xml_sec/xmldsig/

verify.rs

//! XMLDSig reference processing and end-to-end signature verification pipeline.
//!
//! Implements [XMLDSig §4.3.3](https://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core1/#sec-CoreValidation):
//! for each `<Reference>` in `<SignedInfo>`, dereference the URI, apply transforms,
//! compute the digest, and compare with the stored `<DigestValue>`.
//!
//! This module wires together:
//! - [`UriReferenceResolver`] for URI dereference
//! - [`super::transforms::execute_transforms`] for the transform pipeline
//! - [`compute_digest`] + [`constant_time_eq`] for digest computation and comparison
//! - [`verify_signature_with_pem_key`] for full pipeline validation (`SignedInfo` + `SignatureValue`)

use crate::xml::dom::{Node, NodeId};
use base64::Engine;
use std::cell::{Cell, RefCell};
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};

use crate::c14n::canonicalize_bounded_with_xml_base_budget;
use crate::document::{
    DocumentParseSettings, DocumentView, NodeIdentity, XmlDocument, XmlDocumentError,
};
use crate::hard_limits::CANONICALIZED_SIGNATURE_DATA_BYTE_CEILING;
use crate::operation::{
    OperationDecisionReason, OperationExecutionContext, OperationNodeId, OperationNodeKind,
    OperationPlanError, OperationResourceIdentity, OperationStage,
};

#[cfg(test)]
use super::digest::compute_digest;
use super::digest::{DigestAlgorithm, constant_time_eq};
#[cfg(test)]
use super::parse::MAX_REFERENCES_PER_SIGNATURE;
#[cfg(test)]
use super::parse::parse_key_info;
use super::parse::{
    KeyInfo, MAX_X509_DATA_TOTAL_BINARY_LEN, MAX_X509_DECODED_BINARY_LEN, ParseError, Reference,
    RetrievalMethodTransforms, SignatureAlgorithm, XMLDSIG_NS,
};
use super::parse::{
    parse_key_info_with_policy_budgets, parse_key_info_with_policy_budgets_and_document_base,
    parse_reference_with_xpath_budget, parse_signed_info_with_xpath_budget, parse_x509_certificate,
    parse_x509_data_dispatch_with_budget_and_provider, reference_digest_method,
};
use super::signature::{
    SignatureVerificationError, verify_dsa_signature_spki, verify_ecdsa_signature_pem,
    verify_rsa_signature_pem,
};
#[cfg(test)]
use super::transforms::BASE64_TRANSFORM_URI;
use super::transforms::{
    DEFAULT_IMPLICIT_C14N_URI, Transform, TransformExecutionBudget, TransformOptions,
    XPATH_TRANSFORM_URI, XPathHereSemantics, XPathSignatureParseBudget,
    execute_transforms_with_options_and_budget, map_c14n_resource_policy_violation,
    transform_chain_produces_binary,
};
use super::types::{NodeSet, TransformError, subtree_node_id_range};
use super::uri::{ExternalResourceMapError, UriReferenceResolver, validate_external_resource_map};
use super::whitespace::{is_xml_whitespace_only, normalize_xml_base64_bytes};

const MAX_SIGNATURE_VALUE_LEN: usize = 8192;
const MAX_RETRIEVAL_METHOD_COUNT: usize = 64;
/// Cryptographic verifier used by [`VerifyContext`].
///
/// This trait intentionally has no `Send + Sync` supertraits so lightweight
/// single-threaded verifiers can be used without additional bounds.
pub trait VerifyingKey {
    /// Composite resolvers may try individual keys through the selected engine.
    /// `None` identifies a leaf handle. Wrappers must preserve per-key policy
    /// when forwarding the visitor; no public/private key copy is required.
    fn verify_candidate_keys(
        &self,
        _verify: &mut dyn FnMut(&dyn VerifyingKey) -> Result<bool, DsigError>,
    ) -> Result<Option<bool>, DsigError> {
        Ok(None)
    }
    /// Borrow public SPKI for native verification, validating method/key binding.
    /// Opaque external keys may return `None`; native providers then fail closed.
    fn verification_spki(
        &self,
        _algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
    ) -> Result<Option<&[u8]>, DsigError> {
        Ok(None)
    }

    /// Wire encoding already selected by the immutable verification policy.
    fn ecdsa_encoding(&self) -> crate::policy::EcdsaSignatureValueEncoding {
        crate::policy::EcdsaSignatureValueEncoding::XmlDsig
    }
    /// Verify with validated domain separation, rejecting unsupported contexts.
    fn verify_with_context(
        &self,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        context: &super::SignatureContext,
        data: &[u8],
        signature: &[u8],
    ) -> Result<bool, DsigError> {
        if !context.as_bytes().is_empty() {
            return Err(super::SignatureVerificationError::UnsupportedAlgorithm {
                uri: algorithm.uri().to_owned(),
            }
            .into());
        }
        self.verify(algorithm, data, signature)
    }
    /// Validate this key against the operation's immutable trust policy.
    ///
    /// Built-in keys override this hook so pre-resolved and resolver-produced
    /// keys enforce identical strength constraints. Custom opaque keys may
    /// retain their own policy enforcement by accepting the default no-op.
    fn validate_policy(
        &self,
        _policy: &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), DsigError> {
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Check that `signature_value` has the wire framing required by the
    /// declared algorithm and this key before provider dispatch.
    ///
    /// Key implementations with key-size-dependent framing should override
    /// this method. The default enforces the algorithm-wide XMLDSig envelope.
    fn validate_signature_value(
        &self,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        signature_value: &[u8],
    ) -> Result<bool, DsigError> {
        Ok(super::signature::signature_value_matches_algorithm(
            algorithm,
            signature_value,
        ))
    }

    /// Validate wire framing under the operation's immutable compatibility policy.
    ///
    /// The default delegates to [`VerifyingKey::validate_signature_value`] and
    /// therefore implements only the standard XMLDSig framing contract. Custom
    /// keys that support policy-selected wire formats, such as
    /// [`crate::policy::EcdsaSignatureValueEncoding::XmlSecAsn1Der`], must
    /// override this hook rather than accepting both formats implicitly.
    fn validate_signature_value_with_policy(
        &self,
        policy: &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        signature_value: &[u8],
    ) -> Result<bool, DsigError> {
        let _ = policy;
        self.validate_signature_value(algorithm, signature_value)
    }

    /// Verify `signature_value` over `signed_data` with the declared algorithm.
    fn verify(
        &self,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        signed_data: &[u8],
        signature_value: &[u8],
    ) -> Result<bool, DsigError>;

    /// Verify after applying operation-scoped compatibility semantics.
    ///
    /// The default delegates to [`VerifyingKey::verify`]. Custom keys whose
    /// provider input depends on compatibility policy must override this hook
    /// consistently with [`VerifyingKey::validate_signature_value_with_policy`].
    fn verify_with_policy(
        &self,
        policy: &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        signed_data: &[u8],
        signature_value: &[u8],
    ) -> Result<bool, DsigError> {
        let _ = policy;
        self.verify(algorithm, signed_data, signature_value)
    }
}

/// Key resolver hook used by [`VerifyContext`] when no pre-set key is provided.
///
/// This trait intentionally has no `Send + Sync` supertraits; callers that need
/// cross-thread sharing can wrap resolvers/keys in their own thread-safe types.
pub trait KeyResolver {
    /// Discover and explicitly authorize a key for an end-to-end operation.
    /// The default preserves discovery only: applications that authorize keys
    /// themselves return `ResolvedVerificationKey::CallerTrusted` explicitly.
    fn resolve_for_verification<'a>(
        &'a self,
        key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        policy: &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
        provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
    ) -> Result<Option<super::ResolvedVerificationKey<'a>>, DsigError> {
        Ok(self
            .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(key_info, algorithm, policy, provider)?
            .map(super::ResolvedVerificationKey::Candidate))
    }
    /// Resolve a verification key from parsed `<KeyInfo>` sources.
    ///
    /// Return `Ok(None)` when no suitable key could be resolved from available
    /// key material (for example, missing `<KeyInfo>` candidates). `VerifyContext`
    /// maps `Ok(None)` to `DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::KeyNotFound)`;
    /// reserve `Err(...)` for resolver failures.
    fn resolve<'a>(
        &'a self,
        key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
    ) -> Result<Option<Box<dyn VerifyingKey + 'a>>, DsigError>;

    /// Resolve under the operation's immutable policy snapshot.
    ///
    /// Implementations that make trust or key-source decisions must override
    /// this method. Resolver implementations that inspect multiple candidates
    /// must enforce [`crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::max_key_candidates`] across
    /// that internal search. The verification pipeline separately requires
    /// capacity for the single candidate returned by any resolver. The default
    /// preserves source-only custom resolvers whose behavior is independent of
    /// other policy fields.
    fn resolve_with_policy<'a>(
        &'a self,
        key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        _policy: &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
    ) -> Result<Option<Box<dyn VerifyingKey + 'a>>, DsigError> {
        self.resolve(key_info, algorithm)
    }

    /// Resolve under both the operation policy and cryptographic provider.
    ///
    /// Resolvers that evaluate cryptographic key metadata, such as
    /// `X509Digest`, must override this hook. The default keeps existing
    /// policy-aware custom resolvers source-compatible.
    fn resolve_with_policy_and_provider<'a>(
        &'a self,
        key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        policy: &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
        _provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
    ) -> Result<Option<Box<dyn VerifyingKey + 'a>>, DsigError> {
        self.resolve_with_policy(key_info, algorithm, policy)
    }

    /// Return `true` when this resolver consumes document `<KeyInfo>` material.
    ///
    /// The verification pipeline uses this to decide whether malformed
    /// `<KeyInfo>` should raise `DsigError::ParseKeyInfo` before resolver
    /// execution. Resolvers that ignore document key material can keep the
    /// default `false` to avoid fail-closed parsing on advisory `<KeyInfo>`.
    fn consumes_document_key_info(&self) -> bool {
        false
    }
}

/// Allowed structural URI classes for XMLDSig reference and key-source policy.
///
/// External URIs resolve only from bytes supplied through
/// [`VerifyContext::external_resources`]; allowing them never enables I/O.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[must_use = "pass the policy to VerifyContext::allowed_uri_types(), or store it for reuse"]
pub struct UriTypeSet {
    allow_empty: bool,
    allow_same_document: bool,
    allow_external: bool,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum UriClass {
    Empty,
    SameDocument,
    External,
}

fn classify_uri(uri: &str) -> UriClass {
    if uri.is_empty() {
        UriClass::Empty
    } else if uri.starts_with('#') {
        UriClass::SameDocument
    } else {
        UriClass::External
    }
}

impl UriTypeSet {
    /// Create a custom URI policy.
    pub const fn new(allow_empty: bool, allow_same_document: bool, allow_external: bool) -> Self {
        Self {
            allow_empty,
            allow_same_document,
            allow_external,
        }
    }

    /// Allow only same-document references (`""`, `#id`, `#xpointer(...)`).
    pub const SAME_DOCUMENT: Self = Self {
        allow_empty: true,
        allow_same_document: true,
        allow_external: false,
    };

    /// Allow all URI classes.
    ///
    /// External URIs still require an explicit caller-owned resource map.
    pub const ALL: Self = Self {
        allow_empty: true,
        allow_same_document: true,
        allow_external: true,
    };

    /// Return whether this set permits the URI's structural class.
    pub fn allows(self, uri: &str) -> bool {
        match classify_uri(uri) {
            UriClass::Empty => self.allow_empty,
            UriClass::SameDocument => self.allow_same_document,
            UriClass::External => self.allow_external,
        }
    }
}

impl Default for UriTypeSet {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self::SAME_DOCUMENT
    }
}

/// Request-scoped selection of the XMLDSig operation node.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SignatureSelection<'a> {
    /// Require exactly one `Signature` in the complete document.
    #[default]
    UniqueDocumentSignature,
    /// Select the first descendant `Signature` from the document root.
    FirstDocumentSignature,
    /// Select the first descendant `Signature` below the element with this ID.
    FirstSignatureUnderId(&'a str),
}

/// Verification builder/configuration.
#[must_use = "configure the context and call verify(), or store it for reuse"]
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct VerifyContext<'a> {
    key: Option<&'a dyn VerifyingKey>,
    key_resolver: Option<&'a dyn KeyResolver>,
    policy: crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
    provider: &'a dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
    xml_backend: crate::XmlBackend,
    store_pre_digest: bool,
    external_resources: Option<&'a HashMap<String, Vec<u8>>>,
    signature_selection: SignatureSelection<'a>,
    id_attributes: &'a [crate::IdAttributeRegistration],
}

impl<'a> VerifyContext<'a> {
    /// Create a context with conservative defaults.
    ///
    /// Defaults:
    /// - no pre-set key, no key resolver
    /// - manifests disabled
    /// - same-document URIs only
    /// - all transforms allowed
    /// - pre-digest buffers not stored
    pub fn new() -> Self {
        Self {
            key: None,
            key_resolver: None,
            policy: crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default(),
            provider: crate::provider::default_provider(),
            xml_backend: crate::XmlBackend::default(),
            store_pre_digest: false,
            external_resources: None,
            signature_selection: SignatureSelection::UniqueDocumentSignature,
            id_attributes: &[],
        }
    }

    /// Set a pre-resolved verification key.
    ///
    /// Built-in [`super::VerificationKey`] values are validated against the
    /// same operation key-strength policy as resolver-produced keys. Custom
    /// opaque [`VerifyingKey`] implementations retain responsibility for any
    /// key metadata that the core cannot inspect.
    pub fn key(mut self, key: &'a dyn VerifyingKey) -> Self {
        self.key = Some(key);
        self
    }

    /// Set a key resolver fallback used when `key()` is not provided.
    pub fn key_resolver(mut self, resolver: &'a dyn KeyResolver) -> Self {
        self.key_resolver = Some(resolver);
        self
    }

    /// Replace the complete immutable verification policy snapshot.
    pub fn policy(mut self, policy: crate::policy::VerificationPolicy) -> Self {
        self.policy = policy;
        self
    }

    /// Select the cryptographic provider for this verification operation.
    pub fn provider(mut self, provider: &'a dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider) -> Self {
        self.provider = provider;
        self
    }

    /// Select the compiled XML parser backend for this verification operation.
    pub fn xml_backend(mut self, backend: crate::XmlBackend) -> Self {
        self.xml_backend = backend;
        self
    }

    /// Enable or disable `<Manifest>` processing.
    ///
    /// When enabled, references in `<ds:Manifest>` elements that are direct
    /// element children of `<ds:Object>` are processed only when the direct-child
    /// `<ds:Object>` or `<ds:Manifest>` itself is referenced from `<SignedInfo>`
    /// by an ID-based same-document fragment URI such as `#id` or
    /// `#xpointer(id('id'))`, and that reference uses only canonicalization
    /// transforms (or implicit canonicalization). Filtering or binary transforms
    /// do not prove that the complete Manifest structure was authenticated.
    /// Only those signed Manifest references are returned in
    /// `VerifyResult::manifest_references`.
    /// Manifest parsing begins only after every `<SignedInfo>` reference digest
    /// validates; a failure returns immediately with no Manifest results.
    /// Nested `<ds:Manifest>` descendants under `<ds:Object>` are not
    /// processed.
    /// Direct-child unsigned/unreferenced Manifests are skipped and do not
    /// appear in `VerifyResult::manifest_references`.
    /// Whole-document same-document references such as `URI=""` or
    /// `URI="#xpointer(/)"` do not mark a specific direct-child
    /// `<ds:Object>`/`<ds:Manifest>` as signed for this option.
    ///
    /// Manifests are parsed and processed only after the SignedInfo references
    /// and SignatureValue both validate. Their digest mismatches, policy
    /// violations, and processing failures are then reported independently in
    /// `VerifyResult::manifest_references` and do not alter `VerifyResult::status`.
    /// Callers that enable `process_manifests(true)` must inspect
    /// `VerifyResult::manifest_references` in addition to `VerifyResult::status`
    /// when interpreting `verify()` results.
    /// Structural/parse errors in Manifest content abort `verify()` and are
    /// returned as `Err(...)`.
    pub fn process_manifests(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.policy.manifest_processing = if enabled {
            crate::policy::ManifestProcessing::Process
        } else {
            crate::policy::ManifestProcessing::Ignore
        };
        self
    }

    /// Restrict allowed reference URI classes.
    pub fn allowed_uri_types(mut self, types: UriTypeSet) -> Self {
        self.policy.uris.references = types;
        self
    }

    /// Restrict URI classes used to retrieve key material from `<KeyInfo>`.
    ///
    /// This policy is independent from [`Self::allowed_uri_types`]: allowing an
    /// external signed payload does not implicitly allow external key retrieval.
    /// Same-document retrieval is enabled by default; external retrieval requires
    /// an explicit opt-in and still uses only caller-supplied resources.
    pub fn allowed_retrieval_method_uri_types(mut self, types: UriTypeSet) -> Self {
        self.policy.uris.retrieval_methods = types;
        self
    }

    /// Provide external URI payloads explicitly.
    ///
    /// The map is the complete external I/O boundary: verification never
    /// performs network or filesystem access. External URIs must also be
    /// enabled through [`UriTypeSet`]. Map keys are RFC 3986 resolved URI
    /// identities: use normalized paths with dot segments removed and retain
    /// query or fragment suffixes.
    pub fn external_resources(mut self, resources: &'a HashMap<String, Vec<u8>>) -> Self {
        self.external_resources = Some(resources);
        self
    }

    /// Select the operation start node by its XML ID value.
    ///
    /// Verification selects the first descendant `<Signature>` in document
    /// order. This is request context, not a policy decision, and mirrors
    /// libxmlsec1's depth-first `xmlSecFindNode` start-node contract.
    pub fn start_node_id(mut self, id: &'a str) -> Self {
        self.signature_selection = SignatureSelection::FirstSignatureUnderId(id);
        self
    }

    /// Select the first descendant `<Signature>` from the document root.
    ///
    /// This is the libxmlsec1 command-line operation-root contract. The library
    /// default remains fail-closed and requires a unique document signature.
    pub fn first_document_signature(mut self) -> Self {
        self.signature_selection = SignatureSelection::FirstDocumentSignature;
        self
    }

    /// Add caller-declared ID attributes for start-node and Reference lookup.
    pub fn id_attributes(mut self, registrations: &'a [crate::IdAttributeRegistration]) -> Self {
        self.id_attributes = registrations;
        self
    }

    /// Allow bounded internal DTD declarations while keeping external entity
    /// resolution disabled. This is off by default.
    pub fn allow_internal_dtd(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.policy.xml.allow_internal_dtd = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Restrict allowed transform and canonicalization algorithms by URI.
    ///
    /// Example values:
    /// - `http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature`
    /// - `http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#`
    ///
    /// The allowlist covers explicit Reference and RetrievalMethod transforms,
    /// the declared SignedInfo canonicalization method, and implicit default
    /// C14N (`http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315`) when a Reference
    /// transform chain ends as a node set.
    pub fn allowed_transforms<I, S>(mut self, transforms: I) -> Self
    where
        I: IntoIterator<Item = S>,
        S: Into<String>,
    {
        self.policy.transforms.allowed_algorithms =
            Some(transforms.into_iter().map(Into::into).collect());
        self
    }

    /// Store pre-digest buffers for diagnostics.
    ///
    /// Retained reference buffers and canonicalized `<SignedInfo>` share a
    /// non-configurable 32 MiB safety ceiling. Canonicalized `<SignedInfo>` is
    /// charged even when diagnostic retention is disabled because signature
    /// verification always materializes it. Overflow remains a typed policy
    /// violation at both low-level and end-to-end entry points.
    pub fn store_pre_digest(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.store_pre_digest = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Select the node returned by XPath's `here()` extension function.
    ///
    /// The default follows XMLDSig and returns the `<XPath>` parameter.
    /// Use [`XPathHereSemantics::XmlSecLegacy`] only for documents known to
    /// have been generated with libxmlsec1's `<Transform>` interpretation.
    pub fn xpath_here_semantics(mut self, semantics: XPathHereSemantics) -> Self {
        self.policy.transforms.xpath_here_semantics = semantics;
        self
    }

    fn allowed_transform_uris(&self) -> Option<&HashSet<String>> {
        self.policy.transforms.allowed_algorithms.as_ref()
    }

    fn transform_options(&self) -> TransformOptions {
        TransformOptions::default()
            .allow_internal_dtd(self.policy.xml.allow_internal_dtd)
            .xpath_here_semantics(self.policy.transforms.xpath_here_semantics)
    }

    /// Verify one XMLDSig signature using this context.
    ///
    /// Returns `Ok(VerifyResult)` for both valid and invalid signatures; inspect
    /// `VerifyResult::status` for the core `<SignedInfo>` and signature-value
    /// outcome. When Manifest processing is enabled, inspect every
    /// `VerifyResult::manifest_references` entry separately. `Err(...)` is
    /// reserved for pipeline failures.
    pub fn verify(&self, xml: &str) -> Result<VerifyResult, DsigError> {
        verify_signature_with_context(xml, self)
    }

    /// Verify a signature against a retained owned document generation.
    ///
    /// The active XML input policy is revalidated against the document's parse
    /// provenance as well as its current byte and node counts. In particular, a
    /// strict context rejects a document that required internal DTD support.
    pub fn verify_document(&self, document: &XmlDocument) -> Result<VerifyResult, DsigError> {
        verify_signature_document_with_context(document, self)
    }

    /// Verify every Signature in one retained document generation.
    ///
    /// All signatures share the operation's work and retention budgets. A
    /// malformed or invalid signature is retained as an individual outcome,
    /// never silently skipped. Call [`VerifyEvidence::accepted`] with the
    /// current document before accepting the request; a successful return
    /// alone is not validation. [`VerifyEvidence::all_valid`] is historical
    /// mathematical diagnostics only and does not revalidate document generation.
    pub fn verify_all(&self, document: &XmlDocument) -> Result<VerifyEvidence, DsigError> {
        verify_all_document(document, self, &VerificationRequest::default())
    }

    /// Discover bounded Signature identities without key or digest work.
    ///
    /// These are untrusted selection handles, not verification evidence. Use
    /// them to authorize request keys even when Signatures have no XML ID.
    pub fn signature_identities(
        &self,
        document: &XmlDocument,
    ) -> Result<Vec<NodeIdentity>, DsigError> {
        self.policy.validate()?;
        document.validate_operation_policy(&self.policy.xml, &self.policy.resources)?;
        document.with_view(|view| {
            let count = count_signature_nodes(view, self.policy.resources.max_signatures)?;
            let mut identities = Vec::with_capacity(count);
            for node in view.document().descendants() {
                if node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "Signature")) {
                    identities.push(view.node_identity(node));
                }
            }
            Ok(identities)
        })
    }

    /// Verify all signatures against explicit caller-selected targets and keys.
    ///
    /// Requests are not policy: they cannot permit algorithms, URI classes or
    /// XML features forbidden by the immutable policy snapshot.
    pub fn verify_request(
        &self,
        document: &XmlDocument,
        request: &VerificationRequest<'_>,
    ) -> Result<VerifyEvidence, DsigError> {
        verify_all_document(document, self, request)
    }
}

/// Application requirement for the independently verified signatures.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SignatureRequirement {
    /// Every discovered signature must pass, and at least one must exist.
    #[default]
    All,
    /// Explicitly tolerate other invalid signatures if this many pass.
    AtLeast(usize),
    /// Require exactly this many discovered signatures, all passing.
    Exactly(usize),
}

/// Explicit key authorization for one stable, caller-selected Signature.
pub struct CallerTrustedSignatureKey<'a> {
    /// Signature that this key is authorized to verify.
    pub signature: NodeIdentity,
    /// Application-owned key; embedded KeyInfo cannot override it.
    pub key: &'a dyn VerifyingKey,
}

/// Request data, immutably borrowed for one verification operation.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct VerificationRequest<'a> {
    /// Elements whose complete expanded content must be authenticated.
    /// Comments and an enveloped Signature are not part of this assertion.
    pub expected_targets: &'a [NodeIdentity],
    /// Per-signature trusted keys. Duplicate/foreign/stale mappings fail closed.
    pub trusted_keys: &'a [CallerTrustedSignatureKey<'a>],
    /// Explicit external bytes; no implicit I/O or configuration discovery.
    pub external_resources: Option<&'a HashMap<String, Vec<u8>>>,
    /// Required multi-signature outcome; zero counts are invalid requests.
    pub signatures: SignatureRequirement,
    /// Opaque caller correlation value, never read from XML or used as trust.
    pub correlation: Option<[u8; 16]>,
}

/// Outcome for one exact Signature, including pipeline failures.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct SignatureEvidence {
    identity: NodeIdentity,
    result: Result<VerifyResult, DsigError>,
}

impl SignatureEvidence {
    /// Stable identity of the Signature actually processed.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn identity(&self) -> NodeIdentity {
        self.identity
    }

    /// Individual outcome. Digest matches do not imply signature validity.
    pub const fn result(&self) -> &Result<VerifyResult, DsigError> {
        &self.result
    }
}

/// Bounded outcomes for all signatures in one document generation.
#[derive(Debug)]
#[must_use = "inspect the individual outcomes before accepting the document"]
pub struct VerifyEvidence {
    document: NodeIdentity,
    signatures: Vec<SignatureEvidence>,
    accepted: bool,
    correlation: Option<[u8; 16]>,
}

impl VerifyEvidence {
    /// Whether the explicit request requirements hold for this document.
    /// Foreign documents or any mutation after verification invalidate acceptance.
    pub fn accepted(&self, document: &XmlDocument) -> Result<bool, DsigError> {
        document.with_view(|view| {
            view.resolve_node(self.document)?;
            Ok(self.accepted)
        })
    }

    /// Uninterpreted correlation value supplied by the caller.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn correlation(&self) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
        self.correlation
    }

    /// Prove complete expanded element content under an authorized signature.
    ///
    /// This does not claim source-byte equality, comment coverage or protection
    /// of the owning enveloped Signature. Arbitrary XPath/binary transforms
    /// remain indeterminate rather than falsely covering their original input.
    /// The exact document generation must still exist; wrapping an unsigned
    /// sibling with a matching name cannot satisfy an identity-based assertion.
    pub fn covers_element(
        &self,
        document: &XmlDocument,
        target: NodeIdentity,
    ) -> Result<bool, DsigError> {
        document.with_view(|view| {
            view.resolve_node(self.document)?;
            let target_node = view.resolve_node(target)?;
            if !target_node.is_element() {
                return Err(DsigError::InvalidRequest {
                    reason: "coverage target must be an element",
                });
            }
            let target_id = target_node.id().get();
            for signature in &self.signatures {
                let Ok(result) = &signature.result else {
                    continue;
                };
                if result.status != DsigStatus::Valid
                    || !matches!(
                        result.key_trust,
                        super::KeyTrustEvidence::CallerTrusted
                            | super::KeyTrustEvidence::ValidatedX509(_)
                    )
                {
                    continue;
                }
                let signature_node = view.resolve_node(signature.identity)?;
                for reference in result
                    .signed_info_references
                    .iter()
                    .chain(&result.manifest_references)
                {
                    if reference.status != DsigStatus::Valid {
                        continue;
                    }
                    let Some(root) = reference.target_identity else {
                        continue;
                    };
                    if reference.coverage == ReferenceCoverage::TransformedData {
                        continue;
                    }
                    let root = view.resolve_node(root)?;
                    // The normalized arena assigns contiguous preorder IDs;
                    // reuse the same subtree contract as node-set subtraction,
                    // rather than walking depth for every report/target pair.
                    if !subtree_node_id_range(root).contains(&target_id) {
                        continue;
                    }
                    if reference.coverage == ReferenceCoverage::EnvelopedElementContent
                        && subtree_node_id_range(signature_node).contains(&target_id)
                    {
                        continue;
                    }
                    return Ok(true);
                }
            }
            Ok(false)
        })
    }

    /// Outcomes in document order, including malformed signatures.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn signatures(&self) -> &[SignatureEvidence] {
        &self.signatures
    }

    /// Whether a nonempty set of signatures and their processed Manifests passed.
    ///
    /// This is a historical mathematical outcome, not current-document
    /// authorization. Use `accepted(document)` for generation-bound acceptance.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn all_valid(&self) -> bool {
        !self.signatures.is_empty()
            && self.signatures.iter().all(|entry| {
                entry.result.as_ref().is_ok_and(|result| {
                    result.status == DsigStatus::Valid
                        && result
                            .manifest_references
                            .iter()
                            .all(|reference| reference.status == DsigStatus::Valid)
                })
            })
    }
}

impl Default for VerifyContext<'_> {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self::new()
    }
}

/// Per-reference verification result.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
#[non_exhaustive]
#[must_use = "inspect status before accepting the reference result"]
pub struct ReferenceResult {
    /// Exact Reference node when processing a retained document.
    pub reference_identity: Option<NodeIdentity>,
    /// Resolved same-document target, not an untrusted URI claim.
    pub target_identity: Option<NodeIdentity>,
    /// SHA-256 identity of resolved external bytes before transforms. This is
    /// provenance, not signer authorization or an original-element proof.
    pub external_resource_fingerprint: Option<[u8; 32]>,
    /// What can be proven about original element-content coverage.
    pub coverage: ReferenceCoverage,
    /// Whether this reference came from `<SignedInfo>` or `<Manifest>`.
    pub reference_set: ReferenceSet,
    /// Zero-based index within `reference_set`.
    pub reference_index: usize,
    /// URI from the `<Reference>` element (for diagnostics).
    pub uri: String,
    /// Digest algorithm used.
    pub digest_algorithm: DigestAlgorithm,
    /// Reference verification status.
    pub status: DsigStatus,
    /// Pre-digest bytes (populated when `store_pre_digest` is enabled).
    pub pre_digest_data: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}

/// Conservative coverage classification for the original semantic document.
///
/// XMLDSig 1.1 §8.1.1 protects only transformed data. Unknown projection is
/// deliberately not promoted to complete original-element coverage.
/// https://www.w3.org/TR/2013/REC-xmldsig-core1-20130411/#sec-Signed
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum ReferenceCoverage {
    /// No complete original-element coverage proof (binary or arbitrary filter).
    TransformedData,
    /// Expanded element names, attributes and content, excluding comments.
    ElementContent,
    /// Element content except the owning Signature subtree and comments.
    EnvelopedElementContent,
}

/// Origin of a processed `<Reference>`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum ReferenceSet {
    /// `<Reference>` under `<SignedInfo>`.
    SignedInfo,
    /// `<Reference>` under `<Object>/<Manifest>`.
    Manifest,
}

/// Verification status.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum DsigStatus {
    /// Signature/reference is cryptographically valid.
    Valid,
    /// Signature/reference is invalid with a concrete reason.
    Invalid(FailureReason),
}

/// Why XMLDSig verification failed.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum FailureReason {
    /// `<DigestValue>` mismatch for a `<Reference>` at `ref_index`.
    ReferenceDigestMismatch {
        /// Zero-based index of the failing `<Reference>` in its processed set.
        ///
        /// On per-reference verification entries, use
        /// `ReferenceResult::reference_set` to distinguish the `<SignedInfo>`
        /// and `<Manifest>` reference sets.
        ///
        /// When this reason appears in `VerifyResult::status` without an
        /// accompanying `ReferenceResult`, `ref_index` always refers to the
        /// `<SignedInfo>` reference set.
        ref_index: usize,
    },
    /// `<Reference>` rejected by URI/transform allowlist policy.
    ReferencePolicyViolation {
        /// Zero-based index of the failing `<Reference>` in its processed set.
        ref_index: usize,
    },
    /// `<Reference>` processing failed (dereference, transform, missing URI).
    ReferenceProcessingFailure {
        /// Zero-based index of the failing `<Reference>` in its processed set.
        ref_index: usize,
    },
    /// `<SignatureValue>` does not match canonicalized `<SignedInfo>`.
    SignatureMismatch,
    /// No verification key was configured or could be resolved.
    KeyNotFound,
}

/// Result of processing all `<Reference>` elements in `<SignedInfo>`.
#[derive(Debug)]
#[non_exhaustive]
#[must_use = "check first_failure/results before accepting the reference set"]
pub struct ReferencesResult {
    /// Per-reference results (one per `<Reference>` in order).
    /// On fail-fast, only references up to and including the failed one are present.
    pub results: Vec<ReferenceResult>,
    /// Index of the first failed reference, if any.
    pub first_failure: Option<usize>,
}

impl ReferencesResult {
    /// Whether all references passed digest verification.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn all_valid(&self) -> bool {
        self.results
            .iter()
            .all(|result| matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid))
    }
}

