weirdnet-keys
Key material and key policy, built only on vetted RustCrypto, dalek, BIP39, vsss-rs and age crates. Nothing here invents a cipher, a KDF or a format of its own.
Key32: a 256-bit key, wiped on drop, never printed.words: the 24 BIP39 words for a key.shards: Shamir k-of-n split and combine, with a checksummed text form.kdf: HKDF-SHA256 and Argon2id.aead: XChaCha20-Poly1305Sealed.password: Argon2id password sealing and claim tags.mac: HMAC-SHA256 with constant-time checks.exchange: X25519 agreement (contributory check) and HKDF exchange keys.keyring: envelope encryption for a database key (DEK). The DEK is wrapped by a versioned service key and by a key derived from the master key; the service key is wrapped by a password. Init, unlock, rotate, rekey (with undo on failure), recover, verify and export. Files and the database come in through theKeyFilesandEncryptedDatabasetraits the application implements; this crate never opens a database.dark: shards sealed with a shard password for custodians, and the claim tag that finds them again.age(default feature): password age files for exports.
Profiles
Every label (HKDF info, associated data, shard prefix, claim salt) comes from a Profile.
Profile::WEIRDNET is the default. An application with existing data defines its own
profile with its existing labels and passes it everywhere; envelopes record their format, so
a file written under one profile is refused under another. Nothing is migrated or rewrapped
automatically.
Limits
See SECURITY.md for the review notes. Not audited. The shard checksum catches typos, not forgery: a forged or mixed share combines
into a wrong key, which verify_master and every unwrap then reject.