trusty-common 0.52.4

//! Coverage for the #5099 socket-permission contract.
//!
//! The mode assertions are the regression proof: against the pre-fix commit —
//! where every bind site called `UnixListener::bind` bare — the socket comes
//! back at the umask-derived mode (`0755` under the common `022` umask) and the
//! directory at whatever `create_dir_all` produced.
//!
//! Every refusal path is covered by a pure decision function
//! (`classify_existing_dir`, `peer_uid_verdict`), so foreign-uid and
//! foreign-owner policy is asserted without root and without a second account.
//! What remains genuinely unreachable unprivileged is only the platform syscall
//! plumbing that feeds those functions.

use super::dir::{DirVerdict, classify_existing_dir};
use super::peer::peer_uid_verdict;
use super::singleton::{TakeoverVerdict, classify_takeover};
use super::*;

use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
use std::time::Duration;

/// Mode bits of `path`, masked to the permission nibbles. Uses `lstat` so a
/// symlink's own mode is reported, never its target's.
fn mode_of(path: &Path) -> u32 {
    std::fs::symlink_metadata(path)
        .expect("stat path under test")
        .permissions()
        .mode()
        & 0o777
}

// ── path resolution ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

#[test]
fn scratch_socket_dir_from_uses_tmpdir_when_set() {
    // Why: on macOS the per-user `/var/folders/…/T/` must be honored, not
    // replaced by `/tmp`.
    let dir = scratch_socket_dir_from(Some("/var/folders/xy/T"), 501);
    assert_eq!(dir, Path::new("/var/folders/xy/T/trusty-501"));
}

#[test]
fn scratch_socket_dir_from_falls_back_to_tmp() {
    // Why: #5099's core exposure — an unset `TMPDIR` on Linux used to land the
    // socket directly in world-writable `/tmp`. The fallback must still
    // interpose a uid-keyed directory that this process can hold at 0700.
    for absent in [None, Some(""), Some("   ")] {
        let dir = scratch_socket_dir_from(absent, 1000);
        assert_eq!(
            dir,
            Path::new("/tmp/trusty-1000"),
            "TMPDIR={absent:?} must still get a uid-keyed subdirectory"
        );
    }
}

#[test]
fn scratch_socket_dir_is_uid_keyed() {
    // Why: two users on one host must never share a socket directory.
    let dir = scratch_socket_dir();
    let leaf = dir
        .file_name()
        .and_then(|n| n.to_str())
        .expect("scratch dir has a leaf name");
    assert_eq!(leaf, format!("trusty-{}", self_uid()));
}

// ── sun_path budget (review finding 4) ──────────────────────────────────────

#[test]
fn sun_path_capacity_is_platform_plausible() {
    // Why: derived from struct layout, so a wrong answer would silently skew
    // every budget check. macOS is 104, Linux 108.
    let cap = sun_path_capacity();
    assert!(
        (104..=108).contains(&cap),
        "sun_path capacity {cap} is outside the known 104..=108 range"
    );
}

#[test]
fn check_sun_path_budget_accepts_a_path_that_fits() {
    let path = PathBuf::from("/tmp/trusty-501/short.sock");
    check_sun_path_budget(&path).expect("a short path must fit");
}

#[test]
fn check_sun_path_budget_rejects_an_over_long_path() {
    // Why: the pre-check exists to replace a bare `invalid argument` with a
    // message naming the budget and the overflow.
    let long = format!("/tmp/{}.sock", "x".repeat(sun_path_capacity()));
    let err = check_sun_path_budget(Path::new(&long)).expect_err("must reject");
    match err {
        UdsSecurityError::PathTooLong { len, capacity, .. } => {
            assert!(len >= capacity, "len {len} must exceed capacity {capacity}");
            let rendered = err.to_string();
            assert!(
                rendered.contains(&capacity.to_string()) && rendered.contains(&len.to_string()),
                "diagnostic must name both the budget and the actual length: {rendered}"
            );
        }
        other => panic!("expected PathTooLong, got {other:?}"),
    }
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn bind_hardened_rejects_an_over_long_path() {
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let long = tmp.path().join(format!("{}.sock", "x".repeat(120)));
    let err = bind_hardened(&long).expect_err("must reject before binding");
    assert!(
        matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::PathTooLong { .. }),
        "expected PathTooLong, got {err:?}"
    );
}

// ── directory decisions, as pure functions (review finding 5) ───────────────

#[test]
fn classify_existing_dir_rejects_a_symlink() {
    // Why: THE review-finding-1 policy. `metadata()` on a symlinked directory
    // reports the TARGET's owner and mode, so a link pointing at any directory
    // this uid happens to own would otherwise pass the owner check — and
    // `set_permissions` would then chmod the target.
    let err = classify_existing_dir(Path::new("/tmp/x"), true, false, "symlink", 501, 0o700, 501)
        .expect_err("a symlink must be refused even when owner and mode look right");
    assert!(
        matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::SymlinkDir { .. }),
        "expected SymlinkDir, got {err:?}"
    );
}

