vta-service 0.64.0

Service for Verifiable Trust Agents operating in Verifiable Trust Communities
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
//! `rooms/keys/profile/{read,write}/0.1` and the epoch-advance re-write, end to end against a
//! **real** room host (`room_host::dispatch`) on a loopback port: the same proof
//! verification, chain authorization, version assignment and author recording a host
//! applies, so "the host stored it under `write`" and "the host refused it" are the host's
//! statements, not this test's. The host's answers are signed as its own DID, which this
//! agent requires of every reply it acts on.

use std::sync::Arc;

use chrono::{Duration as Span, Utc};
use dtg_credentials::DTGCredential;
use serde_json::{Value, json};
use trust_tasks_rs::{TrustTask, TypeUri};
use vti_rooms_dtg::test_support::Party;

use super::*;
use crate::operations::room_groups::Member;
use crate::operations::room_oracle::{AUTHORITY_TYPE, MEMBERSHIP_TYPE};

const READ: &str = vta_sdk::trust_tasks::TASK_ROOMS_KEYS_PROFILE_READ_0_1;
const WRITE: &str = vta_sdk::trust_tasks::TASK_ROOMS_KEYS_PROFILE_WRITE_0_1;
const OWNER_KEY_PATH: &str = "m/44'/0'/7'/0'/1'";
const ROOM_KEY_PATH: &str = "m/44'/0'/7'/0'/2'";
const MEMBER_KEY_PATH: &str = "m/44'/0'/7'/0'/3'";

/// A real room host behind HTTP, its answers signed as its DID.
struct Host {
    did: String,
    state: Arc<room_host::HostState>,
    doc: Value,
    _dir: tempfile::TempDir,
}

async fn start_host() -> Host {
    start_host_with(false).await
}

/// [`start_host`]; with `contend`, every `rooms/records/put` loses its predicted version to
/// another write that lands just before it — the version race `rooms/keys/profile/write`
/// item 6 answers `contended` for when it never stops.
async fn start_host_with(contend: bool) -> Host {
    let party = Party::new();
    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let state = room_host::open_state(dir.path()).expect("a host");
    state.set_host_did(&party.did).expect("bind the host DID");

    let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
    let port = listener.local_addr().unwrap().port();
    let shared = state.clone();
    let host_did = party.did.clone();
    let secret = party.secret_multibase.clone();
    let app = axum::Router::new().route(
        "/trust-tasks",
        axum::routing::post(move |body: axum::body::Bytes| {
            let shared = shared.clone();
            let host_did = host_did.clone();
            let secret = secret.clone();
            async move {
                if contend {
                    let doc: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body).unwrap_or(Value::Null);
                    if doc["type"] == vti_rooms::wire::ROOMS_RECORDS_PUT_TYPE
                        && let Some(room) = doc["payload"]["roomId"].as_str()
                    {
                        let noise = vti_rooms::Record {
                            key: format!("noise-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple()),
                            version: 0,
                            epoch: None,
                            status: vti_rooms::RecordStatus::Active,
                            pinned: false,
                            sealed: None,
                            nonce: None,
                            sealed_version: None,
                            cleartext: Some(json!({ "body": "another member's write" })),
                            author: None,
                            updated_at: 0,
                        };
                        vti_rooms::storage::put_record(
                            shared.rooms(),
                            shared.records(),
                            room,
                            noise,
                            None,
                            Utc::now().timestamp() as u64,
                        )
                        .await
                        .expect("the competing write lands");
                    }
                }
                let answer = room_host::dispatch(&shared, &body).await;
                let mut doc = answer.document;
                if doc["type"]
                    .as_str()
                    .is_some_and(|t| t.ends_with("#response"))
                {
                    let mut typed: TrustTask<Value> = serde_json::from_value(doc).unwrap();
                    vta_sdk::trust_task_sign::sign_in_place(&mut typed, &host_did, &secret)
                        .await
                        .unwrap();
                    doc = serde_json::to_value(typed).unwrap();
                }
                (axum::http::StatusCode::OK, doc.to_string())
            }
        }),
    );
    tokio::spawn(async move { axum::serve(listener, app).await.unwrap() });

