xml_sec/

key_manager.rs

//! Caller-owned, provider-neutral key inventory and xmlsec key-store import.

use std::collections::HashSet;

#[cfg(test)]
use crate::xmldsig::DsaSigningKey;
#[cfg(test)]
use base64::Engine as _;
use crypto_bigint::{
    BoxedUint,
    modular::{BoxedMontyForm, BoxedMontyParams},
};
use der::Decode as _;
use dsa::{
    Components as DsaComponents, SigningKey as NativeDsaSigningKey,
    VerifyingKey as DsaVerifyingKey, pkcs8::EncodePrivateKey as _,
};
mod pkcs12_import;
use pkcs12_import::Limits as Pkcs12Limits;
use rsa::{
    RsaPrivateKey,
    pkcs8::{DecodePrivateKey as _, EncryptedPrivateKeyInfoRef, PrivateKeyInfoRef},
};
#[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
use rsa::{RsaPublicKey, pkcs8::DecodePublicKey as _};
use x509_parser::prelude::{FromDer as _, X509Certificate};
use zeroize::Zeroizing;

#[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
use crate::xmldsig::parse::X509PublicKeyInfo;
use crate::{
    XmlBackend, XmlDomNode as Node,
    document::{
        DocumentParseSettings, XmlParseWorkBudget, parse_borrowed_with_settings_and_budget,
    },
    policy::ResourcePolicy,
    xmldsig::keys::InspectedKeyCandidateBudget,
    xmldsig::parse::XMLDSIG11_NS,
    xmldsig::{
        DefaultKeyResolver, DsigError, HmacSigningKey, HmacVerificationKey, KeyInfo, KeyInfoSource,
        KeyResolver, KeyResolverConfig, KeyValueInfo, SignatureAlgorithm, SigningKey, VerifyingKey,
        X509DataInfo, validate_signing_key,
    },
};

const XMLSEC_NS: &str = "http://www.aleksey.com/xmlsec/2002";
const XMLDSIG_NS: &str = "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#";

enum PublicDerFormat {
    KeyOrCertificate,
    SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
}

fn check_selected_public_material(
    info: &KeyInfo,
    resources: &ResourcePolicy,
) -> Result<usize, DsigError> {
    let mut total = 0_usize;
    for source in &info.sources {
        let mut charge = |length: usize| -> Result<(), DsigError> {
            if length > resources.max_external_resource_bytes {
                return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    maximum: resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
                    actual: length,
                }
                .into());
            }
            total = total.checked_add(length).ok_or({
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    maximum: resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
                    actual: usize::MAX,
                }
            })?;
            if total > resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes {
                return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    maximum: resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
                    actual: total,
                }
                .into());
            }
            Ok(())
        };
        match source {
            KeyInfoSource::KeyValue(value) => {
                // One selected key is one resource, irrespective of how many
                // XML fields encode it. Bound the complete borrowed payload
                // before resolution materializes its SPKI.
                let lengths = match value {
                    KeyValueInfo::Rsa { modulus, exponent } => {
                        [modulus.len(), exponent.len(), 0, 0]
                    }
                    KeyValueInfo::Dsa { p, q, g, y } => [
                        p.as_ref().map_or(0, Vec::len),
                        q.as_ref().map_or(0, Vec::len),
                        g.as_ref().map_or(0, Vec::len),
                        y.len(),
                    ],
                    KeyValueInfo::Ec {
                        curve_oid,
                        public_key,
                    } => [curve_oid.len(), public_key.len(), 0, 0],
                    KeyValueInfo::InvalidEcKeyValue | KeyValueInfo::Unsupported { .. } => continue,
                };
                let length = lengths.into_iter().try_fold(0_usize, |sum, length| {
                    sum.checked_add(length)
                        .ok_or(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                            resource: crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                            maximum: resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
                            actual: usize::MAX,
                        })
                })?;
                charge(length)?;
            }
            KeyInfoSource::DerEncodedKeyValue(bytes) => charge(bytes.len())?,
            KeyInfoSource::X509Data(data) => {
                for certificate in &data.certificates {
                    charge(certificate.len())?;
                }
                for crl in &data.crls {
                    charge(crl.len())?;
                }
            }
            _ => {}
        }
    }
    Ok(total)
}

/// A named secret imported from an xmlsec key store.
pub struct StoredSymmetricKey {
    /// Opaque caller-supplied lookup name.
    pub name: String,
    /// XML Security symmetric-key family.
    pub kind: SymmetricKeyKind,
    /// Secret bytes, zeroized when the inventory is dropped.
    pub bytes: Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>,
    /// Allowed operations.
    pub usages: KeyUsages,
}

#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
/// The secret-key family declared by an xmlsec key store.
pub enum SymmetricKeyKind {
    /// HMAC signing and verification key.
    Hmac,
    /// AES content-encryption key.
    Aes,
    /// Legacy DES key marker; import rejects it until a DES operation exists.
    Des,
}

#[derive(Default)]
/// A caller-owned inventory of imported XML Security key material.
pub struct KeyInventory {
    /// Total XML entries inspected, including unsupported algorithms.
    entry_count: usize,
    /// Supported symmetric keys.
    symmetric_keys: Vec<StoredSymmetricKey>,
    /// Supported public keys.
    public_keys: Vec<StoredPublicKey>,
    /// Private PKCS#8 keys imported from caller-owned byte sources.
    private_keys: Vec<StoredPrivateKey>,
    /// Untrusted certificates available for key lookup or path construction.
    lookup_certificates: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
    /// Explicit caller-trusted certificate anchors.
    trusted_certificates: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
    /// Caller-supplied DER certificate revocation lists.
    crls: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
    material_bytes: usize,
    kdf_work: usize,
}

/// Import session for multiple XML key stores under one operation snapshot.
/// Failed attempts retain their inspection and parser-work charges. Successful
/// stores are moved into the inventory, never cloned.
pub struct XmlKeyStoreImporter<'a, P: crate::document::XmlDocumentPolicy> {
    policy: &'a P,
    backend: XmlBackend,
    parse_work: XmlParseWorkBudget,
    inspected: usize,
    inventory: KeyInventory,
    live_material_bytes: usize,
}

impl<'a, P: crate::document::XmlDocumentPolicy> XmlKeyStoreImporter<'a, P> {
    /// Bind this session to the caller's immutable policy and XML backend.
    pub fn new(policy: &'a P, backend: XmlBackend) -> Result<Self, KeyStoreError> {
        Self::with_live_material(policy, backend, 0)
    }

    /// Bind import accounting to material already retained by the operation.
    /// This is usage, not a second policy limit; it remains live until finish.
    pub fn with_live_material(
        policy: &'a P,
        backend: XmlBackend,
        live_material_bytes: usize,
    ) -> Result<Self, KeyStoreError> {
        ensure_resource_policy(policy.resource_policy())?;
        if live_material_bytes > policy.resource_policy().max_external_resource_total_bytes {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                policy.resource_policy().max_external_resource_total_bytes,
            ));
        }
        Ok(Self {
            policy,
            backend,
            parse_work: XmlParseWorkBudget::from_resources(policy.resource_policy()),
            inspected: 0,
            inventory: KeyInventory::default(),
            live_material_bytes,
        })
    }

    /// Import a file without resetting work budgets. Failure leaves stored keys
    /// unchanged, but does not refund work already performed.
    pub fn import(&mut self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        let store = KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes_with_budget(
            bytes,
            self.policy,
            self.backend,
            &self.parse_work,
            &mut self.inspected,
            self.inventory
                .material_bytes
                .checked_add(self.live_material_bytes)
                .ok_or_else(|| {
                    import_resource_limit(
                        crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                        self.policy
                            .resource_policy()
                            .max_external_resource_total_bytes,
                    )
                })?,
        )?;
        self.inventory.extend(store, self.policy.resource_policy())
    }

    /// Finish the import session and transfer ownership of the complete inventory.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn finish(self) -> KeyInventory {
        self.inventory
    }
}

/// Candidate inspections shared by named signing lookups in one operation.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct SigningLookupBudget {
    inspected: usize,
}

/// Operations for which a caller may authorize a key.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum KeyUsage {
    /// XMLDSig signing.
    Sign,
    /// XMLDSig verification.
    Verify,
    /// XMLEnc encryption or key wrapping.
    Encrypt,
    /// XMLEnc decryption or key unwrapping.
    Decrypt,
}

/// Explicit, immutable allowed-use set for one imported key.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct KeyUsages(u8);

impl KeyUsages {
    /// A key usable only for signing.
    pub const SIGN: Self = Self(1);
    /// A key usable only for verification.
    pub const VERIFY: Self = Self(2);
    /// A key usable only for encryption.
    pub const ENCRYPT: Self = Self(4);
    /// A key usable only for decryption.
    pub const DECRYPT: Self = Self(8);

    /// Combine disjoint permissions explicitly.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn union(self, other: Self) -> Self {
        Self(self.0 | other.0)
    }

    /// Test one requested operation.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn allows(self, usage: KeyUsage) -> bool {
        let bit = match usage {
            KeyUsage::Sign => Self::SIGN.0,
            KeyUsage::Verify => Self::VERIFY.0,
            KeyUsage::Encrypt => Self::ENCRYPT.0,
            KeyUsage::Decrypt => Self::DECRYPT.0,
        };
        self.0 & bit != 0
    }
}

/// Private key encoded as provider-neutral PKCS#8 DER.
pub struct StoredPrivateKey {
    /// Opaque caller-assigned name.
    pub name: String,
    /// Private key bytes; zeroized on drop.
    pub pkcs8_der: Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>,
    /// Allowed operations.
    pub usages: KeyUsages,
    /// Associated certificates, leaf first when a matching leaf exists.
    pub certificate_chain: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
    has_matching_leaf: bool,
}

impl StoredPrivateKey {
    /// Return the chain only when its first certificate matches this private key.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn matching_certificate_chain(&self) -> Option<&[Vec<u8>]> {
        self.has_matching_leaf.then_some(&self.certificate_chain)
    }
}

/// A named public key imported from an xmlsec key store.
pub struct StoredPublicKey {
    /// Opaque caller-supplied lookup name.
    pub name: String,
    /// Parsed XMLDSig key material.
    pub key_info: KeyInfo,
    /// Allowed operations.
    pub usages: KeyUsages,
}

impl StoredPublicKey {
    /// Decode this already-selected RSA recipient without searching the inventory again.
    #[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
    pub fn rsa_encryption_key(
        &self,
        policy: &crate::policy::EncryptionPolicy,
    ) -> Result<RsaPublicKey, KeyStoreError> {
        policy.validate()?;
        if !self.usages.allows(KeyUsage::Encrypt) {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
                "key is not authorized for encryption",
            ));
        }
        for source in &self.key_info.sources {
            return match source {
                KeyInfoSource::KeyValue(KeyValueInfo::Rsa { modulus, exponent }) => {
                    rsa_recipient_from_components(modulus, exponent, policy)
                }
                KeyInfoSource::DerEncodedKeyValue(der) => {
                    check_encryption_material_size(der.len(), &policy.resources)?;
                    let (rest, spki) = x509_parser::x509::SubjectPublicKeyInfo::from_der(der)
                        .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA encryption key"))?;
                    if !rest.is_empty() {
                        return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA encryption key"));
                    }
                    let x509_parser::public_key::PublicKey::RSA(raw) = spki
                        .parsed()
                        .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA encryption key"))?
                    else {
                        return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
                            "named key is not an RSA public key",
                        ));
                    };
                    rsa_recipient_preflight(raw.modulus, raw.exponent, policy)?;
                    RsaPublicKey::from_public_key_der(der)
                        .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA encryption key"))
                }
                KeyInfoSource::X509Data(data) if data.parsed_certificates.len() == 1 => {
                    if let Some(certificate) = data.certificates.first() {
                        check_encryption_material_size(certificate.len(), &policy.resources)?;
                    }
                    match &data.parsed_certificates[0].public_key {
                        X509PublicKeyInfo::Rsa { modulus, exponent } => {
                            rsa_recipient_from_components(modulus, exponent, policy)
                        }
                        _ => Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("certificate does not contain RSA")),
                    }
                }
                _ => continue,
            };
        }
        Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
            "named key is not an RSA public key",
        ))
    }
}

/// Policy-aware verification adapter over a caller-owned inventory.
pub struct InventoryVerificationResolver<'a> {
    inventory: &'a KeyInventory,
}

impl<'a> KeyResolver for InventoryVerificationResolver<'a> {
    fn resolve<'k>(
        &'k self,
        key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
    ) -> Result<Option<Box<dyn VerifyingKey + 'k>>, DsigError> {
        self.resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
            key_info,
            algorithm,
            &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default(),
            crate::provider::default_provider(),
        )
    }

    fn resolve_with_policy<'k>(
        &'k self,
        key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        policy: &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
    ) -> Result<Option<Box<dyn VerifyingKey + 'k>>, DsigError> {
        self.resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
            key_info,
            algorithm,
            policy,
            crate::provider::default_provider(),
        )
    }

    fn resolve_with_policy_and_provider<'k>(
        &'k self,
        key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        policy: &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
        provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
    ) -> Result<Option<Box<dyn VerifyingKey + 'k>>, DsigError> {
        self.resolve_for_verification(key_info, algorithm, policy, provider)
            .map(|key| key.map(crate::xmldsig::ResolvedVerificationKey::into_key))
    }

    fn resolve_for_verification<'k>(
        &'k self,
        key_info: Option<&KeyInfo>,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        policy: &crate::policy::VerificationPolicy,
        provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
    ) -> Result<Option<crate::xmldsig::ResolvedVerificationKey<'k>>, DsigError> {
        policy.validate()?;
        if let Some(info) = key_info {
            crate::xmldsig::keys::validate_key_info_source_permissions(info, policy.key_sources)?;
        }
        let mut candidate: Option<&StoredPublicKey> = None;
        let mut secret_candidate: Option<&StoredSymmetricKey> = None;
        let mut inspected_candidates = InspectedKeyCandidateBudget::new(policy);
        for name in key_info
            .into_iter()
            .flat_map(|info| &info.sources)
            .filter_map(|source| match source {
                KeyInfoSource::KeyName(name) => Some(name.as_str()),
                _ => None,
            })
        {
            if self.inventory.symmetric_keys.is_empty() && self.inventory.public_keys.is_empty() {
                inspected_candidates.charge()?;
            }
            let mut symmetric_match = None;
            for entry in &self.inventory.symmetric_keys {
                inspected_candidates.charge()?;
                if entry.name == name {
                    symmetric_match = Some(entry);
                    break;
                }
            }
            if let Some(found) = symmetric_match {
                if !found.usages.allows(KeyUsage::Verify) || found.kind != SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac {
                    return Err(DsigError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "named key is not authorized for verification",
                    });
                }
                if candidate.is_some()
                    || secret_candidate.is_some_and(|previous| !core::ptr::eq(previous, found))
                {
                    return Err(DsigError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "more than one named verification key matches",
                    });
                }
                secret_candidate = Some(found);
                continue;
            }
            let mut public_match = None;
            for entry in &self.inventory.public_keys {
                inspected_candidates.charge()?;
                if entry.name == name {
                    public_match = Some(entry);
                    break;
                }
            }
            if let Some(found) = public_match {
                if !found.usages.allows(KeyUsage::Verify) {
                    return Err(DsigError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "named key is not authorized for verification",
                    });
                }
                if secret_candidate.is_some()
                    || candidate.is_some_and(|previous| !core::ptr::eq(previous, found))
                {
                    return Err(DsigError::InvalidStructure {
                        reason: "more than one named verification key matches",
                    });
                }
                candidate = Some(found);
            }
        }
        if let Some(candidate) = secret_candidate {
            if algorithm.hmac_output_bits().is_none() {
                return Err(DsigError::InvalidStructure {
                    reason: "named HMAC key is incompatible with signature method",
                });
            }
            for (resource, maximum) in [
                (
                    crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
                ),
                (
                    crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    policy.resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
                ),
            ] {
                if candidate.bytes.len() > maximum {
                    return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                        resource,
                        maximum,
                        actual: candidate.bytes.len(),
                    }
                    .into());
                }
            }
            let key = HmacVerificationKey::new(candidate.bytes.to_vec()).map_err(|_| {
                DsigError::InvalidStructure {
                    reason: "invalid named HMAC key",
                }
            })?;
            return Ok(Some(
                crate::xmldsig::ResolvedVerificationKey::CallerTrusted(Box::new(key)),
            ));
        }
        let selected_material_bytes = candidate
            .map(|candidate| check_selected_public_material(&candidate.key_info, &policy.resources))
            .transpose()?
            .unwrap_or(0);
        let selected_info = candidate.map_or(key_info, |entry| Some(&entry.key_info));
        let configured_x509_index = selected_info.and_then(|info| {
            info.sources.iter().position(|source| match source {
                KeyInfoSource::X509Data(data) if data.certificate_chain.is_empty() => {
                    crate::xmldsig::parse::x509_data_has_lookup_identifiers(data)
                }
                KeyInfoSource::X509Data(_) => {
                    policy.key_trust.verify_x509_chains
                        || !self.inventory.trusted_certificates.is_empty()
                }
                _ => false,
            })
        });
        // Try only sources preceding the first configured-X.509 use without
        // inspecting or copying inventory certificates that may never be used.
        let mut prefix_error = None;
        if let Some(info) = selected_info
            && let Some(first_x509) = configured_x509_index
            && first_x509 != 0
        {
            let prefix_resolver = DefaultKeyResolver::new(KeyResolverConfig::default());
            let outcome = prefix_resolver.resolve_sources_with_candidate_budget(
                info,
                algorithm,
                policy,
                provider,
                &mut inspected_candidates,
                if candidate.is_some() {
                    crate::xmldsig::keys::ResolutionScope::TrustedPrefix(first_x509)
                } else {
                    crate::xmldsig::keys::ResolutionScope::DocumentPrefix(first_x509)
                },
            )?;
            if let Some(key) = outcome.key {
                return Ok(Some(key));
            }
            prefix_error = outcome.deferred_error;
        }
        let fallback = if configured_x509_index.is_some() {
            let certificates = self
                .inventory
                .lookup_certificates
                .iter()
                .chain(&self.inventory.trusted_certificates);
            // Selecting a trusted named key substitutes key material, not
            // document revocation evidence. Retain CRLs without importing any
            // document certificate into the trusted candidate's chain.
            let document_crls = key_info
                .filter(|_| {
                    candidate.is_some()
                        && policy.key_trust.check_crls
                        && policy.key_trust.verify_x509_chains
                })
                .into_iter()
                .flat_map(|info| &info.sources)
                .filter_map(|source| match source {
                    KeyInfoSource::X509Data(data) => Some(data.crls.as_slice()),
                    _ => None,
                })
                .flatten();
            let crls = self
                .inventory
                .crls
                .iter()
                .chain(document_crls)
                .filter(|_| policy.key_trust.check_crls && policy.key_trust.verify_x509_chains);
            let mut total = selected_material_bytes;
            for material in certificates.chain(crls.clone()) {
                if material.len() > policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes {
                    return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                        resource: crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                        maximum: policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
                        actual: material.len(),
                    }
                    .into());
                }
                // The owned resolver config and its borrowed inventory/document
                // input coexist. Reserve both payloads before any config clone;
                // this is live-memory policy, not a certificate syntax rule.
                for _ in 0..2 {
                    debug_assert!(total <= policy.resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes);
                    if material.len() > policy.resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes - total {
                        return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                            resource:
                                crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                            maximum: policy.resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
                            actual: total.saturating_add(material.len()),
                        }
                        .into());
                    }
                    total += material.len();
                }
            }
            DefaultKeyResolver::new(KeyResolverConfig {
                lookup_certs: self.inventory.lookup_certificates.clone(),
                trusted_certs: self.inventory.trusted_certificates.clone(),
                crls: crls.cloned().collect(),
                ..KeyResolverConfig::default()
            })
        } else {
            DefaultKeyResolver::new(KeyResolverConfig::default())
        };
        if let Some(first_x509) = configured_x509_index
            && let Some(info) = selected_info
        {
            // Resume after the inspected prefix: one budget counts actual
            // work, not a replay caused by attaching configured certificates.
            let mut outcome = fallback.resolve_sources_with_candidate_budget(
                info,
                algorithm,
                policy,
                provider,
                &mut inspected_candidates,
                if candidate.is_some() {
                    crate::xmldsig::keys::ResolutionScope::TrustedSuffix(first_x509)
                } else {
                    crate::xmldsig::keys::ResolutionScope::DocumentSuffix(first_x509)
                },
            )?;
            // Terminal suffix failures have already propagated. On a complete
            // miss, keep the first deferred error in original source order.
            if outcome.key.is_none()
                && let Some(error) = prefix_error
            {
                outcome.deferred_error = Some(error);
            }
            return outcome.finish();
        }
        if let Some(candidate) = candidate {
            return fallback.resolve_trusted_material_with_candidate_budget(
                &candidate.key_info,
                algorithm,
                policy,
                provider,
                &mut inspected_candidates,
            );
        }
        fallback.resolve_with_candidate_budget(
            key_info,
            algorithm,
            policy,
            provider,
            &mut inspected_candidates,
        )
    }

    fn consumes_document_key_info(&self) -> bool {
        true
    }
}

enum ParsedMaterial {
    Symmetric(SymmetricKeyKind, Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>),
    Public(KeyValueInfo),
    Dsa(KeyValueInfo, Option<Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>>),
    Unsupported,
}

type ParsedDsaKey = (KeyValueInfo, Option<Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>>);

#[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
struct InventoryDirectAes(Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>);

#[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
impl crate::xmlenc::DecryptionKeyResolver for InventoryDirectAes {
    fn resolve_key(
        &self,
        _provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
        algorithm: crate::xmlenc::DataEncryptionAlgorithm,
        encrypted_key: Option<&crate::xmlenc::EncryptedKey>,
    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, crate::xmlenc::XmlEncError> {
        if encrypted_key.is_some() {
            return Err(crate::xmlenc::XmlEncError::KeyNotFound);
        }
        crate::xmlenc::validate_key_len(algorithm, &self.0)?;
        Ok(self.0.to_vec())
    }

    fn resolve_key_candidates(
        &self,
        provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
        algorithm: crate::xmlenc::DataEncryptionAlgorithm,
        encrypted_key: Option<&crate::xmlenc::EncryptedKey>,
        budget: &mut crate::xmlenc::KeyCandidateBudget,
    ) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>, crate::xmlenc::XmlEncError> {
        // This inventory entry is a content key, not a transport key.
        // Ineligible recipient paths neither copy it nor consume candidates.
        if encrypted_key.is_some() {
            return Err(crate::xmlenc::XmlEncError::KeyNotFound);
        }
        budget.consume(1)?;
        self.resolve_key(provider, algorithm, None)
            .map(|key| vec![key])
    }

    fn resolve_key_candidates_with_policy(
        &self,
        provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
        algorithm: crate::xmlenc::DataEncryptionAlgorithm,
        encrypted_key: Option<&crate::xmlenc::EncryptedKey>,
        policy: &crate::policy::DecryptionPolicy,
        budget: &mut crate::xmlenc::KeyCandidateBudget,
    ) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>, crate::xmlenc::XmlEncError> {
        policy.validate()?;
        if encrypted_key.is_some() {
            return Err(crate::xmlenc::XmlEncError::KeyNotFound);
        }
        check_selected_material_size(self.0.len(), &policy.resources).map_err(
            |error| match error {
                KeyStoreError::Policy(violation) => crate::xmlenc::XmlEncError::Policy(violation),
                other => crate::xmlenc::XmlEncError::InvalidStructure(other.to_string()),
            },
        )?;
        self.resolve_key_candidates(provider, algorithm, None, budget)
    }
}

#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
/// Key-store import errors that never include secret material.
pub enum KeyStoreError {
    /// The XML structure or key material was invalid.
    #[error("invalid xmlsec keys.xml: {0}")]
    Invalid(String),
    /// The named key is missing, duplicated, or incompatible with the requested operation.
    #[error("key inventory selection failed: {0}")]
    Selection(&'static str),
    /// The active operation policy rejected the key or its resources.
    #[error("key inventory policy violation: {0}")]
    Policy(#[from] crate::policy::PolicyViolation),
    /// A protected container could not be decoded with the supplied password.
    #[error("protected key container could not be decoded")]
    ProtectedContainer,
}

impl KeyInventory {
    /// Work reserved before password derivation, including unsuccessful imports.
    /// An operation importing through temporary inventories must carry this
    /// usage forward rather than resetting its remaining KDF allowance.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn key_import_kdf_work(&self) -> usize {
        self.kdf_work
    }

    fn retained_material_bytes(&self) -> Result<usize, KeyStoreError> {
        let mut total = 0_usize;
        let mut add = |length: usize| -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
            total = total
                .checked_add(length)
                .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("key material size overflow"))?;
            Ok(())
        };
        for key in &self.symmetric_keys {
            add(key.name.len())?;
            add(key.bytes.len())?;
        }
        for key in &self.private_keys {
            add(key.name.len())?;
            add(key.pkcs8_der.len())?;
            for certificate in &key.certificate_chain {
                add(certificate.len())?;
            }
        }
        for key in &self.public_keys {
            add(key.name.len())?;
            for source in &key.key_info.sources {
                match source {
                    KeyInfoSource::KeyName(name) => add(name.len())?,
                    KeyInfoSource::KeyValue(KeyValueInfo::Dsa { p, q, g, y }) => {
                        add(p.as_ref().map_or(0, Vec::len))?;
                        add(q.as_ref().map_or(0, Vec::len))?;
                        add(g.as_ref().map_or(0, Vec::len))?;
                        add(y.len())?;
                    }
                    KeyInfoSource::KeyValue(KeyValueInfo::Rsa { modulus, exponent }) => {
                        add(modulus.len())?;
                        add(exponent.len())?;
                    }
                    KeyInfoSource::KeyValue(KeyValueInfo::Ec {
                        curve_oid,
                        public_key,
                    }) => {
                        add(curve_oid.len())?;
                        add(public_key.len())?;
                    }
                    KeyInfoSource::DerEncodedKeyValue(bytes) => add(bytes.len())?,
                    _ => {}
                }
            }
        }
        for certificate in self
            .lookup_certificates
            .iter()
            .chain(&self.trusted_certificates)
        {
            add(certificate.len())?;
        }
        for crl in &self.crls {
            add(crl.len())?;
        }
        Ok(total)
    }

    /// Number of imported candidates, including unsupported XML entries.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn entry_count(&self) -> usize {
        self.entry_count
    }

    /// Imported symmetric keys, without mutable access to inventory bounds.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn symmetric_keys(&self) -> &[StoredSymmetricKey] {
        &self.symmetric_keys
    }

    /// Imported public keys, without mutable access to inventory bounds.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn public_keys(&self) -> &[StoredPublicKey] {
        &self.public_keys
    }

    /// Imported private keys, without mutable access to inventory bounds.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn private_keys(&self) -> &[StoredPrivateKey] {
        &self.private_keys
    }

    /// Combine two caller-owned imports after checking aggregate bytes,
    /// candidates, KDF work, and cross-store name collisions before mutation.
    pub fn extend(
        &mut self,
        mut other: Self,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        ensure_resource_policy(resources)?;
        let work = self
            .kdf_work
            .checked_add(other.kdf_work)
            .filter(|work| *work <= resources.max_key_import_kdf_work)
            .ok_or_else(|| {
                import_resource_limit(
                    crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_IMPORT_KDF_WORK,
                    resources.max_key_import_kdf_work,
                )
            })?;
        let candidates = self
            .entry_count
            .checked_add(other.entry_count)
            .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("key candidate count overflow"))?;
        if candidates > resources.max_key_candidates {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
                resources.max_key_candidates,
            ));
        }
        let bytes = self
            .material_bytes
            .checked_add(other.material_bytes)
            .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("key material size overflow"))?;
        if bytes > resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
            ));
        }
        let mut names = HashSet::new();
        for name in other
            .symmetric_keys
            .iter()
            .map(|entry| entry.name.as_str())
            .chain(other.public_keys.iter().map(|entry| entry.name.as_str()))
            .chain(other.private_keys.iter().map(|entry| entry.name.as_str()))
        {
            names.insert(name);
        }
        if names.iter().any(|name| {
            self.symmetric_keys.iter().any(|entry| entry.name == *name)
                || self.public_keys.iter().any(|entry| entry.name == *name)
                || self.private_keys.iter().any(|entry| entry.name == *name)
        }) {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("duplicate key name"));
        }
        self.entry_count = candidates;
        self.material_bytes = bytes;
        self.kdf_work = work;
        self.symmetric_keys.append(&mut other.symmetric_keys);
        self.public_keys.append(&mut other.public_keys);
        self.private_keys.append(&mut other.private_keys);
        self.lookup_certificates
            .append(&mut other.lookup_certificates);
        self.trusted_certificates
            .append(&mut other.trusted_certificates);
        self.crls.append(&mut other.crls);
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Select an authorized named RSA recipient from XMLDSig RSAKeyValue or
    /// DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo without introducing an implicit key source.
    #[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
    pub fn rsa_encryption_key(
        &self,
        name: &str,
        policy: &crate::policy::EncryptionPolicy,
    ) -> Result<RsaPublicKey, KeyStoreError> {
        policy.validate()?;
        let entry = find_named_entry(
            &self.public_keys,
            name,
            &policy.resources,
            &mut 0,
            |entry| &entry.name,
        )?
        .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("named encryption key not found"))?;
        entry.rsa_encryption_key(policy)
    }

