vallum 0.8.16

Security boundary between AI coding agents and your shell — redacts secrets, neutralizes prompt injection, sanitizes untrusted terminal output, audits every command.
Documentation 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226

// tests/project_config_cli.rs — project-level .vallum.toml end-to-end.
use std::process::Command;

fn vallum_bin() -> &'static str {
    env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_vallum")
}

fn temp_repo(tag: &str) -> (std::path::PathBuf, std::path::PathBuf) {
    let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("vallum_projcli_{tag}_{}", std::process::id()));
    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
    std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.join(".git")).unwrap();
    let cfg = dir.join("global-config.toml");
    std::fs::write(&cfg, format!("[audit]\nlog_dir = \"{}\"\n", dir.display())).unwrap();
    (dir, cfg)
}

#[test]
fn config_init_project_scaffolds_and_refuses_overwrite() {
    let (dir, cfg) = temp_repo("init");
    let out = Command::new(vallum_bin())
        .env("VALLUM_CONFIG", &cfg)
        .current_dir(&dir)
        .args(["config", "init", "--project"])
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert_eq!(out.status.code(), Some(0));
    let body = std::fs::read_to_string(dir.join(".vallum.toml")).unwrap();
    assert!(body.contains("[[policy.rules]]"), "{body}");
    assert!(body.contains("tighten-only"), "{body}");
    // Second run without --force refuses (still exit 0, message says exists).
    let out = Command::new(vallum_bin())
        .env("VALLUM_CONFIG", &cfg)
        .current_dir(&dir)
        .args(["config", "init", "--project"])
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert_eq!(out.status.code(), Some(0));
    assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).contains("already exists"));
    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
}

fn write_project_rule(dir: &std::path::Path) {
    std::fs::write(
        dir.join(".vallum.toml"),
        "[[policy.rules]]\npattern = 'echo BLOCKME'\naction = \"deny\"\nreason = \"project deny\"\n",
    )
    .unwrap();
}

#[test]
fn project_deny_rule_fires_in_direct_run_with_attribution() {
    let (dir, cfg) = temp_repo("deny");
    write_project_rule(&dir);
    let out = Command::new(vallum_bin())
        .env("VALLUM_CONFIG", &cfg)
        .current_dir(&dir)
        .args(["run", "echo", "BLOCKME"])
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert_eq!(out.status.code(), Some(125));
    assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).contains("project deny"));
    // policy test attributes the source.
    let out = Command::new(vallum_bin())
        .env("VALLUM_CONFIG", &cfg)
        .current_dir(&dir)
        .args(["policy", "test", "echo BLOCKME"])
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert_eq!(out.status.code(), Some(20));
    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout);
    assert!(stdout.contains("project:"), "{stdout}");
    assert!(stdout.contains("project rule"), "{stdout}");
    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
}

#[test]
fn project_rule_fires_from_subdirectory_via_git_root() {
    let (dir, cfg) = temp_repo("subdir");
    write_project_rule(&dir);
    let sub = dir.join("deep").join("er");
    std::fs::create_dir_all(&sub).unwrap();
    let out = Command::new(vallum_bin())
        .env("VALLUM_CONFIG", &cfg)
        .current_dir(&sub)
        .args(["policy", "test", "echo BLOCKME"])
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert_eq!(
        out.status.code(),
        Some(20),
        "git-root file applies from subdirs"
    );
    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
}

#[test]
fn subdirectory_vallum_toml_cannot_shadow_git_root() {
    let (dir, cfg) = temp_repo("shadow");
    // NO file at the git root; a crafted one sits in a subdirectory.
    let sub = dir.join("sub");
    std::fs::create_dir_all(&sub).unwrap();
    write_project_rule(&sub);
    let out = Command::new(vallum_bin())
        .env("VALLUM_CONFIG", &cfg)
        .current_dir(&sub)
        .args(["policy", "test", "echo BLOCKME"])
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert_eq!(out.status.code(), Some(0), "subdir file must be ignored");
    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
}

