yah-cloud 0.8.37

Declarative cloud substrate for yah-managed camps: .yah/cloud/ config schema, MachineProvider drivers (Hetzner + local containerd), cloud-init rendering, and the pond/mesofact reconcilers.
Documentation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
1008
1009
1010
1011
1012
1013
1014
1015
1016
1017
1018
1019
1020
1021
1022
1023
1024
1025
1026
1027
1028
1029
1030
1031
1032
1033
1034
1035
1036
1037
1038
//! The **inner door** planner (R870-F23) — the `service.toml` +
//! domain-manifest join that produces a passway `PASSWAY_PATH_ROUTES_FILE`.
//!
//! ## What an inner door is, and what it is not
//!
//! R870-F15 landed path routing in passway; R870-T18 gave it a config surface
//! (a JSON mount table named by `PASSWAY_PATH_ROUTES_FILE`). Both are the
//! *consumer*. This module is the producer: given a service's declared
//! components and the domain manifest that routes them, it answers "what mount
//! table does this service's own door need, if any".
//!
//! It is an **inner** door because it sits behind the service's public one, on
//! loopback. The public door owns a hostname and terminates TLS; the inner door
//! owns one hostname's *paths* and splits them across units that deploy
//! independently. That split is the only thing it does — and it is the thing
//! the public door structurally cannot do, because the public tier routes by
//! SNI/Host and a request's path is not visible until after that.
//!
//! ## The join carries no new vocabulary
//!
//! R870-F15 claimed the join needs nothing new, and that holds up. Every input
//! already exists:
//!
//! | Field | Source |
//! |---|---|
//! | `mount` | [`ServiceComponent::mount`], normalized by [`normalize_mount`] |
//! | `headers` | the [`DomainRoute`] whose [`route_path_prefix`] equals that mount |
//! | tier | [`ServiceComponent::deploy`] — the one thing R870-F23 added |
//! | `upstreams` | placement-time, so it is [`InnerDoorPlan::routes_file`]'s argument, not a config field |
//!
//! The mount/route agreement is not re-derived here: [`CloudConfig::cross_ref_validate`]
//! already *proves* a component's mount and its route's path prefix are the
//! same string, so the lookup below cannot silently mismatch — a config where
//! it would have does not load.
//!
//! ## The two admission rules
//!
//! Both belong here, never to passway: passway proxies whatever `PathRouter`
//! it is handed and has no view of how many components a service declares.
//!
//! 1. **A service with one independently-deployed unit gets no inner tier at
//!    all.** Enforced by construction — [`plan`] answers `Ok(None)` below two
//!    units, so there is no config to write and no process to supervise. That
//!    makes the negative assertable on the *absence* of a plan rather than on
//!    a site staying up, which is the only form of that assertion that can
//!    fail loudly.
//! 2. **A component cannot be both bundle-staged and its own workload.**
//!    Enforced by [`DeployTier`] being one field with two values rather than
//!    two independent flags: the contradictory state has no spelling. What
//!    remains checkable — that two components do not claim one mount — lives
//!    in `cross_ref_validate`'s existing loop, widened rather than duplicated.
//!
//! ## Grouping is by deployed UNIT, not by component
//!
//! Every bundle-tier component of a service shares ONE bundle workload (config
//! 1, R870-B11), so they contribute one upstream between them —
//! [`DeployedUnit::Bundle`]. They still contribute their own *mounts*, because
//! a mount is where the bundle stores that component's output
//! (`app/dist/<mount>/`) and because the domain manifest may give that path
//! response headers the root does not have. So N bundle components produce N
//! mounts and one unit, and it is the unit count that rule 1 keys on.

use std::collections::{BTreeMap, HashMap};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};

use anyhow::{bail, Result};
use serde::Serialize;
use workload_spec::{
    EnvValue, EnvVar, ExposeSpec, HealthProbe, Healthcheck, ImageRef, InlineFile,
    LifecycleArchetype, MeshExpose, MeshIdent, Millis, NamespaceId, ResourceLimits, RestartPolicy,
    SchemaVersion, StopPolicy, TenantId, TierTag, Workload, WorkloadSpec,
};

use crate::config::{
    domain_serving_service, normalize_mount, route_path_prefix, DeployTier, DomainConfig,
    DomainRoute, ServiceComponent, ServiceConfig,
};

/// `schema_version` of the route table this module writes. Must match
/// passway's `path_routes_file::SCHEMA_VERSION`; a mismatch is a boot failure
/// on the door naming both numbers, which is the intended way for a
/// producer/consumer skew to surface (see that module's doc).
pub const ROUTES_SCHEMA_VERSION: u32 = 1;

/// Which deployed thing serves a mount.
///
/// The distinction the whole module turns on: several components can share one
/// of these, and rule 1 counts *these*, not components.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)]
pub enum DeployedUnit {
    /// The service's single assembled W272 bundle — every [`DeployTier::Bundle`]
    /// component, collapsed.
    Bundle,
    /// One [`DeployTier::Workload`] component, by component id.
    Component(String),
}

