//! Generated by `trust-tasks-codegen` — do not edit by hand.
//!
//! Spec slug: `rooms/blobs/get`. Version: `0.1`.
#[allow(unused_imports)]
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
/// Error types.
pub mod error {
/// Error from a `TryFrom` or `FromStr` implementation.
pub struct ConversionError(::std::borrow::Cow<'static, str>);
impl ::std::error::Error for ConversionError {}
impl ::std::fmt::Display for ConversionError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), ::std::fmt::Error> {
::std::fmt::Display::fmt(&self.0, f)
}
}
impl ::std::fmt::Debug for ConversionError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), ::std::fmt::Error> {
::std::fmt::Debug::fmt(&self.0, f)
}
}
impl From<&'static str> for ConversionError {
fn from(value: &'static str) -> Self {
Self(value.into())
}
}
impl From<String> for ConversionError {
fn from(value: String) -> Self {
Self(value.into())
}
}
}
///What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "AuthorityPresentation",
/// "description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.",
/// "type": "object",
/// "required": [
/// "authority",
/// "membership"
/// ],
/// "properties": {
/// "authority": {
/// "description": "The authority chain, LEAF FIRST: the first element is the credential being relied on and the last MUST be one issued by the room itself. Every link the presenter relies on is present, because the host will not fetch one. Capped at 8: verification is linear in chain length and runs on every operation, so an unbounded chain is a denial-of-service surface against the host. The known uses need 2 to 3 — a person attenuating to an agent, and that agent to a sub-agent.",
/// "type": "array",
/// "items": {
/// "type": "string"
/// },
/// "maxItems": 8,
/// "minItems": 1
/// },
/// "membership": {
/// "description": "The presenter's membership credential for this room, or — on a `private` room — a zero-knowledge presentation of it. Serialized per the governing profile.",
/// "type": "string"
/// },
/// "subjectBinding": {
/// "description": "REQUIRED on a `private` room, where the subject identifier is withheld: a proof that the membership credential and the authority chain's leaf describe the SAME subject. Without it two parties pool credentials — one contributes membership, the other authority — and the combination verifies as a single party holding both. A host MUST refuse a private-room presentation that omits this.",
/// "type": "string"
/// }
/// },
/// "additionalProperties": false
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub struct AuthorityPresentation {
///The authority chain, LEAF FIRST: the first element is the credential being relied on and the last MUST be one issued by the room itself. Every link the presenter relies on is present, because the host will not fetch one. Capped at 8: verification is linear in chain length and runs on every operation, so an unbounded chain is a denial-of-service surface against the host. The known uses need 2 to 3 — a person attenuating to an agent, and that agent to a sub-agent.
pub authority: ::std::vec::Vec<::std::string::String>,
///The presenter's membership credential for this room, or — on a `private` room — a zero-knowledge presentation of it. Serialized per the governing profile.
pub membership: ::std::string::String,
///REQUIRED on a `private` room, where the subject identifier is withheld: a proof that the membership credential and the authority chain's leaf describe the SAME subject. Without it two parties pool credentials — one contributes membership, the other authority — and the combination verifies as a single party holding both. A host MUST refuse a private-room presentation that omits this.
#[serde(
rename = "subjectBinding",
default,
skip_serializing_if = "::std::option::Option::is_none"
)]
pub subject_binding: ::std::option::Option<::std::string::String>,
}
impl AuthorityPresentation {
pub fn builder() -> builder::AuthorityPresentation {
Default::default()
}
}
/**
The ciphertext manifest of one blob, committed by the uploader before any byte moves. Its digest is the BlobRef. Every chunk is checked against `chunks.chunkDigests` on arrival and the reassembled blob against `digest`, so a host can neither accept nor serve bytes the uploader did not commit to. The manifest also appears, by its BlobRef, inside the sealed FileManifest the author signs; a reader who opens the record therefore knows which ciphertext its author meant, and a host cannot substitute a different blob under the same record.
Consistency rules JSON Schema cannot state: `chunks.chunkCount` MUST equal ceil(size / chunks.chunkSize), and `chunks.chunkDigests` MUST have exactly `chunkCount` items. A party receiving a manifest violating either MUST refuse it.
