useract-forensic

One per-user timeline from many artifacts — useract-forensic merges shell history, device connections, SRUM, registry artifacts, and LNK targets into a single UserActivity stream and surfaces the cross-source signals no one artifact can show: a file opened from a USB stick that was plugged in, a command run while a stick was mounted, history wiped right after a payload ran, a user/app that shipped gigabytes out.

It is the correlation layer, not another parser. It consumes the forensic fleet's already-built reader crates and normalizes their output into one uniform event — so "who did what, when, to which file / program / folder / device" reads off a single sorted list, with graded findings attached.

30 seconds: merge two sources, get cross-source findings

use useract_forensic::{build_timeline, audit, ShellHistorySource, DeviceSource};

// Decode each source with its own published reader crate …
let entries = shellhist_core::parse_auto(history_bytes, Some(".bash_history"));
let devices = peripheral_core::setupapi::parse(setupapi_bytes);

// … then correlate them here.
let shell = ShellHistorySource::new(&entries);
let usb   = DeviceSource::new(&devices);

let timeline = build_timeline(&[&shell, &usb]);   // merged, sorted by epoch
for finding in audit(&timeline) {
    println!("[{:?}] {} — {}", finding.severity, finding.code, finding.note);
    // [Some(Low)]    USERACT-EXEC-DURING-REMOVABLE-MEDIA — the command "tar … /media/usb" ran within …
    // [Some(Medium)] USERACT-HISTORY-TAMPERED            — user activity "unset HISTFILE" disables …
}

What it normalizes into

Every source collapses into one event type:

pub struct UserActivity {
    pub timestamp: Option<i64>,   // Unix epoch, when the source records it
    pub actor:     Option<String>,// user / SID, when the source attributes it
    pub action:    Action,        // Executed | Accessed | Connected | Searched | Typed | HistoryTampered
    pub subject:   Subject,       // Command | File | Folder | Device{id, volume_serial} | Query
    pub source:    SourceKind,    // which reader produced it
    pub detail:    String,
}

A new source is one impl ActivitySource { fn activities(&self) -> Vec<UserActivity> } away — it slots straight into build_timeline with no API change.

Sources

Source	Crate	Action	Status
Shell command history (bash/zsh/fish/PowerShell)	`shellhist-core`	`Executed` / `HistoryTampered`	✅ v0.1
External device connections (`setupapi.dev.log`)	`peripheral-core`	`Connected` (+ volume serial)	✅ v0.1
Per-user app exec + network bytes by SID	`srum-parser` / `srum-core`	`Executed` (actor!)	✅ v0.2
UserAssist / TypedURLs / ShellBags	`winreg-artifacts`	`Executed` / `Typed` / `Accessed`	✅ v0.2
Recent-file LNK (the volume serial that completes the device join)	`lnk-core`	`Accessed` (File + serial)	✅ v0.2
Jump Lists — per-app recent/pinned items (`DestList` MRU access time + origin host)	`lnk-core`	`Accessed` (File + serial)	✅ v0.3

SRUM is the strongest — the first source that attributes activity to a specific SID, resolving the SRUM integer foreign keys through the SruDbIdMapTable. ShellBags now decode to real folder names (via winreg-artifacts + the shellitem primitive) and Jump Lists join in as a recent-items source (lnk-core 0.3). See docs/roadmap.md.

The anomaly codes

Each finding is an observation ("consistent with …"); the examiner draws the conclusions. Codes are a stable, published contract.

Code	Severity	Category	What it observes
`USERACT-FILE-ON-EXTERNAL-DEVICE`	Medium	Threat	A file/folder accessed on a volume whose serial matches a connected external device (the LNK ⋈ peripheral volume-serial join) — consistent with data movement to/from removable media (MITRE T1052 / T1091)
`USERACT-NETWORK-EXFIL-VOLUME`	Medium	Threat	A SRUM network row whose per-interval `bytes_sent` crosses a conservative 256 MiB threshold — a graded lead (not a verdict), consistent with bulk data exfiltration (MITRE T1048 / T1052)
`USERACT-EXEC-DURING-REMOVABLE-MEDIA`	Low	Threat	A shell command executed within an hour of a removable mass-storage device being connected (temporal cross-source join) — consistent with activity involving external media (MITRE T1052 / T1091)
`USERACT-HISTORY-TAMPERED`	Medium	Concealment	A history-clearing activity present in the timeline — consistent with anti-forensic history tampering (MITRE T1070.003)

The volume-serial join (device_file_volume_joins) is live: an LNK Subject::File carrying a volume_serial (from the link's VolumeID) joins to a Subject::Device connected with the same serial, firing USERACT-FILE-ON-EXTERNAL-DEVICE.

Trust, but verify

useract-forensic consumes attacker-controllable, already-decoded evidence and correlates it:

#![forbid(unsafe_code)] — no FFI, no C bindings, no raw pointers.
Panic-free — the workspace denies clippy::unwrap_used and clippy::expect_used in production code; correlation degrades gracefully, never crashes.
100% line coverage on the library, clippy -D warnings clean.
Validated on real artifacts — the integration test feeds a .bash_history file written by a genuine bash subshell (decoded with the published shellhist_core::parse_auto), a real peripheral_core::DeviceConnection, a lnk_core::ShellLink and peripheral_core::DeviceConnection sharing a volume serial, a SRUM NetworkUsageRecord attributed through the SruDbIdMapTable, and a winreg_artifacts UserAssist entry — asserting the timeline merges all sources in epoch order, the volume-serial join fires USERACT-FILE-ON-EXTERNAL-DEVICE, and SRUM activity is actor-attributed (tests/real_data.rs).