//! Generated by `trust-tasks-codegen` — do not edit by hand.
//!
//! Spec slug: `task-consent/granted`. Version: `0.1`.
#[allow(unused_imports)]
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
/// Error types.
pub mod error {
/// Error from a `TryFrom` or `FromStr` implementation.
pub struct ConversionError(::std::borrow::Cow<'static, str>);
impl ::std::error::Error for ConversionError {}
impl ::std::fmt::Display for ConversionError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), ::std::fmt::Error> {
::std::fmt::Display::fmt(&self.0, f)
}
}
impl ::std::fmt::Debug for ConversionError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), ::std::fmt::Error> {
::std::fmt::Debug::fmt(&self.0, f)
}
}
impl From<&'static str> for ConversionError {
fn from(value: &'static str) -> Self {
Self(value.into())
}
}
impl From<String> for ConversionError {
fn from(value: String) -> Self {
Self(value.into())
}
}
}
/**
A cryptographic digest as a multibase-encoded multihash — the encoding the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 defines for `digestMultibase`, and the one `did:webvh` uses for its SCID and entry hashes.
Multihash carries the hash algorithm in-band, so the value is self-describing and the wire format survives an algorithm change without a schema revision; multibase does the same for the base encoding, so a verifier never infers base58 from base64url by context. A bare hex string or a `sha-256:`-style prefix hard-codes one algorithm into the wire contract and is non-conforming here.
This definition constrains the *encoding only*. What the digest is computed over is stated by each referencing field, because it differs legitimately: a digest over a JSON document is taken over its RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization, while a digest over an opaque artifact is taken over its bytes. A field whose input is a JSON document and which does not name a canonicalization is not reproducible.
Restricted to the two multibase headers W3C Controlled Identifiers 1.0 §2.4 normatively requires — `z` (base58btc) and `u` (base64url-no-pad). CID permits others but states that "interoperability is not guaranteed between implementations using such values", and a registry whose purpose is interoperability should not mint digests a conforming verifier may be unable to read. The alphabets are enforced rather than assumed: base58btc excludes 0, O, I and l, and an earlier permissive pattern let three published examples carry digests that were not valid base58 at all. base58btc is RECOMMENDED, for consistency with `did:key` and `did:webvh`.*/
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "DigestMultibase",
/// "description": "\nA cryptographic digest as a multibase-encoded multihash — the encoding the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 defines for `digestMultibase`, and the one `did:webvh` uses for its SCID and entry hashes.\n\nMultihash carries the hash algorithm in-band, so the value is self-describing and the wire format survives an algorithm change without a schema revision; multibase does the same for the base encoding, so a verifier never infers base58 from base64url by context. A bare hex string or a `sha-256:`-style prefix hard-codes one algorithm into the wire contract and is non-conforming here.\n\nThis definition constrains the *encoding only*. What the digest is computed over is stated by each referencing field, because it differs legitimately: a digest over a JSON document is taken over its RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization, while a digest over an opaque artifact is taken over its bytes. A field whose input is a JSON document and which does not name a canonicalization is not reproducible.\n\nRestricted to the two multibase headers W3C Controlled Identifiers 1.0 §2.4 normatively requires — `z` (base58btc) and `u` (base64url-no-pad). CID permits others but states that \"interoperability is not guaranteed between implementations using such values\", and a registry whose purpose is interoperability should not mint digests a conforming verifier may be unable to read. The alphabets are enforced rather than assumed: base58btc excludes 0, O, I and l, and an earlier permissive pattern let three published examples carry digests that were not valid base58 at all. base58btc is RECOMMENDED, for consistency with `did:key` and `did:webvh`.",
/// "examples": [
/// "zQmbWqxBEKC3P8tqsKc98xmWNzrzDtRLMiMPL8wBuTGsMnR"
/// ],
/// "type": "string",
/// "minLength": 16,
/// "pattern": "^(z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+|u[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$"
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct DigestMultibase(::std::string::String);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for DigestMultibase {
type Target = ::std::string::String;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::string::String {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<DigestMultibase> for ::std::string::String {
fn from(value: DigestMultibase) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for DigestMultibase {
type Err = self::error::ConversionError;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
if value.chars().count() < 16usize {
return Err("shorter than 16 characters".into());
}
static PATTERN: ::std::sync::LazyLock<::regress::Regex> =
::std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| {
::regress::Regex::new("^(z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+|u[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$").unwrap()
});
if PATTERN.find(value).is_none() {
return Err(
"doesn't match pattern \"^(z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+|u[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$\"".into(),
);
}
Ok(Self(value.to_string()))
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for DigestMultibase {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&::std::string::String> for DigestMultibase {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: &::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<::std::string::String> for DigestMultibase {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: ::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl<'de> ::serde::Deserialize<'de> for DigestMultibase {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: ::serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
::std::string::String::deserialize(deserializer)?