#[test]
fn classify_existing_dir_rejects_a_regular_file() {
    // Why: review round 2, finding 1. A regular file owned by this uid at the
    // socket-dir path passed the symlink AND owner checks, was classified
    // `Narrow`, and got chmod'd to 0700 before `bind` failed ENOTDIR.
    let err = classify_existing_dir(
        Path::new("/tmp/x"),
        false,
        false,
        "regular file",
        501,
        0o644,
        501,
    )
    .expect_err("a non-directory must be refused");
    match err {
        UdsSecurityError::NotADirectory { ref found, .. } => {
            assert_eq!(found, "regular file", "diagnostic must name what was found");
        }
        other => panic!("expected NotADirectory, got {other:?}"),
    }
}

#[test]
fn classify_existing_dir_checks_file_type_before_owner() {
    // Why: a foreign-owned non-directory must report NotADirectory. Reporting
    // ForeignDirOwner would imply the path was a directory worth chmodding.
    let err = classify_existing_dir(Path::new("/tmp/x"), false, false, "fifo", 999, 0o777, 501)
        .expect_err("no");
    assert!(
        matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::NotADirectory { .. }),
        "file type must be checked before ownership, got {err:?}"
    );
}

#[test]
fn classify_existing_dir_rejects_a_foreign_owner() {
    let err = classify_existing_dir(Path::new("/tmp/x"), false, true, "directory", 0, 0o700, 501)
        .expect_err("a root-owned directory must be refused");
    match err {
        UdsSecurityError::ForeignDirOwner {
            owner, expected, ..
        } => {
            assert_eq!((owner, expected), (0, 501));
        }
        other => panic!("expected ForeignDirOwner, got {other:?}"),
    }
}

#[test]
fn classify_existing_dir_narrows_a_wide_dir() {
    let v = classify_existing_dir(
        Path::new("/tmp/x"),
        false,
        true,
        "directory",
        501,
        0o755,
        501,
    )
    .expect("ours");
    assert_eq!(v, DirVerdict::Narrow);
}

#[test]
fn classify_existing_dir_accepts_an_already_correct_dir() {
    let v = classify_existing_dir(
        Path::new("/tmp/x"),
        false,
        true,
        "directory",
        501,
        0o700,
        501,
    )
    .expect("ours");
    assert_eq!(v, DirVerdict::Accept);
}

#[test]
fn classify_existing_dir_checks_symlink_before_owner() {
    // Why: ordering matters. An attacker-owned symlink must report SymlinkDir,
    // not ForeignDirOwner — the latter would imply the path itself was checked.
    let err = classify_existing_dir(Path::new("/tmp/x"), true, false, "symlink", 999, 0o777, 501)
        .expect_err("no");
    assert!(
        matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::SymlinkDir { .. }),
        "symlink must be rejected before ownership is considered, got {err:?}"
    );
}

// ── directory behaviour on a real filesystem ────────────────────────────────

#[test]
fn prepare_socket_dir_creates_at_0700() {
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let dir = tmp.path().join("sockets");

    prepare_socket_dir(&dir).expect("prepare fresh socket dir");

    assert_eq!(
        mode_of(&dir),
        SOCKET_DIR_MODE,
        "fresh socket dir must be 0700"
    );
}

#[test]
fn prepare_socket_dir_creates_missing_ancestors() {
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let dir = tmp.path().join("a").join("b").join("sockets");

    prepare_socket_dir(&dir).expect("prepare nested socket dir");

    assert_eq!(mode_of(&dir), SOCKET_DIR_MODE);
}

#[test]
fn prepare_socket_dir_narrows_a_wide_existing_dir() {
    // Why: the directory this replaces was created by `create_dir_all`, so on
    // every existing install it is already 0755. Upgrading must repair it.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let dir = tmp.path().join("sockets");
    std::fs::create_dir(&dir).expect("create wide dir");
    std::fs::set_permissions(&dir, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).expect("widen");
    assert_eq!(mode_of(&dir), 0o755, "precondition: dir starts wide");

    prepare_socket_dir(&dir).expect("prepare pre-existing socket dir");

    assert_eq!(
        mode_of(&dir),
        SOCKET_DIR_MODE,
        "existing dir must be narrowed"
    );
}

#[test]
fn prepare_socket_dir_rejects_a_symlink() {
    // Why: the end-to-end version of review finding 1, on a real filesystem.
    // The link points at a directory THIS uid owns, which is exactly the case
    // the old `metadata()`-based check waved through. Asserts the target is
    // left untouched — the old code chmod'd it to 0700.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let target = tmp.path().join("attacker_controlled");
    std::fs::create_dir(&target).expect("create target");
    std::fs::set_permissions(&target, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o777)).expect("widen");
    let link = tmp.path().join("sockets");
    std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&target, &link).expect("create symlink");

    let err = prepare_socket_dir(&link).expect_err("a symlinked socket dir must be refused");

    assert!(
        matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::SymlinkDir { .. }),
        "expected SymlinkDir, got {err:?}"
    );
    assert_eq!(
        mode_of(&target),
        0o777,
        "the symlink target must NOT have been chmod'd"
    );
}