Each transfer chunk is exactly one sealed STREAM segment (see FileManifest): every chunk but the last is `chunkSize` bytes, and `chunkSize` is the plaintext segment size plus the 16-byte AEAD tag. The 262144-byte ceiling of ChunkSize therefore puts the largest plaintext segment at 262128 bytes, and the 4096-chunk ceiling of ChunkCount puts the largest blob at 1 GiB of ciphertext.*/
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "BlobManifest",
/// "description": "The ciphertext manifest of one blob, committed by the uploader before any byte moves. Its digest is the BlobRef. Every chunk is checked against `chunks.chunkDigests` on arrival and the reassembled blob against `digest`, so a host can neither accept nor serve bytes the uploader did not commit to. The manifest also appears, by its BlobRef, inside the sealed FileManifest the author signs; a reader who opens the record therefore knows which ciphertext its author meant, and a host cannot substitute a different blob under the same record.\n\nConsistency rules JSON Schema cannot state: `chunks.chunkCount` MUST equal ceil(size / chunks.chunkSize), and `chunks.chunkDigests` MUST have exactly `chunkCount` items. A party receiving a manifest violating either MUST refuse it.\n\nEach transfer chunk is exactly one sealed STREAM segment (see FileManifest): every chunk but the last is `chunkSize` bytes, and `chunkSize` is the plaintext segment size plus the 16-byte AEAD tag. The 262144-byte ceiling of ChunkSize therefore puts the largest plaintext segment at 262128 bytes, and the 4096-chunk ceiling of ChunkCount puts the largest blob at 1 GiB of ciphertext.",
/// "type": "object",
/// "required": [
/// "chunks",
/// "digest",
/// "size"
/// ],
/// "properties": {
/// "chunks": {
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/ChunkManifest"
/// },
/// "digest": {
/// "description": "Digest of the whole ciphertext, over its bytes. Checked after reassembly, so a correct set of chunks in the wrong order is still caught.",
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/DigestMultibase"
/// },
/// "size": {
/// "description": "Ciphertext bytes, padding included. What the host stores, and what every limit and usage figure is stated in.",
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/ExpectedSizeBytes"
/// }
/// },
/// "additionalProperties": false
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub struct BlobManifest {
pub chunks: ChunkManifest,
///Digest of the whole ciphertext, over its bytes. Checked after reassembly, so a correct set of chunks in the wrong order is still caught.
pub digest: DigestMultibase,
///Ciphertext bytes, padding included. What the host stores, and what every limit and usage figure is stated in.
pub size: ExpectedSizeBytes,
}
impl BlobManifest {
pub fn builder() -> builder::BlobManifest {
Default::default()
}
}
///The name of one blob: the digest of its BlobManifest, taken over the manifest's RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization. sha2-256 is RECOMMENDED and MUST be implemented. Content addressing over ciphertext, never plaintext, so a BlobRef says nothing about what the file contains, and two uploads of one file have different BlobRefs (a fresh `fileId` gives a different key, and so different ciphertext). Rooms cannot be correlated by the files they share. Compared as decoded multihash bytes, never as encoded strings. A BlobRef is defined over the manifest's JSON, as this schema states it and RFC 8785 canonicalizes it, never over any binding's generated type: two bindings that model the manifest as distinct types still compute the same BlobRef from the same JSON.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "BlobRef",
/// "description": "The name of one blob: the digest of its BlobManifest, taken over the manifest's RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization. sha2-256 is RECOMMENDED and MUST be implemented. Content addressing over ciphertext, never plaintext, so a BlobRef says nothing about what the file contains, and two uploads of one file have different BlobRefs (a fresh `fileId` gives a different key, and so different ciphertext). Rooms cannot be correlated by the files they share. Compared as decoded multihash bytes, never as encoded strings. A BlobRef is defined over the manifest's JSON, as this schema states it and RFC 8785 canonicalizes it, never over any binding's generated type: two bindings that model the manifest as distinct types still compute the same BlobRef from the same JSON.",
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/DigestMultibase"
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct BlobRef(pub DigestMultibase);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for BlobRef {
type Target = DigestMultibase;
fn deref(&self) -> &DigestMultibase {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<BlobRef> for DigestMultibase {
fn from(value: BlobRef) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<DigestMultibase> for BlobRef {
fn from(value: DigestMultibase) -> Self {
Self(value)
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for BlobRef {
type Err = <DigestMultibase as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Err> {
Ok(Self(value.parse()?))