.parse()
.map_err(|e: self::error::ConversionError| {
<D::Error as ::serde::de::Error>::custom(e.to_string())
})
}
}
///Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "Ext",
/// "description": "Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.",
/// "type": "object",
/// "minProperties": 1,
/// "additionalProperties": true,
/// "propertyNames": {
/// "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$"
/// }
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct Ext(pub ::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value>);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for Ext {
type Target = ::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value>;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value> {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<Ext> for ::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value> {
fn from(value: Ext) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value>> for Ext {
fn from(value: ::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value>) -> Self {
Self(value)
}
}
///`ExtKey`
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "type": "string",
/// "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$"
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct ExtKey(::std::string::String);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for ExtKey {
type Target = ::std::string::String;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::string::String {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<ExtKey> for ::std::string::String {
fn from(value: ExtKey) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for ExtKey {
type Err = self::error::ConversionError;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
static PATTERN: ::std::sync::LazyLock<::regress::Regex> =
::std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| {
::regress::Regex::new("^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$").unwrap()
});
if PATTERN.find(value).is_none() {
return Err("doesn't match pattern \"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$\"".into());
}
Ok(Self(value.to_string()))
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for ExtKey {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&::std::string::String> for ExtKey {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: &::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<::std::string::String> for ExtKey {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: ::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl<'de> ::serde::Deserialize<'de> for ExtKey {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: ::serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
::std::string::String::deserialize(deserializer)?
.parse()
.map_err(|e: self::error::ConversionError| {
<D::Error as ::serde::de::Error>::custom(e.to_string())
})
}
}
///Fire-and-forget notice from the executor to the requester that its pending task has reached the approval threshold and a single-use grant is waiting, so the requester re-submits at once instead of polling. Non-load-bearing by design: the grant check at re-submit is the real gate, so a lost or spurious notice costs at most one poll cycle.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "$id": "https://trusttasks.org/spec/task-consent/granted/0.1",
/// "title": "Payload",
/// "description": "Fire-and-forget notice from the executor to the requester that its pending task has reached the approval threshold and a single-use grant is waiting, so the requester re-submits at once instead of polling. Non-load-bearing by design: the grant check at re-submit is the real gate, so a lost or spurious notice costs at most one poll cycle.",
/// "type": "object",
/// "required": [
/// "payloadDigest",
/// "status",
/// "taskType"
/// ],
/// "properties": {
/// "ext": {
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/Ext"
/// },
/// "payloadDigest": {
/// "description": "The salted wire digest of the approved task — the same value the matching task-consent/request carried and the decision echoed. The requester already holds it; it is repeated here only so the requester can correlate the notice to the pending task it should now re-submit. It confers nothing: the executor's single-use grant lookup at re-submit is the authorization.",
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/DigestMultibase"
/// },
/// "status": {
/// "description": "Always `granted`. A denial sends no notice — the requester's re-submit discovers it, and a notice that could carry a denial would tempt a consumer into treating this advisory channel as the authoritative outcome, which it is not.",
/// "type": "string",
/// "enum": [
/// "granted"
/// ]
/// },
/// "taskType": {
/// "description": "Type URI of the approved task, for correlation and display at the requester. Advisory on the same terms as the digest — the executor re-derives everything it enforces from the re-submitted payload itself.",
/// "type": "string",
/// "format": "uri"
/// }
/// },
/// "additionalProperties": false
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Payload {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "::std::option::Option::is_none")]
pub ext: ::std::option::Option<Ext>,
///The salted wire digest of the approved task — the same value the matching task-consent/request carried and the decision echoed. The requester already holds it; it is repeated here only so the requester can correlate the notice to the pending task it should now re-submit. It confers nothing: the executor's single-use grant lookup at re-submit is the authorization.