/// Process a single `<Reference>`: dereference URI → apply transforms → compute
/// digest → compare with stored `<DigestValue>`.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// - `reference`: The parsed `<Reference>` element.
/// - `resolver`: URI resolver for the document.
/// - `signature_node`: The `<Signature>` element (for enveloped-signature transform).
/// - `reference_set`: Whether this reference belongs to `<SignedInfo>` or `<Manifest>`.
/// - `reference_index`: Zero-based index of this reference inside `reference_set`.
/// - `store_pre_digest`: If true, store the pre-digest bytes in the result,
///   subject to the signature-wide diagnostic retention ceiling.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns `Err` for processing failures (URI dereference, transform errors).
/// Digest mismatch is NOT an error — it produces
/// `Ok(ReferenceResult { status: Invalid(ReferenceDigestMismatch { .. }) })`.
pub fn process_reference(
    reference: &Reference,
    resolver: &UriReferenceResolver<'_>,
    signature_node: Node<'_, '_>,
    reference_set: ReferenceSet,
    reference_index: usize,
    store_pre_digest: bool,
) -> Result<ReferenceResult, ReferenceProcessingError> {
    let execution_budget = TransformExecutionBudget::default();
    let canonicalized_data_budget = CanonicalizedDataBudget::default();
    let execution = ReferenceExecutionContext {
        store_pre_digest,
        transform_options: TransformOptions::default(),
        transform_budget: &execution_budget,
        canonicalized_data_budget: &canonicalized_data_budget,
        provider: crate::provider::default_provider(),
    };
    process_reference_with_options(
        reference,
        resolver,
        signature_node,
        reference_set,
        reference_index,
        reference_origin_node(signature_node, reference_set, reference_index),
        &execution,
    )
}

fn reference_origin_node<'a, 'input>(
    signature_node: Node<'a, 'input>,
    reference_set: ReferenceSet,
    reference_index: usize,
) -> Option<Node<'a, 'input>> {
    let is_reference = |node: &Node<'_, '_>| {
        node.is_element()
            && node.tag_name().namespace() == Some(XMLDSIG_NS)
            && node.tag_name().name() == "Reference"
    };
    match reference_set {
        ReferenceSet::SignedInfo => signature_node
            .children()
            .find(|node| {
                node.is_element()
                    && node.tag_name().namespace() == Some(XMLDSIG_NS)
                    && node.tag_name().name() == "SignedInfo"
            })?
            .children()
            .filter(is_reference)
            .nth(reference_index),
        ReferenceSet::Manifest => signature_node
            .children()
            .filter(|node| {
                node.is_element()
                    && node.tag_name().namespace() == Some(XMLDSIG_NS)
                    && node.tag_name().name() == "Object"
            })
            .flat_map(|object| {
                object.children().filter(|node| {
                    node.is_element()
                        && node.tag_name().namespace() == Some(XMLDSIG_NS)
                        && node.tag_name().name() == "Manifest"
                })
            })
            .flat_map(|manifest| manifest.children().filter(is_reference))
            .nth(reference_index),
    }
}

fn bind_reference_evidence(
    result: &mut ReferenceResult,
    reference: &Reference,
    view: DocumentView<'_>,
    origin: Option<Node<'_, '_>>,
    observed: &OperationResourceIdentity,
) {
    result.reference_identity = origin.map(|node| view.node_identity(node));
    if let OperationResourceIdentity::External { fingerprint, .. } = observed {
        result.external_resource_fingerprint = Some(*fingerprint);
    }
    if let OperationResourceIdentity::DocumentNode(target) = observed {
        result.target_identity = Some(*target);
        // A later node-set transform can reparse C14N output, so arbitrary
        // chains cannot retain an original subtree claim. This classification
        // describes proven element content, never discarded comments or the
        // namespace-declaration spelling normalized by canonicalization.
        let mut enveloped = false;
        let mut canonicalized = false;
        for transform in &reference.transforms {
            match transform {
                Transform::C14n(_) if !canonicalized => canonicalized = true,
                Transform::Enveloped if !canonicalized => enveloped = true,
                _ => return,
            }
        }
        result.coverage = if enveloped {
            ReferenceCoverage::EnvelopedElementContent
        } else {
            ReferenceCoverage::ElementContent
        };
    }
}

struct ReferenceExecutionContext<'a> {
    store_pre_digest: bool,
    transform_options: TransformOptions,
    transform_budget: &'a TransformExecutionBudget,
    canonicalized_data_budget: &'a CanonicalizedDataBudget,
    provider: &'a dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
}

struct CanonicalizedDataBudget {
    remaining: Cell<usize>,
    max_bytes: usize,
}

struct VerificationOperationBudgets {
    transforms: TransformExecutionBudget,
    canonicalized: CanonicalizedDataBudget,
    xpath_parse: RefCell<XPathSignatureParseBudget>,
    key_info_materialization: RefCell<KeyInfoMaterializationState>,
    external_resource_identities: RefCell<HashMap<String, OperationResourceIdentity>>,
    resolved_reference_resources: RefCell<HashMap<NodeId, OperationResourceIdentity>>,
    external_resource_set_identity: RefCell<Option<OperationResourceIdentity>>,
}

impl VerificationOperationBudgets {
    fn with_transforms(
        policy: &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
        transforms: TransformExecutionBudget,
    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            transforms,
            canonicalized: CanonicalizedDataBudget::with_limit(
                policy.resources.effective_canonicalized_bytes(),
            ),
            xpath_parse: RefCell::new(XPathSignatureParseBudget::from_resources(&policy.resources)),
            key_info_materialization: RefCell::new(KeyInfoMaterializationState::default()),
            external_resource_identities: RefCell::new(HashMap::new()),
            resolved_reference_resources: RefCell::new(HashMap::new()),
            external_resource_set_identity: RefCell::new(None),
        }
    }

    fn external_resource_set_identity(
        &self,
        resolver: &UriReferenceResolver<'_>,
    ) -> OperationResourceIdentity {
        // One resolver borrows the same immutable map for the entire request.
        // Hash/sort it once, not once per graph node or Signature.
        let mut cached = self.external_resource_set_identity.borrow_mut();
        cached
            .get_or_insert_with(|| resolver.external_resource_set_identity())
            .clone()
    }

    fn resource_identity_for_reference(
        &self,
        reference: &Reference,
        index: usize,
        resolver: &UriReferenceResolver<'_>,
        view: DocumentView<'_>,
        origin: Option<Node<'_, '_>>,
    ) -> OperationResourceIdentity {
        let Some(uri) = reference.uri.as_deref() else {
            return OperationResourceIdentity::Generated("omitted-reference", index);
        };
        if uri.is_empty() || uri == "#xpointer(/)" {
            // XMLDSig 1.1, Recommendation 11 April 2013, §4.4.3.3
            // "Same-Document URI-References" (numbering differs in older editions):
            // URI="" selects the containing document node-set without comments;
            // #xpointer(/) retains comments. Both bind the document root, not
            // an ID-resolved element (root XPointer meaning: §4.4.3.2).
            // https://www.w3.org/TR/2013/REC-xmldsig-core1-20130411/#sec-Same-Document
            return OperationResourceIdentity::DocumentNode(view.root());
        }
        if uri.starts_with('#') {
            return resolver
                .node_id_for_same_document_reference(uri)
                .ok()
                .flatten()
                .map(|node| OperationResourceIdentity::DocumentNode(view.node_identity_by_id(node)))
                .unwrap_or(OperationResourceIdentity::Generated(
                    "missing-document-reference",
                    index,
                ));
        }

        let resolved_uri;
        let uri = if let Some(origin) = origin {
            if let Some(identity) = self.resolved_reference_resources.borrow().get(&origin.id()) {
                return identity.clone();
            }
            // XML Base Second Edition §4.2 resolves the external reference in
            // its owning element's context. Identity and execution must agree.
            // https://www.w3.org/TR/2009/REC-xmlbase-20090128/#resolving
            let Ok(resolved) = crate::c14n::xml_base::resolve_uri_from_node_with_budget(
                origin,
                uri,
                self.transforms.xml_base_resolution(),
            ) else {
                return OperationResourceIdentity::Generated(
                    "unresolved-external-reference",
                    index,
                );
            };
            resolved_uri = resolved;
            resolved_uri.as_str()
        } else {
            uri
        };
        if let Some(identity) = self.external_resource_identities.borrow().get(uri).cloned() {
            if let Some(origin) = origin {
                self.resolved_reference_resources
                    .borrow_mut()
                    .insert(origin.id(), identity.clone());
            }
            return identity;
        }
        let identity = resolver.external_resource_identity(uri).unwrap_or(
            OperationResourceIdentity::Generated("missing-external-reference", index),
        );
        if matches!(identity, OperationResourceIdentity::External { .. }) {
            self.external_resource_identities
                .borrow_mut()
                .insert(uri.to_owned(), identity.clone());
            if let Some(origin) = origin {
                self.resolved_reference_resources
                    .borrow_mut()
                    .insert(origin.id(), identity.clone());
            }
        }
        identity
    }
}

struct VerificationPlanNodes {
    document: OperationNodeId,
    key_materialization: OperationNodeId,
    key: OperationNodeId,
    digests: Vec<OperationNodeId>,
    canonicalization: OperationNodeId,
    crypto: OperationNodeId,
}

fn compile_verification_operation_plan(
    operation: &mut OperationExecutionContext<
        &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
        &VerificationOperationBudgets,
    >,
    view: DocumentView<'_>,
    signature_node: Node<'_, '_>,
    references: &[Reference],
    resolver: &UriReferenceResolver<'_>,
) -> Result<VerificationPlanNodes, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    operation
        .validate_document_view(view)
        .map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;
    let document_node = operation.add_node(
        OperationNodeKind::Document,
        OperationStage::Parse,
        Some(OperationResourceIdentity::DocumentNode(
            view.node_identity(signature_node),
        )),
    );
    let key_materialization_resource = operation.budgets().external_resource_set_identity(resolver);
    let key_materialization = operation.add_node(
        OperationNodeKind::Key { index: 0 },
        OperationStage::Resolve,
        Some(key_materialization_resource.clone()),
    );
    let key_node = operation.add_node(
        OperationNodeKind::Key { index: 1 },
        OperationStage::Resolve,
        None,
    );
    operation
        .add_dependency(key_materialization, document_node)
        .map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;
    operation
        .add_dependency(key_node, key_materialization)
        .map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;
    let mut digests = Vec::with_capacity(references.len());
    for (index, reference) in references.iter().enumerate() {
        let resource = operation.budgets().resource_identity_for_reference(
            reference,
            index,
            resolver,
            view,
            reference_origin_node(signature_node, ReferenceSet::SignedInfo, index),
        );
        let digest_node = operation.add_node(
            OperationNodeKind::Digest { index },
            OperationStage::Digest,
            Some(resource.clone()),
        );
        operation
            .add_dependency(digest_node, document_node)
            .map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;
        digests.push(digest_node);
    }
    let canonicalization = operation.add_node(
        OperationNodeKind::Canonicalization,
        OperationStage::Canonicalization,
        None,
    );
    for digest in &digests {
        operation
            .add_dependency(canonicalization, *digest)
            .map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;
    }
    let crypto = operation.add_node(OperationNodeKind::Crypto, OperationStage::Crypto, None);
    operation
        .add_dependency(crypto, key_node)
        .map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;
    operation
        .add_dependency(crypto, canonicalization)
        .map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;
    operation.compile().map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;
    Ok(VerificationPlanNodes {
        document: document_node,
        key_materialization,
        key: key_node,
        digests,
        canonicalization,
        crypto,
    })
}

fn map_verification_plan_error(error: OperationPlanError) -> SignatureVerificationPipelineError {
    SignatureVerificationPipelineError::OperationPlan(error.to_string())
}

impl Default for CanonicalizedDataBudget {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            remaining: Cell::new(CANONICALIZED_SIGNATURE_DATA_BYTE_CEILING),
            max_bytes: CANONICALIZED_SIGNATURE_DATA_BYTE_CEILING,
        }
    }
}

impl CanonicalizedDataBudget {
    fn remaining(&self) -> usize {
        self.remaining.get()
    }

    fn charge(&self, bytes: usize) -> Result<(), ReferenceProcessingError> {
        let available = self.remaining.get();
        let Some(remaining) = available.checked_sub(bytes) else {
            self.remaining.set(0);
            return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                resource: crate::policy::resource_name::CANONICALIZED_BYTES,
                maximum: self.max_bytes,
                actual: self
                    .max_bytes
                    .saturating_add(bytes.saturating_sub(available)),
            }
            .into());
        };
        self.remaining.set(remaining);
        Ok(())
    }

    fn with_limit(max_bytes: usize) -> Self {
        Self {
            remaining: Cell::new(max_bytes),
            max_bytes,
        }
    }
}

fn process_reference_with_options(
    reference: &Reference,
    resolver: &UriReferenceResolver<'_>,
    signature_node: Node<'_, '_>,
    reference_set: ReferenceSet,
    reference_index: usize,
    reference_node: Option<Node<'_, '_>>,
    execution: &ReferenceExecutionContext<'_>,
) -> Result<ReferenceResult, ReferenceProcessingError> {
    // 1. Dereference URI. Omitted URI is distinct from URI="" in XMLDSig and
    // must be rejected until caller-provided external object resolution exists.
    let uri = reference
        .uri
        .as_deref()
        .ok_or(ReferenceProcessingError::MissingUri)?;
    let initial_data = reference_node
        .map_or_else(
            || {
                resolver.dereference_with_budget(
                    uri,
                    execution.transform_budget.node_set_materialization(),
                )
            },
            |node| {
                resolver.dereference_from_with_budget(
                    uri,
                    node,
                    execution.transform_budget.node_set_materialization(),
                    execution.transform_budget.xml_base_resolution(),
                )
            },
        )
        .map_err(ReferenceProcessingError::UriDereference)?;

    // 2. Apply transform chain
    let pre_digest_bytes = execute_transforms_with_options_and_budget(
        signature_node,
        initial_data,
        &reference.transforms,
        execution.transform_options,
        execution.transform_budget,
    )
    .map_err(ReferenceProcessingError::Transform)?;

    // 3. Compute digest
    let computed_digest = super::compute_digest_with_provider(
        execution.provider,
        reference.digest_method,
        &pre_digest_bytes,
    )?;

    // 4. Compare with stored DigestValue (constant-time)
    let status = if constant_time_eq(&computed_digest, &reference.digest_value) {
        DsigStatus::Valid
    } else {
        DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferenceDigestMismatch {
            ref_index: reference_index,
        })
    };

    let pre_digest_data = if execution.store_pre_digest {
        execution
            .canonicalized_data_budget
            .charge(pre_digest_bytes.len())?;
        Some(pre_digest_bytes)
    } else {
        None
    };

    Ok(ReferenceResult {
        reference_identity: None,
        target_identity: None,
        external_resource_fingerprint: None,
        coverage: ReferenceCoverage::TransformedData,
        reference_set,
        reference_index,
        uri: uri.to_owned(),
        digest_algorithm: reference.digest_method,
        status,
        pre_digest_data,
    })
}

/// Process all `<Reference>` elements in a `<SignedInfo>`, with fail-fast
/// on the first digest mismatch.
///
/// Per XMLDSig spec: if any reference fails, the entire signature is invalid.
/// Processing stops at the first failure for efficiency.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns `Err` only for processing failures (malformed XML, unsupported
/// transform, etc.). Digest mismatches are reported via
/// `ReferencesResult::first_failure`.
pub fn process_all_references(
    references: &[Reference],
    resolver: &UriReferenceResolver<'_>,
    signature_node: Node<'_, '_>,
    store_pre_digest: bool,
) -> Result<ReferencesResult, ReferenceProcessingError> {
    let execution_budget = TransformExecutionBudget::default();
    let canonicalized_data_budget = CanonicalizedDataBudget::default();
    let execution = ReferenceExecutionContext {
        store_pre_digest,
        transform_options: TransformOptions::default(),
        transform_budget: &execution_budget,
        canonicalized_data_budget: &canonicalized_data_budget,
        provider: crate::provider::default_provider(),
    };
    process_all_references_with_options(references, resolver, signature_node, &execution)
}

fn process_all_references_with_options(
    references: &[Reference],
    resolver: &UriReferenceResolver<'_>,
    signature_node: Node<'_, '_>,
    execution: &ReferenceExecutionContext<'_>,
) -> Result<ReferencesResult, ReferenceProcessingError> {
    let mut results = Vec::with_capacity(references.len());

    for (i, reference) in references.iter().enumerate() {
        let result = process_reference_with_options(
            reference,
            resolver,
            signature_node,
            ReferenceSet::SignedInfo,
            i,
            reference_origin_node(signature_node, ReferenceSet::SignedInfo, i),
            execution,
        )?;
        let failed = matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Invalid(_));
        results.push(result);

        if failed {
            return Ok(ReferencesResult {
                results,
                first_failure: Some(i),
            });
        }
    }

    Ok(ReferencesResult {
        results,
        first_failure: None,
    })
}

/// Errors during reference processing.
///
/// Distinct from digest mismatch (which is a validation result, not a processing error).
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum ReferenceProcessingError {
    /// The immutable verification policy rejected reference processing.
    #[error("verification policy violation: {0}")]
    Policy(#[from] crate::policy::PolicyViolation),

    /// The selected provider could not compute the declared digest.
    #[error("cryptographic provider error: {0}")]
    Provider(#[from] crate::provider::ProviderError),

    /// `<Reference>` omitted the `URI` attribute, which we do not resolve implicitly.
    #[error("reference URI is required; omitted URI references are not supported")]
    MissingUri,

    /// URI dereference failed.
    #[error("URI dereference failed: {0}")]
    UriDereference(#[source] super::types::TransformError),

    /// Transform execution failed.
    #[error("transform failed: {0}")]
    Transform(#[source] super::types::TransformError),
}

impl ReferenceProcessingError {
    fn into_policy_violation(self) -> Result<crate::policy::PolicyViolation, Self> {
        match self {
            Self::Policy(error)
            | Self::UriDereference(TransformError::Policy(error))
            | Self::Transform(TransformError::Policy(error)) => Ok(error),
            error => Err(error),
        }
    }
}

/// End-to-end XMLDSig verification result for one `<Signature>`.
#[derive(Debug)]
#[non_exhaustive]
#[must_use = "inspect status before accepting the document"]
pub struct VerifyResult {
    /// Key authorization, independent of `status`; neither alone authorizes data.
    pub key_trust: super::KeyTrustEvidence,
    /// Core XMLDSig status for the `<SignedInfo>` references and signature value.
    ///
    /// Manifest reference failures do not alter this field; inspect
    /// [`Self::manifest_references`] before accepting Manifest-backed data.
    pub status: DsigStatus,
    /// `<Reference>` verification results from `<SignedInfo>`.
    /// On fail-fast, this includes references up to and including
    /// the first digest mismatch only.
    pub signed_info_references: Vec<ReferenceResult>,
    /// `<Manifest>` reference results.
    /// Populated only when `VerifyContext::process_manifests(true)` is enabled
    /// and core signature validation succeeds.
    /// Includes only references from signed direct-child `<ds:Object>/<ds:Manifest>`
    /// blocks that are referenced from `<SignedInfo>`.
    /// Each entry has an independent status that does not alter [`Self::status`].
    /// Callers must inspect every entry before accepting Manifest-backed data.
    /// Unsigned/unreferenced direct-child Manifest blocks are skipped, so an
    /// empty list does not imply that no Manifest elements existed in `verify()` input.
    pub manifest_references: Vec<ReferenceResult>,
    /// Canonicalized `<SignedInfo>` bytes when `store_pre_digest` is enabled
    /// and verification reaches SignedInfo canonicalization.
    pub canonicalized_signed_info: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}

/// Errors while running end-to-end XMLDSig verification.
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum DsigError {
    /// Caller-supplied request identities or requirements are inconsistent.
    #[error("invalid verification request: {reason}")]
    InvalidRequest {
        /// Concrete invariant violated before signature execution.
        reason: &'static str,
    },
    /// The compiled verification policy rejected an operation input.
    #[error("verification policy violation: {0}")]
    Policy(#[from] crate::policy::PolicyViolation),

    /// The selected provider cannot execute the requested operation.
    #[error("cryptographic provider error: {0}")]
    Provider(#[from] crate::provider::ProviderError),

    /// XML parsing failed.
    #[error("XML parse error: {0}")]
    XmlParse(#[from] crate::xml::dom::ParseError),

    /// The owned XML document boundary rejected the document or identity.
    #[error("XML document error: {0}")]
    Document(#[from] crate::document::XmlDocumentError),

    /// Required signature element is missing.
    #[error("missing required element: <{element}>")]
    MissingElement {
        /// Name of the missing element.
        element: &'static str,
    },

    /// Signature element tree shape violates XMLDSig structure requirements.
    #[error("invalid Signature structure: {reason}")]
    InvalidStructure {
        /// Validation failure reason.
        reason: &'static str,
    },

    /// The authenticated dependency graph could not be compiled or executed.
    #[error("invalid operation plan: {0}")]
    OperationPlan(String),

    /// The requested operation start node is absent or has a duplicate ID.
    #[error("selected node ID is missing or ambiguous: {id}")]
    SelectedNodeUnavailable {
        /// Caller-provided XML ID value.
        id: String,
    },

    /// `<SignedInfo>` parsing failed.
    #[error("failed to parse SignedInfo: {0}")]
    ParseSignedInfo(super::parse::ParseError),

    /// `<KeyInfo>` parsing failed.
    #[error("failed to parse KeyInfo: {0}")]
    ParseKeyInfo(#[source] super::parse::ParseError),

    /// Configuration-driven key resolution failed.
    #[error("key resolution failed: {0}")]
    KeyResolution(#[from] super::keys::KeyResolutionError),

    /// `<Object>/<Manifest>/<Reference>` parsing failed.
    #[error("failed to parse Manifest reference: {0}")]
    ParseManifestReference(#[source] ParseError),

    /// Reference processing failed.
    #[error("reference processing failed: {0}")]
    Reference(ReferenceProcessingError),

    /// SignedInfo canonicalization failed.
    #[error("SignedInfo canonicalization failed: {0}")]
    Canonicalization(#[from] crate::c14n::C14nError),

    /// SignatureValue base64 decoding failed.
    #[error("invalid SignatureValue base64: {0}")]
    SignatureValueBase64(#[from] base64::DecodeError),

    /// Cryptographic verification failed before validity decision.
    #[error("signature verification failed: {0}")]
    Crypto(#[from] SignatureVerificationError),
}

impl From<super::parse::ParseError> for DsigError {
    fn from(error: super::parse::ParseError) -> Self {
        match error {
            super::parse::ParseError::Policy(error) => Self::Policy(error),
            super::parse::ParseError::Transform(super::TransformError::Policy(error)) => {
                Self::Policy(error)
            }
            error => Self::ParseSignedInfo(error),
        }
    }
}

fn map_key_info_parse_error(error: super::parse::ParseError) -> DsigError {
    match error {
        super::parse::ParseError::Policy(error)
        | super::parse::ParseError::Transform(super::TransformError::Policy(error)) => {
            DsigError::Policy(error)
        }
        error => DsigError::ParseKeyInfo(error),
    }
}

fn map_manifest_parse_error(error: super::parse::ParseError) -> DsigError {
    match error {
        super::parse::ParseError::Policy(error)
        | super::parse::ParseError::Transform(super::TransformError::Policy(error)) => {
            DsigError::Policy(error)
        }
        error => DsigError::ParseManifestReference(error),
    }
}

impl From<ReferenceProcessingError> for DsigError {
    fn from(error: ReferenceProcessingError) -> Self {
        match error.into_policy_violation() {
            Ok(error) => Self::Policy(error),
            Err(error) => Self::Reference(error),
        }
    }
}

type SignatureVerificationPipelineError = DsigError;

impl From<OperationPlanError> for DsigError {
    fn from(error: OperationPlanError) -> Self {
        Self::OperationPlan(error.to_string())
    }
}

/// Verify one XMLDSig `<Signature>` end-to-end with a PEM public key.
///
/// Pipeline:
/// 1. Parse `<Signature>` children and enforce structural constraints
/// 2. Parse `<SignedInfo>`
/// 3. Validate all `<Reference>` digests (fail-fast)
/// 4. Canonicalize `<SignedInfo>`
/// 5. Base64-decode `<SignatureValue>`
/// 6. Verify signature bytes against canonicalized `<SignedInfo>` using the provided PEM key
///
/// If any `<Reference>` digest mismatches, returns `Ok` with
/// `status == Invalid(ReferenceDigestMismatch { .. })`.
///
/// This API uses only the provided PEM key and does not parse embedded
/// `<KeyInfo>` key material for key selection/validation. Consequently,
/// malformed optional `<KeyInfo>` does not produce `DsigError::ParseKeyInfo`
/// on this API path.
///
/// Structural constraints enforced by this API:
/// - The document must contain exactly one XMLDSig `<Signature>` element.
/// - `<SignedInfo>` must be the first element child of `<Signature>` and appear once.
/// - `<SignatureValue>` must be the second element child of `<Signature>` and appear once.
/// - `<KeyInfo>` is optional and, when present, must be the third element child.
/// - Only XMLDSig namespace element children are allowed under `<Signature>`.
/// - Non-whitespace mixed text content under `<Signature>` is rejected.
/// - After `<SignedInfo>`, `<SignatureValue>`, and optional `<KeyInfo>`, only `<Object>` elements are allowed.
/// - `<SignatureValue>` must not contain nested element children.
pub fn verify_signature_with_pem_key(
    xml: &str,
    public_key_pem: &str,
    store_pre_digest: bool,
) -> Result<VerifyResult, DsigError> {
    struct PemVerifyingKey<'a> {
        public_key_pem: &'a str,
    }

    impl VerifyingKey for PemVerifyingKey<'_> {
        fn verify_with_context(
            &self,
            algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
            context: &super::SignatureContext,
            signed_data: &[u8],
            signature_value: &[u8],
        ) -> Result<bool, DsigError> {
            if context.as_bytes().is_empty() {
                return self.verify(algorithm, signed_data, signature_value);
            }
            if algorithm.context_element().is_none() {
                return Err(SignatureVerificationError::UnsupportedAlgorithm {
                    uri: algorithm.uri().to_owned(),
                }
                .into());
            }
            let (rest, pem) = x509_parser::pem::parse_x509_pem(self.public_key_pem.as_bytes())
                .map_err(|_| SignatureVerificationError::InvalidKeyPem)?;
            if !rest.iter().all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_whitespace()) || pem.label != "PUBLIC KEY" {
                return Err(SignatureVerificationError::InvalidKeyPem.into());
            }
            Ok(super::modern::verify_with_context(
                algorithm,
                &pem.contents,
                context,
                signed_data,
                signature_value,
            )?)
        }

        fn verify(
            &self,
            algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
            signed_data: &[u8],
            signature_value: &[u8],
        ) -> Result<bool, DsigError> {
            verify_with_algorithm(algorithm, self.public_key_pem, signed_data, signature_value)
        }
    }

    let key = PemVerifyingKey { public_key_pem };
    VerifyContext::new()
        .key(&key)
        .store_pre_digest(store_pre_digest)
        .verify(xml)
}

fn verify_signature_with_context(
    xml: &str,
    ctx: &VerifyContext<'_>,
) -> Result<VerifyResult, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    ctx.policy.validate()?;
    ctx.policy.resources.validate_xml_document_len(xml.len())?;
    let execution_budget = TransformExecutionBudget::from_resources(&ctx.policy.resources)
        .with_xml_backend(ctx.xml_backend);
    let settings = DocumentParseSettings::from_policy(&ctx.policy.xml, &ctx.policy.resources)
        .with_backend(ctx.xml_backend);
    let document = XmlDocument::parse_with_settings_and_budget(
        xml.to_owned(),
        settings,
        execution_budget.xml_parse_work(),
    )
    .map_err(|error| map_document_parse_error(error, settings))?;
    verify_signature_document_with_context_and_transforms(&document, ctx, execution_budget)
}

fn map_document_parse_error(error: XmlDocumentError, settings: DocumentParseSettings) -> DsigError {
    match error.into_policy_violation(settings) {
        Ok(error) => DsigError::Policy(error),
        Err(XmlDocumentError::Parse(error)) => DsigError::XmlParse(error),
        Err(error) => DsigError::Document(error),
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod xml_parse_budget_tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn verification_initial_parse_uses_the_policy_work_budget() {
        // Even a structurally invalid signature must not reach parsing when
        // the immutable operation snapshot denies all XML parse work.
        let xml = "<root/>";
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_xml_parse_work_bytes = 0;

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(xml)
            .expect_err("a zero parse-work budget must reject the input parse");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            DsigError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XML_PARSE_WORK_BYTES,
                maximum: 0,
                actual,
            }) if actual == xml.len()
        ));
    }
}

fn verify_signature_document_with_context(
    document: &XmlDocument,
    ctx: &VerifyContext<'_>,
) -> Result<VerifyResult, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    document.validate_operation_policy(&ctx.policy.xml, &ctx.policy.resources)?;
    verify_signature_document_with_context_and_transforms(
        document,
        ctx,
        TransformExecutionBudget::from_resources(&ctx.policy.resources)
            .with_xml_backend(ctx.xml_backend),
    )
}

fn count_signature_nodes(view: DocumentView<'_>, maximum: usize) -> Result<usize, DsigError> {
    let mut count = 0;
    for node in view.document().descendants() {
        if !node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "Signature")) {
            continue;
        }
        if count == maximum {
            return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                resource: crate::policy::resource_name::VERIFICATION_SIGNATURES,
                maximum,
                actual: count + 1,
            }
            .into());
        }
        count += 1;
    }
    Ok(count)
}

fn verify_all_document(
    document: &XmlDocument,
    ctx: &VerifyContext<'_>,
    request: &VerificationRequest<'_>,
) -> Result<VerifyEvidence, DsigError> {
    ctx.policy.validate()?;
    document.validate_operation_policy(&ctx.policy.xml, &ctx.policy.resources)?;
    if request.external_resources.is_some() && ctx.external_resources.is_some() {
        return Err(DsigError::InvalidRequest {
            reason: "external resources configured in both context and request",
        });
    }
    // RFC 5280 §6.1.1: validation time is one operation input, including
    // alternate certification paths and all Signatures in a batch.
    // https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-6.1.1
    let capture_time =
        ctx.policy.key_trust.verify_x509_chains && ctx.policy.key_trust.verification_time.is_none();
    let captured_context;
    let ctx = if capture_time || request.external_resources.is_some() {
        captured_context = {
            let mut captured = ctx.clone();
            if let Some(resources) = request.external_resources {
                captured.external_resources = Some(resources);
            }
            if capture_time {
                captured.policy.key_trust.verification_time = Some(std::time::SystemTime::now());
            }
            captured
        };
        &captured_context
    } else {
        ctx
    };
    let budgets = VerificationOperationBudgets::with_transforms(
        &ctx.policy,
        TransformExecutionBudget::from_resources(&ctx.policy.resources)
            .with_xml_backend(ctx.xml_backend),
    );
    document.with_view(|view| {
        match request.signatures {
            SignatureRequirement::AtLeast(0) | SignatureRequirement::Exactly(0) => {
                return Err(DsigError::InvalidRequest {
                    reason: "signature requirement must be nonzero",
                });
            }
            _ => {}
        }
        if request.expected_targets.len() > ctx.policy.resources.max_references {
            return Err(DsigError::InvalidRequest {
                reason: "too many expected coverage targets",
            });
        }
        if request.trusted_keys.len() > ctx.policy.resources.max_signatures {
            return Err(DsigError::InvalidRequest {
                reason: "too many trusted signature keys",
            });
        }
        for (index, target) in request.expected_targets.iter().copied().enumerate() {
            if !view.resolve_node(target)?.is_element() {
                return Err(DsigError::InvalidRequest {
                    reason: "coverage target must be an element",
                });
            }
            if request.expected_targets[..index].contains(&target) {
                return Err(DsigError::InvalidRequest {
                    reason: "duplicate expected coverage target",
                });
            }
        }
        for (index, entry) in request.trusted_keys.iter().enumerate() {
            if !view
                .resolve_node(entry.signature)?
                .has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "Signature"))
            {
                return Err(DsigError::InvalidRequest {
                    reason: "trusted key target must be a Signature",
                });
            }
            if request.trusted_keys[..index]
                .iter()
                .any(|prior| prior.signature == entry.signature)
            {
                return Err(DsigError::InvalidRequest {
                    reason: "ambiguous trusted keys for one Signature",
                });
            }
        }
        let is_signature = |node: &Node<'_, '_>| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "Signature"));
        let count = count_signature_nodes(view, ctx.policy.resources.max_signatures)?;
        // Cardinality is checked before allocating the report or calling a
        // resolver. No Vec of backend handles or cloned XML is needed.
        let mut signatures = Vec::with_capacity(count);
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::with_document_view(view, ctx.id_attributes)
            .with_same_document_id_semantics(ctx.policy.transforms.same_document_id_semantics)
            .with_external_resource_limits(
                ctx.policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
                ctx.policy.resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
            );
        let resolver = match ctx.external_resources {
            Some(resources) => resolver.with_external_resources(resources),
            None => resolver,
        };
        for signature in view.document().descendants().filter(is_signature) {
            // Authentication is signature-local; work accounting is request-
            // wide. A valid first signature cannot authenticate a Manifest
            // belonging to an invalid second signature.
            let mut operation = OperationExecutionContext::new(
                &ctx.policy,
                &budgets,
                Some((view.identity(), view.generation())),
            );
            let signature_identity = view.node_identity(signature);
            let key = request
                .trusted_keys
                .iter()
                .find(|entry| entry.signature == signature_identity)
                .map(|entry| entry.key)
                .or(ctx.key);
            let result =
                verify_signature_node(view, ctx, key, &mut operation, &resolver, signature);
            signatures.push(SignatureEvidence {
                identity: view.node_identity(signature),
                result,
            });
        }
        let mut evidence = VerifyEvidence {
            document: view.root(),
            signatures,
            accepted: false,
            correlation: request.correlation,
        };
        let valid = evidence
            .signatures
            .iter()
            .filter(|entry| {
                entry.result.as_ref().is_ok_and(|result| {
                    result.status == DsigStatus::Valid
                        && result
                            .manifest_references
                            .iter()
                            .all(|reference| reference.status == DsigStatus::Valid)
                })
            })
            .count();
        evidence.accepted = match request.signatures {
            SignatureRequirement::All => valid > 0 && valid == count,
            SignatureRequirement::AtLeast(minimum) => valid >= minimum,
            SignatureRequirement::Exactly(required) => valid == required && count == required,
        };
        for target in request.expected_targets {
            if !evidence.covers_element(document, *target)? {
                evidence.accepted = false;
                break;
            }
        }
        Ok(evidence)
    })
}

fn verify_signature_document_with_context_and_transforms(
    document: &XmlDocument,
    ctx: &VerifyContext<'_>,
    transforms: TransformExecutionBudget,
) -> Result<VerifyResult, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    // RFC 5280 §6.1.1 makes the validation time an input to path validation.
    // Capture it once, not separately for each source or alternate path:
    // https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-6.1.1
    let captured_context;
    let ctx = if ctx.policy.key_trust.verify_x509_chains
        && ctx.policy.key_trust.verification_time.is_none()
    {
        captured_context = {
            let mut context = ctx.clone();
            context.policy.key_trust.verification_time = Some(std::time::SystemTime::now());
            context
        };
        &captured_context
    } else {
        ctx
    };
    let budgets = VerificationOperationBudgets::with_transforms(&ctx.policy, transforms);
    let mut operation = OperationExecutionContext::new(
        &ctx.policy,
        &budgets,
        Some((document.identity(), document.generation())),
    );
    document.with_view(|view| verify_signature_view(view, ctx, &mut operation))
}

fn verify_signature_view<'a>(
    view: DocumentView<'a>,
    ctx: &VerifyContext<'_>,
    operation: &mut OperationExecutionContext<
        &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
        &VerificationOperationBudgets,
    >,
) -> Result<VerifyResult, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    ctx.policy.validate()?;
    let doc = view.document();
    let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::with_document_view(view, ctx.id_attributes)
        .with_same_document_id_semantics(ctx.policy.transforms.same_document_id_semantics)
        .with_external_resource_limits(
            ctx.policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
            ctx.policy.resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
        );
    let resolver = match ctx.external_resources {
        Some(resources) => resolver.with_external_resources(resources),
        None => resolver,
    };
    let start_node = match ctx.signature_selection {
        SignatureSelection::FirstSignatureUnderId(id) => {
            resolver.node_for_id(id).ok_or_else(|| {
                SignatureVerificationPipelineError::SelectedNodeUnavailable { id: id.to_owned() }
            })?
        }
        SignatureSelection::UniqueDocumentSignature
        | SignatureSelection::FirstDocumentSignature => doc.root(),
    };
    let mut signatures = start_node.descendants().filter(|node| {
        node.is_element()
            && node.tag_name().name() == "Signature"
            && node.tag_name().namespace() == Some(XMLDSIG_NS)
    });
    let signature_node = match (signatures.next(), ctx.signature_selection) {
        (None, _) => {
            return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::MissingElement {
                element: "Signature",
            });
        }
        // libxmlsec1 treats --node-id as an operation start node and performs
        // a depth-first xmlSecFindNode lookup from there. Without a selector,
        // the library API retains its fail-closed document-wide cardinality.
        (
            Some(node),
            SignatureSelection::FirstDocumentSignature
            | SignatureSelection::FirstSignatureUnderId(_),
        ) => node,
        (Some(node), SignatureSelection::UniqueDocumentSignature)
            if signatures.next().is_none() =>
        {
            node
        }
        (Some(_), SignatureSelection::UniqueDocumentSignature) => {
            return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "Signature must appear exactly once in document",
            });
        }
    };

    verify_signature_node(view, ctx, ctx.key, operation, &resolver, signature_node)
}