    /// Select a named signer under the operation's immutable policy.
    pub fn signing_key(
        &self,
        name: &str,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        policy: &crate::policy::SigningPolicy,
    ) -> Result<Box<dyn SigningKey>, KeyStoreError> {
        self.signing_key_with_budget(name, algorithm, policy, &mut SigningLookupBudget::default())
    }

    /// Select a named signer while sharing lookup work across caller retries.
    pub fn signing_key_with_budget(
        &self,
        name: &str,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        policy: &crate::policy::SigningPolicy,
        budget: &mut SigningLookupBudget,
    ) -> Result<Box<dyn SigningKey>, KeyStoreError> {
        self.signing_key_with_provider_and_budget(
            name,
            algorithm,
            policy,
            crate::provider::default_provider(),
            budget,
        )
    }

    /// Select an authorized key and import it into the explicitly chosen engine.
    pub fn signing_key_with_provider(
        &self,
        name: &str,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        policy: &crate::policy::SigningPolicy,
        provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
    ) -> Result<Box<dyn SigningKey>, KeyStoreError> {
        self.signing_key_with_provider_and_budget(
            name,
            algorithm,
            policy,
            provider,
            &mut SigningLookupBudget::default(),
        )
    }

    /// Provider-aware selection sharing the operation's retry budget.
    pub fn signing_key_with_provider_and_budget(
        &self,
        name: &str,
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
        policy: &crate::policy::SigningPolicy,
        provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
        budget: &mut SigningLookupBudget,
    ) -> Result<Box<dyn SigningKey>, KeyStoreError> {
        policy.validate()?;
        policy.check_signature_algorithm(algorithm)?;
        provider
            .require_capability(crate::provider::ProviderCapability::Sign(algorithm))
            .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("provider does not support signing method"))?;
        if algorithm.hmac_output_bits().is_some() {
            let entry = find_named_entry(
                &self.symmetric_keys,
                name,
                &policy.resources,
                &mut budget.inspected,
                |entry| &entry.name,
            )?
            .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("named signing key not found"))?;
            if entry.kind != SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac || !entry.usages.allows(KeyUsage::Sign) {
                return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
                    "key is not authorized for signing",
                ));
            }
            check_operation_material_size(entry.bytes.len(), &policy.resources)?;
            let key = HmacSigningKey::new(entry.bytes.to_vec())
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid HMAC key"))?;
            validate_signing_key(&key, algorithm, policy).map_err(signing_policy_error)?;
            return Ok(Box::new(key));
        }
        let entry = find_named_entry(
            &self.private_keys,
            name,
            &policy.resources,
            &mut budget.inspected,
            |entry| &entry.name,
        )?
        .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("named signing key not found"))?;
        if !entry.usages.allows(KeyUsage::Sign) {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
                "key is not authorized for signing",
            ));
        }
        let der = entry.pkcs8_der.as_slice();
        check_operation_material_size(der.len(), &policy.resources)?;
        if let Ok(info) = PrivateKeyInfoRef::try_from(der)
            && info.algorithm.oid == dsa::OID
        {
            preflight_dsa_pkcs8_components(&info)?;
        }
        let key = provider
            .import_signing_key(algorithm, der)
            .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("incompatible signing key for provider"))?;
        validate_signing_key(key.as_ref(), algorithm, policy).map_err(signing_policy_error)?;
        Ok(key)
    }

    /// Select a named direct AES key or RSA private-key transport resolver.
    #[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
    pub fn decryption_resolver(
        &self,
        name: &str,
        policy: &crate::policy::DecryptionPolicy,
    ) -> Result<Box<dyn crate::xmlenc::DecryptionKeyResolver>, KeyStoreError> {
        self.decryption_resolver_with_provider(name, policy, crate::provider::default_provider())
    }

    /// Select an authorized recovery key owned by the chosen native engine.
    #[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
    pub fn decryption_resolver_with_provider(
        &self,
        name: &str,
        policy: &crate::policy::DecryptionPolicy,
        provider: &dyn crate::provider::CryptoProvider,
    ) -> Result<Box<dyn crate::xmlenc::DecryptionKeyResolver>, KeyStoreError> {
        policy.validate()?;
        let mut visited = 0;
        if let Some(entry) = find_named_entry(
            &self.symmetric_keys,
            name,
            &policy.resources,
            &mut visited,
            |entry| &entry.name,
        )? {
            if entry.kind != SymmetricKeyKind::Aes || !entry.usages.allows(KeyUsage::Decrypt) {
                return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
                    "key is not authorized for decryption",
                ));
            }
            check_selected_material_size(entry.bytes.len(), &policy.resources)?;
            return Ok(Box::new(InventoryDirectAes(Zeroizing::new(
                entry.bytes.to_vec(),
            ))));
        }
        let entry = find_named_entry(
            &self.private_keys,
            name,
            &policy.resources,
            &mut visited,
            |entry| &entry.name,
        )?
        .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("named decryption key not found"))?;
        if !entry.usages.allows(KeyUsage::Decrypt) {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
                "key is not authorized for decryption",
            ));
        }
        check_selected_material_size(entry.pkcs8_der.len(), &policy.resources)?;
        // Borrow public PKCS#1 components before bigint decoding: import
        // permission is not an exemption from the decryption snapshot.
        let info = PrivateKeyInfoRef::try_from(entry.pkcs8_der.as_slice())
            .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("incompatible RSA decryption key"))?;
        let components = rsa::pkcs1::RsaPrivateKey::from_der(info.private_key.as_bytes())
            .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("incompatible RSA decryption key"))?;
        policy.rsa_keys.validate_components(
            "decryption",
            components.modulus.as_bytes(),
            components.public_exponent.as_bytes(),
        )?;
        let key = provider
            .import_recovery_key(&entry.pkcs8_der)
            .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("incompatible RSA decryption key"))?;
        Ok(Box::new(crate::xmlenc::PrivateKeyDecryptor::provider_key(
            key,
        )))
    }
    /// Build a resolver from this inventory and one immutable key-store snapshot.
    /// Trust anchors are copied once, not on each candidate lookup.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn verification_resolver(&self) -> InventoryVerificationResolver<'_> {
        InventoryVerificationResolver { inventory: self }
    }
    /// Register raw symmetric bytes under a unique name.
    pub fn add_symmetric(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        kind: SymmetricKeyKind,
        bytes: Vec<u8>,
        usages: KeyUsages,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        self.check_new_name(&name, resources)?;
        if bytes.len() > resources.max_external_resource_bytes {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
            ));
        }
        if bytes.is_empty()
            || (kind == SymmetricKeyKind::Aes && !matches!(bytes.len(), 16 | 24 | 32))
        {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid symmetric key length"));
        }
        let permitted = match kind {
            SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac => KeyUsages::SIGN.union(KeyUsages::VERIFY),
            SymmetricKeyKind::Aes => KeyUsages::ENCRYPT.union(KeyUsages::DECRYPT),
            SymmetricKeyKind::Des => {
                return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("DES encryption is unsupported"));
            }
        };
        if usages.0 == 0 || usages.0 & !permitted.0 != 0 {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
                "symmetric key usage is incompatible",
            ));
        }
        self.reserve_material(named_material_length(&name, bytes.len(), 1)?, resources)?;
        self.symmetric_keys.push(StoredSymmetricKey {
            name,
            kind,
            bytes: Zeroizing::new(bytes),
            usages,
        });
        self.entry_count += 1;
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Register DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo or a complete X.509 certificate.
    /// A certificate is a lookup candidate, never an implicit trust anchor.
    pub fn add_public_der(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        der: Vec<u8>,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        self.add_public_der_inner(name, der, None, resources)
    }

    /// Register public DER with explicit verification/encryption permissions.
    pub fn add_public_der_with_usages(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        der: Vec<u8>,
        usages: KeyUsages,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        self.add_public_der_inner(name, der, Some(usages), resources)
    }

    fn add_public_der_inner(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        der: Vec<u8>,
        usages: Option<KeyUsages>,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        self.add_public_der_payload(
            name,
            der,
            usages,
            resources,
            PublicDerFormat::KeyOrCertificate,
        )
    }

    fn add_public_der_payload(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        der: Vec<u8>,
        usages: Option<KeyUsages>,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
        format: PublicDerFormat,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        self.check_new_name(&name, resources)?;
        let permitted = KeyUsages::VERIFY.union(KeyUsages::ENCRYPT);
        if usages.is_some_and(|usages| usages.0 == 0 || usages.0 & !permitted.0 != 0) {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("public key usage is incompatible"));
        }
        if der.len() > resources.max_external_resource_bytes {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
            ));
        }
        self.check_material_capacity(named_material_length(&name, der.len(), 2)?, resources)?;
        let material_len = der.len();
        let mut key_info = KeyInfo::default();
        key_info.sources.push(KeyInfoSource::KeyName(name.clone()));
        let is_rsa = if let Ok((rest, spki)) =
            x509_parser::x509::SubjectPublicKeyInfo::from_der(&der)
            && rest.is_empty()
            && spki.raw == der
        {
            let is_rsa = crate::xmldsig::keys::supported_parsed_spki_is_rsa(&spki, &der)
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("unsupported public key algorithm"))?;
            key_info
                .sources
                .push(KeyInfoSource::DerEncodedKeyValue(der));
            is_rsa
        } else {
            if matches!(format, PublicDerFormat::SubjectPublicKeyInfo) {
                // RFC 7468 section 13 identifies PUBLIC KEY as SPKI. Section 2
                // permits reinterpretation, but this label-dispatched API does
                // not: certificate fallback belongs only to generic DER import.
                // https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7468#section-13
                // https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7468#section-2
                return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid PUBLIC KEY payload"));
            }
            let (rest, certificate) = X509Certificate::from_der(&der)
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid public key or X.509 certificate"))?;
            if !rest.is_empty() {
                return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid X.509 certificate"));
            }
            let parsed = crate::xmldsig::parse::parse_x509_certificate(&der)
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("unsupported X.509 certificate key"))?;
            let is_rsa = crate::xmldsig::keys::supported_parsed_spki_is_rsa(
                certificate.public_key(),
                certificate.public_key().raw,
            )
            .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("unsupported X.509 certificate key"))?;
            key_info.sources.push(KeyInfoSource::X509Data(X509DataInfo {
                certificates: vec![der],
                parsed_certificates: vec![parsed],
                certificate_chain: vec![0],
                ..X509DataInfo::default()
            }));
            is_rsa
        };
        let usages = usages.unwrap_or(if is_rsa { permitted } else { KeyUsages::VERIFY });
        if usages.allows(KeyUsage::Encrypt) && !is_rsa {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
                "only RSA public keys can be used for encryption",
            ));
        }
        self.reserve_material(named_material_length(&name, material_len, 2)?, resources)?;
        self.public_keys.push(StoredPublicKey {
            name,
            key_info,
            usages,
        });
        self.entry_count += 1;
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Import one PEM-encoded public key. RFC 7468 labels select SPKI or
    /// PKCS#1; extra text and multiple armor blocks are rejected.
    /// Aggregate capacity includes retained inventory, the live encoded input,
    /// decoded DER, and any SPKI normalization output before allocation.
    pub fn add_public_pem(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        bytes: &[u8],
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        self.add_public_pem_inner(name, bytes, None, resources)
    }

    /// Import one PEM public key with explicit verification/encryption permissions.
    pub fn add_public_pem_with_usages(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        bytes: &[u8],
        usages: KeyUsages,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        self.add_public_pem_inner(name, bytes, Some(usages), resources)
    }

    fn add_public_pem_inner(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        bytes: &[u8],
        usages: Option<KeyUsages>,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        ensure_resource_policy(resources)?;
        self.check_new_name(&name, resources)?;
        self.check_material_capacity(named_material_length(&name, bytes.len(), 2)?, resources)?;
        let block = BorrowedPem::parse(bytes, resources.max_external_resource_bytes)?;
        if !matches!(block.label, "PUBLIC KEY" | "RSA PUBLIC KEY") {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("unsupported public PEM label"));
        }
        self.check_material_capacity(
            named_material_length(
                &name,
                bytes
                    .len()
                    .checked_add(block.decoded_len)
                    .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("key material size overflow"))?,
                2,
            )?,
            resources,
        )?;
        let decoded = block.decode()?;
        let der = match block.label {
            "PUBLIC KEY" => decoded,
            "RSA PUBLIC KEY" => {
                use der::Encode as _;
                let components = rsa::pkcs1::RsaPublicKey::from_der(&decoded)
                    .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA public key"))?;
                crate::xmldsig::keys::bounded_rsa_public_components(
                    components.modulus.as_bytes(),
                    components.public_exponent.as_bytes(),
                )
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("RSA public key exceeds safety limit"))?;
                // Wrap borrowed PKCS#1 bytes directly; the final SPKI importer
                // performs native RSA validation once, without an intermediate key.
                let spki = rsa::pkcs8::SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef {
                    algorithm: rsa::pkcs1::ALGORITHM_ID,
                    subject_public_key: der::asn1::BitStringRef::new(0, &decoded)
                        .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA public key"))?,
                };
                let encoded_len = usize::try_from(
                    spki.encoded_len()
                        .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA public key"))?,
                )
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA public key"))?;
                if encoded_len > resources.max_external_resource_bytes {
                    return Err(import_resource_limit(
                        crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                        resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
                    ));
                }
                self.check_material_capacity(
                    named_material_length(
                        &name,
                        bytes
                            .len()
                            .checked_add(decoded.capacity())
                            .and_then(|total| total.checked_add(encoded_len))
                            .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("key material size overflow"))?,
                        2,
                    )?,
                    resources,
                )?;
                spki.to_der()
                    .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA public key"))?
            }
            _ => return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("unsupported public PEM label")),
        };
        let previous_total = self.material_bytes;
        let charged_total = self.check_material_capacity(
            named_material_length(&name, bytes.len().max(der.len()), 2)?,
            resources,
        )?;
        self.add_public_der_payload(
            name,
            der,
            usages,
            resources,
            PublicDerFormat::SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
        )?;
        debug_assert!(self.material_bytes >= previous_total);
        self.material_bytes = charged_total;
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Import a DER private key as PKCS#8 (plain or encrypted) or RSA PKCS#1.
    /// Passwords are consulted only for a structurally encrypted container;
    /// a wrong password never retries a plaintext decoder.
    pub fn add_private_der(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        bytes: &[u8],
        password: Option<&[u8]>,
        usages: KeyUsages,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        self.add_private_der_inner(name, bytes, password, usages, resources, 0)
    }

    fn add_private_der_inner(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        bytes: &[u8],
        password: Option<&[u8]>,
        usages: KeyUsages,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
        live_encoded_bytes: usize,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        self.check_new_name(&name, resources)?;
        if bytes.len() > resources.max_external_resource_bytes {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
            ));
        }
        let retained_with_input =
            self.check_material_capacity(named_material_length(&name, bytes.len(), 1)?, resources)?;
        validate_private_key_usages(usages)?;
        // Borrowed input and decoded PEM remain live while an owned output is
        // created. Preflight that peak, not only the final inventory footprint.
        let check_plain_output = |output: usize| {
            if output > resources.max_external_resource_bytes {
                return Err(import_resource_limit(
                    crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
                ));
            }
            let live = bytes
                .len()
                .checked_add(live_encoded_bytes)
                .and_then(|live| live.checked_add(output))
                .ok_or_else(|| {
                    import_resource_limit(
                        crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                        resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
                    )
                })?;
            self.check_material_capacity(named_material_length(&name, live, 1)?, resources)
        };
        let der = if PrivateKeyInfoRef::try_from(bytes).is_ok() {
            check_plain_output(bytes.len())?;
            Zeroizing::new(bytes.to_vec())
        } else if let Ok(encrypted) = EncryptedPrivateKeyInfoRef::try_from(bytes) {
            // PEM decoding does not end the caller's encoded buffer lifetime.
            // Its bytes coexist with DER and the KDF workspace, not replace DER.
            let kdf_live_bytes = retained_with_input
                .checked_add(live_encoded_bytes)
                .ok_or_else(|| {
                    import_resource_limit(
                        crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                        resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
                    )
                })?;
            let remaining = self.remaining_kdf_resources(resources)?;
            enforce_pkcs8_kdf_policy(&encrypted, &remaining, kdf_live_bytes)?;
            let password = password.ok_or(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)?;
            let work =
                enforce_pkcs8_password_policy(&encrypted, password, &remaining, kdf_live_bytes)?;
            self.kdf_work += work;
            // Decrypt in the one preflighted, zeroizing output allocation;
            // SecretDocument followed by to_vec would retain two plaintext copies.
            let mut plain = Zeroizing::new(encrypted.encrypted_data.as_bytes().to_vec());
            let plaintext_len = encrypted
                .encryption_algorithm
                .decrypt_in_place(password, &mut plain)
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)?;
            let plaintext_len = plaintext_len.len();
            plain.truncate(plaintext_len);
            PrivateKeyInfoRef::try_from(plain.as_slice())
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)?;
            plain
        } else {
            use der::Encode as _;
            preflight_rsa_pkcs1_components(bytes)?;
            // RFC 8017 A.1.2 / RFC 5958 section 2: wrap the original PKCS#1
            // octets directly, avoiding bigint re-encoding and two owned DERs.
            // https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5958#section-2
            let normalized = PrivateKeyInfoRef::new(
                rsa::pkcs1::ALGORITHM_ID,
                der::asn1::OctetStringRef::new(bytes)
                    .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA private key"))?,
            );
            let size = usize::try_from(
                normalized
                    .encoded_len()
                    .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA private key"))?,
            )
            .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("key material size overflow"))?;
            check_plain_output(size)?;
            let normalized = normalized
                .to_der()
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA private key"))?;
            Zeroizing::new(normalized)
        };
        if der.len() > resources.max_external_resource_bytes {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
            ));
        }
        let identity = PrivateKeyIdentity::decode(&der)?;
        if usages.allows(KeyUsage::Decrypt) && !matches!(identity, PrivateKeyIdentity::Rsa(_)) {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
                "only RSA private keys can be used for decryption",
            ));
        }
        drop(identity);
        self.reserve_material(
            named_material_length(&name, bytes.len().max(der.len()), 1)?,
            resources,
        )?;
        self.private_keys.push(StoredPrivateKey {
            name,
            pkcs8_der: der,
            usages,
            certificate_chain: Vec::new(),
            has_matching_leaf: false,
        });
        self.entry_count += 1;
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Import private DER using a caller-owned password callback only when
    /// the input is an encrypted PKCS#8 container.
    pub fn add_private_der_with_password_callback<F>(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        bytes: &[u8],
        password: F,
        usages: KeyUsages,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError>
    where
        F: FnOnce() -> Option<Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>>,
    {
        self.check_new_name(&name, resources)?;
        validate_private_key_usages(usages)?;
        if bytes.len() > resources.max_external_resource_bytes {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
            ));
        }
        let retained_with_input =
            self.check_material_capacity(named_material_length(&name, bytes.len(), 1)?, resources)?;
        let encrypted = EncryptedPrivateKeyInfoRef::try_from(bytes).ok();
        let secret = if let Some(encrypted) = &encrypted {
            let remaining = self.remaining_kdf_resources(resources)?;
            // Secret acquisition is observable work: use the same remaining
            // allowance as direct import before invoking the caller.
            enforce_pkcs8_kdf_policy(encrypted, &remaining, retained_with_input)?;
            Some(password().ok_or(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)?)
        } else {
            None
        };
        if let Some(secret) = &secret {
            // The callback owns capacity, not only initialized password bytes.
            self.check_material_capacity(
                named_material_length(
                    &name,
                    bytes.len().checked_add(secret.capacity()).ok_or_else(|| {
                        import_resource_limit(
                            crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                            resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
                        )
                    })?,
                    1,
                )?,
                resources,
            )?;
            let encrypted = encrypted
                .as_ref()
                .ok_or(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)?;
            enforce_pkcs8_password_policy(
                encrypted,
                secret,
                &self.remaining_kdf_resources(resources)?,
                retained_with_input + secret.capacity() - secret.len(),
            )?;
        }
        self.add_private_der(
            name,
            bytes,
            secret.as_deref().map(Vec::as_slice),
            usages,
            resources,
        )
    }

    /// Import one PEM private key, including encrypted PKCS#8. Traditional
    /// OpenSSL PEM encryption is handled at the CLI compatibility boundary.
    pub fn add_private_pem(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        bytes: &[u8],
        password: Option<&[u8]>,
        usages: KeyUsages,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        ensure_resource_policy(resources)?;
        self.check_new_name(&name, resources)?;
        self.check_material_capacity(named_material_length(&name, bytes.len(), 1)?, resources)?;
        let block = BorrowedPem::parse(bytes, resources.max_external_resource_bytes)?;
        validate_private_key_usages(usages)?;
        self.check_material_capacity(
            named_material_length(
                &name,
                bytes
                    .len()
                    .checked_add(block.decoded_len)
                    .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("key material size overflow"))?,
                1,
            )?,
            resources,
        )?;
        enum Payload {
            Plain,
            Encrypted,
            Rsa,
        }
        let payload = match block.label {
            "PRIVATE KEY" => Payload::Plain,
            "ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY" => Payload::Encrypted,
            "RSA PRIVATE KEY" => Payload::Rsa,
            _ => return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("unsupported private PEM label")),
        };
        let mut der = Zeroizing::new(vec![0; block.decoded_len]);
        block.decode_into(&mut der)?;
        // RFC 7468 sections 10/11 define distinct PKCS#8 labels. Section 2
        // permits reinterpretation, but our protected-key contract forbids it:
        // https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7468#section-2
        match payload {
            Payload::Encrypted => {
                EncryptedPrivateKeyInfoRef::try_from(der.as_slice())
                    .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)?;
            }
            Payload::Plain => {
                PrivateKeyInfoRef::try_from(der.as_slice())
                    .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid PRIVATE KEY payload"))?;
            }
            Payload::Rsa => preflight_rsa_pkcs1_components(&der)?,
        }
        let previous_total = self.material_bytes;
        let name_len = name.len();
        self.add_private_der_inner(name, &der, password, usages, resources, bytes.len())?;
        let retained_len = self.material_bytes - previous_total;
        self.material_bytes = previous_total + name_len + bytes.len().max(retained_len - name_len);
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Import a bounded PKCS#12 bundle from caller-owned bytes. The key may
    /// sign; RSA keys may also decrypt. A bundle with more than one private
    /// key is rejected rather than assigning names from iteration order.
    pub fn add_pkcs12(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        bytes: &[u8],
        password: &str,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        self.add_pkcs12_inner(
            name,
            bytes,
            password,
            KeyUsages::SIGN.union(KeyUsages::DECRYPT),
            resources,
            true,
        )
    }

    /// Import PKCS#12 using a caller-owned password callback. Its result is
    /// zeroized after decoding and callback failure exposes no diagnostic.
    pub fn add_pkcs12_with_password_callback<F>(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        bytes: &[u8],
        password: F,
        usages: KeyUsages,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError>
    where
        F: FnOnce() -> Option<Zeroizing<String>>,
    {
        let limits = self.pkcs12_import_limits(&name, bytes, usages, resources)?;
        let prepared = pkcs12_import::prepare_with_work(bytes, &limits, self.kdf_work)?;
        let secret = password().ok_or(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)?;
        let contents =
            prepared.decrypt_with_work(&secret, secret.capacity(), &mut self.kdf_work)?;
        self.add_pkcs12_contents(name, bytes.len(), contents, usages, resources, false)
    }