/// One mount of an inner door's table, before upstream addresses exist.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct InnerDoorMount {
    /// passway's mount spelling: `""` for the service root, otherwise
    /// `/segment[/segment…]`. The `service.toml` side spells the same mount
    /// without the leading slash — see [`passway_mount`].
    pub mount: String,
    /// What serves it.
    pub unit: DeployedUnit,
    /// Response headers the domain manifest gives this path (R746). Empty when
    /// no route declares any.
    pub headers: BTreeMap<String, String>,
}

/// A service's inner door, as configuration — everything but the addresses.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct InnerDoorPlan {
    /// Service name, for error messages and the workload name.
    pub service: String,
    /// Mounts in declaration order. Precedence is `PathRouter`'s (longest
    /// mount wins), not this vector's, so the order is presentational.
    pub mounts: Vec<InnerDoorMount>,
}

/// Translate a normalized mount (`""`, `"app"`) to passway's spelling (`""`,
/// `"/app"`).
///
/// The twin of [`normalize_mount`] on the wire side, and deliberately built by
/// composing with it rather than trimming slashes again: `/app`, `app/` and
/// `/app/` all mean one mount, and this crate already has exactly one place
/// that knows so.
///
/// passway has its own `path_route::mount_from_component` doing the same job on
/// the reading side. That is a genuine two-sided format rather than a
/// duplicated normalizer — passway is a separately released crate with its own
/// workspace, and yubaba cannot call into it — and it is handled the way the
/// wire format handles every other such risk: `PathRouter::new` is the ONE
/// validator of mount well-formedness, so a disagreement here is a loud boot
/// failure on the door, never a silently mis-served prefix.
pub fn passway_mount(raw: Option<&str>) -> String {
    match raw.map(normalize_mount) {
        Some(m) if !m.is_empty() => format!("/{m}"),
        _ => String::new(),
    }
}

/// Plan the inner door for one service, or answer `None` when it should not
/// have one.
///
/// `None` is rule 1 and is the common answer: a service whose components all
/// ship in one bundle has a single upstream, and a proxy in front of a single
/// upstream is a hop that can only add latency and a failure mode.
///
/// `Err` is reserved for a service that *needs* a door and cannot have a
/// working one — today that is exactly one case, no root mount, which would
/// produce a table that 503s every unclaimed path.
pub fn plan(
    service: &ServiceConfig,
    domains: &BTreeMap<String, DomainConfig>,
) -> Result<Option<InnerDoorPlan>> {
    let routes = domain_serving_service(domains, &service.name).map(|d| d.routes.as_slice());

    let mut mounts: Vec<InnerDoorMount> = Vec::new();
    for component in &service.components {
        let unit = match component.deploy {
            DeployTier::Bundle => DeployedUnit::Bundle,
            DeployTier::Workload => DeployedUnit::Component(component.id.clone()),
        };
        mounts.push(InnerDoorMount {
            mount: passway_mount(component.mount.as_deref()),
            headers: headers_for(routes, component),
            unit,
        });
    }

    // Rule 1, counted on UNITS. Three bundle components are one unit and get
    // no door; one bundle component plus one workload component are two and
    // do.
    let units: std::collections::BTreeSet<&DeployedUnit> = mounts.iter().map(|m| &m.unit).collect();
    if units.len() < 2 {
        return Ok(None);
    }

    if !mounts.iter().any(|m| m.mount.is_empty()) {
        bail!(
            "services/{}/service.toml declares {} independently-deployed units but no component \
             at the service root — every component sets a `mount`. An inner door's table needs a \
             root (\"\") mount as its catch-all; without one every path outside the declared \
             mounts 503s, which is indistinguishable from an outage. Drop the `mount` from \
             whichever component serves `/`.",
            service.name,
            units.len(),
        );
    }

    Ok(Some(InnerDoorPlan {
        service: service.name.clone(),
        mounts,
    }))
}

/// The response headers the domain manifest gives `component`'s mount.
///
/// Matched on the mount rather than on the route's `component` reference, so a
/// path declared as a bare prefix still contributes: `cross_ref_validate` has
/// already proved the two agree for every route that names a component, and
/// matching on the prefix is what makes the lookup total.
fn headers_for(
    routes: Option<&[DomainRoute]>,
    component: &ServiceComponent,
) -> BTreeMap<String, String> {
    let wanted = component
        .mount
        .as_deref()
        .map(normalize_mount)
        .unwrap_or_default();
    routes
        .unwrap_or(&[])
        .iter()
        .find(|r| route_path_prefix(&r.path) == wanted && !r.headers.is_empty())
        .map(|r| r.headers.clone())
        .unwrap_or_default()
}

// ── Rendering ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Serialization mirror of passway's `path_routes_file::PathRoutesFile`. Kept
/// private: the supported output is [`InnerDoorPlan::routes_file`]'s string, so
/// nothing can construct a half-filled table and write it.
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
struct RoutesFile<'a> {
    schema_version: u32,
    routes: Vec<RouteEntry<'a>>,
}

