//! Generated by `trust-tasks-codegen` — do not edit by hand.
//!
//! Spec slug: `rooms/epoch/prune`. Version: `0.2`.
/// Why this specification version is deprecated (SPEC "Superseded and
/// Withdrawn Versions"), or `None` while it is current.
pub const DEPRECATION: Option<&str> = None;
#[allow(unused_imports)]
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
/// Error types.
pub mod error {
/// Error from a `TryFrom` or `FromStr` implementation.
pub struct ConversionError(::std::borrow::Cow<'static, str>);
impl ::std::error::Error for ConversionError {}
impl ::std::fmt::Display for ConversionError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), ::std::fmt::Error> {
::std::fmt::Display::fmt(&self.0, f)
}
}
impl ::std::fmt::Debug for ConversionError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), ::std::fmt::Error> {
::std::fmt::Debug::fmt(&self.0, f)
}
}
impl From<&'static str> for ConversionError {
fn from(value: &'static str) -> Self {
Self(value.into())
}
}
impl From<String> for ConversionError {
fn from(value: String) -> Self {
Self(value.into())
}
}
}
/**
What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.
**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.
**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.*/
///
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub struct AuthorityPresentation {
///The authority chain, LEAF FIRST: the first element is the credential being relied on and the last MUST be one issued by the room itself. Every link the presenter relies on is present, because the host will not fetch one. Capped at 8: verification is linear in chain length and runs on every operation, so an unbounded chain is a denial-of-service surface against the host. The known uses need 2 to 3 — a person attenuating to an agent, and that agent to a sub-agent.
pub authority: ::std::vec::Vec<::std::string::String>,
///The presenter's membership credential for this room, or — on a `private` room — a zero-knowledge presentation of it. Serialized per the governing profile.
pub membership: ::std::string::String,
///REQUIRED on a `private` room, where the subject identifier is withheld: a proof that the membership credential and the authority chain's leaf describe the SAME subject. Without it two parties pool credentials — one contributes membership, the other authority — and the combination verifies as a single party holding both. A host MUST refuse a private-room presentation that omits this.
#[serde(
rename = "subjectBinding",
default,
skip_serializing_if = "::std::option::Option::is_none"
)]
pub subject_binding: ::std::option::Option<::std::string::String>,
}
impl AuthorityPresentation {
pub fn builder() -> builder::AuthorityPresentation {
Default::default()
}
}
/**
The earliest epoch whose storage key a room still lets anybody derive: its chain was pruned below it (`rooms/epoch/prune`), and every epoch under it is meant to be unreadable — at the host, and, as far as each of them conforms, at every member's key holder. Absent means the room's chain has never been pruned.
**The off-by-one, stated once.** A rung (`EpochLink`) numbered `e` opens with epoch `e`'s key and yields epoch `e − 1`'s. A prune with `beforeEpoch: N` drops the rungs numbered below `N`, so rung `N` survives and still yields epoch `N − 1`'s key; the floor after it is therefore `N − 1`, never `N`. A party applying a floor `F` discards the rungs numbered `F` and below — rung `F` would yield `F − 1` — and every key for an epoch below `F`.
**Monotonic.** A floor only rises. A host raises the room's to the higher of the floor it held and `beforeEpoch − 1` at each prune it performs, and never lowers it; every other party keeps the highest it has learnt for the room, from any source, and never lowers it either. A lower floor learnt later — from a stale response, or a host that has not been pruned — changes nothing.
**A host** that holds a floor for a room MUST NOT store, accept or serve a rung numbered at or below it, and MUST serve the floor wherever a response can carry it (`rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2, `rooms/epoch/prune` 0.2).
**A member's key holder** — and any client of the member that keeps the room's rungs or keys itself — on learning a floor `F` above the one it held, by any means (`rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2 in its own reads, `rooms/keys/backfill` 0.2, `rooms/keys/chain` 0.2 from its principal):
1. MUST discard every rung it holds for the room numbered `F` or below, and every storage key, file key or other key material it holds or has cached for an epoch below `F` — including one it derived in passing while applying commits through those epochs (`rooms/keys/commit`, `rooms/epoch/commits`);
2. MUST NOT store such a rung or key again from any source — a delivery from its principal, a backfill, a repair, a catch-up, or a host that has not been pruned — and MUST NOT ask for one;
3. MUST refuse to derive or use a key for an epoch below `F`, answering exactly as it answers for an epoch its chain does not reach (`beyondChain`, with an earliest epoch at or above `F`), whatever it still holds;
4. MUST keep `F` itself for as long as it holds anything for the room, since it is what makes items 2 and 3 enforceable after the material is gone.