    let mb = party.did.strip_prefix("did:key:").unwrap();
    let vm = format!("{}#{mb}", party.did);
    let doc = json!({
        "@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1"],
        "id": party.did,
        "verificationMethod": [{
            "id": vm, "type": "Multikey", "controller": party.did, "publicKeyMultibase": mb,
        }],
        "authentication": [vm],
        "assertionMethod": [vm],
        "service": [{
            "id": format!("{}#rest", party.did), "type": "TrustTaskHTTPS",
            "serviceEndpoint": format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}"),
        }],
    });
    Host {
        did: party.did,
        state,
        doc,
        _dir: dir,
    }
}

/// One member's VTA: their persona, the room's grant to it and its membership in the vault,
/// and a resolver that knows the host.
struct Vta {
    state: AppState,
    _dir: tempfile::TempDir,
    persona: String,
}

async fn vta(room: &Party, host: &Host, key_path: &str, actions: &[&str]) -> Vta {
    let (mut state, dir) = crate::test_support::build_signing_test_app_state().await;
    let persona = crate::test_support::seed_holder_key(&state, key_path, None).await;
    let now = Utc::now();
    let mut vac = DTGCredential::new_vac(
        room.did.clone(),
        dtg_credentials::IssuerScope::Public,
        persona.clone(),
        room.did.clone(),
        actions.iter().map(|a| a.to_string()).collect(),
        now - Span::minutes(1),
        now + Span::days(30),
    )
    .unwrap()
    .with_id(format!("urn:example:vac:{persona}"));
    vac.sign(&room.secret, None).await.unwrap();
    let mut vmc = DTGCredential::new_vmc(
        room.did.clone(),
        persona.clone(),
        now - Span::minutes(1),
        Some(now + Span::days(30)),
        false,
    );
    vmc.sign(&room.secret, None).await.unwrap();
    vault(&state, AUTHORITY_TYPE, &room.did, &vac).await;
    vault(&state, MEMBERSHIP_TYPE, &room.did, &vmc).await;

    let mut resolver = affinidi_did_resolver_cache_sdk::DIDCacheClient::new(
        affinidi_did_resolver_cache_sdk::config::DIDCacheConfigBuilder::default().build(),
    )
    .await
    .unwrap();
    resolver
        .add_did_document(&host.did, serde_json::from_value(host.doc.clone()).unwrap())
        .await;
    state.did_resolver = Some(resolver);
    Vta {
        state,
        _dir: dir,
        persona,
    }
}

async fn vault(state: &AppState, type_tag: &str, issuer: &str, cred: &DTGCredential) {
    use crate::vault::model::{CredentialFormat, CredentialStatus, StoredCredential};
    use vti_common::vault::VaultStatus;
    crate::vault::storage::put(
        &state.vault_ks,
        &StoredCredential {
            id: format!("{type_tag}-{issuer}"),
            format: CredentialFormat::EddsaJcs2022,
            types: vec![type_tag.into()],
            schema_id: None,
            community_did: None,
            context_id: None,
            subject_did: None,
            issuer_did: Some(issuer.to_string()),
            purpose: None,
            status: CredentialStatus::Unknown,
            valid_from: None,
            valid_until: None,
            received_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
            source: None,
            tags: Default::default(),
            body: serde_json::to_vec(cred).unwrap(),
            lifecycle: VaultStatus::Active,
            archived_at: None,
            deleted_at: None,
            grace_until: None,
        },
    )
    .await
    .unwrap();
}

async fn seed_room(host: &Host, room: &str, owner: &str, visibility: vti_rooms::Visibility) {
    vti_rooms::storage::create_room(
        host.state.rooms(),
        &vti_rooms::Room {
            room_id: room.to_string(),
            owner_did: owner.to_string(),
            visibility,
            retention_policy: vti_rooms::RetentionPolicy::Chained,
            anchor_cadence: Default::default(),
            epoch: 1,
            next_version: 1,
            retention_days: 90,
            epoch_expires_at: None,
            created_at: 0,
            updated_at: 0,
            mirror_of: None,
        },
    )
    .await
    .expect("seed the room");
}