#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
struct RouteEntry<'a> {
    mount: &'a str,
    upstreams: Vec<String>,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "BTreeMap::is_empty")]
    headers: &'a BTreeMap<String, String>,
}

impl InnerDoorPlan {
    /// Every distinct unit this door proxies to, in a stable order. What a
    /// caller resolving addresses has to answer for.
    pub fn units(&self) -> Vec<DeployedUnit> {
        let set: std::collections::BTreeSet<DeployedUnit> =
            self.mounts.iter().map(|m| m.unit.clone()).collect();
        set.into_iter().collect()
    }

    /// Render the JSON passway reads, resolving each unit to its address.
    ///
    /// `address` is placement-time knowledge — which node the unit landed on
    /// and which port kamaji gave it — so it arrives as a closure rather than
    /// as config. Returning `None` from it is refused rather than skipped: a
    /// mount whose upstream could not be resolved would be dropped from the
    /// table, and the door would then serve that path from whichever *shorter*
    /// mount matched — the root, usually — which is a wrong answer wearing a
    /// 200.
    pub fn routes_file(
        &self,
        address: impl Fn(&DeployedUnit) -> Option<String>,
    ) -> Result<String> {
        let mut routes = Vec::with_capacity(self.mounts.len());
        for m in &self.mounts {
            let Some(addr) = address(&m.unit) else {
                bail!(
                    "service {}: mount {:?} is served by {:?}, which has no resolved address yet. \
                     Refusing to write a partial route table — a missing mount does not 503, it \
                     falls through to the root mount and serves the wrong component with a 200.",
                    self.service,
                    m.mount,
                    m.unit,
                );
            };
            routes.push(RouteEntry {
                mount: &m.mount,
                upstreams: vec![addr],
                headers: &m.headers,
            });
        }
        Ok(serde_json::to_string(&RoutesFile {
            schema_version: ROUTES_SCHEMA_VERSION,
            routes,
        })?)
    }
}

// ── Supervision ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// The passway binary every node carries, installed by the yubaba release
/// tarball's `control_plane_install`. The inner door is the *same* binary as
/// the public door — one door implementation, two configurations, which is the
/// property R870-F15 built path routing to preserve.
pub const INNER_DOOR_BINARY: &str = "/usr/local/bin/passway";

/// Where a node keeps generated route tables. Same directory the demux and
/// http-router tables already live in.
pub const ROUTES_DIR: &str = "/var/lib/passway/routes";

/// The only address an inner door ever binds, and the only one the outer door
/// ever dials it at. Literal rather than a parameter — see
/// [`InnerDoorPlan::workload`].
pub const INNER_DOOR_HOST: &str = "127.0.0.1";

/// Low end of the window [`listen_port`] picks from, inclusive.
pub const INNER_DOOR_PORT_LOW: u16 = 10_000;
/// High end of the window [`listen_port`] picks from, inclusive.
pub const INNER_DOOR_PORT_HIGH: u16 = 19_999;

/// The loopback port a service's inner door listens on — derived from the
/// service name, so every apply of an unchanged tree renders the same number.
///
/// ## Why a derived pin rather than kamaji's ledger
///
/// R870-F23 phase 2 preferred taking the number from `kamaji::ports`
/// ([`LedgerPorts`], `oss/kamaji/crates/kamaji/src/ports.rs`). Read rather than
/// assumed, that ledger cannot answer here, for three reasons that also happen
/// to make a pin safe:
///
/// 1. **It is node-local and has no RPC.** `LedgerPorts` persists
///    `(ident, name) -> port` to a JSON file beside the supervisor's state dir,
///    and yubaba's HTTP surface exposes no allocation verb (`yubaba/src/lib.rs`
///    routes `/workloads/*`, `/services`, `/node/*` — nothing for ports). An
///    apply running on an operator's laptop has no way to ask.
/// 2. **A pin is honoured, not rejected, on the path this workload takes.**
///    R844-F14's rule — a non-world-fixed pin is an error — bites in
///    `LedgerPorts::resolve_set`, and `NativeRuntime::resolve_declared_ports`
///    (`kamaji/src/native.rs:280`) filters `pin.is_none()` *before* calling it.
///    A stated number is therefore passed through, which is what
///    `PASSWAY_LISTEN` needs: the door's own env has to carry the number, and
///    a number the node picked after the spec was rendered could not be in it.
/// 3. **A collision is not even representable.** The ledger allocates on the
///    workload's *mesh* IP; an inner door binds loopback. `100.64.0.3:14210`
///    and `127.0.0.1:14210` are different sockets.
///
/// The window is deliberately below Linux's default ephemeral range
/// (32768-60999), which is where `pick_free_port`'s `bind(:0)` draws from — so
/// a derived number cannot land on one the ledger is about to hand out even on
/// the same interface.
///
/// The hash is FNV-1a written out here rather than `DefaultHasher`, whose
/// output std explicitly does not promise to keep stable across releases. This
/// number is written into a deployed door's environment and into the outer
/// door's upstream list; a toolchain bump silently moving it would repoint one
/// tier and not the other.
pub fn listen_port(service: &str) -> u16 {
    let mut hash: u64 = 0xcbf2_9ce4_8422_2325;
    for byte in service.as_bytes() {
        hash ^= u64::from(*byte);
        hash = hash.wrapping_mul(0x0000_0100_0000_01b3);
    }
    let span = u64::from(INNER_DOOR_PORT_HIGH - INNER_DOOR_PORT_LOW) + 1;
    INNER_DOOR_PORT_LOW + (hash % span) as u16
}