    /// Import a PKCS#12 bundle with explicit signing/decryption permissions.
    pub fn add_pkcs12_with_usages(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        bytes: &[u8],
        password: &str,
        usages: KeyUsages,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        self.add_pkcs12_inner(name, bytes, password, usages, resources, false)
    }

    fn add_pkcs12_inner(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        bytes: &[u8],
        password: &str,
        usages: KeyUsages,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
        auto_decrypt: bool,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        let limits = self.pkcs12_import_limits(&name, bytes, usages, resources)?;
        let contents = pkcs12_import::prepare_with_work(bytes, &limits, self.kdf_work)?
            .decrypt_with_work(password, password.len(), &mut self.kdf_work)?;
        self.add_pkcs12_contents(name, bytes.len(), contents, usages, resources, auto_decrypt)
    }

    fn add_pkcs12_contents(
        &mut self,
        name: String,
        encoded_len: usize,
        mut contents: pkcs12_import::Contents,
        mut usages: KeyUsages,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
        auto_decrypt: bool,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        if contents.private_keys.len() != 1 {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
                "PKCS#12 bundle must contain exactly one private key",
            ));
        }
        let private_key = contents
            .private_keys
            .pop()
            .ok_or(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)?;
        let mut certificates = contents.certificates;
        let identity = PrivateKeyIdentity::decode(private_key.as_ref())?;
        if usages.allows(KeyUsage::Decrypt) && !matches!(identity, PrivateKeyIdentity::Rsa(_)) {
            if auto_decrypt {
                usages = KeyUsages::SIGN;
            } else {
                return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
                    "only RSA private keys can be used for decryption",
                ));
            }
        }
        let mut matching_leaf = None;
        for certificate in &certificates {
            let (rest, parsed) = X509Certificate::from_der(certificate)
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid certificate in PKCS#12"))?;
            if !rest.is_empty() {
                return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid certificate in PKCS#12"));
            }
            if identity.matches_spki(parsed.public_key().raw) {
                if matching_leaf.is_some_and(|leaf: &[u8]| leaf != certificate.as_slice()) {
                    return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
                        "ambiguous certificate for PKCS#12 private key",
                    ));
                }
                // RFC 7292 section 4.2 permits repeated certificate bags.
                // Identical DER is the same leaf, not a second candidate.
                matching_leaf = Some(certificate.as_slice());
            }
        }
        drop(identity);
        // PKCS#12 may carry unrelated CA certificates. They remain lookup
        // material; only an actual SPKI match is promoted to the leaf slot.
        let has_matching_leaf = matching_leaf.is_some();
        if let Some(leaf) = matching_leaf {
            let position = certificates
                .iter()
                .position(|candidate| candidate == leaf)
                .ok_or(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)?;
            certificates.swap(0, position);
            let mut index = 1;
            while index < certificates.len() {
                if certificates[index] == certificates[0] {
                    certificates.remove(index);
                } else {
                    index += 1;
                }
            }
        }
        let decoded_bytes = certificates
            .iter()
            .try_fold(private_key.len(), |total, cert| {
                total
                    .checked_add(cert.len())
                    .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("key material size overflow"))
            })?;
        let retained_candidates = 1_usize
            .checked_add(certificates.len())
            .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("key candidate count overflow"))?;
        let remaining_candidates = resources.max_key_candidates - self.entry_count;
        if retained_candidates > remaining_candidates {
            return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded {
                resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
                maximum: remaining_candidates,
            }
            .into());
        }
        self.reserve_material(
            named_material_length(&name, decoded_bytes.max(encoded_len), 1)?,
            resources,
        )?;
        self.private_keys.push(StoredPrivateKey {
            name,
            pkcs8_der: private_key,
            usages,
            certificate_chain: certificates,
            has_matching_leaf,
        });
        self.entry_count += retained_candidates;
        Ok(())
    }

    fn pkcs12_import_limits(
        &self,
        name: &str,
        bytes: &[u8],
        usages: KeyUsages,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<Pkcs12Limits, KeyStoreError> {
        self.check_new_name(name, resources)?;
        validate_private_key_usages(usages)?;
        if bytes.len() > resources.max_external_resource_bytes {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    maximum: resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
                },
            ));
        }
        let retained_with_input =
            self.check_material_capacity(named_material_length(name, bytes.len(), 1)?, resources)?;
        let remaining_candidates = resources.max_key_candidates - self.entry_count;
        Ok(Pkcs12Limits {
            resources: resources.clone(),
            candidates: remaining_candidates,
            // Borrowing the PFX does not end its lifetime during decryption.
            memory_available: resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes - retained_with_input,
        })
    }

    fn check_new_name(&self, name: &str, resources: &ResourcePolicy) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        ensure_resource_policy(resources)?;
        if name.is_empty() {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("empty key name"));
        }
        if self.entry_count >= resources.max_key_candidates {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
                resources.max_key_candidates,
            ));
        }
        if name.len() > resources.max_external_resource_bytes {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
            ));
        }
        self.check_material_capacity(name.len(), resources)?;
        if self.symmetric_keys.iter().any(|key| key.name == name)
            || self.public_keys.iter().any(|key| key.name == name)
            || self.private_keys.iter().any(|key| key.name == name)
        {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("duplicate key name"));
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    fn remaining_kdf_resources(
        &self,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<ResourcePolicy, KeyStoreError> {
        if self.kdf_work > resources.max_key_import_kdf_work {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_IMPORT_KDF_WORK,
                resources.max_key_import_kdf_work,
            ));
        }
        let mut remaining = resources.clone();
        remaining.max_key_import_kdf_work -= self.kdf_work;
        Ok(remaining)
    }

    fn check_material_capacity(
        &self,
        length: usize,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<usize, KeyStoreError> {
        let total = self.material_bytes.checked_add(length).ok_or_else(|| {
            import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
            )
        })?;
        if total > resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
            ));
        }
        Ok(total)
    }

    fn reserve_material(
        &mut self,
        length: usize,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        self.material_bytes = self.check_material_capacity(length, resources)?;
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Import a DER certificate as an untrusted lookup candidate or an
    /// explicitly caller-trusted anchor. Parsing alone never grants trust.
    pub fn add_certificate_der(
        &mut self,
        der: Vec<u8>,
        trusted_anchor: bool,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        let material_bytes = self.preflight_x509_import(&der, resources)?;
        let (rest, _) = X509Certificate::from_der(&der)
            .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid X.509 certificate"))?;
        if !rest.is_empty() {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid X.509 certificate"));
        }
        self.material_bytes = material_bytes;
        if trusted_anchor {
            self.trusted_certificates.push(der);
        } else {
            self.lookup_certificates.push(der);
        }
        self.entry_count += 1;
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Import a DER CRL for policy-controlled revocation checks.
    pub fn add_crl_der(
        &mut self,
        der: Vec<u8>,
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        let material_bytes = self.preflight_x509_import(&der, resources)?;
        let (rest, _) = x509_parser::revocation_list::CertificateRevocationList::from_der(&der)
            .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid X.509 CRL"))?;
        if !rest.is_empty() {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid X.509 CRL"));
        }
        self.material_bytes = material_bytes;
        self.crls.push(der);
        self.entry_count += 1;
        Ok(())
    }

    fn preflight_x509_import(
        &self,
        der: &[u8],
        resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    ) -> Result<usize, KeyStoreError> {
        // Policy exhaustion is terminal before any candidate-local DER work.
        ensure_resource_policy(resources)?;
        if der.len() > resources.max_external_resource_bytes {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
            ));
        }
        if self.entry_count >= resources.max_key_candidates {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
                resources.max_key_candidates,
            ));
        }
        self.check_material_capacity(der.len(), resources)
    }
    /// Import caller-owned XML bytes under the operation's XML and resource snapshot.
    pub fn from_xml_bytes<P: crate::document::XmlDocumentPolicy>(
        bytes: &[u8],
        policy: &P,
        backend: XmlBackend,
    ) -> Result<Self, KeyStoreError> {
        let budget = XmlParseWorkBudget::from_resources(policy.resource_policy());
        Self::from_xml_bytes_with_budget(bytes, policy, backend, &budget, &mut 0, 0)
    }

    fn from_xml_bytes_with_budget<P: crate::document::XmlDocumentPolicy>(
        bytes: &[u8],
        policy: &P,
        backend: XmlBackend,
        budget: &XmlParseWorkBudget,
        inspected: &mut usize,
        live_material: usize,
    ) -> Result<Self, KeyStoreError> {
        let resources = policy.resource_policy();
        ensure_resource_policy(resources)?;
        if bytes.len() > resources.max_external_resource_bytes {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
            ));
        }
        if bytes.len() > resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes - live_material {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
            ));
        }
        let settings = DocumentParseSettings::from_policy(policy.xml_input_policy(), resources)
            .with_backend(backend);
        let text = crate::document::decode_xml_with_budget(
            bytes,
            resources
                .max_xml_document_bytes
                .min(resources.max_external_resource_bytes),
            Some(budget),
        )
        .map_err(|error| match error.into_policy_violation(settings) {
            Ok(violation) => KeyStoreError::Policy(violation),
            Err(error) => KeyStoreError::Invalid(error.to_string()),
        })?;
        let document = parse_borrowed_with_settings_and_budget(&text, settings, Some(budget))
            .map_err(|error| match error.into_policy_violation(settings) {
                Ok(violation) => KeyStoreError::Policy(violation),
                Err(error) => KeyStoreError::Invalid(error.to_string()),
            })?;
        let root = document.root_element();
        if !root.has_tag_name((XMLSEC_NS, "Keys")) {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid("expected xmlsec Keys root".into()));
        }
        let mut material_budget = XmlImportMaterialBudget {
            used: live_material + bytes.len(),
            maximum: resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
        };
        let mut names = HashSet::new();
        let mut store = Self::default();
        let mut entry_count = 0_usize;
        for info in root.children().filter(|child| child.is_element()) {
            if !info.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "KeyInfo")) {
                return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid("unexpected child of Keys".into()));
            }
            if *inspected >= resources.max_key_candidates {
                return Err(import_resource_limit(
                    crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
                    resources.max_key_candidates,
                ));
            }
            *inspected += 1;
            entry_count += 1;
            preflight_xml_material(info, &mut material_budget)?;
            let mut name = None;
            let mut value = None;
            for child in info.children().filter(|child| child.is_element()) {
                if child.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "KeyName")) {
                    if name.is_some() {
                        return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid("duplicate KeyName".into()));
                    }
                    let text = element_text(child)?;
                    if text.is_empty() {
                        return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid("empty KeyName".into()));
                    }
                    name = Some(text);
                } else if child.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "KeyValue")) {
                    if value.is_some() {
                        return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid("duplicate KeyValue".into()));
                    }
                    let mut values = child.children().filter(|node| node.is_element());
                    let key = values.next().ok_or_else(|| {
                        KeyStoreError::Invalid("KeyValue has no key material".into())
                    })?;
                    if values.next().is_some() {
                        return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid("ambiguous KeyValue".into()));
                    }
                    let material = if key.has_tag_name((XMLSEC_NS, "HMACKeyValue")) {
                        Some(SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac)
                    } else if key.has_tag_name((XMLSEC_NS, "AESKeyValue")) {
                        Some(SymmetricKeyKind::Aes)
                    } else if key.has_tag_name((XMLSEC_NS, "DESKeyValue")) {
                        Some(SymmetricKeyKind::Des)
                    } else {
                        None
                    };
                    value = Some(if let Some(kind) = material {
                        ParsedMaterial::Symmetric(kind, decode_xml_base64_secret(key)?)
                    } else if key.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "DSAKeyValue")) {
                        let (public, private) =
                            parse_xmlsec_dsa_key_value(key, &mut material_budget)?;
                        ParsedMaterial::Dsa(public, private)
                    } else if key.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "RSAKeyValue"))
                        // XMLDSig 1.1 section 4.5.2.3 places ECKeyValue in dsig11:
                        // https://www.w3.org/TR/2013/REC-xmldsig-core1-20130411/#sec-ECKeyValue
                        || key.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG11_NS, "ECKeyValue"))
                    {
                        ParsedMaterial::Public(
                            crate::xmldsig::parse::parse_key_value_dispatch(child)
                                .map_err(|error| KeyStoreError::Invalid(error.to_string()))?,
                        )
                    } else {
                        ParsedMaterial::Unsupported
                    });
                } else {
                    return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid("unsupported KeyInfo child".into()));
                }
            }
            let name = name.ok_or_else(|| KeyStoreError::Invalid("missing KeyName".into()))?;
            let material =
                value.ok_or_else(|| KeyStoreError::Invalid("missing KeyValue".into()))?;
            if !names.insert(name.clone()) {
                return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid("duplicate key name".into()));
            }
            match material {
                ParsedMaterial::Symmetric(kind, bytes) => {
                    if bytes.is_empty() {
                        return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid("empty symmetric key".into()));
                    }
                    if kind == SymmetricKeyKind::Aes && !matches!(bytes.len(), 16 | 24 | 32) {
                        return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid("invalid AES key length".into()));
                    }
                    let usages = match kind {
                        SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac => KeyUsages::SIGN.union(KeyUsages::VERIFY),
                        SymmetricKeyKind::Aes => KeyUsages::ENCRYPT.union(KeyUsages::DECRYPT),
                        SymmetricKeyKind::Des => {
                            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("DES encryption is unsupported"));
                        }
                    };
                    store.symmetric_keys.push(StoredSymmetricKey {
                        name,
                        kind,
                        bytes,
                        usages,
                    });
                }
                ParsedMaterial::Public(value) => {
                    let mut key_info = KeyInfo::default();
                    key_info.sources.push(KeyInfoSource::KeyName(name.clone()));
                    key_info.sources.push(KeyInfoSource::KeyValue(value));
                    let is_rsa = key_info
                        .sources
                        .iter()
                        .find_map(|source| match source {
                            KeyInfoSource::KeyValue(value) => Some(value),
                            _ => None,
                        })
                        .ok_or_else(|| KeyStoreError::Invalid("invalid public KeyValue".into()))?;
                    let is_rsa = crate::xmldsig::keys::supported_key_value_is_rsa(is_rsa)
                        .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Invalid("invalid public KeyValue".into()))?;
                    let usages = if is_rsa {
                        KeyUsages::VERIFY.union(KeyUsages::ENCRYPT)
                    } else {
                        KeyUsages::VERIFY
                    };
                    store.public_keys.push(StoredPublicKey {
                        name,
                        key_info,
                        usages,
                    });
                }
                ParsedMaterial::Dsa(public, private) => {
                    // This inventory has no external DSA parameter inheritance;
                    // its stored public tuple must be independently resolvable.
                    crate::xmldsig::keys::supported_key_value_is_rsa(&public)
                        .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Invalid("invalid public DSAKeyValue".into()))?;
                    let mut key_info = KeyInfo::default();
                    key_info.sources.push(KeyInfoSource::KeyName(name.clone()));
                    key_info.sources.push(KeyInfoSource::KeyValue(public));
                    if let Some(pkcs8_der) = private {
                        store.private_keys.push(StoredPrivateKey {
                            name: name.clone(),
                            pkcs8_der,
                            usages: KeyUsages::SIGN,
                            certificate_chain: Vec::new(),
                            has_matching_leaf: false,
                        });
                    }
                    store.public_keys.push(StoredPublicKey {
                        name,
                        key_info,
                        usages: KeyUsages::VERIFY,
                    });
                }
                ParsedMaterial::Unsupported => {}
            }
        }
        store.entry_count = entry_count;
        // Decoding can retain both public components and a derived private key.
        // Keep the input charge too, so compact XML never lowers the import budget.
        store.material_bytes = bytes
            .len()
            .checked_add(store.retained_material_bytes()?)
            .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("key material size overflow"))?;
        if store.material_bytes > resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes - live_material {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
            ));
        }
        Ok(store)
    }
}

fn validate_private_key_usages(usages: KeyUsages) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
    let permitted = KeyUsages::SIGN.union(KeyUsages::DECRYPT);
    if usages.0 == 0 || usages.0 & !permitted.0 != 0 {
        return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
            "private key usage is incompatible",
        ));
    }
    Ok(())
}

fn import_resource_limit(resource: &'static str, maximum: usize) -> KeyStoreError {
    crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded { resource, maximum }.into()
}

fn check_operation_material_size(
    length: usize,
    resources: &ResourcePolicy,
) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
    if length > resources.max_external_resource_bytes {
        return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
            resource: crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
            maximum: resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
            actual: length,
        }
        .into());
    }
    if length > resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes {
        return Err(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
            resource: crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
            maximum: resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
            actual: length,
        }
        .into());
    }
    Ok(())
}

#[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
fn check_selected_material_size(
    length: usize,
    resources: &ResourcePolicy,
) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
    check_operation_material_size(length, resources)
}

#[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
fn check_encryption_material_size(
    length: usize,
    resources: &ResourcePolicy,
) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
    check_operation_material_size(length, resources)
}

#[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
fn rsa_recipient_preflight(
    modulus: &[u8],
    exponent: &[u8],
    policy: &crate::policy::EncryptionPolicy,
) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
    let combined = modulus
        .len()
        .checked_add(exponent.len())
        .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("encryption key size overflow"))?;
    check_encryption_material_size(combined, &policy.resources)?;
    policy
        .rsa_keys
        .validate_components("encryption", modulus, exponent)?;
    Ok(())
}

#[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
fn rsa_recipient_from_components(
    modulus: &[u8],
    exponent: &[u8],
    policy: &crate::policy::EncryptionPolicy,
) -> Result<RsaPublicKey, KeyStoreError> {
    rsa_recipient_preflight(modulus, exponent, policy)?;
    let first_nonzero = modulus
        .iter()
        .position(|byte| *byte != 0)
        .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA encryption key"))?;
    RsaPublicKey::new(
        BoxedUint::from_be_slice_vartime(&modulus[first_nonzero..]),
        BoxedUint::from_be_slice_vartime(exponent),
    )
    .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA encryption key"))
}

fn signing_policy_error(error: crate::xmldsig::SigningError) -> KeyStoreError {
    match error {
        crate::xmldsig::SigningError::Policy(violation) => violation.into(),
        _ => KeyStoreError::Selection("signing key violates operation policy"),
    }
}

fn ensure_resource_policy(resources: &ResourcePolicy) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
    resources.validate().map_err(Into::into)
}

fn find_named_entry<'a, T>(
    entries: &'a [T],
    name: &str,
    resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    visited: &mut usize,
    entry_name: impl Fn(&T) -> &str,
) -> Result<Option<&'a T>, KeyStoreError> {
    for entry in entries {
        let next = visited
            .checked_add(1)
            .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("key candidate count overflow"))?;
        resources.validate_key_candidates(next)?;
        *visited = next;
        if entry_name(entry) == name {
            return Ok(Some(entry));
        }
    }
    Ok(None)
}

fn named_material_length(
    name: &str,
    payload: usize,
    retained_names: usize,
) -> Result<usize, KeyStoreError> {
    name.len()
        .checked_mul(retained_names)
        .and_then(|names| names.checked_add(payload))
        .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("key material size overflow"))
}

// Public identity stays borrowed (RSA), native (DSA), or stack-sized (EC).
// Import validation must not serialize an unaccounted SPKI beside live input.
#[cfg_attr(
    feature = "experimental-pq",
    expect(
        clippy::large_enum_variant,
        reason = "A transient, wire-bounded 2592-byte public key avoids a heap allocation during identity comparison"
    )
)]
enum PrivateKeyIdentity<'a> {
    Rsa(rsa::pkcs1::RsaPrivateKey<'a>),
    Dsa {
        algorithm: rsa::pkcs8::AlgorithmIdentifierRef<'a>,
        key: NativeDsaSigningKey,
    },
    Ec {
        algorithm: rsa::pkcs8::AlgorithmIdentifierRef<'a>,
        point: [u8; 133],
        length: usize,
    },
    EdDsa {
        algorithm: rsa::pkcs8::AlgorithmIdentifierRef<'a>,
        public: [u8; 57],
        length: usize,
    },
    #[cfg(feature = "experimental-pq")]
    PostQuantum {
        algorithm: rsa::pkcs8::AlgorithmIdentifierRef<'a>,
        public: [u8; 2592],
        length: usize,
    },
}

impl<'a> PrivateKeyIdentity<'a> {
    fn decode(der: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self, KeyStoreError> {
        let info = PrivateKeyInfoRef::try_from(der)
            .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("unsupported PKCS#12 private key"))?;
        #[cfg(feature = "experimental-pq")]
        if let Some(parameter) = crate::xmldsig::PqAlgorithm::from_oid(info.algorithm.oid) {
            let key = crate::xmldsig::PostQuantumSigningKey::from_pkcs8_der(parameter, der)
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid PQ private key"))?;
            // RFC 9881 section 4 / RFC 9909 section 5: identity is the raw
            // public bytes, not a separately allocated ASN.1 serialization.
            let mut public = [0; 2592];
            let length = key.copy_public(&mut public);
            return Ok(Self::PostQuantum {
                algorithm: info.algorithm,
                public,
                length,
            });
        }
        // RFC 8410 sections 3 and 7 require absent parameters and a nested
        // octet string: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8410.html#section-7
        // Primitive decoding validates that contract before deriving identity.
        if info.algorithm.oid == der::asn1::ObjectIdentifier::new_unwrap("1.3.101.112") {
            let key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_pkcs8_der(der)
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid Ed25519 private key"))?;
            let mut public = [0; 57];
            public[..32].copy_from_slice(&key.verifying_key().to_bytes());
            return Ok(Self::EdDsa {
                algorithm: info.algorithm,
                public,
                length: 32,
            });
        }
        if info.algorithm.oid == der::asn1::ObjectIdentifier::new_unwrap("1.3.101.113") {
            let key = ed448_goldilocks::SigningKey::from_pkcs8_der(der)
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid Ed448 private key"))?;
            return Ok(Self::EdDsa {
                algorithm: info.algorithm,
                public: key.verifying_key().to_bytes(),
                length: 57,
            });
        }
        if info.algorithm.oid == rsa::pkcs1::ALGORITHM_OID {
            preflight_rsa_pkcs1_components(info.private_key.as_bytes())?;
            RsaPrivateKey::from_pkcs8_der(der)
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA private key"))?;
            return rsa::pkcs1::RsaPrivateKey::from_der(info.private_key.as_bytes())
                .map(Self::Rsa)
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA private key"));
        } else if info.algorithm.oid == dsa::OID {
            preflight_dsa_pkcs8_components(&info)?;
            return NativeDsaSigningKey::from_pkcs8_der(der)
                .map(|key| Self::Dsa {
                    algorithm: info.algorithm,
                    key,
                })
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid DSA private key"));
        }
        macro_rules! try_ec {
            ($key:ty) => {
                if let Ok(key) = <$key>::from_pkcs8_der(der) {
                    use p256::elliptic_curve::sec1::ToSec1Point as _;
                    let encoded = key.public_key().to_sec1_point(false);
                    let bytes = encoded.as_bytes();
                    let mut point = [0; 133];
                    point[..bytes.len()].copy_from_slice(bytes);
                    return Ok(Self::Ec {
                        algorithm: info.algorithm,
                        point,
                        length: bytes.len(),
                    });
                }
            };
        }
        try_ec!(p256::SecretKey);
        try_ec!(p384::SecretKey);
        try_ec!(p521::SecretKey);
        Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("unsupported PKCS#12 private key"))
    }

    fn matches_spki(&self, der: &[u8]) -> bool {
        let Ok(spki) = rsa::pkcs8::SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef::from_der(der) else {
            return false;
        };
        let Some(bytes) = spki.subject_public_key.as_bytes() else {
            return false;
        };
        match self {
            #[cfg(feature = "experimental-pq")]
            Self::PostQuantum {
                algorithm,
                public,
                length,
            } => spki.algorithm == *algorithm && bytes == &public[..*length],
            Self::EdDsa {
                algorithm,
                public,
                length,
            } => spki.algorithm == *algorithm && bytes == &public[..*length],
            Self::Rsa(key) => {
                if spki.algorithm != rsa::pkcs1::ALGORITHM_ID {
                    return false;
                }
                let Ok(public) = rsa::pkcs1::RsaPublicKey::from_der(bytes) else {
                    return false;
                };
                key.modulus == public.modulus && key.public_exponent == public.public_exponent
            }
            Self::Dsa { algorithm, key } => {
                if spki.algorithm != *algorithm {
                    return false;
                }
                let Ok(y) = der::asn1::UintRef::from_der(bytes) else {
                    return false;
                };
                // Compare native little-endian limbs as a byte iterator, without
                // materializing a second big integer or owned public encoding.
                key.verifying_key()
                    .y()
                    .as_words()
                    .iter()
                    .rev()
                    .flat_map(|word| word.to_be_bytes())
                    .skip_while(|byte| *byte == 0)
                    .eq(y.as_bytes().iter().copied())
            }
            Self::Ec {
                algorithm,
                point,
                length,
            } => spki.algorithm == *algorithm && bytes == &point[..*length],
        }
    }
}

/// Validate borrowed PKCS#1 private components against process-safety ceilings.
///
/// Container adapters must call this before constructing native big integers.
/// This checks ingestion safety, not the operation's RSA algorithm/key policy.
pub fn preflight_rsa_pkcs1_components(der: &[u8]) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
    let key = rsa::pkcs1::RsaPrivateKey::from_der(der)
        .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid RSA private key"))?;
    let modulus = key.modulus.as_bytes();
    let maximum = crate::hard_limits::RSA_MODULUS_BIT_CEILING;
    if modulus.len() > maximum.div_ceil(8)
        || modulus
            .first()
            .is_some_and(|first| modulus.len() * 8 - first.leading_zeros() as usize > maximum)
    {
        return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("RSA modulus exceeds safety limit"));
    }
    if [
        key.public_exponent,
        key.private_exponent,
        key.prime1,
        key.prime2,
        key.exponent1,
        key.exponent2,
        key.coefficient,
    ]
    .into_iter()
    .any(|component| component.as_bytes().len() > maximum.div_ceil(8))
        || key.other_prime_infos.as_ref().is_some_and(|infos| {
            infos.iter().any(|info| {
                [info.prime, info.exponent, info.coefficient]
                    .into_iter()
                    .any(|component| component.as_bytes().len() > maximum.div_ceil(8))
            })
        })
    {
        return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
            "RSA component exceeds safety limit",
        ));
    }
    Ok(())
}

#[derive(der::Sequence)]
struct BorrowedDsaParameters<'a> {
    p: der::asn1::UintRef<'a>,
    q: der::asn1::UintRef<'a>,
    g: der::asn1::UintRef<'a>,
}

fn preflight_dsa_pkcs8_components(info: &PrivateKeyInfoRef<'_>) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
    let parameters = info
        .algorithm
        .parameters
        .as_ref()
        .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("missing DSA parameters"))?
        .decode_as::<BorrowedDsaParameters<'_>>()
        .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid DSA parameters"))?;
    let x = der::asn1::UintRef::from_der(info.private_key.as_bytes())
        .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid DSA private exponent"))?;
    if [parameters.p, parameters.q, parameters.g, x]
        .into_iter()
        .any(|component| {
            component.as_bytes().len() > crate::hard_limits::DSA_KEY_COMPONENT_BYTE_CEILING
        })
    {
        return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
            "DSA component exceeds safety limit",
        ));
    }
    Ok(())
}

// Borrow the frame and stream whitespace-separated Base64 into one preflighted
// DER buffer. No normalized Base64 string or owned label/header copies are needed.
struct BorrowedPem<'a> {
    label: &'a str,
    data: &'a str,
    decoded_len: usize,
}

impl<'a> BorrowedPem<'a> {
    fn parse(bytes: &'a [u8], maximum: usize) -> Result<Self, KeyStoreError> {
        if bytes.len() > maximum {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                maximum,
            ));
        }
        let invalid = || KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid PEM key");
        let text = std::str::from_utf8(bytes)
            .map_err(|_| invalid())?
            .trim_matches(|character: char| character.is_ascii_whitespace());
        let (label, rest) = text
            .strip_prefix("-----BEGIN ")
            .and_then(|rest| rest.split_once("-----"))
            .ok_or_else(invalid)?;
        let (payload, end) = rest
            .trim_start_matches([' ', '\t', '\n', '\r'])
            .split_once("-----END ")
            .ok_or_else(invalid)?;
        if end.strip_prefix(label) != Some("-----") || payload.contains("-----BEGIN ") {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
                "PEM must contain one complete block",
            ));
        }
        // Preserve the existing importer's optional header and whitespace
        // acceptance without allocating header strings or a stripped body.
        let data = if let Some((headers, data)) = payload
            .split_once("\n\n")
            .or_else(|| payload.split_once("\r\n\r\n"))
        {
            if headers.lines().any(|line| !line.contains(':')) {
                return Err(invalid());
            }
            data
        } else {
            payload
        };
        let mut characters = 0_usize;
        let mut padding = 0_usize;
        for part in data.split_whitespace() {
            for byte in part.bytes() {
                if byte == b'=' {
                    padding += 1;
                } else if padding != 0
                    || !matches!(byte, b'A'..=b'Z' | b'a'..=b'z' | b'0'..=b'9' | b'+' | b'/')
                {
                    return Err(invalid());
                }
                characters += 1;
            }
        }
        if !characters.is_multiple_of(4) || padding > 2 {
            return Err(invalid());
        }
        let decoded_len = (characters / 4 * 3)
            .checked_sub(padding)
            .ok_or_else(invalid)?;
        Ok(Self {
            label,
            data,
            decoded_len,
        })
    }

    fn decode(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KeyStoreError> {
        let mut decoded = vec![0; self.decoded_len];
        self.decode_into(&mut decoded)?;
        Ok(decoded)
    }

    fn decode_into(&self, decoded: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        use std::io::Read as _;
        let input = PemBase64Reader {
            parts: self.data.split_whitespace(),
            current: &[],
        };
        let mut decoder =
            base64::read::DecoderReader::new(input, &base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD);
        decoder
            .read_exact(decoded)
            .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid PEM key"))?;
        let mut eof = [0];
        if decoder
            .read(&mut eof)
            .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid PEM key"))?
            != 0
        {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid PEM key"));
        }
        Ok(())
    }
}

struct PemBase64Reader<'a> {
    parts: std::str::SplitWhitespace<'a>,
    current: &'a [u8],
}

impl std::io::Read for PemBase64Reader<'_> {
    fn read(&mut self, buffer: &mut [u8]) -> std::io::Result<usize> {
        let mut written = 0;
        while written < buffer.len() {
            if self.current.is_empty() {
                let Some(part) = self.parts.next() else {
                    break;
                };
                self.current = part.as_bytes();
            }
            let length = self.current.len().min(buffer.len() - written);
            buffer[written..written + length].copy_from_slice(&self.current[..length]);
            self.current = &self.current[length..];
            written += length;
        }
        Ok(written)
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
fn single_pem_block(bytes: &[u8], maximum: usize) -> Result<pem::Pem, KeyStoreError> {
    if bytes.len() > maximum {
        return Err(import_resource_limit(
            crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
            maximum,
        ));
    }
    let text = std::str::from_utf8(bytes)
        .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("PEM key is not ASCII text"))?
        .trim_matches(|character: char| character.is_ascii_whitespace());
    let block = pem::parse(text).map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid PEM key"))?;
    let begin = format!("-----BEGIN {}-----", block.tag());
    let end = format!("-----END {}-----", block.tag());
    if !text.starts_with(&begin)
        || !text.ends_with(&end)
        || text.matches(&begin).count() != 1
        || text.matches(&end).count() != 1
    {
        return Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
            "PEM must contain one complete block",
        ));
    }
    Ok(block)
}