A key holder SHOULD learn the floor whenever it fetches rungs or catches up, and SHOULD ask for it — a `rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2 read carries it whatever `fromEpoch` and `limit` it names — at least as often as it otherwise reads the room. One that never asks never learns, and keeps what it held.
**What a floor does not do, stated plainly.** It is honoured by parties that conform; it does not reach into one that does not, and it recalls nothing. Plaintext a key holder already returned, records a member already opened, files already downloaded and decrypted, exports, and any key a member's own software extracted are beyond it. What it guarantees cryptographically is what the prune guarantees: a party that had not derived a key below the floor before the host erased its rungs can never derive it afterwards. What it adds is that every conforming key holder stops being able to — so that a restart, a new device or an agent's next recall reads nothing below the floor, rather than everything its holder happened to keep.*/
///
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct EpochFloor(pub ::std::num::NonZeroU64);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for EpochFloor {
type Target = ::std::num::NonZeroU64;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::num::NonZeroU64 {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<EpochFloor> for ::std::num::NonZeroU64 {
fn from(value: EpochFloor) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<::std::num::NonZeroU64> for EpochFloor {
fn from(value: ::std::num::NonZeroU64) -> Self {
Self(value)
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for EpochFloor {
type Err = <::std::num::NonZeroU64 as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Err> {
Ok(Self(value.parse()?))
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for EpochFloor {
type Error = <::std::num::NonZeroU64 as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<String> for EpochFloor {
type Error = <::std::num::NonZeroU64 as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn try_from(value: String) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::fmt::Display for EpochFloor {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> ::std::fmt::Result {
self.0.fmt(f)
}
}
///Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.
///
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct Ext(pub ::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value>);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for Ext {
type Target = ::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value>;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value> {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<Ext> for ::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value> {
fn from(value: Ext) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value>> for Ext {
fn from(value: ::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value>) -> Self {
Self(value)
}
}
///`ExtKey`
///
#[derive(::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct ExtKey(::std::string::String);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for ExtKey {
type Target = ::std::string::String;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::string::String {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<ExtKey> for ::std::string::String {
fn from(value: ExtKey) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for ExtKey {
type Err = self::error::ConversionError;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
static PATTERN: ::std::sync::LazyLock<::regress::Regex> =
::std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| {
::regress::Regex::new("^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$").unwrap()
});
if PATTERN.find(value).is_none() {
return Err("doesn't match pattern \"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$\"".into());
}
Ok(Self(value.to_string()))
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for ExtKey {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&::std::string::String> for ExtKey {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: &::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<::std::string::String> for ExtKey {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: ::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl<'de> ::serde::Deserialize<'de> for ExtKey {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: ::serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
::std::string::String::deserialize(deserializer)?
.parse()
.map_err(|e: self::error::ConversionError| {
<D::Error as ::serde::de::Error>::custom(e.to_string())
})
}
}
///A room's owner asks its host to drop the epoch key chain below an epoch, making the history before it unrecoverable for anyone who has not already derived it. 0.2 makes the host keep the room's resulting epoch floor and serve it, so that members' key holders discard what they hold below it.
///
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub struct Payload {
/**
Drop every rung numbered *below* this epoch, exactly as 0.1. Rung `N` itself survives and still yields epoch `N − 1`'s key, so the earliest epoch anybody can still derive afterwards — the room's epoch floor — is `N − 1` (`EpochFloor`). To make the history sealed under epochs before `E` unreadable, send `beforeEpoch: E + 1`.
