielded outputs (for example, an Orchard-receiver payment
    // routed into a fresh Ironwood bundle post-NU6.3) is indistinguishable from one that spends
    // real notes in that pool. Any step that produces a shielded bundle carries the anchor selected
    // at proposal construction time; a purely transparent step performs no shielded-tree lookup, so
    // the value resolved here from the confirmations policy is unused.
    let anchor_height = proposal_step
        .anchor_height()
        .unwrap_or_else(|| confirmations_policy.anchor_height(min_target_height));

    let (sapling_anchor, sapling_inputs) = if proposal_step
        .involves(PoolType::Shielded(ShieldedPool::Sapling))
    {
        wallet_db.with_sapling_tree_mut::<_, _, Error<_, _, _, _, _, _>>(|sapling_tree| {
            let anchor = sapling_tree
                .root_at_checkpoint_id(&anchor_height)?
                .ok_or(ProposalError::AnchorNotFound(anchor_height))?
                .into();

            let sapling_inputs = proposal_step
                .shielded_inputs()
                .map(|inputs| {
                    inputs
                        .notes()
                        .iter()
                        .filter_map(|selected| match selected.note() {
                            Note::Sapling(note) => sapling_tree
                                .witness_at_checkpoint_id_caching(
                                    selected.note_commitment_tree_position(),
                                    &anchor_height,
                                )
                                .and_then(|witness| {
                                    witness
                                        .ok_or(ShardTreeError::Query(QueryError::CheckpointPruned))
                                })
                                .map(|merkle_path| {
                                    Some((selected.spending_key_scope(), note, merkle_path))
                                })
                                .map_err(Error::from)
                                .transpose(),
                            #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
                            Note::Orchard { .. } => None,
                        })
                        .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, Error<_, _, _, _, _, _>>>()
                })
                .transpose()?
                .unwrap_or_default();

            Ok((Some(anchor), sapling_inputs))
        })?
    } else {
        (None, vec![])
    };

    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let (orchard_anchor, orchard_inputs) = if proposal_step
        .involves(PoolType::Shielded(ShieldedPool::Orchard))
    {
        wallet_db.with_orchard_tree_mut::<_, _, Error<_, _, _, _, _, _>>(|orchard_tree| {
            let anchor = orchard_tree
                .root_at_checkpoint_id(&anchor_height)?
                .ok_or(ProposalError::AnchorNotFound(anchor_height))?
                .into();

            let orchard_inputs = proposal_step
                .shielded_inputs()
                .map(|inputs| {
                    inputs
                        .notes()
                        .iter()
                        .filter_map(|selected| match selected.note() {
                            Note::Orchard {
                                note,
                                pool: orchard::ValuePool::Orchard,
                            } => orchard_tree
                                .witness_at_checkpoint_id_caching(
                                    selected.note_commitment_tree_position(),
                                    &anchor_height,
                                )
                                .and_then(|witness| {
                                    witness
                                        .ok_or(ShardTreeError::Query(QueryError::CheckpointPruned))
                                })
                                .map(|merkle_path| Some((note, merkle_path.into())))
                                .map_err(Error::from)
                                .transpose(),
                            _ => None,
                        })
                        .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, Error<_, _, _, _, _, _>>>()
                })
                .transpose()?
                .unwrap_or_default();

            Ok((Some(anchor), orchard_inputs))
        })?
    } else {
        (None, vec![])
    };
    #[cfg(not(feature = "orchard"))]
    let orchard_anchor = None;

    // The Ironwood bundle is required exactly when the step involves the Ironwood pool, mirroring
    // the Sapling and Orchard gating above. A payment to an Orchard-protocol receiver post-NU6.3
    // targets the Ironwood pool, so input selection classifies it as an Ironwood-pool output; it
    // is therefore captured by `involves(Ironwood)`. Transactions with no Ironwood-pool inputs or
    // outputs (for example a pure-Sapling spend or a transparent-to-Sapling shielding) must not
    // require an Ironwood anchor, even once Ironwood is active.
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let (ironwood_anchor, ironwood_inputs) =
        if proposal_step.involves(PoolType::Shielded(ShieldedPool::Ironwood)) {
            wallet_db
                .with_ironwood_tree_mut::<_, _, Error<_, _, _, _, _, _>>(|ironwood_tree| {
                    let anchor = ironwood_tree
                        .root_at_checkpoint_id(&anchor_height)?
                        .ok_or(ProposalError::AnchorNotFound(anchor_height))?
                        .into();

                    let ironwood_inputs = proposal_step
                        .shielded_inputs()
                        .map(|inputs| {
                            inputs
                                .notes()
                                .iter()
                                .filter_map(|selected| match selected.note() {
                                    Note::Orchard {
                                        note,
                                        pool: orchard::ValuePool::Ironwood,
                                    } => ironwood_tree
                                        .witness_at_checkpoint_id_caching(
                                            selected.note_commitment_tree_position(),
                                            &anchor_height,
                                        )
                                        .and_then(|witness| {
                                            witness.ok_or(ShardTreeError::Query(
                                                QueryError::CheckpointPruned,
                                            ))
                                        })
                                        .map(|merkle_path| Some((note, merkle_path.into())))
                                        .map_err(Error::from)
                                        .transpose(),
                                    _ => None,
                                })
                                .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, Error<_, _, _, _, _, _>>>()
                        })
                        .transpose()?
                        .unwrap_or_default();

                    Ok((Some(anchor), ironwood_inputs))
                })?
                .ok_or(Error::ProposalNotSupported)?
        } else {
            (None, vec![])
        };

    #[cfg(not(feature = "orchard"))]
    let ironwood_anchor = None;

    // Create the transaction. The type of the proposal ensures that there
    // The Ironwood bundle's padding is DERIVED from the step, independently of the Orchard
    // bundle's: it is unpadded for a canonical ZIP 318 crossing and padded otherwise. The two
    // pools' padding is deliberately not coupled — an Orchard bundle is always padded, and the
    // Ironwood bundle drops its padding only when doing so makes the transaction indistinguishable
    // from a migration transfer. The fee model reaches the same conclusion from the same data (see
    // `fees::common::single_pool_output_balance`), which is what keeps the computed fee and the
    // built bundle in agreement.
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let ironwood_padding = proposal_step.ironwood_bundle_padding();
    #[cfg(not(feature = "orchard"))]
    let ironwood_padding = orchard_pool_padding;

    // are no possible transparent inputs, so we ignore those here.
    let mut builder = Builder::new(
        params.clone(),
        BlockHeight::from(min_target_height),
        BuildConfig::Standard {
            sapling_anchor,
            orchard_anchor,
            ironwood_anchor,
            orchard_padding: orchard_pool_padding,
            ironwood_padding,
        },
    );
    // A canonical crossing takes the ZIP 318 rolling expiry, which every crossing in the same
    // modulus period shares. The builder's ordinary per-transaction expiry (target height plus a
    // small delta) would single it out immediately, undoing the shape the unpadded bundle and the
    // bucketed anchor were chosen to produce. A caller-supplied expiry is refused rather than
    // silently overridden: the padding and anchor are already fixed by this point, so honouring it
    // would emit a transaction that is canonical in every respect but one.
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let expiry_height = {
        if step_is_canonical_crossing(wallet_db, params, proposal_step, min_target_height) {
            match expiry_height {
                Some(requested) => {
                    return Err(Error::ExpiryHeightConflictsWithCanonicalCrossing { requested });
                }
                None => Some(zcash_protocol::zip318::expiry_height(
                    min_target_height.into(),
                )),
            }
        } else {
            expiry_height
        }
    };

    if let Some(expiry_height) = expiry_height {
        builder = builder.with_expiry_height(expiry_height);
    }

    if let Some(version) = proposed_version {
        builder.propose_version(version)?;
    }

    #[cfg(all(feature = "transparent-inputs", not(feature = "orchard")))]
    let has_shielded_inputs = !sapling_inputs.is_empty();
    #[cfg(all(feature = "transparent-inputs", feature = "orchard"))]
    let has_shielded_inputs =
        !(sapling_inputs.is_empty() && orchard_inputs.is_empty() && ironwood_inputs.is_empty());

    let input_sources = NonEmpty::from_vec({
        let mut sources = vec![];
        if !sapling_inputs.is_empty() {
            sources.push(PoolType::SAPLING);
        }
        #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
        if !orchard_inputs.is_empty() || !ironwood_inputs.is_empty() {
            sources.push(PoolType::ORCHARD);
        }
        // We assume here that prior step outputs cannot be shielded, due to checks above (and the
        // fact that the witness required to spend such outputs could not be computed.)
        #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
        if !(proposal_step.transparent_inputs().is_empty()
            && proposal_step.prior_step_inputs().is_empty())
        {
            sources.push(PoolType::Transparent);
        }
        sources
    })
    .ok_or(Error::ProposalNotSupported)?;

    for (_sapling_key_scope, sapling_note, merkle_path) in sapling_inputs.into_iter() {
        let key = match _sapling_key_scope {
            Scope::External => ufvk.sapling().map(|k| k.fvk().clone()),
            Scope::Internal => ufvk.sapling().map(|k| k.to_internal_fvk()),
        };

        builder.add_sapling_spend(
            key.ok_or(Error::KeyNotAvailable(PoolType::SAPLING))?,
            sapling_note.clone(),
            merkle_path,
        )?;
    }

    // Post-NU6.3 the Orchard bundle enforces the cross-address restriction, so Orchard-pool
    // change must be returned to a spent Orchard note's own address to remain in the Orchard pool
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    for (orchard_note, merkle_path) in orchard_inputs.into_iter() {
        builder.add_orchard_spend(
            ufvk.orchard()
                .cloned()
                .ok_or(Error::KeyNotAvailable(PoolType::ORCHARD))?,
            *orchard_note,
            merkle_path,
        )?;
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    for (ironwood_note, merkle_path) in ironwood_inputs.into_iter() {
        builder.add_ironwood_spend(
            ufvk.orchard()
                .cloned()
                .ok_or(Error::KeyNotAvailable(PoolType::ORCHARD))?,
            *ironwood_note,
            merkle_path,
        )?;
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    let mut transparent_input_addresses =
        HashMap::<TransparentAddress, TransparentAddressMetadata>::new();

    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    let mut metadata_from_address = |addr: &TransparentAddress| -> Result<
        TransparentAddressMetadata,
        CreateErrT<DbT, InputsErrT, FeeRuleT, ChangeErrT, N>,
    > {
        match transparent_input_addresses.get(addr) {
            Some(result) => Ok(result.clone()),
            None => {
                // `wallet_db.get_transparent_address_metadata` includes reserved ephemeral
                // addresses in its lookup. We don't need to include these in order to be
                // able to construct ZIP 320 transactions, because in that case the ephemeral
                // output is represented via a "change" reference to a previous step. However,
                // we do need them in order to create a transaction from a proposal that
                // explicitly spends an output from an ephemeral address (only for outputs
                // already detected by this wallet instance).