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for BlobRef {
type Error = <DigestMultibase as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<String> for BlobRef {
type Error = <DigestMultibase as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn try_from(value: String) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::fmt::Display for BlobRef {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> ::std::fmt::Result {
self.0.fmt(f)
}
}
///Number of chunks in the bundle, equal to ceil(expectedSizeBytes / chunkSize). Bounded at 4096 so that the manifest itself — one digest per chunk — fits in the single document that carries it under the same message-size reasoning as a chunk.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "ChunkCount",
/// "description": "Number of chunks in the bundle, equal to ceil(expectedSizeBytes / chunkSize). Bounded at 4096 so that the manifest itself — one digest per chunk — fits in the single document that carries it under the same message-size reasoning as a chunk.",
/// "type": "integer",
/// "maximum": 4096.0,
/// "minimum": 1.0
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct ChunkCount(pub ::std::num::NonZeroU64);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for ChunkCount {
type Target = ::std::num::NonZeroU64;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::num::NonZeroU64 {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<ChunkCount> for ::std::num::NonZeroU64 {
fn from(value: ChunkCount) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<::std::num::NonZeroU64> for ChunkCount {
fn from(value: ::std::num::NonZeroU64) -> Self {
Self(value)
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for ChunkCount {
type Err = <::std::num::NonZeroU64 as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Err> {
Ok(Self(value.parse()?))
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for ChunkCount {
type Error = <::std::num::NonZeroU64 as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<String> for ChunkCount {
type Error = <::std::num::NonZeroU64 as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn try_from(value: String) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::fmt::Display for ChunkCount {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> ::std::fmt::Result {
self.0.fmt(f)
}
}
/**
The terms of a `chunkedTrustTask` transfer, committed before any chunk moves. On export the recipient states them in the descriptor; on import the producer pre-commits them in the request and the recipient echoes them. Either way the manifest arrives in a document whose proof is REQUIRED, so the per-chunk digests are authenticated by the party that computed them and each chunk can be verified — and a single bad chunk re-fetched or refused — on arrival rather than only after reassembly.
Consistency rules JSON Schema cannot state: `chunkCount` MUST equal ceil(expectedSizeBytes / chunkSize) for the bundle the manifest describes, and `chunkDigests` MUST have exactly `chunkCount` items. A party receiving a manifest violating either MUST refuse it.*/
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "ChunkManifest",
/// "description": "The terms of a `chunkedTrustTask` transfer, committed before any chunk moves. On export the recipient states them in the descriptor; on import the producer pre-commits them in the request and the recipient echoes them. Either way the manifest arrives in a document whose proof is REQUIRED, so the per-chunk digests are authenticated by the party that computed them and each chunk can be verified — and a single bad chunk re-fetched or refused — on arrival rather than only after reassembly.\n\nConsistency rules JSON Schema cannot state: `chunkCount` MUST equal ceil(expectedSizeBytes / chunkSize) for the bundle the manifest describes, and `chunkDigests` MUST have exactly `chunkCount` items. A party receiving a manifest violating either MUST refuse it.",
/// "type": "object",
/// "required": [
/// "chunkCount",
/// "chunkDigests",
/// "chunkSize"
/// ],
/// "properties": {
/// "chunkCount": {
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/ChunkCount"
/// },
/// "chunkDigests": {
/// "description": "Digest of each chunk's raw bytes (not of its base64url encoding), in index order. Compared as decoded multihash bytes, never as encoded strings. sha2-256 is RECOMMENDED and MUST be implemented by every party; a party that does not implement the hash a digest names MUST treat the manifest as unverifiable rather than skip the check.",
/// "type": "array",
/// "items": {
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/DigestMultibase"
/// },
/// "maxItems": 4096,
/// "minItems": 1
/// },
/// "chunkSize": {
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/ChunkSize"
/// }
/// },
/// "additionalProperties": false
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub struct ChunkManifest {
#[serde(rename = "chunkCount")]
pub chunk_count: ChunkCount,
///Digest of each chunk's raw bytes (not of its base64url encoding), in index order. Compared as decoded multihash bytes, never as encoded strings. sha2-256 is RECOMMENDED and MUST be implemented by every party; a party that does not implement the hash a digest names MUST treat the manifest as unverifiable rather than skip the check.