fn verify_signature_node<'a>(
    view: DocumentView<'a>,
    ctx: &VerifyContext<'_>,
    key: Option<&dyn VerifyingKey>,
    operation: &mut OperationExecutionContext<
        &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
        &VerificationOperationBudgets,
    >,
    resolver: &UriReferenceResolver<'a>,
    signature_node: Node<'a, 'a>,
) -> Result<VerifyResult, DsigError> {
    if ctx.policy.resources.max_signatures == 0 {
        return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
            resource: crate::policy::resource_name::VERIFICATION_SIGNATURES,
            maximum: 0,
            actual: 1,
        }
        .into());
    }
    let doc = view.document();
    let signature_children = parse_signature_children(signature_node)?;
    let signed_info_node = signature_children.signed_info_node;
    let should_parse_key_info = match (key, ctx.key_resolver) {
        (Some(_), _) => false,
        (None, Some(resolver)) => resolver.consumes_document_key_info(),
        (None, None) => true,
    };
    let mut key_info = if should_parse_key_info {
        signature_children
            .key_info_node
            .map(|node| {
                parse_key_info_with_policy_budgets(
                    node,
                    ctx.provider,
                    operation.budgets().transforms.xml_base_resolution(),
                    &ctx.policy.resources,
                    ctx.policy
                        .key_trust
                        .certificate_signature_algorithms
                        .as_ref(),
                )
            })
            .transpose()
            .map_err(map_key_info_parse_error)?
    } else {
        None
    };

    let signed_info = parse_signed_info_with_xpath_budget(
        signed_info_node,
        &mut operation.budgets().xpath_parse.borrow_mut(),
        &ctx.policy.resources,
    )?;
    if signed_info.references.len() > ctx.policy.resources.max_references {
        return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
            resource: crate::policy::resource_name::SIGNATURE_REFERENCES,
            maximum: ctx.policy.resources.max_references,
            actual: signed_info.references.len(),
        }
        .into());
    }
    for reference in &signed_info.references {
        if reference.transforms.len() > ctx.policy.resources.max_transforms_per_reference {
            return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                resource: crate::policy::resource_name::REFERENCE_TRANSFORMS,
                maximum: ctx.policy.resources.max_transforms_per_reference,
                actual: reference.transforms.len(),
            }
            .into());
        }
    }
    ctx.policy
        .check_signature_algorithm(signed_info.signature_method)?;
    // Refuse an inadmissible authenticator before reference resolution/transforms.
    // XMLDSig 1.1 section 4.4.2 explicitly requires max(80, hash_bits/2),
    // independently of data; section 6.3.1 separately requires octet alignment.
    // https://www.w3.org/TR/2013/REC-xmldsig-core1-20130411/#sec-SignatureMethod
    if let Some(full_output_bits) = signed_info.signature_method.hmac_output_bits() {
        ctx.policy.hmac.validate_output(
            signed_info.signature_method,
            signed_info
                .hmac_output_length_bits
                .unwrap_or(full_output_bits),
        )?;
    }
    for reference in &signed_info.references {
        if ctx
            .policy
            .digest_algorithms
            .as_ref()
            .is_some_and(|allowed| !allowed.contains(&reference.digest_method))
        {
            return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::Algorithm {
                operation: "verification",
                algorithm: reference.digest_method.uri().to_string(),
            }
            .into());
        }
    }
    enforce_reference_policies(
        &signed_info.references,
        ctx.policy.uris.references,
        ctx.allowed_transform_uris(),
    )?;
    enforce_transform_allowed(ctx.allowed_transform_uris(), signed_info.c14n_method.uri())?;

    if let Some(resources) = ctx.external_resources {
        validate_external_resource_map(
            resources,
            ctx.policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
            ctx.policy.resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
        )
        .map_err(|error| match error {
            ExternalResourceMapError::Policy(error) => error.into(),
            ExternalResourceMapError::TotalLengthOverflow => {
                SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                    reason: "external resource total length overflow",
                }
            }
        })?;
    }
    let remaining_reference_capacity = ctx
        .policy
        .resources
        .max_references
        .checked_sub(signed_info.references.len())
        .ok_or(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
            reason: "SignedInfo exceeds the per-signature Reference limit",
        })?;
    let plan_nodes = compile_verification_operation_plan(
        operation,
        view,
        signature_node,
        &signed_info.references,
        resolver,
    )?;
    let signature_identity =
        OperationResourceIdentity::DocumentNode(view.node_identity(signature_node));
    operation.run_with_resource(plan_nodes.document, &signature_identity, || {
        operation
            .validate_document_view(view)
            .map_err(map_verification_plan_error)
    })?;
    let observed_key_resources = operation.budgets().external_resource_set_identity(resolver);
    let retrieval_materialization = operation.run_with_resource(
        plan_nodes.key_materialization,
        &observed_key_resources,
        || {
            if let Some(info) = key_info.as_mut() {
                let budgets = operation.budgets();
                let mut xpath_parse = budgets.xpath_parse.borrow_mut();
                let mut retrieval_budgets = RetrievalMaterializationBudgets {
                    xpath_parse: &mut xpath_parse,
                    execution: &budgets.transforms,
                    resources: &ctx.policy.resources,
                    certificate_signature_algorithms: ctx
                        .policy
                        .key_trust
                        .certificate_signature_algorithms
                        .as_ref(),
                    xml_backend: ctx.xml_backend,
                };
                let mut materialization = budgets.key_info_materialization.borrow_mut();
                let mut outcome = materialize_key_info_references_with_budgets(
                    info,
                    resolver,
                    &ctx.policy,
                    ctx.provider,
                    &mut retrieval_budgets,
                    &mut materialization,
                )?;
                outcome.merge(materialize_retrieval_methods_with_budgets(
                    info,
                    resolver,
                    ctx.policy.uris.retrieval_methods,
                    ctx.allowed_transform_uris(),
                    ctx.provider,
                    &mut retrieval_budgets,
                    &mut materialization.candidate_work,
                )?);
                Ok::<_, SignatureVerificationPipelineError>(outcome)
            } else {
                Ok(RetrievalMaterialization::default())
            }
        },
    )?;
    let mut reference_results = Vec::with_capacity(signed_info.references.len());
    let mut first_failure = None;
    for (index, (node, reference)) in plan_nodes
        .digests
        .iter()
        .copied()
        .zip(&signed_info.references)
        .enumerate()
    {
        let observed = operation.budgets().resource_identity_for_reference(
            reference,
            index,
            resolver,
            view,
            reference_origin_node(signature_node, ReferenceSet::SignedInfo, index),
        );
        let mut result = operation.run_with_resource(node, &observed, || {
            let budgets = operation.budgets();
            let execution = ReferenceExecutionContext {
                store_pre_digest: ctx.store_pre_digest,
                transform_options: ctx.transform_options(),
                transform_budget: &budgets.transforms,
                canonicalized_data_budget: &budgets.canonicalized,
                provider: ctx.provider,
            };
            process_reference_with_options(
                reference,
                resolver,
                signature_node,
                ReferenceSet::SignedInfo,
                index,
                reference_origin_node(signature_node, ReferenceSet::SignedInfo, index),
                &execution,
            )
            .map_err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::from)
        })?;
        bind_reference_evidence(
            &mut result,
            reference,
            view,
            reference_origin_node(signature_node, ReferenceSet::SignedInfo, index),
            &observed,
        );
        let accepted = result.status == DsigStatus::Valid;
        operation.set_outcome(
            node,
            accepted,
            if accepted {
                OperationDecisionReason::ReferenceDigestVerified
            } else {
                OperationDecisionReason::ReferenceDigestRejected
            },
        );
        if result.status == DsigStatus::Valid
            && let Some(reference) = signed_info.references.get(result.reference_index)
            && reference
                .transforms
                .iter()
                .all(transform_preserves_manifest_structure)
            && let Some(uri) = reference.uri.as_deref()
            && let Ok(Some(target)) = resolver.node_id_for_same_document_reference(uri)
        {
            let identity = view.node_identity_by_id(target);
            operation.authenticate(identity);
            debug_assert!(operation.is_authenticated(identity));
        }
        reference_results.push(result);
        if !accepted {
            first_failure = Some(index);
            break;
        }
    }
    debug_assert!(
        plan_nodes.digests[reference_results.len()..]
            .iter()
            .all(|node| !operation.is_executed(*node))
    );
    let references = ReferencesResult {
        results: reference_results,
        first_failure,
    };

    if let Some(first_failure) = references.first_failure {
        debug_assert!(operation.first_failure().is_some());
        let status = references.results[first_failure].status;
        return Ok(VerifyResult {
            key_trust: super::KeyTrustEvidence::NotEvaluated,
            status,
            signed_info_references: references.results,
            manifest_references: Vec::new(),
            canonicalized_signed_info: None,
        });
    }

    let canonical_signed_info = operation.run(plan_nodes.canonicalization, || {
        let signed_info_subtree: HashSet<_> = signed_info_node
            .descendants()
            .map(|node: Node<'_, '_>| node.id())
            .collect();
        let mut canonical_signed_info = Vec::new();
        let signed_info_limit = operation
            .budgets()
            .canonicalized
            .remaining()
            .min(operation.budgets().transforms.remaining_c14n_output());
        canonicalize_bounded_with_xml_base_budget(
            doc,
            Some(&|node| signed_info_subtree.contains(&node.id())),
            &signed_info.c14n_method,
            signed_info_limit,
            operation.budgets().transforms.xml_base_resolution(),
            &mut canonical_signed_info,
        )
        .map_err(|error| {
            if let Some(violation) = map_c14n_resource_policy_violation(
                &error,
                crate::policy::resource_name::CANONICALIZED_BYTES,
                operation.budgets().canonicalized.max_bytes,
            ) {
                SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(violation)
            } else {
                SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Canonicalization(error)
            }
        })?;
        operation
            .budgets()
            .transforms
            .charge_c14n_output(canonical_signed_info.len())
            .map_err(ReferenceProcessingError::Transform)?;
        operation
            .budgets()
            .canonicalized
            .charge(canonical_signed_info.len())?;
        Ok::<_, SignatureVerificationPipelineError>(canonical_signed_info)
    })?;

    let signature_value = decode_signature_value(
        signature_children.signature_value_node,
        signed_info.signature_method,
        &ctx.policy.resources,
    )?;
    if let Some(full_output_bits) = signed_info.signature_method.hmac_output_bits() {
        let expected_bits = signed_info
            .hmac_output_length_bits
            .unwrap_or(full_output_bits);
        if signature_value.len() != expected_bits / 8 {
            return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "SignatureValue length does not match HMACOutputLength",
            });
        }
    }
    let resolved_key = operation.run(plan_nodes.key, || {
        resolve_verifying_key(ctx, key, key_info.as_ref(), signed_info.signature_method)
    })?;
    let Some(resolved_key) = resolved_key else {
        operation.set_outcome(
            plan_nodes.key,
            false,
            OperationDecisionReason::KeyUnavailable,
        );
        if let Some(error) = retrieval_materialization.deferred_error {
            return Err(error);
        }
        return Ok(VerifyResult {
            key_trust: super::KeyTrustEvidence::NotEvaluated,
            status: DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::KeyNotFound),
            signed_info_references: references.results,
            manifest_references: Vec::new(),
            canonicalized_signed_info: if ctx.store_pre_digest {
                Some(canonical_signed_info)
            } else {
                None
            },
        });
    };
    operation.set_outcome(plan_nodes.key, true, OperationDecisionReason::KeyResolved);
    let verifier = resolved_key.as_ref();
    let signature_valid = operation.run(plan_nodes.crypto, || {
        verifier.validate_policy(&ctx.policy)?;
        if !verifier.validate_signature_value_with_policy(
            &ctx.policy,
            signed_info.signature_method,
            &signature_value,
        )? {
            return Ok::<_, SignatureVerificationPipelineError>(false);
        }
        ctx.provider
            .require_capability(crate::provider::ProviderCapability::Verify(
                signed_info.signature_method,
            ))?;
        let policy_verifier = PolicyVerifyingKey {
            key: verifier,
            policy: &ctx.policy,
        };
        ctx.provider.verify_with_context(
            &policy_verifier,
            signed_info.signature_method,
            &signed_info.signature_context,
            &canonical_signed_info,
            &signature_value,
        )
    })?;

    if !signature_valid {
        operation.set_outcome(
            plan_nodes.crypto,
            false,
            OperationDecisionReason::SignatureRejected,
        );
        return Ok(VerifyResult {
            key_trust: resolved_key.evidence(&ctx.policy)?,
            status: DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::SignatureMismatch),
            signed_info_references: references.results,
            manifest_references: Vec::new(),
            canonicalized_signed_info: if ctx.store_pre_digest {
                Some(canonical_signed_info)
            } else {
                None
            },
        });
    }
    operation.set_outcome(
        plan_nodes.crypto,
        true,
        OperationDecisionReason::SignatureVerified,
    );
    // Manifest syntax and references are authenticated content. Delay parsing
    // until SignatureValue succeeds, then extend the same operation graph with
    // the newly trusted dependency subgraph and its evidence node.
    let (manifest_references, manifest_digests) =
        if ctx.policy.manifest_processing == crate::policy::ManifestProcessing::Process {
            process_authenticated_manifest_references(
                operation,
                view,
                signature_node,
                resolver,
                ctx,
                remaining_reference_capacity,
                plan_nodes.crypto,
            )?
        } else {
            (Vec::new(), Vec::new())
        };
    operation.extend();
    let evidence = operation.add_node(OperationNodeKind::Evidence, OperationStage::Evidence, None);
    operation
        .add_dependency(evidence, plan_nodes.crypto)
        .map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;
    for digest in manifest_digests {
        operation
            .add_dependency(evidence, digest)
            .map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;
    }
    operation.compile().map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;
    operation.run(evidence, || {
        Ok::<_, SignatureVerificationPipelineError>(VerifyResult {
            key_trust: resolved_key.evidence(&ctx.policy)?,
            status: DsigStatus::Valid,
            signed_info_references: references.results,
            manifest_references,
            canonicalized_signed_info: if ctx.store_pre_digest {
                Some(canonical_signed_info)
            } else {
                None
            },
        })
    })
}

struct PolicyVerifyingKey<'a> {
    key: &'a dyn VerifyingKey,
    policy: &'a crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
}

impl VerifyingKey for PolicyVerifyingKey<'_> {
    fn verify_candidate_keys(
        &self,
        verify: &mut dyn FnMut(&dyn VerifyingKey) -> Result<bool, DsigError>,
    ) -> Result<Option<bool>, DsigError> {
        self.key.verify_candidate_keys(&mut |key| {
            key.validate_policy(self.policy)?;
            verify(&PolicyVerifyingKey {
                key,
                policy: self.policy,
            })
        })
    }
    fn verification_spki(&self, algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm) -> Result<Option<&[u8]>, DsigError> {
        self.key.verification_spki(algorithm)
    }

    fn ecdsa_encoding(&self) -> crate::policy::EcdsaSignatureValueEncoding {
        self.policy.ecdsa_signature_value_encoding
    }
    fn verify_with_context(
        &self,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        context: &super::SignatureContext,
        data: &[u8],
        signature: &[u8],
    ) -> Result<bool, DsigError> {
        if context.as_bytes().is_empty() {
            self.verify(algorithm, data, signature)
        } else {
            self.key
                .verify_with_context(algorithm, context, data, signature)
        }
    }
    fn validate_policy(&self, policy: &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy) -> Result<(), DsigError> {
        self.key.validate_policy(policy)
    }

    fn validate_signature_value(
        &self,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        signature_value: &[u8],
    ) -> Result<bool, DsigError> {
        self.key
            .validate_signature_value_with_policy(self.policy, algorithm, signature_value)
    }

    fn verify(
        &self,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        signed_data: &[u8],
        signature_value: &[u8],
    ) -> Result<bool, DsigError> {
        self.key
            .verify_with_policy(self.policy, algorithm, signed_data, signature_value)
    }
}

#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct RetrievalMaterialization {
    deferred_error: Option<SignatureVerificationPipelineError>,
}

impl RetrievalMaterialization {
    fn merge(&mut self, other: Self) {
        if self.deferred_error.is_none() {
            self.deferred_error = other.deferred_error;
        }
    }
}

struct RetrievalMaterializationBudgets<'a> {
    certificate_signature_algorithms: Option<&'a crate::policy::CertificateSignatureAlgorithms>,
    xpath_parse: &'a mut XPathSignatureParseBudget,
    execution: &'a TransformExecutionBudget,
    resources: &'a crate::policy::ResourcePolicy,
    xml_backend: crate::XmlBackend,
}

#[derive(Default)]
struct KeyInfoMaterializationState {
    active: HashSet<(super::uri::TraversalDocumentIdentity, String)>,
    candidate_work: usize,
}

trait KeyInfoReferencePolicy {
    fn certificate_signature_algorithms(
        &self,
    ) -> Option<&crate::policy::CertificateSignatureAlgorithms>;
    fn resources(&self) -> &crate::policy::ResourcePolicy;
    fn xml(&self) -> &crate::policy::XmlInputPolicy;
    fn key_info_reference_uris(&self) -> UriTypeSet;
    fn retrieval_method_uris(&self) -> UriTypeSet;
    fn key_info_reference_source_enabled(&self) -> bool;
    fn allowed_transforms(&self) -> Option<&HashSet<String>>;
}

impl KeyInfoReferencePolicy for crate::policy::SigningPolicy {
    fn certificate_signature_algorithms(
        &self,
    ) -> Option<&crate::policy::CertificateSignatureAlgorithms> {
        None
    }
    fn resources(&self) -> &crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
        &self.resources
    }

    fn xml(&self) -> &crate::policy::XmlInputPolicy {
        &self.xml
    }

    fn key_info_reference_uris(&self) -> UriTypeSet {
        self.uris.key_info_references
    }

    fn retrieval_method_uris(&self) -> UriTypeSet {
        self.uris.retrieval_methods
    }

    fn key_info_reference_source_enabled(&self) -> bool {
        true
    }

    fn allowed_transforms(&self) -> Option<&HashSet<String>> {
        self.transforms.allowed_algorithms.as_ref()
    }
}

impl KeyInfoReferencePolicy for crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
    fn certificate_signature_algorithms(
        &self,
    ) -> Option<&crate::policy::CertificateSignatureAlgorithms> {
        self.key_trust.certificate_signature_algorithms.as_ref()
    }
    fn resources(&self) -> &crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
        &self.resources
    }

    fn xml(&self) -> &crate::policy::XmlInputPolicy {
        &self.xml
    }

    fn key_info_reference_uris(&self) -> UriTypeSet {
        self.uris.key_info_references
    }

    fn retrieval_method_uris(&self) -> UriTypeSet {
        self.uris.retrieval_methods
    }

    fn key_info_reference_source_enabled(&self) -> bool {
        self.key_sources.key_info_reference
    }

    fn allowed_transforms(&self) -> Option<&HashSet<String>> {
        self.transforms.allowed_algorithms.as_ref()
    }
}

struct KeyInfoReferenceMaterializationContext<'a, 'budget, P> {
    policy: &'a P,
    provider: &'a dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
    budgets: &'a mut RetrievalMaterializationBudgets<'budget>,
}

fn materialize_key_info_references_with_budgets<P: KeyInfoReferencePolicy>(
    key_info: &mut KeyInfo,
    resolver: &UriReferenceResolver<'_>,
    policy: &P,
    provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
    budgets: &mut RetrievalMaterializationBudgets<'_>,
    materialization: &mut KeyInfoMaterializationState,
) -> Result<RetrievalMaterialization, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    fn visit<P: KeyInfoReferencePolicy>(
        key_info: &mut KeyInfo,
        resolver: &UriReferenceResolver<'_>,
        context: &mut KeyInfoReferenceMaterializationContext<'_, '_, P>,
        materialization: &mut KeyInfoMaterializationState,
        depth: usize,
    ) -> Result<RetrievalMaterialization, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
        let mut materialized = Vec::new();
        let mut outcome = RetrievalMaterialization::default();
        for source in std::mem::take(&mut key_info.sources) {
            let source_work = match &source {
                super::parse::KeyInfoSource::X509Data(info) => info.certificates.len().max(1),
                _ => 1,
            };
            materialization.candidate_work =
                materialization.candidate_work.saturating_add(source_work);
            context
                .policy
                .resources()
                .validate_key_candidates(materialization.candidate_work)?;

            let super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyInfoReference { uri } = source else {
                materialized.push(source);
                continue;
            };
            if !context.policy.key_info_reference_source_enabled() {
                return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::KeyTrust {
                    reason: "KeyInfoReference key sources are disabled",
                }
                .into());
            }
            if !context.policy.key_info_reference_uris().allows(&uri) {
                return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::Uri {
                    operation: "KeyInfoReference",
                    reason: "URI class is disabled",
                }
                .into());
            }
            let next_depth = depth.saturating_add(1);
            context
                .policy
                .resources()
                .validate_key_info_reference_depth(next_depth)?;
            let cycle_key = (resolver.traversal_document_identity(), uri.clone());
            if !materialization.active.insert(cycle_key.clone()) {
                return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                    reason: "KeyInfoReference cycle detected",
                });
            }

            let is_same_document = uri.is_empty() || uri.starts_with('#');
            let (mut referenced, mut nested_outcome) = if is_same_document {
                let node = resolver
                    .node_for_same_document_reference(&uri)
                    .map_err(|error| {
                        SignatureVerificationPipelineError::from(
                            ReferenceProcessingError::UriDereference(error),
                        )
                    })?
                    .ok_or(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "KeyInfoReference target is missing or ambiguous",
                    })?;
                if !node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "KeyInfo")) {
                    return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "KeyInfoReference target must be KeyInfo",
                    });
                }
                (
                    parse_key_info_with_policy_budgets(
                        node,
                        context.provider,
                        context.budgets.execution.xml_base_resolution(),
                        context.policy.resources(),
                        context.policy.certificate_signature_algorithms(),
                    )
                    .map_err(map_key_info_parse_error)?,
                    RetrievalMaterialization::default(),
                )
            } else {
                // The fragment selects a node inside the retrieved document; it
                // is not part of either the caller-owned resource identity or
                // the base URI used by references nested in that document.
                let (resource_uri, fragment) = uri
                    .split_once('#')
                    .map_or((uri.as_str(), None), |(resource, fragment)| {
                        (resource, (!fragment.is_empty()).then_some(fragment))
                    });
                let bytes = resolver
                    .external_resource(resource_uri)
                    .map_err(|error| {
                        SignatureVerificationPipelineError::from(
                            ReferenceProcessingError::UriDereference(error),
                        )
                    })?
                    .ok_or(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "KeyInfoReference external resource is unavailable",
                    })?;
                // External KeyInfo bytes share the operation's work allowance even if decoding
                // fails before a document exists. Parsing the decoded text is a separate pass.
                context
                    .budgets
                    .execution
                    .xml_parse_work()
                    .charge_policy(bytes.len())?;
                let xml = crate::encoding::decode_xml_octets(
                    bytes,
                    context.policy.resources().max_xml_document_bytes,
                )
                .map_err(map_key_info_xml_decode_error)?;
                let settings = DocumentParseSettings::from_policy(
                    context.policy.xml(),
                    context.policy.resources(),
                )
                .with_backend(context.budgets.xml_backend);
                let document = XmlDocument::parse_with_settings_and_budget(
                    xml.into_owned(),
                    settings,
                    context.budgets.execution.xml_parse_work(),
                )
                .map_err(|error| map_document_parse_error(error, settings))?;
                document.with_view(|view| {
                    let external_resolver = resolver.for_external_document_view(view, resource_uri);
                    let target = match fragment {
                        Some(fragment) => external_resolver
                            .node_for_same_document_reference(&format!("#{fragment}"))
                            .map_err(|error| {
                                SignatureVerificationPipelineError::from(
                                    ReferenceProcessingError::UriDereference(error),
                                )
                            })?
                            .ok_or(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                                reason: "KeyInfoReference external target is missing or ambiguous",
                            })?,
                        _ => view.document().root_element(),
                    };
                    if !target.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "KeyInfo")) {
                        return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                            reason: "KeyInfoReference external target must be KeyInfo",
                        });
                    }
                    let mut referenced = parse_key_info_with_policy_budgets_and_document_base(
                        target,
                        context.provider,
                        context.budgets.execution.xml_base_resolution(),
                        context.policy.resources(),
                        Some(resource_uri),
                        context.policy.certificate_signature_algorithms(),
                    )
                    .map_err(map_key_info_parse_error)?;
                    let mut nested_outcome = visit(
                        &mut referenced,
                        &external_resolver,
                        context,
                        materialization,
                        next_depth,
                    )?;
                    nested_outcome.merge(materialize_retrieval_methods_with_budgets(
                        &mut referenced,
                        &external_resolver,
                        context.policy.retrieval_method_uris(),
                        context.policy.allowed_transforms(),
                        context.provider,
                        context.budgets,
                        &mut materialization.candidate_work,
                    )?);
                    // RetrievalMethod nodes are meaningful only in the document
                    // whose resolver owns their same-document URI context.
                    referenced.sources.retain(|source| {
                        !matches!(source, super::parse::KeyInfoSource::RetrievalMethod { .. })
                    });
                    Ok((referenced, nested_outcome))
                })?
            };
            if is_same_document {
                nested_outcome.merge(visit(
                    &mut referenced,
                    resolver,
                    context,
                    materialization,
                    next_depth,
                )?);
            }
            outcome.merge(nested_outcome);
            materialization.active.remove(&cycle_key);
            materialized.extend(referenced.sources);
        }
        key_info.sources = materialized;
        context
            .policy
            .resources()
            .validate_key_candidates(key_info.embedded_candidate_count())?;
        Ok(outcome)
    }

    let mut context = KeyInfoReferenceMaterializationContext {
        policy,
        provider,
        budgets,
    };
    visit(key_info, resolver, &mut context, materialization, 0)
}

fn map_key_info_xml_decode_error(
    error: crate::encoding::XmlEncodingError,
) -> SignatureVerificationPipelineError {
    match error {
        crate::encoding::XmlEncodingError::DecodedLimit { maximum, actual } => {
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XML_DOCUMENT,
                    maximum,
                    actual,
                },
            )
        }
        _ => SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
            reason: "KeyInfoReference external resource has an invalid XML encoding",
        },
    }
}

fn materialize_key_info_references_for_policy<P: KeyInfoReferencePolicy>(
    key_info: &mut KeyInfo,
    resolver: UriReferenceResolver<'_>,
    policy: &P,
    provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
    xml_backend: crate::XmlBackend,
) -> Result<(), DsigError> {
    let resolver = resolver.with_external_resource_limits(
        policy.resources().max_external_resource_bytes,
        policy.resources().max_external_resource_total_bytes,
    );
    let mut xpath_parse_budget = XPathSignatureParseBudget::from_resources(policy.resources());
    let execution_budget = TransformExecutionBudget::from_resources(policy.resources());
    let mut budgets = RetrievalMaterializationBudgets {
        xpath_parse: &mut xpath_parse_budget,
        execution: &execution_budget,
        resources: policy.resources(),
        certificate_signature_algorithms: policy.certificate_signature_algorithms(),
        xml_backend,
    };
    let mut materialization = KeyInfoMaterializationState::default();
    // Candidate-local retrieval failures remain deferred: this metadata-only
    // entry point cannot know whether a later key-selection stage needs them.
    materialize_key_info_references_with_budgets(
        key_info,
        &resolver,
        policy,
        provider,
        &mut budgets,
        &mut materialization,
    )?;
    Ok(())
}

/// Resolve and recursively expand policy-allowed `KeyInfoReference` sources
/// while preparing caller-supplied key material for signing.
///
/// The recursive reference traversal shares the verifier's candidate-work,
/// depth, cycle, target, XML parsing, and external-resource bounds. Retrieval
/// methods nested in an external referenced document are materialized while
/// that document's URI context is active; retrieval methods in the caller's
/// document remain the responsibility of the complete signing pipeline.
/// candidate failures are deferred so an earlier usable key source can still
/// be selected; the complete signing pipeline reports the retained failure if
/// no source resolves to a key. URI classes remain controlled by the signing
/// policy's `uris` field; external
/// bytes must be attached to `resolver` explicitly by the caller. The resolver
/// is consumed so this operation can bind a fresh aggregate external-resource
/// budget to the supplied policy. `xml_backend` is used for every recursively
/// referenced XML document, preserving the caller's parser semantics.
pub fn materialize_signing_key_info_references(
    key_info: &mut KeyInfo,
    resolver: UriReferenceResolver<'_>,
    policy: &crate::policy::SigningPolicy,
    provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
    xml_backend: crate::XmlBackend,
) -> Result<(), DsigError> {
    policy.validate()?;
    materialize_key_info_references_for_policy(key_info, resolver, policy, provider, xml_backend)
}

/// Resolve and recursively expand policy-allowed `KeyInfoReference` sources
/// before verification key selection.
///
/// In addition to URI and resource policy, this entry point enforces the
/// verification policy's `key_sources.key_info_reference` trust gate. Retrieval
/// methods nested in an external referenced document are materialized in that
/// document's URI context; retrieval methods in the caller's document remain
/// the responsibility of the complete verification pipeline. Candidate-local
/// retrieval failures remain deferred so usable sibling sources survive; the
/// complete pipeline reports one only when key selection has no fallback.
/// External bytes must be attached to `resolver` explicitly by the caller. The resolver is
/// consumed so this operation can bind a fresh aggregate external-resource
/// budget to the supplied policy. `xml_backend` is used for every recursively
/// referenced XML document, preserving the caller's parser semantics.
pub fn materialize_verification_key_info_references(
    key_info: &mut KeyInfo,
    resolver: UriReferenceResolver<'_>,
    policy: &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
    provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
    xml_backend: crate::XmlBackend,
) -> Result<(), DsigError> {
    policy.validate()?;
    materialize_key_info_references_for_policy(key_info, resolver, policy, provider, xml_backend)
}

fn materialize_retrieval_methods_with_budgets(
    key_info: &mut KeyInfo,
    resolver: &UriReferenceResolver<'_>,
    allowed_uri_types: UriTypeSet,
    allowed_transforms: Option<&HashSet<String>>,
    provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
    budgets: &mut RetrievalMaterializationBudgets<'_>,
    candidate_work: &mut usize,
) -> Result<RetrievalMaterialization, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    let retrieval_count = key_info
        .sources
        .iter()
        .filter(|source| matches!(source, super::parse::KeyInfoSource::RetrievalMethod { .. }))
        .count();
    if retrieval_count > MAX_RETRIEVAL_METHOD_COUNT {
        return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
            reason: "KeyInfo contains too many RetrievalMethod elements",
        });
    }

    let mut total_binary_len = existing_x509_binary_len(key_info)?;
    let mut seen = HashSet::new();
    let mut materialized = Vec::with_capacity(key_info.sources.len());
    let mut outcome = RetrievalMaterialization::default();
    for source in std::mem::take(&mut key_info.sources) {
        let super::parse::KeyInfoSource::RetrievalMethod {
            uri: resolved_uri,
            resource_type,
            transforms,
        } = source
        else {
            materialized.push(source);
            continue;
        };

        let identity = (
            resolved_uri.clone(),
            resource_type.clone(),
            transforms.clone(),
        );
        if !seen.insert(identity) {
            continue;
        }

        if resource_type.as_deref() == Some("http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rawX509Certificate")
        {
            if transforms != RetrievalMethodTransforms::None
                || classify_uri(&resolved_uri) != UriClass::External
            {
                return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                    reason: "raw X509 RetrievalMethod requires an untransformed external URI",
                });
            }
            if !allowed_uri_types.allows(&resolved_uri) {
                return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::Uri {
                    operation: "verification",
                    reason: "retrieval method URI class is not permitted",
                }
                .into());
            }
            let certificate = resolver.external_resource(&resolved_uri).map_err(|error| {
                SignatureVerificationPipelineError::from(ReferenceProcessingError::Transform(error))
            })?;
            let Some(certificate) = certificate else {
                outcome.deferred_error.get_or_insert_with(|| {
                    SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Reference(
                        ReferenceProcessingError::Transform(super::TransformError::UnsupportedUri(
                            resolved_uri.clone(),
                        )),
                    )
                });
                materialized.push(super::parse::KeyInfoSource::RetrievalMethod {
                    uri: resolved_uri,
                    resource_type,
                    transforms,
                });
                continue;
            };
            *candidate_work = candidate_work.saturating_add(1);
            budgets.resources.validate_key_candidates(*candidate_work)?;
            if certificate.len() > MAX_X509_DECODED_BINARY_LEN {
                return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                    reason: "raw X509 RetrievalMethod certificate exceeds maximum allowed length",
                });
            }
            add_retrieval_binary_usage(&mut total_binary_len, certificate.len())?;
            let parsed = match parse_x509_certificate(certificate) {
                Ok(parsed) => parsed,
                Err(error) => {
                    let error = map_key_info_parse_error(error);
                    if matches!(error, SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(_)) {
                        return Err(error);
                    }
                    outcome.deferred_error.get_or_insert(error);
                    materialized.push(super::parse::KeyInfoSource::RetrievalMethod {
                        uri: resolved_uri,
                        resource_type,
                        transforms,
                    });
                    continue;
                }
            };
            materialized.push(super::parse::KeyInfoSource::X509Data(
                super::parse::X509DataInfo {
                    certificates: vec![certificate.to_vec()],
                    parsed_certificates: vec![parsed],
                    certificate_chain: vec![0],
                    ..super::parse::X509DataInfo::default()
                },
            ));
        } else if resource_type.as_deref() == Some("http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#X509Data") {
            if !allowed_uri_types.allows(&resolved_uri) {
                return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::Uri {
                    operation: "verification",
                    reason: "retrieval method URI class is not permitted",
                }
                .into());
            }
            let target = resolver
                .node_for_same_document_reference(&resolved_uri)
                .map_err(ReferenceProcessingError::Transform)?;
            let Some(target) = target else {
                outcome.deferred_error.get_or_insert(
                    SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "X509Data RetrievalMethod target is missing or ambiguous",
                    },
                );
                materialized.push(super::parse::KeyInfoSource::RetrievalMethod {
                    uri: resolved_uri,
                    resource_type,
                    transforms,
                });
                continue;
            };
            let node = match transforms {
                RetrievalMethodTransforms::None
                    if target.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "X509Data")) =>
                {
                    target
                }
                RetrievalMethodTransforms::None => {
                    return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "untransformed X509Data RetrievalMethod must target X509Data directly",
                    });
                }
                RetrievalMethodTransforms::X509DataNodeSetFilter {
                    expression,
                    namespaces,
                } => {
                    enforce_transform_allowed(allowed_transforms, XPATH_TRANSFORM_URI)?;
                    budgets
                        .xpath_parse
                        .validate_expression(&expression)
                        .map_err(ReferenceProcessingError::Transform)?;
                    budgets
                        .xpath_parse
                        .validate_namespaces(&namespaces)
                        .map_err(ReferenceProcessingError::Transform)?;
                    select_retrieved_x509_data_root(target, budgets.execution)?
                }
                RetrievalMethodTransforms::Unsupported => {
                    return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "X509Data RetrievalMethod contains unsupported transforms",
                    });
                }
            };
            let data = parse_x509_data_dispatch_with_budget_and_provider(
                node,
                &mut total_binary_len,
                candidate_work,
                provider,
                budgets.resources,
                budgets.certificate_signature_algorithms,
            )
            .map_err(map_key_info_parse_error)?;
            materialized.push(super::parse::KeyInfoSource::X509Data(data));
        } else {
            materialized.push(super::parse::KeyInfoSource::RetrievalMethod {
                uri: resolved_uri,
                resource_type,
                transforms,
            });
        }
    }
    key_info.sources = materialized;
    Ok(outcome)
}

fn select_retrieved_x509_data_root<'a, 'input>(
    target: Node<'a, 'input>,
    execution_budget: &TransformExecutionBudget,
) -> Result<Node<'a, 'input>, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    // XMLDSig XPath filtering evaluates the predicate for every node in the
    // dereferenced node-set, including attribute and namespace nodes. The
    // element-only scan below selects X509Data but must not undercount that
    // XPath context cardinality.
    let context_nodes = NodeSet::ensure_subtree_materialization_fits_with_budget(
        target,
        false,
        execution_budget.node_set_materialization(),
    )
    .map_err(ReferenceProcessingError::Transform)?;
    execution_budget
        .validate_xpath_context_evaluations(context_nodes)
        .map_err(ReferenceProcessingError::Transform)?;
    execution_budget
        .charge_xpath_work(context_nodes)
        .map_err(ReferenceProcessingError::Transform)?;
    execution_budget
        .charge_node_filter_work(context_nodes)
        .map_err(ReferenceProcessingError::Transform)?;
    let mut root = None;
    for candidate in target.descendants() {
        if !candidate.is_element()
            || candidate.tag_name().namespace() != Some(XMLDSIG_NS)
            || candidate.tag_name().name() != "X509Data"
        {
            continue;
        }
        if root.replace(candidate).is_some() {
            return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "X509Data RetrievalMethod selected multiple X509Data elements",
            });
        }
    }
    root.ok_or(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
        reason: "X509Data RetrievalMethod selected no X509Data element",
    })
}