                let result = wallet_db
                    .get_transparent_address_metadata(account_id, addr)
                    .map_err(InputSelectorError::DataSource)?
                    .ok_or(Error::AddressNotRecognized(*addr))?;

                transparent_input_addresses.insert(*addr, result.clone());
                Ok(result)
            }
        }
    };

    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    let utxos_spent = {
        let mut utxos_spent: Vec<OutPoint> = vec![];
        let mut add_transparent_input =
            |builder: &mut Builder<_, _>,
             utxos_spent: &mut Vec<_>,
             recipient_address: &TransparentAddress,
             outpoint: OutPoint,
             txout: TxOut|
             -> Result<(), CreateErrT<DbT, InputsErrT, FeeRuleT, ChangeErrT, N>> {
                let metadata = metadata_from_address(recipient_address)?;
                match metadata.source() {
                    TransparentAddressSource::Derived {
                        scope,
                        address_index,
                    } => {
                        let pubkey = ufvk
                            .transparent()
                            .ok_or(Error::KeyNotAvailable(PoolType::Transparent))?
                            .derive_address_pubkey(*scope, *address_index)
                            .expect("spending key derivation should not fail");
                        utxos_spent.push(outpoint.clone());
                        builder.add_transparent_p2pkh_input(pubkey, outpoint, txout)?;
                    }
                    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-key-import")]
                    TransparentAddressSource::StandalonePubkey(pubkey) => {
                        utxos_spent.push(outpoint.clone());
                        builder.add_transparent_p2pkh_input(*pubkey, outpoint, txout)?;
                    }
                    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-key-import")]
                    TransparentAddressSource::StandaloneScript(redeem_script) => {
                        let from_chain =
                            zs_script::FromChain::parse(&zs_script::Code(redeem_script.to_bytes()))
                                .map_err(|_| ::transparent::builder::Error::UnsupportedScript)?;
                        utxos_spent.push(outpoint.clone());
                        builder.add_transparent_p2sh_input(from_chain, outpoint, txout)?;
                    }
                }

                Ok(())
            };

        for utxo in proposal_step.transparent_inputs() {
            add_transparent_input(
                &mut builder,
                &mut utxos_spent,
                utxo.recipient_address(),
                utxo.outpoint().clone(),
                utxo.txout().clone(),
            )?;
        }
        for input_ref in proposal_step.prior_step_inputs() {
            // A referenced transparent step output must exist and be referenced *at most* once.
            // (Exactly once in the case of ephemeral outputs.)
            let (address, outpoint) = unused_transparent_outputs
                .remove(input_ref)
                .ok_or(Error::Proposal(ProposalError::ReferenceError(*input_ref)))?;

            let txout = &prior_step_results[input_ref.step_index()]
                .1
                .build_result
                .transaction()
                .transparent_bundle()
                .ok_or(ProposalError::ReferenceError(*input_ref))?
                .vout[outpoint.n() as usize];

            add_transparent_input(
                &mut builder,
                &mut utxos_spent,
                &address,
                outpoint,
                txout.clone(),
            )?;
        }
        utxos_spent
    };

    let (external_ovk, internal_ovk) = match ovk_policy {
        OvkPolicy::Sender => (
            Some(
                ufvk.select_ovk(zip32::Scope::External, &input_sources)
                    .ok_or(Error::KeyNotAvailable(input_sources.head))?,
            ),
            None,
        ),
        OvkPolicy::Custom {
            external_ovk,
            internal_ovk,
        } => (Some(external_ovk), internal_ovk),
        OvkPolicy::Discard => (None, None),
    };

    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let mut orchard_output_meta: Vec<(ShieldedBuildRecipient<_>, Zatoshis, Option<MemoBytes>)> =
        vec![];
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let mut ironwood_output_meta: Vec<(
        ShieldedBuildRecipient<_>,
        Zatoshis,
        Option<MemoBytes>,
    )> = vec![];
    let mut sapling_output_meta: Vec<(ShieldedBuildRecipient<_>, Zatoshis, Option<MemoBytes>)> =
        vec![];
    let mut transparent_output_meta: Vec<(
        TransparentBuildRecipient<_>,
        TransparentAddress,
        Zatoshis,
        StepOutputIndex,
    )> = vec![];

    for (&payment_index, output_pool) in proposal_step.payment_pools() {
        let payment = proposal_step
            .transaction_request()
            .payments()
            .get(&payment_index)
            .expect(
                "The mapping between payment index and payment is checked in step construction",
            );
        let payment_amount = payment
            .amount()
            .ok_or(ProposalError::PaymentAmountMissing(payment_index))?;
        let recipient_address = payment.recipient_address();

        let add_sapling_output =
            |builder: &mut Builder<_, _>,
             sapling_output_meta: &mut Vec<_>,
             to: sapling::PaymentAddress|
             -> Result<(), CreateErrT<DbT, InputsErrT, FeeRuleT, ChangeErrT, N>> {
                let memo = payment.memo().map_or_else(MemoBytes::empty, |m| m.clone());
                builder.add_sapling_output(
                    external_ovk.map(|k| k.into()),
                    to,
                    payment_amount,
                    memo.clone(),
                )?;
                sapling_output_meta.push((
                    ShieldedBuildRecipient::External {
                        recipient_address: recipient_address.clone(),
                        output_pool: PoolType::SAPLING,
                    },
                    payment_amount,
                    Some(memo),
                ));
                Ok(())
            };

        #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
        let add_orchard_output =
            |builder: &mut Builder<_, _>,
             orchard_output_meta: &mut Vec<_>,
             to: orchard::Address|
             -> Result<(), CreateErrT<DbT, InputsErrT, FeeRuleT, ChangeErrT, N>> {
                let memo = payment.memo().map_or_else(MemoBytes::empty, |m| m.clone());
                builder.add_orchard_output(
                    external_ovk.map(|k| k.into()),
                    to,
                    payment_amount,
                    memo.clone(),
                )?;
                orchard_output_meta.push((
                    ShieldedBuildRecipient::External {
                        recipient_address: recipient_address.clone(),
                        output_pool: PoolType::ORCHARD,
                    },
                    payment_amount,
                    Some(memo),
                ));
                Ok(())
            };

        #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
        let add_ironwood_output =
            |builder: &mut Builder<_, _>,
             ironwood_output_meta: &mut Vec<_>,
             to: orchard::Address|
             -> Result<(), CreateErrT<DbT, InputsErrT, FeeRuleT, ChangeErrT, N>> {
                let memo = payment.memo().map_or_else(MemoBytes::empty, |m| m.clone());
                builder.add_ironwood_output(
                    external_ovk.map(|k| k.into()),
                    to,
                    payment_amount,
                    memo.clone(),
                )?;
                ironwood_output_meta.push((
                    ShieldedBuildRecipient::External {
                        recipient_address: recipient_address.clone(),
                        // The payment is built into the Ironwood bundle, so its sent-note record
                        // belongs to the Ironwood pool. (Post-NU6.3 an Orchard-pool payment output
                        // is forbidden when spending Orchard; only change may return to Orchard.)
                        output_pool: PoolType::IRONWOOD,
                    },
                    payment_amount,
                    Some(memo),
                ));
                Ok(())
            };

        let add_transparent_output =
            |builder: &mut Builder<_, _>,
             transparent_output_meta: &mut Vec<_>,
             to: TransparentAddress|
             -> Result<(), CreateErrT<DbT, InputsErrT, FeeRuleT, ChangeErrT, N>> {
                if payment.memo().is_some() {
                    return Err(Error::Payment(zip321::PaymentError::TransparentMemo));
                }
                builder.add_transparent_output(&to, payment_amount)?;
                transparent_output_meta.push((
                    TransparentBuildRecipient::External {
                        recipient_address: recipient_address.clone(),
                        output_pool: PoolType::TRANSPARENT,
                    },
                    to,
                    payment_amount,
                    StepOutputIndex::Payment(payment_index),
                ));
                Ok(())
            };

        match recipient_address
            .clone()
            .convert_if_network(params.network_type())?
        {
            Address::Unified(ua) => match output_pool {
                #[cfg(not(feature = "orchard"))]
                PoolType::Shielded(ShieldedPool::Orchard) => {
                    return Err(Error::ProposalNotSupported);
                }
                #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
                PoolType::Shielded(ShieldedPool::Orchard) => {
                    // Legacy Orchard payment (pre-NU6.3). Once Ironwood is active, input
                    // selection assigns Orchard-receiver payments the Ironwood output pool
                    // instead, so this arm always builds a plain Orchard output.
                    let to = *ua.orchard().expect("The mapping between payment pool and receiver is checked in step construction");
                    add_orchard_output(&mut builder, &mut orchard_output_meta, to)?;
                }
                PoolType::Shielded(ShieldedPool::Sapling) => {
                    let to = *ua.sapling().expect("The mapping between payment pool and receiver is checked in step construction");
                    add_sapling_output(&mut builder, &mut sapling_output_meta, to)?;
                }
                PoolType::Transparent => {
                    let to = *ua.transparent().expect("The mapping between payment pool and receiver is checked in step construction");
                    add_transparent_output(&mut builder, &mut transparent_output_meta, to)?;
                }
                #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
                PoolType::Shielded(ShieldedPool::Ironwood) => {
                    // Ironwood payment (post-NU6.3): delivered to the recipient's Orchard
                    // receiver, but through the Ironwood bundle, a pool distinct from Orchard.
                    let to = *ua.orchard().expect("The mapping between payment pool and receiver is checked in step construction");
                    add_ironwood_output(&mut builder, &mut ironwood_output_meta, to)?;
                }
                #[cfg(not(feature = "orchard"))]
                PoolType::Shielded(ShieldedPool::Ironwood) => {
                    return Err(Error::ProposalNotSupported);
                }
            },
            Address::Sapling(to) => {
                add_sapling_output(&mut builder, &mut sapling_output_meta, to)?;
            }
            Address::Transparent(to) => {
                add_transparent_output(&mut builder, &mut transparent_output_meta, to)?;
            }
            #[cfg(not(feature = "transparent-inputs"))]
            Address::Tex(_) => {
                return Err(Error::ProposalNotSupported);
            }
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
            Address::Tex(data) => {
                if has_shielded_inputs {
                    return Err(ProposalError::PaysTexFromShielded.into());
                }
                let to = TransparentAddress::PublicKeyHash(data);
                add_transparent_output(&mut builder, &mut transparent_output_meta, to)?;
            }
        }
    }

    for change_value in proposal_step.balance().proposed_change() {
        let memo = change_value
            .memo()
            .map_or_else(MemoBytes::empty, |m| m.clone());
        let output_pool = change_value.output_pool();
        match output_pool {
            PoolType::Shielded(ShieldedPool::Sapling) => {
                builder.add_sapling_output(
                    internal_ovk.map(|k| k.into()),
                    ufvk.sapling()
                        .ok_or(Error::KeyNotAvailable(PoolType::SAPLING))?
                        .change_address()
                        .1,
                    change_value.value(),
                    memo.clone(),
                )?;
                sapling_output_meta.push((
                    ShieldedBuildRecipient::InternalShielded {
                        receiving_account: account_id,
                        external_address: None,
                    },
                    change_value.value(),
                    Some(memo),
                ))
            }
            PoolType::Shielded(ShieldedPool::Orchard) => {
                #[cfg(not(feature = "orchard"))]
                return Err(Error::UnsupportedChangeType(output_pool));