`minimum: 2` because pruning below epoch 1 would drop nothing and asking to is a caller that has misunderstood the direction — the chain walks backwards, and epoch 1 is where it ends.*/
#[serde(rename = "beforeEpoch")]
pub before_epoch: i64,
///Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "::std::option::Option::is_none")]
pub ext: ::std::option::Option<Ext>,
///Must confer `admin` at this room's scope. Not `curate`, and not `write`: pruning is not a statement about any record, and every member who can write can curate. It ends the room's ability to open a span of its own history, for everyone, which is the same class of act as advancing the epoch.
pub presentation: AuthorityPresentation,
///Why, for the room's audit trail. A prune is irreversible and unattributable after the fact — the rungs are simply gone — so the only record of intent is the one made at the time.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "::std::option::Option::is_none")]
pub reason: ::std::option::Option<PayloadReason>,
///The room to prune.
#[serde(rename = "roomId")]
pub room_id: ::std::string::String,
}
impl Payload {
pub fn builder() -> builder::Payload {
Default::default()
}
}
///Why, for the room's audit trail. A prune is irreversible and unattributable after the fact — the rungs are simply gone — so the only record of intent is the one made at the time.
///
#[derive(::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct PayloadReason(::std::string::String);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for PayloadReason {
type Target = ::std::string::String;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::string::String {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<PayloadReason> for ::std::string::String {
fn from(value: PayloadReason) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for PayloadReason {
type Err = self::error::ConversionError;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
if value.chars().count() > 512usize {
return Err("longer than 512 characters".into());
}
Ok(Self(value.to_string()))
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for PayloadReason {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&::std::string::String> for PayloadReason {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: &::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<::std::string::String> for PayloadReason {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: ::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl<'de> ::serde::Deserialize<'de> for PayloadReason {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: ::serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
::std::string::String::deserialize(deserializer)?
.parse()
.map_err(|e: self::error::ConversionError| {
<D::Error as ::serde::de::Error>::custom(e.to_string())
})
}
}
///Success response to rooms/epoch/prune. Type https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/epoch/prune/0.2#response.
///
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub struct Response {
///The lowest epoch the chain still reaches, after pruning. **Not a restatement of `beforeEpoch`**: a chain with a gap in it already stopped somewhere, and a prune below that gap changes nothing about how far back a member can actually walk. Reporting the request back would tell an operator they had achieved something they had not.
#[serde(rename = "earliestRung")]
pub earliest_rung: ::std::num::NonZeroU64,
///The room's epoch floor after this prune: the higher of the floor the host held and `beforeEpoch − 1`. What every member's key holder discards below once it learns it (`EpochFloor`), and what `rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2 serves from now on. Unlike `earliestRung`, a statement of intent rather than of reach: a chain with a gap already reached less far, but the floor is what the owner decided.
#[serde(rename = "epochFloor")]
pub epoch_floor: EpochFloor,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "::std::option::Option::is_none")]
pub ext: ::std::option::Option<Ext>,
///How many rungs were dropped. `0` is a success: the chain already went back no further, and a caller that read it as a failure would retry an operation that has nothing left to do.
pub pruned: u64,
#[serde(rename = "roomId")]
pub room_id: ::std::string::String,
}
impl Response {
pub fn builder() -> builder::Response {
Default::default()
}
}
/// Types for composing complex structures.