/// The mesh identity a [`DeployTier::Workload`] component registers its service
/// record under.
///
/// **This is the naming rule, not a lookup**, and it is stated here because
/// nothing else states it. A bundle's ident comes from the mirror
/// (`BundleSlot::workload_name`, overridable by `name = "…"`), but a
/// workload-tier component has no slot of its own — `[providers.*]` is
/// per-kind, per-mirror, which is exactly the gap [`DeployTier`] was added to
/// close. So the ident has to be derivable from the two names the service
/// already declares, and this is that derivation.
///
/// Getting it wrong is a *loud* failure rather than a quiet one:
/// [`InnerDoorPlan::routes_file`] refuses a mount whose unit resolved to no
/// address, naming the unit, so a component that registered under some other
/// ident fails the apply instead of falling through to the root mount.
pub fn component_workload_ident(service: &str, component_id: &str) -> String {
    crate::reconciler::native_support::sanitize_ident(&format!("{service}-{component_id}"))
}

impl InnerDoorPlan {
    /// The workload name / mesh identity for this service's inner door.
    pub fn workload_name(&self) -> String {
        format!("passway-inner-{}", self.service)
    }

    /// Where this door's route table is materialized on the node.
    pub fn routes_path(&self) -> PathBuf {
        Path::new(ROUTES_DIR).join(format!("{}.routes.json", self.service))
    }

    /// This door's loopback port — [`listen_port`] of the service name.
    pub fn listen_port(&self) -> u16 {
        listen_port(&self.service)
    }

    /// The mesh identity whose ready service record carries `unit`'s address.
    ///
    /// The two arms come from different places on purpose, and neither is
    /// derivable from the other. A bundle's ident is a *mirror* fact —
    /// `BundleSlot::workload_name`, which a slot may rename with `name = "…"` —
    /// so it is handed in. A workload-tier component has no slot to rename it,
    /// so its ident is derived ([`component_workload_ident`]).
    pub fn unit_ident(&self, unit: &DeployedUnit, bundle_ident: &str) -> String {
        match unit {
            DeployedUnit::Bundle => bundle_ident.to_string(),
            DeployedUnit::Component(id) => component_workload_ident(&self.service, id),
        }
    }

    /// Resolve every unit to a `host:port`, given a way to look an address up
    /// by mesh identity.
    ///
    /// The step between [`units`](Self::units) and the `address` closure
    /// [`routes_file`](Self::routes_file) and [`workload`](Self::workload)
    /// take: those two ask "where is this unit", this answers it from a
    /// discovery read. Split out rather than folded in so the identity mapping
    /// stays testable without a fleet.
    ///
    /// A unit with no answer is simply absent from the map — the refusal lives
    /// in `routes_file`, which is the single place a missing address is
    /// reported and which already explains why a dropped mount is worse than a
    /// failed apply.
    pub fn resolve_addresses(
        &self,
        bundle_ident: &str,
        lookup: impl Fn(&str) -> Option<String>,
    ) -> BTreeMap<DeployedUnit, String> {
        self.units()
            .into_iter()
            .filter_map(|unit| {
                let addr = lookup(&self.unit_ident(&unit, bundle_ident))?;
                Some((unit, addr))
            })
            .collect()
    }

    /// Render the supervisable workload: a passway process serving this
    /// service's mount table on loopback.
    ///
    /// ## Cleartext, and the invariant that makes it safe
    ///
    /// `PASSWAY_TLS_MODE=plaintext` (operator call, 2026-09-09 — see
    /// `passway::tls::parse_listener_tls_mode` for the full argument). The
    /// short version: no CA issues for `127.0.0.1`, so "TLS everywhere" here
    /// means a self-signed leaf plus a way to switch OFF upstream certificate
    /// verification on the *public* door — a real trust-boundary knob traded
    /// for encrypting a hop that never leaves the loopback interface.
    ///
    /// This function cannot violate that invariant even if `listen_port` is
    /// wrong, because it binds `127.0.0.1` literally and passway refuses the
    /// mode on anything else. The bind is not a parameter.
    ///
    /// ## Why `listen_port` is an argument
    ///
    /// It is placement-time knowledge, exactly like the upstream addresses:
    /// which port is free is a property of the node, not of the config. The
    /// caller allocates and passes it, so this stays a pure function of
    /// (plan, port, addresses) and is testable without a node.
    ///
    /// ## The route table travels IN the spec
    ///
    /// Not written beside it: [`WorkloadSpec::files`] makes the table and the
    /// process that reads it one deploy rather than two, so a redeploy cannot
    /// leave a door serving a stale table. Only kamaji's native backend
    /// materializes those; every other backend refuses the spec by name rather
    /// than starting the door against a file that is not there.
    ///
    /// ## Why `Workload::Container` and not a new `Workload` variant
    ///
    /// `TenantPasswayWorkload` is a typed variant, so the precedent for one
    /// exists — but it earns that by carrying config kamaji itself must act on
    /// (a domain to match, a PEM pair to re-read on every cold start, an idle
    /// TTL to reap against). An inner door carries none of it: its entire
    /// configuration is an argv, three env vars and one file, all of which
    /// `WorkloadSpec` already expresses. A variant would buy nothing but
    /// exhaustive-match churn in peer-owned `kamaji-proto`, which is the trade
    /// R572-F1 already made and recorded.
    pub fn workload(
        &self,
        listen_port: u16,
        address: impl Fn(&DeployedUnit) -> Option<String>,
    ) -> Result<Workload> {
        let routes_path = self.routes_path();
        let name = self.workload_name();
        let listen = format!("127.0.0.1:{listen_port}");