#[test]
fn prepare_socket_dir_rejects_a_regular_file_without_chmodding_it() {
    // Why: the end-to-end half of review-round-2 finding 1. The pre-fix code
    // chmod'd this file to 0700 on its way to an ENOTDIR from `bind`; the mode
    // assertion is what proves the file was left alone.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let planted = tmp.path().join("sockets");
    std::fs::write(&planted, b"not a directory").expect("plant file");
    std::fs::set_permissions(&planted, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o644)).expect("chmod");

    let err = prepare_socket_dir(&planted).expect_err("a non-directory must be refused");

    match err {
        UdsSecurityError::NotADirectory { ref found, .. } => {
            assert_eq!(found, "regular file");
        }
        other => panic!("expected NotADirectory, got {other:?}"),
    }
    assert_eq!(
        mode_of(&planted),
        0o644,
        "the planted file must NOT have been chmod'd"
    );
}

#[test]
fn prepare_socket_dir_is_idempotent() {
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let dir = tmp.path().join("sockets");

    prepare_socket_dir(&dir).expect("first prepare");
    prepare_socket_dir(&dir).expect("second prepare must succeed");

    assert_eq!(mode_of(&dir), SOCKET_DIR_MODE);
}

// ── bind ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

#[tokio::test]
async fn bind_hardened_sets_socket_0600_and_dir_0700() {
    // Why: THE regression test for #5099. Against the pre-fix commit the socket
    // comes back at the umask default (0755 under umask 022) and this assertion
    // fails.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let dir = tmp.path().join("sockets");
    let sock = dir.join("t.sock");

    let _listener = bind_hardened(&sock).expect("bind hardened listener");

    assert_eq!(mode_of(&sock), SOCKET_MODE, "socket must be 0600");
    assert_eq!(mode_of(&dir), SOCKET_DIR_MODE, "socket dir must be 0700");
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn bind_hardened_socket_is_connectable_after_hardening() {
    // Why: narrowing to 0600 must not break the same-uid client the socket
    // exists for — a fix that made the socket unusable would also pass a
    // mode-only assertion. Also proves the accept-side peer check admits a
    // legitimate peer.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let sock = tmp.path().join("sockets").join("t.sock");
    let listener = bind_hardened(&sock).expect("bind hardened listener");

    let client = UnixStream::connect(&sock).await.expect("same-uid connect");
    let (accepted, _) = listener.accept().await.expect("accept");

    ensure_peer_is_self(&accepted).expect("same-uid peer must be accepted");
    drop(client);
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn bind_hardened_rejects_a_path_with_no_parent() {
    // Failure path: a bare relative filename has no directory to harden, so the
    // bind must be refused rather than silently binding unprotected.
    let err = bind_hardened(Path::new("bare.sock")).expect_err("must refuse");
    assert!(
        matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::NoParent { .. }),
        "expected NoParent, got {err:?}"
    );
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn bind_hardened_propagates_an_address_in_use_failure() {
    // Failure path: `bind_hardened` deliberately does NOT unlink a stale socket
    // (that would break `CtrlSocket::bind_singleton`'s probe-first guarantee),
    // so a second bind must surface EADDRINUSE, not swallow it.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let sock = tmp.path().join("sockets").join("t.sock");
    let _first = bind_hardened(&sock).expect("first bind");

    let err = bind_hardened(&sock).expect_err("second bind must fail");
    assert!(
        matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::Bind { .. }),
        "expected Bind, got {err:?}"
    );
}

// ── connect (review finding 3) ──────────────────────────────────────────────

#[tokio::test]
async fn connect_hardened_accepts_a_properly_hardened_socket() {
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let sock = tmp.path().join("sockets").join("t.sock");
    let listener = bind_hardened(&sock).expect("bind");

    let client = connect_hardened(&sock).await.expect("dial our own socket");
    let (accepted, _) = listener.accept().await.expect("accept");
    ensure_peer_is_self(&accepted).expect("peer is us");
    drop(client);
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn connect_hardened_refuses_a_world_readable_socket() {
    // Why: a daemon that predates #5099 still answers at the canonical path.
    // The client must refuse it rather than trusting the transport.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let sock = tmp.path().join("sockets").join("t.sock");
    let _listener = bind_hardened(&sock).expect("bind");
    std::fs::set_permissions(&sock, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o777)).expect("widen socket");

    let err = connect_hardened(&sock).await.expect_err("must refuse");
    match err {
        UdsSecurityError::UntrustedSocket { ref reason, .. } => {
            assert!(
                reason.contains("0777"),
                "reason must name the mode: {reason}"
            );
        }
        other => panic!("expected UntrustedSocket, got {other:?}"),
    }
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn connect_hardened_refuses_a_socket_in_a_wide_directory() {
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let dir = tmp.path().join("sockets");
    let sock = dir.join("t.sock");
    let _listener = bind_hardened(&sock).expect("bind");
    std::fs::set_permissions(&dir, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).expect("widen dir");

    let err = connect_hardened(&sock).await.expect_err("must refuse");
    match err {
        UdsSecurityError::UntrustedSocket { ref reason, .. } => {
            assert!(
                reason.contains("directory") && reason.contains("0755"),
                "reason must name the directory and its mode: {reason}"
            );
        }
        other => panic!("expected UntrustedSocket, got {other:?}"),
    }
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn connect_hardened_refuses_a_regular_file() {
    // Why: an attacker who cannot bind can still plant a regular file. Dialling
    // it would fail with a confusing ENOTSOCK deep in the client.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let dir = tmp.path().join("sockets");
    prepare_socket_dir(&dir).expect("prepare");
    let planted = dir.join("t.sock");
    std::fs::write(&planted, b"not a socket").expect("plant file");
    std::fs::set_permissions(&planted, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).expect("chmod");

    let err = connect_hardened(&planted).await.expect_err("must refuse");
    match err {
        UdsSecurityError::UntrustedSocket { ref reason, .. } => {
            assert!(reason.contains("not a socket"), "got: {reason}");
        }
        other => panic!("expected UntrustedSocket, got {other:?}"),
    }
}