fn request(uri: &str, payload: Value) -> TrustTask<Value> {
    let uri: TypeUri = uri.parse().unwrap();
    TrustTask::new(format!("urn:uuid:{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()), uri, payload)
}

fn body(outcome: TrustTaskOutcome) -> Value {
    serde_json::from_slice(&outcome.body).expect("a document")
}

fn admin() -> AuthClaims {
    crate::test_support::super_admin_claims()
}

async fn read(v: &Vta, room: &str, host: &Host) -> Value {
    body(
        handle_read(
            &v.state,
            &admin(),
            request(READ, json!({ "roomId": room, "host": host.did })),
        )
        .await,
    )
}

async fn write_profile(v: &Vta, room: &str, host: &Host, profile: Value) -> Value {
    body(
        handle_write(
            &v.state,
            &admin(),
            request(
                WRITE,
                json!({ "roomId": room, "host": host.did, "profile": profile }),
            ),
        )
        .await,
    )
}

/// A sealed room, its owner holding every action and the room's group, at epoch 1.
struct Sealed {
    host: Host,
    room: Party,
    owner: Vta,
}

async fn sealed_room() -> Sealed {
    let host = start_host().await;
    let room = Party::new();
    let owner = vta(
        &room,
        &host,
        OWNER_KEY_PATH,
        &["read", "write", "curate", "admin"],
    )
    .await;
    seed_room(
        &host,
        &room.did,
        &owner.persona,
        vti_rooms::Visibility::Attributed,
    )
    .await;
    let room_signing =
        crate::test_support::seed_holder_key(&owner.state, ROOM_KEY_PATH, None).await;
    let room_key = format!(
        "{room_signing}#{}",
        room_signing.strip_prefix("did:key:").unwrap()
    );
    let created = body(
        super::super::room_owner_group::handle_create(
            &owner.state,
            &admin(),
            request(
                vta_sdk::trust_tasks::TASK_ROOMS_OWNER_GROUP_CREATE_0_1,
                json!({ "roomId": room.did, "signingKeyId": room_key, "member": owner.persona }),
            ),
        )
        .await,
    );
    assert_eq!(created["payload"]["epoch"], 1, "{created}");
    Sealed { host, room, owner }
}

/// Admit a member holding `actions` with their own VTA, through the owner's
/// `rooms/owner/group/add/0.2` at the real host; the member joins from the Welcome.
async fn admit(s: &Sealed, actions: &[&str]) -> Vta {
    let m = vta(&s.room, &s.host, MEMBER_KEY_PATH, actions).await;
    let kp = room_groups::mint_key_package(
        &m.state.room_groups_ks,
        &Member::new(&s.room.did, &m.persona).unwrap(),
        3600,
        0,
    )
    .await
    .unwrap();
    let out = body(
        super::super::room_owner_group::handle_add_v0_2(
            &s.owner.state,
            &admin(),
            request(
                vta_sdk::trust_tasks::TASK_ROOMS_OWNER_GROUP_ADD_0_2,
                json!({
                    "roomId": s.room.did, "host": s.host.did, "member": m.persona,
                    "keyPackage": kp.key_package,
                }),
            ),
        )
        .await,
    );
    let welcome = {
        use base64::Engine as _;
        base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
            .decode(out["payload"]["welcome"].as_str().expect("{out}"))
            .unwrap()
    };
    room_groups::join(
        &m.state.room_groups_ks,
        &Member::new(&s.room.did, &m.persona).unwrap(),
        &welcome,
        0,
    )
    .await
    .expect("joins from the Welcome");
    m
}

fn board() -> Value {
    json!({
        "name": "Board pack — 2027",
        "description": "Papers for the 2027 board meetings.",
        "tags": ["board", "finance"],
        "emoji": "📋",
    })
}