#[cfg(test)]
fn materialize_retrieval_methods(
    key_info: &mut KeyInfo,
    resolver: &UriReferenceResolver<'_>,
    allowed_uri_types: UriTypeSet,
    allowed_transforms: Option<&HashSet<String>>,
    provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
) -> Result<RetrievalMaterialization, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    let mut xpath_parse_budget = XPathSignatureParseBudget::default();
    let execution_budget = TransformExecutionBudget::default();
    let resources = crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default();
    let mut budgets = RetrievalMaterializationBudgets {
        xpath_parse: &mut xpath_parse_budget,
        execution: &execution_budget,
        resources: &resources,
        certificate_signature_algorithms: None,
        xml_backend: crate::XmlBackend::default(),
    };
    let mut candidate_work = key_info.embedded_candidate_count();
    materialize_retrieval_methods_with_budgets(
        key_info,
        resolver,
        allowed_uri_types,
        allowed_transforms,
        provider,
        &mut budgets,
        &mut candidate_work,
    )
}

fn existing_x509_binary_len(
    key_info: &KeyInfo,
) -> Result<usize, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    let mut total = 0usize;
    for source in &key_info.sources {
        if let super::parse::KeyInfoSource::X509Data(info) = source {
            for len in info
                .certificates
                .iter()
                .chain(&info.skis)
                .chain(&info.crls)
                .map(Vec::len)
                .chain(info.digests.iter().map(|(_, digest)| digest.len()))
            {
                add_retrieval_binary_usage(&mut total, len)?;
            }
        }
    }
    Ok(total)
}

fn add_retrieval_binary_usage(
    total: &mut usize,
    delta: usize,
) -> Result<(), SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    *total =
        total
            .checked_add(delta)
            .ok_or(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "RetrievalMethod X509Data binary length overflow",
            })?;
    if *total > MAX_X509_DATA_TOTAL_BINARY_LEN {
        return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
            reason: "RetrievalMethod X509Data exceeds maximum aggregate binary length",
        });
    }
    Ok(())
}

fn manifest_reference_failure_reason(
    error: ReferenceProcessingError,
    ref_index: usize,
) -> FailureReason {
    match error.into_policy_violation() {
        Ok(_) => FailureReason::ReferencePolicyViolation { ref_index },
        Err(_) => FailureReason::ReferenceProcessingFailure { ref_index },
    }
}

struct CompiledManifestReference {
    index: usize,
    reference: Reference,
    reference_node_id: NodeId,
}

struct CompiledManifestInvalid {
    result: ReferenceResult,
}

enum ScheduledManifestReference {
    Parsed {
        node: OperationNodeId,
        reference: CompiledManifestReference,
    },
    Invalid {
        node: OperationNodeId,
        invalid: CompiledManifestInvalid,
    },
}

impl ScheduledManifestReference {
    fn index(&self) -> usize {
        match self {
            Self::Parsed { reference, .. } => reference.index,
            Self::Invalid { invalid, .. } => invalid.result.reference_index,
        }
    }
}

fn process_authenticated_manifest_references(
    operation: &mut OperationExecutionContext<
        &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
        &VerificationOperationBudgets,
    >,
    view: DocumentView<'_>,
    signature_node: Node<'_, '_>,
    resolver: &UriReferenceResolver<'_>,
    ctx: &VerifyContext<'_>,
    mut remaining_reference_capacity: usize,
    crypto: OperationNodeId,
) -> Result<(Vec<ReferenceResult>, Vec<OperationNodeId>), SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    let mut processed_manifests = HashSet::new();
    let mut next_reference_index = 0usize;
    let mut frontier_index = 0usize;
    let mut completed_digests = Vec::new();
    let mut results = Vec::new();
    loop {
        operation.extend();
        let discovery = operation.add_node(
            OperationNodeKind::Manifest {
                index: frontier_index,
            },
            OperationStage::AuthenticatedDependency,
            None,
        );
        operation
            .add_dependency(discovery, crypto)
            .map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;
        for digest in &completed_digests {
            operation
                .add_dependency(discovery, *digest)
                .map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;
        }
        operation.compile().map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;
        let parsed = operation.run(discovery, || {
            let mut xpath_parse = operation.budgets().xpath_parse.borrow_mut();
            let mut state = ManifestDiscoveryState {
                processed: &mut processed_manifests,
                remaining_capacity: &mut remaining_reference_capacity,
                next_reference_index: &mut next_reference_index,
                xpath_parse: &mut xpath_parse,
            };
            parse_manifest_references(
                signature_node,
                operation,
                view,
                &mut state,
                ctx.allowed_transform_uris(),
            )
        })?;
        let discovered = parsed.references.len() + parsed.invalid_results.len();
        if discovered == 0 {
            break;
        }

        operation.extend();
        let mut scheduled = Vec::with_capacity(discovered);
        for item in parsed.references {
            let resource = operation.budgets().resource_identity_for_reference(
                &item.reference,
                item.index,
                resolver,
                view,
                resolver.node_for_node_id(item.reference_node_id),
            );
            let node = operation.add_node(
                OperationNodeKind::Digest { index: item.index },
                OperationStage::AuthenticatedDependency,
                Some(resource.clone()),
            );
            operation
                .add_dependency(node, discovery)
                .map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;
            scheduled.push(ScheduledManifestReference::Parsed {
                node,
                reference: item,
            });
        }
        for item in parsed.invalid_results {
            let node = operation.add_node(
                OperationNodeKind::Digest {
                    index: item.result.reference_index,
                },
                OperationStage::AuthenticatedDependency,
                None,
            );
            operation
                .add_dependency(node, discovery)
                .map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;
            scheduled.push(ScheduledManifestReference::Invalid {
                node,
                invalid: item,
            });
        }
        scheduled.sort_by_key(ScheduledManifestReference::index);
        operation.compile().map_err(map_verification_plan_error)?;

        for scheduled_reference in scheduled {
            let (node, result) = match scheduled_reference {
                ScheduledManifestReference::Invalid { node, invalid } => {
                    let result = operation.run(node, || {
                        Ok::<_, SignatureVerificationPipelineError>(invalid.result)
                    })?;
                    (node, result)
                }
                ScheduledManifestReference::Parsed {
                    node,
                    reference: compiled,
                } => {
                    let observed = operation.budgets().resource_identity_for_reference(
                        &compiled.reference,
                        compiled.index,
                        resolver,
                        view,
                        resolver.node_for_node_id(compiled.reference_node_id),
                    );
                    let result = operation.run_with_resource(node, &observed, || {
                        let reference = &compiled.reference;
                        let budgets = operation.budgets();
                        let execution = ReferenceExecutionContext {
                            store_pre_digest: ctx.store_pre_digest,
                            transform_options: ctx.transform_options(),
                            transform_budget: &budgets.transforms,
                            canonicalized_data_budget: &budgets.canonicalized,
                            provider: ctx.provider,
                        };
                        let mut result = if execution.transform_budget.remaining_c14n_output() == 0
                            || reference.transforms.len()
                                > ctx.policy.resources.max_transforms_per_reference
                            || ctx
                                .policy
                                .digest_algorithms
                                .as_ref()
                                .is_some_and(|allowed| !allowed.contains(&reference.digest_method))
                        {
                            manifest_reference_invalid_result(
                                reference,
                                compiled.index,
                                FailureReason::ReferencePolicyViolation {
                                    ref_index: compiled.index,
                                },
                            )
                        } else {
                            match enforce_reference_policies(
                                std::slice::from_ref(reference),
                                ctx.policy.uris.references,
                                ctx.allowed_transform_uris(),
                            ) {
                                Ok(()) => process_reference_with_options(
                                    reference,
                                    resolver,
                                    signature_node,
                                    ReferenceSet::Manifest,
                                    compiled.index,
                                    resolver.node_for_node_id(compiled.reference_node_id),
                                    &execution,
                                )
                                .unwrap_or_else(|error| {
                                    manifest_reference_invalid_result(
                                        reference,
                                        compiled.index,
                                        manifest_reference_failure_reason(error, compiled.index),
                                    )
                                }),
                                Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(_)) => {
                                    manifest_reference_invalid_result(
                                        reference,
                                        compiled.index,
                                        FailureReason::ReferencePolicyViolation {
                                            ref_index: compiled.index,
                                        },
                                    )
                                }
                                Err(_) => manifest_reference_invalid_result(
                                    reference,
                                    compiled.index,
                                    FailureReason::ReferenceProcessingFailure {
                                        ref_index: compiled.index,
                                    },
                                ),
                            }
                        };
                        bind_reference_evidence(
                            &mut result,
                            reference,
                            view,
                            resolver.node_for_node_id(compiled.reference_node_id),
                            &observed,
                        );
                        if result.status == DsigStatus::Valid
                            && reference
                                .transforms
                                .iter()
                                .all(transform_preserves_manifest_structure)
                            && let Some(uri) = reference.uri.as_deref()
                            && let Ok(Some(target)) =
                                resolver.node_id_for_same_document_reference(uri)
                        {
                            operation.authenticate(view.node_identity_by_id(target));
                        }
                        Ok::<_, SignatureVerificationPipelineError>(result)
                    })?;
                    (node, result)
                }
            };
            let accepted = result.status == DsigStatus::Valid;
            operation.set_outcome(
                node,
                accepted,
                if accepted {
                    OperationDecisionReason::ReferenceDigestVerified
                } else {
                    OperationDecisionReason::ReferenceDigestRejected
                },
            );
            completed_digests.push(node);
            results.push(result);
        }
        frontier_index += 1;
    }
    results.sort_by_key(|result| result.reference_index);
    Ok((results, completed_digests))
}

fn manifest_reference_invalid_result(
    reference: &Reference,
    index: usize,
    reason: FailureReason,
) -> ReferenceResult {
    ReferenceResult {
        reference_identity: None,
        target_identity: None,
        external_resource_fingerprint: None,
        coverage: ReferenceCoverage::TransformedData,
        reference_set: ReferenceSet::Manifest,
        reference_index: index,
        uri: reference
            .uri
            .clone()
            .unwrap_or_else(|| "<omitted>".to_owned()),
        digest_algorithm: reference.digest_method,
        status: DsigStatus::Invalid(reason),
        pre_digest_data: None,
    }
}

fn parse_manifest_references(
    signature_node: Node<'_, '_>,
    operation: &OperationExecutionContext<
        &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
        &VerificationOperationBudgets,
    >,
    view: DocumentView<'_>,
    state: &mut ManifestDiscoveryState<'_>,
    allowed_transforms: Option<&HashSet<String>>,
) -> Result<ParsedManifestReferences, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    let mut references = Vec::new();
    let mut invalid = Vec::new();
    for object_node in signature_node.children().filter(|node| {
        node.is_element()
            && node.tag_name().namespace() == Some(XMLDSIG_NS)
            && node.tag_name().name() == "Object"
    }) {
        let object_is_signed = operation.is_authenticated(view.node_identity(object_node));
        for manifest_node in object_node.children().filter(|node| {
            node.is_element()
                && node.tag_name().namespace() == Some(XMLDSIG_NS)
                && node.tag_name().name() == "Manifest"
        }) {
            let manifest_is_signed = operation.is_authenticated(view.node_identity(manifest_node));
            // Leave unauthenticated Manifests unmarked so a verified outer
            // Manifest can make them eligible on the next discovery pass.
            if !object_is_signed && !manifest_is_signed {
                continue;
            }
            if !state.processed.insert(manifest_node.id()) {
                continue;
            }
            let mut manifest_children = Vec::new();
            for child in manifest_node.children() {
                if child.is_text()
                    && child.text().is_some_and(|text| {
                        text.chars().any(|c| !matches!(c, ' ' | '\t' | '\n' | '\r'))
                    })
                {
                    return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "Manifest contains non-whitespace mixed content",
                    });
                }
                if child.is_element() {
                    manifest_children.push(child);
                }
            }
            if manifest_children.is_empty() {
                return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                    reason: "Manifest must contain at least one ds:Reference element child",
                });
            }
            for child in manifest_children {
                if child.tag_name().namespace() != Some(XMLDSIG_NS)
                    || child.tag_name().name() != "Reference"
                {
                    return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "Manifest must contain only ds:Reference element children",
                    });
                }
                if *state.remaining_capacity == 0 {
                    return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "signed Manifests exceed the per-signature Reference limit",
                    });
                }
                *state.remaining_capacity -= 1;
                let reference_index = *state.next_reference_index;
                *state.next_reference_index += 1;
                match parse_reference_with_xpath_budget(child, state.xpath_parse) {
                    Ok(reference) => references.push(CompiledManifestReference {
                        index: reference_index,
                        reference,
                        reference_node_id: child.id(),
                    }),
                    Err(ParseError::Transform(super::TransformError::UnsupportedTransform(
                        uri,
                    ))) => {
                        let digest_algorithm =
                            reference_digest_method(child).map_err(map_manifest_parse_error)?;
                        let reason =
                            if allowed_transforms.is_some_and(|allowed| !allowed.contains(&uri)) {
                                FailureReason::ReferencePolicyViolation {
                                    ref_index: reference_index,
                                }
                            } else {
                                FailureReason::ReferenceProcessingFailure {
                                    ref_index: reference_index,
                                }
                            };
                        invalid.push(CompiledManifestInvalid {
                            result: ReferenceResult {
                                reference_identity: Some(view.node_identity(child)),
                                target_identity: None,
                                external_resource_fingerprint: None,
                                coverage: ReferenceCoverage::TransformedData,
                                reference_set: ReferenceSet::Manifest,
                                reference_index,
                                uri: child.attribute("URI").unwrap_or("<omitted>").to_owned(),
                                digest_algorithm,
                                status: DsigStatus::Invalid(reason),
                                pre_digest_data: None,
                            },
                        });
                    }
                    Err(error) => return Err(map_manifest_parse_error(error)),
                }
            }
        }
    }
    Ok(ParsedManifestReferences {
        references,
        invalid_results: invalid,
    })
}

struct ParsedManifestReferences {
    references: Vec<CompiledManifestReference>,
    invalid_results: Vec<CompiledManifestInvalid>,
}

struct ManifestDiscoveryState<'a> {
    processed: &'a mut HashSet<NodeId>,
    remaining_capacity: &'a mut usize,
    next_reference_index: &'a mut usize,
    xpath_parse: &'a mut XPathSignatureParseBudget,
}

fn transform_preserves_manifest_structure(transform: &Transform) -> bool {
    match transform {
        Transform::C14n(_) => true,
        // Both eligible ID targets are descendants of the owning Signature.
        // Enveloped subtraction therefore removes their intersection with that
        // Signature subtree, even though the Signature node itself is not in the
        // dereferenced node set.
        Transform::Enveloped
        | Transform::XpathExcludeAllSignatures
        | Transform::XPath(_)
        | Transform::XPathFilter2(_)
        | Transform::Base64Decode => false,
    }
}

#[expect(
    clippy::large_enum_variant,
    reason = "single bounded authorization result avoids heap allocation"
)]
enum ResolvedVerifyingKey<'a> {
    Borrowed(&'a dyn VerifyingKey),
    Owned(super::ResolvedVerificationKey<'a>),
}

impl ResolvedVerifyingKey<'_> {
    fn evidence(
        &self,
        policy: &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
    ) -> Result<super::KeyTrustEvidence, DsigError> {
        match self {
            Self::Borrowed(_)
                if policy.key_trust.mode
                    == crate::policy::VerificationTrustMode::CryptographicOnly =>
            {
                Ok(super::KeyTrustEvidence::NotEstablished)
            }
            Self::Borrowed(_) => Ok(super::KeyTrustEvidence::CallerTrusted),
            Self::Owned(key) => key.authorize(policy),
        }
    }
    fn as_ref(&self) -> &dyn VerifyingKey {
        match self {
            Self::Borrowed(key) => *key,
            Self::Owned(key) => key.as_ref(),
        }
    }
}

fn resolve_verifying_key<'k>(
    ctx: &VerifyContext<'k>,
    key: Option<&'k dyn VerifyingKey>,
    key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
    algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
) -> Result<Option<ResolvedVerifyingKey<'k>>, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    if let Some(key) = key {
        if !ctx.policy.key_sources.preset_key {
            return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::KeyTrust {
                reason: "pre-resolved verification keys are disabled",
            }
            .into());
        }
        require_verifying_key_candidate_capacity(&ctx.policy)?;
        return Ok(Some(ResolvedVerifyingKey::Borrowed(key)));
    }
    if let Some(resolver) = ctx.key_resolver {
        require_verifying_key_candidate_capacity(&ctx.policy)?;
        let resolved =
            resolver.resolve_for_verification(key_info, algorithm, &ctx.policy, ctx.provider)?;
        if let Some(key) = &resolved {
            key.authorize(&ctx.policy)?;
        }
        return Ok(resolved.map(ResolvedVerifyingKey::Owned));
    }
    Ok(None)
}

fn require_verifying_key_candidate_capacity(
    policy: &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
) -> Result<(), SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    policy
        .resources
        .validate_key_candidates(1)
        .map_err(Into::into)
}

fn enforce_reference_policies(
    references: &[Reference],
    allowed_uri_types: UriTypeSet,
    allowed_transforms: Option<&HashSet<String>>,
) -> Result<(), SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    for reference in references {
        let uri = reference
            .uri
            .as_deref()
            .ok_or(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Reference(
                ReferenceProcessingError::MissingUri,
            ))?;
        if !allowed_uri_types.allows(uri) {
            return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::Uri {
                operation: "verification",
                reason: "reference URI class is not permitted",
            }
            .into());
        }

        if let Some(allowed) = allowed_transforms {
            for transform in &reference.transforms {
                let transform_uri = transform.algorithm_uri();
                enforce_transform_allowed(Some(allowed), transform_uri)?;
            }

            // External dereference has an octet-stream data type independent of
            // whether the caller supplied the resource. Every transform then
            // determines the next type, including implicit binary-to-node-set
            // adapters before XML-level transforms.
            let produces_binary = transform_chain_produces_binary(
                classify_uri(uri) == UriClass::External,
                &reference.transforms,
            );
            if !produces_binary {
                enforce_transform_allowed(Some(allowed), DEFAULT_IMPLICIT_C14N_URI)?;
            }
        }
    }
    Ok(())
}

fn enforce_transform_allowed(
    allowed_transforms: Option<&HashSet<String>>,
    algorithm: &str,
) -> Result<(), SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    if allowed_transforms.is_some_and(|allowed| !allowed.contains(algorithm)) {
        return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::Algorithm {
            operation: "verification transform",
            algorithm: algorithm.to_owned(),
        }
        .into());
    }
    Ok(())
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
pub(super) struct SignatureChildNodes<'a, 'input> {
    signed_info_node: Node<'a, 'input>,
    signature_value_node: Node<'a, 'input>,
    key_info_node: Option<Node<'a, 'input>>,
}

pub(super) fn parse_signature_children<'a, 'input>(
    signature_node: Node<'a, 'input>,
) -> Result<SignatureChildNodes<'a, 'input>, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    let mut signed_info_node: Option<Node<'_, '_>> = None;
    let mut signature_value_node: Option<Node<'_, '_>> = None;
    let mut key_info_node: Option<Node<'_, '_>> = None;
    let mut signed_info_index: Option<usize> = None;
    let mut signature_value_index: Option<usize> = None;
    let mut key_info_index: Option<usize> = None;
    let mut first_unexpected_dsig_index: Option<usize> = None;

    let mut element_index = 0usize;
    for child in signature_node.children() {
        if child.is_text() {
            if child
                .text()
                .is_some_and(|text| !is_xml_whitespace_only(text))
            {
                return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                    reason: "Signature must not contain non-whitespace mixed content",
                });
            }
            continue;
        }
        if !child.is_element() {
            continue;
        }

        element_index += 1;
        if child.tag_name().namespace() != Some(XMLDSIG_NS) {
            return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "Signature must contain only XMLDSIG element children",
            });
        }
        match child.tag_name().name() {
            "SignedInfo" => {
                if signed_info_node.is_some() {
                    return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "SignedInfo must appear exactly once under Signature",
                    });
                }
                signed_info_node = Some(child);
                signed_info_index = Some(element_index);
            }
            "SignatureValue" => {
                if signature_value_node.is_some() {
                    return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "SignatureValue must appear exactly once under Signature",
                    });
                }
                signature_value_node = Some(child);
                signature_value_index = Some(element_index);
            }
            "KeyInfo" => {
                if key_info_node.is_some() {
                    return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "KeyInfo must appear at most once under Signature",
                    });
                }
                key_info_node = Some(child);
                key_info_index = Some(element_index);
            }
            "Object" => {
                // Valid Object elements are allowed only after SignedInfo, SignatureValue,
                // and optional KeyInfo; this is enforced via first_unexpected_dsig_index.
            }
            _ => {
                if first_unexpected_dsig_index.is_none() {
                    first_unexpected_dsig_index = Some(element_index);
                }
            }
        }
    }

    let signed_info_node =
        signed_info_node.ok_or(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::MissingElement {
            element: "SignedInfo",
        })?;
    let signature_value_node =
        signature_value_node.ok_or(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::MissingElement {
            element: "SignatureValue",
        })?;
    if signed_info_index != Some(1) {
        return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
            reason: "SignedInfo must be the first element child of Signature",
        });
    }
    if signature_value_index != Some(2) {
        return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
            reason: "SignatureValue must be the second element child of Signature",
        });
    }
    if let Some(index) = key_info_index
        && index != 3
    {
        return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
            reason: "KeyInfo must be the third element child of Signature when present",
        });
    }

    let allowed_prefix_end = key_info_index.unwrap_or(2);
    if let Some(unexpected_index) = first_unexpected_dsig_index {
        return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
            reason: if unexpected_index > allowed_prefix_end {
                "After SignedInfo, SignatureValue, and optional KeyInfo, Signature may contain only Object elements"
            } else {
                "Signature may contain SignedInfo first, SignatureValue second, optional KeyInfo third, and Object elements thereafter"
            },
        });
    }

    Ok(SignatureChildNodes {
        signed_info_node,
        signature_value_node,
        key_info_node,
    })
}

fn decode_signature_value(
    signature_value_node: Node<'_, '_>,
    algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
    resources: &crate::policy::ResourcePolicy,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    if matches!(algorithm, SignatureAlgorithm::PostQuantum(_)) {
        let (maximum, raw_maximum) = signature_value_limits(algorithm, resources);
        // PQ signatures can be tens of kilobytes: borrow their XML text and
        // stream directly into the decoded allocation, without a second
        // full-size normalized Base64 buffer.
        let payload = super::whitespace::XmlBase64Payload::bounded(
            signature_value_node,
            raw_maximum,
            maximum,
        )
        .map_err(
            |reason| SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: match reason {
                    "unexpected nested element" => {
                        "SignatureValue must not contain element children"
                    }
                    "maximum allowed text length" => {
                        "SignatureValue exceeds maximum allowed text length"
                    }
                    "maximum allowed base64 length" => {
                        "SignatureValue exceeds maximum allowed length"
                    }
                    _ => "SignatureValue contains malformed Base64",
                },
            },
        )?;
        return payload.decode().map_err(|_| {
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "SignatureValue contains malformed Base64",
            }
        });
    }
    if signature_value_node
        .children()
        .any(|child| child.is_element())
    {
        return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
            reason: "SignatureValue must not contain element children",
        });
    }

    // Count bounded borrowed text first: comments may split a
    // signature into many tiny text nodes. Reserving per node would repeatedly
    // copy the accumulated payload; one exact reservation keeps this linear.
    let (maximum, raw_maximum) = signature_value_limits(algorithm, resources);
    let mut text_len = 0usize;
    let mut normalized_len = 0usize;
    for child in signature_value_node
        .children()
        .filter(|child| child.is_text())
    {
        if let Some(text) = child.text() {
            if text.len() > raw_maximum - text_len {
                return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                    reason: "SignatureValue exceeds maximum allowed text length",
                });
            }
            text_len += text.len();
            for byte in text.bytes() {
                if matches!(byte, b' ' | b'\t' | b'\r' | b'\n') {
                    continue;
                }
                if normalized_len == maximum {
                    return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "SignatureValue exceeds maximum allowed length",
                    });
                }
                normalized_len += 1;
            }
        }
    }
    let mut normalized = Vec::with_capacity(normalized_len);
    let mut raw_text_len = 0usize;
    for child in signature_value_node
        .children()
        .filter(|child| child.is_text())
    {
        if let Some(text) = child.text() {
            push_normalized_signature_text(
                text,
                &mut raw_text_len,
                &mut normalized,
                algorithm,
                resources,
            )?;
        }
    }

    Ok(base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.decode(normalized)?)
}

fn push_normalized_signature_text(
    text: &str,
    raw_text_len: &mut usize,
    normalized: &mut Vec<u8>,
    algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
    resources: &crate::policy::ResourcePolicy,
) -> Result<(), SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    let (maximum, raw_maximum) = signature_value_limits(algorithm, resources);
    if text.len() > raw_maximum - *raw_text_len {
        return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
            reason: "SignatureValue exceeds maximum allowed text length",
        });
    }
    *raw_text_len += text.len();
    let additional = text
        .bytes()
        .filter(|byte| !matches!(byte, b' ' | b'\t' | b'\r' | b'\n'))
        .count();
    if additional > maximum - normalized.len() {
        return Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
            reason: "SignatureValue exceeds maximum allowed length",
        });
    }

    normalize_xml_base64_bytes(text.as_bytes(), normalized, |_| true).map_err(|err| {
        SignatureVerificationPipelineError::SignatureValueBase64(base64::DecodeError::InvalidByte(
            err.normalized_offset,
            err.invalid_byte,
        ))
    })?;

    Ok(())
}

fn signature_value_limits(
    algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
    resources: &crate::policy::ResourcePolicy,
) -> (usize, usize) {
    // FIPS 205 table 2 includes signatures up to 49,856 octets. The old
    // RSA-oriented encoded-text ceiling is not their wire contract.
    // https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.205
    // XSD 1.0 section 3.2.16 fixes base64Binary whitespace to collapse:
    // https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-2-20041028/#base64Binary
    // Raw text is bounded by the operation's XML budget, not the wire width.
    let encoded = match algorithm {
        SignatureAlgorithm::PostQuantum(parameter) => parameter.signature_len().div_ceil(3) * 4,
        _ => MAX_SIGNATURE_VALUE_LEN,
    };
    (encoded, resources.max_xml_document_bytes)
}

fn verify_with_algorithm(
    algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
    public_key_pem: &str,
    signed_data: &[u8],
    signature_value: &[u8],
) -> Result<bool, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
    match algorithm {
        SignatureAlgorithm::Ed25519
        | SignatureAlgorithm::Ed25519Ctx
        | SignatureAlgorithm::Ed25519Ph
        | SignatureAlgorithm::Ed448
        | SignatureAlgorithm::Ed448Ph
        | SignatureAlgorithm::PostQuantum(_) => {
            let (rest, pem) = x509_parser::pem::parse_x509_pem(public_key_pem.as_bytes())
                .map_err(|_| SignatureVerificationError::InvalidKeyPem)?;
            if !rest.iter().all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_whitespace()) || pem.label != "PUBLIC KEY" {
                return Err(SignatureVerificationError::InvalidKeyPem.into());
            }
            Ok(super::modern::verify(
                algorithm,
                &pem.contents,
                signed_data,
                signature_value,
            )?)
        }
        SignatureAlgorithm::DsaSha1 | SignatureAlgorithm::DsaSha256 => {
            let (rest, pem) = x509_parser::pem::parse_x509_pem(public_key_pem.as_bytes())
                .map_err(|_| SignatureVerificationError::InvalidKeyPem)?;
            if !rest.iter().all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_whitespace()) || pem.label != "PUBLIC KEY" {
                return Err(SignatureVerificationError::InvalidKeyPem.into());
            }
            Ok(verify_dsa_signature_spki(
                algorithm,
                &pem.contents,
                signed_data,
                signature_value,
            )?)
        }
        SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha1
        | SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha224
        | SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha256
        | SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha384
        | SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha512 => Err(SignatureVerificationError::UnsupportedAlgorithm {
            uri: algorithm.uri().to_string(),
        }
        .into()),
        SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha1
        | SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha224
        | SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256
        | SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha384
        | SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha512 => Ok(verify_rsa_signature_pem(
            algorithm,
            public_key_pem,
            signed_data,
            signature_value,
        )?),
        SignatureAlgorithm::EcdsaSha1
        | SignatureAlgorithm::EcdsaSha224
        | SignatureAlgorithm::EcdsaSha256
        | SignatureAlgorithm::EcdsaSha384
        | SignatureAlgorithm::EcdsaSha512
        | SignatureAlgorithm::EcdsaSha3_224
        | SignatureAlgorithm::EcdsaSha3_256
        | SignatureAlgorithm::EcdsaSha3_384
        | SignatureAlgorithm::EcdsaSha3_512 => {
            // Malformed ECDSA signature bytes are treated as a verification miss
            // (Ok(false)) instead of a pipeline error; only key/algorithm and
            // crypto-operation failures propagate as Err.
            match verify_ecdsa_signature_pem(
                algorithm,
                public_key_pem,
                signed_data,
                signature_value,
            ) {
                Ok(valid) => Ok(valid),
                Err(SignatureVerificationError::InvalidSignatureFormat) => Ok(false),
                Err(error) => Err(error.into()),
            }
        }
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
#[expect(clippy::unwrap_used, reason = "tests use trusted XML fixtures")]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use crate::c14n::C14nAlgorithm;
    use crate::xml::dom::Document;
    use crate::xmldsig::TransformError;
    use crate::xmldsig::digest::DigestAlgorithm;
    use crate::xmldsig::parse::{Reference, parse_signed_info};
    use crate::xmldsig::transforms::Transform;
    use crate::xmldsig::uri::UriReferenceResolver;
    use base64::Engine;

    // ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    /// Build a Reference with given URI, transforms, digest method, and expected digest.
    fn make_reference(
        uri: &str,
        transforms: Vec<Transform>,
        digest_method: DigestAlgorithm,
        digest_value: Vec<u8>,
    ) -> Reference {
        Reference {
            uri: Some(uri.to_string()),
            id: None,
            ref_type: None,
            transforms,
            digest_method,
            digest_value,
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn reference_resolution_uses_each_elements_effective_xml_base() {
        // Equal lexical URIs under different xml:base values identify distinct
        // caller-owned resources and must not collide in the resolver.
        let first = b"first payload";
        let second = b"second payload";
        let first_digest = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
            .encode(compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, first));
        let second_digest = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
            .encode(compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, second));
        let xml = format!(
            r#"<root xml:base="https://example.test/base/" xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}">
                <ds:Signature><ds:SignedInfo>
                    <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
                    <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>
                    <ds:Reference xml:base="one/" URI="payload.bin">
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
                        <ds:DigestValue>{first_digest}</ds:DigestValue>
                    </ds:Reference>
                    <ds:Reference xml:base="../two/" URI="payload.bin">
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
                        <ds:DigestValue>{second_digest}</ds:DigestValue>
                    </ds:Reference>
                </ds:SignedInfo><ds:SignatureValue>AA==</ds:SignatureValue></ds:Signature>
            </root>"#
        );
        let document = Document::parse(&xml).unwrap();
        let signature = document
            .descendants()
            .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "Signature")))
            .unwrap();
        let signed_info_node = signature
            .children()
            .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "SignedInfo")))
            .unwrap();
        let signed_info = parse_signed_info(signed_info_node).unwrap();
        let resources = HashMap::from([
            (
                "https://example.test/base/one/payload.bin".into(),
                first.to_vec(),
            ),
            (
                "https://example.test/two/payload.bin".into(),
                second.to_vec(),
            ),
        ]);
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document).with_external_resources(&resources);

        let result = process_all_references(&signed_info.references, &resolver, signature, false)
            .expect("each Reference should resolve against its own effective base");

        assert!(result.all_valid());
    }

    #[test]
    fn internal_dtd_opt_in_applies_to_detached_xml_transforms() {
        // The parse policy covers every XML document in one verification
        // pipeline, including caller-owned octets converted to a node-set.
        let detached = b"<!DOCTYPE payload [<!ELEMENT payload (#PCDATA)>]><payload>ok</payload>";
        let digest = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(compute_digest(
            DigestAlgorithm::Sha256,
            b"<payload>ok</payload>",
        ));
        let xml = format!(
            r#"<root xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}">
  <ds:Signature>
    <ds:SignedInfo>
      <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
      <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>
      <ds:Reference URI="urn:detached-dtd">
        <ds:Transforms>
          <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315"/>
        </ds:Transforms>
        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
        <ds:DigestValue>{digest}</ds:DigestValue>
      </ds:Reference>
    </ds:SignedInfo>
    <ds:SignatureValue>AQ==</ds:SignatureValue>
  </ds:Signature>
</root>"#
        );
        let resources = HashMap::from([("urn:detached-dtd".to_owned(), detached.to_vec())]);
        let key = AcceptingKey;

        let default_error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&key)
            .allowed_uri_types(UriTypeSet::ALL)
            .external_resources(&resources)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("internal DTD parsing must remain disabled by default");
        assert!(matches!(
            default_error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Reference(ReferenceProcessingError::Transform(
                crate::xmldsig::TransformError::XmlParse(_)
            ))
        ));