pub mod builder {
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct AuthorityPresentation {
authority:
::std::result::Result<::std::vec::Vec<::std::string::String>, ::std::string::String>,
membership: ::std::result::Result<::std::string::String, ::std::string::String>,
subject_binding: ::std::result::Result<
::std::option::Option<::std::string::String>,
::std::string::String,
>,
}
impl ::std::default::Default for AuthorityPresentation {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
authority: Err("no value supplied for authority".to_string()),
membership: Err("no value supplied for membership".to_string()),
subject_binding: Ok(Default::default()),
}
}
}
impl AuthorityPresentation {
pub fn authority<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::vec::Vec<::std::string::String>>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.authority = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for authority: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn membership<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::string::String>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.membership = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for membership: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn subject_binding<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::option::Option<::std::string::String>>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.subject_binding = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for subject_binding: {e}"));
self
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<AuthorityPresentation> for super::AuthorityPresentation {
type Error = super::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: AuthorityPresentation,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, super::error::ConversionError> {
Ok(Self {
authority: value.authority?,
membership: value.membership?,
subject_binding: value.subject_binding?,
})
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<super::AuthorityPresentation> for AuthorityPresentation {
fn from(value: super::AuthorityPresentation) -> Self {
Self {
authority: Ok(value.authority),
membership: Ok(value.membership),
subject_binding: Ok(value.subject_binding),
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct Payload {
before_epoch: ::std::result::Result<i64, ::std::string::String>,
ext: ::std::result::Result<::std::option::Option<super::Ext>, ::std::string::String>,
presentation: ::std::result::Result<super::AuthorityPresentation, ::std::string::String>,
reason: ::std::result::Result<
::std::option::Option<super::PayloadReason>,
::std::string::String,
>,
room_id: ::std::result::Result<::std::string::String, ::std::string::String>,
}
impl ::std::default::Default for Payload {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
before_epoch: Err("no value supplied for before_epoch".to_string()),
ext: Ok(Default::default()),
presentation: Err("no value supplied for presentation".to_string()),
reason: Ok(Default::default()),
room_id: Err("no value supplied for room_id".to_string()),
}
}
}
impl Payload {
pub fn before_epoch<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<i64>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.before_epoch = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for before_epoch: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn ext<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::option::Option<super::Ext>>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.ext = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for ext: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn presentation<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<super::AuthorityPresentation>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.presentation = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for presentation: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn reason<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::option::Option<super::PayloadReason>>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.reason = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for reason: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn room_id<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::string::String>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.room_id = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for room_id: {e}"));
self
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<Payload> for super::Payload {
type Error = super::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: Payload) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, super::error::ConversionError> {
Ok(Self {
before_epoch: value.before_epoch?,
ext: value.ext?,
presentation: value.presentation?,
reason: value.reason?,
room_id: value.room_id?,
})
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<super::Payload> for Payload {
fn from(value: super::Payload) -> Self {
Self {
before_epoch: Ok(value.before_epoch),
ext: Ok(value.ext),
presentation: Ok(value.presentation),
reason: Ok(value.reason),
room_id: Ok(value.room_id),
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct Response {
earliest_rung: ::std::result::Result<::std::num::NonZeroU64, ::std::string::String>,
epoch_floor: ::std::result::Result<super::EpochFloor, ::std::string::String>,
ext: ::std::result::Result<::std::option::Option<super::Ext>, ::std::string::String>,