                #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
                {
                    let orchard_fvk = ufvk
                        .orchard()
                        .ok_or(Error::KeyNotAvailable(PoolType::ORCHARD))?;

                    let change_address =
                        orchard_fvk.address_at(0u32, orchard::keys::Scope::Internal);

                    if ironwood_active_at(params, min_target_height) {
                        // Post-NU6.3 with an Orchard spend: the change stays in the Orchard pool,
                        // returned to a spent note's own address so it satisfies the Orchard V3
                        // cross-address restriction. Only the payment crosses into Ironwood. The
                        // Orchard V3 bundle forbids ordinary outputs, so the change is added via
                        // `add_orchard_change_output`, which pairs it with a fabricated same-address
                        builder.add_orchard_change_output(
                            orchard_fvk.clone(),
                            internal_ovk.map(|k| k.into()),
                            change_address,
                            change_value.value(),
                            memo.clone(),
                        )?;
                        orchard_output_meta.push((
                            ShieldedBuildRecipient::InternalShielded {
                                receiving_account: account_id,
                                external_address: None,
                            },
                            change_value.value(),
                            Some(memo),
                        ))
                    } else {
                        builder.add_orchard_output(
                            internal_ovk.map(|k| k.into()),
                            change_address,
                            change_value.value(),
                            memo.clone(),
                        )?;
                        orchard_output_meta.push((
                            ShieldedBuildRecipient::InternalShielded {
                                receiving_account: account_id,
                                external_address: None,
                            },
                            change_value.value(),
                            Some(memo),
                        ))
                    }
                }
            }
            PoolType::Transparent => {
                // Transparent change outputs (both ephemeral outputs used in multi-step
                // proposals and non-ephemeral change sent to internal-scope addresses)
                // are added to the transaction below, after address reservation.
                #[cfg(not(feature = "transparent-inputs"))]
                return Err(Error::UnsupportedChangeType(output_pool));
            }
            PoolType::Shielded(ShieldedPool::Ironwood) => {
                #[cfg(not(feature = "orchard"))]
                return Err(Error::UnsupportedChangeType(output_pool));

                #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
                {
                    let orchard_fvk = ufvk
                        .orchard()
                        .ok_or(Error::KeyNotAvailable(PoolType::ORCHARD))?;

                    let change_address =
                        orchard_fvk.address_at(0u32, orchard::keys::Scope::Internal);

                    builder.add_ironwood_output(
                        internal_ovk.map(|k| k.into()),
                        change_address,
                        change_value.value(),
                        memo.clone(),
                    )?;
                    ironwood_output_meta.push((
                        ShieldedBuildRecipient::InternalShielded {
                            receiving_account: account_id,
                            external_address: None,
                        },
                        change_value.value(),
                        Some(memo),
                    ))
                }
            }
        }
    }

    // This reserves the ephemeral addresses even if transaction construction fails.
    // It is not worth the complexity of being able to unreserve them, because there
    // are few failure modes after this point that would allow us to do so.
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    {
        let ephemeral_outputs: Vec<(usize, &ChangeValue)> = proposal_step
            .balance()
            .proposed_change()
            .iter()
            .enumerate()
            .filter(|(_, change_value)| {
                change_value.is_ephemeral() && change_value.output_pool() == PoolType::Transparent
            })
            .collect();

        let addresses_and_metadata = wallet_db
            .reserve_next_n_ephemeral_addresses(account_id, ephemeral_outputs.len())
            .map_err(Error::DataSource)?;
        assert_eq!(addresses_and_metadata.len(), ephemeral_outputs.len());

        // We don't need the TransparentAddressSource here; we can look it up from the data source later.
        for ((change_index, change_value), (ephemeral_address, _)) in
            ephemeral_outputs.iter().zip(addresses_and_metadata)
        {
            // This output is ephemeral; we will report an error in `create_proposed_transactions`
            // if a later step does not consume it.
            builder.add_transparent_output(&ephemeral_address, change_value.value())?;
            transparent_output_meta.push((
                TransparentBuildRecipient::EphemeralTransparent {
                    receiving_account: account_id,
                    ephemeral_address,
                },
                ephemeral_address,
                change_value.value(),
                StepOutputIndex::Change(*change_index),
            ))
        }
    }

    // Add any transparent change outputs, sending them to the next available internal-scope
    // (change) transparent addresses of the account. As with ephemeral addresses above, this
    // reserves the internal addresses even if transaction construction subsequently fails.
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    {
        let transparent_change_outputs: Vec<(usize, &ChangeValue)> = proposal_step
            .balance()
            .proposed_change()
            .iter()
            .enumerate()
            .filter(|(_, change_value)| {
                !change_value.is_ephemeral() && change_value.output_pool() == PoolType::Transparent
            })
            .collect();

        if !transparent_change_outputs.is_empty() {
            let addresses_and_metadata = wallet_db
                .reserve_next_n_internal_addresses(account_id, transparent_change_outputs.len())
                .map_err(Error::DataSource)?;
            assert_eq!(
                addresses_and_metadata.len(),
                transparent_change_outputs.len()
            );

            for ((change_index, change_value), (change_address, _)) in transparent_change_outputs
                .iter()
                .zip(addresses_and_metadata)
            {
                builder.add_transparent_output(&change_address, change_value.value())?;
                transparent_output_meta.push((
                    TransparentBuildRecipient::InternalTransparent {
                        receiving_account: account_id,
                        recipient_address: change_address,
                    },
                    change_address,
                    change_value.value(),
                    StepOutputIndex::Change(*change_index),
                ))
            }
        }
    }

    Ok(BuildState {
        #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
        step_index,
        builder,
        #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
        transparent_input_addresses,
        #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
        orchard_output_meta,
        #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
        ironwood_output_meta,
        sapling_output_meta,
        transparent_output_meta,
        #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
        utxos_spent,
    })
}

// `unused_transparent_outputs` maps `StepOutput`s for transparent outputs
// that have not been consumed so far, to the corresponding pair of
// `TransparentAddress` and `Outpoint`.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
fn create_proposed_transaction<DbT, ParamsT, InputsErrT, FeeRuleT, ChangeErrT, N>(
    wallet_db: &mut DbT,
    params: &ParamsT,
    spend_prover: &impl SpendProver,
    output_prover: &impl OutputProver,
    spending_keys: &SpendingKeys,
    account_id: <DbT as WalletRead>::AccountId,
    ovk_policy: OvkPolicy,
    fee_rule: &FeeRuleT,
    min_target_height: TargetHeight,
    confirmations_policy: ConfirmationsPolicy,
    prior_step_results: &[(&Step<N>, StepResult<<DbT as WalletRead>::AccountId>)],
    proposal_step: &Step<N>,
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")] unused_transparent_outputs: &mut HashMap<
        StepOutput,
        (TransparentAddress, OutPoint),
    >,
    proposed_version: Option<TxVersion>,
    expiry_height: Option<BlockHeight>,
) -> Result<
    StepResult<<DbT as WalletRead>::AccountId>,
    CreateErrT<DbT, InputsErrT, FeeRuleT, ChangeErrT, N>,
>
where
    DbT: WalletWrite + WalletCommitmentTrees,
    ParamsT: consensus::Parameters + Clone,
    FeeRuleT: FeeRule,
{
    let build_state = build_proposed_transaction::<_, _, _, FeeRuleT, _, _>(
        wallet_db,
        params,
        &spending_keys.usk.to_unified_full_viewing_key(),
        account_id,
        ovk_policy,
        min_target_height,
        confirmations_policy,
        prior_step_results,
        proposal_step,
        #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
        unused_transparent_outputs,
        proposed_version,
        // The non-PCZT path always builds padded Orchard-pool bundles.
        BundlePadding::DEFAULT,
        expiry_height,
    )?;

    // Build the transaction with the specified fee rule
    #[cfg_attr(not(feature = "transparent-inputs"), allow(unused_mut))]
    let mut transparent_signing_set = TransparentSigningSet::new();
    #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
    for (_address, address_metadata) in build_state.transparent_input_addresses {
        match address_metadata.source() {
            TransparentAddressSource::Derived {
                scope,
                address_index,
            } => {
                transparent_signing_set.add_key(
                    spending_keys
                        .usk
                        .transparent()
                        .derive_secret_key(*scope, *address_index)
                        .expect("spending key derivation should not fail"),
                );
            }
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-key-import")]
            TransparentAddressSource::StandalonePubkey(_)
            | TransparentAddressSource::StandaloneScript(_) => {
                let keys = spending_keys
                    .standalone_transparent_keys
                    .get(&_address)
                    .ok_or(Error::AddressNotRecognized(_address))?;
                for key in keys {
                    transparent_signing_set.add_key(*key);
                }
            }
        }
    }
    let sapling_extsks = &[
        spending_keys.usk.sapling().clone(),
        spending_keys.usk.sapling().derive_internal(),
    ];
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let orchard_saks = &[spending_keys.usk.orchard().into()];
    #[cfg(not(feature = "orchard"))]
    let orchard_saks = &[];
    let build_result = build_state.builder.build(
        &transparent_signing_set,
        sapling_extsks,
        orchard_saks,
        UnwrapErr(SysRng),
        spend_prover,
        output_prover,
        fee_rule,
    )?;