/// Written as the owner, read back as the owner: sealed at the host under an opaque key
/// derived from the epoch's storage key, which says nothing in the clear.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_curators_profile_is_written_sealed_and_read_back() {
    let s = sealed_room().await;
    let out = write_profile(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &s.host, board()).await;
    assert_eq!(out["payload"]["outcome"], "written", "{out}");
    assert_eq!(out["payload"]["epoch"], 1, "{out}");
    let key = out["payload"]["key"].as_str().unwrap().to_string();
    assert_eq!(key.len(), 22, "the shape of any random record key");

    // At the host: ciphertext, at that key, attributed to the owner persona.
    let stored = vti_rooms::storage::get_record(s.host.state.records(), &s.room.did, &key)
        .await
        .expect("stored");
    assert_eq!(stored.author.as_deref(), Some(s.owner.persona.as_str()));
    let at_host = serde_json::to_string(&stored).unwrap();
    assert!(
        !at_host.contains("Board pack"),
        "the name never reaches the host"
    );

    let got = read(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &s.host).await;
    let p = &got["payload"];
    assert_eq!(p["status"], "found", "{got}");
    assert_eq!(p["profile"], board());
    assert_eq!(p["author"], s.owner.persona);
    assert_eq!(p["epoch"], 1);
    assert_eq!(p["stale"], false);
    assert_eq!(p["searched"], json!({ "fromEpoch": 1, "toEpoch": 1 }));
    assert!(p.get("rejected").is_none(), "{got}");
    assert!(p["verification"]["trace"].is_string(), "{got}");
}

/// A room with no profile reads `absent`, and says how far it looked.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_room_with_no_profile_is_absent() {
    let s = sealed_room().await;
    let got = read(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &s.host).await;
    assert_eq!(got["payload"]["status"], "absent", "{got}");
    assert_eq!(
        got["payload"]["searched"],
        json!({ "fromEpoch": 1, "toEpoch": 1 })
    );
}

/// **The forged rename.** A member holding only `write` is refused by their own VTA before
/// the host is contacted — and when they go round it, signing a statement themselves and
/// storing it at the profile location (which the host must accept: it cannot tell the
/// record is the profile), every reader ignores it as `noAuthority`, names them, and keeps
/// the profile before it.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_write_only_members_rename_is_refused_and_then_ignored() {
    let s = sealed_room().await;
    write_profile(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &s.host, board()).await;
    let mallory = admit(&s, &["read", "write"]).await;

    // The owner re-wrote the profile under epoch 2 at the admission, so the newcomer —
    // who reads only from the epoch they joined at — sees it.
    let seen = read(&mallory, &s.room.did, &s.host).await;
    assert_eq!(seen["payload"]["status"], "found", "{seen}");
    assert_eq!(seen["payload"]["epoch"], 2, "{seen}");
    assert_eq!(seen["payload"]["author"], s.owner.persona);

    // Through the task: refused, before the host.
    let refused = write_profile(
        &mallory,
        &s.room.did,
        &s.host,
        json!({ "name": "Mallory's" }),
    )
    .await;
    assert_eq!(
        refused["payload"]["code"], "rooms/keys/profile/write:noAuthority",
        "{refused}"
    );

    // Around it: the same statement a hostile client would build.
    let resolver = mallory.state.did_resolver.clone().unwrap();
    let auth = admin();
    let sp = Speaker::for_caller(
        &mallory.state,
        &auth,
        &resolver,
        &s.room.did,
        &s.host.did,
        None,
    )
    .await
    .unwrap();
    let forged = write(&sp, true, &json!({ "name": "Mallory's room" }))
        .await
        .expect("the host stores what `write` permits");
    assert_eq!(forged.epoch, Some(2));