#[test]
fn verify_socket_for_connect_reports_a_stat_failure_as_stat_not_create() {
    // Why: review round 2, finding 2. A dialer creates nothing, so a failed
    // stat used to surface as "create socket directory …" — naming an action
    // never attempted.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let missing = tmp.path().join("absent").join("t.sock");

    let err = verify_socket_for_connect(&missing).expect_err("must fail");

    assert!(
        matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::StatForConnect { .. }),
        "expected StatForConnect, got {err:?}"
    );
    assert!(
        !err.to_string().contains("create socket directory"),
        "a dialer must not claim it was creating anything: {err}"
    );
}

#[test]
fn verify_socket_for_connect_refuses_a_regular_file_as_the_directory() {
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let planted = tmp.path().join("sockets");
    std::fs::write(&planted, b"not a directory").expect("plant file");

    let err = verify_socket_for_connect(&planted.join("t.sock")).expect_err("must refuse");
    assert!(
        matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::NotADirectory { .. }),
        "expected NotADirectory, got {err:?}"
    );
}

#[test]
fn verify_socket_for_connect_refuses_a_symlinked_directory() {
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let target = tmp.path().join("elsewhere");
    std::fs::create_dir(&target).expect("create target");
    let link = tmp.path().join("sockets");
    std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&target, &link).expect("symlink");

    let err = verify_socket_for_connect(&link.join("t.sock")).expect_err("must refuse");
    assert!(
        matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::SymlinkDir { .. }),
        "expected SymlinkDir, got {err:?}"
    );
}

// ── peer decisions, as pure functions (review finding 5) ────────────────────

#[test]
fn peer_uid_verdict_accepts_the_same_uid() {
    peer_uid_verdict(501, 501).expect("a same-uid peer must be admitted");
}

#[test]
fn peer_uid_verdict_refuses_a_foreign_uid() {
    // Why: this is the refusal that previously had NO unprivileged coverage —
    // the `#[ignore]`d cross-uid test could not run in CI, so the policy was
    // asserted nowhere.
    let err = peer_uid_verdict(999, 501).expect_err("a foreign uid must be refused");
    match err {
        UdsSecurityError::ForeignPeer { peer, expected } => {
            assert_eq!((peer, expected), (999, 501));
        }
        other => panic!("expected ForeignPeer, got {other:?}"),
    }
}

#[test]
fn peer_uid_verdict_refuses_root_when_we_are_not_root() {
    // Why: root is deliberately not special-cased. Admitting it would widen the
    // accepted set for no gain, since root bypasses the filesystem check anyway.
    let err = peer_uid_verdict(0, 501).expect_err("root must be refused like any foreign uid");
    assert!(matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::ForeignPeer { peer: 0, .. }));
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn peer_uid_of_self_connection_is_self() {
    // Why: proves the platform syscall is wired up correctly on this target — a
    // stub returning 0 would pass `peer_uid_verdict` only for root.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let sock = tmp.path().join("sockets").join("t.sock");
    let listener = bind_hardened(&sock).expect("bind");

    let _client = UnixStream::connect(&sock).await.expect("connect");
    let (accepted, _) = listener.accept().await.expect("accept");

    assert_eq!(
        peer_uid(&accepted).expect("read peer uid"),
        self_uid(),
        "a connection from this process must report this process's uid"
    );
}

/// Why (#6642): the console identifies a UDS daemon's process by asking the
/// kernel who is on the other end of the connection it already makes. A stub
/// returning `None` would leave every UDS service's CPU graph permanently
/// empty, with nothing failing to say so.
/// What: connects to a socket this process is also listening on, so the peer pid
/// has one correct answer — this process's own.
#[tokio::test]
async fn peer_pid_of_self_connection_is_this_process() {
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let sock = tmp.path().join("sockets").join("pid.sock");
    let listener = bind_hardened(&sock).expect("bind");

    let _client = UnixStream::connect(&sock).await.expect("connect");
    let (accepted, _) = listener.accept().await.expect("accept");

    // Darwin and Linux both implement this; every other target answers None by
    // design, so the assertion is scoped to the two that must work.
    #[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios"))]
    assert_eq!(
        super::peer::peer_pid(&accepted),
        Some(std::process::id()),
        "a connection from this process must report this process's pid"
    );
    #[cfg(not(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios")))]
    assert_eq!(super::peer::peer_pid(&accepted), None);
}

// ── singleton bind (#5182) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────