    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let orchard_fvk: orchard::keys::FullViewingKey = spending_keys.usk.orchard().into();
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let orchard_internal_ivk = orchard_fvk.to_ivk(orchard::keys::Scope::Internal);
    // Same-address Orchard change (post-NU6.3, when spending Orchard notes) is returned to a spent
    // note's own address, which may be external-scoped; try the external IVK as well so such change
    // outputs remain decryptable for recording.
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let orchard_external_ivk = orchard_fvk.to_ivk(orchard::keys::Scope::External);
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let orchard_outputs = build_state.orchard_output_meta.into_iter().enumerate().map(
        |(i, (recipient, value, memo))| {
            let output_index = build_result
                .orchard_meta()
                .output_action_index(i)
                .expect("An action should exist in the transaction for each Orchard output.");

            let recipient = recipient.into_recipient(|| {
                build_result
                    .transaction()
                    .orchard_bundle()
                    .and_then(|bundle| {
                        bundle
                            .decrypt_output_with_key(output_index, &orchard_internal_ivk)
                            .or_else(|| {
                                bundle.decrypt_output_with_key(output_index, &orchard_external_ivk)
                            })
                            .map(|(note, _, _)| Note::Orchard {
                                note,
                                pool: orchard::ValuePool::Orchard,
                            })
                    })
                    .expect("Wallet-internal outputs must be decryptable with the wallet's IVK")
            });

            SentTransactionOutput::from_parts_in_tree(
                Some(NoteCommitmentTree::Orchard),
                output_index,
                recipient,
                value,
                memo,
            )
        },
    );

    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let ironwood_outputs = build_state
        .ironwood_output_meta
        .into_iter()
        .enumerate()
        .map(|(i, (recipient, value, memo))| {
            let raw_output_index = build_result
                .ironwood_meta()
                .output_action_index(i)
                .expect("An action should exist in the transaction for each Ironwood output.");

            let recipient = recipient.into_recipient(|| {
                build_result
                    .transaction()
                    .ironwood_bundle()
                    .and_then(|bundle| {
                        bundle
                            .decrypt_output_with_key(raw_output_index, &orchard_internal_ivk)
                            .map(|(note, _, _)| Note::Orchard { note, pool: orchard::ValuePool::Ironwood })
                    })
                    .expect(
                        "Wallet-internal Ironwood outputs must be decryptable with the wallet's IVK",
                    )
            });

            // The Ironwood output is stored at its raw index within the Ironwood bundle — the same
            // index the scanner assigns — so the send and scan write paths agree. Each shielded
            // pool has its own received-notes table keyed by (transaction, action_index), so
            // Orchard and Ironwood indices never collide despite both starting at zero.
            SentTransactionOutput::from_parts_in_tree(
                Some(NoteCommitmentTree::Ironwood),
                raw_output_index,
                recipient,
                value,
                memo,
            )
        });

    let sapling_dfvk = spending_keys
        .usk
        .sapling()
        .to_diversifiable_full_viewing_key();
    let sapling_internal_ivk =
        PreparedIncomingViewingKey::new(&sapling_dfvk.to_ivk(Scope::Internal));
    let sapling_outputs = build_state.sapling_output_meta.into_iter().enumerate().map(
        |(i, (recipient, value, memo))| {
            let output_index = build_result
                .sapling_meta()
                .output_index(i)
                .expect("An output should exist in the transaction for each Sapling payment.");

            let recipient = recipient.into_recipient(|| {
                build_result
                    .transaction()
                    .sapling_bundle()
                    .and_then(|bundle| {
                        try_sapling_note_decryption(
                            &sapling_internal_ivk,
                            &bundle.shielded_outputs()[output_index],
                            zip212_enforcement(params, min_target_height.into()),
                        )
                        .map(|(note, _, _)| Note::Sapling(note))
                    })
                    .expect("Wallet-internal outputs must be decryptable with the wallet's IVK")
            });

            SentTransactionOutput::from_parts_in_tree(
                Some(NoteCommitmentTree::Sapling),
                output_index,
                recipient,
                value,
                memo,
            )
        },
    );

    let txid: [u8; 32] = build_result.transaction().txid().into();
    assert_eq!(
        build_state.transparent_output_meta.len(),
        build_result
            .transaction()
            .transparent_bundle()
            .map_or(0, |b| b.vout.len()),
    );

    #[allow(unused_variables)]
    let transparent_outputs = build_state
        .transparent_output_meta
        .into_iter()
        .enumerate()
        .map(|(n, (recipient, address, value, step_output_index))| {
            // This assumes that transparent outputs are pushed onto `transparent_output_meta`
            // with the same indices they have in the transaction's transparent outputs.
            // We do not reorder transparent outputs; there is no reason to do so because it
            // would not usefully improve privacy.
            let outpoint = OutPoint::new(txid, n as u32);

            let recipient = recipient.into_recipient(
                #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
                outpoint.clone(),
            );

            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
            unused_transparent_outputs.insert(
                StepOutput::new(build_state.step_index, step_output_index),
                (address, outpoint),
            );
            SentTransactionOutput::from_parts(n, recipient, value, None)
        });

    let mut outputs: Vec<SentTransactionOutput<_>> = vec![];
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    outputs.extend(orchard_outputs);
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    outputs.extend(ironwood_outputs);
    outputs.extend(sapling_outputs);
    outputs.extend(transparent_outputs);

    Ok(StepResult {
        build_result,
        outputs,
        fee_amount: proposal_step.balance().fee_required(),
        #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
        utxos_spent: build_state.utxos_spent,
    })
}

/// Constructs a transaction using the inputs supplied by the given proposal.
///
/// Only single-step proposals are currently supported.
///
/// Returns a partially-created Zcash transaction (PCZT) that is ready to be authorized.
/// You can use the following roles for this:
/// - [`pczt::roles::prover::Prover`]
/// - [`pczt::roles::signer::Signer`] (if you have local access to the spend authorizing
///   keys)
/// - [`pczt::roles::combiner::Combiner`] (if you create proofs and apply signatures in
///   parallel)
///
/// Before sending the PCZT to an external Signer, create a signer view with
/// [`redact_pczt_for_signer`] and retain the original for combination.
/// A Signer that independently obtains the relevant full viewing keys and returns
/// only Orchard-protocol signature contributions can instead use
/// [`redact_pczt_for_batch_signer`].
///
/// Once the PCZT fully authorized, call [`extract_and_store_transaction_from_pczt`] to
/// finish transaction creation.
///
/// `expiry_height`, when set, replaces the builder-derived expiry before
/// the PCZT is finalized. Applying this override after finalization can invalidate
/// dummy spend signatures.
///
/// A nonzero `expiry_height` below the proposal's
/// [`min_target_height`](Proposal::min_target_height) is rejected with
/// [`Error::ExpiryHeightBelowTargetHeight`]. An `expiry_height` of zero,
/// which disables expiry, is exempt from this check.
///
/// `orchard_pool_padding` selects the transactional bundle padding for the Orchard
/// bundle; pass
/// [`BundlePadding::DEFAULT`](zcash_primitives::transaction::builder::BundlePadding).
/// The Ironwood bundle's padding is not a caller's to choose: it is derived from the
/// proposal by [`Step::ironwood_bundle_padding`](crate::proposal::Step::ironwood_bundle_padding),
/// so that it matches the action count the fee was computed from.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
#[cfg(feature = "pczt")]
pub fn create_pczt_from_proposal<DbT, ParamsT, InputsErrT, FeeRuleT, ChangeErrT, N>(
    wallet_db: &mut DbT,
    params: &ParamsT,
    account_id: <DbT as WalletRead>::AccountId,
    ovk_policy: OvkPolicy,
    proposal: &Proposal<FeeRuleT, N>,
    expiry_height: Option<BlockHeight>,
    orchard_pool_padding: BundlePadding,
) -> Result<pczt::Pczt, CreateErrT<DbT, InputsErrT, FeeRuleT, ChangeErrT, N>>
where
    DbT: WalletWrite + WalletCommitmentTrees,
    ParamsT: consensus::Parameters + Clone,
    FeeRuleT: FeeRule,
    <DbT as WalletRead>::AccountId: serde::Serialize,
{
    let account = wallet_db
        .get_account(account_id)
        .map_err(Error::DataSource)?
        .ok_or(Error::AccountIdNotRecognized)?;
    let ufvk = account.ufvk().ok_or(Error::AccountCannotSpend)?;
    let account_derivation = account.source().key_derivation();

    // For now we only support turning single-step proposals into PCZTs.
    if proposal.steps().len() > 1 {
        return Err(Error::ProposalNotSupported);
    }
    let fee_rule = proposal.fee_rule();
    let min_target_height = proposal.min_target_height();

    if let Some(expiry_height) = expiry_height {
        let min_target_height = BlockHeight::from(min_target_height);
        if expiry_height != consensus::H0 && expiry_height < min_target_height {
            return Err(Error::ExpiryHeightBelowTargetHeight {
                expiry_height,
                min_target_height,
            });
        }
    }

    let prior_step_results = &[];
    let proposal_step = proposal.steps().first();

    let unused_transparent_outputs = &mut HashMap::new();
    // Build at the version the proposal requested, falling back to the version implied by the
    // target height (version 6 from NU6.3 onward). Both the version 6 format and its Ironwood
    // bundle are fully representable as a PCZT.
    let proposed_version = proposal.proposed_version();

    let build_state = build_proposed_transaction::<_, _, _, FeeRuleT, _, _>(
        wallet_db,
        params,
        ufvk,
        account_id,
        ovk_policy,
        min_target_height,
        proposal.confirmations_policy(),
        prior_step_results,
        proposal_step,
        #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
        unused_transparent_outputs,
        proposed_version,
        orchard_pool_padding,
        // This path applies `expiry_height` after the PCZT is built instead (below),
        // since overriding it via the builder would be redundant with that existing mechanism.
        None,
    )?;

    // This path applies its expiry AFTER the builder has run, so the refusal inside
    // `build_proposed_transaction` — which saw `None` above — cannot see the caller's argument.
    // Without this, an override would silently overwrite the ZIP 318 rolling expiry that
    // `build_proposed_transaction` set, leaving a transaction canonical in every respect but the
    // one that is committed and publicly visible.
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    if let Some(requested) = expiry_height
        && step_is_canonical_crossing(wallet_db, params, proposal_step, min_target_height)
    {
        return Err(Error::ExpiryHeightConflictsWithCanonicalCrossing { requested });
    }

    // Build the transaction with the specified fee rule
    let mut build_result = build_state
        .builder
        .build_for_pczt(UnwrapErr(SysRng), fee_rule)?;

    if let Some(expiry_height) = expiry_height {
        build_result.pczt_parts.expiry_height = expiry_height;
    }

    let created = Creator::build_from_parts(build_result.pczt_parts).ok_or(PcztError::Build)?;

    let io_finalized = IoFinalizer::new(created).finalize_io()?;

    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let orchard_outputs = build_state
        .orchard_output_meta
        .into_iter()
        .enumerate()
        .map(|(i, (recipient, _, _))| {
            let output_index = build_result
                .orchard_meta
                .output_action_index(i)
                .expect("An action should exist in the transaction for each Orchard output.");

            (
                output_index,
                PcztRecipient::from_shielded_recipient(recipient),
            )
        })
        .collect::<HashMap<_, _>>();