fn enforce_pkcs8_kdf_policy(
    encrypted: &EncryptedPrivateKeyInfoRef<'_>,
    resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    retained_with_input: usize,
) -> Result<usize, KeyStoreError> {
    use pkcs8::pkcs5::{EncryptionScheme, pbes2::Kdf};
    // RFC 8018 §6.2 leaves KDF iteration policy to the application. Reject
    // excessive work before decrypting attacker-supplied containers.
    // https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8018#section-6.2
    let EncryptionScheme::Pbes2(params) = &encrypted.encryption_algorithm else {
        return Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer);
    };
    // PBES2 decryption mutates a ciphertext-sized output buffer while the
    // encoded input remains live. Include that capacity before any password
    // callback or KDF, including failed padding/DER decoding.
    let live_with_output =
        retained_with_input.checked_add(encrypted.encrypted_data.as_bytes().len());
    if live_with_output.is_none_or(|total| total > resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes) {
        return Err(kdf_policy_violation(
            crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
            resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
            live_with_output.map(|total| total as u64),
        ));
    }
    let live_with_output = live_with_output.ok_or(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)?;
    let work = match &params.kdf {
        Kdf::Pbkdf2(kdf) => {
            if kdf.iteration_count == 0 {
                return Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer);
            }
            use pkcs8::pkcs5::pbes2::Pbkdf2Prf;
            let hash_len = match kdf.prf {
                Pbkdf2Prf::HmacWithSha1 => 20,
                Pbkdf2Prf::HmacWithSha224 => 28,
                Pbkdf2Prf::HmacWithSha256 => 32,
                Pbkdf2Prf::HmacWithSha384 => 48,
                Pbkdf2Prf::HmacWithSha512 => 64,
                _ => return Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer),
            };
            // RFC 8018 5.2 steps 2-3: every ceil(dkLen/hLen) block runs c
            // PRFs. The cipher determines dkLen, not a caller's KDF hint.
            // https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8018#section-5.2
            let blocks = params.encryption.key_size().div_ceil(hash_len) as u64;
            let work = u64::from(kdf.iteration_count).checked_mul(blocks);
            if work.is_none_or(|work| work > resources.max_key_import_kdf_work as u64) {
                return Err(kdf_policy_violation(
                    crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_IMPORT_KDF_WORK,
                    resources.max_key_import_kdf_work,
                    work,
                ));
            }
            work.ok_or(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)? as usize
        }
        Kdf::Scrypt(kdf) => enforce_scrypt_kdf_limits(
            kdf.cost_parameter,
            u64::from(kdf.block_size),
            u64::from(kdf.parallelization),
            resources,
            live_with_output,
        )?,
        _ => return Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer),
    };
    Ok(work)
}

fn enforce_pkcs8_password_policy(
    encrypted: &EncryptedPrivateKeyInfoRef<'_>,
    password: &[u8],
    resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    live_bytes: usize,
) -> Result<usize, KeyStoreError> {
    if password.len() > resources.max_external_resource_bytes {
        return Err(kdf_policy_violation(
            crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
            resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
            Some(password.len() as u64),
        ));
    }
    let live = live_bytes.checked_add(password.len()).ok_or_else(|| {
        import_resource_limit(
            crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
            resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
        )
    })?;
    // Product work accounting: one unit per 64 input bytes conservatively
    // covers password hashing for the supported SHA PRFs, in addition to rounds.
    let hashing_passes = match &encrypted.encryption_algorithm {
        pkcs8::pkcs5::EncryptionScheme::Pbes2(params)
            if matches!(&params.kdf, pkcs8::pkcs5::pbes2::Kdf::Scrypt(_)) =>
        {
            2
        }
        _ => 1,
    };
    // Scrypt initializes password-keyed HMAC both before and after ROMix.
    let password_work = password.len().div_ceil(64) * hashing_passes;
    if password_work > resources.max_key_import_kdf_work {
        return Err(kdf_policy_violation(
            crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_IMPORT_KDF_WORK,
            resources.max_key_import_kdf_work,
            Some(password_work as u64),
        ));
    }
    let mut remaining = resources.clone();
    remaining.max_key_import_kdf_work -= password_work;
    enforce_pkcs8_kdf_policy(encrypted, &remaining, live)
        .map(|work| work + password_work)
        .map_err(|error| match error {
            KeyStoreError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_IMPORT_KDF_WORK,
                actual,
                ..
            }) => kdf_policy_violation(
                crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_IMPORT_KDF_WORK,
                resources.max_key_import_kdf_work,
                Some(actual.saturating_add(password_work) as u64),
            ),
            error => error,
        })
}

fn enforce_scrypt_kdf_limits(
    n: u64,
    r: u64,
    p: u64,
    resources: &ResourcePolicy,
    retained_with_input: usize,
) -> Result<usize, KeyStoreError> {
    if n == 0 || r == 0 || p == 0 {
        return Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer);
    }
    let work = n.checked_mul(r).and_then(|value| value.checked_mul(p));
    if work.is_none_or(|value| value > resources.max_key_import_kdf_work as u64) {
        return Err(kdf_policy_violation(
            crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_IMPORT_KDF_WORK,
            resources.max_key_import_kdf_work,
            work,
        ));
    }
    // RustCrypto scrypt retains B[p*r] plus V[N*r] and T[r] per parallel
    // worker when its `parallel` feature is unified in a downstream build.
    let memory = n
        .checked_add(2)
        .and_then(|blocks| blocks.checked_mul(p))
        .and_then(|blocks| blocks.checked_mul(r))
        .and_then(|blocks| blocks.checked_mul(128));
    if memory.is_none_or(|value| value > resources.max_key_import_kdf_memory_bytes as u64) {
        return Err(kdf_policy_violation(
            crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_IMPORT_KDF_MEMORY,
            resources.max_key_import_kdf_memory_bytes,
            memory,
        ));
    }
    // The workspace is live alongside the existing inventory, name and
    // imported container. An independent KDF ceiling cannot waive that peak.
    let total = memory.and_then(|memory| memory.checked_add(retained_with_input as u64));
    if total.is_none_or(|total| total > resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes as u64) {
        return Err(kdf_policy_violation(
            crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
            resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes,
            total,
        ));
    }
    // The work check above proves this value exists and fits the usize ceiling.
    Ok(work.ok_or(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)? as usize)
}

fn kdf_policy_violation(
    resource: &'static str,
    maximum: usize,
    actual: Option<u64>,
) -> KeyStoreError {
    KeyStoreError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
        resource,
        maximum,
        actual: actual
            .and_then(|value| usize::try_from(value).ok())
            .unwrap_or(usize::MAX),
    })
}

fn element_text(node: Node<'_, '_>) -> Result<String, KeyStoreError> {
    let length = node
        .children()
        .filter(|child| child.is_text())
        .filter_map(|child| child.text())
        .map(str::len)
        .sum();
    let mut text = String::with_capacity(length);
    for child in node.children() {
        if child.is_element() {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid("unexpected nested element".into()));
        }
        if child.is_text() {
            text.push_str(child.text().unwrap_or_default());
        }
    }
    Ok(text)
}

fn decode_xml_base64(node: Node<'_, '_>) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KeyStoreError> {
    xml_base64_payload(node)?
        .decode()
        .map_err(|reason| KeyStoreError::Invalid(reason.into()))
}

fn decode_xml_base64_secret(node: Node<'_, '_>) -> Result<Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>, KeyStoreError> {
    let payload = xml_base64_payload(node)?;
    // Own the zeroizing guard before decoding: malformed trailing bits can
    // fail after part of the secret has already been written into the buffer.
    let mut output = Zeroizing::new(vec![0; payload.decoded_len]);
    payload
        .decode_into(&mut output)
        .map_err(|reason| KeyStoreError::Invalid(reason.into()))?;
    Ok(output)
}

fn xml_base64_payload<'a, 'input>(
    node: Node<'a, 'input>,
) -> Result<crate::xmldsig::whitespace::XmlBase64Payload<'a, 'input>, KeyStoreError> {
    crate::xmldsig::whitespace::XmlBase64Payload::new(node)
        .map_err(|reason| KeyStoreError::Invalid(reason.into()))
}

struct XmlImportMaterialBudget {
    used: usize,
    maximum: usize,
}

impl XmlImportMaterialBudget {
    fn reserve(&mut self, length: usize) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
        if self.used > self.maximum || length > self.maximum - self.used {
            return Err(import_resource_limit(
                crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                self.maximum,
            ));
        }
        self.used += length;
        Ok(())
    }
}

fn preflight_xml_material(
    info: Node<'_, '_>,
    budget: &mut XmlImportMaterialBudget,
) -> Result<(), KeyStoreError> {
    // The source remains live while decoded entries and cloned names are
    // retained. Charge them before importing any entry, including failed ones.
    let key = info
        .children()
        .find(|child| child.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "KeyValue")))
        .and_then(|value| value.children().find(|child| child.is_element()));
    let name_copies = match key {
        Some(key) if key.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "DSAKeyValue")) => {
            if key
                .children()
                .any(|child| child.has_tag_name((XMLSEC_NS, "X")))
            {
                4
            } else {
                3
            }
        }
        Some(key)
            if key.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "RSAKeyValue"))
                || key.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG11_NS, "ECKeyValue")) =>
        {
            3
        }
        _ => 2,
    };
    let uses_shared_public_parser = key.is_some_and(|key| {
        key.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "RSAKeyValue"))
            || key.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG11_NS, "ECKeyValue"))
    });
    if uses_shared_public_parser {
        crate::xmldsig::parse::validate_key_info_container(info)
            .map_err(|error| KeyStoreError::Invalid(error.to_string()))?;
    }
    for child in info.children().filter(|child| child.is_element()) {
        if child.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "KeyName")) {
            let length = child
                .children()
                .filter(|node| node.is_text())
                .filter_map(|node| node.text())
                .try_fold(0_usize, |sum, text| {
                    sum.checked_add(text.len())
                        .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("key material size overflow"))
                })?;
            // Inventory, duplicate-name set, KeyInfo and private DSA name.
            if uses_shared_public_parser && length > crate::xmldsig::parse::MAX_KEY_NAME_TEXT_LEN {
                return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid(
                    "KeyName exceeds maximum allowed text length".into(),
                ));
            }
            for _ in 0..name_copies {
                budget.reserve(length)?;
            }
        } else if child.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "KeyValue")) {
            for key in child.children().filter(|node| node.is_element()) {
                if key.has_tag_name((XMLSEC_NS, "HMACKeyValue"))
                    || key.has_tag_name((XMLSEC_NS, "AESKeyValue"))
                    || key.has_tag_name((XMLSEC_NS, "DESKeyValue"))
                {
                    budget.reserve(xml_base64_payload(key)?.decoded_len)?;
                } else if key.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "RSAKeyValue"))
                    || key.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "DSAKeyValue"))
                    || key.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG11_NS, "ECKeyValue"))
                {
                    for component in key.children().filter(|node| node.is_element()) {
                        if component.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG11_NS, "NamedCurve")) {
                            budget.reserve(component.attribute("URI").map_or(0, str::len))?;
                        } else {
                            budget.reserve(xml_base64_payload(component)?.decoded_len)?;
                        }
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
    Ok(())
}

fn parse_xmlsec_dsa_key_value(
    node: Node<'_, '_>,
    budget: &mut XmlImportMaterialBudget,
) -> Result<ParsedDsaKey, KeyStoreError> {
    let mut p = None;
    let mut q = None;
    let mut g = None;
    let mut y = None;
    let mut seed = None;
    let mut counter = None;
    let mut private_x = None;
    let mut previous_position = None;
    for child in node.children().filter(|child| child.is_element()) {
        let (position, slot) = if child.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "P")) {
            (0, Some(&mut p))
        } else if child.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "Q")) {
            (1, Some(&mut q))
        } else if child.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "G")) {
            (2, Some(&mut g))
        } else if child.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "Y")) {
            (4, Some(&mut y))
        } else if child.has_tag_name((XMLSEC_NS, "X")) {
            if private_x.is_some() {
                return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid("duplicate DSA X".into()));
            }
            // XMLDSig 1.1 §4.5.2.1 has no private X field. libxmlsec's
            // keys.xml adds one before Y; only this store importer accepts it.
            // https://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core1/#sec-DSAKeyValue
            private_x = Some(decode_xml_base64_secret(child)?);
            (3, None)
        } else if child.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "J")) {
            (5, None)
        } else if child.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "Seed")) {
            (6, Some(&mut seed))
        } else if child.has_tag_name((XMLDSIG_NS, "PgenCounter")) {
            (7, Some(&mut counter))
        } else {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid(
                "unsupported DSAKeyValue child".into(),
            ));
        };
        // XMLDSig 1.1 §4.5.2.1 defines a sequence, not an unordered set.
        if previous_position.is_some_and(|previous| position <= previous) {
            return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid(
                "DSA parameters are out of order".into(),
            ));
        }
        previous_position = Some(position);
        if let Some(slot) = slot {
            if slot.replace(decode_xml_base64(child)?).is_some() {
                return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid("duplicate DSA parameter".into()));
            }
        } else if position == 5 {
            let _ = decode_xml_base64(child)?;
        }
    }
    if p.is_some() != q.is_some() {
        return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid(
            "DSA P and Q must occur together".into(),
        ));
    }
    if seed.is_some() != counter.is_some() {
        return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid(
            "DSA Seed and PgenCounter must occur together".into(),
        ));
    }
    if [p.as_ref(), q.as_ref(), g.as_ref(), y.as_ref()]
        .into_iter()
        .flatten()
        .any(|component| component.len() > crate::hard_limits::DSA_KEY_COMPONENT_BYTE_CEILING)
        || private_x.as_ref().is_some_and(|component| {
            component.len() > crate::hard_limits::DSA_KEY_COMPONENT_BYTE_CEILING
        })
    {
        return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid(
            "DSA component exceeds safety limit".into(),
        ));
    }
    let y = y.ok_or_else(|| KeyStoreError::Invalid("DSAKeyValue requires Y".into()))?;
    let private =
        if let Some(x) = private_x {
            let (Some(p), Some(q), Some(g)) = (&p, &q, &g) else {
                return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid(
                    "private DSA key requires P, Q, and G".into(),
                ));
            };
            let components = DsaComponents::from_components(
                BoxedUint::from_be_slice_vartime(p),
                BoxedUint::from_be_slice_vartime(q),
                BoxedUint::from_be_slice_vartime(g),
            )
            .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Invalid("invalid DSA parameters".into()))?;
            let x_value = BoxedUint::from_be_slice_vartime(&x);
            let monty = BoxedMontyParams::new(components.p().clone());
            let expected_y = BoxedMontyForm::new((**components.g()).clone(), &monty)
                .pow(&x_value)
                .retrieve();
            if expected_y != BoxedUint::from_be_slice_vartime(&y) {
                return Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid(
                    "DSA private and public values differ".into(),
                ));
            }
            let public = DsaVerifyingKey::from_components(components, expected_y)
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Invalid("invalid DSA public key".into()))?;
            let private = NativeDsaSigningKey::from_components(public, x_value)
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Invalid("invalid DSA private key".into()))?;
            use der::Encode as _;
            // The native encoder owns parameter DER, padded X bytes, X DER and
            // PKCS#8 DER concurrently; the retained copy also exists before return.
            let parameters_len =
                usize::try_from(private.verifying_key().components().encoded_len().map_err(
                    |_| KeyStoreError::Invalid("DSA private key encoding failed".into()),
                )?)
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("key material size overflow"))?;
            let x_bytes_len = usize::try_from(private.x().bits_precision() / 8)
                .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Selection("key material size overflow"))?;
            // DER length headers and the PKCS#8 algorithm identifier fit this
            // checked bound: each header is at most 1 tag + 1 count + sizeof(usize).
            let header = 2 + std::mem::size_of::<usize>();
            let x_der_len = x_bytes_len
                .checked_add(header + 1)
                .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("key material size overflow"))?;
            let pkcs8_len = parameters_len
                .checked_add(x_der_len)
                .and_then(|length| length.checked_add(4 * header + 16))
                .ok_or(KeyStoreError::Selection("key material size overflow"))?;
            budget.reserve(parameters_len)?;
            budget.reserve(x_bytes_len)?;
            budget.reserve(x_der_len)?;
            budget.reserve(pkcs8_len)?;
            budget.reserve(pkcs8_len)?;
            Some(Zeroizing::new(
                private
                    .to_pkcs8_der()
                    .map_err(|_| KeyStoreError::Invalid("DSA private key encoding failed".into()))?
                    .as_bytes()
                    .to_vec(),
            ))
        } else {
            None
        };
    Ok((KeyValueInfo::Dsa { p, q, g, y }, private))
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use rand_chacha::{ChaCha8Rng, rand_core::SeedableRng as _};
    use rsa::RsaPublicKey;
    use rsa::pkcs1::EncodeRsaPrivateKey as _;
    use rsa::pkcs8::EncodePublicKey as _;

    use super::*;

    fn xml_policy(resources: ResourcePolicy) -> crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
        crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            resources,
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn inventory_merge_preserves_import_work() {
        // Moving inventories must not discard work spent before the merge.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_import_kdf_work: 5,
            ..Default::default()
        };
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory {
            kdf_work: 2,
            ..Default::default()
        };
        inventory
            .extend(
                KeyInventory {
                    kdf_work: 3,
                    ..Default::default()
                },
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("exact work allowance");
        assert_eq!(inventory.key_import_kdf_work(), 5);
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.extend(
                KeyInventory {
                    kdf_work: 1,
                    ..Default::default()
                },
                &resources
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(_))
        ));
        assert_eq!(inventory.key_import_kdf_work(), 5, "failed merge is atomic");
    }

    #[test]
    fn repeated_pkcs12_imports_share_kdf_work() {
        // Each bundle fits by itself, but a session may not reset password work.
        let bytes = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/xmlenc/01-phaos-xmlenc-3/rsa-priv-key.p12");
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_import_kdf_work: 10_000,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_pkcs12("first".into(), bytes, "secret", &resources)
            .expect("first bundle fits");
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.add_pkcs12("second".into(), bytes, "secret", &resources),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(_))
        ));
        let work = inventory.key_import_kdf_work();
        let exact = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_import_kdf_work: work * 2,
            ..resources
        };
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_pkcs12("first".into(), bytes, "secret", &exact)
            .expect("first exact-boundary bundle");
        inventory
            .add_pkcs12("second".into(), bytes, "secret", &exact)
            .expect("second exact-boundary bundle");
        assert_eq!(inventory.key_import_kdf_work(), work * 2);
    }

    #[test]
    fn imports_donor_pkcs12_and_rejects_wrong_password() {
        // A real upstream PHAOS bundle exercises MAC, password decoding, key
        // association, and certificate import rather than a synthetic ASN.1 stub.
        let bytes = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/xmlenc/01-phaos-xmlenc-3/rsa-priv-key.p12");
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_pkcs12("phaos".into(), bytes, "secret", &resources)
            .expect("donor PKCS#12 should import");
        assert_eq!(inventory.private_keys.len(), 1);
        assert!(!inventory.private_keys[0].certificate_chain.is_empty());
        assert!(inventory.private_keys[0].usages.allows(KeyUsage::Sign));

        let mut wrong = KeyInventory::default();
        assert!(matches!(
            wrong.add_pkcs12("phaos".into(), bytes, "wrong", &resources),
            Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)
        ));
        assert!(wrong.private_keys.is_empty());

        let oversized = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_bytes: bytes.len() - 1,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::default().add_pkcs12("phaos".into(), bytes, "secret", &oversized),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    maximum,
                }
            )) if maximum == bytes.len() - 1
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pkcs12_kdf_limit_is_a_typed_policy_denial() {
        // A valid protected bundle that exceeds import work is not a bad password.
        let bytes = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/xmlenc/01-phaos-xmlenc-3/rsa-priv-key.p12");
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_import_kdf_work: 1,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::default().add_pkcs12("phaos".into(), bytes, "secret", &resources),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::KdfIterationsOutsideLimit { maximum: 1 }
            ))
        ));
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::default().add_pkcs12(
                "phaos".into(),
                bytes,
                "wrong",
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pkcs12_visible_encryption_kdf_is_checked_before_password() {
        // Raising an unencrypted PBES2 iteration count must deny the import
        // before asking for a secret, even when MacData is within the limit.
        let mut bytes =
            include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/xmlenc/01-phaos-xmlenc-3/rsa-priv-key.p12").to_vec();
        let offset = bytes
            .windows(4)
            .position(|v| v == [2, 2, 8, 0])
            .expect("PBKDF2 iterations");
        bytes[offset + 3] = 1;
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_import_kdf_work: 2048,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        let result = KeyInventory::default().add_pkcs12_with_password_callback(
            "limited".into(),
            &bytes,
            || panic!("visible KDF must be checked first"),
            KeyUsages::SIGN,
            &resources,
        );
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(_))));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pkcs12_content_count_denial_is_not_a_password_error() {
        // AuthenticatedSafe has two content infos; its count is public and
        // must report the candidate policy rather than request a password.
        let bytes = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/xmlenc/01-phaos-xmlenc-3/rsa-priv-key.p12");
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_candidates: 1,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        let result = KeyInventory::default().add_pkcs12_with_password_callback(
            "limited".into(),
            bytes,
            || panic!("container limit must be checked first"),
            KeyUsages::SIGN,
            &resources,
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            result,
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
                    maximum: 1,
                }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pkcs12_aggregate_kdf_work_preserves_policy_error() {
        // Individual counts fit, but MAC plus PBES2 exceeds one shared budget.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_import_kdf_work: 3000,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        let bytes = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/xmlenc/01-phaos-xmlenc-3/rsa-priv-key.p12");
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::default().add_pkcs12("limited".into(), bytes, "secret", &resources),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_IMPORT_KDF_WORK,
                    maximum: 3000,
                }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pkcs12_workspace_denial_preserves_policy_error() {
        // KDF workspace denial must not look like a wrong password.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_import_kdf_memory_bytes: 1,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        let bytes = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/xmlenc/01-phaos-xmlenc-3/rsa-priv-key.p12");
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::default().add_pkcs12("limited".into(), bytes, "secret", &resources),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_IMPORT_KDF_MEMORY,
                    maximum: 1,
                }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pkcs12_temporary_memory_shares_existing_inventory_budget() {
        // Encoded input fits, but decrypted buffers and retained vector slots
        // must not receive a fresh aggregate allowance beside existing keys.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_bytes: 3000,
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: 5000,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "hmac".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                vec![1; 2000],
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("existing key fits");
        let bytes = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/xmlenc/01-phaos-xmlenc-3/rsa-priv-key.p12");
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.add_pkcs12("bundle".into(), bytes, "secret", &resources),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    maximum: 5000
                }
            ))
        ));
        assert_eq!(inventory.symmetric_keys().len(), 1);
        assert!(inventory.private_keys().is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn private_bundle_certificates_do_not_authorize_verification() {
        // A SIGN/DECRYPT-only PKCS#12 bundle must not implicitly make its
        // associated leaf available as a verification lookup candidate.
        let bytes = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/xmlenc/01-phaos-xmlenc-3/rsa-priv-key.p12");
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_pkcs12("private".into(), bytes, "secret", &resources)
            .expect("bundle imports");
        let leaf = inventory.private_keys()[0].certificate_chain[0].clone();
        let subject = crate::xmldsig::parse::parse_x509_certificate(&leaf)
            .expect("bundle leaf parses")
            .subject_dn;
        let key_info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::X509Data(X509DataInfo {
                subject_names: vec![subject],
                ..X509DataInfo::default()
            })],
        };
        let resolver = inventory.verification_resolver();
        assert!(
            resolver
                .resolve(Some(&key_info), SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256)
                .expect("lookup completes")
                .is_none()
        );

        inventory
            .add_certificate_der(leaf, false, &resources)
            .expect("explicit lookup certificate imports");
        assert!(
            inventory
                .verification_resolver()
                .resolve(Some(&key_info), SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256)
                .expect("explicit lookup completes")
                .is_some()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn stored_signing_keys_obey_operation_material_limits() {
        // An import-time resource policy must not override stricter limits
        // selected for a later signing operation.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "hmac".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                b"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef".to_vec(),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("HMAC imports");
        inventory
            .add_private_pem(
                "rsa".into(),
                include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-key.pem"),
                None,
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("RSA imports");

        for (name, algorithm, length) in [
            (
                "hmac",
                SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha256,
                inventory.symmetric_keys[0].bytes.len(),
            ),
            (
                "rsa",
                SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
                inventory.private_keys[0].pkcs8_der.len(),
            ),
        ] {
            let mut policy = crate::policy::SigningPolicy::default();
            policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes = length - 1;
            assert!(matches!(
                inventory.signing_key(name, algorithm, &policy),
                Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                    crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                        resource: crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                        maximum,
                        actual,
                    }
                )) if maximum == length - 1 && actual == length
            ));

            policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes = length;
            policy.resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes = length - 1;
            assert!(matches!(
                inventory.signing_key(name, algorithm, &policy),
                Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                    crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                        resource: crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                        maximum,
                        actual,
                    }
                )) if maximum == length - 1 && actual == length
            ));
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn named_signing_lookup_obeys_active_candidate_budget() {
        // Import limits do not authorize a later operation to scan the full inventory.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        for name in ["first", "second"] {
            inventory
                .add_symmetric(
                    name.into(),
                    SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                    vec![0x42; 32],
                    KeyUsages::SIGN,
                    &resources,
                )
                .expect("HMAC imports");
        }
        let mut policy = crate::policy::SigningPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_key_candidates = 1;
        assert!(
            inventory
                .signing_key("first", SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha256, &policy)
                .is_ok()
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.signing_key("second", SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha256, &policy),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
                    ..
                }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
    #[test]
    fn named_decryption_lookup_shares_candidate_budget_across_key_kinds() {
        // Scanning a symmetric miss must consume the same operation budget as
        // the subsequent private-key lookup.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "aes".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Aes,
                vec![0x42; 32],
                KeyUsages::DECRYPT,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("AES imports");
        inventory
            .add_private_pem(
                "rsa".into(),
                include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-key.pem"),
                None,
                KeyUsages::DECRYPT,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("RSA imports");
        let mut policy = crate::policy::DecryptionPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_key_candidates = 1;
        assert!(inventory.decryption_resolver("aes", &policy).is_ok());
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.decryption_resolver("rsa", &policy),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
                    ..
                }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pkcs12_imports_share_candidate_budget() {
        // Two ContentInfos and two SafeBags cost four inspections. The retained
        // key/certificate use two inventory slots, leaving too little work for
        // another bundle even though two more retained slots would fit.
        let bundle = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/xmlenc/01-phaos-xmlenc-3/rsa-priv-key.p12");
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_candidates: 4,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_pkcs12("first".into(), bundle, "secret", &resources)
            .expect("first bundle fits");
        assert_eq!(inventory.entry_count(), 2);
        assert!(
            inventory.private_keys()[0]
                .matching_certificate_chain()
                .is_some()
        );
        assert!(
            inventory
                .add_pkcs12("second".into(), bundle, "secret", &resources)
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn pkcs12_temporary_budget_excludes_live_input() {
        // The borrowed PFX remains live during both prepare and decrypt;
        // plaintext and KDF allocations must not reuse its allowance.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "old".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                vec![7; 32],
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("retained key");
        let input = [0; 128];
        let limits = inventory
            .pkcs12_import_limits("new", &input, KeyUsages::SIGN, &resources)
            .expect("import allowance");
        assert_eq!(
            limits.memory_available,
            resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes
                - inventory.material_bytes
                - 3
                - input.len()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn pkcs12_input_consumes_aggregate_import_budget() {
        // Repeated containers must charge encoded bytes, even when decoded material is small.
        let bundle = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/xmlenc/01-phaos-xmlenc-3/rsa-priv-key.p12");
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_pkcs12("first".into(), bundle, "secret", &resources)
            .expect("first bundle imports");
        assert!(inventory.material_bytes >= bundle.len());
        let limited = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: bundle.len() * 2 - 1,
            ..resources
        };
        assert!(
            inventory
                .add_pkcs12("second".into(), bundle, "secret", &limited)
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn pkcs12_unrelated_ca_does_not_block_private_key() {
        // Generated with OpenSSL from the tracked RSA key and unrelated CA;
        // the CA is lookup material, not a fabricated leaf certificate.
        let bundle = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
            .decode(
                include_str!("../tests/fixtures/keys/pkcs12/rsa-key-unrelated-ca.p12.b64").trim(),
            )
            .expect("fixture base64 decodes");
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_pkcs12(
                "ca-only".into(),
                &bundle,
                "secret",
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect("unrelated CA must not invalidate the private key");
        assert_eq!(inventory.private_keys.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(inventory.private_keys[0].certificate_chain.len(), 1);
        assert!(!inventory.private_keys[0].has_matching_leaf);
        assert!(
            inventory
                .signing_key(
                    "ca-only",
                    SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
                    &crate::policy::SigningPolicy::default(),
                )
                .is_ok()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn pkcs12_identical_leaf_bags_are_one_candidate() {
        // OpenSSL exported the same certificate as both the leaf and an extra
        // cert bag; the inventory retains one copy for the matching key.
        let bundle = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
            .decode(include_str!("../tests/fixtures/keys/pkcs12/rsa-duplicate-leaf.p12.b64").trim())
            .expect("fixture base64 decodes");
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_pkcs12(
                "duplicate-leaf".into(),
                &bundle,
                "secret",
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect("identical leaf bags are not ambiguous");
        assert_eq!(inventory.private_keys[0].certificate_chain.len(), 1);
        assert!(inventory.private_keys[0].has_matching_leaf);
    }