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&key)
            .allowed_uri_types(UriTypeSet::ALL)
            .external_resources(&resources)
            .allow_internal_dtd(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("the explicit DTD opt-in must cover detached XML transforms");

        assert_eq!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid);

        let external_entity = br#"<!DOCTYPE payload [
            <!ENTITY ext SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
        ]><payload>&ext;</payload>"#;
        let external_entity_resources =
            HashMap::from([("urn:detached-dtd".to_owned(), external_entity.to_vec())]);
        let external_entity_error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&key)
            .allowed_uri_types(UriTypeSet::ALL)
            .external_resources(&external_entity_resources)
            .allow_internal_dtd(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("the internal-DTD opt-in must not resolve external entities");
        assert!(matches!(
            external_entity_error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Reference(ReferenceProcessingError::Transform(
                crate::xmldsig::TransformError::XmlParse(_)
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn owned_verification_revalidates_internal_dtd_provenance() {
        // A document accepted by one permissive operation must not bypass a
        // later verification context's stricter XML input policy.
        let document = XmlDocument::parse_with_settings(
            "<!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY value \"ok\">]><root>&value;</root>".into(),
            DocumentParseSettings::new(
                true,
                crate::hard_limits::XML_DOCUMENT_NODE_CEILING,
                crate::hard_limits::XML_DOCUMENT_BYTE_CEILING,
            ),
        )
        .expect("explicitly permitted DTD fixture must parse");

        assert!(matches!(
            VerifyContext::new().verify_document(&document),
            Err(DsigError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::XmlInput {
                    reason: "owned document requires internal DTD support"
                }
            ))
        ));
        assert!(!matches!(
            VerifyContext::new()
                .allow_internal_dtd(true)
                .verify_document(&document),
            Err(DsigError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::XmlInput { .. }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verification_policy_bounds_reference_canonicalization() {
        // Reference transforms and SignedInfo canonicalization are one operation;
        // references must not fall back to the transform hard-limit budget.
        let digest = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode([0_u8; 32]);
        let xml = format!(
            r#"<root xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}"><payload>{}</payload><ds:Signature><ds:SignedInfo><ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/><ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/><ds:Reference URI=""><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/></ds:Transforms><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/><ds:DigestValue>{digest}</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference></ds:SignedInfo><ds:SignatureValue>AQ==</ds:SignatureValue></ds:Signature></root>"#,
            "payload".repeat(16)
        );
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            resources: crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
                max_canonicalized_bytes: 64,
                ..crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("reference canonicalization must consume the policy budget");

        assert!(
            matches!(
                error,
                SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                    crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                        resource: crate::policy::resource_name::CANONICALIZED_BYTES,
                        maximum: 64,
                        ..
                    }
                )
            ),
            "unexpected error: {error:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn verification_policy_bounds_document_bytes_before_parsing() {
        // A small node count does not bound parser work when one text node is
        // large, so the byte ceiling must reject before structural inspection.
        let xml = format!("<root>{}</root>", "x".repeat(1_024));
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            resources: crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
                max_xml_document_bytes: xml.len() - 1,
                ..crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };

        assert!(matches!(
            VerifyContext::new().policy(policy).verify(&xml),
            Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XML_DOCUMENT,
                    maximum,
                    actual,
                }
            )) if maximum == xml.len() - 1 && actual == xml.len()
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verification_entry_points_enforce_policy_depth() {
        // Both borrowed XML and a retained document parsed under wider defaults
        // must be rejected before signature selection traverses the tree.
        let xml = "<root><child><leaf/></child></root>";
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            resources: crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
                max_xml_depth: 2,
                ..crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };
        let document = XmlDocument::parse(xml).expect("wide retained fixture must parse");

        assert!(matches!(
            VerifyContext::new().policy(policy.clone()).verify(xml),
            Err(DsigError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XML_DEPTH,
                    maximum: 2,
                    actual: 3,
                }
            ))
        ));
        assert!(matches!(
            VerifyContext::new()
                .policy(policy)
                .verify_document(&document),
            Err(DsigError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XML_DEPTH,
                    maximum: 2,
                    actual: 3,
                }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verification_policy_bounds_base64_transform_input() {
        // The operation snapshot must reach the transform executor rather than
        // silently falling back to its implementation-wide default budget.
        let digest = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode([0_u8; 32]);
        let xml = format!(
            r##"<root xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}"><payload ID="payload">QUJDRA==</payload><ds:Signature><ds:SignedInfo><ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/><ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/><ds:Reference URI="#payload"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#base64"/></ds:Transforms><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/><ds:DigestValue>{digest}</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference></ds:SignedInfo><ds:SignatureValue>AQ==</ds:SignatureValue></ds:Signature></root>"##
        );
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            resources: crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
                max_base64_transform_input_bytes: 4,
                ..crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("Base64 input must use the operation policy ceiling");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::BASE64_TRANSFORM_INPUT_BYTES,
                    maximum: 4,
                    ..
                }
            )
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verification_policy_bounds_cumulative_base64_transform_output() {
        // References share one operation budget. Validating each decoded value
        // against the full ceiling would let a signature multiply output work.
        let first_digest = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
            .encode(compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, b"a"));
        let second_digest = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
            .encode(compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, b"b"));
        let xml = format!(
            r##"<root xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}"><first ID="first">YQ==</first><second ID="second">Yg==</second><ds:Signature><ds:SignedInfo><ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/><ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/><ds:Reference URI="#first"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#base64"/></ds:Transforms><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/><ds:DigestValue>{first_digest}</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference><ds:Reference URI="#second"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#base64"/></ds:Transforms><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/><ds:DigestValue>{second_digest}</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference></ds:SignedInfo><ds:SignatureValue>AQ==</ds:SignatureValue></ds:Signature></root>"##
        );
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            resources: crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
                max_base64_transform_input_bytes: 8,
                max_base64_transform_output_bytes: 1,
                ..crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("references must share the Base64 output allowance");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::BASE64_TRANSFORM_OUTPUT_BYTES,
                    maximum: 1,
                    actual: 2,
                }
            )
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verification_policy_bounds_xpath_source_before_compilation() {
        // XPath parser limits are part of the same operation snapshot as the
        // evaluator limits; parsing cannot use a separate hard-coded budget.
        let digest = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode([0_u8; 32]);
        let xml = format!(
            r#"<root xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}"><ds:Signature><ds:SignedInfo><ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/><ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/><ds:Reference URI=""><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xpath-19991116"><ds:XPath>true()</ds:XPath></ds:Transform></ds:Transforms><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/><ds:DigestValue>{digest}</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference></ds:SignedInfo><ds:SignatureValue>AQ==</ds:SignatureValue></ds:Signature></root>"#
        );
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            resources: crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
                max_xpath_expression_bytes: 4,
                ..crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("XPath source must use the operation policy ceiling");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XPATH_EXPRESSION_BYTES,
                    maximum: 4,
                    ..
                }
            )
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verification_policy_shares_canonicalization_budget_with_signed_info() {
        // Reference transforms and SignedInfo canonicalization are one operation.
        // Each output fits independently, but their aggregate must not receive
        // two separate copies of the configured canonicalization allowance.
        let payload_text = "x".repeat(700);
        let canonical_payload = format!("<payload ID=\"payload\">{payload_text}</payload>");
        let digest = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(compute_digest(
            DigestAlgorithm::Sha256,
            canonical_payload.as_bytes(),
        ));
        let xml = format!(
            r##"<root xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}">{canonical_payload}<ds:Signature><ds:SignedInfo><ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/><ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/><ds:Reference URI="#payload"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/></ds:Transforms><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/><ds:DigestValue>{digest}</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference></ds:SignedInfo><ds:SignatureValue>AQ==</ds:SignatureValue></ds:Signature></root>"##
        );
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            resources: crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
                max_canonicalized_bytes: 1_024,
                ..crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("SignedInfo must consume the remaining operation C14N budget");

        assert!(
            matches!(
                &error,
                SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                    crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                        resource: "canonicalized bytes",
                        maximum: 1_024,
                        ..
                    }
                )
            ),
            "unexpected error: {error:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn manifest_processing_stops_after_c14n_budget_exhaustion() {
        // A failed bounded render consumes the remaining operation allowance.
        // Later Manifest references, including cheap binary ones, must not run.
        let digest = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode([0_u8; 32]);
        let xml = format!(
            r##"<root xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}"><payload Id="payload">too large</payload><ds:Signature><ds:Object Id="signed-object"><ds:Manifest><ds:Reference URI="#payload"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315"/></ds:Transforms><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/><ds:DigestValue>{digest}</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference><ds:Reference URI="urn:small"><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/><ds:DigestValue>{digest}</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference></ds:Manifest></ds:Object></ds:Signature></root>"##
        );
        let resources = HashMap::from([("urn:small".to_owned(), b"small".to_vec())]);
        let transform_budget = TransformExecutionBudget::with_c14n_limit(8);
        let ctx = VerifyContext::new()
            .allowed_uri_types(UriTypeSet::ALL)
            .external_resources(&resources);
        let document = XmlDocument::parse(xml).expect("test signature must parse");
        let results = document
            .with_view(|view| {
                let signature = view
                    .document()
                    .descendants()
                    .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "Signature")))
                    .expect("test signature must contain Signature");
                let object = signature
                    .children()
                    .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "Object")))
                    .expect("test signature must contain Object");
                let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::with_document_view(view, &[])
                    .with_external_resources(&resources);
                let budgets =
                    VerificationOperationBudgets::with_transforms(&ctx.policy, transform_budget);
                let mut operation = OperationExecutionContext::new(
                    &ctx.policy,
                    &budgets,
                    Some((view.identity(), view.generation())),
                );
                let crypto =
                    operation.add_node(OperationNodeKind::Crypto, OperationStage::Crypto, None);
                operation.compile().expect("base plan");
                operation
                    .run(crypto, || Ok::<_, SignatureVerificationPipelineError>(()))
                    .expect("crypto gate");
                operation.authenticate(view.node_identity(object));
                process_authenticated_manifest_references(
                    &mut operation,
                    view,
                    signature,
                    &resolver,
                    &ctx,
                    2,
                    crypto,
                )
                .map(|(results, _)| results)
            })
            .expect("resource exhaustion is reported per Manifest reference");

        assert_eq!(results.len(), 2);
        assert!(results.iter().all(|result| {
            matches!(
                result.status,
                DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferencePolicyViolation { .. })
            )
        }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verification_policy_bounds_detached_xml_nodes() {
        // Caller-owned detached octets become a second XML document during a
        // node-set transform and must inherit the same operation node ceiling.
        let detached = format!("<payload>{}</payload>", "<n/>".repeat(32));
        let digest = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode([0_u8; 32]);
        let xml = format!(
            r#"<root xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}"><ds:Signature><ds:SignedInfo><ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/><ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/><ds:Reference URI="urn:detached-nodes"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xpath-19991116"><ds:XPath>true()</ds:XPath></ds:Transform></ds:Transforms><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/><ds:DigestValue>{digest}</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference></ds:SignedInfo><ds:SignatureValue>AQ==</ds:SignatureValue></ds:Signature></root>"#
        );
        let resources = HashMap::from([("urn:detached-nodes".to_owned(), detached.into_bytes())]);
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            uris: crate::policy::UriPolicy {
                references: UriTypeSet::ALL,
                ..crate::policy::UriPolicy::default()
            },
            resources: crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
                max_xml_nodes: 24,
                ..crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .policy(policy)
            .external_resources(&resources)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("detached XML must inherit the policy node ceiling");

        assert!(
            matches!(
                error,
                SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                    crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                        resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XML_NODES,
                        maximum: 24,
                        ..
                    }
                )
            ),
            "unexpected error: {error:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn query_only_reference_resolves_against_relative_xml_base() {
        // A query-only URI replaces the inherited base query without changing
        // its relative path; no absolute document base is required by XML Base.
        let payload = b"query-selected payload";
        let digest = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
            .encode(compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, payload));
        let xml = format!(
            r#"<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}"><ds:SignedInfo>
                <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
                <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>
                <ds:Reference xml:base="a/b?old" URI="?new">
                    <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
                    <ds:DigestValue>{digest}</ds:DigestValue>
                </ds:Reference>
            </ds:SignedInfo><ds:SignatureValue>AA==</ds:SignatureValue></ds:Signature>"#
        );
        let document = Document::parse(&xml).unwrap();
        let signature = document.root_element();
        let signed_info_node = signature
            .children()
            .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "SignedInfo")))
            .unwrap();
        let signed_info = parse_signed_info(signed_info_node).unwrap();
        let resources = HashMap::from([("a/b?new".to_string(), payload.to_vec())]);
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document).with_external_resources(&resources);

        let result = process_all_references(&signed_info.references, &resolver, signature, false)
            .expect("query-only URI must resolve against the complete relative base path");

        assert!(result.all_valid());
    }

    #[test]
    fn manifest_reference_resolution_uses_its_effective_xml_base() {
        // Manifest references carry their own XML Base context and must not
        // accidentally reuse the SignedInfo or Signature element context.
        let payload = b"manifest payload";
        let digest = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
            .encode(compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, payload));
        let xml = format!(
            r#"<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}" xml:base="https://example.test/">
                <ds:Object><ds:Manifest xml:base="manifests/">
                    <ds:Reference URI="payload.bin">
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
                        <ds:DigestValue>{digest}</ds:DigestValue>
                    </ds:Reference>
                </ds:Manifest></ds:Object>
            </ds:Signature>"#
        );
        let document = Document::parse(&xml).unwrap();
        let signature = document.root_element();
        let reference_node = signature
            .descendants()
            .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "Reference")))
            .unwrap();
        let reference = super::super::parse::parse_reference(reference_node).unwrap();
        let resources = HashMap::from([(
            "https://example.test/manifests/payload.bin".to_string(),
            payload.to_vec(),
        )]);
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document).with_external_resources(&resources);

        let result = process_reference(
            &reference,
            &resolver,
            signature,
            ReferenceSet::Manifest,
            0,
            false,
        )
        .expect("Manifest Reference should inherit its own XML Base context");

        assert_eq!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid);
    }

    #[test]
    fn manifest_reference_index_ignores_nested_manifest_descendants() {
        // The public Manifest index follows Signature/Object/Manifest structure;
        // wrapper descendants must not steal an index and supply another base URI.
        let payload = b"direct manifest payload";
        let digest = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
            .encode(compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, payload));
        let xml = format!(
            r#"<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}" xml:base="https://example.test/">
                <ds:Object><wrapper><ds:Manifest xml:base="nested/">
                    <ds:Reference URI="payload.bin">
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
                        <ds:DigestValue>{digest}</ds:DigestValue>
                    </ds:Reference>
                </ds:Manifest></wrapper></ds:Object>
                <ds:Object><ds:Manifest xml:base="direct/">
                    <ds:Reference URI="payload.bin">
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
                        <ds:DigestValue>{digest}</ds:DigestValue>
                    </ds:Reference>
                </ds:Manifest></ds:Object>
            </ds:Signature>"#
        );
        let document = Document::parse(&xml).unwrap();
        let signature = document.root_element();
        let direct_reference_node = signature
            .children()
            .filter(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "Object")))
            .nth(1)
            .unwrap()
            .children()
            .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "Manifest")))
            .unwrap()
            .children()
            .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "Reference")))
            .unwrap();
        let reference = super::super::parse::parse_reference(direct_reference_node).unwrap();
        let resources = HashMap::from([(
            "https://example.test/direct/payload.bin".to_string(),
            payload.to_vec(),
        )]);
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document).with_external_resources(&resources);

        let result = process_reference(
            &reference,
            &resolver,
            signature,
            ReferenceSet::Manifest,
            0,
            false,
        )
        .expect("Manifest index must select the direct Object/Manifest reference");

        assert_eq!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid);
    }

    struct RejectingKey;

    impl VerifyingKey for RejectingKey {
        fn verify(
            &self,
            _algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
            _signed_data: &[u8],
            _signature_value: &[u8],
        ) -> Result<bool, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
            Ok(false)
        }
    }

    struct AcceptingKey;

    impl VerifyingKey for AcceptingKey {
        fn verify(
            &self,
            _algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
            _signed_data: &[u8],
            _signature_value: &[u8],
        ) -> Result<bool, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
            Ok(true)
        }
    }

    struct PanicResolver;

    struct UntrustedTestResolver;

    impl KeyResolver for UntrustedTestResolver {
        fn resolve<'a>(
            &'a self,
            _key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
            _algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        ) -> Result<Option<Box<dyn VerifyingKey + 'a>>, DsigError> {
            Ok(Some(Box::new(AcceptingKey)))
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn verification_requires_explicit_key_authorization() {
        // A resolver finding a working key must not authorize its signer.
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==");
        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key_resolver(&UntrustedTestResolver)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("default verification must reject an untrusted resolver candidate");
        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            DsigError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::KeyTrust { .. })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn cryptographic_only_is_explicit_and_never_reports_trust() {
        // Opting out of signer authorization must remain visible in the result.
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.key_trust.mode = crate::policy::VerificationTrustMode::CryptographicOnly;
        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .policy(policy)
            .key_resolver(&UntrustedTestResolver)
            .verify(&signature_with_target_reference("AQ=="))
            .expect("explicit mathematical mode permits an untrusted candidate");
        assert_eq!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid);
        assert_eq!(
            result.key_trust,
            super::super::KeyTrustEvidence::NotEstablished
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn caller_key_authorization_does_not_authenticate_an_invalid_signature() {
        // A trusted key is not evidence that the signature itself verified.
        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .verify(&signature_with_target_reference("AQ=="))
            .expect("an invalid mathematical signature is a completed result");
        assert_eq!(
            result.status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::SignatureMismatch)
        );
        assert_eq!(
            result.key_trust,
            super::super::KeyTrustEvidence::CallerTrusted
        );
    }

    impl KeyResolver for PanicResolver {
        fn resolve<'a>(
            &'a self,
            _key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
            _algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        ) -> Result<Option<Box<dyn VerifyingKey + 'a>>, SignatureVerificationPipelineError>
        {
            panic!("resolver should not be called when references already fail");
        }
    }

    struct MissingKeyResolver;

    impl KeyResolver for MissingKeyResolver {
        fn resolve<'a>(
            &'a self,
            _key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
            _algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        ) -> Result<Option<Box<dyn VerifyingKey + 'a>>, SignatureVerificationPipelineError>
        {
            Ok(None)
        }
    }

    struct ConsumingKeyInfoResolver;

    impl KeyResolver for ConsumingKeyInfoResolver {
        fn resolve<'a>(
            &'a self,
            _key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
            _algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        ) -> Result<Option<Box<dyn VerifyingKey + 'a>>, SignatureVerificationPipelineError>
        {
            Ok(None)
        }

        fn consumes_document_key_info(&self) -> bool {
            true
        }
    }

    struct FallbackKeyInfoResolver;

    impl KeyResolver for FallbackKeyInfoResolver {
        fn resolve_for_verification<'a>(
            &'a self,
            key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
            algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
            _policy: &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
            _provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
        ) -> Result<Option<super::super::ResolvedVerificationKey<'a>>, DsigError> {
            // This test resolver explicitly authorizes its application-owned key.
            self.resolve(key_info, algorithm)
                .map(|key| key.map(super::super::ResolvedVerificationKey::CallerTrusted))
        }

        fn resolve<'a>(
            &'a self,
            key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
            _algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        ) -> Result<Option<Box<dyn VerifyingKey + 'a>>, SignatureVerificationPipelineError>
        {
            let sources = &key_info.expect("KeyInfo must be parsed").sources;
            assert!(matches!(
                sources.as_slice(),
                [
                    super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::RetrievalMethod { .. },
                    super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyName(name),
                ] if name == "fallback"
            ));
            Ok(Some(Box::new(AcceptingKey)))
        }

        fn consumes_document_key_info(&self) -> bool {
            true
        }
    }

    struct EarlyKeyInfoResolver;

    impl KeyResolver for EarlyKeyInfoResolver {
        fn resolve_for_verification<'a>(
            &'a self,
            key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
            algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
            _policy: &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
            _provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
        ) -> Result<Option<super::super::ResolvedVerificationKey<'a>>, DsigError> {
            // Only the selected primary application key is authorized here.
            self.resolve(key_info, algorithm)
                .map(|key| key.map(super::super::ResolvedVerificationKey::CallerTrusted))
        }

        fn resolve<'a>(
            &'a self,
            key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
            _algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        ) -> Result<Option<Box<dyn VerifyingKey + 'a>>, SignatureVerificationPipelineError>
        {
            let sources = &key_info.expect("KeyInfo must be parsed").sources;
            assert!(matches!(
                sources.as_slice(),
                [
                    super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyName(name),
                    super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::RetrievalMethod { .. },
                ] if name == "primary"
            ));
            Ok(Some(Box::new(AcceptingKey)))
        }

        fn consumes_document_key_info(&self) -> bool {
            true
        }
    }

    fn minimal_signature_xml(reference_uri: &str, transforms_xml: &str) -> String {
        format!(
            r#"<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
  <ds:SignedInfo>
    <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
    <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>
    <ds:Reference URI="{reference_uri}">
      {transforms_xml}
      <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
      <ds:DigestValue>AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=</ds:DigestValue>
    </ds:Reference>
  </ds:SignedInfo>
  <ds:SignatureValue>AQ==</ds:SignatureValue>
</ds:Signature>"#
        )
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_all_retains_each_signature_without_vacuous_success() {
        // Malformed signatures remain individually visible; an empty document
        // never satisfies a request merely because there were no failures.
        let document = XmlDocument::parse(format!(
            "<root xmlns:ds=\"{XMLDSIG_NS}\"><ds:Signature/><ds:Signature/></root>"
        ))
        .unwrap();
        let evidence = VerifyContext::new().verify_all(&document).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(evidence.signatures().len(), 2);
        assert!(
            evidence
                .signatures()
                .iter()
                .all(|entry| entry.result().is_err())
        );
        assert!(!evidence.all_valid());
        let empty = XmlDocument::parse("<root/>").unwrap();
        assert!(!VerifyContext::new().verify_all(&empty).unwrap().all_valid());
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_all_checks_cardinality_before_running_keys() {
        // The cardinality policy bounds report allocation and crypto work,
        // including malformed signatures that never reach core validation.
        let document = XmlDocument::parse(format!(
            "<root xmlns:ds=\"{XMLDSIG_NS}\"><ds:Signature/><ds:Signature/></root>"
        ))
        .unwrap();
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_signatures = 1;
        assert!(matches!(
            VerifyContext::new().policy(policy).verify_all(&document),
            Err(DsigError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: "verification signatures",
                    maximum: 1,
                    actual: 2,
                }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verification_signature_limit_also_gates_the_single_api() {
        // The same compiled resource policy must apply to both public paths.
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_signatures = 0;
        assert!(matches!(
            VerifyContext::new()
                .policy(policy)
                .key(&AcceptingKey)
                .verify(&signature_with_target_reference("AQ==")),
            Err(DsigError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: "verification signatures",
                    maximum: 0,
                    actual: 1,
                }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_all_preserves_generation_and_rejects_wrapped_siblings() {
        // A signature over one element never authenticates a lookalike sibling.
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==")
            .replace("</root>", "<target ID=\"unsigned\">payload</target></root>");
        let document = XmlDocument::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let (signed, unsigned) = document.with_view(|view| {
            (
                view.node_for_id("target", &[]).unwrap(),
                view.node_for_id("unsigned", &[]).unwrap(),
            )
        });
        let evidence = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .verify_all(&document)
            .unwrap();
        assert!(evidence.all_valid());
        assert!(evidence.covers_element(&document, signed).unwrap());
        assert!(!evidence.covers_element(&document, unsigned).unwrap());
        let foreign = XmlDocument::parse("<target/>").unwrap();
        let target = foreign.with_view(|view| view.root_element());
        assert!(matches!(
            evidence.covers_element(&document, target),
            Err(DsigError::Document(XmlDocumentError::ForeignIdentity))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_request_rejects_duplicate_targets_before_crypto() {
        // Ambiguous request mapping is not a successful duplicate assertion.
        let document = XmlDocument::parse(signature_with_target_reference("AQ==")).unwrap();
        let target = document.with_view(|view| view.node_for_id("target", &[]).unwrap());
        let targets = [target, target];
        let request = VerificationRequest {
            expected_targets: &targets,
            ..VerificationRequest::default()
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            VerifyContext::new().verify_request(&document, &request),
            Err(DsigError::InvalidRequest {
                reason: "duplicate expected coverage target"
            })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_all_shares_canonicalization_retention_budget() {
        // Repeating a Signature may not reset the retained-data allowance.
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==");
        let single = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .store_pre_digest(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .unwrap();
        let bytes = single.canonicalized_signed_info.unwrap().len()
            + single.signed_info_references[0]
                .pre_digest_data
                .as_ref()
                .unwrap()
                .len();
        let parsed = Document::parse(&xml).unwrap();
        let signature = parsed
            .descendants()
            .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "Signature")))
            .unwrap();
        let xml = xml.replace("</root>", &format!("{}</root>", &xml[signature.range()]));
        let document = XmlDocument::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_canonicalized_bytes = bytes * 2 - 1;
        let evidence = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .store_pre_digest(true)
            .policy(policy)
            .verify_all(&document)
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(evidence.signatures.len(), 2);
        assert_eq!(
            evidence.signatures[0].result().as_ref().unwrap().status,
            DsigStatus::Valid
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            evidence.signatures[1].result(),
            Err(DsigError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: "canonicalized bytes",
                    ..
                }
            ))
        ));
        assert!(!evidence.accepted(&document).unwrap());
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_all_manifest_coverage_requires_its_authenticated_digest() {
        // A valid enclosing Signature authenticates the Manifest declaration,
        // not a target whose separately checked Manifest digest mismatches.
        for valid in [true, false] {
            let document = XmlDocument::parse(signature_with_manifest_xml(valid)).unwrap();
            let target = document.with_view(|view| view.node_for_id("target", &[]).unwrap());
            let evidence = VerifyContext::new()
                .key(&AcceptingKey)
                .process_manifests(true)
                .verify_all(&document)
                .unwrap();
            let result = evidence.signatures()[0].result().as_ref().unwrap();
            assert_eq!(result.manifest_references.len(), 1);
            assert!(result.manifest_references[0].reference_identity.is_some());
            assert_eq!(evidence.covers_element(&document, target).unwrap(), valid);
            assert_eq!(evidence.accepted(&document).unwrap(), valid);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_all_filtered_digest_does_not_claim_original_subtree() {
        // A projection may discard content even when its local digest matches.
        // No arbitrary filter is promoted to complete original-node coverage.
        let mut reference = make_reference(
            "#target",
            vec![Transform::XpathExcludeAllSignatures],
            DigestAlgorithm::Sha256,
            vec![],
        );
        let document = XmlDocument::parse(signature_with_target_reference("AQ==")).unwrap();
        document.with_view(|view| {
            let target = view.node_for_id("target", &[]).unwrap();
            let mut result = manifest_reference_invalid_result(
                &reference,
                0,
                FailureReason::ReferenceProcessingFailure { ref_index: 0 },
            );
            result.status = DsigStatus::Valid;
            bind_reference_evidence(
                &mut result,
                &reference,
                view,
                None,
                &OperationResourceIdentity::DocumentNode(target),
            );
            assert_eq!(result.target_identity, Some(target));
            assert_eq!(result.coverage, ReferenceCoverage::TransformedData);
            reference.transforms = vec![Transform::C14n(crate::c14n::C14nAlgorithm::new(
                crate::c14n::C14nMode::Exclusive1_0,
                false,
            ))];
            bind_reference_evidence(
                &mut result,
                &reference,
                view,
                None,
                &OperationResourceIdentity::DocumentNode(target),
            );
            assert_eq!(result.coverage, ReferenceCoverage::ElementContent);
        });
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_request_rejects_conflicting_resource_owners() {
        // There is no implicit override between request bytes and old builder
        // configuration: ownership must be explicit before resolver work.
        let document = XmlDocument::parse("<root/>").unwrap();
        let resources = HashMap::new();
        let request = VerificationRequest {
            external_resources: Some(&resources),
            ..VerificationRequest::default()
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            VerifyContext::new()
                .external_resources(&resources)
                .verify_request(&document, &request),
            Err(DsigError::InvalidRequest {
                reason: "external resources configured in both context and request"
            })
        ));
    }

    fn signature_with_target_reference(signature_value_b64: &str) -> String {
        let xml_template = r##"<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
  <target ID="target">payload</target>
  <ds:Signature>
    <ds:SignedInfo>
      <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
      <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>
      <ds:Reference URI="#target">
        <ds:Transforms>
          <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
        </ds:Transforms>
        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
        <ds:DigestValue>AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=</ds:DigestValue>
      </ds:Reference>
    </ds:SignedInfo>
    <ds:SignatureValue>SIGNATURE_VALUE_PLACEHOLDER</ds:SignatureValue>
  </ds:Signature>
</root>"##;

        let doc = Document::parse(xml_template).unwrap();
        let sig_node = doc
            .descendants()
            .find(|node| node.is_element() && node.tag_name().name() == "Signature")
            .unwrap();
        let signed_info_node = sig_node
            .children()
            .find(|node| node.is_element() && node.tag_name().name() == "SignedInfo")
            .unwrap();
        let signed_info = parse_signed_info(signed_info_node).unwrap();
        let reference = &signed_info.references[0];
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&doc);
        let initial_data = resolver
            .dereference(reference.uri.as_deref().unwrap())
            .unwrap();
        let pre_digest =
            crate::xmldsig::execute_transforms(sig_node, initial_data, &reference.transforms)
                .unwrap();
        let digest = compute_digest(reference.digest_method, &pre_digest);
        let digest_b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(digest);
        xml_template
            .replace("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=", &digest_b64)
            .replace("SIGNATURE_VALUE_PLACEHOLDER", signature_value_b64)
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_reports_key_not_found_status_without_key_or_resolver() {
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==");

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("missing key config must be reported as verification status");
        assert!(
            matches!(
                result.status,
                DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::KeyNotFound)
            ),
            "unexpected status: {:?}",
            result.status
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_rejects_disallowed_uri() {
        let xml = minimal_signature_xml("http://example.com/external", "");
        let err = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("external URI should be rejected by default policy");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::Uri {
                operation: "verification",
                ..
            })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_bounds_effective_xml_base_components() {
        // External URI resolution must stop before repeatedly copying an
        // attacker-controlled chain of effective XML Base values.
        let mut xml = minimal_signature_xml("payload", "");
        for _ in 0..65 {
            xml = format!(r#"<n xml:base="segment/">{xml}</n>"#);
        }
        let resources = HashMap::new();
        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .allowed_uri_types(UriTypeSet::ALL)
            .external_resources(&resources)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("XML Base component work must be bounded before lookup");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XML_BASE_COMPONENTS,
                    maximum: 64,
                    actual: 65,
                }
            )
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_bounds_cumulative_xml_base_resolution_bytes() {
        // The operation-wide byte budget charges intermediate URI copies, not
        // merely the small final external resource returned by the caller map.
        let mut xml = minimal_signature_xml("payload", "");
        for _ in 0..2 {
            xml = format!(r#"<n xml:base="segment/">{xml}</n>"#);
        }
        let resources = HashMap::new();
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_xml_base_resolution_bytes = 32;
        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .policy(policy)
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .allowed_uri_types(UriTypeSet::ALL)
            .external_resources(&resources)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("cumulative XML Base copies must obey the operation budget");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XML_BASE_RESOLUTION_BYTES,
                    maximum: 32,
                    ..
                }
            )
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_applies_xml_base_policy_to_signed_info_c14n() {
        // The SignedInfo node-set excludes its ancestors, so C14N 1.1 must
        // resolve their inherited xml:base values through the same operation
        // budget already used by Reference processing.
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==")
            .replacen(
                "http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#",
                "http://www.w3.org/2006/12/xml-c14n11",
                1,
            )
            .replace(
                "  <ds:Signature>",
                "  <outer xml:base=\"one/\"><inner xml:base=\"two/\"><ds:Signature>",
            )
            .replace("  </ds:Signature>", "  </ds:Signature></inner></outer>");
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            resources: crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
                max_xml_base_components: 1,
                ..crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("SignedInfo C14N must use the operation XML Base budget");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XML_BASE_COMPONENTS,
                    maximum: 1,
                    actual: 2,
                }
            )
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_classifies_signed_info_xml_base_byte_limit_as_policy() {
        // SignedInfo C14N 1.1 XML Base work is policy enforcement, not a
        // malformed canonicalization request, and must retain typed diagnostics.
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==")
            .replacen(
                "http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#",
                "http://www.w3.org/2006/12/xml-c14n11",
                1,
            )
            .replace(
                "  <ds:Signature>",
                "  <outer xml:base=\"segment/\"><ds:Signature>",
            )
            .replace("  </ds:Signature>", "  </ds:Signature></outer>");
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            resources: crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
                max_xml_base_resolution_bytes: 1,
                ..crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("SignedInfo XML Base byte exhaustion must be a policy error");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XML_BASE_RESOLUTION_BYTES,
                    maximum: 1,
                    actual,
                }
            ) if actual > 1
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_meters_repeated_external_dereferences() {
        // One caller-owned entry can be referenced repeatedly. The aggregate
        // ceiling bounds bytes cloned and processed, not just unique map data.
        let payload = b"payload";
        let digest = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(
            crate::xmldsig::compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha1, payload),
        );
        let reference = format!(
            r#"<ds:Reference URI="urn:payload"><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/><ds:DigestValue>{digest}</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference>"#
        );
        let xml = format!(
            r#"<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}"><ds:SignedInfo><ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/><ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>{reference}{reference}</ds:SignedInfo><ds:SignatureValue>AQ==</ds:SignatureValue></ds:Signature>"#
        );
        let resources = HashMap::from([("urn:payload".to_owned(), payload.to_vec())]);
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            uris: crate::policy::UriPolicy {
                references: UriTypeSet::ALL,
                ..crate::policy::UriPolicy::default()
            },
            resources: crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
                max_external_resource_bytes: payload.len(),
                max_external_resource_total_bytes: payload.len(),
                ..crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .policy(policy)
            .external_resources(&resources)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("the second dereference must exhaust the aggregate byte ceiling");

        assert!(
            error
                .to_string()
                .contains("aggregate external resource bytes")
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_rejects_empty_uri_when_policy_disallows_empty() {
        let xml = minimal_signature_xml("", "");
        let err = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .allowed_uri_types(UriTypeSet::new(false, true, false))
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("empty URI must be rejected when empty references are disabled");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::Uri {
                operation: "verification",
                ..
            })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_rejects_disallowed_transform() {
        let xml = minimal_signature_xml(
            "",
            r#"<ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/></ds:Transforms>"#,
        );
        let err = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .allowed_transforms(["http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"])
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("enveloped transform should be rejected by allowlist");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::Algorithm {
                operation: "verification transform",
                ..
            })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_applies_transform_allowlist_to_signed_info_c14n() {
        // Reference C14N remains allowlisted; only the distinct SignedInfo
        // canonicalization method should trigger this policy rejection.
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==").replacen(
            "<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#\"/>",
            "<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315\"/>",
            1,
        );
        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .allowed_transforms(["http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"])
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("SignedInfo C14N must obey the operation transform allowlist");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::Algorithm {
                    operation: "verification transform",
                    ref algorithm,
                }
            )
                if algorithm == "http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315"
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_applies_transform_allowlist_to_key_retrieval() {
        // The reference and SignedInfo both use exclusive C14N. The only XPath
        // operation is document-selected key retrieval and must be rejected.
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==")
            .replacen(
                "</ds:Signature>",
                r##"<ds:KeyInfo><ds:RetrievalMethod URI="#keys" Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#X509Data"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xpath-19991116"><ds:XPath>ancestor-or-self::ds:X509Data</ds:XPath></ds:Transform></ds:Transforms></ds:RetrievalMethod></ds:KeyInfo></ds:Signature>"##,
                1,
            )
            .replacen(
                "</root>",
                r#"<holder ID="keys"><ds:X509Data><ds:X509SubjectName>CN=leaf</ds:X509SubjectName></ds:X509Data></holder></root>"#,
                1,
            );
        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key_resolver(&ConsumingKeyInfoResolver)
            .allowed_transforms(["http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"])
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("RetrievalMethod XPath must obey the operation transform allowlist");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::Algorithm {
                    operation: "verification transform",
                    ref algorithm,
                }
            )
                if algorithm == XPATH_TRANSFORM_URI
        ));
    }

    fn signature_with_manifest_xml(valid_manifest_digest: bool) -> String {
        signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(valid_manifest_digest, |xml| xml)
    }