#[tokio::test]
async fn bind_singleton_binds_a_fresh_path() {
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let sock = tmp.path().join("sockets").join("fresh.sock");

    let listener = bind_singleton_hardened(&sock).await.expect("bind fresh");

    assert_eq!(mode_of(&sock), SOCKET_MODE, "a takeover must still harden");
    drop(listener);
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn bind_singleton_takes_over_a_stale_socket_file() {
    // Why: a console-supervised child that is SIGKILLed leaves its socket file
    // behind. Without the takeover the next spawn fails EADDRINUSE forever and
    // every delivery stays pending — the state #5182 exists to leave.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let sock = tmp.path().join("sockets").join("stale.sock");
    let dead = bind_hardened(&sock).expect("bind first");
    drop(dead); // tokio does not unlink on drop, so the file survives.
    assert!(sock.exists(), "the corpse must still be on disk");

    // The subject is the takeover, not how fast the kernel reclaims a socket.
    wait_until_corpse(&sock).await;

    let listener = bind_singleton_hardened(&sock)
        .await
        .expect("a socket nobody serves must be taken over");

    assert_eq!(mode_of(&sock), SOCKET_MODE);
    drop(listener);
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn bind_singleton_refuses_a_socket_someone_is_serving() {
    // Two listeners on one path means the kernel picks which one a delivery
    // reaches, so the second must fail rather than unlink a live owner.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let sock = tmp.path().join("sockets").join("live.sock");
    let _live = bind_hardened(&sock).expect("bind the live owner");

    let err = bind_singleton_hardened(&sock)
        .await
        .expect_err("a served socket must not be taken over");

    assert!(
        matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::AlreadyServing { .. }),
        "expected AlreadyServing, got {err:?}"
    );
    assert!(sock.exists(), "the live owner's socket must survive");
}

// ── the takeover decision (#7312) ───────────────────────────────────────────
//
// Every arm below is asserted against `classify_takeover` directly, because two
// of the four cannot be reached through real syscalls on this machine: Linux
// reports a non-socket as ECONNREFUSED and macOS as ENOTSOCK, and neither
// platform lets an unprivileged test manufacture an `Inconclusive` probe of a
// real socket.

#[test]
fn takeover_verdict_refuses_a_non_socket_even_when_the_probe_says_dead() {
    // This pair — not a socket, probe says NotServing — is exactly what Linux
    // hands the decision for a regular file on the socket path. Before #7312 it
    // unlinked the file and bound over it.
    assert_eq!(
        classify_takeover(false, Some(SocketVerdict::NotServing)),
        TakeoverVerdict::NotASocket
    );
}

#[test]
fn takeover_verdict_refuses_a_non_socket_on_every_probe_answer() {
    for verdict in [
        SocketVerdict::Serving,
        SocketVerdict::NotServing,
        SocketVerdict::Inconclusive,
    ] {
        assert_eq!(
            classify_takeover(false, Some(verdict)),
            TakeoverVerdict::NotASocket,
            "the file type outranks the probe, got {verdict:?}"
        );
    }
}

#[test]
fn takeover_verdict_refuses_a_non_socket_that_was_never_probed() {
    // What `bind_singleton_hardened` actually passes for a non-socket: no
    // verdict, because it does not spend a connect on one.
    assert_eq!(
        classify_takeover(false, None),
        TakeoverVerdict::NotASocket,
        "an unprobed non-socket is still refused"
    );
}

#[test]
fn takeover_verdict_refuses_an_unprobed_socket() {
    // A missing verdict is never grounds to unlink. Only the one the kernel
    // proved is.
    assert_eq!(classify_takeover(true, None), TakeoverVerdict::Occupied);
}

#[test]
fn takeover_verdict_takes_over_a_dead_socket() {
    // The one arm that unlinks anything, unchanged by #7312.
    assert_eq!(
        classify_takeover(true, Some(SocketVerdict::NotServing)),
        TakeoverVerdict::TakeOver
    );
}

#[test]
fn takeover_verdict_refuses_a_served_socket() {
    assert_eq!(
        classify_takeover(true, Some(SocketVerdict::Serving)),
        TakeoverVerdict::Occupied
    );
}

#[test]
fn takeover_verdict_refuses_an_inconclusive_probe() {
    // The fail-open check: `Inconclusive` must never reach the unlink. A probe
    // that could not settle the question is treated as a live owner.
    assert_eq!(
        classify_takeover(true, Some(SocketVerdict::Inconclusive)),
        TakeoverVerdict::Occupied
    );
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn bind_singleton_refuses_a_regular_file_and_leaves_it_on_disk() {
    // #7312: the takeover exists for a socket corpse. A regular file on the
    // socket path is not one, and deleting it is data loss in whatever owns it.
    //
    // This is the platform split, in one test. macOS answers a connect to a
    // regular file with ENOTSOCK, which reads `Inconclusive` and refused — by
    // accident, and under the wrong error. Linux answers ECONNREFUSED, which
    // read `NotServing`: the file was unlinked, the bind succeeded, and
    // `trusty-code`'s `run_uds_socket_bind_failure_is_fatal` then served
    // forever instead of failing, hanging a CI shard until its 45-minute
    // cancel. Both platforms must now refuse for the stated reason.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let dir = tmp.path().join("sockets");
    std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).expect("socket dir");
    let sock = dir.join("occupied.sock");
    std::fs::write(&sock, b"not a socket").expect("occupy the socket path");

    let err = bind_singleton_hardened(&sock)
        .await
        .expect_err("a regular file on the socket path must stop the bind");

    let rendered = err.to_string();
    assert!(
        rendered.contains("is a regular file, not a socket"),
        "the refusal must name what is actually there, got: {rendered}"
    );
    assert!(sock.exists(), "the file must not have been unlinked");
    assert_eq!(
        std::fs::read(&sock).expect("read the file back"),
        b"not a socket",
        "the file's contents must be untouched"
    );
}