    #[test]
    fn ec_pkcs12_import_is_sign_only() {
        // The convenience importer must not advertise RSA transport for EC.
        let bundle = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
            .decode(include_str!("../tests/fixtures/keys/pkcs12/ec-key.p12.b64").trim())
            .expect("fixture base64 decodes");
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_pkcs12("ec".into(), &bundle, "secret", &resources)
            .expect("EC signing bundle imports");
        assert!(inventory.private_keys()[0].usages.allows(KeyUsage::Sign));
        assert!(!inventory.private_keys()[0].usages.allows(KeyUsage::Decrypt));
        assert!(
            KeyInventory::default()
                .add_pkcs12_with_usages(
                    "ec".into(),
                    &bundle,
                    "secret",
                    KeyUsages::DECRYPT,
                    &resources,
                )
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn password_callback_runs_for_protected_container() {
        // Password delivery is caller-owned and failures must not leak the
        // callback's diagnostic or retry a plaintext decoder.
        let bundle = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/xmlenc/01-phaos-xmlenc-3/rsa-priv-key.p12");
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_pkcs12_with_password_callback(
                "bundle".into(),
                bundle,
                || Some(Zeroizing::new("secret".to_owned())),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect("callback password decrypts donor bundle");
        assert!(inventory.private_keys[0].usages.allows(KeyUsage::Sign));
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::default().add_pkcs12_with_password_callback(
                "bundle".into(),
                bundle,
                || None,
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)
        ));
        let limited = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: bundle.len() - 1,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::default().add_pkcs12_with_password_callback(
                "bundle".into(),
                bundle,
                || panic!("budget must be checked before password delivery"),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &limited,
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    ..
                }
            ))
        ));
        let limited_kdf = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_import_kdf_work: 1,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::default().add_pkcs12_with_password_callback(
                "bundle".into(),
                bundle,
                || panic!("KDF denial must precede password delivery"),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &limited_kdf,
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::KdfIterationsOutsideLimit { maximum: 1 }
            ))
        ));
        let oversized_bundle = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_bytes: bundle.len() - 1,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::default().add_pkcs12_with_password_callback(
                "bundle".into(),
                bundle,
                || panic!("size denial must precede password delivery"),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &oversized_bundle,
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    maximum,
                }
            )) if maximum == bundle.len() - 1
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pkcs12_callback_preflights_indefinite_outer_ber() {
        // The outer PFX may use BER indefinite length without changing MAC parameters.
        let bundle = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/xmlenc/01-phaos-xmlenc-3/rsa-priv-key.p12");
        assert_eq!(bundle[0], 0x30);
        let length_octets = usize::from(bundle[1] & 0x7f);
        assert!(bundle[1] & 0x80 != 0 && length_octets > 0);
        let mut ber = vec![0x30, 0x80];
        ber.extend_from_slice(&bundle[2 + length_octets..]);
        ber.extend_from_slice(&[0, 0]);
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_import_kdf_work: 1,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::default().add_pkcs12_with_password_callback(
                "bundle".into(),
                &ber,
                || panic!("BER MAC KDF denial must precede password delivery"),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &resources,
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::KdfIterationsOutsideLimit { maximum: 1 }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn donor_xml_store_preserves_private_dsa_material() {
        // xmlsec's non-standard DSA X must be checked against Y, not silently
        // dropped while presenting the named key as usable for signing.
        let bytes = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/xmlsec/mixed-keys.xml");
        let inventory = KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(
            bytes,
            &xml_policy(ResourcePolicy::default()),
            XmlBackend::default(),
        )
        .expect("donor key store should parse");
        let dsa = inventory
            .private_keys
            .iter()
            .find(|entry| entry.name == "test-dsa")
            .expect("DSA private X should be imported");
        assert!(dsa.usages.allows(KeyUsage::Sign));
        assert!(!dsa.usages.allows(KeyUsage::Decrypt));
        assert!(DsaSigningKey::from_pkcs8_der(&dsa.pkcs8_der).is_ok());
        let dsa_public = inventory
            .public_keys()
            .iter()
            .find(|entry| entry.name == "test-dsa")
            .expect("DSA public entry is retained");
        assert_eq!(dsa_public.usages, KeyUsages::VERIFY);
    }

    #[test]
    fn xml_store_charges_retained_decoded_material() {
        // DSA retains public components, private PKCS#8 and three name copies.
        // A long valid name makes retained bytes exceed the encoded source.
        let source = include_str!("../tests/fixtures/keys/xmlsec/mixed-keys.xml");
        let marker = source.find("<KeyName>test-dsa</KeyName>").expect("DSA key");
        let start = source[..marker].rfind("<KeyInfo").expect("DSA KeyInfo");
        let end =
            marker + source[marker..].find("</KeyInfo>").expect("DSA end") + "</KeyInfo>".len();
        let xml = format!(
            "<Keys xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\">{}</Keys>",
            source[start..end]
                .replace('\n', "")
                .replace("test-dsa", &"name".repeat(512))
        );
        let inventory = KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(
            xml.as_bytes(),
            &xml_policy(ResourcePolicy::default()),
            XmlBackend::default(),
        )
        .expect("compact DSA store imports");
        let retained = inventory.retained_material_bytes().expect("bounded tally");
        assert_eq!(inventory.material_bytes, xml.len() + retained);
        assert!(retained >= inventory.private_keys[0].pkcs8_der.len());
        assert!(
            retained > xml.len(),
            "fixture must distinguish retained bytes from source bytes"
        );
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: retained - 1,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(
                xml.as_bytes(),
                &xml_policy(resources),
                XmlBackend::default()
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    ..
                }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn xml_import_session_keeps_failed_work_and_preflights_live_material() {
        // Retrying malformed input cannot refund candidate inspections; a
        // full live inventory rejects the next source before XML parsing.
        let xml = |value: &str| {
            format!(
                "<Keys xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\" xmlns:ds=\"{XMLDSIG_NS}\"><ds:KeyInfo><ds:KeyName>a</ds:KeyName><ds:KeyValue><HMACKeyValue>{value}</HMACKeyValue></ds:KeyValue></ds:KeyInfo></Keys>"
            )
        };
        let policy = xml_policy(ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_candidates: 1,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        });
        let mut importer =
            XmlKeyStoreImporter::new(&policy, XmlBackend::default()).expect("session");
        assert!(matches!(
            importer.import(xml("!").as_bytes()),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid(_))
        ));
        assert!(matches!(
            importer.import(xml("AA==").as_bytes()),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
                    maximum: 1
                }
            ))
        ));
        assert_eq!(importer.finish().entry_count(), 0);
        let valid = xml("AA==");
        let policy = xml_policy(ResourcePolicy {
            // Source, decoded byte, inventory name, and duplicate-name copy.
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: valid.len() + 3,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        });
        let mut importer =
            XmlKeyStoreImporter::new(&policy, XmlBackend::default()).expect("session");
        importer
            .import(valid.as_bytes())
            .expect("first source fits exactly");
        let consumed = importer.parse_work.consumed();
        assert!(matches!(
            importer.import(b"!!"),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    ..
                }
            ))
        ));
        assert_eq!(
            importer.parse_work.consumed(),
            consumed,
            "no parser work after byte denial"
        );
        assert_eq!(importer.finish().entry_count(), 1);
    }

    #[test]
    fn xml_store_rejects_empty_symmetric_material() {
        // Empty decoded secrets are invalid at the same boundary as direct imports.
        for kind in ["HMACKeyValue", "AESKeyValue", "DESKeyValue"] {
            let xml = format!(
                "<Keys xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\"><KeyInfo xmlns=\"{XMLDSIG_NS}\"><KeyName>empty</KeyName><KeyValue><{kind} xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\"/></KeyValue></KeyInfo></Keys>"
            );
            assert!(
                KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(
                    xml.as_bytes(),
                    &xml_policy(ResourcePolicy::default()),
                    XmlBackend::default(),
                )
                .is_err()
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn aes_imports_require_supported_key_widths() {
        // Both direct and XML key stores must reject widths unusable by AES-CBC/GCM.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        for length in [1, 15, 17, 23, 25, 31, 33] {
            let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
            assert!(
                inventory
                    .add_symmetric(
                        "aes".into(),
                        SymmetricKeyKind::Aes,
                        vec![0; length],
                        KeyUsages::ENCRYPT,
                        &resources,
                    )
                    .is_err()
            );
            let xml = format!(
                "<Keys xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\"><KeyInfo xmlns=\"{XMLDSIG_NS}\"><KeyName>aes</KeyName><KeyValue><AESKeyValue xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\">{}</AESKeyValue></KeyValue></KeyInfo></Keys>",
                base64::Engine::encode(&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, vec![0; length])
            );
            assert!(
                KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(
                    xml.as_bytes(),
                    &xml_policy(resources.clone()),
                    XmlBackend::default(),
                )
                .is_err()
            );
        }
        for length in [16, 24, 32] {
            let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
            inventory
                .add_symmetric(
                    "aes".into(),
                    SymmetricKeyKind::Aes,
                    vec![0; length],
                    KeyUsages::ENCRYPT,
                    &resources,
                )
                .expect("AES-128/192/256 key imports");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn unsupported_des_material_is_not_authorized() {
        // A parsed legacy DES value must not advertise an operation that the
        // encryption pipeline cannot execute.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        assert!(
            inventory
                .add_symmetric(
                    "des".into(),
                    SymmetricKeyKind::Des,
                    vec![0x42; 8],
                    KeyUsages::ENCRYPT,
                    &resources,
                )
                .is_err()
        );
        let xml = format!(
            "<Keys xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\"><KeyInfo xmlns=\"{XMLDSIG_NS}\"><KeyName>des</KeyName><KeyValue><DESKeyValue xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\">QkJCQkJCQkI=</DESKeyValue></KeyValue></KeyInfo></Keys>"
        );
        assert!(
            KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(
                xml.as_bytes(),
                &xml_policy(resources.clone()),
                XmlBackend::default(),
            )
            .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn xml_store_accepts_xmlsig11_ec_key_value() {
        // XMLDSig 1.1 ECKeyValue must be recognized as public material.
        let pem = pem::parse(include_bytes!(
            "../tests/fixtures/keys/ec/ec-prime256v1-pubkey.pem"
        ))
        .expect("EC public PEM decodes");
        let (_, spki) = x509_parser::x509::SubjectPublicKeyInfo::from_der(pem.contents())
            .expect("EC SPKI parses");
        let point =
            base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(spki.subject_public_key.data.as_ref());
        let xml = format!(
            "<Keys xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\"><KeyInfo xmlns=\"{XMLDSIG_NS}\"><KeyName>ec</KeyName><KeyValue><ECKeyValue xmlns=\"{XMLDSIG11_NS}\"><NamedCurve URI=\"urn:oid:1.2.840.10045.3.1.7\"/><PublicKey>{point}</PublicKey></ECKeyValue></KeyValue></KeyInfo></Keys>"
        );
        let store = KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(
            xml.as_bytes(),
            &xml_policy(ResourcePolicy::default()),
            XmlBackend::default(),
        )
        .expect("ECKeyValue namespace is supported");
        assert_eq!(store.public_keys().len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(store.public_keys()[0].usages, KeyUsages::VERIFY);
        assert!(
            store.public_keys()[0]
                .key_info
                .sources
                .iter()
                .any(|source| matches!(source, KeyInfoSource::KeyValue(KeyValueInfo::Ec { .. })))
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn xml_store_rejects_unusable_public_key_values() {
        // Malformed supported public-key material must fail at import, not at verification.
        let cases = [
            "<RSAKeyValue><Modulus></Modulus><Exponent>AQAB</Exponent></RSAKeyValue>",
            "<ECKeyValue xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#\"><NamedCurve URI=\"urn:oid:1.2.840.10045.3.1.7\"/><PublicKey>AQ==</PublicKey></ECKeyValue>",
        ];
        for key in cases {
            let xml = format!(
                "<Keys xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\"><KeyInfo xmlns=\"{XMLDSIG_NS}\"><KeyName>invalid</KeyName><KeyValue>{key}</KeyValue></KeyInfo></Keys>"
            );
            assert!(
                KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(
                    xml.as_bytes(),
                    &xml_policy(ResourcePolicy::default()),
                    XmlBackend::default(),
                )
                .is_err()
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn xml_store_import_limits_preserve_policy_errors() {
        // Limit denials must not look like malformed stores or candidate misses.
        let xml = format!(
            "<Keys xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\"><KeyInfo xmlns=\"{XMLDSIG_NS}\"><KeyName>key</KeyName><KeyValue><HMACKeyValue xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\">c2VjcmV0</HMACKeyValue></KeyValue></KeyInfo></Keys>"
        );
        let two = xml.replace(
            "</Keys>",
            &format!(
                "{} </Keys>",
                xml[xml.find("<KeyInfo").expect("fixture has KeyInfo")
                    ..xml.find("</Keys>").expect("fixture has Keys end tag")]
                    .replace(">key<", ">other<")
            ),
        );
        for (bytes, resources, expected) in [
            (
                xml.as_bytes(),
                ResourcePolicy {
                    max_external_resource_bytes: xml.len() - 1,
                    ..ResourcePolicy::default()
                },
                crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
            ),
            (
                xml.as_bytes(),
                ResourcePolicy {
                    max_external_resource_total_bytes: xml.len() - 1,
                    ..ResourcePolicy::default()
                },
                crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
            ),
            (
                two.as_bytes(),
                ResourcePolicy {
                    max_key_candidates: 1,
                    ..ResourcePolicy::default()
                },
                crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
            ),
        ] {
            assert!(
                matches!(KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(bytes, &xml_policy(resources), XmlBackend::default()),
                Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded { resource, .. })) if resource == expected)
            );
        }
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: 3,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.add_symmetric(
                "key".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                vec![7; 32],
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &resources
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    ..
                }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn xml_store_enforces_all_parser_resource_limits() {
        // Import must not skip the depth, namespace or cumulative work limits.
        let xml = format!(
            "<Keys xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\" xmlns:a=\"urn:a\" xmlns:b=\"urn:b\"><KeyInfo xmlns=\"{XMLDSIG_NS}\"><KeyName>key</KeyName><KeyValue><HMACKeyValue xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\">c2VjcmV0</HMACKeyValue></KeyValue></KeyInfo></Keys>"
        );
        for resources in [
            ResourcePolicy {
                max_xml_depth: 2,
                ..ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ResourcePolicy {
                max_xml_namespace_bindings: 1,
                ..ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ResourcePolicy {
                max_xml_parse_work_bytes: 1,
                ..ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
        ] {
            assert!(
                KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(
                    xml.as_bytes(),
                    &xml_policy(resources),
                    XmlBackend::default()
                )
                .is_err_and(|error| matches!(error, KeyStoreError::Policy(_))),
                "parser policy denial must retain its type in key stores"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn xml_store_bounds_source_before_utf16_decode() {
        // The source-byte ceiling must be checked before UTF-16 expansion or parsing.
        let xml = format!("<Keys xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\"/>");
        let mut bytes = vec![0xff, 0xfe];
        for unit in xml.encode_utf16() {
            bytes.extend_from_slice(&unit.to_le_bytes());
        }
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_xml_document_bytes: xml.len() + 1,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        assert!(bytes.len() > resources.max_xml_document_bytes);
        assert!(
            KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(&bytes, &xml_policy(resources), XmlBackend::default())
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn xml_store_uses_operation_xml_policy() {
        // Internal DTD permission must come from the operation snapshot, not
        // an importer-local default that rejects a caller-authorized store.
        let xml = format!(
            "<!DOCTYPE Keys [<!ENTITY key 'named'>]><Keys xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\"><KeyInfo xmlns=\"{XMLDSIG_NS}\"><KeyName>&key;</KeyName><KeyValue><HMACKeyValue xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\">c2VjcmV0</HMACKeyValue></KeyValue></KeyInfo></Keys>"
        );
        let denied = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        assert!(
            KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(xml.as_bytes(), &denied, XmlBackend::default()).is_err()
        );
        let mut allowed = denied;
        allowed.xml.allow_internal_dtd = true;
        assert!(
            KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(xml.as_bytes(), &allowed, XmlBackend::default()).is_ok()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn ec_public_key_cannot_authorize_encryption() {
        // EC material can verify signatures but cannot serve as an RSA recipient.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let ec = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/ec/ec-prime256v1-pubkey.pem");
        let cert = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/ec/ec-prime256v1-cert.pem");
        let mut store = KeyInventory::default();
        store
            .add_public_pem("ec".into(), ec, &resources)
            .expect("EC public key imports");
        assert_eq!(store.public_keys()[0].usages, KeyUsages::VERIFY);
        assert!(
            store
                .add_public_pem_with_usages("ec-encrypt".into(), ec, KeyUsages::ENCRYPT, &resources)
                .is_err()
        );
        let cert_der = pem::parse(cert)
            .expect("EC certificate PEM decodes")
            .into_contents();
        store
            .add_public_der("ec-cert".into(), cert_der.clone(), &resources)
            .expect("EC certificate imports");
        assert_eq!(store.public_keys()[1].usages, KeyUsages::VERIFY);
        assert!(
            store
                .add_public_der_with_usages(
                    "ec-cert-encrypt".into(),
                    cert_der,
                    KeyUsages::ENCRYPT,
                    &resources
                )
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn xml_store_rejects_policy_above_absolute_ceiling() {
        // Public imports cannot bypass hard ceilings with an unvalidated policy.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_xml_nodes: crate::hard_limits::XML_DOCUMENT_NODE_CEILING as usize + 1,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        let xml = format!("<Keys xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\"/>");
        assert!(
            KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(
                xml.as_bytes(),
                &xml_policy(resources.clone()),
                XmlBackend::default(),
            )
            .is_err()
        );
        assert!(
            KeyInventory::default()
                .add_symmetric(
                    "key".into(),
                    SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                    b"secret".to_vec(),
                    KeyUsages::SIGN,
                    &resources,
                )
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn ec_private_key_cannot_advertise_rsa_decryption() {
        // Only RSA private material can satisfy the inventory's decrypt API.
        let pem = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/ec/ec-prime256v1-key.pem");
        assert!(
            KeyInventory::default()
                .add_private_pem(
                    "ec".into(),
                    pem,
                    None,
                    KeyUsages::DECRYPT,
                    &ResourcePolicy::default(),
                )
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn imports_rsa_pkcs1_pem_and_resolves_named_spki() {
        // Traditional RSA import and named public lookup share one inventory,
        // while the resolver still applies the operation's verification policy.
        let private_pem = include_str!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-key.pem");
        let rsa = RsaPrivateKey::from_pkcs8_pem(private_pem).expect("RSA fixture parses");
        let pkcs1 = rsa.to_pkcs1_der().expect("RSA fixture encodes as PKCS#1");
        let public = rsa
            .to_public_key()
            .to_public_key_der()
            .expect("RSA fixture has SPKI");
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_private_der(
                "key".into(),
                pkcs1.as_bytes(),
                None,
                KeyUsages::SIGN.union(KeyUsages::DECRYPT),
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("PKCS#1 private key imports");
        inventory
            .add_public_der("verify-key".into(), public.as_bytes().to_vec(), &resources)
            .expect("public SPKI imports");
        assert!(inventory.private_keys[0].usages.allows(KeyUsage::Sign));
        let mut info = KeyInfo::default();
        info.sources
            .push(KeyInfoSource::KeyName("verify-key".into()));
        let resolver = inventory.verification_resolver();
        let resolved = resolver
            .resolve(Some(&info), SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256)
            .expect("named public key resolves");
        assert!(resolved.is_some());
    }

    #[test]
    fn rejects_unknown_pem_text_and_duplicate_names() {
        // PEM is a single armor block; unrelated trailing data must not be
        // silently skipped by the general-purpose PEM parser.
        let public = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-pubkey.pem");
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        inventory
            .add_public_pem("first".into(), public, &resources)
            .expect("public PEM imports");
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.add_public_pem("first".into(), public, &resources),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("duplicate key name"))
        ));
        let mut trailing = public.to_vec();
        trailing.extend_from_slice(b"\nnot a key");
        assert!(
            inventory
                .add_public_pem("other".into(), &trailing, &resources)
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn public_pem_label_rejects_certificate_payload() {
        // Strict label dispatch must not inherit generic DER's certificate fallback.
        let certificate = pem::parse(include_bytes!(
            "../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-cert.pem"
        ))
        .expect("certificate")
        .into_contents();
        let mislabeled = pem::encode(&pem::Pem::new("PUBLIC KEY", certificate.clone()));
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        for usages in [None, Some(KeyUsages::VERIFY)] {
            let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
            assert!(matches!(
                inventory.add_public_pem_inner(
                    "key".into(),
                    mislabeled.as_bytes(),
                    usages,
                    &resources
                ),
                Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid PUBLIC KEY payload"))
            ));
            assert!(inventory.public_keys().is_empty());
        }
        KeyInventory::default()
            .add_public_der("cert".into(), certificate, &resources)
            .expect("generic DER intentionally accepts certificates");
        KeyInventory::default()
            .add_public_pem(
                "spki".into(),
                include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-pubkey.pem"),
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("correct SPKI label");
    }

    #[test]
    fn rsa_spki_import_rejects_even_public_exponent() {
        // ASN.1 shape alone must not grant verify/encrypt usages to an unusable RSA key.
        let mut der = single_pem_block(
            include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-pubkey.pem"),
            ResourcePolicy::default().max_external_resource_bytes,
        )
        .expect("public key fixture")
        .into_contents();
        let exponent = der
            .windows(5)
            .position(|bytes| bytes == [0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01])
            .expect("RSA exponent in SPKI");
        der[exponent + 4] = 0;
        assert!(
            KeyInventory::default()
                .add_public_der("invalid".into(), der, &ResourcePolicy::default())
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn rsa_public_pkcs1_pem_is_bounded_before_bigint_decode() {
        // The borrowed ASN.1 modulus is checked before RSA allocates integers.
        let modulus = vec![1_u8; crate::hard_limits::RSA_MODULUS_BIT_CEILING.div_ceil(8) + 1];
        let exponent = [1_u8, 0, 1];
        let public = rsa::pkcs1::RsaPublicKey {
            modulus: der::asn1::UintRef::new(&modulus).expect("valid modulus"),
            public_exponent: der::asn1::UintRef::new(&exponent).expect("valid exponent"),
        };
        let pem = pem::encode(&pem::Pem::new(
            "RSA PUBLIC KEY",
            der::Encode::to_der(&public).expect("encodable RSA public key"),
        ));
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::default().add_public_pem(
                "oversized".into(),
                pem.as_bytes(),
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
                "RSA public key exceeds safety limit"
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn direct_inventory_names_consume_resource_budget() {
        // Caller-owned names must not bypass per-resource or retained aggregate bounds.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_bytes: 64,
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: 100,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        assert!(
            inventory
                .add_symmetric(
                    "x".repeat(65),
                    SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                    vec![7; 32],
                    KeyUsages::SIGN,
                    &resources,
                )
                .is_err()
        );
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "a".repeat(40),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                vec![7; 32],
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("first named key fits");
        assert!(
            inventory
                .add_symmetric(
                    "b".repeat(40),
                    SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                    vec![8; 32],
                    KeyUsages::SIGN,
                    &resources,
                )
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn private_pem_label_cannot_enable_der_fallback() {
        // A protected label must never import plaintext, even with a password.
        let plain = pem::parse(include_bytes!(
            "../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-key.pem"
        ))
        .expect("fixture")
        .into_contents();
        let mislabeled = pem::encode(&pem::Pem::new("ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY", plain));
        for password in [None, Some(b"ignored".as_slice())] {
            let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
            assert!(matches!(
                inventory.add_private_pem(
                    "key".into(),
                    mislabeled.as_bytes(),
                    password,
                    KeyUsages::SIGN,
                    &ResourcePolicy::default()
                ),
                Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)
            ));
            assert!(inventory.private_keys.is_empty());
            assert_eq!(inventory.material_bytes, 0);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn encrypted_pkcs8_callback_checks_remaining_work() {
        use der::Encode as _;
        use pkcs8::pkcs5::{EncryptionScheme, pbes2};
        // Failed decryption consumes work. A later container must not request
        // another secret when its visible derivation exceeds the remainder.
        let envelope = EncryptedPrivateKeyInfoRef {
            encryption_algorithm: EncryptionScheme::Pbes2(pbes2::Parameters {
                kdf: pbes2::Kdf::Pbkdf2(pbes2::Pbkdf2Params {
                    salt: pbes2::Salt::new(b"12345678").expect("salt"),
                    iteration_count: 2,
                    key_length: None,
                    prf: pbes2::Pbkdf2Prf::HmacWithSha256,
                }),
                encryption: pbes2::EncryptionScheme::Aes256Cbc { iv: [0; 16] },
            }),
            encrypted_data: der::asn1::OctetStringRef::new(&[0; 64]).expect("ciphertext"),
        }
        .to_der()
        .expect("envelope");
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_import_kdf_work: 4,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.add_private_der(
                "first".into(),
                &envelope,
                Some(b"wrong"),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &resources,
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)
        ));
        assert_eq!(inventory.key_import_kdf_work(), 3);
        let calls = std::cell::Cell::new(0);
        let result = inventory.add_private_der_with_password_callback(
            "second".into(),
            &envelope,
            || {
                calls.set(calls.get() + 1);
                Some(Zeroizing::new(b"wrong".to_vec()))
            },
            KeyUsages::SIGN,
            &resources,
        );
        assert_eq!(calls.get(), 0, "preflight precedes secret acquisition");
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(_))));
        assert_eq!(inventory.key_import_kdf_work(), 3);
        // An exact remaining derivation is allowed to request the password.
        let exact = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_import_kdf_work: 6,
            ..resources
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.add_private_der_with_password_callback(
                "third".into(),
                &envelope,
                || {
                    calls.set(calls.get() + 1);
                    Some(Zeroizing::new(b"wrong".to_vec()))
                },
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &exact,
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)
        ));
        assert_eq!(calls.get(), 1);
        assert_eq!(inventory.key_import_kdf_work(), 6);
    }

    #[test]
    fn encrypted_pkcs8_requires_correct_password_without_plaintext_fallback() {
        // Wrong passwords must not retry another format or leave a partial
        // registration in the caller-owned inventory.
        let private_pem = include_str!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-key.pem");
        let rsa = RsaPrivateKey::from_pkcs8_pem(private_pem).expect("RSA fixture parses");
        let plain = rsa.to_pkcs8_der().expect("RSA fixture encodes as PKCS#8");
        let mut rng = ChaCha8Rng::seed_from_u64(0xA11C_E501);
        let encrypted = PrivateKeyInfoRef::try_from(plain.as_bytes())
            .expect("PKCS#8 reference parses")
            .encrypt_with_rng(&mut rng, b"correct")
            .expect("PKCS#8 fixture encrypts");
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        let restricted = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_import_kdf_work: 1,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.add_private_der(
                "restricted".into(),
                encrypted.as_bytes(),
                Some(b"correct"),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &restricted,
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_IMPORT_KDF_WORK,
                    maximum: 1,
                    ..
                }
            ))
        ));
        let callback_calls = std::cell::Cell::new(0);
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.add_private_der_with_password_callback(
                "restricted-callback".into(),
                encrypted.as_bytes(),
                || {
                    callback_calls.set(callback_calls.get() + 1);
                    Some(Zeroizing::new(b"correct".to_vec()))
                },
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &restricted,
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_IMPORT_KDF_WORK,
                    maximum: 1,
                    ..
                }
            ))
        ));
        assert_eq!(callback_calls.get(), 0);
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.add_private_der(
                "protected".into(),
                encrypted.as_bytes(),
                Some(b"wrong"),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &resources,
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)
        ));
        assert!(inventory.private_keys.is_empty());
        inventory
            .add_private_der(
                "protected".into(),
                encrypted.as_bytes(),
                Some(b"correct"),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("correct password imports encrypted PKCS#8");
        assert_eq!(inventory.private_keys.len(), 1);
        assert!(inventory.material_bytes >= encrypted.as_bytes().len());
        let mut callback_inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        callback_inventory
            .add_private_der_with_password_callback(
                "callback".into(),
                encrypted.as_bytes(),
                || Some(Zeroizing::new(b"correct".to_vec())),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("callback decrypts encrypted PKCS#8");
        callback_inventory
            .add_private_der_with_password_callback(
                "plain".into(),
                plain.as_bytes(),
                || panic!("plaintext PKCS#8 must not request a password"),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("plaintext import ignores password callback");
    }