    // The owner: epoch 2's record ignored, epoch 1's profile still the room's, stale.
    let got = read(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &s.host).await;
    let p = &got["payload"];
    assert_eq!(p["status"], "found", "{got}");
    assert_eq!(p["profile"]["name"], "Board pack — 2027");
    assert_eq!(p["epoch"], 1);
    assert_eq!(p["stale"], true);
    assert_eq!(p["searched"], json!({ "fromEpoch": 2, "toEpoch": 1 }));
    assert_eq!(
        p["rejected"],
        json!([{ "epoch": 2, "version": forged.version, "reason": "noAuthority", "author": mallory.persona }])
    );

    // Mallory herself cannot walk below the epoch she joined at: absent, and told why.
    let theirs = read(&mallory, &s.room.did, &s.host).await;
    assert_eq!(theirs["payload"]["status"], "absent", "{theirs}");
    assert_eq!(theirs["payload"]["rejected"][0]["reason"], "noAuthority");

    // The owner repairs it by writing again.
    write_profile(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &s.host, board()).await;
    let fixed = read(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &s.host).await;
    assert_eq!(fixed["payload"]["epoch"], 2, "{fixed}");
    assert_eq!(fixed["payload"]["stale"], false);
    assert!(fixed["payload"].get("rejected").is_none(), "{fixed}");
}

/// Every advance re-writes the profile under the new epoch, as the owner: a renewal moves it
/// from a stale epoch to the current one. A room with no profile gets none.
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_advance_re_writes_the_profile_under_the_new_epoch() {
    let s = sealed_room().await;
    let renew = |s: &Sealed| {
        let doc = request(
            vta_sdk::trust_tasks::TASK_ROOMS_OWNER_GROUP_RENEW_0_1,
            json!({ "roomId": s.room.did, "host": s.host.did }),
        );
        let state = s.owner.state.clone();
        async move { body(super::super::room_owner_group::handle_renew(&state, &admin(), doc).await) }
    };

    // No profile: the advance writes none on the room's behalf (item 4).
    let out = renew(&s).await;
    assert_eq!(out["payload"]["epoch"], 2, "{out}");
    assert_eq!(
        read(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &s.host).await["payload"]["status"],
        "absent"
    );

    write_profile(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &s.host, board()).await;
    let out = renew(&s).await;
    assert_eq!(out["payload"]["epoch"], 3, "{out}");
    let got = read(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &s.host).await;
    assert_eq!(got["payload"]["status"], "found", "{got}");
    assert_eq!(got["payload"]["epoch"], 3);
    assert_eq!(got["payload"]["stale"], false);
    assert_eq!(got["payload"]["profile"], board());
}

/// Clearing retracts the current epoch's record (curate at the host), and the walk stops
/// there: `cleared`, not the older profile below it. An advance after a clear writes none.
#[tokio::test]
async fn clearing_stops_the_walk() {
    let s = sealed_room().await;
    write_profile(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &s.host, board()).await;
    // Advance, so the current epoch's location is the re-written one.
    let _ = admit(&s, &["read"]).await;

    let out = body(
        handle_write(
            &s.owner.state,
            &admin(),
            request(
                WRITE,
                json!({ "roomId": s.room.did, "host": s.host.did, "clear": true }),
            ),
        )
        .await,
    );
    assert_eq!(out["payload"]["outcome"], "cleared", "{out}");
    let got = read(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &s.host).await;
    assert_eq!(got["payload"]["status"], "cleared", "{got}");
    assert_eq!(got["payload"]["epoch"], 2);
    assert!(got["payload"].get("profile").is_none());

    // Reversible by another write, at the same epoch.
    let again = write_profile(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &s.host, json!({ "name": "Board" })).await;
    assert_eq!(again["payload"]["outcome"], "written", "{again}");
    let got = read(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &s.host).await;
    assert_eq!(got["payload"]["status"], "found", "{got}");
    assert_eq!(got["payload"]["profile"], json!({ "name": "Board" }));
}