pruned: ::std::result::Result<u64, ::std::string::String>,
room_id: ::std::result::Result<::std::string::String, ::std::string::String>,
}
impl ::std::default::Default for Response {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
earliest_rung: Err("no value supplied for earliest_rung".to_string()),
epoch_floor: Err("no value supplied for epoch_floor".to_string()),
ext: Ok(Default::default()),
pruned: Err("no value supplied for pruned".to_string()),
room_id: Err("no value supplied for room_id".to_string()),
}
}
}
impl Response {
pub fn earliest_rung<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::num::NonZeroU64>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.earliest_rung = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for earliest_rung: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn epoch_floor<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<super::EpochFloor>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.epoch_floor = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for epoch_floor: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn ext<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::option::Option<super::Ext>>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.ext = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for ext: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn pruned<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<u64>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.pruned = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for pruned: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn room_id<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::string::String>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.room_id = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for room_id: {e}"));
self
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<Response> for super::Response {
type Error = super::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: Response) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, super::error::ConversionError> {
Ok(Self {
earliest_rung: value.earliest_rung?,
epoch_floor: value.epoch_floor?,
ext: value.ext?,
pruned: value.pruned?,
room_id: value.room_id?,
})
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<super::Response> for Response {
fn from(value: super::Response) -> Self {
Self {
earliest_rung: Ok(value.earliest_rung),
epoch_floor: Ok(value.epoch_floor),
ext: Ok(value.ext),
pruned: Ok(value.pruned),
room_id: Ok(value.room_id),
}
}
}
}
impl crate::Payload for Payload {
const TYPE_URI: &'static str = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/epoch/prune/0.2";
const IS_PROOF_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const IS_ISSUED_AT_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const IS_RECIPIENT_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: Option<&'static str> = Some(
"{\"$defs\":{\"AuthorityPresentation\":{\"additionalProperties\":false,\"description\":\"What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\\n\\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\\n\\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.\",\"properties\":{\"authority\":{\"description\":\"The authority chain, LEAF FIRST: the first element is the credential being relied on and the last MUST be one issued by the room itself. Every link the presenter relies on is present, because the host will not fetch one. Capped at 8: verification is linear in chain length and runs on every operation, so an unbounded chain is a denial-of-service surface against the host. The known uses need 2 to 3 — a person attenuating to an agent, and that agent to a sub-agent.\",\"items\":{\"type\":\"string\"},\"maxItems\":8,\"minItems\":1,\"type\":\"array\"},\"membership\":{\"description\":\"The presenter's membership credential for this room, or — on a `private` room — a zero-knowledge presentation of it. Serialized per the governing profile.\",\"type\":\"string\"},\"subjectBinding\":{\"description\":\"REQUIRED on a `private` room, where the subject identifier is withheld: a proof that the membership credential and the authority chain's leaf describe the SAME subject. Without it two parties pool credentials — one contributes membership, the other authority — and the combination verifies as a single party holding both. A host MUST refuse a private-room presentation that omits this.\",\"type\":\"string\"}},\"required\":[\"membership\",\"authority\"],\"title\":\"AuthorityPresentation\",\"type\":\"object\"},\"EpochFloor\":{\"description\":\"The earliest epoch whose storage key a room still lets anybody derive: its chain was pruned below it (`rooms/epoch/prune`), and every epoch under it is meant to be unreadable — at the host, and, as far as each of them conforms, at every member's key holder. Absent means the room's chain has never been pruned.\\n\\n**The off-by-one, stated once.** A rung (`EpochLink`) numbered `e` opens with epoch `e`'s key and yields epoch `e − 1`'s. A prune with `beforeEpoch: N` drops the rungs numbered below `N`, so rung `N` survives and still yields epoch `N − 1`'s key; the floor after it is therefore `N − 1`, never `N`. A party applying a floor `F` discards the rungs numbered `F` and below — rung `F` would yield `F − 1` — and every key for an epoch below `F`.\\n\\n**Monotonic.