    #[test]
    fn invalid_private_usages_do_not_request_password() {
        // Caller-visible rejection must precede prompting or retrieving secrets.
        let private = pem::parse(include_bytes!(
            "../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-key.pem"
        ))
        .expect("key")
        .into_contents();
        let encrypted = PrivateKeyInfoRef::try_from(private.as_slice())
            .expect("PKCS8")
            .encrypt_with_rng(&mut ChaCha8Rng::seed_from_u64(42), b"correct")
            .expect("encrypted PKCS8");
        for usages in [
            KeyUsages::VERIFY,
            KeyUsages(0),
            KeyUsages::SIGN.union(KeyUsages::VERIFY),
        ] {
            let calls = std::cell::Cell::new(0);
            let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
            assert!(matches!(
                inventory.add_private_der_with_password_callback(
                    "invalid".into(),
                    encrypted.as_bytes(),
                    || {
                        calls.set(calls.get() + 1);
                        Some(Zeroizing::new(b"correct".to_vec()))
                    },
                    usages,
                    &ResourcePolicy::default()
                ),
                Err(KeyStoreError::Selection(
                    "private key usage is incompatible"
                ))
            ));
            assert_eq!(calls.get(), 0);
            assert_eq!(inventory.entry_count(), 0);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn certificate_and_crl_capacity_precedes_der_parsing() {
        // Exhausted inventory limits are terminal policy errors even for
        // malformed DER. Failed imports must not change retained accounting.
        for candidates in [true, false] {
            for certificate in [true, false] {
                let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
                let resources = ResourcePolicy {
                    max_key_candidates: if candidates { 1 } else { 64 },
                    max_external_resource_total_bytes: 2,
                    ..ResourcePolicy::default()
                };
                inventory
                    .add_symmetric(
                        "a".into(),
                        SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                        vec![0],
                        KeyUsages::SIGN,
                        &resources,
                    )
                    .expect("fill inventory");
                let result = if certificate {
                    inventory.add_certificate_der(vec![0], false, &resources)
                } else {
                    inventory.add_crl_der(vec![0], &resources)
                };
                let resource = if candidates {
                    crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES
                } else {
                    crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES
                };
                assert!(matches!(result, Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                    crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded { resource: actual, .. }
                )) if actual == resource));
                assert_eq!(inventory.entry_count(), 1);
                assert_eq!(inventory.material_bytes, 2);
                assert!(inventory.lookup_certificates.is_empty());
                assert!(inventory.crls.is_empty());
            }
        }
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::default().add_crl_der(vec![0], &ResourcePolicy::default()),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("invalid X.509 CRL"))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn pkcs8_pbkdf2_output_blocks_are_checked_before_password() {
        use der::Encode as _;
        // AES-256/SHA-1 needs two PBKDF2 blocks; three rounds cost six PRFs,
        // not three. Denial must precede the public password callback.
        use pkcs8::pkcs5::{EncryptionScheme, pbes2};
        let encrypted = EncryptedPrivateKeyInfoRef {
            encryption_algorithm: EncryptionScheme::Pbes2(pbes2::Parameters {
                kdf: pbes2::Kdf::Pbkdf2(pbes2::Pbkdf2Params {
                    salt: pbes2::Salt::new(b"12345678").expect("salt"),
                    iteration_count: 3,
                    key_length: None,
                    prf: pbes2::Pbkdf2Prf::HmacWithSha1,
                }),
                encryption: pbes2::EncryptionScheme::Aes256Cbc { iv: [0; 16] },
            }),
            encrypted_data: der::asn1::OctetStringRef::new(&[0; 16]).expect("ciphertext"),
        };
        let bytes = encrypted.to_der().expect("encrypted envelope");
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_import_kdf_work: 5,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        let calls = std::cell::Cell::new(0);
        let result = KeyInventory::default().add_private_der_with_password_callback(
            "key".into(),
            &bytes,
            || {
                calls.set(calls.get() + 1);
                None
            },
            KeyUsages::SIGN,
            &resources,
        );
        assert_eq!(calls.get(), 0);
        assert!(matches!(
            result,
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_IMPORT_KDF_WORK,
                    maximum: 5,
                    actual: 6,
                }
            ))
        ));
        let exact = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_import_kdf_work: 6,
            ..resources
        };
        assert!(enforce_pkcs8_kdf_policy(&encrypted, &exact, 0).is_ok());
        // Cover each PRF width and CBC key width, including single-block
        // cases so the fix cannot unconditionally double iteration charges.
        for (prf, hash_len) in [
            (pbes2::Pbkdf2Prf::HmacWithSha1, 20),
            (pbes2::Pbkdf2Prf::HmacWithSha224, 28),
            (pbes2::Pbkdf2Prf::HmacWithSha256, 32),
            (pbes2::Pbkdf2Prf::HmacWithSha384, 48),
            (pbes2::Pbkdf2Prf::HmacWithSha512, 64),
        ] {
            for cipher in [
                pbes2::EncryptionScheme::Aes128Cbc { iv: [0; 16] },
                pbes2::EncryptionScheme::Aes192Cbc { iv: [0; 16] },
                pbes2::EncryptionScheme::Aes256Cbc { iv: [0; 16] },
            ] {
                let mut envelope = encrypted.clone();
                let EncryptionScheme::Pbes2(params) = &mut envelope.encryption_algorithm else {
                    panic!("PBES2 fixture");
                };
                let pbes2::Kdf::Pbkdf2(kdf) = &mut params.kdf else {
                    panic!("PBKDF2 fixture");
                };
                kdf.prf = prf;
                params.encryption = cipher;
                let work = 3 * cipher.key_size().div_ceil(hash_len);
                let exact = ResourcePolicy {
                    max_key_import_kdf_work: work,
                    ..ResourcePolicy::default()
                };
                assert!(enforce_pkcs8_kdf_policy(&envelope, &exact, 0).is_ok());
                let tight = ResourcePolicy {
                    max_key_import_kdf_work: work - 1,
                    ..exact
                };
                assert!(matches!(enforce_pkcs8_kdf_policy(&envelope, &tight, 0),
                    Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                        resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_IMPORT_KDF_WORK,
                        actual, ..
                    })) if actual == work));
            }
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn protected_password_consumes_live_byte_and_work_budgets() {
        use der::Encode as _;
        use pkcs8::pkcs5::{EncryptionScheme, pbes2};
        // Password hashing and retained callback capacity must be denied before
        // failed padding can hide the resource-policy failure.
        let envelope = EncryptedPrivateKeyInfoRef {
            encryption_algorithm: EncryptionScheme::Pbes2(pbes2::Parameters {
                kdf: pbes2::Kdf::Pbkdf2(pbes2::Pbkdf2Params {
                    salt: pbes2::Salt::new(b"12345678").expect("salt"),
                    iteration_count: 2,
                    key_length: None,
                    prf: pbes2::Pbkdf2Prf::HmacWithSha256,
                }),
                encryption: pbes2::EncryptionScheme::Aes256Cbc { iv: [0; 16] },
            }),
            encrypted_data: der::asn1::OctetStringRef::new(&[0; 64]).expect("ciphertext"),
        }
        .to_der()
        .expect("envelope");
        let peak = 3 + envelope.len() + 64;
        for resources in [
            ResourcePolicy {
                max_external_resource_bytes: 255,
                ..ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ResourcePolicy {
                max_external_resource_total_bytes: peak + 255,
                ..ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ResourcePolicy {
                max_key_import_kdf_work: 5,
                ..ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
        ] {
            let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
            assert!(matches!(
                inventory.add_private_der(
                    "new".into(),
                    &envelope,
                    Some(&[0; 256]),
                    KeyUsages::SIGN,
                    &resources
                ),
                Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(_))
            ));
            assert!(inventory.private_keys().is_empty());
        }
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: peak + 255,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        let mut secret = Vec::with_capacity(256);
        secret.push(0);
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::default().add_private_der_with_password_callback(
                "new".into(),
                &envelope,
                || Some(Zeroizing::new(secret)),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &resources
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(_))
        ));
        let exact = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: peak + 256,
            max_key_import_kdf_work: 6,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::default().add_private_der(
                "new".into(),
                &envelope,
                Some(&[0; 256]),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &exact
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn private_identity_matches_without_owned_public_encoding() {
        // Compare every supported family against its canonical encoder, and
        // reject changed public material. Import itself retains no SPKI copy.
        let rsa_der = pem::parse(include_bytes!(
            "../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-key.pem"
        ))
        .expect("RSA PEM fixture")
        .into_contents();
        let rsa = RsaPrivateKey::from_pkcs8_der(&rsa_der).expect("RSA private key");
        let public = rsa
            .to_public_key()
            .to_public_key_der()
            .expect("RSA public encoding");
        let identity = PrivateKeyIdentity::decode(&rsa_der).expect("RSA identity");
        assert!(identity.matches_spki(public.as_bytes()));
        let mut changed = public.as_bytes().to_vec();
        *changed.last_mut().expect("nonempty RSA SPKI") ^= 2;
        assert!(!identity.matches_spki(&changed));
        assert!(!identity.matches_spki(b"invalid DER"));

        macro_rules! check_ec {
            ($key:ty, $length:expr) => {{
                let mut scalar = [0; $length];
                scalar[$length - 1] = 1;
                let key = <$key>::from_slice(&scalar).expect("valid EC scalar");
                let private = key.to_pkcs8_der().expect("EC private encoding");
                let public = key
                    .public_key()
                    .to_public_key_der()
                    .expect("EC public encoding");
                let identity = PrivateKeyIdentity::decode(private.as_bytes()).expect("EC identity");
                assert!(identity.matches_spki(public.as_bytes()));
                let mut changed = public.as_bytes().to_vec();
                *changed.last_mut().expect("nonempty EC SPKI") ^= 1;
                assert!(!identity.matches_spki(&changed));
            }};
        }
        check_ec!(p256::SecretKey, 32);
        check_ec!(p384::SecretKey, 48);
        check_ec!(p521::SecretKey, 66);

        let inventory = KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(
            include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/xmlsec/mixed-keys.xml"),
            &xml_policy(ResourcePolicy::default()),
            XmlBackend::default(),
        )
        .expect("mixed store fixture");
        let private = inventory
            .private_keys()
            .iter()
            .find(|entry| entry.name == "test-dsa")
            .expect("stored DSA private key");
        let key = NativeDsaSigningKey::from_pkcs8_der(&private.pkcs8_der).expect("DSA private key");
        let public = key
            .verifying_key()
            .to_public_key_der()
            .expect("DSA public encoding");
        let identity = PrivateKeyIdentity::decode(&private.pkcs8_der).expect("DSA identity");
        assert!(identity.matches_spki(public.as_bytes()));
        let mut changed = public.as_bytes().to_vec();
        *changed.last_mut().expect("nonempty DSA SPKI") ^= 1;
        assert!(!identity.matches_spki(&changed));
    }

    #[test]
    fn xml_import_counts_source_and_decoded_material_together() {
        // The caller still owns the Base64 XML while the decoded HMAC is live.
        let xml = format!(
            "<Keys xmlns='{XMLSEC_NS}' xmlns:ds='{XMLDSIG_NS}'><ds:KeyInfo><ds:KeyName>hmac</ds:KeyName><ds:KeyValue><HMACKeyValue>{}</HMACKeyValue></ds:KeyValue></ds:KeyInfo></Keys>",
            base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(vec![1; 1024])
        );
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: xml.len(),
            ..Default::default()
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(
                xml.as_bytes(),
                &xml_policy(resources),
                XmlBackend::default()
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(_))
        ));
        // Exact peak includes both live name copies, not just retained bytes.
        let peak = xml.len() + 1024 + 2 * "hmac".len();
        for maximum in [peak - 1, peak] {
            let policy = xml_policy(ResourcePolicy {
                max_external_resource_total_bytes: maximum,
                ..Default::default()
            });
            let result =
                KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(xml.as_bytes(), &policy, XmlBackend::default());
            if maximum == peak {
                let store = result.expect("exact live peak fits");
                assert_eq!(store.symmetric_keys[0].bytes.as_slice(), &[1; 1024]);
                assert_eq!(store.material_bytes, xml.len() + 1024 + "hmac".len());
            } else {
                assert!(matches!(result, Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(_))));
            }
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn private_pem_preflight_precedes_payload_parsing() {
        // Structurally invalid DER must never be reached when its allocation
        // already exceeds the allowance, for plain and encrypted labels alike.
        for label in ["PRIVATE KEY", "ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY", "RSA PRIVATE KEY"] {
            let pem = pem::encode(&pem::Pem::new(label, vec![1, 2, 3]));
            let resources = ResourcePolicy {
                max_external_resource_total_bytes: pem.len() + "key".len() + 2,
                ..Default::default()
            };
            let mut store = KeyInventory::default();
            assert!(matches!(
                store.add_private_pem(
                    "key".into(),
                    pem.as_bytes(),
                    None,
                    KeyUsages::SIGN,
                    &resources
                ),
                Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(_))
            ));
            assert_eq!(store.entry_count(), 0);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn xml_public_key_import_preserves_key_info_metadata_validation() {
        // Importing KeyValue directly must not bypass the original KeyInfo
        // mixed-content and name-length validation performed by shared parsing.
        let source = include_str!("../tests/fixtures/keys/xmlsec/mixed-keys.xml");
        let marker = source.find("<RSAKeyValue").expect("RSA entry");
        let start = source[..marker].rfind("<KeyInfo").expect("RSA KeyInfo");
        let end =
            marker + source[marker..].find("</KeyInfo>").expect("RSA end") + "</KeyInfo>".len();
        let entry = &source[start..end];
        let name_start = entry.find("<KeyName>").expect("name") + "<KeyName>".len();
        let name_end = name_start + entry[name_start..].find("</KeyName>").expect("name end");
        for changed in [
            format!(
                "{}{}{}",
                &entry[..name_start],
                "a".repeat(4097),
                &entry[name_end..]
            ),
            entry.replacen("<KeyName>", "unexpected<KeyName>", 1),
        ] {
            let xml = format!("<Keys xmlns='{XMLSEC_NS}'>{changed}</Keys>");
            assert!(
                KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(
                    xml.as_bytes(),
                    &xml_policy(ResourcePolicy::default()),
                    XmlBackend::default()
                )
                .is_err()
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn public_pem_decoder_preserves_framing_and_whitespace_contract() {
        // Decode borrowed input without tightening the existing whitespace/header
        // contract; malformed framing, alphabet and padding remain rejected.
        for data in [
            "AQID",
            "A Q\tI\r\nD",
            "A\u{2003}QID",
            "Header: value\n\nAQID",
            "Header: value\r\n\r\nAQID",
        ] {
            let text = format!("-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n{data}\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----");
            let expected = single_pem_block(text.as_bytes(), 4096).expect("existing PEM contract");
            let frame = BorrowedPem::parse(text.as_bytes(), 4096).expect("borrowed frame");
            assert_eq!(
                frame.decode().expect("borrowed decode"),
                expected.contents()
            );
        }
        for data in ["AQI=", "AQ==", "AQID"] {
            let text =
                format!("-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n{data}\n-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----");
            let frame = BorrowedPem::parse(text.as_bytes(), 4096).expect("borrowed frame");
            assert_eq!(frame.decode().expect("decode").len(), frame.decoded_len);
        }
        // Exercise padding and the decoder's fixed-size staging boundaries;
        // whitespace-separated input must not truncate a multi-read payload.
        for length in [0, 1, 2, 3, 1023, 1024, 1025, 4096] {
            let bytes = vec![0xa5; length];
            let encoded = pem::encode(&pem::Pem::new("PUBLIC KEY", bytes.clone()));
            let frame = BorrowedPem::parse(encoded.as_bytes(), 8192).expect("frame");
            assert_eq!(frame.decoded_len, length);
            assert_eq!(frame.decode().expect("streamed decoding"), bytes);
        }
        for text in [
            "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nAQID\n-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----",
            "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nAQID\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----junk",
            "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nAQID\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nAQID\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----",
            "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nAQI\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----",
            "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nAQ$=\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----",
            "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nAR==\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----",
            "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nA===\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----",
            "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nAQ=I\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----",
            "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nnot a header\n\nAQID\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----",
        ] {
            assert!(
                BorrowedPem::parse(text.as_bytes(), 4096)
                    .and_then(|frame| frame.decode())
                    .is_err(),
                "accepted {text}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn public_pem_import_accounts_for_simultaneous_buffers() {
        use rsa::pkcs1::EncodeRsaPublicKey as _;
        use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePublicKey as _;
        // Caller PEM, decoded bytes and a normalized SPKI coexist; neither
        // prior inventory material nor any intermediate may reuse that budget.
        let pem = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-pubkey.pem");
        let spki = pem::parse(pem).expect("public PEM fixture").into_contents();
        let key = RsaPublicKey::from_public_key_der(&spki).expect("RSA key");
        let pkcs1 = key.to_pkcs1_der().expect("PKCS1 encoding");
        for (label, decoded, extra) in [
            ("PUBLIC KEY", spki.as_slice(), 0),
            ("RSA PUBLIC KEY", pkcs1.as_bytes(), spki.len()),
        ] {
            let encoded = pem::encode(&pem::Pem::new(label, decoded.to_vec()));
            for exact in [false, true] {
                let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
                inventory
                    .add_symmetric(
                        "existing".into(),
                        SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                        vec![1; 16],
                        KeyUsages::SIGN,
                        &ResourcePolicy::default(),
                    )
                    .expect("existing key");
                let retained = inventory.material_bytes;
                let resources = ResourcePolicy {
                    max_external_resource_total_bytes: retained
                        + 2 * "new".len()
                        + encoded.len()
                        + decoded.len()
                        + extra
                        - usize::from(!exact),
                    ..ResourcePolicy::default()
                };
                let result = inventory.add_public_pem("new".into(), encoded.as_bytes(), &resources);
                if exact {
                    result.expect("exact peak allowance");
                    assert_eq!(inventory.entry_count(), 2);
                } else {
                    assert!(matches!(result, Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(_))));
                    assert_eq!(inventory.entry_count(), 1);
                    assert_eq!(inventory.material_bytes, retained);
                }
            }
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn plaintext_private_import_checks_all_live_copies() {
        use rsa::pkcs1::EncodeRsaPrivateKey as _;
        // Borrowed input, decoded PEM and retained DER coexist. Reject one
        // byte below that peak without retaining a key, and accept exactly it.
        let der = pem::parse(include_bytes!(
            "../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-key.pem"
        ))
        .expect("private key")
        .into_contents();
        let pkcs1 = RsaPrivateKey::from_pkcs8_der(&der)
            .expect("RSA")
            .to_pkcs1_der()
            .expect("PKCS1");
        for (label, input) in [
            ("PRIVATE KEY", der.as_slice()),
            ("RSA PRIVATE KEY", pkcs1.as_bytes()),
        ] {
            let pem = pem::encode(&pem::Pem::new(label, input.to_vec()));
            for encoded in [false, true] {
                let peak = 3 + input.len() + der.len() + if encoded { pem.len() } else { 0 };
                for exact in [false, true] {
                    let resources = ResourcePolicy {
                        max_external_resource_total_bytes: peak - usize::from(!exact),
                        ..ResourcePolicy::default()
                    };
                    let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
                    let result = if encoded {
                        inventory.add_private_pem(
                            "new".into(),
                            pem.as_bytes(),
                            None,
                            KeyUsages::SIGN,
                            &resources,
                        )
                    } else {
                        inventory.add_private_der(
                            "new".into(),
                            input,
                            None,
                            KeyUsages::SIGN,
                            &resources,
                        )
                    };
                    if exact {
                        result.expect("exact live-byte allowance");
                        assert_eq!(inventory.entry_count(), 1);
                    } else {
                        assert!(matches!(result, Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(_))));
                        assert_eq!(inventory.entry_count(), 0);
                        assert_eq!(inventory.material_bytes, 0);
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn encrypted_pkcs8_plaintext_is_reserved_before_password() {
        use der::Encode as _;
        use pkcs8::pkcs5::{EncryptionScheme, pbes2};
        // PBKDF2 has no large workspace, but decrypt still allocates a full
        // ciphertext-sized buffer, even for a wrong password/malformed key.
        let encrypted = EncryptedPrivateKeyInfoRef {
            encryption_algorithm: EncryptionScheme::Pbes2(pbes2::Parameters {
                kdf: pbes2::Kdf::Pbkdf2(pbes2::Pbkdf2Params {
                    salt: pbes2::Salt::new(b"12345678").expect("salt"),
                    iteration_count: 2,
                    key_length: None,
                    prf: pbes2::Pbkdf2Prf::HmacWithSha256,
                }),
                encryption: pbes2::EncryptionScheme::Aes256Cbc { iv: [0; 16] },
            }),
            encrypted_data: der::asn1::OctetStringRef::new(&[0; 64]).expect("ciphertext"),
        };
        let bytes = encrypted.to_der().expect("envelope");
        let peak = 3 + bytes.len() + 64;
        let tight = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: peak - 1,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        let calls = std::cell::Cell::new(0);
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        let result = inventory.add_private_der_with_password_callback(
            "new".into(),
            &bytes,
            || {
                calls.set(calls.get() + 1);
                None
            },
            KeyUsages::SIGN,
            &tight,
        );
        assert_eq!(calls.get(), 0);
        assert!(
            matches!(result, Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
            resource: crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES, actual, ..
        })) if actual == peak)
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.add_private_der(
                "new".into(),
                &bytes,
                Some(b"wrong"),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &tight
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(_))
        ));
        let exact = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: peak,
            ..tight
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.add_private_der_with_password_callback(
                "new".into(),
                &bytes,
                || {
                    calls.set(calls.get() + 1);
                    None
                },
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &exact
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)
        ));
        assert_eq!(calls.get(), 1);
        assert!(inventory.private_keys().is_empty());
        assert_eq!(inventory.material_bytes, 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn encrypted_pem_workspace_accounts_for_live_encoded_input() {
        use der::Encode as _;
        use pkcs8::pkcs5::{EncryptionScheme, pbes2};
        // PEM and its decoded DER coexist during derivation. A DER-only
        // allowance must not authorize that larger peak or mutate inventory.
        let encrypted = EncryptedPrivateKeyInfoRef {
            encryption_algorithm: EncryptionScheme::Pbes2(pbes2::Parameters {
                kdf: pbes2::Kdf::Scrypt(pbes2::ScryptParams {
                    salt: pbes2::Salt::new(b"12345678").expect("salt"),
                    cost_parameter: 16,
                    block_size: 1,
                    parallelization: 1,
                    key_length: None,
                }),
                encryption: pbes2::EncryptionScheme::Aes256Cbc { iv: [0; 16] },
            }),
            encrypted_data: der::asn1::OctetStringRef::new(&[0; 16]).expect("ciphertext"),
        };
        let der = encrypted.to_der().expect("envelope");
        let pem = pem::encode(&pem::Pem::new("ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY", der.clone()));
        let peak = 3 + pem.len() + der.len() + 16 + 2304;
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        let tight = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: peak - 1,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.add_private_pem("new".into(), pem.as_bytes(), None, KeyUsages::SIGN, &tight),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                resource: crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                actual, ..
            })) if actual == peak
        ));
        let exact = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: peak,
            ..tight
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.add_private_pem("new".into(), pem.as_bytes(), None, KeyUsages::SIGN, &exact),
            Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)
        ));
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.add_private_der("new".into(), &der, None, KeyUsages::SIGN, &tight),
            Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)
        ));
        assert!(inventory.private_keys().is_empty());
        assert_eq!(inventory.material_bytes, 0);
        // Exercise actual derivation/import as well as preflight: an exactly
        // fitting PEM peak succeeds with the correct password, not just framing.
        let plain = pem::parse(include_bytes!(
            "../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-key.pem"
        ))
        .expect("private key")
        .into_contents();
        let EncryptionScheme::Pbes2(params) = &encrypted.encryption_algorithm else {
            panic!("PBES2 envelope");
        };
        let ciphertext = params.encrypt(b"correct", &plain).expect("encrypt");
        let real = EncryptedPrivateKeyInfoRef {
            encryption_algorithm: encrypted.encryption_algorithm.clone(),
            encrypted_data: der::asn1::OctetStringRef::new(&ciphertext).expect("ciphertext"),
        }
        .to_der()
        .expect("envelope");
        let pem = pem::encode(&pem::Pem::new("ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY", real.clone()));
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: 3
                + pem.len()
                + real.len()
                + ciphertext.len()
                + 2304
                + b"correct".len(),
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        inventory
            .add_private_pem(
                "new".into(),
                pem.as_bytes(),
                Some(b"correct"),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("exact PEM peak imports");
        assert_eq!(inventory.private_keys().len(), 1);
    }

    #[test]
    fn pkcs8_scrypt_workspace_shares_retained_inventory_budget() {
        use der::Encode as _;
        // A workspace below its own ceiling must still fit alongside existing
        // inventory material; rejection must precede password delivery.
        use pkcs8::pkcs5::{EncryptionScheme, pbes2};
        let encrypted = EncryptedPrivateKeyInfoRef {
            encryption_algorithm: EncryptionScheme::Pbes2(pbes2::Parameters {
                kdf: pbes2::Kdf::Scrypt(pbes2::ScryptParams {
                    salt: pbes2::Salt::new(b"12345678").expect("salt"),
                    cost_parameter: 16,
                    block_size: 1,
                    parallelization: 1,
                    key_length: None,
                }),
                encryption: pbes2::EncryptionScheme::Aes256Cbc { iv: [0; 16] },
            }),
            encrypted_data: der::asn1::OctetStringRef::new(&[0; 16]).expect("ciphertext"),
        };
        let bytes = encrypted.to_der().expect("envelope");
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "old".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                vec![7; 1024],
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect("retained key");
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: inventory.material_bytes + 2304,
            max_key_import_kdf_memory_bytes: 4096,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        let calls = std::cell::Cell::new(0);
        let result = inventory.add_private_der_with_password_callback(
            "new".into(),
            &bytes,
            || {
                calls.set(calls.get() + 1);
                None
            },
            KeyUsages::SIGN,
            &resources,
        );
        assert_eq!(calls.get(), 0);
        assert!(matches!(
            result,
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    ..
                }
            ))
        ));
        assert!(inventory.private_keys().is_empty());
        assert_eq!(inventory.symmetric_keys().len(), 1);
        let exact = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: inventory.material_bytes
                + bytes.len()
                + 3
                + 16
                + 2304,
            ..resources
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.add_private_der_with_password_callback(
                "new".into(),
                &bytes,
                || {
                    calls.set(calls.get() + 1);
                    None
                },
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &exact,
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::ProtectedContainer)
        ));
        assert_eq!(
            calls.get(),
            1,
            "an exactly fitting workspace reaches password delivery"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn configured_x509_continuation_retains_first_deferred_error() {
        // Splitting at configured X509 must preserve the unsplit diagnostic
        // order, while a later terminal failure still stops immediately.
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_certificate_der(
                single_pem_block(
                    include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-cert.pem"),
                    ResourcePolicy::default().max_external_resource_bytes,
                )
                .expect("certificate")
                .into_contents(),
                false,
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect("lookup");
        let mut info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![
                KeyInfoSource::KeyValue(KeyValueInfo::Dsa {
                    p: None,
                    q: None,
                    g: None,
                    y: vec![1],
                }),
                KeyInfoSource::X509Data(X509DataInfo {
                    subject_names: vec!["CN=absent".into()],
                    ..X509DataInfo::default()
                }),
                KeyInfoSource::KeyValue(KeyValueInfo::InvalidEcKeyValue),
            ],
        };
        let unsplit = DefaultKeyResolver::new(KeyResolverConfig::default())
            .resolve(Some(&info), SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256)
            .err()
            .expect("mismatch");
        let split = inventory
            .verification_resolver()
            .resolve(Some(&info), SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256)
            .err()
            .expect("mismatch");
        assert_eq!(format!("{split:?}"), format!("{unsplit:?}"));
        info.sources[2] = KeyInfoSource::DerEncodedKeyValue(vec![0]);
        let unsplit = DefaultKeyResolver::new(KeyResolverConfig::default())
            .resolve(Some(&info), SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256)
            .err()
            .expect("terminal");
        let split = inventory
            .verification_resolver()
            .resolve(Some(&info), SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256)
            .err()
            .expect("terminal");
        assert_eq!(format!("{split:?}"), format!("{unsplit:?}"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn configured_x509_fallback_preserves_terminal_prefix_errors() {
        // Attaching configured certificates must not turn malformed earlier
        // DER key material into a successful certificate fallback.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        let certificate = single_pem_block(
            include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-cert.pem"),
            resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
        )
        .expect("certificate")
        .into_contents();
        let subject = crate::xmldsig::parse::parse_x509_certificate(&certificate)
            .expect("leaf")
            .subject_dn;
        inventory
            .add_certificate_der(certificate, false, &resources)
            .expect("lookup");
        let mut info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![
                KeyInfoSource::DerEncodedKeyValue(vec![0]),
                KeyInfoSource::X509Data(X509DataInfo {
                    subject_names: vec![subject],
                    ..X509DataInfo::default()
                }),
            ],
        };
        assert!(
            inventory
                .verification_resolver()
                .resolve(Some(&info), SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,)
                .is_err(),
            "a terminal prefix error must stop resolution"
        );
        // Unsupported EC material for an RSA method is explicitly deferrable;
        // a certificate can satisfy it, but a complete miss retains the error.
        info.sources[0] = KeyInfoSource::KeyValue(KeyValueInfo::InvalidEcKeyValue);
        assert!(
            inventory
                .verification_resolver()
                .resolve(Some(&info), SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,)
                .expect("deferred prefix permits certificate fallback")
                .is_some()
        );
        let KeyInfoSource::X509Data(data) = &mut info.sources[1] else {
            panic!("X509 selector");
        };
        data.subject_names = vec!["CN=absent".into()];
        assert!(
            inventory
                .verification_resolver()
                .resolve(Some(&info), SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,)
                .is_err(),
            "a complete miss retains its deferred error"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn configured_x509_fallback_does_not_reinspect_prefix() {
        // One absent name, its document source, and the certificate inspection
        // fit exactly. Replaying the source prefix incorrectly exhausts it.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        let certificate = single_pem_block(
            include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-cert.pem"),
            resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
        )
        .expect("certificate")
        .into_contents();
        let subject = crate::xmldsig::parse::parse_x509_certificate(&certificate)
            .expect("leaf")
            .subject_dn;
        inventory
            .add_certificate_der(certificate, false, &resources)
            .expect("lookup");
        let info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![
                KeyInfoSource::KeyName("absent".into()),
                KeyInfoSource::X509Data(X509DataInfo {
                    subject_names: vec![subject],
                    ..X509DataInfo::default()
                }),
            ],
        };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_key_candidates = 3;
        assert!(
            inventory
                .verification_resolver()
                .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                    Some(&info),
                    SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
                    &policy,
                    crate::provider::default_provider(),
                )
                .expect("each source inspected once")
                .is_some()
        );
        policy.resources.max_key_candidates = 2;
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory
                .verification_resolver()
                .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                    Some(&info),
                    SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
                    &policy,
                    crate::provider::default_provider(),
                ),
            Err(DsigError::Policy(_))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn scrypt_parallel_buffers_are_checked_before_derivation() {
        // N*r fits a tiny limit, but p independent B/V/T workspaces do not.
        let mut resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_key_import_kdf_work: 10_000,
            max_key_import_kdf_memory_bytes: 4_096,
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            enforce_scrypt_kdf_limits(2, 1, 1_000, &resources, 0),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_IMPORT_KDF_MEMORY,
                    maximum: 4_096,
                    actual: 512_000,
                }
            ))
        ));
        resources.max_key_import_kdf_memory_bytes = 512_000;
        assert!(enforce_scrypt_kdf_limits(2, 1, 1_000, &resources, 0).is_ok());
    }