/// A member who holds no curate is refused a clear.
#[tokio::test]
async fn clearing_takes_curate() {
    let s = sealed_room().await;
    let member = admit(&s, &["read", "write"]).await;
    let out = body(
        handle_write(
            &member.state,
            &admin(),
            request(
                WRITE,
                json!({ "roomId": s.room.did, "host": s.host.did, "clear": true }),
            ),
        )
        .await,
    );
    assert_eq!(
        out["payload"]["code"], "rooms/keys/profile/write:noAuthority",
        "{out}"
    );
}

/// A room this VTA holds nothing for is `notAMember`, for both tasks.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_room_nobody_here_belongs_to_is_not_a_member() {
    let s = sealed_room().await;
    let stranger = Party::new().did;
    let got = body(
        handle_read(
            &s.owner.state,
            &admin(),
            request(READ, json!({ "roomId": stranger, "host": s.host.did })),
        )
        .await,
    );
    assert_eq!(
        got["payload"]["code"], "rooms/keys/profile/read:notAMember",
        "{got}"
    );
    let got = write_profile(&s.owner, &stranger, &s.host, board()).await;
    assert_eq!(
        got["payload"]["code"], "rooms/keys/profile/write:notAMember",
        "{got}"
    );
}

/// The profile is not one of the room's records: `rooms/keys/browse` leaves it out (its
/// count still checked against everything the host listed), and `rooms/keys/read` of its
/// key does not open it but says where to read it.
#[tokio::test]
async fn browse_and_read_keep_the_profile_out_of_the_records() {
    let s = sealed_room().await;
    let w = write_profile(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &s.host, board()).await;
    let key = w["payload"]["key"].as_str().unwrap().to_string();

    let listed = body(
        super::super::room_group::handle_browse(
            &s.owner.state,
            &admin(),
            request(
                vta_sdk::trust_tasks::TASK_ROOMS_KEYS_BROWSE_0_1,
                json!({ "roomId": s.room.did, "host": s.host.did }),
            ),
        )
        .await,
    );
    assert_eq!(listed["payload"]["records"], json!([]), "{listed}");
    assert_eq!(
        listed["payload"]["verification"]["count"], "agrees",
        "{listed}"
    );

    let opened = body(
        super::super::room_group::handle_read(
            &s.owner.state,
            &admin(),
            request(
                vta_sdk::trust_tasks::TASK_ROOMS_KEYS_READ_0_1,
                json!({ "roomId": s.room.did, "host": s.host.did, "key": key }),
            ),
        )
        .await,
    );
    assert!(opened["payload"].get("plaintext").is_none(), "{opened}");
    assert_eq!(
        opened["payload"]["ext"]["org.openvtc.rooms"]["roomProfile"],
        true
    );
}

/// On an `open` room the profile is the record at `room-profile`, its signed body in
/// `cleartext.body` and its name as the title — and a reader verifies it the same way.
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_open_rooms_profile_is_at_room_profile_in_the_clear() {
    let host = start_host().await;
    let room = Party::new();
    let owner = vta(
        &room,
        &host,
        OWNER_KEY_PATH,
        &["read", "write", "curate", "admin"],
    )
    .await;
    seed_room(
        &host,
        &room.did,
        &owner.persona,
        vti_rooms::Visibility::Open,
    )
    .await;

    let out = write_profile(&owner, &room.did, &host, board()).await;
    assert_eq!(out["payload"]["key"], "room-profile", "{out}");
    assert!(out["payload"].get("epoch").is_none(), "{out}");
    let stored = vti_rooms::storage::get_record(host.state.records(), &room.did, "room-profile")
        .await
        .unwrap();
    let stored = serde_json::to_value(&stored).unwrap();
    assert!(
        stored.to_string().contains("Board pack"),
        "an open room hides nothing from its host"
    );

    let got = read(&owner, &room.did, &host).await;
    assert_eq!(got["payload"]["status"], "found", "{got}");
    assert_eq!(got["payload"]["profile"], board());
    assert!(got["payload"].get("searched").is_none(), "{got}");
}