    fn signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation<F>(
        valid_manifest_digest: bool,
        mutate_manifest: F,
    ) -> String
    where
        F: FnOnce(String) -> String,
    {
        const TMP_SIGNED_INFO_DIGEST: &str = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=";
        const INVALID_MANIFEST_DIGEST: &str = "//////////////////////////8=";
        let xml_template = r##"<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
  <target ID="target">payload</target>
  <ds:Signature>
    <ds:SignedInfo>
      <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
      <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>
      <ds:Reference URI="#manifest">
        <ds:Transforms>
          <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
        </ds:Transforms>
        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
        <ds:DigestValue>SIGNEDINFO_OBJECT_DIGEST_PLACEHOLDER</ds:DigestValue>
      </ds:Reference>
    </ds:SignedInfo>
    <ds:SignatureValue>AQ==</ds:SignatureValue>
    <ds:Object>
      <ds:Manifest ID="manifest">
        <ds:Reference URI="#target">
          <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
          <ds:DigestValue>MANIFEST_DIGEST_PLACEHOLDER</ds:DigestValue>
        </ds:Reference>
      </ds:Manifest>
    </ds:Object>
  </ds:Signature>
</root>"##;
        let seed_xml = xml_template.replace(
            "SIGNEDINFO_OBJECT_DIGEST_PLACEHOLDER",
            TMP_SIGNED_INFO_DIGEST,
        );
        let doc = Document::parse(&seed_xml).unwrap();
        let signature_node = doc
            .descendants()
            .find(|node| {
                node.is_element()
                    && node.tag_name().namespace() == Some(XMLDSIG_NS)
                    && node.tag_name().name() == "Signature"
            })
            .unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&doc);
        let initial_data = resolver.dereference("#target").unwrap();
        let manifest_pre_digest =
            crate::xmldsig::execute_transforms(signature_node, initial_data, &[]).unwrap();
        let computed_manifest_digest_b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
            .encode(compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha1, &manifest_pre_digest));
        let final_manifest_digest_b64 = if valid_manifest_digest {
            computed_manifest_digest_b64.as_str()
        } else {
            INVALID_MANIFEST_DIGEST
        };
        let xml_with_manifest_digest = mutate_manifest(
            seed_xml.replace("MANIFEST_DIGEST_PLACEHOLDER", final_manifest_digest_b64),
        );
        let signed_doc = Document::parse(&xml_with_manifest_digest).unwrap();
        let signed_signature_node = signed_doc
            .descendants()
            .find(|node| {
                node.is_element()
                    && node.tag_name().namespace() == Some(XMLDSIG_NS)
                    && node.tag_name().name() == "Signature"
            })
            .unwrap();
        let signed_info_node = signed_signature_node
            .children()
            .find(|node| {
                node.is_element()
                    && node.tag_name().namespace() == Some(XMLDSIG_NS)
                    && node.tag_name().name() == "SignedInfo"
            })
            .unwrap();
        let signed_info = parse_signed_info(signed_info_node).unwrap();
        let object_reference = &signed_info.references[0];
        let signed_resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&signed_doc);
        let signed_initial_data = signed_resolver
            .dereference(object_reference.uri.as_deref().unwrap())
            .unwrap();
        let signed_pre_digest = crate::xmldsig::execute_transforms(
            signed_signature_node,
            signed_initial_data,
            &object_reference.transforms,
        )
        .unwrap();
        let signed_digest_b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(compute_digest(
            object_reference.digest_method,
            &signed_pre_digest,
        ));

        xml_with_manifest_digest.replacen(TMP_SIGNED_INFO_DIGEST, &signed_digest_b64, 1)
    }

    fn replace_fixture_manifest_digest(xml: &str, replacement: &str) -> String {
        let object_marker = "<ds:Object>";
        let object_start = xml
            .find(object_marker)
            .expect("fixture should contain ds:Object")
            + object_marker.len();
        let open = "<ds:DigestValue>";
        let close = "</ds:DigestValue>";
        let value_start = xml[object_start..]
            .find(open)
            .map(|offset| object_start + offset + open.len())
            .expect("Manifest should contain DigestValue");
        let value_end = xml[value_start..]
            .find(close)
            .map(|offset| value_start + offset)
            .expect("Manifest DigestValue must be closed");

        format!("{}{replacement}{}", &xml[..value_start], &xml[value_end..])
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_processes_manifest_references_when_enabled() {
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml(true);

        let result_without_manifests = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("manifest processing disabled should still verify SignedInfo");
        assert!(
            result_without_manifests.manifest_references.is_empty(),
            "manifest results must stay empty when manifest processing is disabled",
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            result_without_manifests.status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::SignatureMismatch)
        ));

        let malformed_manifest_xml = signature_with_manifest_xml(true).replacen(
            "</ds:Object>",
            "</ds:Object><ds:Object><ds:Manifest><ds:Foo/></ds:Manifest></ds:Object>",
            1,
        );
        let malformed_with_manifests_disabled = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .verify(&malformed_manifest_xml)
            .expect("malformed Manifest must be ignored when manifest processing is disabled");
        assert!(
            malformed_with_manifests_disabled
                .manifest_references
                .is_empty(),
            "manifest parser must not run when process_manifests is disabled",
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            malformed_with_manifests_disabled.status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::SignatureMismatch)
        ));

        let result_with_manifests = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("manifest references should be processed when enabled");
        assert_eq!(result_with_manifests.manifest_references.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(
            result_with_manifests.manifest_references[0].reference_set,
            ReferenceSet::Manifest
        );
        assert_eq!(
            result_with_manifests.manifest_references[0].reference_index,
            0
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            result_with_manifests.manifest_references[0].status,
            DsigStatus::Valid
        ));
        assert!(matches!(result_with_manifests.status, DsigStatus::Valid));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_skips_manifest_work_when_signature_value_is_invalid() {
        // SignedInfo authenticates the Manifest bytes only after SignatureValue
        // succeeds. Malformed nested content must not consume parsing work when
        // the cryptographic signature itself is invalid.
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |xml| {
            replace_fixture_manifest_digest(&xml, "!!!")
        });
        assert!(
            xml.split_once("<ds:Object>")
                .is_some_and(|(_, object)| object.contains("<ds:DigestValue>!!!</ds:DigestValue>")),
            "fixture mutation must corrupt the nested Manifest DigestValue",
        );

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("invalid SignatureValue must short-circuit Manifest parsing");

        assert!(matches!(
            result.status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::SignatureMismatch)
        ));
        assert!(result.manifest_references.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_shares_xpath_parse_budget_with_manifest_references() {
        // SignedInfo and every Manifest form one attacker-controlled parse unit:
        // splitting expressions across Reference sets must not reset the ceiling.
        let filters = r#"<XPath xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2002/06/xmldsig-filter2" Filter="intersect">true()</XPath>"#
            .repeat(64);
        let transform = format!(
            r#"<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2002/06/xmldsig-filter2">{filters}</ds:Transform>"#
        );
        let max_transforms = transform.repeat(16);
        let max_manifest_reference = format!(
            r##"<ds:Reference URI="#target"><ds:Transforms>{max_transforms}</ds:Transforms><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/><ds:DigestValue>AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference>"##
        );
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |xml| {
            xml.replacen(
                r##"<ds:Reference URI="#target">"##,
                &format!(
                    r##"<ds:Reference URI="#target"><ds:Transforms>{}</ds:Transforms>"##,
                    max_transforms
                ),
                1,
            )
            .replacen(
                "</ds:SignedInfo>",
                r##"<ds:Reference URI="#target"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xpath-19991116"><ds:XPath>false()</ds:XPath></ds:Transform></ds:Transforms><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/><ds:DigestValue>2jmj7l5rSw0yVb/vlWAYkK/YBwk=</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference></ds:SignedInfo>"##,
                1,
            )
            .replacen(
                "</ds:Manifest>",
                &format!("{}</ds:Manifest>", max_manifest_reference.repeat(3)),
                1,
            )
        });

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("SignedInfo and Manifest References must share one XPath parse budget");

        assert!(
            matches!(
                &error,
                SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                    crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                        resource: "XPath expressions",
                        ..
                    }
                )
            ),
            "unexpected error: {error:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_processes_manifest_when_signedinfo_references_object() {
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |xml| {
            xml.replacen("URI=\"#manifest\"", "URI=\"#object-id\"", 1)
                .replacen("<ds:Object>", "<ds:Object ID=\"object-id\">", 1)
                .replacen("<ds:Manifest ID=\"manifest\">", "<ds:Manifest>", 1)
        });

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("manifest references should be processed when SignedInfo references ds:Object");
        assert_eq!(
            result.manifest_references.len(),
            1,
            "signed ds:Object should enable processing of its direct-child ds:Manifest",
        );
        assert_eq!(
            result.manifest_references[0].reference_set,
            ReferenceSet::Manifest
        );
        assert_eq!(result.manifest_references[0].reference_index, 0);
        assert!(matches!(
            result.manifest_references[0].status,
            DsigStatus::Valid
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_skips_manifest_removed_by_enveloped_transform() {
        // The owning Signature contains both eligible ID targets. Subtracting
        // its subtree therefore removes every target node from the digest input,
        // so neither form authenticates the Manifest structure for processing.
        for target_object in [false, true] {
            let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |xml| {
                let xml = xml.replacen(
                    r#"<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>"#,
                    r#"<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>"#,
                    1,
                );
                if target_object {
                    xml.replacen("URI=\"#manifest\"", "URI=\"#object-id\"", 1)
                        .replacen("<ds:Object>", "<ds:Object ID=\"object-id\">", 1)
                        .replacen("<ds:Manifest ID=\"manifest\">", "<ds:Manifest>", 1)
                } else {
                    xml
                }
            });

            let result = VerifyContext::new()
                .key(&AcceptingKey)
                .process_manifests(true)
                .store_pre_digest(true)
                .verify(&xml)
                .expect("an emptied reference remains a valid core digest input");

            assert!(matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid));
            assert_eq!(
                result.signed_info_references[0].pre_digest_data.as_deref(),
                Some([].as_slice()),
                "target_object={target_object} must have empty transformed bytes",
            );
            assert!(
                result.manifest_references.is_empty(),
                "target_object={target_object} must not authenticate the Manifest",
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_ignores_manifest_excluded_from_signed_object() {
        // A Reference URI authenticates only its post-transform bytes. Excluding
        // the Manifest subtree must not let its independently valid digest chain
        // masquerade as data authenticated by SignedInfo.
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |xml| {
            xml.replacen("URI=\"#manifest\"", "URI=\"#object-id\"", 1)
                .replacen("<ds:Object>", "<ds:Object ID=\"object-id\">", 1)
                .replacen("<ds:Manifest ID=\"manifest\">", "<ds:Manifest>", 1)
                .replacen(
                    r#"<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>"#,
                    r#"<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xpath-19991116"><ds:XPath>not(ancestor-or-self::ds:Manifest)</ds:XPath></ds:Transform><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>"#,
                    1,
                )
        });

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("excluded Manifest content must be ignored, not parsed");

        assert!(matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid));
        assert!(
            result.manifest_references.is_empty(),
            "a transform-excluded Manifest is not authenticated by SignedInfo",
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_skips_manifest_digest_work_when_signature_is_invalid() {
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml(false);
        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("invalid SignatureValue must short-circuit Manifest digest work");
        assert!(result.manifest_references.is_empty());
        assert!(matches!(
            result.status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::SignatureMismatch)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_manifest_digest_mismatch_is_non_fatal_with_accepting_key() {
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml(false);
        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("manifest digest mismatches should be recorded while signature stays valid");
        assert_eq!(result.manifest_references.len(), 1);
        assert!(matches!(
            result.manifest_references[0].status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferenceDigestMismatch { ref_index: 0 })
        ));
        assert!(matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid));
    }

    #[test]
    fn invalid_outer_manifest_digest_does_not_parse_nested_manifest() {
        // The malformed inner Manifest is not authenticated until its parent
        // Reference digest succeeds. A mismatch must therefore stop before
        // parsing or charging work for the nested structure.
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(false, |xml| {
            xml.replacen("URI=\"#target\"", "URI=\"#inner-object\"", 1)
                .replacen(
                    "</ds:Object>",
                    "</ds:Object><ds:Object ID=\"inner-object\"><ds:Manifest>junk<ds:Unexpected/></ds:Manifest></ds:Object>",
                    1,
                )
        });

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("an unauthenticated nested Manifest must remain opaque");

        assert_eq!(result.manifest_references.len(), 1);
        assert!(matches!(
            result.manifest_references[0].status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferenceDigestMismatch { ref_index: 0 })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_skips_manifest_parsing_when_signedinfo_reference_fails() {
        // Manifest content is not authenticated after a SignedInfo reference
        // failure, so parsing it would spend work on untrusted nested input.
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml(true);
        let (signed_info_prefix, object_suffix) = xml
            .split_once("<ds:Object>")
            .expect("fixture should contain ds:Object");
        let open = "<ds:DigestValue>";
        let close = "</ds:DigestValue>";
        let digest_start = signed_info_prefix
            .find(open)
            .expect("SignedInfo should contain DigestValue");
        let digest_end = signed_info_prefix[digest_start + open.len()..]
            .find(close)
            .map(|offset| digest_start + open.len() + offset)
            .expect("SignedInfo DigestValue must be closed");
        let broken_signed_info_prefix = format!(
            "{}{}AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA={}{}",
            &signed_info_prefix[..digest_start],
            open,
            close,
            &signed_info_prefix[digest_end + close.len()..],
        );
        let broken_xml = format!("{broken_signed_info_prefix}<ds:Object>{object_suffix}");
        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&broken_xml)
            .expect("SignedInfo digest failure should return without parsing Manifests");
        assert!(matches!(
            result.status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferenceDigestMismatch { ref_index: 0 })
        ));
        assert!(
            result.manifest_references.is_empty(),
            "unauthenticated Manifest content must not be parsed",
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_skips_manifest_policy_work_when_signature_is_invalid() {
        // A digest-valid SignedInfo reference does not authenticate Manifest
        // policy inputs until SignatureValue also succeeds.
        let broken_xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |xml| {
            xml.replacen("URI=\"#target\"", "URI=\"http://example.com/external\"", 1)
        });
        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&broken_xml)
            .expect("invalid SignatureValue must short-circuit Manifest policy work");
        assert!(result.manifest_references.is_empty());
        assert!(matches!(
            result.status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::SignatureMismatch)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_records_manifest_policy_violations_with_accepting_key() {
        let broken_xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |xml| {
            xml.replacen("URI=\"#target\"", "URI=\"http://example.com/external\"", 1)
        });
        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&broken_xml)
            .expect("manifest policy violations should be recorded while signature stays valid");
        assert_eq!(result.manifest_references.len(), 1);
        assert!(matches!(
            result.manifest_references[0].status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferencePolicyViolation { ref_index: 0 })
        ));
        assert!(matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_applies_digest_policy_to_manifest_references() {
        // Manifest results are authenticated extension data and must obey the
        // same digest allowlist as SignedInfo references.
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            manifest_processing: crate::policy::ManifestProcessing::Process,
            digest_algorithms: Some(HashSet::from([DigestAlgorithm::Sha1])),
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |mut xml| {
            let legacy = "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1";
            let offset = xml
                .rfind(legacy)
                .expect("Manifest DigestMethod must be present");
            xml.replace_range(offset..offset + legacy.len(), DigestAlgorithm::Sha256.uri());
            let value_start = xml[offset..]
                .find("<ds:DigestValue>")
                .map(|relative| offset + relative + "<ds:DigestValue>".len())
                .expect("Manifest DigestValue must be present");
            let value_end = xml[value_start..]
                .find("</ds:DigestValue>")
                .map(|relative| value_start + relative)
                .expect("Manifest DigestValue must be closed");
            xml.replace_range(
                value_start..value_end,
                &base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode([0_u8; 32]),
            );
            xml
        });
        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("a disallowed Manifest digest is a per-reference result");

        assert!(matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid));
        assert!(matches!(
            result.manifest_references[0].status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferencePolicyViolation { ref_index: 0 })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_applies_transform_count_policy_to_manifest_references() {
        // Authenticated Manifest references share the caller's per-reference
        // transform ceiling and fail before transform execution when exceeded.
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            manifest_processing: crate::policy::ManifestProcessing::Process,
            resources: crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
                max_transforms_per_reference: 1,
                ..crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |mut xml| {
            let manifest_start = xml
                .find("<ds:Manifest")
                .expect("fixture must contain a Manifest");
            let manifest = xml[manifest_start..].replacen(
                "<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1\"/>",
                concat!(
                    "<ds:Transforms>",
                    "<ds:Transform Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#\"/>",
                    "<ds:Transform Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#\"/>",
                    "</ds:Transforms>",
                    "<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1\"/>"
                ),
                1,
            );
            xml.replace_range(manifest_start.., &manifest);
            xml
        });
        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("Manifest transform policy is a per-reference result");

        assert!(matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid));
        assert!(matches!(
            result.manifest_references[0].status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferencePolicyViolation { ref_index: 0 })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_skips_manifest_uri_work_when_signature_is_invalid() {
        // Missing Manifest URIs remain unauthenticated until SignatureValue
        // succeeds, so they cannot trigger Manifest policy processing here.
        let broken_xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |xml| {
            xml.replacen("<ds:Reference URI=\"#target\">", "<ds:Reference>", 1)
        });

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&broken_xml)
            .expect("invalid SignatureValue must short-circuit Manifest URI processing");
        assert!(result.manifest_references.is_empty());
        assert!(matches!(
            result.status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::SignatureMismatch)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_records_manifest_missing_uri_with_accepting_key() {
        let broken_xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |xml| {
            xml.replacen("<ds:Reference URI=\"#target\">", "<ds:Reference>", 1)
        });

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&broken_xml)
            .expect("manifest missing URI should be recorded while signature stays valid");
        assert_eq!(result.manifest_references.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(result.manifest_references[0].uri, "<omitted>");
        assert!(matches!(
            result.manifest_references[0].status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferenceProcessingFailure { ref_index: 0 })
        ));
        assert!(matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_ignores_nested_manifests_in_object() {
        // A digest-valid Manifest below a wrapper is outside the strict direct-
        // child processing profile and must not appear in diagnostics.
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |xml| {
            xml.replacen(
                "<ds:Manifest ID=\"manifest\">",
                "<wrapper><ds:Manifest ID=\"manifest\">",
                1,
            )
            .replacen("</ds:Manifest>", "</ds:Manifest></wrapper>", 1)
        });

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("nested Manifest nodes are ignored in strict mode");
        assert!(
            result.manifest_references.is_empty(),
            "only direct ds:Manifest children of ds:Object must be processed"
        );
        assert!(matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_reports_manifest_reference_parse_errors_explicitly() {
        // Malformed nested DigestValue is parsed only after the enclosing
        // Manifest structure has been authenticated by SignedInfo.
        let broken_xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |xml| {
            replace_fixture_manifest_digest(&xml, "!!!")
        });

        let err = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&broken_xml)
            .expect_err("invalid Manifest DigestValue must map to ParseManifestReference");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::ParseManifestReference(_)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_reports_unsupported_manifest_transform_with_declared_digest() {
        // Unsupported optional Manifest transforms do not invalidate core
        // SignedInfo, but their result must preserve the declared digest method.
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |xml| {
            let xml = xml.replacen(
                "<ds:Reference URI=\"#target\">",
                "<ds:Reference URI=\"#target\"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm=\"urn:unsupported\"/></ds:Transforms>",
                1,
            );
            let xml = xml.replacen(
                "</ds:Transforms>\n          <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1\"/>",
                "</ds:Transforms>\n          <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256\"/>",
                1,
            );
            replace_fixture_manifest_digest(&xml, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=")
        });
        assert!(xml.contains("urn:unsupported"));
        assert!(xml.contains("http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"));

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("unsupported Manifest transform is a per-reference result");
        assert_eq!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid);
        assert_eq!(result.manifest_references.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(
            result.manifest_references[0].digest_algorithm,
            DigestAlgorithm::Sha256
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            result.manifest_references[0].status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferenceProcessingFailure { ref_index: 0 })
        ));

        let restricted = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .allowed_transforms([
                DEFAULT_IMPLICIT_C14N_URI,
                "http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#",
            ])
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("a disallowed Manifest transform is a per-reference policy result");
        assert!(matches!(
            restricted.manifest_references[0].status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferencePolicyViolation { ref_index: 0 })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn manifest_reference_limit_counts_unsupported_entries() {
        let references = (0..=MAX_REFERENCES_PER_SIGNATURE)
            .map(|index| {
                format!(
                    r##"<ds:Reference URI="#target-{index}"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="urn:unsupported"/></ds:Transforms><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/><ds:DigestValue>AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference>"##
                )
            })
            .collect::<String>();
        let xml = format!(
            r#"<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"><ds:Object Id="signed"><ds:Manifest>{references}</ds:Manifest></ds:Object></ds:Signature>"#
        );
        let document = XmlDocument::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let error = document.with_view(|view| {
            let signature = view.document().root_element();
            let object = signature.children().find(|node| node.is_element()).unwrap();
            let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
            let budgets = VerificationOperationBudgets::with_transforms(
                &policy,
                TransformExecutionBudget::from_resources(&policy.resources),
            );
            let operation = OperationExecutionContext::new(
                &policy,
                &budgets,
                Some((view.identity(), view.generation())),
            );
            operation.authenticate(view.node_identity(object));
            let mut processed = HashSet::new();
            let mut remaining = MAX_REFERENCES_PER_SIGNATURE;
            let mut next_index = 0;
            let mut xpath_parse = XPathSignatureParseBudget::default();
            let mut state = ManifestDiscoveryState {
                processed: &mut processed,
                remaining_capacity: &mut remaining,
                next_reference_index: &mut next_index,
                xpath_parse: &mut xpath_parse,
            };
            match parse_manifest_references(signature, &operation, view, &mut state, None) {
                Ok(_) => panic!("unsupported references must consume the same aggregate limit"),
                Err(error) => error,
            }
        });
        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "signed Manifests exceed the per-signature Reference limit"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn unsigned_manifest_remains_eligible_after_trust_expands() {
        // The second Object is not authenticated during the first discovery
        // pass. It must remain unprocessed so a valid reference from the first
        // Manifest can make its sibling Manifest eligible on the next pass.
        let digest = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode([0_u8; 32]);
        let xml = format!(
            r##"<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}"><ds:Object Id="outer"><ds:Manifest><ds:Reference URI="#inner"><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/><ds:DigestValue>{digest}</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference></ds:Manifest></ds:Object><ds:Object Id="inner"><ds:Manifest><ds:Reference URI="#payload"><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/><ds:DigestValue>{digest}</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference></ds:Manifest></ds:Object></ds:Signature>"##
        );
        let document = XmlDocument::parse(xml).expect("nested Manifest fixture must parse");
        document.with_view(|view| {
            let signature = view.document().root_element();
            let mut objects = signature.children().filter(|node| node.is_element());
            let outer = objects.next().expect("outer Object");
            let inner = objects.next().expect("inner Object");
            let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
            let budgets = VerificationOperationBudgets::with_transforms(
                &policy,
                TransformExecutionBudget::from_resources(&policy.resources),
            );
            let operation = OperationExecutionContext::new(
                &policy,
                &budgets,
                Some((view.identity(), view.generation())),
            );
            operation.authenticate(view.node_identity(outer));
            let mut processed = HashSet::new();
            let mut remaining = 2;
            let mut next_index = 0;
            let mut xpath_budget = XPathSignatureParseBudget::default();

            let first = parse_manifest_references(
                signature,
                &operation,
                view,
                &mut ManifestDiscoveryState {
                    processed: &mut processed,
                    remaining_capacity: &mut remaining,
                    next_reference_index: &mut next_index,
                    xpath_parse: &mut xpath_budget,
                },
                None,
            )
            .expect("outer Manifest must be discovered");
            assert_eq!(first.references.len(), 1);
            assert_eq!(first.references[0].reference.uri.as_deref(), Some("#inner"));

            operation.authenticate(view.node_identity(inner));
            let second = parse_manifest_references(
                signature,
                &operation,
                view,
                &mut ManifestDiscoveryState {
                    processed: &mut processed,
                    remaining_capacity: &mut remaining,
                    next_reference_index: &mut next_index,
                    xpath_parse: &mut xpath_budget,
                },
                None,
            )
            .expect("newly authenticated sibling Manifest must remain eligible");
            assert_eq!(second.references.len(), 1);
            assert_eq!(
                second.references[0].reference.uri.as_deref(),
                Some("#payload")
            );
        });
    }

    #[test]
    fn manifest_reference_limit_includes_signed_info_references() {
        // The per-signature ceiling is shared by core and authenticated
        // Manifest references; enabling Manifest processing must not reset it.
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml(true);
        let reference_start = xml
            .find(r##"<ds:Reference URI="#manifest">"##)
            .expect("fixture SignedInfo must reference the Manifest");
        let reference_end = xml[reference_start..]
            .find("</ds:Reference>")
            .map(|offset| reference_start + offset + "</ds:Reference>".len())
            .expect("fixture SignedInfo Reference must be closed");
        let repeated = xml[reference_start..reference_end].repeat(MAX_REFERENCES_PER_SIGNATURE);
        let xml = format!(
            "{}{repeated}{}",
            &xml[..reference_start],
            &xml[reference_end..]
        );

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("one Manifest Reference must exceed the exhausted signature-wide limit");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "signed Manifests exceed the per-signature Reference limit"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn configured_reference_limit_is_shared_with_manifests() {
        // Lowering the operation policy must lower the aggregate SignedInfo and
        // Manifest capacity rather than falling back to the crate hard limit.
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            manifest_processing: crate::policy::ManifestProcessing::Process,
            resources: crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
                max_references: 1,
                ..crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&signature_with_manifest_xml(true))
            .expect_err("Manifest must exceed the caller-selected aggregate limit");
        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "signed Manifests exceed the per-signature Reference limit"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_materializes_single_x509_data_subtree() {
        for uri in [
            "#target",
            "#xpointer(id('target'))",
            "#xpointer(id(&quot;target&quot;))",
        ] {
            for target_xml in [
                r#"<ds:X509Data Id="target"><ds:X509SubjectName>CN=leaf</ds:X509SubjectName></ds:X509Data>"#,
                r#"<holder Id="target"><ds:X509Data><ds:X509SubjectName>CN=leaf</ds:X509SubjectName></ds:X509Data></holder>"#,
            ] {
                let xml = format!(
                    r#"<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"><ds:KeyInfo><ds:RetrievalMethod URI="{uri}" Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#X509Data"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xpath-19991116"><ds:XPath>ancestor-or-self::ds:X509Data</ds:XPath></ds:Transform></ds:Transforms></ds:RetrievalMethod></ds:KeyInfo>{target_xml}</root>"#
                );
                let document = Document::parse(&xml).unwrap();
                let key_info_node = document
                    .descendants()
                    .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "KeyInfo")))
                    .unwrap();
                let mut key_info = parse_key_info(key_info_node).unwrap();
                let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document);

                materialize_retrieval_methods(
                    &mut key_info,
                    &resolver,
                    UriTypeSet::SAME_DOCUMENT,
                    None,
                    crate::provider::default_provider(),
                )
                .expect("XPath filter must produce one X509Data-rooted node-set");
                assert!(matches!(
                    key_info.sources.as_slice(),
                    [super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::X509Data(info)]
                        if info.subject_names == ["CN=leaf"]
                ));
            }
        }
    }

    fn retrieval_method_xpath_signature() -> String {
        format!(
            r##"<root xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}">
              <payload Id="payload">ok</payload>
              <ds:Signature>
                <ds:SignedInfo>
                  <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
                  <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>
                  <ds:Reference URI="#payload">
                    <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
                    <ds:DigestValue>AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=</ds:DigestValue>
                  </ds:Reference>
                </ds:SignedInfo>
                <ds:SignatureValue>AQ==</ds:SignatureValue>
                <ds:KeyInfo>
                  <ds:RetrievalMethod URI="#target" Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#X509Data">
                    <ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="{XPATH_TRANSFORM_URI}">
                      <ds:XPath>ancestor-or-self::ds:X509Data</ds:XPath>
                    </ds:Transform></ds:Transforms>
                  </ds:RetrievalMethod>
                </ds:KeyInfo>
              </ds:Signature>
              <holder Id="target"><ds:X509Data><ds:X509SubjectName>CN=leaf</ds:X509SubjectName></ds:X509Data></holder>
            </root>"##
        )
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_xpath_uses_signature_expression_budget() {
        // RetrievalMethod XPath belongs to the same untrusted Signature as
        // Reference XPath and must not receive a separate parse allowance.
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_xpath_expressions = 0;

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&retrieval_method_xpath_signature())
            .expect_err("RetrievalMethod XPath must consume the signature parse budget");

        assert!(
            matches!(
                &error,
                SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                    crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                        resource: "XPath expressions",
                        maximum: 0,
                        actual: 1,
                    }
                )
            ),
            "unexpected error: {error:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_xpath_obeys_expression_byte_limit() {
        // Edge whitespace is semantically harmless for this restricted shape,
        // but its raw untrusted bytes still belong to the operation budget.
        let expression = "ancestor-or-self::ds:X509Data";
        let padded_expression = format!("  {expression}  ");
        let xml = retrieval_method_xpath_signature().replace(expression, &padded_expression);
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_xpath_expression_bytes = expression.len();

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("RetrievalMethod XPath must obey the expression byte limit");

        assert!(
            matches!(
                &error,
                SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                    crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                        resource: "XPath expression bytes",
                        maximum,
                        actual,
                    }
                ) if *maximum == expression.len() && *actual == padded_expression.len()
            ),
            "unexpected error: {error:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_xpath_obeys_expression_complexity_limit() {
        // Recognizing a fixed safe predicate must not bypass the common XPath
        // complexity policy applied to every expression in the signature.
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_xpath_expression_complexity = 0;

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&retrieval_method_xpath_signature())
            .expect_err("RetrievalMethod XPath must obey the complexity limit");

        assert!(
            matches!(
                &error,
                SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                    crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                        resource: "XPath expression complexity",
                        maximum: 0,
                        actual,
                    }
                ) if *actual > 0
            ),
            "unexpected error: {error:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_xpath_uses_node_filter_work_budget() {
        // Attribute and namespace XPath nodes participate in filtering even
        // though the optimized X509Data locator scans only tree descendants.
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_node_set_filter_work = 4;
        let xml = retrieval_method_xpath_signature().replace(
            "<holder Id=\"target\">",
            "<holder Id=\"target\" role=\"signing\" xmlns:metadata=\"urn:metadata\">",
        );

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("RetrievalMethod XPath must consume node-filter work");

        assert!(
            matches!(
                &error,
                SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                    crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                        resource: crate::policy::resource_name::NODE_SET_FILTER_WORK,
                        maximum: 4,
                        actual,
                    }
                ) if *actual > 4
            ),
            "unexpected error: {error:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_xpath_charges_every_context_to_evaluation_work() {
        // The optimized predicate avoids a generic XPath engine, but every
        // attribute and namespace context still consumes evaluation work.
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_xpath_evaluation_work = 4;
        let xml = retrieval_method_xpath_signature().replace(
            "<holder Id=\"target\">",
            "<holder Id=\"target\" role=\"signing\" xmlns:metadata=\"urn:metadata\">",
        );

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("RetrievalMethod XPath must charge every evaluation context");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XPATH_EVALUATION_WORK,
                    maximum: 4,
                    actual,
                }
            ) if actual > 4
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_xpath_obeys_namespace_binding_limit() {
        // The specialized RetrievalMethod path must retain the XPath element's
        // in-scope namespaces and enforce the same limit as ordinary XPath.
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_xpath_namespace_bindings = 0;

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&retrieval_method_xpath_signature())
            .expect_err("RetrievalMethod XPath namespaces must obey the binding limit");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XPATH_NAMESPACE_BINDINGS,
                    maximum: 0,
                    actual,
                }
            ) if actual > 0
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_xpath_obeys_namespace_byte_limit() {
        // Prefix and URI bytes retained from the XPath namespace axis consume
        // the same per-expression byte budget as an ordinary XPath transform.
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_xpath_namespace_bytes = 0;

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&retrieval_method_xpath_signature())
            .expect_err("RetrievalMethod XPath namespaces must obey the byte limit");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XPATH_NAMESPACE_BYTES,
                    maximum: 0,
                    actual,
                }
            ) if actual > 0
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_xpath_obeys_context_evaluation_limit() {
        // A bare fragment includes attribute and namespace XPath nodes in
        // addition to the four tree nodes below. Tree-only accounting would
        // incorrectly admit this input at the configured ceiling.
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_xpath_context_evaluations = 4;
        let xml = retrieval_method_xpath_signature().replace(
            "<holder Id=\"target\">",
            "<holder Id=\"target\" role=\"signing\" xmlns:metadata=\"urn:metadata\">",
        );