/// Wait for a dropped listener's socket to actually read dead.
///
/// Why: dropping the listener closes the fd, and the kernel finishes tearing
/// the socket down afterwards; on macOS under a loaded test binary a connect
/// lands in that window and succeeds. Two tests establish the same
/// precondition, so the loop is written once.
async fn wait_until_corpse(sock: &Path) {
    let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5);
    while probe_socket_verdict(sock, Duration::from_millis(50)).await != SocketVerdict::NotServing {
        assert!(
            std::time::Instant::now() < deadline,
            "the dropped listener never stopped answering connects"
        );
        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
    }
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn bind_singleton_hardened_refuses_a_symlink_to_a_dead_socket() {
    // #7312: a symlink is refused on its own type, and the dead socket it
    // points at is NOT the corpse this function may reclaim — reclaiming
    // through a link would unlink the link and bind a fresh socket at a path
    // whose name still promises indirection. `verify_socket_for_connect`
    // refuses a symlinked socket on the dialing side for the same reason.
    //
    // Note the target here is genuinely dead, so the probe would answer
    // `NotServing` on BOTH platforms. Only the file-type check stops the
    // takeover, which makes this the arm with no platform escape hatch.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let dir = tmp.path().join("sockets");
    let target = dir.join("dead.sock");
    let dead = bind_hardened(&target).expect("bind the soon-to-be corpse");
    drop(dead); // tokio does not unlink on drop, so the file survives.
    wait_until_corpse(&target).await;

    let link = dir.join("link.sock");
    std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&target, &link).expect("symlink onto the corpse");

    let err = bind_singleton_hardened(&link)
        .await
        .expect_err("a symlinked socket path must stop the bind");

    assert!(
        matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::NotASocketFile { ref found, .. } if found == "symlink"),
        "expected NotASocketFile naming a symlink, got {err:?}"
    );
    assert!(
        std::fs::symlink_metadata(&link).is_ok(),
        "the symlink itself must survive"
    );
    assert!(
        std::fs::symlink_metadata(&target).is_ok(),
        "the symlink's target must survive"
    );
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn bind_singleton_hardened_refuses_a_symlink_to_a_live_socket() {
    // The same refusal with an owner behind it: unlinking here would strand a
    // live listener, which is what `AlreadyServing` exists to prevent — but the
    // symlink is refused before the probe ever runs, so the refusal does not
    // depend on catching the owner in the act.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let dir = tmp.path().join("sockets");
    let target = dir.join("live.sock");
    let _live = bind_hardened(&target).expect("bind the live owner");

    let link = dir.join("link.sock");
    std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&target, &link).expect("symlink onto the live socket");

    let err = bind_singleton_hardened(&link)
        .await
        .expect_err("a symlinked socket path must stop the bind");

    assert!(
        matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::NotASocketFile { ref found, .. } if found == "symlink"),
        "expected NotASocketFile naming a symlink, got {err:?}"
    );
    assert!(
        std::fs::symlink_metadata(&link).is_ok(),
        "the symlink itself must survive"
    );
    assert!(
        socket_is_serving(&target, Duration::from_millis(500)).await,
        "the live owner must still be answering on its own path"
    );
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn bind_singleton_refuses_a_directory_on_the_socket_path() {
    // The other shape the same rule covers: a directory is not a corpse either,
    // and `remove_file` on one would have failed silently, leaving the bind to
    // report an unrelated EADDRINUSE.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let dir = tmp.path().join("sockets");
    let sock = dir.join("occupied.sock");
    std::fs::create_dir_all(&sock).expect("occupy the socket path with a directory");

    let err = bind_singleton_hardened(&sock)
        .await
        .expect_err("a directory on the socket path must stop the bind");

    assert!(
        matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::NotASocketFile { ref found, .. } if found == "directory"),
        "expected NotASocketFile naming a directory, got {err:?}"
    );
    assert!(sock.is_dir(), "the directory must survive");
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// #6896 — socket buffer sizing.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// One write into a socket under measurement, in bytes. 8 KiB is the macOS
/// default buffer, so an unsized socket absorbs one or two of these.
const FILL_CHUNK: usize = 8 * 1024;

/// Bytes a writer can hand the kernel before the socket stops accepting them,
/// with nothing draining the other end.
///
/// This is the figure the round-trip count derives from: a frame of `F` bytes
/// costs `ceil(F / in_flight)` write-then-drain round trips, and each one parks
/// and unparks the writing task.
fn bytes_in_flight(stream: &tokio::net::UnixStream) -> usize {
    let chunk = vec![0u8; FILL_CHUNK];
    let mut written = 0usize;
    loop {
        match stream.try_write(&chunk) {
            Ok(0) => return written,
            Ok(n) => written += n,
            // Every other error is also "no more fits" for this measurement;
            // returning what was accepted keeps the test from spinning.
            Err(_) => return written,
        }
    }
}