    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let ironwood_outputs = build_state
        .ironwood_output_meta
        .into_iter()
        .enumerate()
        .map(|(i, (recipient, _, _))| {
            let output_index = build_result
                .ironwood_meta
                .output_action_index(i)
                .expect("An action should exist in the transaction for each Ironwood output.");

            (
                output_index,
                PcztRecipient::from_shielded_recipient(recipient),
            )
        })
        .collect::<HashMap<_, _>>();

    let sapling_outputs = build_state
        .sapling_output_meta
        .into_iter()
        .enumerate()
        .map(|(i, (recipient, _, _))| {
            let output_index = build_result
                .sapling_meta
                .output_index(i)
                .expect("An output should exist in the transaction for each Sapling output.");

            (
                output_index,
                PcztRecipient::from_shielded_recipient(recipient),
            )
        })
        .collect::<HashMap<_, _>>();

    let pczt = Updater::new(io_finalized)
        .update_global_with(|mut updater| {
            updater.set_proprietary(
                PROPRIETARY_PROPOSAL_INFO.into(),
                postcard::to_allocvec(&ProposalInfo::<<DbT as WalletRead>::AccountId> {
                    from_account: account_id,
                    target_height: proposal.min_target_height(),
                })
                .expect("postcard encoding of PCZT proposal metadata should not fail"),
            )
        })
        .update_orchard_with(|mut updater| {
            // An action still needs a spend authorization signature if and only if its spend
            // requires one: this covers both the requested real spends and the wallet-controlled
            // zero-value spends the builder pairs with change outputs in the vanilla-Orchard-pool
            // bundle under the post-NU6.3 cross-address rule. Protocol padding dummies are
            // pre-signed and cleared by the IO Finalizer, so they are excluded by this check.
            let spend_needs_derivation = updater
                .bundle()
                .actions()
                .iter()
                .map(|action| action.spend().spend_auth_sig().is_none())
                .collect::<Vec<_>>();

            for (index, needs_derivation) in spend_needs_derivation.iter().enumerate() {
                updater.update_action_with(index, |mut action_updater| {
                    // If the account has a known derivation, add the Orchard key path to the PCZT
                    // for every spend that still requires a signature (real spends and
                    // wallet-controlled zero-value spends), so an external Signer can identify
                    // and sign it.
                    if let Some(derivation) = account_derivation
                        && *needs_derivation
                    {
                        // All spent notes are from the same account.
                        action_updater.set_spend_zip32_derivation(
                            orchard::pczt::Zip32Derivation::parse(
                                derivation.seed_fingerprint().to_bytes(),
                                vec![
                                    zip32::ChildIndex::hardened(32).index(),
                                    zip32::ChildIndex::hardened(params.network_type().coin_type())
                                        .index(),
                                    zip32::ChildIndex::hardened(u32::from(
                                        derivation.account_index(),
                                    ))
                                    .index(),
                                ],
                            )
                            .expect("valid"),
                        );
                    }

                    if let Some((pczt_recipient, external_address)) = orchard_outputs.get(&index) {
                        if let Some(user_address) = external_address {
                            action_updater.set_output_user_address(user_address.encode());
                        }
                        action_updater.set_output_proprietary(
                            PROPRIETARY_OUTPUT_INFO.into(),
                            postcard::to_allocvec(pczt_recipient).expect(
                                "postcard encoding of PCZT recipient metadata should not fail",
                            ),
                        );
                    }

                    Ok(())
                })?;
            }
            Ok(())
        })?
        .update_ironwood_with(|mut updater| {
            // An action still needs a spend authorization signature if and only if its spend
            // requires one: this covers both the requested real spends and the wallet-controlled
            // zero-value spends the builder pairs with change outputs in the vanilla-Orchard-pool
            // bundle under the post-NU6.3 cross-address rule. Protocol padding dummies are
            // pre-signed and cleared by the IO Finalizer, so they are excluded by this check.
            let spend_needs_derivation = updater
                .bundle()
                .actions()
                .iter()
                .map(|action| action.spend().spend_auth_sig().is_none())
                .collect::<Vec<_>>();

            for (index, needs_derivation) in spend_needs_derivation.iter().enumerate() {
                updater.update_action_with(index, |mut action_updater| {
                    // Ironwood notes are spent with the account's Orchard spending key, so the key
                    // path added here is the Orchard one. If the account has a known derivation,
                    // add it for every spend that still requires a signature (real spends and
                    // wallet-controlled zero-value spends), so an external Signer can identify
                    // and sign it.
                    if let Some(derivation) = account_derivation
                        && *needs_derivation
                    {
                        // All spent notes are from the same account.
                        action_updater.set_spend_zip32_derivation(
                            orchard::pczt::Zip32Derivation::parse(
                                derivation.seed_fingerprint().to_bytes(),
                                vec![
                                    zip32::ChildIndex::hardened(32).index(),
                                    zip32::ChildIndex::hardened(params.network_type().coin_type())
                                        .index(),
                                    zip32::ChildIndex::hardened(u32::from(
                                        derivation.account_index(),
                                    ))
                                    .index(),
                                ],
                            )
                            .expect("valid"),
                        );
                    }

                    if let Some((pczt_recipient, external_address)) = ironwood_outputs.get(&index) {
                        if let Some(user_address) = external_address {
                            action_updater.set_output_user_address(user_address.encode());
                        }
                        action_updater.set_output_proprietary(
                            PROPRIETARY_OUTPUT_INFO.into(),
                            postcard::to_allocvec(pczt_recipient).expect(
                                "postcard encoding of PCZT recipient metadata should not fail",
                            ),
                        );
                    }

                    Ok(())
                })?;
            }
            Ok(())
        })?
        .update_sapling_with(|mut updater| {
            // If the account has a known derivation, add the Sapling key path to the PCZT.
            if let Some(derivation) = account_derivation {
                let non_dummy_spends = updater
                    .bundle()
                    .spends()
                    .iter()
                    .enumerate()
                    .filter_map(|(index, spend)| {
                        // Dummy spends will already have a proof generation key.
                        spend.proof_generation_key().is_none().then_some(index)
                    })
                    .collect::<Vec<_>>();

                for index in non_dummy_spends {
                    updater.update_spend_with(index, |mut spend_updater| {
                        // All non-dummy spent notes are from the same account.
                        spend_updater.set_zip32_derivation(
                            sapling::pczt::Zip32Derivation::parse(
                                derivation.seed_fingerprint().to_bytes(),
                                vec![
                                    zip32::ChildIndex::hardened(32).index(),
                                    zip32::ChildIndex::hardened(params.network_type().coin_type())
                                        .index(),
                                    zip32::ChildIndex::hardened(u32::from(
                                        derivation.account_index(),
                                    ))
                                    .index(),
                                ],
                            )
                            .expect("valid"),
                        );
                        Ok(())
                    })?;
                }
            }

            for index in 0..updater.bundle().outputs().len() {
                if let Some((pczt_recipient, external_address)) = sapling_outputs.get(&index) {
                    updater.update_output_with(index, |mut output_updater| {
                        if let Some(user_address) = external_address {
                            output_updater.set_user_address(user_address.encode());
                        }
                        output_updater.set_proprietary(
                            PROPRIETARY_OUTPUT_INFO.into(),
                            postcard::to_allocvec(pczt_recipient).expect(
                                "postcard encoding of PCZT recipient metadata should not fail",
                            ),
                        );
                        Ok(())
                    })?;
                }
            }

            Ok(())
        })?
        .update_transparent_with(|mut updater| {
            // If the account has a known derivation, add the transparent key paths to the PCZT.
            if let Some(derivation) = account_derivation {
                // Match address metadata to the inputs that spend from those addresses.
                let inputs_to_update = updater
                    .bundle()
                    .inputs()
                    .iter()
                    .enumerate()
                    .filter_map(|(index, input)| {
                        let address_metadata = build_state.transparent_input_addresses.get(
                            &TransparentAddress::from_script_from_chain(input.script_pubkey())
                                .expect("we created this with a supported transparent address"),
                        )?;
                        match address_metadata.source() {
                            TransparentAddressSource::Derived {
                                scope,
                                address_index,
                            } => Some((index, *scope, *address_index)),
                            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-key-import")]
                            TransparentAddressSource::StandalonePubkey(_)
                            | TransparentAddressSource::StandaloneScript(_) => None,
                        }
                    })
                    .collect::<Vec<_>>();

                for (index, scope, address_index) in inputs_to_update {
                    updater.update_input_with(index, |mut input_updater| {
                        let pubkey = ufvk
                            .transparent()
                            .expect("we derived this successfully in build_proposed_transaction")
                            .derive_address_pubkey(scope, address_index)
                            .expect("spending key derivation should not fail");

                        input_updater.set_bip32_derivation(
                            pubkey.serialize(),
                            Bip32Derivation::parse(
                                derivation.seed_fingerprint().to_bytes(),
                                vec![
                                    // Transparent uses BIP 44 derivation.
                                    44 | ChildNumber::HARDENED_FLAG,
                                    params.network_type().coin_type() | ChildNumber::HARDENED_FLAG,
                                    u32::from(derivation.account_index())
                                        | ChildNumber::HARDENED_FLAG,
                                    ChildNumber::from(scope).into(),
                                    ChildNumber::from(address_index).into(),
                                ],
                            )
                            .expect("valid"),
                        );
                        Ok(())
                    })?;
                }
            }

            assert_eq!(
                build_state.transparent_output_meta.len(),
                updater.bundle().outputs().len(),
            );
            for (index, (recipient, _, _, _)) in
                build_state.transparent_output_meta.into_iter().enumerate()
            {
                updater.update_output_with(index, |mut output_updater| {
                    let (pczt_recipient, external_address) =
                        PcztRecipient::from_transparent_recipient(recipient);
                    if let Some(user_address) = external_address {
                        output_updater.set_user_address(user_address.encode());
                    }
                    output_updater.set_proprietary(
                        PROPRIETARY_OUTPUT_INFO.into(),
                        postcard::to_allocvec(&pczt_recipient)
                            .expect("postcard encoding of pczt recipient metadata should not fail"),
                    );
                    Ok(())
                })?;
            }

            Ok(())
        })?
        .finish();