#[serde(rename = "payloadDigest")]
pub payload_digest: DigestMultibase,
///Always `granted`. A denial sends no notice — the requester's re-submit discovers it, and a notice that could carry a denial would tempt a consumer into treating this advisory channel as the authoritative outcome, which it is not.
pub status: PayloadStatus,
///Type URI of the approved task, for correlation and display at the requester. Advisory on the same terms as the digest — the executor re-derives everything it enforces from the re-submitted payload itself.
#[serde(rename = "taskType")]
pub task_type: ::std::string::String,
}
///Always `granted`. A denial sends no notice — the requester's re-submit discovers it, and a notice that could carry a denial would tempt a consumer into treating this advisory channel as the authoritative outcome, which it is not.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "description": "Always `granted`. A denial sends no notice — the requester's re-submit discovers it, and a notice that could carry a denial would tempt a consumer into treating this advisory channel as the authoritative outcome, which it is not.",
/// "type": "string",
/// "enum": [
/// "granted"
/// ]
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(
::serde::Deserialize,
::serde::Serialize,
Clone,
Copy,
Debug,
Eq,
Hash,
Ord,
PartialEq,
PartialOrd,
)]
pub enum PayloadStatus {
#[serde(rename = "granted")]
Granted,
}
impl ::std::fmt::Display for PayloadStatus {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> ::std::fmt::Result {
match *self {
Self::Granted => f.write_str("granted"),
}
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for PayloadStatus {
type Err = self::error::ConversionError;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
match value {
"granted" => Ok(Self::Granted),
_ => Err("invalid value".into()),
}
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for PayloadStatus {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&::std::string::String> for PayloadStatus {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: &::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<::std::string::String> for PayloadStatus {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: ::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl crate::Payload for Payload {
const TYPE_URI: &'static str = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/task-consent/granted/0.1";
const IS_RECIPIENT_REQUIRED: bool = true;
}
#[cfg(feature = "validate")]
impl crate::validate::ValidatedPayload for Payload {
const SCHEMA_JSON: &'static str = "{\n \"$defs\": {\n \"DigestMultibase\": {\n \"description\": \"A cryptographic digest as a multibase-encoded multihash — the encoding the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 defines for `digestMultibase`, and the one `did:webvh` uses for its SCID and entry hashes.\\n\\nMultihash carries the hash algorithm in-band, so the value is self-describing and the wire format survives an algorithm change without a schema revision; multibase does the same for the base encoding, so a verifier never infers base58 from base64url by context. A bare hex string or a `sha-256:`-style prefix hard-codes one algorithm into the wire contract and is non-conforming here.\\n\\nThis definition constrains the *encoding only*. What the digest is computed over is stated by each referencing field, because it differs legitimately: a digest over a JSON document is taken over its RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization, while a digest over an opaque artifact is taken over its bytes. A field whose input is a JSON document and which does not name a canonicalization is not reproducible.\\n\\nRestricted to the two multibase headers W3C Controlled Identifiers 1.0 §2.4 normatively requires — `z` (base58btc) and `u` (base64url-no-pad). CID permits others but states that \\\"interoperability is not guaranteed between implementations using such values\\\", and a registry whose purpose is interoperability should not mint digests a conforming verifier may be unable to read. The alphabets are enforced rather than assumed: base58btc excludes 0, O, I and l, and an earlier permissive pattern let three published examples carry digests that were not valid base58 at all. base58btc is RECOMMENDED, for consistency with `did:key` and `did:webvh`.\",\n \"examples\": [\n \"zQmbWqxBEKC3P8tqsKc98xmWNzrzDtRLMiMPL8wBuTGsMnR\"\n ],\n \"minLength\": 16,\n \"pattern\": \"^(z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+|u[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$\",\n \"title\": \"DigestMultibase\",\n \"type\": \"string\"\n },\n \"Ext\": {\n \"additionalProperties\": true,\n \"description\": \"Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.