/// Round trips an 8 MiB frame costs at a given in-flight window.
fn round_trips(in_flight: usize) -> usize {
    let frame = MAX_FRAME_BYTES as usize;
    if in_flight == 0 {
        return frame;
    }
    frame.div_ceil(in_flight)
}

/// The granted sizes, or a panic naming what came back instead.
fn expect_sized(outcome: SocketBufferOutcome) -> SocketBufferSizes {
    match outcome {
        SocketBufferOutcome::Sized(sizes) => sizes,
        other => panic!("expected a sized socket, got {other:?}"),
    }
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn tune_connected_buffers_raises_both_buffers_on_a_socketpair() {
    let (a, _b) = tokio::net::UnixStream::pair().expect("socketpair");

    let sized = expect_sized(tune_connected_buffers(&a).expect("size the buffers"));

    // The kernel clamps, so the granted size is asserted as a floor against the
    // platform default rather than an equality against the request.
    assert!(
        sized.send >= FILL_CHUNK * 2 && sized.recv >= FILL_CHUNK * 2,
        "expected both buffers well above the 8 KiB macOS default, got {sized:?}"
    );
}

/// A socket whose peer has gone is reported, not failed.
///
/// Why: macOS answers EINVAL to `setsockopt(SO_SNDBUF)` once the peer has hung
/// up, and an accepted socket is routinely in that state — a liveness probe
/// connects and closes. Treating it as a failure turned every probe into a
/// connection error, which is the regression this test pins.
#[tokio::test]
async fn tune_connected_buffers_reports_a_peer_that_already_hung_up() {
    let (a, b) = tokio::net::UnixStream::pair().expect("socketpair");
    drop(b);

    let outcome = tune_connected_buffers(&a).expect("a dead peer is not a sizing failure");

    // Linux sets the buffer regardless of connection state, so both outcomes
    // are correct there; what must never happen is an error.
    assert!(
        matches!(
            outcome,
            SocketBufferOutcome::PeerHungUp | SocketBufferOutcome::Sized(_)
        ),
        "unexpected outcome {outcome:?}"
    );
    #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
    assert_eq!(outcome, SocketBufferOutcome::PeerHungUp);
}

/// The fail-open the #6896 review found: `getpeername` cannot answer for a
/// LISTENING socket, so the errno was the only surviving signal there.
///
/// Why this is the regression rather than an end-to-end test: the hazard is a
/// classification, and forcing a real `EINVAL` out of `setsockopt` on a healthy
/// listener is not something a test can arrange. Feeding the classifier a real
/// listener fd and a synthesized `EINVAL` reaches the same decision the bind
/// path would, on every platform — `getpeername` fails on a listener
/// unconditionally, so the `connected = true` arm below is the fail-open, and
/// the `connected = false` arm is the fix.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_listener_can_never_classify_a_failure_as_a_hung_up_peer() {
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let sock = tmp.path().join("sockets").join("classify.sock");
    let listener = bind_hardened(&sock).expect("bind hardened");
    let fd = std::os::fd::AsRawFd::as_raw_fd(&listener);

    let einval = UdsSecurityError::SocketBuffer {
        option: "SO_SNDBUF",
        requested: SOCKET_BUFFER_BYTES,
        source: std::io::Error::from_raw_os_error(libc::EINVAL),
    };

    assert!(
        sockbuf::hangup_is_benign(true, &einval, fd),
        "a listener has no peer, so the connected form would wave this through — \
         which is exactly why the bind path must not use it"
    );
    assert!(
        !sockbuf::hangup_is_benign(false, &einval, fd),
        "the listener form must report the failure, whatever the errno says"
    );
}

/// The strict form refuses precisely where the forgiving one tolerates.
///
/// A hung-up peer is the one condition the two treat differently, so a socket
/// in that state is what separates them. On Linux `setsockopt` ignores the
/// connection state and both simply succeed, which is why the divergence is
/// asserted only on macOS; the type-level guarantee — `tune_listener_buffers`
/// has no benign variant to return — holds on both.
#[tokio::test]
async fn tune_listener_buffers_refuses_where_the_connected_form_tolerates() {
    let (strict_side, peer) = tokio::net::UnixStream::pair().expect("socketpair");
    drop(peer);
    let (lenient_side, peer) = tokio::net::UnixStream::pair().expect("socketpair");
    drop(peer);

    let strict = tune_listener_buffers(&strict_side);
    let lenient = tune_connected_buffers(&lenient_side).expect("the forgiving form tolerates it");

    #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
    {
        assert_eq!(lenient, SocketBufferOutcome::PeerHungUp);
        let err = strict.expect_err("the listener form must not absorb a sizing failure");
        assert!(
            matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::SocketBuffer { .. }),
            "expected SocketBuffer, got {err:?}"
        );
    }
    #[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
    {
        assert!(strict.is_ok(), "linux sizes a hung-up socket: {strict:?}");
        assert!(matches!(lenient, SocketBufferOutcome::Sized(_)));
    }
}