    Ok(pczt)
}

/// Selects the view produced by [`redact_pczt_for_signer`], according to the
/// capabilities of the receiving Signer.
#[cfg(feature = "pczt")]
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SignerView {
    /// The conservative signer view, for general-purpose Signers including
    /// deployed hardware signers (e.g. the Keystone ordinary send flow), which
    /// this view is validated against in the field.
    ///
    /// It removes wallet metadata, Orchard-protocol and Sapling spend
    /// witnesses, and dummy signing keys (a defensive no-op for IO-finalized
    /// PCZTs, whose dummy keys were consumed by the IO Finalizer; per the PCZT
    /// specification, Signers MUST reject PCZTs that contain them). It retains
    /// proofs, binding-signature keys, and anchors, and performs no field
    /// compaction, so the view of a v5 transaction remains representable in
    /// the v1 PCZT encoding (which [`pczt::Pczt::serialize`] selects for it).
    Full,
    /// The compact signer view, for receivers that support the v2 PCZT
    /// encoding and can restore compacted fields with
    /// [`pczt::Pczt::resolve_fields`].
    ///
    /// In addition to the `Full` redactions — except that Sapling spend
    /// witnesses are retained so that the Signer may verify nullifiers —
    /// this clears zk-proofs and binding-signature keys, compacts resolvable
    /// Orchard-protocol fields, and removes v6 shielded anchors (v5 anchors
    /// are retained because signatures commit to them).
    Compact,
}

/// Creates a redacted copy of a wallet PCZT for an external Signer.
///
/// This is intended for PCZTs returned by [`create_pczt_from_proposal`]. The
/// `view` argument selects the redaction policy; see [`SignerView`] for the
/// receiver capabilities each view requires. When in doubt — in particular for
/// hardware signers whose firmware predates the compact view — use
/// [`SignerView::Full`].
///
/// The returned PCZT retains information that a general-purpose Signer may
/// need, including full viewing keys, spend authorization randomizers, key
/// derivation paths, output recovery keys, and user-facing addresses.
/// Applications may apply additional redaction when they know their Signer's
/// capabilities. A Signer that independently obtains the relevant full viewing
/// keys and returns only Orchard-protocol signature contributions can instead
/// use [`redact_pczt_for_batch_signer`].
///
/// The caller must retain `pczt` and combine the Signer's contribution into
/// that authoritative copy. The returned signer view omits wallet metadata and
/// other fields that [`extract_and_store_transaction_from_pczt`] requires.
#[cfg(feature = "pczt")]
pub fn redact_pczt_for_signer(pczt: &pczt::Pczt, view: SignerView) -> pczt::Pczt {
    match view {
        SignerView::Full => full_signer_view(pczt),
        SignerView::Compact => compact_signer_view(pczt),
    }
}

#[cfg(feature = "pczt")]
fn full_signer_view(pczt: &pczt::Pczt) -> pczt::Pczt {
    fn redact_orchard_bundle(mut redactor: pczt::roles::redactor::orchard::OrchardRedactor<'_>) {
        redactor.redact_actions(|mut action| {
            action.clear_spend_witness();
            action.clear_spend_dummy_sk();
            action.redact_output_proprietary(PROPRIETARY_OUTPUT_INFO);
        });
    }

    Redactor::new(pczt.clone())
        .redact_global_with(|mut redactor| {
            redactor.redact_proprietary(PROPRIETARY_PROPOSAL_INFO);
        })
        .redact_transparent_with(|mut redactor| {
            redactor.redact_outputs(|mut output| {
                output.redact_proprietary(PROPRIETARY_OUTPUT_INFO);
            });
        })
        .redact_sapling_with(|mut redactor| {
            redactor.redact_spends(|mut spend| {
                spend.clear_witness();
                spend.clear_dummy_ask();
            });
            redactor.redact_outputs(|mut output| {
                output.redact_proprietary(PROPRIETARY_OUTPUT_INFO);
            });
        })
        .redact_orchard_with(redact_orchard_bundle)
        .redact_ironwood_with(redact_orchard_bundle)
        .finish()
}

#[cfg(feature = "pczt")]
fn compact_signer_view(pczt: &pczt::Pczt) -> pczt::Pczt {
    let redact_v6_anchors = *pczt.global().tx_version() == zcash_protocol::constants::V6_TX_VERSION;

    fn redact_orchard_bundle(
        mut redactor: pczt::roles::redactor::orchard::OrchardRedactor<'_>,
        redact_v6_anchor: bool,
    ) {
        redactor.clear_zkproof();
        redactor.clear_bsk();
        redactor.redact_actions(|mut action| {
            action.clear_spend_witness();
            action.clear_spend_dummy_sk();
            action.redact_output_proprietary(PROPRIETARY_OUTPUT_INFO);
        });

        redactor.compact_resolvable_fields();

        if redact_v6_anchor {
            redactor.clear_anchor();
        }
    }

    Redactor::new(pczt.clone())
        .redact_global_with(|mut redactor| {
            redactor.redact_proprietary(PROPRIETARY_PROPOSAL_INFO);
        })
        .redact_transparent_with(|mut redactor| {
            redactor.redact_outputs(|mut output| {
                output.redact_proprietary(PROPRIETARY_OUTPUT_INFO);
            });
        })
        .redact_sapling_with(|mut redactor| {
            redactor.clear_bsk();
            redactor.redact_spends(|mut spend| {
                spend.clear_zkproof();
                spend.clear_dummy_ask();
            });
            redactor.redact_outputs(|mut output| {
                output.clear_zkproof();
                output.redact_proprietary(PROPRIETARY_OUTPUT_INFO);
            });
            if redact_v6_anchors {
                redactor.clear_anchor();
            }
        })
        .redact_orchard_with(|redactor| {
            redact_orchard_bundle(redactor, redact_v6_anchors);
        })
        .redact_ironwood_with(|redactor| {
            redact_orchard_bundle(redactor, redact_v6_anchors);
        })
        .finish()
}

/// Creates a compact wallet PCZT for a batch Signer that obtains its full viewing key
/// independently and returns only new Orchard and Ironwood signatures.
///
/// In addition to the [`SignerView::Compact`] policy of [`redact_pczt_for_signer`],
/// this removes spend full viewing keys and existing signatures. It also removes the
/// randomizer from actions already authorized in `pczt`, while unsigned actions such as
/// wallet controlled zero value spends retain theirs. Sapling signatures require a
/// separate signing path.
///
/// The caller must retain the authoritative PCZT and apply the returned signature
/// contributions to it; the returned view is not independently extractable. This
/// function must run before its existing signatures are redacted. The returned view
/// cannot be signed with the high level
/// [`pczt::roles::signer::Signer`] because that role expects full viewing keys.
#[cfg(feature = "pczt")]
pub fn redact_pczt_for_batch_signer(pczt: &pczt::Pczt) -> pczt::Pczt {
    // Snapshot existing signature positions before the batch view clears them.
    fn preauthorized_action_indices(bundle: &pczt::orchard::Bundle) -> Vec<usize> {
        bundle
            .actions()
            .iter()
            .enumerate()
            .filter_map(|(index, action)| {
                action.spend().spend_auth_sig().is_some().then_some(index)
            })
            .collect()
    }

    fn redact_orchard_bundle(
        mut redactor: pczt::roles::redactor::orchard::OrchardRedactor<'_>,
        preauthorized_action_indices: &[usize],
    ) {
        // The batch Signer derives its FVK and returns only new signatures. Existing
        // signatures MUST be omitted: deployed batch Signers reject requests that
        // already carry signatures. Omitting them strands nothing — this view is a
        // signing request, not the authoritative PCZT, and the caller's authoritative
        // copy retains them.
        redactor.redact_actions(|mut action| {
            action.clear_spend_fvk();
            action.clear_spend_auth_sig();
        });
        // Unsigned actions keep alpha, including wallet controlled zero value spends.
        for &index in preauthorized_action_indices {
            redactor.redact_action(index, |mut action| action.clear_spend_alpha());
        }
    }

    let orchard_preauthorized = preauthorized_action_indices(pczt.orchard());
    let ironwood_preauthorized = preauthorized_action_indices(pczt.ironwood());

    // Apply the policy shared by every external Signer first.
    Redactor::new(redact_pczt_for_signer(pczt, SignerView::Compact))
        .redact_orchard_with(|redactor| {
            redact_orchard_bundle(redactor, &orchard_preauthorized);
        })
        .redact_ironwood_with(|redactor| {
            redact_orchard_bundle(redactor, &ironwood_preauthorized);
        })
        .finish()
}

/// Finalizes the given PCZT, and persists the transaction to the wallet database.
///
/// The PCZT should have been created via [`create_pczt_from_proposal`], which adds
/// metadata necessary for the wallet backend.
///
/// Returns the transaction ID for the resulting transaction.
///
/// - `sapling_vk` is optional to allow the caller to check whether a PCZT has Sapling
///   with [`pczt::roles::prover::Prover::requires_sapling_proofs`], and avoid downloading
///   the Sapling parameters if they are not needed. If `sapling_vk` is `None`, and the
///   PCZT has a Sapling bundle, this function will return an error.
/// - `orchard_vk` is optional to allow the caller to control where the Orchard verifying
///   key is generated or cached. If `orchard_vk` is `None`, and the PCZT has an Orchard
///   bundle, an Orchard verifying key will be generated on the fly.
#[cfg(feature = "pczt")]
pub fn extract_and_store_transaction_from_pczt<DbT, N>(
    wallet_db: &mut DbT,
    pczt: pczt::Pczt,
    sapling_vk: Option<(
        &sapling::circuit::SpendVerifyingKey,
        &sapling::circuit::OutputVerifyingKey,
    )>,
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")] orchard_vk: Option<&orchard::circuit::VerifyingKey>,
) -> Result<TxId, ExtractErrT<DbT, N>>
where
    DbT: WalletWrite + WalletCommitmentTrees,
    <DbT as WalletRead>::AccountId: serde::de::DeserializeOwned,
{
    let finalized = SpendFinalizer::new(pczt).finalize_spends()?;

    let proposal_info = finalized
        .global()
        .proprietary()
        .get(PROPRIETARY_PROPOSAL_INFO)
        .ok_or_else(|| PcztError::Invalid("PCZT missing proprietary proposal info field".into()))
        .and_then(|v| {
            postcard::from_bytes::<ProposalInfo<<DbT as WalletRead>::AccountId>>(v).map_err(|e| {
                PcztError::Invalid(format!(
                    "Postcard decoding of proprietary proposal info failed: {e}"
                ))
            })
        })?;