\",\n \"minProperties\": 1,\n \"propertyNames\": {\n \"pattern\": \"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$\"\n },\n \"title\": \"Ext\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n }\n },\n \"$id\": \"https://trusttasks.org/spec/task-consent/granted/0.1\",\n \"$schema\": \"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema\",\n \"additionalProperties\": false,\n \"description\": \"Fire-and-forget notice from the executor to the requester that its pending task has reached the approval threshold and a single-use grant is waiting, so the requester re-submits at once instead of polling. Non-load-bearing by design: the grant check at re-submit is the real gate, so a lost or spurious notice costs at most one poll cycle.\",\n \"properties\": {\n \"ext\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/Ext\"\n },\n \"payloadDigest\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/DigestMultibase\",\n \"description\": \"The salted wire digest of the approved task — the same value the matching task-consent/request carried and the decision echoed. The requester already holds it; it is repeated here only so the requester can correlate the notice to the pending task it should now re-submit. It confers nothing: the executor's single-use grant lookup at re-submit is the authorization.\"\n },\n \"status\": {\n \"description\": \"Always `granted`. A denial sends no notice — the requester's re-submit discovers it, and a notice that could carry a denial would tempt a consumer into treating this advisory channel as the authoritative outcome, which it is not.\",\n \"enum\": [\n \"granted\"\n ],\n \"type\": \"string\"\n },\n \"taskType\": {\n \"description\": \"Type URI of the approved task, for correlation and display at the requester. Advisory on the same terms as the digest — the executor re-derives everything it enforces from the re-submitted payload itself.\",\n \"format\": \"uri\",\n \"type\": \"string\"\n }\n },\n \"required\": [\n \"status\",\n \"payloadDigest\",\n \"taskType\"\n ],\n \"title\": \"Task Consent Granted — payload\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n}\n";
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod conformance {
//! Round-trip tests harvested from the spec's `spec.md`,
//! plus a `rejects_invalid_examples` test for any fixtures
//! in `payload.invalid-examples.json` (validate feature).
/// Each fixture in `payload.invalid-examples.json` MUST be
/// rejected by at least one of: serde deserialization, or
/// JSON-Schema validation under the `validate` feature. The
/// fixture file documents the producer-side bug class that
/// each payload exemplifies; this generated test pins it.
#[cfg(feature = "validate")]
#[test]
fn rejects_invalid_examples() {
use crate::validate::ValidatedPayload;
let fixtures: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
(
"Wrong status — only `granted` exists. A denial is never announced, so a notice that could say anything else would tempt consumers into treating this advisory channel as the authoritative outcome.",
"{\n \"payloadDigest\": \"zQmb1XVvHqbCe5nUPFxpJcRz3RtP4pQyKgTsWJgNBzVhE7d\",\n \"status\": \"denied\",\n \"taskType\": \"https://trusttasks.org/spec/webvh/dids/update/1.0\"\n}",
),
(
"Missing payloadDigest — without it the requester cannot correlate the notice to its pending task, and the notice's only job is correlation.",
"{\n \"status\": \"granted\",\n \"taskType\": \"https://trusttasks.org/spec/webvh/dids/update/1.0\"\n}",
),
(
"Missing taskType — required for correlation and display even though it is advisory.",
"{\n \"payloadDigest\": \"zQmb1XVvHqbCe5nUPFxpJcRz3RtP4pQyKgTsWJgNBzVhE7d\",\n \"status\": \"granted\"\n}",
),
(
"Unknown property — the payload is closed; an advisory notice must not grow unspecified members that consumers might start branching on.",
"{\n \"grantToken\": \"eyJhbGciOi...\",\n \"payloadDigest\": \"zQmb1XVvHqbCe5nUPFxpJcRz3RtP4pQyKgTsWJgNBzVhE7d\",\n \"status\": \"granted\",\n \"taskType\": \"https://trusttasks.org/spec/webvh/dids/update/1.0\"\n}",
),
];
for (i, (note, raw)) in fixtures.iter().enumerate() {
let value: serde_json::Value = match serde_json::from_str(raw) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(_) => continue,
};
let serde_ok = serde_json::from_value::<super::Payload>(value.clone()).is_ok();
let schema_ok = super::Payload::validate_value(&value).is_ok();
assert!(
!(serde_ok && schema_ok),
"invalid-example #{} ({:?}) was accepted by both serde and JSON Schema; \
the fixture's stated failure class is no longer caught:\n{}",
i + 1,
note,
raw
);
}
}
}