// ─── The declared refusals, each driven ─────────────────────────────────

/// A DID document for a host nobody answers at: a loopback port nothing listens on.
fn unreachable_host() -> (String, Value) {
    let party = Party::new();
    let mb = party.did.strip_prefix("did:key:").unwrap().to_string();
    let vm = format!("{}#{mb}", party.did);
    let doc = json!({
        "@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1"],
        "id": party.did,
        "verificationMethod": [{
            "id": vm, "type": "Multikey", "controller": party.did, "publicKeyMultibase": mb,
        }],
        "authentication": [vm],
        "assertionMethod": [vm],
        "service": [{
            "id": format!("{}#rest", party.did), "type": "TrustTaskHTTPS",
            "serviceEndpoint": "http://127.0.0.1:9",
        }],
    });
    (party.did, doc)
}

/// Teach `v`'s resolver another host's DID document.
async fn knows(v: &mut Vta, did: &str, doc: Value) {
    let mut resolver = v.state.did_resolver.clone().unwrap();
    resolver
        .add_did_document(did, serde_json::from_value(doc).unwrap())
        .await;
    v.state.did_resolver = Some(resolver);
}

async fn read_at(v: &Vta, room: &str, host: &str) -> Value {
    body(
        handle_read(
            &v.state,
            &admin(),
            request(READ, json!({ "roomId": room, "host": host })),
        )
        .await,
    )
}

async fn write_at(v: &Vta, room: &str, host: &str) -> Value {
    body(
        handle_write(
            &v.state,
            &admin(),
            request(
                WRITE,
                json!({ "roomId": room, "host": host, "profile": board() }),
            ),
        )
        .await,
    )
}

/// A host that does not answer is `hostUnreachable`, for both tasks — retryable, and
/// nothing is known to have been stored.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_host_nobody_answers_at_is_host_unreachable() {
    let mut s = sealed_room().await;
    let (dead, doc) = unreachable_host();
    knows(&mut s.owner, &dead, doc).await;

    let got = read_at(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &dead).await;
    assert_eq!(
        got["payload"]["code"], "rooms/keys/profile/read:hostUnreachable",
        "{got}"
    );
    let got = write_at(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &dead).await;
    assert_eq!(
        got["payload"]["code"], "rooms/keys/profile/write:hostUnreachable",
        "{got}"
    );
}

/// A host that answers and declines — here one that does not serve the room — is
/// `hostRefused`, its own code and message carried in `details`; and a refusal is not an
/// empty profile location.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_host_that_does_not_serve_the_room_is_host_refused() {
    let mut s = sealed_room().await;
    let other = start_host().await;
    knows(&mut s.owner, &other.did, other.doc.clone()).await;

    let got = read_at(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &other.did).await;
    assert_eq!(
        got["payload"]["code"], "rooms/keys/profile/read:hostRefused",
        "{got}"
    );
    assert!(got["payload"]["details"]["code"].is_string(), "{got}");
    let got = write_at(&s.owner, &s.room.did, &other.did).await;
    assert_eq!(
        got["payload"]["code"], "rooms/keys/profile/write:hostRefused",
        "{got}"
    );
    assert!(got["payload"]["details"]["message"].is_string(), "{got}");
}

/// Item 6: when other writes keep taking the version a profile was sealed for, the write
/// re-seals for the next one a bounded number of times and then answers `contended` —
/// never `written` for a record that does not open.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_write_that_keeps_losing_its_version_is_contended() {
    let host = start_host_with(true).await;
    let room = Party::new();
    let owner = vta(
        &room,
        &host,
        OWNER_KEY_PATH,
        &["read", "write", "curate", "admin"],
    )
    .await;
    seed_room(
        &host,
        &room.did,
        &owner.persona,
        vti_rooms::Visibility::Open,
    )
    .await;

    let got = write_profile(&owner, &room.did, &host, board()).await;
    assert_eq!(
        got["payload"]["code"], "rooms/keys/profile/write:contended",
        "{got}"
    );
    // And no reader takes what landed for the profile.
    let read = read(&owner, &room.did, &host).await;
    assert_ne!(read["payload"]["status"], "found", "{read}");
}