/// A read-back failure names the read, not a set that never happened.
#[test]
fn a_read_back_failure_names_its_own_operation() {
    // A closed fd is the one way to make `getsockopt` fail on demand.
    let bad = std::os::unix::net::UnixStream::pair()
        .expect("socketpair")
        .0;
    let fd = std::os::fd::AsRawFd::as_raw_fd(&bad);
    drop(bad);

    let err = socket_buffer_sizes(&BorrowedFdForTest(fd))
        .expect_err("a closed fd cannot answer getsockopt");

    assert!(
        matches!(err, UdsSecurityError::SocketBufferRead { .. }),
        "expected SocketBufferRead, got {err:?}"
    );
    let text = err.to_string();
    assert!(
        text.starts_with("read SO_SNDBUF back"),
        "a read failure must not be reported as a set: {text}"
    );
}

/// A bare fd, so a read-back can be aimed at one that is already closed.
struct BorrowedFdForTest(i32);

impl std::os::fd::AsRawFd for BorrowedFdForTest {
    fn as_raw_fd(&self) -> i32 {
        self.0
    }
}

/// On Linux, the server side is sized on the accepted socket, not inherited
/// from the listener: `accept` hands back a default-sized socket however the
/// listener was sized (#6896).
#[tokio::test]
async fn accept_sized_raises_the_accepted_socket_to_the_listeners_sizing() {
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let sock = tmp.path().join("sockets").join("inherit.sock");
    let listener = bind_hardened(&sock).expect("bind hardened");
    let _client = connect_hardened(&sock).await.expect("connect hardened");
    let (server, _) = accept_sized(&listener).await.expect("accept sized");

    let on_listener = socket_buffer_sizes(&listener).expect("read the listener");
    let accepted = socket_buffer_sizes(&server).expect("read the accepted socket");

    // Two granted figures compared against each other, never against
    // `SOCKET_BUFFER_BYTES`: both sockets asked the same host for the same
    // bytes, so the same `wmem_max` clamp and the same Linux doubling landed on
    // both, whatever those two produce here. Comparing either against the
    // request is what fails on Linux — it answers 2 MiB to a 1 MiB request, and
    // 425984 where `wmem_max` is 212992.
    assert_eq!(
        accepted, on_listener,
        "an accepted socket must carry the same granted sizing as its listener"
    );
    // The regression this guards: drop the sizing from `accept_sized` and the
    // accepted socket falls back to `net.core.wmem_default` on Linux, which is
    // half the listener's granted figure or less.
    assert!(
        accepted.send >= FILL_CHUNK * 2 && accepted.recv >= FILL_CHUNK * 2,
        "the accepted socket must carry the raised sizing, not the platform default: {accepted:?}"
    );
}

#[test]
fn socket_buffer_request_stays_within_the_frame_budget() {
    // macOS refuses a reservation past `kern.ipc.maxsockbuf` scaled by the mbuf
    // overhead, and `sockbuf` propagates that refusal rather than defaulting.
    // Staying an eighth of the frame budget is what keeps the request reachable.
    assert_eq!(SOCKET_BUFFER_BYTES, 1024 * 1024);
    assert!((SOCKET_BUFFER_BYTES as u64) < MAX_FRAME_BYTES);
}

/// The #6896 measurement: a hardened pair holds far more in flight than a pair
/// left at the platform default, so a frame-budget exchange costs far fewer
/// round trips.
///
/// Why a ratio rather than a wall-clock figure: the cost the issue names is the
/// COUNT of write-then-drain round trips, each a task park and unpark, and that
/// count is a deterministic function of the socket buffer sizes. Timing it
/// instead would measure the scheduler under whatever else the host is doing.
///
/// The 8x floor is asserted only on macOS. Linux ships `net.core.wmem_default`
/// at 212992 — 26x the macOS figure — so there the contract the issue states is
/// "unchanged or improved", which is the unconditional assertion below.
#[tokio::test]
async fn hardened_sockets_hold_far_more_in_flight_than_the_platform_default() {
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");

    // Baseline: a bare bind and connect — what this module did before #6896.
    let plain_path = tmp.path().join("plain.sock");
    let plain_listener = tokio::net::UnixListener::bind(&plain_path).expect("bind plain");
    let plain_client = tokio::net::UnixStream::connect(&plain_path)
        .await
        .expect("connect plain");
    let (_plain_server, _) = plain_listener.accept().await.expect("accept plain");
    let plain = bytes_in_flight(&plain_client);

    // The production paths: `bind_hardened` sizes the listener (and so every
    // socket `accept` returns), `connect_hardened` sizes the dialling end.
    let sized_path = tmp.path().join("sockets").join("sized.sock");
    let sized_listener = bind_hardened(&sized_path).expect("bind hardened");
    let sized_client = connect_hardened(&sized_path)
        .await
        .expect("connect hardened");
    let (_sized_server, _) = sized_listener.accept().await.expect("accept hardened");
    let sized = bytes_in_flight(&sized_client);

    eprintln!(
        "#6896 in-flight bytes: default={plain} ({} round trips for an 8 MiB frame), \
         sized={sized} ({} round trips)",
        round_trips(plain),
        round_trips(sized)
    );

    assert!(
        sized >= plain,
        "sizing must never reduce what a socket holds in flight: \
         default={plain}, sized={sized}"
    );

    #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
    assert!(
        sized >= plain * 8 && round_trips(sized) * 8 <= round_trips(plain),
        "expected at least an 8x drop in round trips on macOS: \
         default={plain} ({} round trips), sized={sized} ({} round trips)",
        round_trips(plain),
        round_trips(sized)
    );
}