        let env = vec![
            literal_env("PASSWAY_TLS_MODE", "plaintext".to_string()),
            literal_env("PASSWAY_LISTEN", listen),
            literal_env(
                "PASSWAY_PATH_ROUTES_FILE",
                routes_path.display().to_string(),
            ),
        ];

        let spec = WorkloadSpec {
            schema_version: SchemaVersion::V1,
            name: name.clone(),
            // Identity metadata only — the native backend pulls nothing.
            image: ImageRef {
                registry: "local".into(),
                repository: "passway".into(),
                tag: "inner-door".into(),
                digest: String::new(),
            },
            tier: TierTag("infra".into()),
            tenant: TenantId::singleton(),
            namespace: NamespaceId::singleton(),
            replicas: 1,
            command: Some(vec![INNER_DOOR_BINARY.to_string()]),
            entrypoint: None,
            workdir: None,
            user: None,
            env,
            secrets: vec![],
            volumes: vec![],
            resources: ResourceLimits {
                memory_mb: 128,
                cpu_millis: 256,
                ephemeral_storage_mb: 64,
            },
            depends_on: vec![],
            requires: vec![],
            healthcheck: Some(Healthcheck {
                // A cleartext listener would answer an HttpGet probe, but a
                // bare connect is the same liveness signal without asking the
                // door to route a synthetic path through a mount table that
                // may legitimately not have a catch-all for it.
                probe: HealthProbe::TcpConnect { port: listen_port },
                interval: Millis::from_secs(10),
                timeout: Millis::from_secs(2),
                initial_delay: Millis::from_secs(5),
                failure_threshold: 3,
            }),
            restart_policy: RestartPolicy::Always,
            // Pinned and non-drainable: the service's public door proxies to
            // this on loopback, so moving it to another node does not relocate
            // the thing that reaches it — it severs it.
            archetype: Some(LifecycleArchetype::Appliance),
            stop_policy: StopPolicy {
                signal: 15,
                grace_period: Millis::from_secs(5),
            },
            expose: ExposeSpec {
                mesh: MeshExpose {
                    identity: MeshIdent(name),
                    ports: MeshExpose::anonymous_ports([listen_port]),
                    allow_from: vec![],
                },
                // Loopback only. Nothing off this node reaches an inner door,
                // which is the premise the cleartext listener rests on.
                public: None,
                operator: None,
            },
            labels: HashMap::new(),
            annotations: HashMap::new(),
            files: vec![InlineFile {
                path: routes_path,
                content: self.routes_file(address)?,
                mode: Some(0o600),
            }],
        };

        Ok(Workload::container(spec))
    }
}

fn literal_env(name: &str, value: String) -> EnvVar {
    EnvVar {
        name: name.into(),
        value: EnvValue::Literal { value },
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use crate::config::{FrontDoor, RouteMode};

    fn component(id: &str, mount: Option<&str>, deploy: DeployTier) -> ServiceComponent {
        ServiceComponent {
            id: id.to_string(),
            kind: "mesofact-spa".to_string(),
            path: format!("app/{id}"),
            git: None,
            role: "static".to_string(),
            publishes: Some("static".to_string()),
            mount: mount.map(str::to_string),
            wave: 0,
            deploy,
        }
    }

    fn service(name: &str, components: Vec<ServiceComponent>) -> ServiceConfig {
        ServiceConfig {
            schema_version: 1,
            name: name.to_string(),
            domain: format!("{name}.test"),
            components,
            db: Default::default(),
        }
    }

    fn domains(service: &str, routes: &[(&str, &[(&str, &str)])]) -> BTreeMap<String, DomainConfig> {
        let mut map = BTreeMap::new();
        map.insert(
            "test".to_string(),
            DomainConfig {
                schema_version: 1,
                name: "test".to_string(),
                domain: format!("{service}.test"),
                front_door: FrontDoor::Passway,
                cdn_bucket: "cdn".to_string(),
                worker_bundle_path: None,
                routes: routes
                    .iter()
                    .map(|(path, headers)| DomainRoute {
                        path: path.to_string(),
                        headers: headers
                            .iter()
                            .map(|(k, v)| (k.to_string(), v.to_string()))
                            .collect(),
                        mode: RouteMode::Static {
                            component: format!("{service}/root"),
                        },
                    })
                    .collect(),
            },
        );
        map
    }