    // The per-action sent-output recovery shared by the Orchard and Ironwood bundles, which
    // differ only in the note plaintext version their notes carry (`V2` for Orchard, `V3` —
    // ZIP 2005 — for Ironwood): the note reconstructed from the PCZT's output fields, zipped
    // with the recipient metadata `create_pczt_from_proposal` attached to the output.
    #[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
    fn orchard_protocol_output_info<AccountId: serde::de::DeserializeOwned>(
        actions: &[pczt::orchard::Action],
        note_version: orchard::note::NoteVersion,
    ) -> Result<
        Vec<
            Option<(
                (PcztRecipient<AccountId>, Option<ZcashAddress>),
                orchard::Note,
            )>,
        >,
        PcztError,
    > {
        actions
            .iter()
            .map(|act| {
                let note = || {
                    let recipient = act.output().recipient().as_ref().and_then(|b| {
                        ::orchard::Address::from_raw_address_bytes(b).into_option()
                    })?;
                    let value = act
                        .output()
                        .value()
                        .map(orchard::value::NoteValue::from_raw)?;
                    let rho =
                        orchard::note::Rho::from_bytes(act.spend().nullifier()).into_option()?;
                    let rseed = act.output().rseed().as_ref().and_then(|rseed| {
                        orchard::note::RandomSeed::from_bytes(*rseed, &rho).into_option()
                    })?;

                    orchard::Note::from_parts(recipient, value, rho, rseed, note_version)
                        .into_option()
                };

                let external_address = act
                    .output()
                    .user_address()
                    .as_deref()
                    .map(ZcashAddress::try_from_encoded)
                    .transpose()
                    .map_err(|e| PcztError::Invalid(format!("Invalid user_address: {e}")))?;

                let pczt_recipient = act
                    .output()
                    .proprietary()
                    .get(PROPRIETARY_OUTPUT_INFO)
                    .map(|v| postcard::from_bytes::<PcztRecipient<AccountId>>(v))
                    .transpose()
                    .map_err(|e: postcard::Error| {
                        PcztError::Invalid(format!(
                            "Postcard decoding of proprietary output info failed: {e}"
                        ))
                    })?
                    .map(|pczt_recipient| (pczt_recipient, external_address));

                // If the pczt recipient is not present, this is a dummy note; if the note is not
                // present, then the PCZT has been pruned to make this output unrecoverable and so
                // we also ignore it.
                Ok(pczt_recipient.zip(note()))
            })
            .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, PcztError>>()
    }

    let orchard_output_info = orchard_protocol_output_info::<<DbT as WalletRead>::AccountId>(
        finalized.orchard().actions(),
        orchard::note::NoteVersion::V2,
    )?;

    let ironwood_output_info = orchard_protocol_output_info::<<DbT as WalletRead>::AccountId>(
        finalized.ironwood().actions(),
        orchard::note::NoteVersion::V3,
    )?;

    let sapling_output_info = finalized
        .sapling()
        .outputs()
        .iter()
        .map(|out| {
            let note = || {
                let recipient = out
                    .recipient()
                    .as_ref()
                    .and_then(::sapling::PaymentAddress::from_bytes)?;
                let value = out.value().map(::sapling::value::NoteValue::from_raw)?;
                let rseed = out
                    .rseed()
                    .as_ref()
                    .cloned()
                    .map(::sapling::note::Rseed::AfterZip212)?;

                Some(::sapling::Note::from_parts(recipient, value, rseed))
            };

            let external_address = out
                .user_address()
                .as_deref()
                .map(ZcashAddress::try_from_encoded)
                .transpose()
                .map_err(|e| PcztError::Invalid(format!("Invalid user_address: {e}")))?;

            let pczt_recipient = out
                .proprietary()
                .get(PROPRIETARY_OUTPUT_INFO)
                .map(|v| postcard::from_bytes::<PcztRecipient<<DbT as WalletRead>::AccountId>>(v))
                .transpose()
                .map_err(|e: postcard::Error| {
                    PcztError::Invalid(format!(
                        "Postcard decoding of proprietary output info failed: {e}"
                    ))
                })?
                .map(|pczt_recipient| (pczt_recipient, external_address));

            // If the pczt recipient is not present, this is a dummy note; if the note is not
            // present, then the PCZT has been pruned to make this output unrecoverable and so we
            // also ignore it.
            Ok(pczt_recipient.zip(note()))
        })
        .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, PcztError>>()?;

    let transparent_output_info = finalized
        .transparent()
        .outputs()
        .iter()
        .map(|out| {
            let external_address = out
                .user_address()
                .as_deref()
                .map(ZcashAddress::try_from_encoded)
                .transpose()
                .map_err(|e| PcztError::Invalid(format!("Invalid user_address: {e}")))?;

            let pczt_recipient = out
                .proprietary()
                .get(PROPRIETARY_OUTPUT_INFO)
                .map(|v| postcard::from_bytes::<PcztRecipient<<DbT as WalletRead>::AccountId>>(v))
                .transpose()
                .map_err(|e: postcard::Error| {
                    PcztError::Invalid(format!(
                        "Postcard decoding of proprietary output info failed: {e}"
                    ))
                })?
                .map(|pczt_recipient| (pczt_recipient, external_address));

            Ok(pczt_recipient)
        })
        .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, PcztError>>()?;

    let utxos_map = finalized
        .transparent()
        .inputs()
        .iter()
        .map(|input| {
            Zatoshis::from_u64(*input.value()).map(|value| {
                (
                    OutPoint::new(*input.prevout_txid(), *input.prevout_index()),
                    value,
                )
            })
        })
        .collect::<Result<BTreeMap<_, _>, _>>()?;

    let mut tx_extractor = TransactionExtractor::new(finalized);
    if let Some((spend_vk, output_vk)) = sapling_vk {
        tx_extractor = tx_extractor.with_sapling(spend_vk, output_vk);
    }
    if let Some(orchard_vk) = orchard_vk {
        tx_extractor = tx_extractor.with_orchard(orchard_vk);
    }
    let transaction = tx_extractor.extract()?;
    let txid = transaction.txid();

    #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
    fn to_sent_transaction_output<
        AccountId: Copy,
        D: Domain,
        O: ShieldedOutput<D, { ENC_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE }>,
        DbT: WalletRead + WalletCommitmentTrees,
        N,
    >(
        domain: D,
        note: D::Note,
        output: &O,
        output_pool: ShieldedPool,
        output_index: usize,
        pczt_recipient: PcztRecipient<AccountId>,
        external_address: Option<ZcashAddress>,
        note_value: impl Fn(&D::Note) -> u64,
        memo_bytes: impl Fn(&D::Memo) -> &[u8; 512],
        wallet_note: impl Fn(D::Note) -> Note,
    ) -> Result<SentTransactionOutput<AccountId>, ExtractErrT<DbT, N>> {
        let pk_d = D::get_pk_d(&note);
        let esk = D::derive_esk(&note).expect("notes are post-ZIP 212");
        let memo = try_output_recovery_with_pkd_esk(&domain, pk_d, esk, output).map(|(_, _, m)| {
            MemoBytes::from_bytes(memo_bytes(&m)).expect("Memo is the correct length.")
        });

        // The note commitment tree an output's note is appended to is fully determined by the
        // pool the output was created in; recording it mirrors the transaction-builder path
        // (`create_proposed_transactions`), which tags every shielded sent output with its tree.
        let note_commitment_tree = match output_pool {
            ShieldedPool::Sapling => NoteCommitmentTree::Sapling,
            ShieldedPool::Orchard => NoteCommitmentTree::Orchard,
            ShieldedPool::Ironwood => NoteCommitmentTree::Ironwood,
        };

        let note_value = Zatoshis::try_from(note_value(&note))?;
        let recipient = match (pczt_recipient, external_address) {
            (PcztRecipient::External, Some(addr)) => Ok(Recipient::External {
                recipient_address: addr,
                output_pool: PoolType::Shielded(output_pool),
            }),
            (PcztRecipient::External, None) => Err(PcztError::Invalid(
                "external recipient needs to have its user_address field set".into(),
            )),
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
            (PcztRecipient::EphemeralTransparent { .. }, _) => Err(PcztError::Invalid(
                "shielded output cannot be EphemeralTransparent".into(),
            )),
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
            (PcztRecipient::InternalTransparent { .. }, _) => Err(PcztError::Invalid(
                "shielded output cannot be InternalTransparent".into(),
            )),
            (PcztRecipient::InternalShielded { receiving_account }, external_address) => {
                Ok(Recipient::InternalShielded {
                    receiving_account,
                    external_address,
                    note: Box::new(wallet_note(note)),
                })
            }
        }?;

        Ok(SentTransactionOutput::from_parts_in_tree(
            Some(note_commitment_tree),
            output_index,
            recipient,
            note_value,
            memo,
        ))
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let orchard_outputs = transaction
        .orchard_bundle()
        .map(|bundle| {
            assert_eq!(bundle.actions().len(), orchard_output_info.len());
            bundle
                .actions()
                .iter()
                .zip(orchard_output_info)
                .enumerate()
                .filter_map(|(output_index, (action, output_info))| {
                    output_info.map(|((pczt_recipient, external_address), note)| {
                        let domain = OrchardDomain::for_action(action);
                        to_sent_transaction_output::<_, _, _, DbT, _>(
                            domain,
                            note,
                            action,
                            ShieldedPool::Orchard,
                            output_index,
                            pczt_recipient,
                            external_address,
                            |note| note.value().inner(),
                            |memo| memo,
                            |note| Note::Orchard {
                                note,
                                pool: orchard::ValuePool::Orchard,
                            },
                        )
                    })
                })
                .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()
        })
        .transpose()?;

    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    let ironwood_outputs = transaction
        .ironwood_bundle()
        .map(|bundle| {
            assert_eq!(bundle.actions().len(), ironwood_output_info.len());
            bundle
                .actions()
                .iter()
                .zip(ironwood_output_info)
                .enumerate()
                .filter_map(|(output_index, (action, output_info))| {
                    output_info.map(|((pczt_recipient, external_address), note)| {
                        let domain = IronwoodDomain::for_action(action);
                        to_sent_transaction_output::<_, _, _, DbT, _>(
                            domain,
                            note,
                            action,
                            ShieldedPool::Ironwood,
                            output_index,
                            pczt_recipient,
                            external_address,
                            |note| note.value().inner(),
                            |memo| memo,
                            |note| Note::Orchard {
                                note,
                                pool: orchard::ValuePool::Ironwood,
                            },
                        )
                    })
                })
                .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()
        })
        .transpose()?;

    let sapling_outputs = transaction
        .sapling_bundle()
        .map(|bundle| {
            assert_eq!(bundle.shielded_outputs().len(), sapling_output_info.len());
            bundle
                .shielded_outputs()
                .iter()
                .zip(sapling_output_info)
                .enumerate()
                .filter_map(|(output_index, (action, output_info))| {
                    output_info.map(|((pczt_recipient, external_address), note)| {
                        let domain =
                            SaplingDomain::new(sapling::note_encryption::Zip212Enforcement::On);
                        to_sent_transaction_output::<_, _, _, DbT, _>(
                            domain,
                            note,
                            action,
                            ShieldedPool::Sapling,
                            output_index,
                            pczt_recipient,
                            external_address,
                            |note| note.value().inner(),
                            |memo| memo,
                            Note::Sapling,
                        )
                    })
                })
                .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()
        })
        .transpose()?;