    #[test]
    fn named_hmac_resolution_enforces_usage_and_method() {
        // A named secret may verify only when both its usage and the XMLDSig
        // method permit HMAC; the resolver must not fall back to another key.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "verify".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                b"sufficiently-long-hmac-secret".to_vec(),
                KeyUsages::VERIFY,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("verification HMAC imports");
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "sign-only".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                b"another-hmac-secret".to_vec(),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("sign-only HMAC imports");
        let resolver = inventory.verification_resolver();
        let named = |name: &str| KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::KeyName(name.into())],
            ..KeyInfo::default()
        };
        assert!(
            resolver
                .resolve(Some(&named("verify")), SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha256)
                .expect("named HMAC resolves")
                .is_some()
        );
        assert!(
            resolver
                .resolve(Some(&named("verify")), SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256)
                .is_err()
        );
        assert!(
            resolver
                .resolve(Some(&named("sign-only")), SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha256)
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn named_hmac_resolution_rejects_invalid_policy_snapshot() {
        // Early HMAC resolution must validate the entire snapshot even when
        // the selected key is small and otherwise permitted.
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "verify".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                b"sufficiently-long-hmac-secret".to_vec(),
                KeyUsages::VERIFY,
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect("verification HMAC imports");
        let info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::KeyName("verify".into())],
            ..KeyInfo::default()
        };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes = usize::MAX;
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.verification_resolver().resolve_with_policy(
                Some(&info),
                SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha256,
                &policy
            ),
            Err(DsigError::Policy(_))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn named_hmac_resolution_uses_active_resource_limits() {
        // A store imported under a broad policy must not bypass a later,
        // stricter verification snapshot when resolving a named secret.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let secret = b"sufficiently-long-hmac-secret";
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "verify".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                secret.to_vec(),
                KeyUsages::VERIFY,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("verification HMAC imports");
        let key_info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::KeyName("verify".into())],
            ..KeyInfo::default()
        };
        let resolver = inventory.verification_resolver();
        for (resource, aggregate) in [
            (crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES, false),
            (
                crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                true,
            ),
        ] {
            let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
            if aggregate {
                policy.resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes = secret.len() - 1;
            } else {
                policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes = secret.len() - 1;
            }
            let error = resolver
                .resolve_with_policy(Some(&key_info), SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha256, &policy)
                .err()
                .expect("active limit must reject stored HMAC material");
            assert!(
                matches!(
                    error,
                    DsigError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                        resource: actual,
                        maximum,
                        actual: size,
                    }) if actual == resource && maximum == secret.len() - 1 && size == secret.len()
                ),
                "{error:?}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn one_named_verification_entry_fits_one_candidate() {
        // A name and the single entry it selects are one lookup, not two.
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "only".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                b"sufficiently-long-hmac-secret".to_vec(),
                KeyUsages::VERIFY,
                &policy.resources,
            )
            .expect("HMAC imports");
        policy.resources.max_key_candidates = 1;
        let info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::KeyName("only".into())],
        };
        assert!(
            inventory
                .verification_resolver()
                .resolve_with_policy(Some(&info), SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha256, &policy)
                .expect("one lookup fits")
                .is_some()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn pem_imports_charge_encoded_input_to_aggregate_budget() {
        // Repeated padded PEM inputs must consume the aggregate work budget
        // even when their decoded DER keys are much smaller.
        let public = include_str!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-4096-pubkey.pem");
        let private = include_str!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-4096-key.pem");
        for (pem, is_private) in [(public, false), (private, true)] {
            let padded = format!("{pem}{}", " ".repeat(16 * 1024));
            // Public imports need one live DER; private imports need two,
            // in addition to encoded input. Retaining the first input charge
            // still makes the second padded import exceed this exact peak.
            let workspace = pem::parse(pem).expect("PEM payload").contents().len()
                * if is_private { 2 } else { 1 };
            let resources = ResourcePolicy {
                max_external_resource_bytes: padded.len(),
                max_external_resource_total_bytes: padded.len()
                    + if is_private { 5 } else { 10 }
                    + workspace
                    + 1,
                ..ResourcePolicy::default()
            };
            let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
            let import = |inventory: &mut KeyInventory, name: &str| {
                if is_private {
                    inventory.add_private_pem(
                        name.into(),
                        padded.as_bytes(),
                        None,
                        KeyUsages::SIGN,
                        &resources,
                    )
                } else {
                    inventory.add_public_pem(name.into(), padded.as_bytes(), &resources)
                }
            };
            import(&mut inventory, "first").expect("first PEM import fits");
            assert!(
                matches!(
                    import(&mut inventory, "second"),
                    Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                        crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded {
                            resource:
                                crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                            ..
                        }
                    ))
                ),
                "second PEM input must exceed aggregate budget"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn repeated_key_name_selects_one_inventory_entry() {
        // XMLDSig 1.1 section 4.5 permits repeated KeyInfo choices; duplicate
        // references to one entry are not two distinct verification keys.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "secret".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                b"sufficiently-long-hmac-secret".to_vec(),
                KeyUsages::VERIFY,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("HMAC key imports");
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "other-secret".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                b"another-long-hmac-secret".to_vec(),
                KeyUsages::VERIFY,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("second HMAC key imports");
        inventory
            .add_public_pem(
                "public".into(),
                include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-pubkey.pem"),
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("public key imports");
        let resolver = inventory.verification_resolver();
        for (name, algorithm) in [
            ("secret", SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha256),
            ("public", SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256),
        ] {
            let info = KeyInfo {
                sources: vec![
                    KeyInfoSource::KeyName(name.into()),
                    KeyInfoSource::KeyName(name.into()),
                ],
            };
            assert!(resolver.resolve(Some(&info), algorithm).is_ok(), "{name}");
        }
        let distinct = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![
                KeyInfoSource::KeyName("secret".into()),
                KeyInfoSource::KeyName("other-secret".into()),
            ],
        };
        assert!(
            resolver
                .resolve(Some(&distinct), SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha256)
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn named_lookup_charges_inspected_inventory_entries() {
        // A late KeyName must not bypass a stricter operation candidate limit.
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        for name in ["first", "second"] {
            inventory
                .add_symmetric(
                    name.into(),
                    SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                    b"sufficiently-long-hmac-secret".to_vec(),
                    KeyUsages::VERIFY,
                    &resources,
                )
                .expect("key imports");
        }
        let key_info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::KeyName("second".into())],
            ..KeyInfo::default()
        };
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            resources: ResourcePolicy {
                max_key_candidates: 1,
                ..ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };
        let resolver = inventory.verification_resolver();
        assert!(
            resolver
                .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                    Some(&key_info),
                    SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha256,
                    &policy,
                    crate::provider::default_provider(),
                )
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn private_import_rejects_public_only_usage() {
        // Usage is part of the inventory contract: nonsensical permissions
        // must not survive import and later be interpreted by a resolver.
        let private = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-key.pem");
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        assert!(
            inventory
                .add_private_pem(
                    "wrong-use".into(),
                    private,
                    None,
                    KeyUsages::SIGN.union(KeyUsages::VERIFY),
                    &ResourcePolicy::default(),
                )
                .is_err()
        );
        assert!(inventory.private_keys.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalized_private_key_must_fit_resource_limit() {
        // PKCS#8 wrapping may cross the per-resource ceiling even when PKCS#1 fits.
        let rsa = RsaPrivateKey::from_pkcs8_pem(include_str!(
            "../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-key.pem"
        ))
        .expect("RSA fixture parses");
        let pkcs1 = rsa.to_pkcs1_der().expect("PKCS#1 encodes");
        let pkcs8 = rsa.to_pkcs8_der().expect("PKCS#8 encodes");
        assert!(pkcs8.as_bytes().len() > pkcs1.as_bytes().len());
        let resources = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_bytes: pkcs1.as_bytes().len(),
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        assert!(
            inventory
                .add_private_der(
                    "rsa".into(),
                    pkcs1.as_bytes(),
                    None,
                    KeyUsages::SIGN,
                    &resources,
                )
                .is_err()
        );
        assert!(inventory.private_keys.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn oversized_rsa_components_are_rejected_before_private_key_decode() {
        // PKCS#8 wraps PKCS#1 integers; every component must be checked
        // before RustCrypto allocates big integers or validates CRT arithmetic.
        let pem = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-key.pem");
        let block = single_pem_block(pem, ResourcePolicy::default().max_external_resource_bytes)
            .expect("fixture PEM");
        let info = PrivateKeyInfoRef::try_from(block.contents()).expect("fixture PKCS#8");
        let original = rsa::pkcs1::RsaPrivateKey::from_der(info.private_key.as_bytes())
            .expect("fixture PKCS#1");
        let oversized_modulus = vec![1_u8; 1025];
        let oversized = rsa::pkcs1::RsaPrivateKey {
            modulus: der::asn1::UintRef::new(&oversized_modulus).expect("positive modulus"),
            public_exponent: original.public_exponent,
            private_exponent: original.private_exponent,
            prime1: original.prime1,
            prime2: original.prime2,
            exponent1: original.exponent1,
            exponent2: original.exponent2,
            coefficient: original.coefficient,
            other_prime_infos: None,
        };
        let pkcs1 = der::Encode::to_der(&oversized).expect("PKCS#1 encodes");
        let octets = der::asn1::OctetStringRef::new(&pkcs1).expect("PKCS#8 octets");
        let pkcs8 = der::Encode::to_der(&PrivateKeyInfoRef::new(rsa::pkcs1::ALGORITHM_ID, octets))
            .expect("PKCS#8 encodes");
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        let error = inventory
            .add_private_der(
                "oversized".into(),
                &pkcs8,
                None,
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect_err("oversized RSA modulus must fail at preflight");
        assert!(error.to_string().contains("safety limit"), "{error}");

        let oversized_exponent = vec![1_u8; 1025];
        let oversized = rsa::pkcs1::RsaPrivateKey {
            modulus: original.modulus,
            public_exponent: original.public_exponent,
            private_exponent: der::asn1::UintRef::new(&oversized_exponent)
                .expect("positive exponent"),
            prime1: original.prime1,
            prime2: original.prime2,
            exponent1: original.exponent1,
            exponent2: original.exponent2,
            coefficient: original.coefficient,
            other_prime_infos: None,
        };
        let pkcs1 = der::Encode::to_der(&oversized).expect("PKCS#1 encodes");
        let error = preflight_rsa_pkcs1_components(&pkcs1)
            .expect_err("oversized private exponent must fail before bigint decoding");
        assert!(error.to_string().contains("safety limit"), "{error}");
    }

    #[test]
    fn named_certificate_import_is_not_a_trust_anchor() {
        // A certificate is usable as a named public-key source but importing
        // it must never grant certificate-chain trust implicitly.
        let pem = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-4096-cert.pem");
        let certificate =
            single_pem_block(pem, ResourcePolicy::default().max_external_resource_bytes)
                .expect("certificate fixture is one PEM block");
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_public_der(
                "recipient-cert".into(),
                certificate.contents().to_vec(),
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect("named X.509 certificate imports");
        #[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
        {
            assert!(
                inventory
                    .rsa_encryption_key(
                        "recipient-cert",
                        &crate::policy::EncryptionPolicy::default()
                    )
                    .is_ok()
            );
            let restricted = crate::policy::EncryptionPolicy {
                resources: ResourcePolicy {
                    max_external_resource_bytes: 64,
                    max_external_resource_total_bytes: 64,
                    ..ResourcePolicy::default()
                },
                ..crate::policy::EncryptionPolicy::default()
            };
            assert!(
                inventory
                    .rsa_encryption_key("recipient-cert", &restricted)
                    .is_err()
            );
        }
        assert!(inventory.trusted_certificates.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn eddsa_private_identity_matches_only_its_corresponding_spki() {
        use pkcs8::{EncodePrivateKey, EncodePublicKey};
        // PKCS#12 leaf selection must bind exact algorithm and public bytes,
        // without retaining or allocating a second serialized public key.
        let key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytes(&[0x42; 32]);
        let der = key.to_pkcs8_der().expect("Ed25519 private encoding");
        let public = key
            .verifying_key()
            .to_public_key_der()
            .expect("Ed25519 public encoding");
        let identity = PrivateKeyIdentity::decode(der.as_bytes()).expect("Ed25519 identity");
        assert!(identity.matches_spki(public.as_bytes()));
        let wrong = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytes(&[0x43; 32])
            .verifying_key()
            .to_public_key_der()
            .expect("different Ed25519 public encoding");
        assert!(!identity.matches_spki(wrong.as_bytes()));
        let key = ed448_goldilocks::SigningKey::try_from(&[0x42; 57][..]).expect("Ed448 seed");
        let der = key.to_pkcs8_der().expect("Ed448 private encoding");
        let public = key
            .verifying_key()
            .to_public_key_der()
            .expect("Ed448 public encoding");
        let identity = PrivateKeyIdentity::decode(der.as_bytes()).expect("Ed448 identity");
        assert!(identity.matches_spki(public.as_bytes()));
        assert!(!identity.matches_spki(wrong.as_bytes()));
    }

    #[test]
    fn unsupported_spki_is_rejected_at_import() {
        // A syntactically valid X25519 agreement key is not an Ed25519
        // signing key and must not acquire VERIFY usage (RFC 8410 section 5).
        let mut agreement_spki = vec![
            0x30, 0x2a, 0x30, 0x05, 0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x03, 0x21, 0x00,
        ];
        agreement_spki.extend_from_slice(&[1; 32]);
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        assert!(
            inventory
                .add_public_der(
                    "unsupported".into(),
                    agreement_spki,
                    &ResourcePolicy::default()
                )
                .is_err()
        );
        assert!(inventory.public_keys.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn named_certificate_resolution_preserves_document_crl() {
        // Named inventory selection must preserve document revocation evidence;
        // without it the same chain is valid and resolves successfully.
        use rcgen::{CertificateParams, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SerialNumber};
        let mut root_params = CertificateParams::new(Vec::new()).expect("root params");
        root_params.is_ca = rcgen::IsCa::Ca(rcgen::BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
        root_params.key_usages = vec![KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign, KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign];
        let root = rcgen::CertifiedIssuer::self_signed(
            root_params,
            KeyPair::generate().expect("root key"),
        )
        .expect("root certificate");
        let mut leaf_params = CertificateParams::new(Vec::new()).expect("leaf params");
        leaf_params.serial_number = Some(SerialNumber::from(42_u64));
        leaf_params.key_usages = vec![KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature];
        let leaf = leaf_params
            .signed_by(&KeyPair::generate().expect("leaf key"), &root)
            .expect("leaf certificate");
        let now = time::OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
        let crl = rcgen::CertificateRevocationListParams {
            this_update: now - time::Duration::days(1),
            next_update: now + time::Duration::days(1),
            crl_number: SerialNumber::from(1_u64),
            issuing_distribution_point: None,
            revoked_certs: vec![rcgen::RevokedCertParams {
                serial_number: SerialNumber::from(42_u64),
                revocation_time: now - time::Duration::hours(1),
                reason_code: None,
                invalidity_date: None,
            }],
            key_identifier_method: rcgen::KeyIdMethod::Sha256,
        }
        .signed_by(&root)
        .expect("signed CRL");
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_public_der("leaf".into(), leaf.der().to_vec(), &resources)
            .expect("leaf imports");
        inventory
            .add_certificate_der(root.der().to_vec(), true, &resources)
            .expect("root imports");
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            key_trust: crate::policy::KeyTrustPolicy {
                verify_x509_chains: true,
                check_crls: true,
                verification_time: Some(std::time::SystemTime::now()),
                ..crate::policy::KeyTrustPolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };
        let mut info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::KeyName("leaf".into())],
        };
        let resolver = inventory.verification_resolver();
        assert!(
            resolver
                .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                    Some(&info),
                    SignatureAlgorithm::EcdsaSha256,
                    &policy,
                    crate::provider::default_provider()
                )
                .expect("unrevoked chain resolves")
                .is_some()
        );
        info.sources.push(KeyInfoSource::X509Data(X509DataInfo {
            crls: vec![crl.der().to_vec()],
            ..X509DataInfo::default()
        }));
        let error = resolver
            .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                Some(&info),
                SignatureAlgorithm::EcdsaSha256,
                &policy,
                crate::provider::default_provider(),
            )
            .err()
            .expect("document CRL revokes leaf");
        assert!(
            error
                .to_string()
                .contains("certificate at chain position 0 is revoked"),
            "{error}"
        );
        let mut bounded = policy.clone();
        // The owned fallback coexists with the root and enabled document CRL.
        // Deny one byte below that peak; disabling CRLs releases both charges.
        bounded.resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes =
            leaf.der().len() + 2 * (root.der().len() + crl.der().len()) - 1;
        assert!(matches!(
            resolver.resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                Some(&info),
                SignatureAlgorithm::EcdsaSha256,
                &bounded,
                crate::provider::default_provider()
            ),
            Err(DsigError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    ..
                }
            ))
        ));
        bounded.key_trust.check_crls = false;
        assert!(
            resolver
                .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                    Some(&info),
                    SignatureAlgorithm::EcdsaSha256,
                    &bounded,
                    crate::provider::default_provider()
                )
                .expect("disabled CRL checks do not load CRLs")
                .is_some()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn named_certificate_resolution_enforces_inventory_crl() {
        // A KeyName must not drop caller-supplied revocation evidence.
        fn cert(pem: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
            let text = std::str::from_utf8(pem).expect("fixture is UTF-8");
            let start = text.find("-----BEGIN ").expect("fixture has PEM armor");
            single_pem_block(
                &text.as_bytes()[start..],
                ResourcePolicy::default().max_external_resource_bytes,
            )
            .expect("certificate PEM parses")
            .into_contents()
        }
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_public_der(
                "leaf".into(),
                cert(include_bytes!(
                    "../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-cert.pem"
                )),
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("leaf imports");
        for anchor in [
            include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/ca2cert.pem").as_slice(),
            include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/cacert.pem").as_slice(),
        ] {
            inventory
                .add_certificate_der(cert(anchor), true, &resources)
                .expect("anchor imports");
        }
        inventory
            .add_crl_der(
                cert(include_bytes!(
                    "../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-cert-revoked-crl.pem"
                )),
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("CRL imports");
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            key_trust: crate::policy::KeyTrustPolicy {
                verify_x509_chains: true,
                check_crls: true,
                max_x509_chain_depth: 3,
                verification_time: Some(
                    std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH
                        + std::time::Duration::from_secs(1_773_964_800),
                ),
                ..crate::policy::KeyTrustPolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };
        let key_info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::KeyName("leaf".into())],
            ..KeyInfo::default()
        };
        let error = inventory
            .verification_resolver()
            .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                Some(&key_info),
                SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
                &policy,
                crate::provider::default_provider(),
            )
            .err()
            .expect("revocation evidence must reject this chain");
        assert!(error.to_string().contains("cRLSign"), "{error}");
    }