    /// Rule 1's negative, and the cheap half of this ticket's verify list: a
    /// single-component service produces no plan at all, so there is no config
    /// to write and no process to supervise.
    #[test]
    fn a_single_unit_service_gets_no_inner_door() {
        let svc = service(
            "yah-marketing",
            vec![component("site", None, DeployTier::Bundle)],
        );
        assert_eq!(plan(&svc, &BTreeMap::new()).unwrap(), None);
    }

    /// The same negative one step further out, and the one that would be easy
    /// to get wrong: THREE components still share one bundle, so they are one
    /// unit and still earn no door.
    #[test]
    fn several_bundle_components_are_one_unit_and_still_get_no_door() {
        let svc = service(
            "noisetable",
            vec![
                component("site", None, DeployTier::Bundle),
                component("app", Some("app"), DeployTier::Bundle),
                component("docs", Some("docs"), DeployTier::Bundle),
            ],
        );
        assert_eq!(plan(&svc, &BTreeMap::new()).unwrap(), None);
    }

    #[test]
    fn one_bundle_component_plus_one_workload_component_is_two_units() {
        let svc = service(
            "noisetable",
            vec![
                component("site", None, DeployTier::Bundle),
                component("account", Some("app"), DeployTier::Workload),
            ],
        );
        let plan = plan(&svc, &BTreeMap::new()).unwrap().expect("two units");
        assert_eq!(
            plan.mounts.iter().map(|m| m.mount.as_str()).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
            ["", "/app"]
        );
        assert_eq!(
            plan.units(),
            vec![
                DeployedUnit::Bundle,
                DeployedUnit::Component("account".into())
            ]
        );
    }

    /// The header half of the join: a mount picks up exactly the headers its
    /// own route declares, and the root picks up none when its route declares
    /// none. This is the config-side half of the ticket's live assertion that
    /// `/app/` carries COOP/COEP while `/` carries neither.
    #[test]
    fn each_mount_carries_only_its_own_routes_headers() {
        let svc = service(
            "noisetable",
            vec![
                component("site", None, DeployTier::Bundle),
                component("account", Some("app"), DeployTier::Workload),
            ],
        );
        let domains = domains(
            "noisetable",
            &[
                ("/*", &[]),
                (
                    "/app/*",
                    &[
                        ("cross-origin-opener-policy", "same-origin"),
                        ("cross-origin-embedder-policy", "require-corp"),
                    ],
                ),
            ],
        );
        let plan = plan(&svc, &domains).unwrap().expect("two units");

        let root = &plan.mounts[0];
        assert_eq!(root.mount, "");
        assert!(root.headers.is_empty(), "{:?}", root.headers);

        let app = &plan.mounts[1];
        assert_eq!(app.mount, "/app");
        assert_eq!(
            app.headers.get("cross-origin-opener-policy").map(String::as_str),
            Some("same-origin")
        );
        assert_eq!(
            app.headers
                .get("cross-origin-embedder-policy")
                .map(String::as_str),
            Some("require-corp")
        );
    }

    /// A bundle-tier component at a non-root mount keeps its own headers even
    /// though it shares the bundle's upstream — the reason mounts are per
    /// COMPONENT while units are per deployed thing.
    #[test]
    fn a_bundle_components_sub_mount_keeps_its_headers_and_the_bundle_upstream() {
        let svc = service(
            "noisetable",
            vec![
                component("site", None, DeployTier::Bundle),
                component("docs", Some("docs"), DeployTier::Bundle),
                component("account", Some("app"), DeployTier::Workload),
            ],
        );
        let domains = domains(
            "noisetable",
            &[("/docs/*", &[("x-frame-options", "DENY")])],
        );
        let plan = plan(&svc, &domains).unwrap().expect("two units");

        let docs = &plan.mounts[1];
        assert_eq!(docs.mount, "/docs");
        assert_eq!(docs.unit, DeployedUnit::Bundle);
        assert_eq!(docs.headers.get("x-frame-options").map(String::as_str), Some("DENY"));
        // Two units, three mounts.
        assert_eq!(plan.units().len(), 2);
        assert_eq!(plan.mounts.len(), 3);
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_table_with_no_root_mount_is_refused_rather_than_written() {
        let svc = service(
            "noisetable",
            vec![
                component("app", Some("app"), DeployTier::Bundle),
                component("account", Some("account"), DeployTier::Workload),
            ],
        );
        let err = plan(&svc, &BTreeMap::new()).unwrap_err().to_string();
        assert!(err.contains("no component at the service root"), "{err}");
    }