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("RetrievalMethod XPath contexts must obey the evaluation limit");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XPATH_CONTEXT_EVALUATIONS,
                    maximum: 4,
                    actual,
                }
            ) if actual > 4
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_materializes_direct_untransformed_x509_data() {
        // A typed RetrievalMethod may point directly at the XML structure it
        // identifies; no transform is needed when X509Data is the URI root.
        let xml = r##"<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
          <ds:KeyInfo><ds:RetrievalMethod URI="#target" Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#X509Data"/></ds:KeyInfo>
          <ds:X509Data Id="target"><ds:X509SubjectName>CN=leaf</ds:X509SubjectName></ds:X509Data>
        </root>"##;
        let document = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let key_info_node = document
            .descendants()
            .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "KeyInfo")))
            .unwrap();
        let mut key_info = parse_key_info(key_info_node).unwrap();

        materialize_retrieval_methods(
            &mut key_info,
            &UriReferenceResolver::new(&document),
            UriTypeSet::SAME_DOCUMENT,
            None,
            crate::provider::default_provider(),
        )
        .expect("a direct X509Data target needs no transform");
        assert!(matches!(
            key_info.sources.as_slice(),
            [super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::X509Data(info)]
                if info.subject_names == ["CN=leaf"]
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_respects_configured_same_document_id_semantics() {
        // RetrievalMethod is another consumer of same-document URIs and must
        // not bypass the grammar selected for normal Reference dereferencing.
        fn materialize(
            uri: &str,
            id: &str,
            semantics: crate::policy::SameDocumentIdSemantics,
        ) -> Result<RetrievalMaterialization, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
            let xml = format!(
                r#"<root xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}">
                  <ds:KeyInfo><ds:RetrievalMethod URI="{uri}" Type="{XMLDSIG_NS}X509Data"/></ds:KeyInfo>
                  <ds:X509Data Id="{id}"><ds:X509SubjectName>CN=leaf</ds:X509SubjectName></ds:X509Data>
                </root>"#
            );
            let document = Document::parse(&xml).unwrap();
            let key_info_node = document
                .descendants()
                .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "KeyInfo")))
                .unwrap();
            let mut key_info = parse_key_info(key_info_node).unwrap();
            let resolver =
                UriReferenceResolver::new(&document).with_same_document_id_semantics(semantics);

            materialize_retrieval_methods(
                &mut key_info,
                &resolver,
                UriTypeSet::SAME_DOCUMENT,
                None,
                crate::provider::default_provider(),
            )
        }

        assert!(
            materialize(
                "#12345",
                "12345",
                crate::policy::SameDocumentIdSemantics::Specification,
            )
            .is_err(),
            "the standards mode must reject a non-NCName bare fragment"
        );
        assert!(
            materialize(
                "#visa'3d",
                "visa'3d",
                crate::policy::SameDocumentIdSemantics::XmlSecBarename,
            )
            .is_err(),
            "the donor barename wrapper cannot represent an apostrophe"
        );
        assert!(
            materialize(
                "#visa'3d",
                "visa'3d",
                crate::policy::SameDocumentIdSemantics::XmlSecVisa3d,
            )
            .is_ok(),
            "Visa3D mode resolves the registered ID without an XPointer literal"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn raw_x509_retrieval_method_uses_inherited_xml_base() {
        // RetrievalMethod URI is an attribute URI reference, so XML Base uses
        // the effective base of the element bearing that attribute.
        const RAW_X509_TYPE: &str = "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rawX509Certificate";
        let xml = format!(
            r#"<root xml:base="https://example.test/keys/nested/" xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}">
                <ds:KeyInfo><ds:RetrievalMethod URI="../signer.der" Type="{RAW_X509_TYPE}"/></ds:KeyInfo>
            </root>"#
        );
        let document = Document::parse(&xml).unwrap();
        let key_info_node = document
            .descendants()
            .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "KeyInfo")))
            .unwrap();
        let mut key_info = parse_key_info(key_info_node).unwrap();
        let certificate = include_bytes!(
            "../../tests/fixtures/xmldsig/merlin-xmldsig-twenty-three/certs/balor.der"
        )
        .to_vec();
        let resources = HashMap::from([(
            "https://example.test/keys/signer.der".to_string(),
            certificate,
        )]);
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document).with_external_resources(&resources);

        materialize_retrieval_methods(
            &mut key_info,
            &resolver,
            UriTypeSet::ALL,
            None,
            crate::provider::default_provider(),
        )
        .expect("RetrievalMethod should resolve against inherited xml:base");

        assert!(matches!(
            key_info.sources.as_slice(),
            [super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::X509Data(info)]
                if info.certificates.len() == 1
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_requires_xpath_for_x509_data_below_uri_root() {
        // Without a transform the dereferenced holder, not its descendant,
        // is the result and therefore cannot masquerade as typed X509Data.
        let xml = r##"<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
          <ds:KeyInfo><ds:RetrievalMethod URI="#target" Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#X509Data"/></ds:KeyInfo>
          <holder Id="target"><ds:X509Data><ds:X509SubjectName>CN=leaf</ds:X509SubjectName></ds:X509Data></holder>
        </root>"##;
        let document = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let key_info_node = document
            .descendants()
            .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "KeyInfo")))
            .unwrap();
        let mut key_info = parse_key_info(key_info_node).unwrap();

        let error = materialize_retrieval_methods(
            &mut key_info,
            &UriReferenceResolver::new(&document),
            UriTypeSet::SAME_DOCUMENT,
            None,
            crate::provider::default_provider(),
        )
        .expect_err("a wrapper target requires an explicit selection transform");
        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "untransformed X509Data RetrievalMethod must target X509Data directly"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_rejects_target_inside_external_x509_data_ancestor() {
        // XPath filtering cannot add an ancestor that was outside the URI's
        // dereferenced node-set, so this result is not rooted at X509Data.
        let xml = r##"<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
          <ds:KeyInfo><ds:RetrievalMethod URI="#target" Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#X509Data"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xpath-19991116"><ds:XPath>ancestor-or-self::ds:X509Data</ds:XPath></ds:Transform></ds:Transforms></ds:RetrievalMethod></ds:KeyInfo>
          <ds:X509Data><ds:X509SubjectName Id="target">CN=leaf</ds:X509SubjectName></ds:X509Data>
        </root>"##;
        let document = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let key_info_node = document
            .descendants()
            .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "KeyInfo")))
            .unwrap();
        let mut key_info = parse_key_info(key_info_node).unwrap();

        let error = materialize_retrieval_methods(
            &mut key_info,
            &UriReferenceResolver::new(&document),
            UriTypeSet::SAME_DOCUMENT,
            None,
            crate::provider::default_provider(),
        )
        .expect_err("filter output without an X509Data root must be rejected");
        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "X509Data RetrievalMethod selected no X509Data element"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_rejects_ambiguous_x509_data_relation() {
        // A transformed result with multiple X509Data roots is not one KeyInfo child.
        let xml = r##"<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
          <ds:KeyInfo><ds:RetrievalMethod URI="#target" Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#X509Data"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xpath-19991116"><ds:XPath>ancestor-or-self::ds:X509Data</ds:XPath></ds:Transform></ds:Transforms></ds:RetrievalMethod></ds:KeyInfo>
          <holder Id="target"><ds:X509Data/><ds:X509Data/></holder>
        </root>"##;
        let document = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let key_info_node = document
            .descendants()
            .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "KeyInfo")))
            .unwrap();
        let mut key_info = parse_key_info(key_info_node).unwrap();

        let error = materialize_retrieval_methods(
            &mut key_info,
            &UriReferenceResolver::new(&document),
            UriTypeSet::SAME_DOCUMENT,
            None,
            crate::provider::default_provider(),
        )
        .expect_err("multiple transformed X509Data roots must be rejected");
        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "X509Data RetrievalMethod selected multiple X509Data elements"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_materialization_preserves_key_info_order() {
        // Replacing the source in place keeps a later fallback behind the
        // retrieved key material for first-match resolvers.
        let xml = r##"<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
          <ds:KeyInfo>
            <ds:RetrievalMethod URI="#target" Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#X509Data"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xpath-19991116"><ds:XPath>ancestor-or-self::ds:X509Data</ds:XPath></ds:Transform></ds:Transforms></ds:RetrievalMethod>
            <ds:KeyName>fallback</ds:KeyName>
          </ds:KeyInfo>
          <holder Id="target"><ds:X509Data><ds:X509SubjectName>CN=leaf</ds:X509SubjectName></ds:X509Data></holder>
        </root>"##;
        let document = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let key_info_node = document
            .descendants()
            .find(|node| node.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "KeyInfo")))
            .unwrap();
        let mut key_info = parse_key_info(key_info_node).unwrap();

        materialize_retrieval_methods(
            &mut key_info,
            &UriReferenceResolver::new(&document),
            UriTypeSet::SAME_DOCUMENT,
            None,
            crate::provider::default_provider(),
        )
        .unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            key_info.sources.as_slice(),
            [
                super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::X509Data(_),
                super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyName(name)
            ] if name == "fallback"
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_materialization_bounds_repeated_sources() {
        // Repeating one allowed certificate must not multiply parsing and clones
        // before SignatureValue validation.
        const RAW_X509_TYPE: &str = "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rawX509Certificate";
        let certificate = include_bytes!(
            "../../tests/fixtures/xmldsig/merlin-xmldsig-twenty-three/certs/balor.der"
        )
        .to_vec();
        let resources = HashMap::from([("urn:certificate".to_string(), certificate)]);
        let mut key_info = KeyInfo {
            sources: (0..=64)
                .map(|_| super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::RetrievalMethod {
                    uri: "urn:certificate".into(),
                    resource_type: Some(RAW_X509_TYPE.into()),
                    transforms: RetrievalMethodTransforms::None,
                })
                .collect(),
        };
        let document = Document::parse("<root/>").unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document).with_external_resources(&resources);

        let error = materialize_retrieval_methods(
            &mut key_info,
            &resolver,
            UriTypeSet::ALL,
            None,
            crate::provider::default_provider(),
        )
        .expect_err("retrieval count must be bounded before materialization");
        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "KeyInfo contains too many RetrievalMethod elements"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn key_info_reference_materializes_an_allowed_empty_uri() {
        // Empty URI is a same-document Reference URI. Element-valued
        // KeyInfoReference dereferencing therefore selects a KeyInfo document
        // element rather than consulting the external-resource map.
        let document = XmlDocument::parse(format!(
            r#"<ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}"><ds:KeyName>root-key</ds:KeyName></ds:KeyInfo>"#
        ))
        .unwrap();
        let mut key_info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyInfoReference {
                uri: String::new(),
            }],
        };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.key_sources.key_info_reference = true;
        let mut xpath_parse_budget = XPathSignatureParseBudget::default();
        let execution_budget = TransformExecutionBudget::from_resources(&policy.resources);
        let mut budgets = RetrievalMaterializationBudgets {
            xpath_parse: &mut xpath_parse_budget,
            execution: &execution_budget,
            resources: &policy.resources,
            certificate_signature_algorithms: policy
                .key_trust
                .certificate_signature_algorithms
                .as_ref(),
            xml_backend: crate::XmlBackend::default(),
        };
        let mut materialization = KeyInfoMaterializationState::default();

        document
            .with_view(|view| {
                materialize_key_info_references_with_budgets(
                    &mut key_info,
                    &UriReferenceResolver::with_document_view(view, &[]),
                    &policy,
                    crate::provider::default_provider(),
                    &mut budgets,
                    &mut materialization,
                )?;
                Ok::<_, SignatureVerificationPipelineError>(())
            })
            .unwrap();

        assert!(matches!(
            key_info.sources.as_slice(),
            [super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyName(name)] if name == "root-key"
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn empty_key_info_reference_participates_in_cycle_detection() {
        // Empty URI resolves to the owning document's root KeyInfo. It must
        // recurse through the same traversal state rather than leave the
        // self-reference materialized and bypass cycle/depth enforcement.
        let document = XmlDocument::parse(format!(
            r#"<ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}" xmlns:dsig11="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#"><dsig11:KeyInfoReference URI=""/></ds:KeyInfo>"#
        ))
        .unwrap();
        let mut key_info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyInfoReference {
                uri: String::new(),
            }],
        };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.key_sources.key_info_reference = true;
        let mut xpath_parse_budget = XPathSignatureParseBudget::default();
        let execution_budget = TransformExecutionBudget::from_resources(&policy.resources);
        let mut budgets = RetrievalMaterializationBudgets {
            xpath_parse: &mut xpath_parse_budget,
            execution: &execution_budget,
            resources: &policy.resources,
            certificate_signature_algorithms: policy
                .key_trust
                .certificate_signature_algorithms
                .as_ref(),
            xml_backend: crate::XmlBackend::default(),
        };
        let mut materialization = KeyInfoMaterializationState::default();

        let error = document
            .with_view(|view| {
                materialize_key_info_references_with_budgets(
                    &mut key_info,
                    &UriReferenceResolver::with_document_view(view, &[]),
                    &policy,
                    crate::provider::default_provider(),
                    &mut budgets,
                    &mut materialization,
                )
            })
            .expect_err("empty-URI self-reference must be rejected as a cycle");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "KeyInfoReference cycle detected"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn key_info_materialization_shares_candidate_work_across_source_kinds() {
        // The reference, nested RetrievalMethod, and resulting certificate are
        // three units of materialization work in one operation.
        const RAW_X509_TYPE: &str = "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rawX509Certificate";
        let document = XmlDocument::parse(format!(
            r##"<root xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}" xmlns:dsig11="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#"><ds:KeyInfo ID="target"><ds:RetrievalMethod URI="signer.der" Type="{RAW_X509_TYPE}"/></ds:KeyInfo></root>"##
        ))
        .unwrap();
        let certificate = include_bytes!(
            "../../tests/fixtures/xmldsig/merlin-xmldsig-twenty-three/certs/balor.der"
        )
        .to_vec();
        let resources = HashMap::from([("signer.der".to_owned(), certificate)]);
        let mut key_info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyInfoReference {
                uri: "#target".into(),
            }],
        };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.key_sources.key_info_reference = true;
        policy.uris.retrieval_methods = UriTypeSet::ALL;
        policy.resources.max_key_candidates = 2;
        let mut xpath_parse_budget = XPathSignatureParseBudget::default();
        let execution_budget = TransformExecutionBudget::from_resources(&policy.resources);
        let mut budgets = RetrievalMaterializationBudgets {
            xpath_parse: &mut xpath_parse_budget,
            execution: &execution_budget,
            resources: &policy.resources,
            certificate_signature_algorithms: policy
                .key_trust
                .certificate_signature_algorithms
                .as_ref(),
            xml_backend: crate::XmlBackend::default(),
        };
        let mut materialization = KeyInfoMaterializationState::default();

        let error = document
            .with_view(|view| {
                let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::with_document_view(view, &[])
                    .with_external_resources(&resources);
                let mut outcome = materialize_key_info_references_with_budgets(
                    &mut key_info,
                    &resolver,
                    &policy,
                    crate::provider::default_provider(),
                    &mut budgets,
                    &mut materialization,
                )?;
                outcome.merge(materialize_retrieval_methods_with_budgets(
                    &mut key_info,
                    &resolver,
                    policy.uris.retrieval_methods,
                    policy.transforms.allowed_algorithms.as_ref(),
                    crate::provider::default_provider(),
                    &mut budgets,
                    &mut materialization.candidate_work,
                )?);
                Ok::<_, DsigError>(outcome)
            })
            .expect_err("all materializers must share the candidate-work limit");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            DsigError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
                maximum: 2,
                actual: 3,
            })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn public_key_info_materialization_binds_external_resource_policy() {
        // Public helpers must not inherit the resolver's permissive hard-limit
        // budget when the operation policy selects a stricter byte ceiling.
        let document = Document::parse("<root/>").unwrap();
        let external = format!(
            r#"<ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}"><ds:KeyName>external</ds:KeyName></ds:KeyInfo>"#
        );
        let resources = HashMap::from([("key.xml".to_owned(), external.into_bytes())]);
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document).with_external_resources(&resources);
        let mut key_info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyInfoReference {
                uri: "key.xml".into(),
            }],
        };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.key_sources.key_info_reference = true;
        policy.uris.key_info_references = UriTypeSet::ALL;
        policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes = 0;

        let error = materialize_verification_key_info_references(
            &mut key_info,
            resolver,
            &policy,
            crate::provider::default_provider(),
            crate::XmlBackend::default(),
        )
        .expect_err("policy must reject non-empty external KeyInfo bytes");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            DsigError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                resource: crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                maximum: 0,
                actual,
            }) if actual == resources["key.xml"].len()
        ));
    }

    #[cfg(all(feature = "xml-backend-roxmltree", feature = "xml-backend-xmloxide"))]
    #[test]
    fn public_key_info_materialization_uses_the_selected_backend() {
        // Public materialization is a standalone parse boundary. Its backend
        // must be caller-selected just like the complete sign/verify pipeline.
        let external = format!(
            r#"<ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}"><ds:KeyName>external</ds:KeyName></ds:KeyInfo>"#
        );
        let resources = HashMap::from([("key.xml".to_owned(), external.into_bytes())]);
        let document = Document::parse("<root/>").unwrap();

        for backend in [crate::XmlBackend::Xmloxide, crate::XmlBackend::Roxmltree] {
            let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document).with_external_resources(&resources);
            let mut key_info = KeyInfo {
                sources: vec![super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyInfoReference {
                    uri: "key.xml".into(),
                }],
            };
            let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
            policy.key_sources.key_info_reference = true;
            policy.uris.key_info_references = UriTypeSet::ALL;

            materialize_verification_key_info_references(
                &mut key_info,
                resolver,
                &policy,
                crate::provider::default_provider(),
                backend,
            )
            .unwrap_or_else(|error| panic!("{backend:?} materialization failed: {error}"));

            assert!(matches!(
                key_info.sources.as_slice(),
                [super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyName(name)] if name == "external"
            ));
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn public_key_info_materialization_defers_nested_retrieval_failure() {
        // Metadata expansion must preserve an earlier usable source when a
        // later retrieval candidate fails. The complete operation reports the
        // deferred error only if key selection exhausts all usable sources.
        const RAW_X509_TYPE: &str = "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rawX509Certificate";
        let external = format!(
            r#"<ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}"><ds:KeyName>usable</ds:KeyName><ds:RetrievalMethod URI="missing.der" Type="{RAW_X509_TYPE}"/></ds:KeyInfo>"#
        );
        let resources = HashMap::from([("key.xml".to_owned(), external.into_bytes())]);
        let document = Document::parse("<root/>").unwrap();

        for operation in ["signing", "verification"] {
            let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document).with_external_resources(&resources);
            let mut key_info = KeyInfo {
                sources: vec![super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyInfoReference {
                    uri: "key.xml".into(),
                }],
            };
            match operation {
                "signing" => {
                    let mut policy = crate::policy::SigningPolicy::default();
                    policy.uris.key_info_references = UriTypeSet::ALL;
                    policy.uris.retrieval_methods = UriTypeSet::ALL;
                    materialize_signing_key_info_references(
                        &mut key_info,
                        resolver,
                        &policy,
                        crate::provider::default_provider(),
                        crate::XmlBackend::default(),
                    )
                }
                "verification" => {
                    let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
                    policy.key_sources.key_info_reference = true;
                    policy.uris.key_info_references = UriTypeSet::ALL;
                    policy.uris.retrieval_methods = UriTypeSet::ALL;
                    materialize_verification_key_info_references(
                        &mut key_info,
                        resolver,
                        &policy,
                        crate::provider::default_provider(),
                        crate::XmlBackend::default(),
                    )
                }
                _ => unreachable!(),
            }
            .unwrap_or_else(|error| panic!("{operation} materialization failed: {error}"));

            assert!(matches!(
                key_info.sources.as_slice(),
                [super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyName(name)] if name == "usable"
            ));
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn public_key_info_materialization_binds_xpath_policy() {
        // Both public helpers must carry the caller's XPath parse limits into
        // RetrievalMethod transforms nested in an external KeyInfo document.
        let external = format!(
            r##"<ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}">
                <ds:RetrievalMethod URI="#target" Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#X509Data">
                    <ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="{XPATH_TRANSFORM_URI}">
                        <ds:XPath>ancestor-or-self::ds:X509Data</ds:XPath>
                    </ds:Transform></ds:Transforms>
                </ds:RetrievalMethod>
                <ds:X509Data Id="target"><ds:X509SubjectName>CN=leaf</ds:X509SubjectName></ds:X509Data>
            </ds:KeyInfo>"##
        );
        let resources = HashMap::from([("key.xml".to_owned(), external.into_bytes())]);
        let document = Document::parse("<root/>").unwrap();

        for operation in ["signing", "verification"] {
            let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document).with_external_resources(&resources);
            let mut key_info = KeyInfo {
                sources: vec![super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyInfoReference {
                    uri: "key.xml".into(),
                }],
            };
            let error = match operation {
                "signing" => {
                    let mut policy = crate::policy::SigningPolicy::default();
                    policy.uris.key_info_references = UriTypeSet::ALL;
                    policy.resources.max_xpath_expressions = 0;
                    materialize_signing_key_info_references(
                        &mut key_info,
                        resolver,
                        &policy,
                        crate::provider::default_provider(),
                        crate::XmlBackend::default(),
                    )
                }
                "verification" => {
                    let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
                    policy.key_sources.key_info_reference = true;
                    policy.uris.key_info_references = UriTypeSet::ALL;
                    policy.resources.max_xpath_expressions = 0;
                    materialize_verification_key_info_references(
                        &mut key_info,
                        resolver,
                        &policy,
                        crate::provider::default_provider(),
                        crate::XmlBackend::default(),
                    )
                }
                _ => unreachable!(),
            }
            .expect_err("the public helper must enforce the supplied XPath expression limit");

            assert!(
                matches!(
                    error,
                    DsigError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                        resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XPATH_EXPRESSIONS,
                        maximum: 0,
                        actual: 1,
                    })
                ),
                "unexpected {operation} error: {error:?}"
            );
        }
    }

    fn materialize_external_key_info_chain(
        terminal_reference: &str,
    ) -> Result<KeyInfo, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
        let a = format!(
            r##"<doc xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}" xmlns:dsig11="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#">
                <ds:KeyInfo ID="root"><dsig11:KeyInfoReference URI="#next"/></ds:KeyInfo>
                <ds:KeyInfo ID="next"><dsig11:KeyInfoReference URI="b.xml#root"/></ds:KeyInfo>
            </doc>"##
        );
        let b = format!(
            r##"<doc xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}" xmlns:dsig11="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#">
                <ds:KeyInfo ID="root"><dsig11:KeyInfoReference URI="#next"/></ds:KeyInfo>
                <ds:KeyInfo ID="next">{terminal_reference}</ds:KeyInfo>
            </doc>"##
        );
        let resources = HashMap::from([
            ("a.xml".to_owned(), a.into_bytes()),
            ("b.xml".to_owned(), b.into_bytes()),
        ]);
        let document = XmlDocument::parse("<root/>").unwrap();
        let mut key_info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyInfoReference {
                uri: "a.xml#root".into(),
            }],
        };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.key_sources.key_info_reference = true;
        policy.uris.key_info_references = UriTypeSet::ALL;
        let mut xpath_parse_budget = XPathSignatureParseBudget::default();
        let execution_budget = TransformExecutionBudget::from_resources(&policy.resources);
        let mut budgets = RetrievalMaterializationBudgets {
            xpath_parse: &mut xpath_parse_budget,
            execution: &execution_budget,
            resources: &policy.resources,
            certificate_signature_algorithms: policy
                .key_trust
                .certificate_signature_algorithms
                .as_ref(),
            xml_backend: crate::XmlBackend::default(),
        };
        let mut materialization = KeyInfoMaterializationState::default();

        document.with_view(|view| {
            let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::with_document_view(view, &[])
                .with_external_resources(&resources);
            materialize_key_info_references_with_budgets(
                &mut key_info,
                &resolver,
                &policy,
                crate::provider::default_provider(),
                &mut budgets,
                &mut materialization,
            )?;
            Ok::<_, SignatureVerificationPipelineError>(())
        })?;
        Ok(key_info)
    }

    fn materialize_external_key_info_bytes_with_limit(
        encoded: Vec<u8>,
        maximum_document_bytes: usize,
    ) -> Result<KeyInfo, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
        let resources = HashMap::from([("key.xml".to_owned(), encoded)]);
        let document = XmlDocument::parse("<root/>").unwrap();
        let mut key_info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyInfoReference {
                uri: "key.xml".into(),
            }],
        };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.key_sources.key_info_reference = true;
        policy.uris.key_info_references = UriTypeSet::ALL;
        policy.resources.max_xml_document_bytes = maximum_document_bytes;
        let mut xpath_parse_budget = XPathSignatureParseBudget::default();
        let execution_budget = TransformExecutionBudget::from_resources(&policy.resources);
        let mut budgets = RetrievalMaterializationBudgets {
            xpath_parse: &mut xpath_parse_budget,
            execution: &execution_budget,
            resources: &policy.resources,
            certificate_signature_algorithms: policy
                .key_trust
                .certificate_signature_algorithms
                .as_ref(),
            xml_backend: crate::XmlBackend::default(),
        };
        let mut materialization = KeyInfoMaterializationState::default();

        document.with_view(|view| {
            let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::with_document_view(view, &[])
                .with_external_resources(&resources);
            materialize_key_info_references_with_budgets(
                &mut key_info,
                &resolver,
                &policy,
                crate::provider::default_provider(),
                &mut budgets,
                &mut materialization,
            )?;
            Ok::<_, SignatureVerificationPipelineError>(())
        })?;
        Ok(key_info)
    }

    fn materialize_external_key_info_bytes(
        encoded: Vec<u8>,
    ) -> Result<KeyInfo, SignatureVerificationPipelineError> {
        materialize_external_key_info_bytes_with_limit(
            encoded,
            crate::hard_limits::XML_DOCUMENT_BYTE_CEILING,
        )
    }

    #[test]
    fn external_key_info_reference_decodes_utf16_xml_octets() {
        // External XML follows the XML encoding declaration/BOM contract, not
        // the UTF-8-only contract of Rust strings passed by direct callers.
        let xml = format!(
            r#"<ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="{XMLDSIG_NS}"><ds:KeyName>utf16-key</ds:KeyName></ds:KeyInfo>"#
        );
        let mut encoded = vec![0xff, 0xfe];
        encoded.extend(xml.encode_utf16().flat_map(u16::to_le_bytes));
        let key_info = materialize_external_key_info_bytes(encoded)
            .expect("UTF-16 external KeyInfo must materialize");
        assert!(matches!(
            key_info.sources.as_slice(),
            [super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyName(name)] if name == "utf16-key"
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn external_key_info_reference_rejects_malformed_xml_encoding() {
        // A BOM selecting UTF-16 must not permit a truncated code unit to reach
        // the XML parser under a misleading structural diagnostic.
        let error = materialize_external_key_info_bytes(vec![0xff, 0xfe, b'<'])
            .expect_err("truncated UTF-16 must be rejected during octet decoding");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "KeyInfoReference external resource has an invalid XML encoding"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn external_key_info_reference_preserves_decoded_document_limit() {
        // Decoding can expand a compact single-byte resource beyond the XML document policy.
        // That is a typed policy failure, not malformed KeyInfo structure.
        let encoded = b"<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"ISO-8859-1\"?><ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\"><ds:KeyName>\xe9\xe9</ds:KeyName></ds:KeyInfo>".to_vec();
        let maximum = encoded.len();
        let error = materialize_external_key_info_bytes_with_limit(encoded, maximum)
            .expect_err("decoded XML expansion must retain resource-limit classification");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XML_DOCUMENT,
                    maximum: observed_maximum,
                    actual,
                }
            ) if observed_maximum == maximum && actual > maximum
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn key_info_reference_cycle_identity_includes_the_owning_resource() {
        // Equal fragment spellings in separate external documents are distinct
        // references and must not be rejected as a recursive cycle.
        let key_info = materialize_external_key_info_chain("<ds:KeyName>terminal</ds:KeyName>")
            .expect("cross-document duplicate fragments must materialize");
        assert!(matches!(
            key_info.sources.as_slice(),
            [super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyName(name)] if name == "terminal"
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn key_info_reference_cycle_identity_survives_external_reparse() {
        // Returning to the same external resource must remain a cycle even
        // though each dereference creates a fresh owned XML document.
        let error =
            materialize_external_key_info_chain("<dsig11:KeyInfoReference URI=\"a.xml#root\"/>")
                .expect_err("a resource cycle must fail before exhausting depth");
        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "KeyInfoReference cycle detected"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_materialization_deduplicates_within_count_limit() {
        // Repeated references to the same raw certificate produce one parsed
        // key source rather than one certificate clone per XML element.
        const RAW_X509_TYPE: &str = "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rawX509Certificate";
        let certificate = include_bytes!(
            "../../tests/fixtures/xmldsig/merlin-xmldsig-twenty-three/certs/balor.der"
        )
        .to_vec();
        let resources = HashMap::from([("urn:certificate".to_string(), certificate)]);
        let mut key_info = KeyInfo {
            sources: (0..MAX_RETRIEVAL_METHOD_COUNT)
                .map(|_| super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::RetrievalMethod {
                    uri: "urn:certificate".into(),
                    resource_type: Some(RAW_X509_TYPE.into()),
                    transforms: RetrievalMethodTransforms::None,
                })
                .collect(),
        };
        let document = Document::parse("<root/>").unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document).with_external_resources(&resources);

        materialize_retrieval_methods(
            &mut key_info,
            &resolver,
            UriTypeSet::ALL,
            None,
            crate::provider::default_provider(),
        )
        .unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            key_info.sources.as_slice(),
            [super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::X509Data(info)]
                if info.certificates.len() == 1
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn retrieval_method_candidate_budget_includes_embedded_key_values() {
        // A previously parsed KeyValue consumes the sole candidate slot, so
        // malformed retrieved DER must be rejected by policy before X.509 parsing.
        const RAW_X509_TYPE: &str = "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rawX509Certificate";
        let resources = HashMap::from([("urn:certificate".to_string(), vec![1, 2, 3])]);
        let mut key_info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![
                super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::KeyValue(
                    super::super::parse::KeyValueInfo::Unsupported {
                        namespace: Some(XMLDSIG_NS.into()),
                        local_name: "FutureKeyValue".into(),
                    },
                ),
                super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::RetrievalMethod {
                    uri: "urn:certificate".into(),
                    resource_type: Some(RAW_X509_TYPE.into()),
                    transforms: RetrievalMethodTransforms::None,
                },
            ],
        };
        let document = Document::parse("<root/>").unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document).with_external_resources(&resources);
        let mut xpath_parse_budget = XPathSignatureParseBudget::default();
        let execution_budget = TransformExecutionBudget::default();
        let resource_policy = crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_candidates: 1,
            ..crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        let mut budgets = RetrievalMaterializationBudgets {
            xpath_parse: &mut xpath_parse_budget,
            execution: &execution_budget,
            resources: &resource_policy,
            certificate_signature_algorithms: None,
            xml_backend: crate::XmlBackend::default(),
        };
        let mut candidate_work = key_info.embedded_candidate_count();

        let error = materialize_retrieval_methods_with_budgets(
            &mut key_info,
            &resolver,
            UriTypeSet::ALL,
            None,
            crate::provider::default_provider(),
            &mut budgets,
            &mut candidate_work,
        )
        .expect_err("the retrieved certificate must exceed the aggregate candidate limit");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
                    maximum: 1,
                    actual: 2,
                }
            )
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn raw_x509_retrieval_rejects_empty_same_document_uri() {
        // rawX509Certificate consumes external DER octets; an empty URI denotes
        // the XML document and must never become a key into the external map.
        const RAW_X509_TYPE: &str = "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rawX509Certificate";
        let certificate = include_bytes!(
            "../../tests/fixtures/xmldsig/merlin-xmldsig-twenty-three/certs/balor.der"
        )
        .to_vec();
        let resources = HashMap::from([(String::new(), certificate)]);
        let mut key_info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![super::super::parse::KeyInfoSource::RetrievalMethod {
                uri: String::new(),
                resource_type: Some(RAW_X509_TYPE.into()),
                transforms: RetrievalMethodTransforms::None,
            }],
        };
        let document = Document::parse("<root/>").unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document).with_external_resources(&resources);

        let error = materialize_retrieval_methods(
            &mut key_info,
            &resolver,
            UriTypeSet::ALL,
            None,
            crate::provider::default_provider(),
        )
        .expect_err("empty URI must retain same-document semantics");
        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "raw X509 RetrievalMethod requires an untransformed external URI"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_does_not_hide_malformed_digest_behind_unsupported_transform() {
        // A bad DigestValue remains a parse error even when its transform URI is unsupported.
        let broken_xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |xml| {
            let xml = xml.replacen(
                "<ds:Reference URI=\"#target\">",
                "<ds:Reference URI=\"#target\"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm=\"urn:unsupported\"/></ds:Transforms>",
                1,
            );
            replace_fixture_manifest_digest(&xml, "!!!")
        });

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&broken_xml)
            .expect_err("malformed Manifest digest must not become a validity result");
        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::ParseManifestReference(_)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_rejects_manifest_non_whitespace_mixed_content() {
        // Authenticated mixed content is still structurally invalid under the
        // Manifest element-only grammar.
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |xml| {
            xml.replacen(
                "<ds:Manifest ID=\"manifest\">",
                "<ds:Manifest ID=\"manifest\">junk",
                1,
            )
        });

        let err = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("Manifest mixed content must fail verification");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "Manifest contains non-whitespace mixed content"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_rejects_empty_manifest_children() {
        // An authenticated empty Manifest violates the required Reference+
        // content model rather than disappearing as an unsigned block.
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml_with_manifest_mutation(true, |xml| {
            let (prefix, rest) = xml
                .split_once("<ds:Manifest ID=\"manifest\">")
                .expect("fixture should contain Manifest");
            let (_, suffix) = rest
                .split_once("</ds:Manifest>")
                .expect("fixture should contain closing Manifest");
            format!("{prefix}<ds:Manifest ID=\"manifest\"></ds:Manifest>{suffix}")
        });

        let err = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("empty Manifest must fail verification");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "Manifest must contain at least one ds:Reference element child"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_ignores_unsigned_malformed_manifest_blocks() {
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml(true).replacen(
            "</ds:Object>",
            "</ds:Object><ds:Object><ds:Manifest>junk<ds:Foo/></ds:Manifest></ds:Object>",
            1,
        );
        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("unsigned malformed Manifest must be ignored");
        assert_eq!(
            result.manifest_references.len(),
            1,
            "only signed Manifest references must be reported",
        );
        assert!(matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_skips_ambiguous_manifest_id_blocks() {
        let xml = signature_with_manifest_xml(true).replacen(
            "</ds:Object>",
            "</ds:Object><ds:Object><ds:Manifest ID=\"manifest\">junk<ds:Foo/></ds:Manifest></ds:Object>",
            1,
        );
        let err = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .process_manifests(true)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("ambiguous manifest IDs should make SignedInfo #manifest dereference fail");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Reference(
                ReferenceProcessingError::UriDereference(
                    crate::xmldsig::types::TransformError::ElementNotFound(id)
                )
            ) if id == "manifest"
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_rejects_implicit_default_c14n_when_not_allowlisted() {
        let xml = minimal_signature_xml("", "");
        let err = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .allowed_transforms(["http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"])
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("implicit default C14N must be checked against allowlist");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::Algorithm {
                operation: "verification transform",
                ..
            })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_skips_resolver_when_reference_processing_fails() {
        let xml = minimal_signature_xml("", "");
        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key_resolver(&PanicResolver)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("reference digest mismatch should short-circuit before resolver");
        assert!(matches!(
            result.status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferenceDigestMismatch { ref_index: 0 })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_leaves_fail_fast_reference_tail_unexecuted() {
        // A mismatch on the first Reference must not produce graph evidence for
        // the second Reference, which was never dereferenced or digested.
        let second_reference = r#"
    <ds:Reference URI="">
      <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
      <ds:DigestValue>AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=</ds:DigestValue>
    </ds:Reference>"#;
        let xml = minimal_signature_xml("", "").replacen(
            "  </ds:SignedInfo>",
            &format!("{second_reference}\n  </ds:SignedInfo>"),
            1,
        );

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("digest mismatch must remain a verification result");

        assert_eq!(result.signed_info_references.len(), 1);
        assert!(matches!(
            result.signed_info_references[0].status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferenceDigestMismatch { ref_index: 0 })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_reports_key_not_found_when_resolver_misses() {
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==");
        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key_resolver(&MissingKeyResolver)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("resolver miss should report status, not pipeline error");
        assert!(matches!(
            result.status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::KeyNotFound)
        ));
        assert_eq!(
            result.signed_info_references.len(),
            1,
            "KeyNotFound path must preserve SignedInfo reference diagnostics",
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            result.signed_info_references[0].status,
            DsigStatus::Valid
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verification_candidate_budget_covers_preset_and_custom_resolver_paths() {
        // Zero is a valid deny-all ceiling. Neither an already-resolved key nor
        // a custom resolver may bypass the operation-wide candidate policy.
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==");
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_key_candidates = 0;

        let preset_error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .policy(policy.clone())
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("a preset key consumes one candidate");
        assert!(matches!(
            preset_error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
                    maximum: 0,
                    actual: 1,
                }
            )
        ));

        let resolver_error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key_resolver(&PanicResolver)
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("a custom resolver requires candidate capacity before dispatch");
        assert!(matches!(
            resolver_error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
                    maximum: 0,
                    actual: 1,
                }
            )
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verification_candidate_budget_precedes_embedded_x509_parsing() {
        // The first certificate is valid and consumes the sole permitted slot;
        // malformed bytes in the second must never reach the X.509 parser.
        let first_certificate = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(include_bytes!(
            "../../tests/fixtures/xmldsig/phaos-xmldsig-three/certs/rsa-cert.der"
        ));
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==").replace(
            "</ds:SignatureValue>\n  </ds:Signature>",
            &format!(
                "</ds:SignatureValue>\n    <ds:KeyInfo><ds:X509Data><ds:X509Certificate>{first_certificate}</ds:X509Certificate><ds:X509Certificate>AQID</ds:X509Certificate></ds:X509Data></ds:KeyInfo>\n  </ds:Signature>"
            ),
        );
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_key_candidates = 1;

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("candidate policy must run before embedded certificate parsing");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
                    maximum: 1,
                    actual: 2,
                }
            )
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_resolver_can_ignore_malformed_keyinfo_by_default() {
        let base_xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==");
        let xml = base_xml
            .replace(
                r#"<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">"#,
                r#"<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:dsig11="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#">"#,
            )
            .replace(
                "</ds:SignatureValue>\n  </ds:Signature>",
                "</ds:SignatureValue>\n    <ds:KeyInfo><dsig11:DEREncodedKeyValue>%%%invalid%%%</dsig11:DEREncodedKeyValue></ds:KeyInfo>\n  </ds:Signature>",
            );