** A floor only rises. A host raises the room's to the higher of the floor it held and `beforeEpoch − 1` at each prune it performs, and never lowers it; every other party keeps the highest it has learnt for the room, from any source, and never lowers it either. A lower floor learnt later — from a stale response, or a host that has not been pruned — changes nothing.\\n\\n**A host** that holds a floor for a room MUST NOT store, accept or serve a rung numbered at or below it, and MUST serve the floor wherever a response can carry it (`rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2, `rooms/epoch/prune` 0.2).\\n\\n**A member's key holder** — and any client of the member that keeps the room's rungs or keys itself — on learning a floor `F` above the one it held, by any means (`rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2 in its own reads, `rooms/keys/backfill` 0.2, `rooms/keys/chain` 0.2 from its principal):\\n 1. MUST discard every rung it holds for the room numbered `F` or below, and every storage key, file key or other key material it holds or has cached for an epoch below `F` — including one it derived in passing while applying commits through those epochs (`rooms/keys/commit`, `rooms/epoch/commits`);\\n 2. MUST NOT store such a rung or key again from any source — a delivery from its principal, a backfill, a repair, a catch-up, or a host that has not been pruned — and MUST NOT ask for one;\\n 3. MUST refuse to derive or use a key for an epoch below `F`, answering exactly as it answers for an epoch its chain does not reach (`beyondChain`, with an earliest epoch at or above `F`), whatever it still holds;\\n 4. MUST keep `F` itself for as long as it holds anything for the room, since it is what makes items 2 and 3 enforceable after the material is gone.\\n\\nA key holder SHOULD learn the floor whenever it fetches rungs or catches up, and SHOULD ask for it — a `rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2 read carries it whatever `fromEpoch` and `limit` it names — at least as often as it otherwise reads the room. One that never asks never learns, and keeps what it held.\\n\\n**What a floor does not do, stated plainly.** It is honoured by parties that conform; it does not reach into one that does not, and it recalls nothing. Plaintext a key holder already returned, records a member already opened, files already downloaded and decrypted, exports, and any key a member's own software extracted are beyond it. What it guarantees cryptographically is what the prune guarantees: a party that had not derived a key below the floor before the host erased its rungs can never derive it afterwards. What it adds is that every conforming key holder stops being able to — so that a restart, a new device or an agent's next recall reads nothing below the floor, rather than everything its holder happened to keep.\",\"minimum\":1,\"title\":\"EpochFloor\",\"type\":\"integer\"},\"Ext\":{\"additionalProperties\":true,\"description\":\"Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.\",\"minProperties\":1,\"propertyNames\":{\"pattern\":\"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$\"},\"title\":\"Ext\",\"type\":\"object\"},\"Response\":{\"$anchor\":\"response\",\"additionalProperties\":false,\"description\":\"Success response to rooms/epoch/prune. Type https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/epoch/prune/0.2#response.\",\"properties\":{\"earliestRung\":{\"description\":\"The lowest epoch the chain still reaches, after pruning. **Not a restatement of `beforeEpoch`**: a chain with a gap in it already stopped somewhere, and a prune below that gap changes nothing about how far back a member can actually walk. Reporting the request back would tell an operator they had achieved something they had not.\",\"minimum\":1,\"type\":\"integer\"},\"epochFloor\":{\"$ref\":\"#/$defs/EpochFloor\",\"description\":\"The room's epoch floor after this prune: the higher of the floor the host held and `beforeEpoch − 1`. What every member's key holder discards below once it learns it (`EpochFloor`), and what `rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2 serves from now on. Unlike `earliestRung`, a statement of intent rather than of reach: a chain with a gap already reached less far, but the floor is what the owner decided.\"},\"ext\":{\"$ref\":\"#/$defs/Ext\"},\"pruned\":{\"description\":\"How many rungs were dropped. `0` is a success: the chain already went back no further, and a caller that read it as a failure would retry an operation that has nothing left to do.\",\"minimum\":0,\"type\":\"integer\"},\"roomId\":{\"type\":\"string\"}},\"required\":[\"roomId\",\"pruned\",\"earliestRung\",\"epochFloor\"],\"title\":\"Rooms Epoch Prune — response payload\",\"type\":\"object\"}},\"$id\":\"https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/epoch/prune/0.2\",\"$schema\":\"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema\",\"additionalProperties\":false,\"description\":\"A room's owner asks its host to drop the epoch key chain below an epoch, making the history before it unrecoverable for anyone who has not already derived it. 0.2 makes the host keep the room's resulting epoch floor and serve it, so that members' key holders discard what they hold below it.