    #[test]
    fn rendering_produces_the_exact_shape_passway_reads() {
        let svc = service(
            "noisetable",
            vec![
                component("site", None, DeployTier::Bundle),
                component("account", Some("app"), DeployTier::Workload),
            ],
        );
        let domains = domains(
            "noisetable",
            &[("/app/*", &[("cross-origin-opener-policy", "same-origin")])],
        );
        let plan = plan(&svc, &domains).unwrap().unwrap();

        let json = plan
            .routes_file(|unit| match unit {
                DeployedUnit::Bundle => Some("127.0.0.1:8081".to_string()),
                DeployedUnit::Component(id) if id == "account" => {
                    Some("127.0.0.1:8082".to_string())
                }
                DeployedUnit::Component(_) => None,
            })
            .unwrap();

        assert_eq!(
            json,
            r#"{"schema_version":1,"routes":[{"mount":"","upstreams":["127.0.0.1:8081"]},{"mount":"/app","upstreams":["127.0.0.1:8082"],"headers":{"cross-origin-opener-policy":"same-origin"}}]}"#
        );
    }

    /// An unresolved address must stop the write. Dropping the mount would
    /// leave the door serving `/app` from the ROOT mount with a 200 — the
    /// silent wrong answer, not a 503.
    #[test]
    fn an_unresolved_upstream_refuses_the_whole_table() {
        let svc = service(
            "noisetable",
            vec![
                component("site", None, DeployTier::Bundle),
                component("account", Some("app"), DeployTier::Workload),
            ],
        );
        let plan = plan(&svc, &BTreeMap::new()).unwrap().unwrap();
        let err = plan
            .routes_file(|unit| match unit {
                DeployedUnit::Bundle => Some("127.0.0.1:8081".to_string()),
                DeployedUnit::Component(_) => None,
            })
            .unwrap_err()
            .to_string();
        assert!(err.contains("no resolved address"), "{err}");
        assert!(err.contains("account"), "{err}");
    }

    /// The rendered door, pinned on the four properties that are not
    /// cosmetic: cleartext ONLY on loopback, the routes file travelling inside
    /// the spec, and the env var passway selects path routing by.
    #[test]
    fn the_rendered_door_is_cleartext_on_loopback_and_carries_its_own_table() {
        let svc = service(
            "noisetable",
            vec![
                component("site", None, DeployTier::Bundle),
                component("account", Some("app"), DeployTier::Workload),
            ],
        );
        let plan = plan(&svc, &BTreeMap::new()).unwrap().unwrap();
        let workload = plan
            .workload(8443, |unit| match unit {
                DeployedUnit::Bundle => Some("127.0.0.1:8081".to_string()),
                DeployedUnit::Component(_) => Some("127.0.0.1:8082".to_string()),
            })
            .unwrap();
        let spec = workload.container_spec().expect("container-shaped");

        let env: BTreeMap<&str, &str> = spec
            .env
            .iter()
            .filter_map(|e| match &e.value {
                EnvValue::Literal { value } => Some((e.name.as_str(), value.as_str())),
                _ => None,
            })
            .collect();
        assert_eq!(env.get("PASSWAY_TLS_MODE"), Some(&"plaintext"));
        // The invariant: cleartext is bound to loopback by construction, not
        // by whoever picked the port.
        assert_eq!(env.get("PASSWAY_LISTEN"), Some(&"127.0.0.1:8443"));
        assert!(spec.expose.public.is_none(), "an inner door is never public");

        // The routes file rides the spec, and the env var points AT it.
        assert_eq!(spec.files.len(), 1);
        let file = &spec.files[0];
        assert_eq!(
            env.get("PASSWAY_PATH_ROUTES_FILE").map(|s| s.to_string()),
            Some(file.path.display().to_string())
        );
        assert!(file.content.contains("\"schema_version\":1"), "{}", file.content);
        assert!(file.content.contains("127.0.0.1:8082"), "{}", file.content);
        assert_eq!(spec.command.as_deref(), Some(&[INNER_DOOR_BINARY.to_string()][..]));
    }

    /// A door whose table cannot be rendered is not rendered at all — the
    /// refusal propagates out of `workload`, so there is no spec that deploys
    /// a door pointing at nothing.
    #[test]
    fn an_unresolvable_unit_stops_the_workload_being_built() {
        let svc = service(
            "noisetable",
            vec![
                component("site", None, DeployTier::Bundle),
                component("account", Some("app"), DeployTier::Workload),
            ],
        );
        let plan = plan(&svc, &BTreeMap::new()).unwrap().unwrap();
        assert!(plan.workload(8443, |_| None).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_mount_spelling_matches_passways_convention_in_both_directions() {
        assert_eq!(passway_mount(None), "");
        assert_eq!(passway_mount(Some("")), "");
        assert_eq!(passway_mount(Some("/")), "");
        // Every spelling of one mount collapses to one string — the whole
        // reason this composes with `normalize_mount` instead of formatting.
        for raw in ["app", "/app", "app/", "/app/"] {
            assert_eq!(passway_mount(Some(raw)), "/app", "{raw}");
        }
        assert_eq!(passway_mount(Some("/a/b/")), "/a/b");
    }