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key_resolver(&MissingKeyResolver)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("resolver path should not hard-fail on advisory malformed KeyInfo by default");
        assert!(matches!(
            result.status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::KeyNotFound)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_resolver_can_opt_in_to_keyinfo_parse_failures() {
        let base_xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==");
        let xml = base_xml
            .replace(
                r#"<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">"#,
                r#"<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:dsig11="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#">"#,
            )
            .replace(
                "</ds:SignatureValue>\n  </ds:Signature>",
                "</ds:SignatureValue>\n    <ds:KeyInfo><dsig11:DEREncodedKeyValue>%%%invalid%%%</dsig11:DEREncodedKeyValue></ds:KeyInfo>\n  </ds:Signature>",
            );

        let err = VerifyContext::new()
            .key_resolver(&ConsumingKeyInfoResolver)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("resolver opted into KeyInfo parsing, malformed KeyInfo must fail");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::ParseKeyInfo(_)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_ignores_unsupported_retrieval_before_valid_key_source() {
        // An advisory vendor RetrievalMethod cannot prevent the resolver from
        // reaching a later supported source in document order.
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==").replace(
            "</ds:SignatureValue>\n  </ds:Signature>",
            r##"</ds:SignatureValue>
    <ds:KeyInfo>
      <ds:RetrievalMethod URI="#vendor" Type="urn:vendor:key">
        <ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="urn:vendor:transform"/></ds:Transforms>
      </ds:RetrievalMethod>
      <ds:KeyName>fallback</ds:KeyName>
    </ds:KeyInfo>
  </ds:Signature>"##,
        );

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key_resolver(&FallbackKeyInfoResolver)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("unsupported advisory retrieval must not abort key resolution");
        assert_eq!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid);
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_does_not_eagerly_fail_unused_retrieval_fallback() {
        // KeyInfo sources are alternatives in document order. Once an earlier
        // source resolves, a missing later RetrievalMethod is irrelevant.
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==").replace(
            "</ds:SignatureValue>\n  </ds:Signature>",
            r#"</ds:SignatureValue>
    <ds:KeyInfo>
      <ds:KeyName>primary</ds:KeyName>
      <ds:RetrievalMethod URI="missing.der" Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rawX509Certificate"/>
    </ds:KeyInfo>
  </ds:Signature>"#,
        );

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key_resolver(&EarlyKeyInfoResolver)
            .allowed_retrieval_method_uri_types(UriTypeSet::new(true, true, true))
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("an unused missing retrieval fallback must not abort verification");

        assert_eq!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid);
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_does_not_eagerly_fail_unused_same_document_x509_retrieval() {
        // Same-document X509Data retrieval is an ordered alternative just like
        // raw-certificate retrieval; a resolved earlier source makes it unused.
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==").replace(
            "</ds:SignatureValue>\n  </ds:Signature>",
            r##"</ds:SignatureValue>
    <ds:KeyInfo>
      <ds:KeyName>primary</ds:KeyName>
      <ds:RetrievalMethod URI="#missing" Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#X509Data"/>
    </ds:KeyInfo>
  </ds:Signature>"##,
        );

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key_resolver(&EarlyKeyInfoResolver)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("an unused missing X509Data retrieval fallback must not abort verification");

        assert_eq!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid);
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_reports_missing_same_document_x509_retrieval_without_fallback() {
        // Deferred failures retain their exact diagnostic when no alternative
        // source resolves the verification key.
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==").replace(
            "</ds:SignatureValue>\n  </ds:Signature>",
            r##"</ds:SignatureValue>
    <ds:KeyInfo>
      <ds:RetrievalMethod URI="#missing" Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#X509Data"/>
    </ds:KeyInfo>
  </ds:Signature>"##,
        );

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key_resolver(&ConsumingKeyInfoResolver)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("a sole missing X509Data retrieval must remain an explicit error");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "X509Data RetrievalMethod target is missing or ambiguous"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_does_not_eagerly_parse_unused_retrieval_fallback() {
        // Materialization must preserve ordered fallback semantics even when
        // caller-supplied bytes exist but are not a certificate.
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==").replace(
            "</ds:SignatureValue>\n  </ds:Signature>",
            r#"</ds:SignatureValue>
    <ds:KeyInfo>
      <ds:KeyName>primary</ds:KeyName>
      <ds:RetrievalMethod URI="malformed.der" Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rawX509Certificate"/>
    </ds:KeyInfo>
  </ds:Signature>"#,
        );
        let resources = HashMap::from([("malformed.der".to_string(), b"not DER".to_vec())]);

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key_resolver(&EarlyKeyInfoResolver)
            .allowed_retrieval_method_uri_types(UriTypeSet::ALL)
            .external_resources(&resources)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("an unused malformed retrieval fallback must not abort verification");

        assert_eq!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid);
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_reports_missing_retrieval_when_no_key_source_resolves() {
        // Deferral changes ordering, not diagnostics: if no alternative source
        // resolves, the first missing retrieval remains the pipeline failure.
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==").replace(
            "</ds:SignatureValue>\n  </ds:Signature>",
            r#"</ds:SignatureValue>
    <ds:KeyInfo>
      <ds:RetrievalMethod URI="missing.der" Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rawX509Certificate"/>
    </ds:KeyInfo>
  </ds:Signature>"#,
        );

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key_resolver(&ConsumingKeyInfoResolver)
            .allowed_retrieval_method_uri_types(UriTypeSet::new(true, true, true))
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("a missing sole RetrievalMethod must remain an explicit error");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Reference(ReferenceProcessingError::Transform(
                crate::xmldsig::TransformError::UnsupportedUri(uri)
            )) if uri == "missing.der"
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_reports_malformed_retrieval_when_no_key_source_resolves() {
        // Deferral must retain the parse error when the malformed certificate
        // is the only candidate rather than degrading it to KeyNotFound.
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==").replace(
            "</ds:SignatureValue>\n  </ds:Signature>",
            r#"</ds:SignatureValue>
    <ds:KeyInfo>
      <ds:RetrievalMethod URI="malformed.der" Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rawX509Certificate"/>
    </ds:KeyInfo>
  </ds:Signature>"#,
        );
        let resources = HashMap::from([("malformed.der".to_string(), b"not DER".to_vec())]);

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key_resolver(&ConsumingKeyInfoResolver)
            .allowed_retrieval_method_uri_types(UriTypeSet::ALL)
            .external_resources(&resources)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("a malformed sole RetrievalMethod must remain a parse error");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::ParseKeyInfo(_)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_preserves_signaturevalue_decode_errors_when_resolver_misses() {
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("@@@");

        let err = VerifyContext::new()
            .key_resolver(&MissingKeyResolver)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("invalid SignatureValue must remain a decode error on resolver miss");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::SignatureValueBase64(_)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_context_preserves_signaturevalue_decode_errors_without_key() {
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("@@@");

        let err = VerifyContext::new()
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("invalid SignatureValue must remain a decode error");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::SignatureValueBase64(_)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn enforce_reference_policies_rejects_missing_uri_before_uri_type_checks() {
        let references = vec![Reference {
            uri: None,
            id: None,
            ref_type: None,
            transforms: vec![],
            digest_method: DigestAlgorithm::Sha256,
            digest_value: vec![0; 32],
        }];
        let uri_types = UriTypeSet {
            allow_empty: false,
            allow_same_document: true,
            allow_external: false,
        };

        let err = enforce_reference_policies(&references, uri_types, None)
            .expect_err("missing URI must fail before allow_empty policy is evaluated");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Reference(ReferenceProcessingError::MissingUri)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn enforce_reference_policies_checks_only_terminal_binary_output() {
        let c14n = C14nAlgorithm::from_uri(DEFAULT_IMPLICIT_C14N_URI).unwrap();
        let allowed = HashSet::from([
            BASE64_TRANSFORM_URI.to_owned(),
            DEFAULT_IMPLICIT_C14N_URI.to_owned(),
        ]);
        let without_implicit_c14n = HashSet::from([BASE64_TRANSFORM_URI.to_owned()]);

        for transforms in [
            vec![Transform::Base64Decode, Transform::C14n(c14n)],
            vec![Transform::Base64Decode, Transform::Base64Decode],
        ] {
            let reference = make_reference("", transforms, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, vec![0; 32]);
            enforce_reference_policies(
                std::slice::from_ref(&reference),
                UriTypeSet::default(),
                Some(&allowed),
            )
            .expect("terminal binary output must not require implicit C14N");
        }

        let terminal_base64 = make_reference(
            "",
            vec![Transform::Base64Decode, Transform::Base64Decode],
            DigestAlgorithm::Sha256,
            vec![0; 32],
        );
        enforce_reference_policies(
            std::slice::from_ref(&terminal_base64),
            UriTypeSet::default(),
            Some(&without_implicit_c14n),
        )
        .expect("terminal Base64 output must not require implicit C14N");

        let no_transforms = make_reference("", vec![], DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, vec![0; 32]);
        let error = enforce_reference_policies(
            std::slice::from_ref(&no_transforms),
            UriTypeSet::default(),
            Some(&without_implicit_c14n),
        )
        .expect_err("a node-set result must require allowlisted implicit C14N");
        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::Algorithm {
                    operation: "verification transform",
                    ref algorithm,
                }
            )
                if algorithm == DEFAULT_IMPLICIT_C14N_URI
        ));

        let detached = make_reference("urn:payload", vec![], DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, vec![0; 32]);
        enforce_reference_policies(
            std::slice::from_ref(&detached),
            UriTypeSet::ALL,
            Some(&without_implicit_c14n),
        )
        .expect("external octets without transforms must not require implicit C14N");

        let external_xpath = make_reference(
            "urn:payload",
            vec![Transform::XPath(
                super::super::transforms::XPathExpression::new("true()"),
            )],
            DigestAlgorithm::Sha256,
            vec![0; 32],
        );
        let error = enforce_reference_policies(
            std::slice::from_ref(&external_xpath),
            UriTypeSet::ALL,
            Some(&HashSet::from([XPATH_TRANSFORM_URI.to_owned()])),
        )
        .expect_err("external XML converted to a node-set must require implicit C14N");
        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::Algorithm {
                    operation: "verification transform",
                    ref algorithm,
                }
            )
                if algorithm == DEFAULT_IMPLICIT_C14N_URI
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn stored_pre_digest_budget_counts_repeated_external_references() {
        // The caller map owns one bounded payload, but diagnostic retention is
        // charged per Reference because every result owns its pre-digest bytes.
        let document =
            Document::parse("<ds:Signature xmlns:ds=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\"/>")
                .unwrap();
        let payload = vec![b'x'; 7];
        let digest = compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, &payload);
        let references = (0..5)
            .map(|_| {
                make_reference(
                    "urn:repeated",
                    Vec::new(),
                    DigestAlgorithm::Sha256,
                    digest.clone(),
                )
            })
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let resources = HashMap::from([("urn:repeated".to_owned(), payload)]);
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document).with_external_resources(&resources);
        let transform_budget = TransformExecutionBudget::default();
        let canonicalized_data_budget = CanonicalizedDataBudget::with_limit(32);
        let execution = ReferenceExecutionContext {
            store_pre_digest: true,
            transform_options: TransformOptions::default(),
            transform_budget: &transform_budget,
            canonicalized_data_budget: &canonicalized_data_budget,
            provider: crate::provider::default_provider(),
        };

        let error = process_all_references_with_options(
            &references,
            &resolver,
            document.root_element(),
            &execution,
        )
        .expect_err(
            "retained diagnostics must not multiply one external allocation past the aggregate cap",
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            ReferenceProcessingError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                resource: "canonicalized bytes",
                maximum: 32,
                ..
            })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn operation_memoizes_repeated_external_resource_identity() {
        // The external resource map is immutably borrowed for the operation,
        // so one content fingerprint safely identifies every repeated URI.
        let document = XmlDocument::parse("<root/>").expect("fixture must parse");
        let resources = HashMap::from([("urn:repeated".to_owned(), vec![b'x'; 8 * 1_024])]);
        let reference = make_reference(
            "urn:repeated",
            Vec::new(),
            DigestAlgorithm::Sha256,
            vec![0; 32],
        );
        let budgets = VerificationOperationBudgets::with_transforms(
            &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default(),
            TransformExecutionBudget::default(),
        );

        document.with_view(|view| {
            let resolver =
                UriReferenceResolver::new(view.document()).with_external_resources(&resources);
            let first =
                budgets.resource_identity_for_reference(&reference, 0, &resolver, view, None);
            let second =
                budgets.resource_identity_for_reference(&reference, 1, &resolver, view, None);

            assert_eq!(first, second);
            assert_eq!(budgets.external_resource_identities.borrow().len(), 1);
        });
    }

    #[test]
    fn canonical_signed_info_obeys_policy_without_diagnostic_retention() {
        // SignedInfo is always materialized for crypto verification, so its
        // canonical bytes must consume the configured ceiling even when
        // diagnostics do not retain reference output.
        let xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==");
        let marker = "<ds:SignatureMethod";
        let padding = " ".repeat(1_025);
        let xml = xml.replacen(marker, &format!("{padding}{marker}"), 1);
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            resources: crate::policy::ResourcePolicy {
                max_canonicalized_bytes: 1_024,
                ..crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };

        let error = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&AcceptingKey)
            .policy(policy)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("canonicalized SignedInfo must remain policy-bounded");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: "canonicalized bytes",
                    ..
                }
            )
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn fragmented_pq_signature_value_decodes_at_exact_wire_limit() {
        // Comments split the largest supported signature into tiny text nodes;
        // decoding must preserve bytes and reject an oversized aggregate.
        let parameter = super::super::pq_algorithm::PqAlgorithm::SlhDsaSha2_256f;
        let bytes = vec![0x5a; parameter.signature_len()];
        let encoded = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(&bytes);
        let mut xml = String::from("<SignatureValue>");
        for chunk in encoded.as_bytes().chunks(4) {
            xml.push_str(std::str::from_utf8(chunk).unwrap());
            xml.push_str("<!--split-->\n");
        }
        xml.push_str("</SignatureValue>");
        let document = Document::parse(&xml).unwrap();
        let algorithm = SignatureAlgorithm::PostQuantum(parameter);
        assert_eq!(
            decode_signature_value(
                document.root_element(),
                algorithm,
                &crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
            )
            .unwrap(),
            bytes
        );
        let oversized = xml.replace("</SignatureValue>", "AAAA</SignatureValue>");
        let document = Document::parse(&oversized).unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            decode_signature_value(
                document.root_element(),
                algorithm,
                &crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default()
            ),
            Err(SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "SignatureValue exceeds maximum allowed length"
            })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn push_normalized_signature_text_rejects_form_feed() {
        let mut normalized = Vec::new();
        let mut raw_text_len = 0usize;
        let err = push_normalized_signature_text(
            "ab\u{000C}cd",
            &mut raw_text_len,
            &mut normalized,
            SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
            &crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default(),
        )
        .expect_err("form-feed must not be treated as XML base64 whitespace");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::SignatureValueBase64(
                base64::DecodeError::InvalidByte(_, 0x0C)
            )
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn push_normalized_signature_text_enforces_byte_limit_for_multibyte_chars() {
        let mut normalized = vec![b'A'; MAX_SIGNATURE_VALUE_LEN - 1];
        let mut raw_text_len = normalized.len();
        let err = push_normalized_signature_text(
            "é",
            &mut raw_text_len,
            &mut normalized,
            SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
            &crate::policy::ResourcePolicy::default(),
        )
        .expect_err("multibyte characters must not bypass byte-size limit");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "SignatureValue exceeds maximum allowed length"
            }
        ));
    }

    // ── process_reference: happy path ────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn reference_with_correct_digest_passes() {
        // Create a simple document, compute its canonical form digest,
        // then verify that process_reference returns Valid status.
        let xml = r##"<root>
            <data>hello world</data>
            <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" Id="sig1">
                <ds:SignedInfo/>
            </ds:Signature>
        </root>"##;
        let doc = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&doc);
        let sig_node = doc
            .descendants()
            .find(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "Signature")
            .unwrap();

        // First, compute the expected digest by running the pipeline
        let initial_data = resolver.dereference("").unwrap();
        let transforms = vec![
            Transform::Enveloped,
            Transform::C14n(
                crate::c14n::C14nAlgorithm::from_uri("http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#")
                    .unwrap(),
            ),
        ];
        let pre_digest_bytes =
            crate::xmldsig::execute_transforms(sig_node, initial_data, &transforms).unwrap();
        let expected_digest = compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, &pre_digest_bytes);

        // Now build a Reference with the correct digest and verify
        let reference = make_reference("", transforms, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, expected_digest);

        let result = process_reference(
            &reference,
            &resolver,
            sig_node,
            ReferenceSet::SignedInfo,
            0,
            false,
        )
        .unwrap();
        assert!(
            matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid),
            "digest should match"
        );
        assert!(result.pre_digest_data.is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn reference_with_wrong_digest_fails() {
        let xml = r##"<root>
            <data>hello</data>
            <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
                <ds:SignedInfo/>
            </ds:Signature>
        </root>"##;
        let doc = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&doc);
        let sig_node = doc
            .descendants()
            .find(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "Signature")
            .unwrap();

        let transforms = vec![Transform::Enveloped];
        // Wrong digest value — all zeros
        let wrong_digest = vec![0u8; 32];
        let reference = make_reference("", transforms, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, wrong_digest);

        let result = process_reference(
            &reference,
            &resolver,
            sig_node,
            ReferenceSet::SignedInfo,
            0,
            false,
        )
        .unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            result.status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferenceDigestMismatch { ref_index: 0 })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn reference_with_wrong_digest_preserves_supplied_ref_index() {
        let xml = r##"<root>
            <data>hello</data>
            <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
                <ds:SignedInfo/>
            </ds:Signature>
        </root>"##;
        let doc = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&doc);
        let sig_node = doc
            .descendants()
            .find(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "Signature")
            .unwrap();

        let reference = make_reference(
            "",
            vec![Transform::Enveloped],
            DigestAlgorithm::Sha256,
            vec![0u8; 32],
        );
        let result = process_reference(
            &reference,
            &resolver,
            sig_node,
            ReferenceSet::SignedInfo,
            7,
            false,
        )
        .unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            result.status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferenceDigestMismatch { ref_index: 7 })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn reference_stores_pre_digest_data() {
        let xml = "<root><child>text</child></root>";
        let doc = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&doc);

        // No transforms, no enveloped — just canonicalize entire document
        let initial_data = resolver.dereference("").unwrap();
        let pre_digest =
            crate::xmldsig::execute_transforms(doc.root_element(), initial_data, &[]).unwrap();
        let digest = compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, &pre_digest);

        let reference = make_reference("", vec![], DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, digest);
        let result = process_reference(
            &reference,
            &resolver,
            doc.root_element(),
            ReferenceSet::SignedInfo,
            0,
            true,
        )
        .unwrap();

        assert!(matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid));
        assert!(result.pre_digest_data.is_some());
        assert_eq!(result.pre_digest_data.unwrap(), pre_digest);
    }

    // ── process_reference: URI dereference ───────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn reference_with_id_uri() {
        let xml = r##"<root>
            <item ID="target">specific content</item>
            <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
                <ds:SignedInfo/>
            </ds:Signature>
        </root>"##;
        let doc = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&doc);
        let sig_node = doc
            .descendants()
            .find(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "Signature")
            .unwrap();

        // Compute expected digest for the #target subtree
        let initial_data = resolver.dereference("#target").unwrap();
        let transforms = vec![Transform::C14n(
            crate::c14n::C14nAlgorithm::from_uri("http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#")
                .unwrap(),
        )];
        let pre_digest =
            crate::xmldsig::execute_transforms(sig_node, initial_data, &transforms).unwrap();
        let expected_digest = compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, &pre_digest);

        let reference = make_reference(
            "#target",
            transforms,
            DigestAlgorithm::Sha256,
            expected_digest,
        );
        let result = process_reference(
            &reference,
            &resolver,
            sig_node,
            ReferenceSet::SignedInfo,
            0,
            false,
        )
        .unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid));
    }

    #[test]
    fn reference_with_nonexistent_id_fails() {
        let xml = "<root><child/></root>";
        let doc = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&doc);

        let reference =
            make_reference("#nonexistent", vec![], DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, vec![0; 32]);
        let result = process_reference(
            &reference,
            &resolver,
            doc.root_element(),
            ReferenceSet::SignedInfo,
            0,
            false,
        );
        assert!(result.is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn reference_with_absent_uri_fails_closed() {
        let xml = "<root><child>text</child></root>";
        let doc = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&doc);

        let reference = Reference {
            uri: None, // absent URI
            id: None,
            ref_type: None,
            transforms: vec![],
            digest_method: DigestAlgorithm::Sha256,
            digest_value: vec![0; 32],
        };

        let result = process_reference(
            &reference,
            &resolver,
            doc.root_element(),
            ReferenceSet::SignedInfo,
            0,
            false,
        );
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(ReferenceProcessingError::MissingUri)));
    }

    // ── process_all_references: fail-fast ────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn all_references_pass() {
        let xml = "<root><child>text</child></root>";
        let doc = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&doc);

        // Compute correct digest
        let initial_data = resolver.dereference("").unwrap();
        let pre_digest =
            crate::xmldsig::execute_transforms(doc.root_element(), initial_data, &[]).unwrap();
        let digest = compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, &pre_digest);

        let refs = vec![
            make_reference("", vec![], DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, digest.clone()),
            make_reference("", vec![], DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, digest),
        ];

        let result = process_all_references(&refs, &resolver, doc.root_element(), false).unwrap();
        assert!(result.all_valid());
        assert_eq!(result.results.len(), 2);
        assert!(result.first_failure.is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn reference_processing_shares_xpath_work_across_references() {
        // A signature-wide meter must not reset when processing the next
        // Reference, even though each transform chain is independently valid.
        let document = Document::parse("<root/>").unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document);
        let transform = Transform::XPath(super::super::transforms::XPathExpression::new("true()"));
        let initial_data = resolver.dereference("").unwrap();
        let pre_digest = crate::xmldsig::execute_transforms(
            document.root_element(),
            initial_data,
            std::slice::from_ref(&transform),
        )
        .unwrap();
        let digest = compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, &pre_digest);
        let references = vec![
            make_reference(
                "",
                vec![transform.clone()],
                DigestAlgorithm::Sha256,
                digest.clone(),
            ),
            make_reference("", vec![transform], DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, digest),
        ];
        let budget = TransformExecutionBudget::with_xpath_limit(12);
        let canonicalized_data_budget = CanonicalizedDataBudget::default();
        let execution = ReferenceExecutionContext {
            store_pre_digest: false,
            transform_options: TransformOptions::default(),
            transform_budget: &budget,
            canonicalized_data_budget: &canonicalized_data_budget,
            provider: crate::provider::default_provider(),
        };

        let error = process_all_references_with_options(
            &references,
            &resolver,
            document.root_element(),
            &execution,
        )
        .expect_err("the second Reference must consume the first Reference's XPath work");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            ReferenceProcessingError::Transform(TransformError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::XPATH_EVALUATION_WORK,
                    ..
                }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn reference_processing_shares_node_set_materialization_across_references() {
        // Repeated references to the same small subtree must share one owned-
        // string budget. Otherwise a large inherited namespace can be cloned
        // once per Reference even when canonicalization emits little output.
        let document = Document::parse(
            r#"<root xmlns:n="urn:0123456789"><target Id="selected">payload</target></root>"#,
        )
        .unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&document);
        let initial_data = resolver.dereference("#selected").unwrap();
        let pre_digest =
            crate::xmldsig::execute_transforms(document.root_element(), initial_data, &[]).unwrap();
        let digest = compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, &pre_digest);
        let references = vec![
            make_reference("#selected", vec![], DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, digest.clone()),
            make_reference("#selected", vec![], DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, digest),
        ];
        let budget = TransformExecutionBudget::with_node_set_materialization_limit(30);
        let canonicalized_data_budget = CanonicalizedDataBudget::default();
        let execution = ReferenceExecutionContext {
            store_pre_digest: false,
            transform_options: TransformOptions::default(),
            transform_budget: &budget,
            canonicalized_data_budget: &canonicalized_data_budget,
            provider: crate::provider::default_provider(),
        };

        let error = process_all_references_with_options(
            &references,
            &resolver,
            document.root_element(),
            &execution,
        )
        .expect_err("the second Reference must consume the first Reference's materialization work");

        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            ReferenceProcessingError::UriDereference(TransformError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::NODE_SET_CUMULATIVE_OWNED_STRING_BYTES,
                    ..
                }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn fail_fast_on_first_mismatch() {
        let xml = "<root><child>text</child></root>";
        let doc = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&doc);

        let wrong_digest = vec![0u8; 32];
        let refs = vec![
            make_reference("", vec![], DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, wrong_digest.clone()),
            // Second reference should NOT be processed
            make_reference("", vec![], DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, wrong_digest),
        ];

        let result = process_all_references(&refs, &resolver, doc.root_element(), false).unwrap();
        assert!(!result.all_valid());
        assert_eq!(result.first_failure, Some(0));
        // Only first reference should be in results (fail-fast)
        assert_eq!(result.results.len(), 1);
        assert!(matches!(
            result.results[0].status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferenceDigestMismatch { ref_index: 0 })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn fail_fast_second_reference() {
        let xml = "<root><child>text</child></root>";
        let doc = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&doc);

        // Compute correct digest for first ref
        let initial_data = resolver.dereference("").unwrap();
        let pre_digest =
            crate::xmldsig::execute_transforms(doc.root_element(), initial_data, &[]).unwrap();
        let correct_digest = compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, &pre_digest);
        let wrong_digest = vec![0u8; 32];

        let refs = vec![
            make_reference("", vec![], DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, correct_digest),
            make_reference("", vec![], DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, wrong_digest),
        ];

        let result = process_all_references(&refs, &resolver, doc.root_element(), false).unwrap();
        assert!(!result.all_valid());
        assert_eq!(result.first_failure, Some(1));
        // Both references should be in results
        assert_eq!(result.results.len(), 2);
        assert!(matches!(result.results[0].status, DsigStatus::Valid));
        assert!(matches!(
            result.results[1].status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::ReferenceDigestMismatch { ref_index: 1 })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn empty_references_list() {
        let xml = "<root/>";
        let doc = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&doc);

        let result = process_all_references(&[], &resolver, doc.root_element(), false).unwrap();
        assert!(result.all_valid());
        assert!(result.results.is_empty());
    }

    // ── Digest algorithms ────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn reference_sha1_digest() {
        let xml = "<root>content</root>";
        let doc = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&doc);

        let initial_data = resolver.dereference("").unwrap();
        let pre_digest =
            crate::xmldsig::execute_transforms(doc.root_element(), initial_data, &[]).unwrap();
        let digest = compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha1, &pre_digest);

        let reference = make_reference("", vec![], DigestAlgorithm::Sha1, digest);
        let result = process_reference(
            &reference,
            &resolver,
            doc.root_element(),
            ReferenceSet::SignedInfo,
            0,
            false,
        )
        .unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid));
        assert_eq!(result.digest_algorithm, DigestAlgorithm::Sha1);
    }

    #[test]
    fn reference_sha512_digest() {
        let xml = "<root>content</root>";
        let doc = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&doc);

        let initial_data = resolver.dereference("").unwrap();
        let pre_digest =
            crate::xmldsig::execute_transforms(doc.root_element(), initial_data, &[]).unwrap();
        let digest = compute_digest(DigestAlgorithm::Sha512, &pre_digest);

        let reference = make_reference("", vec![], DigestAlgorithm::Sha512, digest);
        let result = process_reference(
            &reference,
            &resolver,
            doc.root_element(),
            ReferenceSet::SignedInfo,
            0,
            false,
        )
        .unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid));
        assert_eq!(result.digest_algorithm, DigestAlgorithm::Sha512);
    }

    // ── SAML-like end-to-end ─────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn saml_enveloped_reference_processing() {
        // Realistic SAML Response with enveloped signature
        let xml = r##"<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
                                     xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
                                     ID="_resp1">
            <saml:Assertion ID="_assert1">
                <saml:Subject>user@example.com</saml:Subject>
            </saml:Assertion>
            <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
                <ds:SignedInfo>
                    <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
                    <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>
                    <ds:Reference URI="">
                        <ds:Transforms>
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
                        </ds:Transforms>
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
                        <ds:DigestValue>AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=</ds:DigestValue>
                    </ds:Reference>
                </ds:SignedInfo>
                <ds:SignatureValue>fakesig==</ds:SignatureValue>
            </ds:Signature>
        </samlp:Response>"##;
        let doc = Document::parse(xml).unwrap();
        let resolver = UriReferenceResolver::new(&doc);
        let sig_node = doc
            .descendants()
            .find(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "Signature")
            .unwrap();

        // Parse SignedInfo to get the Reference
        let signed_info_node = sig_node
            .children()
            .find(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "SignedInfo")
            .unwrap();
        let signed_info = parse_signed_info(signed_info_node).unwrap();
        let reference = &signed_info.references[0];

        // Compute the correct digest by running the actual pipeline
        let initial_data = resolver.dereference("").unwrap();
        let pre_digest =
            crate::xmldsig::execute_transforms(sig_node, initial_data, &reference.transforms)
                .unwrap();
        let correct_digest = compute_digest(reference.digest_method, &pre_digest);

        // Build a reference with the correct digest
        let corrected_ref = make_reference(
            "",
            reference.transforms.clone(),
            reference.digest_method,
            correct_digest,
        );

        // Verify: should pass
        let result = process_reference(
            &corrected_ref,
            &resolver,
            sig_node,
            ReferenceSet::SignedInfo,
            0,
            true,
        )
        .unwrap();
        assert!(
            matches!(result.status, DsigStatus::Valid),
            "SAML reference should verify"
        );
        assert!(result.pre_digest_data.is_some());

        // Verify the pre-digest data contains the canonicalized document without Signature
        let pre_digest_str = String::from_utf8(result.pre_digest_data.unwrap()).unwrap();
        assert!(
            pre_digest_str.contains("samlp:Response"),
            "pre-digest should contain Response"
        );
        assert!(
            !pre_digest_str.contains("SignatureValue"),
            "pre-digest should NOT contain Signature"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn pipeline_missing_signed_info_returns_missing_element() {
        let xml = r#"<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"></ds:Signature>"#;

        let err = verify_signature_with_pem_key(xml, "dummy-key", false)
            .expect_err("missing SignedInfo must fail before crypto stage");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::MissingElement {
                element: "SignedInfo"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pipeline_multiple_signature_elements_are_rejected() {
        let xml = r#"
<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
  <ds:Signature>
    <ds:SignedInfo/>
  </ds:Signature>
  <ds:Signature/>
</root>
"#;

        let err = verify_signature_with_pem_key(xml, "dummy-key", false)
            .expect_err("multiple signatures must fail closed");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "Signature must appear exactly once in document",
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pipeline_start_node_limits_signature_cardinality_to_its_subtree() {
        // A start-node selector changes the operation root, not global ID or
        // reference resolution; another Signature outside the subtree is irrelevant.
        let xml = r#"
<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
  <scope Id="selected"><ds:Signature/></scope>
  <scope Id="other"><ds:Signature/></scope>
</root>
"#;
        let err = VerifyContext::new()
            .start_node_id("selected")
            .verify(xml)
            .expect_err("the selected Signature remains structurally incomplete");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::MissingElement {
                element: "SignedInfo"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pipeline_reports_keyinfo_parse_error() {
        let xml = r#"
<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
              xmlns:dsig11="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#">
  <ds:SignedInfo>
    <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
    <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>
    <ds:Reference URI="">
      <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
      <ds:DigestValue>AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=</ds:DigestValue>
    </ds:Reference>
  </ds:SignedInfo>
  <ds:SignatureValue>AA==</ds:SignatureValue>
  <ds:KeyInfo>
    <dsig11:DEREncodedKeyValue>%%%invalid%%%</dsig11:DEREncodedKeyValue>
  </ds:KeyInfo>
</ds:Signature>
"#;

        let err = VerifyContext::new().verify(xml).expect_err(
            "invalid KeyInfo must map to ParseKeyInfo when no explicit key is supplied",
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::ParseKeyInfo(_)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pipeline_ignores_malformed_keyinfo_when_explicit_key_is_supplied() {
        let base_xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==");
        let xml = base_xml
            .replace(
                r#"<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">"#,
                r#"<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:dsig11="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#">"#,
            )
            .replace(
                "</ds:SignatureValue>\n  </ds:Signature>",
                "</ds:SignatureValue>\n    <ds:KeyInfo><dsig11:DEREncodedKeyValue>%%%invalid%%%</dsig11:DEREncodedKeyValue></ds:KeyInfo>\n  </ds:Signature>",
            );

        let result = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect("explicit key path should not fail on malformed KeyInfo");
        assert!(matches!(
            result.status,
            DsigStatus::Invalid(FailureReason::SignatureMismatch)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pipeline_rejects_foreign_element_children_under_signature() {
        let base_xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==");
        let xml = base_xml
            .replace(
                r#"<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">"#,
                r#"<root xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:foo="urn:example:foo">"#,
            )
            .replace(
                "</ds:SignedInfo>\n    <ds:SignatureValue>",
                "</ds:SignedInfo>\n    <foo:Bar/>\n    <ds:SignatureValue>",
            );

        let err = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("foreign element children under Signature must fail closed");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "Signature must contain only XMLDSIG element children",
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pipeline_rejects_non_whitespace_mixed_content_under_signature() {
        let base_xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==");
        let xml = base_xml.replace(
            "</ds:SignedInfo>\n    <ds:SignatureValue>",
            "</ds:SignedInfo>\n    oops\n    <ds:SignatureValue>",
        );

        let err = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("non-whitespace mixed content under Signature must fail closed");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "Signature must not contain non-whitespace mixed content",
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pipeline_rejects_keyinfo_out_of_order() {
        let base_xml = signature_with_target_reference("AQ==");
        let xml = base_xml.replace(
            "</ds:SignatureValue>\n  </ds:Signature>",
            "</ds:SignatureValue>\n    <ds:Object/>\n    <ds:KeyInfo><ds:KeyName>late</ds:KeyName></ds:KeyInfo>\n  </ds:Signature>",
        );

        let err = VerifyContext::new()
            .key(&RejectingKey)
            .verify(&xml)
            .expect_err("KeyInfo after Object must be rejected by Signature child order checks");
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SignatureVerificationPipelineError::InvalidStructure {
                reason: "KeyInfo must be the third element child of Signature when present"
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pipeline_accepts_comments_and_processing_instructions_under_signature() {
        let xml = r#"
<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
  <?dbg keep ?>
  <!-- signature metadata -->
  <ds:SignedInfo>
    <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
    <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>
    <ds:Reference URI="">
      <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
      <ds:DigestValue>AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=</ds:DigestValue>
    </ds:Reference>
  </ds:SignedInfo>
  <!-- between required children -->
  <ds:SignatureValue>AA==</ds:SignatureValue>
</ds:Signature>
"#;

        let doc = Document::parse(xml).expect("test XML must parse");
        let signature_node = doc.root_element();
        let parsed = parse_signature_children(signature_node)
            .expect("comment/PI nodes under Signature must be ignored");

        assert_eq!(parsed.signed_info_node.tag_name().name(), "SignedInfo");
        assert_eq!(
            parsed.signature_value_node.tag_name().name(),
            "SignatureValue"
        );
        assert!(parsed.key_info_node.is_none());
    }
}