\",\"properties\":{\"beforeEpoch\":{\"description\":\"Drop every rung numbered *below* this epoch, exactly as 0.1. Rung `N` itself survives and still yields epoch `N − 1`'s key, so the earliest epoch anybody can still derive afterwards — the room's epoch floor — is `N − 1` (`EpochFloor`). To make the history sealed under epochs before `E` unreadable, send `beforeEpoch: E + 1`.\\n\\n`minimum: 2` because pruning below epoch 1 would drop nothing and asking to is a caller that has misunderstood the direction — the chain walks backwards, and epoch 1 is where it ends.\",\"minimum\":2,\"type\":\"integer\"},\"ext\":{\"$ref\":\"#/$defs/Ext\",\"description\":\"Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.\"},\"presentation\":{\"$ref\":\"#/$defs/AuthorityPresentation\",\"description\":\"Must confer `admin` at this room's scope. Not `curate`, and not `write`: pruning is not a statement about any record, and every member who can write can curate. It ends the room's ability to open a span of its own history, for everyone, which is the same class of act as advancing the epoch.\"},\"reason\":{\"description\":\"Why, for the room's audit trail. A prune is irreversible and unattributable after the fact — the rungs are simply gone — so the only record of intent is the one made at the time.\",\"maxLength\":512,\"type\":\"string\"},\"roomId\":{\"description\":\"The room to prune.\",\"type\":\"string\"}},\"required\":[\"roomId\",\"beforeEpoch\",\"presentation\"],\"title\":\"Rooms Epoch Prune — payload\",\"type\":\"object\"}\n",
);
}
impl crate::Payload for Response {
const TYPE_URI: &'static str = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/epoch/prune/0.2#response";
const IS_PROOF_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const IS_ISSUED_AT_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const IS_RECIPIENT_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: Option<&'static str> = Some(
"{\"$defs\":{\"AuthorityPresentation\":{\"additionalProperties\":false,\"description\":\"What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\\n\\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\\n\\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.\",\"properties\":{\"authority\":{\"description\":\"The authority chain, LEAF FIRST: the first element is the credential being relied on and the last MUST be one issued by the room itself. Every link the presenter relies on is present, because the host will not fetch one. Capped at 8: verification is linear in chain length and runs on every operation, so an unbounded chain is a denial-of-service surface against the host. The known uses need 2 to 3 — a person attenuating to an agent, and that agent to a sub-agent.\",\"items\":{\"type\":\"string\"},\"maxItems\":8,\"minItems\":1,\"type\":\"array\"},\"membership\":{\"description\":\"The presenter's membership credential for this room, or — on a `private` room — a zero-knowledge presentation of it. Serialized per the governing profile.\",\"type\":\"string\"},\"subjectBinding\":{\"description\":\"REQUIRED on a `private` room, where the subject identifier is withheld: a proof that the membership credential and the authority chain's leaf describe the SAME subject. Without it two parties pool credentials — one contributes membership, the other authority — and the combination verifies as a single party holding both. A host MUST refuse a private-room presentation that omits this.\",\"type\":\"string\"}},\"required\":[\"membership\",\"authority\"],\"title\":\"AuthorityPresentation\",\"type\":\"object\"},\"EpochFloor\":{\"description\":\"The earliest epoch whose storage key a room still lets anybody derive: its chain was pruned below it (`rooms/epoch/prune`), and every epoch under it is meant to be unreadable — at the host, and, as far as each of them conforms, at every member's key holder. Absent means the room's chain has never been pruned.\\n\\n**The off-by-one, stated once.** A rung (`EpochLink`) numbered `e` opens with epoch `e`'s key and yields epoch `e − 1`'s. A prune with `beforeEpoch: N` drops the rungs numbered below `N`, so rung `N` survives and still yields epoch `N − 1`'s key; the floor after it is therefore `N − 1`, never `N`. A party applying a floor `F` discards the rungs numbered `F` and below — rung `F` would yield `F − 1` — and every key for an epoch below `F`.\\n\\n**Monotonic.** A floor only rises. A host raises the room's to the higher of the floor it held and `beforeEpoch − 1` at each prune it performs, and never lowers it; every other party keeps the highest it has learnt for the room, from any source, and never lowers it either. A lower floor learnt later — from a stale response, or a host that has not been pruned — changes nothing.\\n\\n**A host** that holds a floor for a room MUST NOT store, accept or serve a rung numbered at or below it, and MUST serve the floor wherever a response can carry it (`rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2, `rooms/epoch/prune` 0.2).