    // ── Phase 2: placement (R870-F23 steps 2 and 3) ─────────────────────────

    /// The property the whole pin rests on: same service, same number, forever.
    /// The outer door's upstream list and the inner door's `PASSWAY_LISTEN` are
    /// rendered by two different call sites in two different apply phases; if
    /// this drifted, one tier would be repointed and the other would not.
    #[test]
    fn the_derived_port_is_stable_and_inside_its_declared_window() {
        assert_eq!(listen_port("noisetable"), listen_port("noisetable"));
        for service in ["noisetable", "yah-marketing", "", "a", "a-very-long-service-name"] {
            let port = listen_port(service);
            assert!(
                (INNER_DOOR_PORT_LOW..=INNER_DOOR_PORT_HIGH).contains(&port),
                "{service} -> {port}"
            );
            // Below the Linux default ephemeral floor, which is where
            // `kamaji::ports::pick_free_port`'s `bind(:0)` draws from. A number
            // inside that range could collide with a ledger allocation.
            assert!(port < 32_768, "{service} -> {port}");
        }
    }

    /// Different services get different doors. Not a guarantee the hash can
    /// make in general — 10_000 slots, so a collision is possible — but two
    /// services co-tenant on one node colliding is what this is checked
    /// against, and the two real ones do not.
    #[test]
    fn two_services_do_not_share_a_door() {
        assert_ne!(listen_port("noisetable"), listen_port("yah-marketing"));
    }

    /// Step 3's identity mapping. The two arms come from different places and
    /// the test says so: the bundle's ident is handed in (a mirror may rename
    /// it), a component's is derived from names the service already declares.
    #[test]
    fn each_unit_resolves_through_its_own_identity_rule() {
        let svc = service(
            "noisetable",
            vec![
                component("site", None, DeployTier::Bundle),
                component("account", Some("app"), DeployTier::Workload),
            ],
        );
        let plan = plan(&svc, &BTreeMap::new()).unwrap().unwrap();

        assert_eq!(
            plan.unit_ident(&DeployedUnit::Bundle, "renamed-bundle"),
            "renamed-bundle",
            "a slot's `name = \"…\"` override has to win — it is what the record carries"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            plan.unit_ident(&DeployedUnit::Component("account".into()), "renamed-bundle"),
            "noisetable-account",
        );
    }

    /// A component id that is not already a legal mesh ident is folded, not
    /// passed through — the ident travels into a service-record lookup and a
    /// `MeshIdent`, both of which are lowercase-and-dash.
    #[test]
    fn a_derived_component_ident_is_folded_like_every_other_mesh_ident() {
        assert_eq!(
            component_workload_ident("Noise_Table", "Account.API"),
            "noise-table-account-api"
        );
    }

    /// Steps 2 and 3 joined: a two-unit service renders a door whose table
    /// names both resolved addresses and whose listener is the derived port.
    /// The positive half of the ticket's verify list, at the config tier.
    #[test]
    fn resolved_units_render_a_door_on_the_derived_port() {
        let svc = service(
            "noisetable",
            vec![
                component("site", None, DeployTier::Bundle),
                component("account", Some("app"), DeployTier::Workload),
            ],
        );
        let domains = domains(
            "noisetable",
            &[(
                "/app/*",
                &[
                    ("cross-origin-opener-policy", "same-origin"),
                    ("cross-origin-embedder-policy", "require-corp"),
                ],
            )],
        );
        let plan = plan(&svc, &domains).unwrap().unwrap();

        let addresses = plan.resolve_addresses("noisetable", |ident| match ident {
            "noisetable" => Some("100.64.0.3:8080".to_string()),
            "noisetable-account" => Some("100.64.0.3:14001".to_string()),
            _ => None,
        });
        assert_eq!(addresses.len(), 2);

        let workload = plan
            .workload(plan.listen_port(), |unit| addresses.get(unit).cloned())
            .unwrap();
        let spec = workload.container_spec().expect("container-shaped");
        let listen = spec
            .env
            .iter()
            .find(|e| e.name == "PASSWAY_LISTEN")
            .and_then(|e| match &e.value {
                EnvValue::Literal { value } => Some(value.clone()),
                _ => None,
            })
            .expect("a door always declares its listener");
        assert_eq!(listen, format!("127.0.0.1:{}", listen_port("noisetable")));

        let table = &spec.files[0].content;
        assert!(table.contains("100.64.0.3:8080"), "{table}");
        assert!(table.contains("100.64.0.3:14001"), "{table}");
        assert!(table.contains("cross-origin-embedder-policy"), "{table}");
    }

    /// A unit that resolved to nothing is ABSENT from the map rather than
    /// present-and-empty — which is what makes `routes_file`'s refusal the
    /// single place a missing address is reported.
    #[test]
    fn an_unresolvable_unit_is_absent_rather_than_defaulted() {
        let svc = service(
            "noisetable",
            vec![
                component("site", None, DeployTier::Bundle),
                component("account", Some("app"), DeployTier::Workload),
            ],
        );
        let plan = plan(&svc, &BTreeMap::new()).unwrap().unwrap();
        let addresses = plan.resolve_addresses("noisetable", |ident| {
            (ident == "noisetable").then(|| "100.64.0.3:8080".to_string())
        });
        assert_eq!(addresses.len(), 1);
        assert!(!addresses.contains_key(&DeployedUnit::Component("account".into())));
        assert!(plan
            .workload(plan.listen_port(), |unit| addresses.get(unit).cloned())
            .is_err());
    }
}