#[test]
fn kill_switch_disables_project_config() {
    let (dir, cfg) = temp_repo("kill");
    write_project_rule(&dir);
    let out = Command::new(vallum_bin())
        .env("VALLUM_CONFIG", &cfg)
        .env("VALLUM_NO_PROJECT_CONFIG", "1")
        .current_dir(&dir)
        .args(["policy", "test", "echo BLOCKME"])
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert_eq!(out.status.code(), Some(0));
    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
}

#[test]
fn rejected_project_file_never_blocks_and_never_weakens() {
    let (dir, cfg) = temp_repo("rejected");
    // Forbidden key: tries to disable a built-in — the whole file is ignored.
    std::fs::write(
        dir.join(".vallum.toml"),
        "[policy]\ndisabled = [\"rm_rf_root\"]\n",
    )
    .unwrap();
    // 1. Never blocks: an ordinary command still runs (no DoS).
    let out = Command::new(vallum_bin())
        .env("VALLUM_CONFIG", &cfg)
        .current_dir(&dir)
        .args(["run", "echo", "hi"])
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert_eq!(
        out.status.code(),
        Some(0),
        "stderr: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
    );
    assert!(
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).contains("ignoring project config"),
        "the rejection must be loud"
    );
    // 2. Never weakens: the built-in the file tried to disable still fires.
    let out = Command::new(vallum_bin())
        .env("VALLUM_CONFIG", &cfg)
        .current_dir(&dir)
        .args(["policy", "test", "rm -rf /"])
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert_eq!(out.status.code(), Some(10), "rm_rf_root must still Ask");
    // 3. Doctor surfaces the rejection.
    let out = Command::new(vallum_bin())
        .env("VALLUM_CONFIG", &cfg)
        .current_dir(&dir)
        .args(["doctor"])
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    // Assert on the project-config LINE itself: a bare `contains("rejected")`
    // over the whole report can pass on unrelated output (foreign hook
    // commands in the hook-audit line, for one).
    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout);
    let line = stdout
        .lines()
        .find(|l| l.contains("project-config"))
        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("no project-config check line in:\n{stdout}"));
    assert!(line.contains("rejected"), "{line}");
    assert!(line.contains(".vallum.toml"), "{line}");
    // The guardrail line must also see zero project rules (nothing accepted).
    assert!(
        stdout.contains("0 project rule(s)"),
        "rejected file contributes no rules: {stdout}"
    );
    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
}

#[test]
fn doctor_reports_an_accepted_project_file() {
    let (dir, cfg) = temp_repo("doctorok");
    write_project_rule(&dir);
    let out = Command::new(vallum_bin())
        .env("VALLUM_CONFIG", &cfg)
        .current_dir(&dir)
        .args(["doctor"])
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout);
    let line = stdout
        .lines()
        .find(|l| l.contains("project-config"))
        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("no project-config check line in:\n{stdout}"));
    assert!(line.contains("on —"), "{line}");
    assert!(line.contains("1 rule(s)"), "{line}");
    assert!(
        stdout.contains("1 project rule(s)"),
        "guardrail line must count it: {stdout}"
    );
    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
}

#[test]
fn project_rule_ask_is_never_approval_cached() {
    // Project rules are not in CACHE_ELIGIBLE_RULES (their names are
    // project:<pattern>), so an approved Ask must not mint a cache entry.
    let (dir, _cfg) = temp_repo("nocache");
    let mut cfg = vallum::config::AppConfig::default();
    cfg.audit.log_dir = Some(dir.clone());
    vallum::approvals::record(&cfg, "echo BLOCKME", "/repo", "project:echo BLOCKME");
    assert!(
        vallum::approvals::approvals_path(&cfg)
            .map(|p| !p.exists())
            .unwrap_or(true),
        "project-rule approvals must never be cached"
    );
    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
}