    #[allow(unused_variables)]
    let transparent_outputs = transaction
        .transparent_bundle()
        .map(|bundle| {
            assert_eq!(bundle.vout.len(), transparent_output_info.len());
            bundle
                .vout
                .iter()
                .zip(transparent_output_info)
                .enumerate()
                .filter_map(|(output_index, (output, output_info))| {
                    output_info.map(|(pczt_recipient, external_address)| {
                        // This assumes that transparent outputs are pushed onto `transparent_output_meta`
                        // with the same indices they have in the transaction's transparent outputs.
                        // We do not reorder transparent outputs; there is no reason to do so because it
                        // would not usefully improve privacy.
                        let outpoint = OutPoint::new(txid.into(), output_index as u32);

                        let recipient = match (pczt_recipient, external_address) {
                            (PcztRecipient::External, Some(addr)) => {
                                Ok(Recipient::External {
                                    recipient_address: addr,
                                    output_pool: PoolType::Transparent,
                                })
                            }
                            (PcztRecipient::External, None) => Err(PcztError::Invalid(
                                "external recipient needs to have its user_address field set".into(),
                            )),
                            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
                            (PcztRecipient::EphemeralTransparent { receiving_account }, _) => output
                                .recipient_address()
                                .ok_or(PcztError::Invalid(
                                    "Ephemeral outputs cannot have a non-standard script_pubkey"
                                        .into(),
                                ))
                                .map(|ephemeral_address| Recipient::EphemeralTransparent {
                                    receiving_account,
                                    ephemeral_address,
                                    outpoint,
                                }),
                            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
                            (PcztRecipient::InternalTransparent { receiving_account }, _) => output
                                .recipient_address()
                                .ok_or(PcztError::Invalid(
                                    "Transparent change outputs cannot have a non-standard script_pubkey"
                                        .into(),
                                ))
                                .map(|recipient_address| Recipient::InternalTransparent {
                                    receiving_account,
                                    recipient_address,
                                }),
                            (
                                PcztRecipient::InternalShielded {
                                    receiving_account,
                                },
                                _,
                            ) => Err(PcztError::Invalid(
                                "Transparent output cannot be InternalShielded".into(),
                            )),
                        }?;

                        Ok(SentTransactionOutput::from_parts(
                            output_index,
                            recipient,
                            output.value(),
                            None,
                        ))
                    })
                })
                .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, ExtractErrT<DbT, _>>>()
        })
        .transpose()?;

    let mut outputs: Vec<SentTransactionOutput<_>> = vec![];
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    outputs.extend(orchard_outputs.into_iter().flatten());
    #[cfg(feature = "orchard")]
    outputs.extend(ironwood_outputs.into_iter().flatten());
    outputs.extend(sapling_outputs.into_iter().flatten());
    outputs.extend(transparent_outputs.into_iter().flatten());

    let fee_amount = transaction
        .fee_paid(|outpoint| Ok::<_, BalanceError>(utxos_map.get(outpoint).copied()))?
        // We should never obtain a `None` result because we constructed the UTXOs map and the
        // transaction from the same PCZT.
        .expect("input map was constructed correctly");

    // We don't need the spent UTXOs to be in transaction order.
    let utxos_spent = utxos_map.into_keys().collect::<Vec<_>>();

    let created = time::OffsetDateTime::now_utc();

    let transactions = vec![SentTransaction::new(
        &transaction,
        created,
        proposal_info.target_height,
        proposal_info.from_account,
        &outputs,
        fee_amount,
        #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
        &utxos_spent,
    )];

    wallet_db
        .store_transactions_to_be_sent(&transactions)
        .map_err(Error::DataSource)?;

    Ok(txid)
}

/// Constructs a transaction that consumes available transparent UTXOs belonging to the specified
/// secret key, and sends them to the most-preferred receiver of the default internal address for
/// the provided Unified Spending Key.
///
/// This procedure will not attempt to shield transparent funds if the total amount being shielded
/// is less than the default fee to send the transaction. Fees will be paid only from the
/// transparent UTXOs being consumed.
///
/// Parameters:
/// * `wallet_db`: A read/write reference to the wallet database
/// * `params`: Consensus parameters
/// * `spend_prover`: The [`sapling::SpendProver`] to use in constructing the shielded
///   transaction.
/// * `output_prover`: The [`sapling::OutputProver`] to use in constructing the shielded
///   transaction.
/// * `input_selector`: The [`InputSelector`] to for note selection and change and fee
///   determination
/// * `usk`: The unified spending key that will be used to detect and spend transparent UTXOs,
///   and that will provide the shielded address to which funds will be sent. Funds will be
///   shielded to the internal (change) address associated with the most preferred shielded
///   receiver corresponding to this account, or if no shielded receiver can be used for this
///   account, this function will return an error. This procedure will return an error if the
///   USK does not correspond to an account known to the wallet.
/// * `from_addrs`: The list of transparent addresses that will be used to filter transaparent
///   UTXOs received by the wallet. Only UTXOs received at one of the provided addresses will
///   be selected to be shielded.
/// * `min_confirmations`: The minimum number of confirmations that a previously
///   received note must have in the blockchain in order to be considered for being
///   spent. A value of 10 confirmations is recommended and 0-conf transactions are
///   not supported.
///
/// [`sapling::SpendProver`]: sapling::prover::SpendProver
/// [`sapling::OutputProver`]: sapling::prover::OutputProver
#[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
pub fn shield_transparent_funds<DbT, ParamsT, InputsT, ChangeT>(
    wallet_db: &mut DbT,
    params: &ParamsT,
    spend_prover: &impl SpendProver,
    output_prover: &impl OutputProver,
    input_selector: &InputsT,
    change_strategy: &ChangeT,
    shielding_threshold: Zatoshis,
    spending_keys: &SpendingKeys,
    from_addrs: &[TransparentAddress],
    to_account: <DbT as InputSource>::AccountId,
    confirmations_policy: ConfirmationsPolicy,
) -> Result<NonEmpty<TxId>, ShieldErrT<DbT, InputsT, ChangeT>>
where
    ParamsT: consensus::Parameters,
    DbT: WalletWrite + WalletCommitmentTrees + InputSource<Error = <DbT as WalletRead>::Error>,
    InputsT: ShieldingSelector<InputSource = DbT>,
    ChangeT: ChangeStrategy<MetaSource = DbT>,
{
    let proposal = propose_shielding(
        wallet_db,
        params,
        input_selector,
        change_strategy,
        shielding_threshold,
        from_addrs,
        to_account,
        confirmations_policy,
        CoinbaseFilter::AllTransparentOutputs,
        None,
    )?;

    create_proposed_transactions(
        wallet_db,
        params,
        spend_prover,
        output_prover,
        spending_keys,
        OvkPolicy::Sender,
        &proposal,
        None,
    )
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    use zcash_protocol::zip318::AnchorBucketInterval;

    fn policy(confirmations: u32) -> ConfirmationsPolicy {
        ConfirmationsPolicy::new_symmetrical_unchecked(
            confirmations,
            #[cfg(feature = "transparent-inputs")]
            false,
        )
    }

    fn target(height: u32) -> TargetHeight {
        TargetHeight::from(BlockHeight::from_u32(height))
    }

    /// Bucketing raises the confirmation requirement so that the resulting anchor lands exactly on
    /// a grid boundary. Because the anchor and the note-eligibility bound are the same quantity,
    /// this is what guarantees every selected note has a witness at that anchor.
    #[test]
    fn bucketed_policy_lands_the_anchor_on_a_boundary() {
        let interval = AnchorBucketInterval::ZIP_318;
        let policy = policy(10);

        for height in [2_000_000u32, 2_000_143, 2_000_144, 1_000_000] {
            let target = target(height);
            let bucketed = policy
                .bucketed(interval, target, BlockHeight::from_u32(1))
                .expect("a boundary is reachable well above the grid's origin");
            let anchor = bucketed.anchor_height(target);

            assert!(
                interval.is_boundary(anchor),
                "anchor {anchor:?} off the grid"
            );
            // Age 1: one interval BELOW the most recent boundary, never the most recent itself.
            let most_recent = interval.boundary_at_or_below(policy.anchor_height(target));
            assert_eq!(
                u32::from(anchor),
                u32::from(most_recent) - interval.block_count().get(),
                "the chosen boundary must be exactly one interval below the most recent"
            );
            assert!(anchor < most_recent, "an age of 0 is not admissible");
            // Never fewer confirmations than asked for, and the invariant is preserved.
            assert!(bucketed.trusted() >= policy.trusted());
            assert!(bucketed.untrusted() >= bucketed.trusted());
            // The extra wait is bounded by two intervals: up to one to reach the most recent
            // boundary, plus the one that age 1 steps back.
            assert!(
                u32::from(bucketed.trusted()) - u32::from(policy.trusted())
                    < 2 * interval.block_count().get()
            );
        }
    }

    /// Even an anchor already sitting on a boundary steps back one interval: that boundary is the
    /// most recent, and ZIP 318 admits only ages of 1 or more.
    #[test]
    fn bucketing_never_chooses_the_most_recent_boundary() {
        let interval = AnchorBucketInterval::ZIP_318;
        let policy = policy(10);
        let aligned_anchor = interval.boundary_at_or_below(BlockHeight::from_u32(2_000_000));
        let target = target(u32::from(aligned_anchor) + 10);

        let bucketed = policy
            .bucketed(interval, target, BlockHeight::from_u32(1))
            .expect("reachable");
        assert_eq!(
            u32::from(bucketed.anchor_height(target)),
            u32::from(aligned_anchor) - interval.block_count().get()
        );
        assert!(bucketed.trusted() > policy.trusted());
    }

    /// Below the first boundary there is no grid to bucket to, and the policy declines rather than
    /// producing a zero or negative confirmation count.
    #[test]
    fn bucketing_declines_below_the_first_boundary() {
        let interval = AnchorBucketInterval::ZIP_318;
        let policy = policy(10);
        // The ordinary anchor is 90, whose boundary-at-or-below is 0; there is no boundary an
        // interval below that, so no admissible anchor exists.
        assert!(
            policy
                .bucketed(interval, target(100), BlockHeight::from_u32(1))
                .is_none()
        );
    }

    /// A shorter test-network interval buckets on its own grid.
    #[test]
    fn bucketing_honours_a_custom_interval() {
        let interval = AnchorBucketInterval::custom(NonZeroU32::new(12).expect("nonzero"));
        let policy = policy(3);
        let target = target(1_000);

        let bucketed = policy
            .bucketed(interval, target, BlockHeight::from_u32(1))
            .expect("reachable");
        let anchor = bucketed.anchor_height(target);
        assert!(interval.is_boundary(anchor));
        // Most recent boundary at or below 997 is 996; age 1 steps back to 984.
        assert_eq!(u32::from(anchor), 984);
    }
}