    #[test]
    fn hmac_resolution_does_not_load_unrelated_certificate_material() {
        // The active snapshot bounds selected material, not unrelated X.509
        // bytes that an HMAC resolver never needs to copy or inspect.
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "hmac".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                b"secret".to_vec(),
                KeyUsages::VERIFY,
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect("HMAC imports");
        let pem = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-cert.pem");
        let certificate =
            single_pem_block(pem, ResourcePolicy::default().max_external_resource_bytes)
                .expect("certificate fixture");
        inventory
            .add_certificate_der(
                certificate.contents().to_vec(),
                true,
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect("anchor imports");
        let policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy {
            resources: ResourcePolicy {
                max_external_resource_bytes: 64,
                max_external_resource_total_bytes: 64,
                ..ResourcePolicy::default()
            },
            ..crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default()
        };
        let info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::KeyName("hmac".into())],
            ..KeyInfo::default()
        };
        assert!(
            inventory
                .verification_resolver()
                .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                    Some(&info),
                    SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha256,
                    &policy,
                    crate::provider::default_provider(),
                )
                .expect("unrelated certificates cannot consume HMAC budget")
                .is_some()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn named_key_resolution_obeys_source_policy() {
        // Inventory lookup is not permission to use a KeyName source that the
        // operation's immutable verification policy has disabled.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "blocked-name".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                b"policy-guarded-hmac-secret".to_vec(),
                KeyUsages::VERIFY,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("HMAC fixture imports");
        let info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::KeyName("blocked-name".into())],
            ..KeyInfo::default()
        };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.key_sources.key_name = false;
        assert!(
            inventory
                .verification_resolver()
                .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                    Some(&info),
                    SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha256,
                    &policy,
                    crate::provider::default_provider(),
                )
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn named_lookup_and_fallback_share_one_candidate_budget() {
        // Finding a named inventory entry and resolving its embedded KeyValue
        // are one verification operation, not two independently budgeted scans.
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory.public_keys.push(StoredPublicKey {
            name: "named".into(),
            key_info: KeyInfo {
                sources: vec![
                    KeyInfoSource::KeyName("named".into()),
                    KeyInfoSource::KeyValue(KeyValueInfo::Rsa {
                        modulus: vec![3],
                        exponent: vec![3],
                    }),
                ],
            },
            usages: KeyUsages::VERIFY,
        });
        let info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::KeyName("named".into())],
        };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_key_candidates = 1;
        let error = inventory
            .verification_resolver()
            .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                Some(&info),
                SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
                &policy,
                crate::provider::default_provider(),
            )
            .err()
            .expect("delegation must not reset the candidate budget");
        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            DsigError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
                maximum: 1,
                actual: 2,
            })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn prefix_retry_spends_the_same_candidate_budget() {
        // Unresolved sources preceding X.509 lookup are visited twice, so both
        // passes must charge the same operation budget.
        let mut sources = vec![KeyInfoSource::KeyName("missing".into()); 3];
        sources.push(KeyInfoSource::X509Data(X509DataInfo {
            subject_names: vec!["missing subject".into()],
            ..X509DataInfo::default()
        }));
        let info = KeyInfo { sources };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_key_candidates = 5;
        let error = KeyInventory::default()
            .verification_resolver()
            .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                Some(&info),
                SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
                &policy,
                crate::provider::default_provider(),
            )
            .err()
            .expect("the repeated prefix must exhaust the candidate limit");
        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            DsigError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                resource: crate::policy::resource_name::KEY_CANDIDATES,
                maximum: 5,
                actual: 6,
            })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn selected_key_value_is_one_resource() {
        // Representation must not split one key into separately bounded
        // components; exact boundaries remain accepted for all KeyValue kinds.
        for value in [
            KeyValueInfo::Rsa {
                modulus: vec![1; 256],
                exponent: vec![1; 3],
            },
            KeyValueInfo::Dsa {
                p: Some(vec![1; 64]),
                q: Some(vec![1; 16]),
                g: Some(vec![1; 64]),
                y: vec![1; 64],
            },
            KeyValueInfo::Ec {
                curve_oid: "1.2.840.10045.3.1.7".into(),
                public_key: vec![1; 65],
            },
        ] {
            let info = KeyInfo {
                sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::KeyValue(value)],
            };
            let size =
                check_selected_public_material(&info, &ResourcePolicy::default()).expect("size");
            let resources = ResourcePolicy {
                max_external_resource_bytes: size,
                ..ResourcePolicy::default()
            };
            assert_eq!(
                check_selected_public_material(&info, &resources).expect("exact limit"),
                size
            );
            let resources = ResourcePolicy {
                max_external_resource_bytes: size - 1,
                ..resources
            };
            assert!(matches!(check_selected_public_material(&info, &resources),
                Err(DsigError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES, actual, ..
                })) if actual == size));
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn named_verification_bounds_complete_key_value() {
        // A broadly imported XML key must obey the tighter operation snapshot
        // before the resolver constructs an SPKI from its components.
        use rsa::{pkcs8::DecodePublicKey as _, traits::PublicKeyParts as _};
        let public = RsaPublicKey::from_public_key_pem(include_str!(
            "../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-pubkey.pem"
        ))
        .expect("RSA fixture");
        let modulus = public.n().to_be_bytes_trimmed_vartime();
        let exponent = public.e().to_be_bytes_trimmed_vartime();
        let size = modulus.len() + exponent.len();
        let base64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD;
        let xml = format!(
            "<Keys xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\"><KeyInfo xmlns=\"{XMLDSIG_NS}\"><KeyName>named</KeyName><KeyValue><RSAKeyValue><Modulus>{}</Modulus><Exponent>{}</Exponent></RSAKeyValue></KeyValue></KeyInfo></Keys>",
            base64.encode(modulus),
            base64.encode(exponent)
        );
        let inventory = KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(
            xml.as_bytes(),
            &xml_policy(ResourcePolicy::default()),
            XmlBackend::default(),
        )
        .expect("broad import");
        let info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::KeyName("named".into())],
        };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes = size;
        assert!(
            inventory
                .verification_resolver()
                .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                    Some(&info),
                    SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
                    &policy,
                    crate::provider::default_provider()
                )
                .expect("exact complete-key limit")
                .is_some()
        );
        policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes = size - 1;
        assert!(
            matches!(inventory.verification_resolver().resolve_with_policy_and_provider(Some(&info), SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
            &policy, crate::provider::default_provider()),
            Err(DsigError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                resource: crate::policy::resource_name::EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES, actual, ..
            })) if actual == size)
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn configured_x509_fallback_budgets_live_copies() {
        // Inventory bytes remain live while the owned fallback is assembled.
        // Deny before cloning even malformed CRLs; admit the exact live peak.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let certificate = single_pem_block(
            include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-cert.pem"),
            resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
        )
        .expect("certificate")
        .into_contents();
        for trusted in [false, true] {
            for with_crl in [false, true] {
                let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
                inventory
                    .add_certificate_der(certificate.clone(), trusted, &resources)
                    .expect("certificate imports");
                let document_crl = vec![0; 16];
                if with_crl {
                    inventory.crls.push(vec![0; 32]);
                }
                let info = KeyInfo {
                    sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::X509Data(X509DataInfo {
                        subject_names: vec!["CN=absent".into()],
                        crls: if with_crl {
                            vec![document_crl]
                        } else {
                            Vec::new()
                        },
                        ..X509DataInfo::default()
                    })],
                };
                let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
                policy.key_trust.verify_x509_chains = true;
                policy.key_trust.check_crls = with_crl;
                let configured = certificate.len() + if with_crl { 32 } else { 0 };
                // Document evidence is not copied into fallback for an unnamed
                // source; the default resolver checks it with configured bytes.
                let peak = 2 * configured;
                policy.resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes = peak - 1;
                assert!(
                    matches!(
                        inventory
                            .verification_resolver()
                            .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                                Some(&info),
                                SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
                                &policy,
                                crate::provider::default_provider(),
                            ),
                        Err(DsigError::Policy(
                            crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                                resource:
                                    crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                                ..
                            }
                        ))
                    ),
                    "each owned fallback copy must fit before allocation"
                );
                policy.resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes = peak;
                let resolver = inventory.verification_resolver();
                let outcome = resolver.resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                    Some(&info),
                    SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
                    &policy,
                    crate::provider::default_provider(),
                );
                assert!(
                    !matches!(outcome, Err(DsigError::Policy(_))),
                    "exact copy budget passes preflight"
                );
            }
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn named_x509_fallback_budgets_document_crl_copies() {
        // A named certificate substitutes document keys, not revocation
        // evidence. Both retained document CRLs and fallback copies coexist.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let certificate = single_pem_block(
            include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-cert.pem"),
            resources.max_external_resource_bytes,
        )
        .expect("certificate")
        .into_contents();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_public_der("leaf".into(), certificate.clone(), &resources)
            .expect("named certificate");
        let info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![
                KeyInfoSource::KeyName("leaf".into()),
                KeyInfoSource::X509Data(X509DataInfo {
                    crls: vec![vec![0; 32]],
                    ..X509DataInfo::default()
                }),
            ],
        };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.key_trust.verify_x509_chains = true;
        policy.key_trust.check_crls = true;
        policy.resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes = certificate.len() + 64 - 1;
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory
                .verification_resolver()
                .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                    Some(&info),
                    SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
                    &policy,
                    crate::provider::default_provider(),
                ),
            Err(DsigError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    ..
                }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn selected_certificate_and_anchors_share_aggregate_budget() {
        // Selected named material and configured trust material are one
        // operation, even though they enter the resolver through separate paths.
        let certificate = single_pem_block(
            include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-cert.pem"),
            ResourcePolicy::default().max_external_resource_bytes,
        )
        .expect("leaf PEM")
        .into_contents();
        let anchor = single_pem_block(
            include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-4096-cert.pem"),
            ResourcePolicy::default().max_external_resource_bytes,
        )
        .expect("anchor PEM")
        .into_contents();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_public_der(
                "leaf".into(),
                certificate.clone(),
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect("leaf imports");
        inventory
            .add_certificate_der(anchor.clone(), true, &ResourcePolicy::default())
            .expect("anchor imports");
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.key_trust.verify_x509_chains = true;
        policy.resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes = certificate.len() + anchor.len() - 1;
        let info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::KeyName("leaf".into())],
        };
        let error = inventory
            .verification_resolver()
            .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                Some(&info),
                SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
                &policy,
                crate::provider::default_provider(),
            )
            .err()
            .expect("combined selected and configured material exceeds the budget");
        assert!(matches!(
            error,
            DsigError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimit {
                resource: crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                ..
            })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn named_key_does_not_bypass_other_source_permissions() {
        // Every source in a document KeyInfo is subject to the policy, even
        // when the inventory can resolve its KeyName without the other source.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "named".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                b"verification-secret".to_vec(),
                KeyUsages::VERIFY,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("HMAC fixture imports");
        let info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![
                KeyInfoSource::KeyName("named".into()),
                KeyInfoSource::KeyValue(KeyValueInfo::Rsa {
                    modulus: vec![3],
                    exponent: vec![3],
                }),
            ],
            ..KeyInfo::default()
        };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.key_sources.key_value = false;
        assert!(
            inventory
                .verification_resolver()
                .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                    Some(&info),
                    SignatureAlgorithm::HmacSha256,
                    &policy,
                    crate::provider::default_provider(),
                )
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn named_public_key_is_trusted_inventory_material() {
        // A document KeyName must not inherit the source restrictions of the
        // caller-owned public key's internal representation.
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_public_pem(
                "named".into(),
                include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-pubkey.pem"),
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect("public key imports");
        let info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::KeyName("named".into())],
            ..KeyInfo::default()
        };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.key_sources.key_value = false;
        policy.key_sources.der_encoded_key_value = false;
        policy.key_sources.x509_data = false;
        assert!(
            inventory
                .verification_resolver()
                .resolve_with_policy_and_provider(
                    Some(&info),
                    SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
                    &policy,
                    crate::provider::default_provider(),
                )
                .expect("trusted inventory material resolves")
                .is_some()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn named_public_key_obeys_current_verification_limits() {
        // A permissive import policy cannot replace a later stricter operation snapshot.
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_public_pem(
                "named".into(),
                include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-pubkey.pem"),
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect("public key imports");
        let info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![KeyInfoSource::KeyName("named".into())],
        };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes = 1;
        assert!(
            inventory
                .verification_resolver()
                .resolve_with_policy(Some(&info), SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256, &policy)
                .is_err()
        );
        let certificate = pem::parse(include_bytes!(
            "../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-cert.pem"
        ))
        .expect("certificate PEM")
        .into_contents();
        let mut certificate_inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        certificate_inventory
            .add_public_der("named".into(), certificate, &ResourcePolicy::default())
            .expect("certificate imports as a named public key");
        assert!(
            certificate_inventory
                .verification_resolver()
                .resolve_with_policy(Some(&info), SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256, &policy)
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn unused_certificates_do_not_block_earlier_public_keys() {
        // X.509 lookup bytes are irrelevant when a preceding DER key resolves.
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        let certificate = pem::parse(include_bytes!(
            "../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-cert.pem"
        ))
        .expect("certificate PEM")
        .into_contents();
        inventory
            .add_certificate_der(certificate, false, &ResourcePolicy::default())
            .expect("certificate imports");
        let public = pem::parse(include_bytes!(
            "../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-pubkey.pem"
        ))
        .expect("public PEM")
        .into_contents();
        let info = KeyInfo {
            sources: vec![
                KeyInfoSource::DerEncodedKeyValue(public.clone()),
                KeyInfoSource::X509Data(X509DataInfo {
                    subject_names: vec!["unused".into()],
                    ..X509DataInfo::default()
                }),
            ],
        };
        let mut policy = crate::policy::VerificationPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes = public.len();
        assert!(
            inventory
                .verification_resolver()
                .resolve_with_policy(Some(&info), SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256, &policy)
                .expect("earlier public key resolves")
                .is_some()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn public_import_rejects_incompatible_usage() {
        // Public material may verify or encrypt, but cannot authorize signing.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let public = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-pubkey.pem");
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        assert!(
            inventory
                .add_public_pem_with_usages("invalid".into(), public, KeyUsages::SIGN, &resources,)
                .is_err()
        );
        assert_eq!(inventory.entry_count(), 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn public_certificate_import_accepts_supported_ed25519_key() {
        // Ed25519 can now acquire verification usage, but importing a
        // certificate still does not promote it into the trusted anchor set.
        let pair =
            rcgen::KeyPair::generate_for(&rcgen::PKCS_ED25519).expect("Ed25519 key generation");
        let params = rcgen::CertificateParams::new(vec!["example.test".into()])
            .expect("certificate parameters");
        let certificate = params.self_signed(&pair).expect("certificate generation");
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        assert!(
            inventory
                .add_public_der(
                    "ed25519".into(),
                    certificate.der().to_vec(),
                    &ResourcePolicy::default()
                )
                .is_ok()
        );
        assert!(inventory.trusted_certificates.is_empty());
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
    #[test]
    fn imported_usage_restricts_operation_selection() {
        // Explicit restrictions survive import and are enforced when selecting
        // material for the opposite operation.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let public = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-pubkey.pem");
        let bundle = include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/xmlenc/01-phaos-xmlenc-3/rsa-priv-key.p12");
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_public_pem_with_usages("verify".into(), public, KeyUsages::VERIFY, &resources)
            .expect("verification-only public key imports");
        assert!(
            inventory
                .rsa_encryption_key("verify", &crate::policy::EncryptionPolicy::default())
                .is_err()
        );
        inventory
            .add_pkcs12_with_usages(
                "decrypt".into(),
                bundle,
                "secret",
                KeyUsages::DECRYPT,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("decryption-only private key imports");
        assert!(
            inventory
                .signing_key(
                    "decrypt",
                    SignatureAlgorithm::RsaSha256,
                    &crate::policy::SigningPolicy::default(),
                )
                .is_err()
        );
        assert!(
            inventory
                .decryption_resolver("decrypt", &crate::policy::DecryptionPolicy::default())
                .is_ok()
        );
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
    #[test]
    fn selected_weak_rsa_decryptor_obeys_default_policy() {
        // Importing a legacy key grants no exemption from operation minima.
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        let weak = RsaPrivateKey::new(&mut ChaCha8Rng::seed_from_u64(0xA11C_E502), 1024)
            .expect("legacy key generation")
            .to_pkcs8_der()
            .expect("legacy key encoding");
        inventory
            .add_private_der(
                "weak".into(),
                weak.as_bytes(),
                None,
                KeyUsages::DECRYPT,
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect("legacy import");
        let error = inventory
            .decryption_resolver("weak", &crate::policy::DecryptionPolicy::default())
            .err()
            .expect("weak key is rejected");
        assert!(
            matches!(
                error,
                KeyStoreError::Policy(crate::policy::PolicyViolation::KeySize {
                    operation: "decryption",
                    ..
                })
            ),
            "{error:?}"
        );
        // A caller can deliberately authorize legacy input, but the snapshot
        // must survive inventory selection and the complete recovery pipeline.
        let key = RsaPrivateKey::from_pkcs8_der(weak.as_bytes()).expect("legacy decode");
        let mut encryption = crate::policy::EncryptionPolicy::default();
        encryption.rsa_keys.minimum_modulus_bits = 1024;
        let encrypted = crate::xmlenc::EncryptedDataBuilder::new(
            crate::xmlenc::DataEncryptionAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm,
        )
        .policy(encryption)
        .recipient_rsa_oaep(key.to_public_key())
        .encrypt_binary(b"legacy consent")
        .expect("explicit legacy encryption");
        let mut decryption = crate::policy::DecryptionPolicy::default();
        decryption.rsa_keys.minimum_modulus_bits = 1024;
        let resolver = inventory
            .decryption_resolver("weak", &decryption)
            .expect("explicit legacy selection");
        assert_eq!(
            crate::xmlenc::DecryptContext::new(resolver.as_ref())
                .policy(decryption)
                .decrypt(&encrypted.encrypted_data_xml)
                .expect("explicit legacy recovery"),
            crate::xmlenc::DecryptedContent::Bytes(b"legacy consent".to_vec())
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            crate::xmlenc::DecryptContext::new(resolver.as_ref())
                .decrypt(&encrypted.encrypted_data_xml),
            Err(crate::xmlenc::XmlEncError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::KeySize {
                    actual_bits: 1024,
                    ..
                }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
    #[test]
    fn selected_rsa_recipient_obeys_operation_modulus_policy() {
        // Import permission does not override a stricter encryption snapshot.
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_public_pem(
                "rsa".into(),
                include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-pubkey.pem"),
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect("RSA fixture imports");
        let mut policy = crate::policy::EncryptionPolicy::default();
        policy.rsa_keys.minimum_modulus_bits = 4096;
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.rsa_encryption_key("rsa", &policy),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::KeySize { .. }
            ))
        ));
        assert!(matches!(
            inventory.public_keys()[0].rsa_encryption_key(&policy),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::KeySize { .. }
            ))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn inventory_merge_checks_names_and_budget_atomically() {
        // Combining independently parsed stores cannot bypass name or
        // aggregate-material limits, and a rejected merge is atomic.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut first = KeyInventory::default();
        first
            .add_symmetric(
                "one".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                b"first-secret".to_vec(),
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("first key imports");
        let mut duplicate = KeyInventory::default();
        duplicate
            .add_symmetric(
                "one".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                b"second-secret".to_vec(),
                KeyUsages::VERIFY,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("independent duplicate imports");
        assert!(matches!(
            first.extend(duplicate, &resources),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Selection("duplicate key name"))
        ));
        assert_eq!(first.entry_count(), 1);
        let mut second = KeyInventory::default();
        second
            .add_symmetric(
                "two".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Hmac,
                b"second-secret".to_vec(),
                KeyUsages::VERIFY,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("second key imports");
        let constrained = ResourcePolicy {
            max_external_resource_total_bytes: b"first-secret".len(),
            ..ResourcePolicy::default()
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            first.extend(second, &constrained),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(
                crate::policy::PolicyViolation::ResourceLimitExceeded {
                    resource: crate::policy::resource_name::AGGREGATE_EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_BYTES,
                    ..
                }
            ))
        ));
        assert_eq!(first.entry_count(), 1);
    }

    #[test]
    fn public_dsa_store_entries_require_usable_parameters() {
        // The inventory has no implicit parameter inheritance. Do not grant
        // VERIFY to material that its own resolver cannot construct as a key.
        for fields in [
            "<Y>AQ==</Y>",
            "<P/><Q/><G/><Y>AQ==</Y>",
            "<P>AQ==</P><Q>AQ==</Q><G>AQ==</G><Y>AQ==</Y>",
        ] {
            let xml = format!(
                "<Keys xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\"><KeyInfo xmlns=\"{XMLDSIG_NS}\"><KeyName>dsa</KeyName><KeyValue><DSAKeyValue>{fields}</DSAKeyValue></KeyValue></KeyInfo></Keys>"
            );
            assert!(
                KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(
                    xml.as_bytes(),
                    &xml_policy(ResourcePolicy::default()),
                    XmlBackend::default()
                )
                .is_err(),
                "accepted unusable DSA: {fields}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn oversized_private_dsa_component_stops_before_big_integer_work() {
        // A bounded XML file can still contain an outsized exponent; reject
        // it before constructing a large modular exponentiation.
        let oversized = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(vec![1_u8; 513]);
        let xml = format!(
            "<Keys xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\"><KeyInfo xmlns=\"{XMLDSIG_NS}\"><KeyName>dsa</KeyName><KeyValue><DSAKeyValue><P>{oversized}</P><Q>AQ==</Q><G>AQ==</G><X xmlns=\"{XMLSEC_NS}\">AQ==</X><Y>AQ==</Y></DSAKeyValue></KeyValue></KeyInfo></Keys>"
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::from_xml_bytes(
                xml.as_bytes(),
                &xml_policy(ResourcePolicy::default()),
                XmlBackend::default(),
            ),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Invalid(message)) if message.contains("safety limit")
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn oversized_pkcs8_dsa_parameters_stop_before_key_derivation() {
        // PKCS#8 uses the same component ceiling as xmlsec's DSAKeyValue.
        #[derive(der::Sequence)]
        struct DsaParameters<'a> {
            p: der::asn1::UintRef<'a>,
            q: der::asn1::UintRef<'a>,
            g: der::asn1::UintRef<'a>,
        }
        let oversized = vec![1_u8; crate::hard_limits::DSA_KEY_COMPONENT_BYTE_CEILING + 1];
        let one = [1_u8];
        let parameters = der::Encode::to_der(&DsaParameters {
            p: der::asn1::UintRef::new(&oversized).expect("positive P"),
            q: der::asn1::UintRef::new(&one).expect("positive Q"),
            g: der::asn1::UintRef::new(&one).expect("positive G"),
        })
        .expect("DSA parameters encode");
        let x = der::Encode::to_der(&der::asn1::UintRef::new(&one).expect("positive X"))
            .expect("DSA X encodes");
        let algorithm = rsa::pkcs8::AlgorithmIdentifierRef {
            oid: dsa::OID,
            parameters: Some(der::asn1::AnyRef::from_der(&parameters).expect("parameters")),
        };
        let private = der::asn1::OctetStringRef::new(&x).expect("private octets");
        let pkcs8 = der::Encode::to_der(&PrivateKeyInfoRef::new(algorithm, private))
            .expect("PKCS#8 encodes");
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        let error = inventory
            .add_private_der(
                "oversized-dsa".into(),
                &pkcs8,
                None,
                KeyUsages::SIGN,
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect_err("oversized DSA parameter must fail preflight");
        assert!(error.to_string().contains("safety limit"), "{error}");
    }

    #[test]
    fn compressed_ec_spki_cannot_acquire_verify_usage() {
        // Import must enforce the same SEC1 profile as signature verification,
        // for every supported curve, rather than grant unusable VERIFY usage.
        for pem in [
            include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/ec/ec-prime256v1-pubkey.pem").as_slice(),
            include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/ec/ec-prime384v1-pubkey.pem").as_slice(),
            include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/ec/ec-prime521v1-pubkey.pem").as_slice(),
        ] {
            let original =
                single_pem_block(pem, ResourcePolicy::default().max_external_resource_bytes)
                    .expect("EC fixture")
                    .into_contents();
            let spki = rsa::pkcs8::SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef::from_der(&original).expect("SPKI");
            let point = spki
                .subject_public_key
                .as_bytes()
                .expect("octet-aligned point");
            let coordinate_len = (point.len() - 1) / 2;
            let mut compressed = vec![2 | (point.last().expect("Y coordinate") & 1)];
            compressed.extend_from_slice(&point[1..=coordinate_len]);
            let encoded = der::Encode::to_der(&rsa::pkcs8::SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef {
                algorithm: spki.algorithm,
                subject_public_key: der::asn1::BitStringRef::from_bytes(&compressed)
                    .expect("point"),
            })
            .expect("compressed SPKI");
            let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
            assert!(
                inventory
                    .add_public_der("compressed".into(), encoded, &ResourcePolicy::default())
                    .is_err()
            );
            assert!(inventory.public_keys().is_empty());
            inventory
                .add_public_der("uncompressed".into(), original, &ResourcePolicy::default())
                .expect("supported uncompressed encoding remains usable");
        }
        // A genuinely signed certificate wrapper must not bypass this profile.
        struct CompressedPoint<'a>(&'a [u8], &'static rcgen::SignatureAlgorithm);
        impl rcgen::PublicKeyData for CompressedPoint<'_> {
            fn der_bytes(&self) -> &[u8] {
                self.0
            }
            fn algorithm(&self) -> &'static rcgen::SignatureAlgorithm {
                self.1
            }
        }
        let mut root_params = rcgen::CertificateParams::new(Vec::new()).expect("root params");
        root_params.is_ca = rcgen::IsCa::Ca(rcgen::BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
        let root = rcgen::CertifiedIssuer::self_signed(
            root_params,
            rcgen::KeyPair::generate().expect("root key"),
        )
        .expect("root certificate");
        for (pem, algorithm) in [
            (
                include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/ec/ec-prime256v1-cert.pem").as_slice(),
                &rcgen::PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256,
            ),
            (
                include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/ec/ec-prime384v1-cert.pem").as_slice(),
                &rcgen::PKCS_ECDSA_P384_SHA384,
            ),
        ] {
            let original =
                single_pem_block(pem, ResourcePolicy::default().max_external_resource_bytes)
                    .expect("certificate fixture")
                    .into_contents();
            let (_, certificate) = X509Certificate::from_der(&original).expect("certificate");
            let point = certificate.public_key().subject_public_key.data.as_ref();
            let coordinate_len = (point.len() - 1) / 2;
            let mut compressed = vec![2 | (point.last().expect("Y coordinate") & 1)];
            compressed.extend_from_slice(&point[1..=coordinate_len]);
            let leaf = rcgen::CertificateParams::new(Vec::new())
                .expect("leaf params")
                .signed_by(&CompressedPoint(&compressed, algorithm), &root)
                .expect("signed compressed certificate");
            let encoded = leaf.der().to_vec();
            let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
            assert!(
                inventory
                    .add_public_der(
                        "compressed-cert".into(),
                        encoded,
                        &ResourcePolicy::default()
                    )
                    .is_err()
            );
            assert!(inventory.public_keys().is_empty());
            inventory
                .add_public_der(
                    "uncompressed-cert".into(),
                    original,
                    &ResourcePolicy::default(),
                )
                .expect("uncompressed certificate imports");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn malformed_ec_point_cannot_acquire_verify_usage() {
        // A supported curve OID does not make an off-curve point usable.
        let block = single_pem_block(
            include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/ec/ec-prime256v1-pubkey.pem"),
            ResourcePolicy::default().max_external_resource_bytes,
        )
        .expect("EC SPKI fixture");
        let mut der = block.into_contents();
        let last = der.last_mut().expect("point bytes");
        *last ^= 1;
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        assert!(
            inventory
                .add_public_der("off-curve".into(), der, &ResourcePolicy::default())
                .is_err()
        );
        assert!(inventory.public_keys().is_empty());
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
    #[test]
    fn decryption_policy_rejection_retains_its_type() {
        // An invalid operation snapshot is not a candidate-local key miss.
        let mut policy = crate::policy::DecryptionPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes = usize::MAX;
        assert!(matches!(
            KeyInventory::default().decryption_resolver("missing", &policy),
            Err(KeyStoreError::Policy(_))
        ));
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
    #[test]
    fn inventory_decryption_resolver_enforces_aes_usage_end_to_end() {
        // Inventory authorization is checked before the normal XMLEnc
        // decryptor receives an otherwise valid direct AES content key.
        use crate::xmlenc::{
            DataEncryptionAlgorithm, DecryptContext, DecryptedContent, EncryptedDataBuilder,
        };

        let key = b"0123456789abcdef";
        let encrypted = EncryptedDataBuilder::new(DataEncryptionAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm)
            .direct_key(*key)
            .encrypt_binary(b"inventory decrypt payload")
            .expect("AES fixture encrypts");
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut keys = KeyInventory::default();
        keys.add_symmetric(
            "decrypt".into(),
            SymmetricKeyKind::Aes,
            key.to_vec(),
            KeyUsages::DECRYPT,
            &resources,
        )
        .expect("decrypt key imports");
        let resolver = keys
            .decryption_resolver("decrypt", &crate::policy::DecryptionPolicy::default())
            .expect("decrypt use is allowed");
        let content = DecryptContext::new(resolver.as_ref())
            .decrypt(&encrypted.encrypted_data_xml)
            .expect("inventory key decrypts");
        assert!(
            matches!(content, DecryptedContent::Bytes(bytes) if bytes == b"inventory decrypt payload")
        );

        let mut restricted = KeyInventory::default();
        restricted
            .add_symmetric(
                "encrypt-only".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Aes,
                key.to_vec(),
                KeyUsages::ENCRYPT,
                &resources,
            )
            .expect("encrypt-only key imports");
        assert!(
            restricted
                .decryption_resolver("encrypt-only", &crate::policy::DecryptionPolicy::default())
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
    #[test]
    fn inventory_direct_aes_rechecks_execution_policy() {
        // Selection does not freeze resource permission: reject a tighter
        // execution snapshot before copying bytes or consuming a candidate.
        use crate::xmlenc::{DataEncryptionAlgorithm, KeyCandidateBudget, XmlEncError};
        let mut inventory = KeyInventory::default();
        inventory
            .add_symmetric(
                "aes".into(),
                SymmetricKeyKind::Aes,
                vec![1; 16],
                KeyUsages::DECRYPT,
                &ResourcePolicy::default(),
            )
            .expect("AES imports");
        let resolver = inventory
            .decryption_resolver("aes", &crate::policy::DecryptionPolicy::default())
            .expect("AES resolver");
        let mut policy = crate::policy::DecryptionPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes = 15;
        let mut budget = KeyCandidateBudget::with_limit(1);
        assert!(matches!(
            resolver.resolve_key_candidates_with_policy(
                &crate::provider::RustCryptoProvider,
                DataEncryptionAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm,
                None,
                &policy,
                &mut budget
            ),
            Err(XmlEncError::Policy(_))
        ));
        assert_eq!(budget.remaining(), 1);
        policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes = 16;
        assert_eq!(
            resolver
                .resolve_key_candidates_with_policy(
                    &crate::provider::RustCryptoProvider,
                    DataEncryptionAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm,
                    None,
                    &policy,
                    &mut budget
                )
                .expect("exact execution allowance"),
            vec![vec![1; 16]]
        );
        assert_eq!(budget.remaining(), 0);
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
    #[test]
    fn inventory_direct_aes_does_not_consume_recipient_candidates() {
        // A direct AES key is not a wrapping key. Recipient traversal must
        // leave its sole candidate available for the later direct-key path.
        use crate::xmlenc::{
            CipherData, DataEncryptionAlgorithm, EncryptedKey, EncryptionMethod,
            KeyCandidateBudget, KeyTransportAlgorithm, XmlEncError,
        };
        let mut keys = KeyInventory::default();
        keys.add_symmetric(
            "direct".into(),
            SymmetricKeyKind::Aes,
            vec![1; 16],
            KeyUsages::DECRYPT,
            &ResourcePolicy::default(),
        )
        .expect("AES imports");
        let resolver = keys
            .decryption_resolver("direct", &crate::policy::DecryptionPolicy::default())
            .expect("AES resolver");
        let recipient = EncryptedKey {
            id: None,
            recipient: None,
            key_name: None,
            encryption_method: EncryptionMethod {
                algorithm: KeyTransportAlgorithm::RsaOaep11.uri().into(),
                key_size_bits: None,
                oaep_digest: None,
                mgf_algorithm: None,
                oaep_params: None,
            },
            cipher_data: CipherData {
                value: String::new(),
            },
            reference_list: None,
            carried_key_name: None,
        };
        let mut budget = KeyCandidateBudget::with_limit(1);
        let provider = crate::provider::RustCryptoProvider;
        for _ in 0..64 {
            assert!(matches!(
                resolver.resolve_key_candidates(
                    &provider,
                    DataEncryptionAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm,
                    Some(&recipient),
                    &mut budget
                ),
                Err(XmlEncError::KeyNotFound)
            ));
            assert_eq!(budget.remaining(), 1);
        }
        assert_eq!(
            resolver
                .resolve_key_candidates(
                    &provider,
                    DataEncryptionAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm,
                    None,
                    &mut budget
                )
                .expect("one direct candidate"),
            vec![vec![1; 16]]
        );
        assert_eq!(budget.remaining(), 0);
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "xmlenc")]
    #[test]
    fn decryption_selection_checks_operation_limits_before_material_use() {
        // Reusing a broadly imported inventory with a tighter operation
        // snapshot must reject both AES and RSA material before copy/decode.
        let resources = ResourcePolicy::default();
        let mut keys = KeyInventory::default();
        keys.add_symmetric(
            "aes".into(),
            SymmetricKeyKind::Aes,
            vec![0x31; 16],
            KeyUsages::DECRYPT,
            &resources,
        )
        .expect("AES key imports");
        keys.add_private_pem(
            "rsa".into(),
            include_bytes!("../tests/fixtures/keys/rsa/rsa-2048-key.pem"),
            None,
            KeyUsages::DECRYPT,
            &resources,
        )
        .expect("RSA key imports");
        let mut policy = crate::policy::DecryptionPolicy::default();
        policy.resources.max_external_resource_bytes = 8;
        policy.resources.max_external_resource_total_bytes = 8;
        assert!(keys.decryption_resolver("aes", &policy).is_err());
        assert!(keys.decryption_resolver("rsa", &policy).is_err());
    }
}