\\n\\n**A member's key holder** — and any client of the member that keeps the room's rungs or keys itself — on learning a floor `F` above the one it held, by any means (`rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2 in its own reads, `rooms/keys/backfill` 0.2, `rooms/keys/chain` 0.2 from its principal):\\n 1. MUST discard every rung it holds for the room numbered `F` or below, and every storage key, file key or other key material it holds or has cached for an epoch below `F` — including one it derived in passing while applying commits through those epochs (`rooms/keys/commit`, `rooms/epoch/commits`);\\n 2. MUST NOT store such a rung or key again from any source — a delivery from its principal, a backfill, a repair, a catch-up, or a host that has not been pruned — and MUST NOT ask for one;\\n 3. MUST refuse to derive or use a key for an epoch below `F`, answering exactly as it answers for an epoch its chain does not reach (`beyondChain`, with an earliest epoch at or above `F`), whatever it still holds;\\n 4. MUST keep `F` itself for as long as it holds anything for the room, since it is what makes items 2 and 3 enforceable after the material is gone.\\n\\nA key holder SHOULD learn the floor whenever it fetches rungs or catches up, and SHOULD ask for it — a `rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2 read carries it whatever `fromEpoch` and `limit` it names — at least as often as it otherwise reads the room. One that never asks never learns, and keeps what it held.\\n\\n**What a floor does not do, stated plainly.** It is honoured by parties that conform; it does not reach into one that does not, and it recalls nothing. Plaintext a key holder already returned, records a member already opened, files already downloaded and decrypted, exports, and any key a member's own software extracted are beyond it. What it guarantees cryptographically is what the prune guarantees: a party that had not derived a key below the floor before the host erased its rungs can never derive it afterwards. What it adds is that every conforming key holder stops being able to — so that a restart, a new device or an agent's next recall reads nothing below the floor, rather than everything its holder happened to keep.\",\"minimum\":1,\"title\":\"EpochFloor\",\"type\":\"integer\"},\"Ext\":{\"additionalProperties\":true,\"description\":\"Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.\",\"minProperties\":1,\"propertyNames\":{\"pattern\":\"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$\"},\"title\":\"Ext\",\"type\":\"object\"},\"Response\":{\"$anchor\":\"response\",\"additionalProperties\":false,\"description\":\"Success response to rooms/epoch/prune. Type https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/epoch/prune/0.2#response.\",\"properties\":{\"earliestRung\":{\"description\":\"The lowest epoch the chain still reaches, after pruning. **Not a restatement of `beforeEpoch`**: a chain with a gap in it already stopped somewhere, and a prune below that gap changes nothing about how far back a member can actually walk. Reporting the request back would tell an operator they had achieved something they had not.\",\"minimum\":1,\"type\":\"integer\"},\"epochFloor\":{\"$ref\":\"#/$defs/EpochFloor\",\"description\":\"The room's epoch floor after this prune: the higher of the floor the host held and `beforeEpoch − 1`. What every member's key holder discards below once it learns it (`EpochFloor`), and what `rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2 serves from now on. Unlike `earliestRung`, a statement of intent rather than of reach: a chain with a gap already reached less far, but the floor is what the owner decided.\"},\"ext\":{\"$ref\":\"#/$defs/Ext\"},\"pruned\":{\"description\":\"How many rungs were dropped. `0` is a success: the chain already went back no further, and a caller that read it as a failure would retry an operation that has nothing left to do.\",\"minimum\":0,\"type\":\"integer\"},\"roomId\":{\"type\":\"string\"}},\"required\":[\"roomId\",\"pruned\",\"earliestRung\",\"epochFloor\"],\"title\":\"Rooms Epoch Prune — response payload\",\"type\":\"object\"}},\"$ref\":\"#/$defs/Response\",\"$schema\":\"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema\"}\n",
);
}
impl crate::RequestPayload for Payload {
type Response = Response;
}
/// The earlier `MAJOR.MINOR` of this slug that this version declares it
/// extends (front matter `extends`, SPEC §5.2 "Declared extension"), or
/// `None`. Only the direct declaration; walk a chain with
/// [`crate::extension::extends_for`].
pub const EXTENDS: Option<&str> = None;
/// The extended error codes this specification declares (SPEC §7.3 item 9,
/// §8.5), in declaration order. Empty when it declares none.
pub const ERROR_CODES: &[crate::DeclaredErrorCode] =
&[error_codes::NOT_AHEAD, error_codes::CHAIN_TOO_DEEP];
/// One constant per extended error code this specification declares
/// (SPEC §7.3 item 9), named for its local part.
///
/// Emit these rather than a string literal: the code is read from the
/// specification, so it cannot name a code the specification never
/// declared.
pub mod error_codes {
/// `rooms/epoch/prune:notAhead`
///
/// `beforeEpoch` is at or above the room's current epoch, which would drop the chain a member needs to read anything at all. `details.epoch` names the room's current one.
///
/// Declared `retryable: false`.
pub const NOT_AHEAD: crate::DeclaredErrorCode = crate::DeclaredErrorCode {
code: "rooms/epoch/prune:notAhead",
retryable: false,
details_schema: ::core::option::Option::None,
};
/// `rooms/epoch/prune:chainTooDeep`
///
/// The authority chain exceeds the maximum of 8 links.
///
/// Declared `retryable: false`.
pub const CHAIN_TOO_DEEP: crate::DeclaredErrorCode = crate::DeclaredErrorCode {
code: "rooms/epoch/prune:chainTooDeep",
retryable: false,
details_schema: ::core::option::Option::None,
};
}