#[serde(rename = "chunkDigests")]
pub chunk_digests: ::std::vec::Vec<DigestMultibase>,
#[serde(rename = "chunkSize")]
pub chunk_size: ChunkSize,
}
impl ChunkManifest {
pub fn builder() -> builder::ChunkManifest {
Default::default()
}
}
///Size in bytes of every chunk except the last, which carries the remainder and is between 1 and this value inclusive. The ceiling of 262144 (256 KiB) is normative and is derived in `vta/backup/initiate-export/1.1` under Chunked transfer: it is the largest power of two whose `get-chunk` or `put-chunk` document still fits a 1 MiB mediator message after base64url encoding of `data`, DIDComm authcrypt encoding, and two nested forward wrappers. The floor of 16384 keeps a 1 GiB bundle within `ChunkCount`'s ceiling at sizes a constrained transport can still choose.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "ChunkSize",
/// "description": "Size in bytes of every chunk except the last, which carries the remainder and is between 1 and this value inclusive. The ceiling of 262144 (256 KiB) is normative and is derived in `vta/backup/initiate-export/1.1` under Chunked transfer: it is the largest power of two whose `get-chunk` or `put-chunk` document still fits a 1 MiB mediator message after base64url encoding of `data`, DIDComm authcrypt encoding, and two nested forward wrappers. The floor of 16384 keeps a 1 GiB bundle within `ChunkCount`'s ceiling at sizes a constrained transport can still choose.",
/// "type": "integer",
/// "maximum": 262144.0,
/// "minimum": 16384.0
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct ChunkSize(pub i64);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for ChunkSize {
type Target = i64;
fn deref(&self) -> &i64 {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<ChunkSize> for i64 {
fn from(value: ChunkSize) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<i64> for ChunkSize {
fn from(value: i64) -> Self {
Self(value)
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for ChunkSize {
type Err = <i64 as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Err> {
Ok(Self(value.parse()?))
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for ChunkSize {
type Error = <i64 as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<String> for ChunkSize {
type Error = <i64 as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn try_from(value: String) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::fmt::Display for ChunkSize {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> ::std::fmt::Result {
self.0.fmt(f)
}
}
/**
A cryptographic digest as a multibase-encoded multihash — the encoding the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 defines for `digestMultibase`, and the one `did:webvh` uses for its SCID and entry hashes.
Multihash carries the hash algorithm in-band, so the value is self-describing and the wire format survives an algorithm change without a schema revision; multibase does the same for the base encoding, so a verifier never infers base58 from base64url by context. A bare hex string or a `sha-256:`-style prefix hard-codes one algorithm into the wire contract and is non-conforming here.
This definition constrains the *encoding only*. What the digest is computed over is stated by each referencing field, because it differs legitimately: a digest over a JSON document is taken over its RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization, while a digest over an opaque artifact is taken over its bytes. A field whose input is a JSON document and which does not name a canonicalization is not reproducible.
Restricted to the two multibase headers W3C Controlled Identifiers 1.0 §2.4 normatively requires — `z` (base58btc) and `u` (base64url-no-pad). CID permits others but states that "interoperability is not guaranteed between implementations using such values", and a registry whose purpose is interoperability should not mint digests a conforming verifier may be unable to read. The alphabets are enforced rather than assumed: base58btc excludes 0, O, I and l, and an earlier permissive pattern let three published examples carry digests that were not valid base58 at all. base58btc is RECOMMENDED, for consistency with `did:key` and `did:webvh`.*/
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "DigestMultibase",
/// "description": "A cryptographic digest as a multibase-encoded multihash — the encoding the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 defines for `digestMultibase`, and the one `did:webvh` uses for its SCID and entry hashes.\n\nMultihash carries the hash algorithm in-band, so the value is self-describing and the wire format survives an algorithm change without a schema revision; multibase does the same for the base encoding, so a verifier never infers base58 from base64url by context. A bare hex string or a `sha-256:`-style prefix hard-codes one algorithm into the wire contract and is non-conforming here.\n\nThis definition constrains the *encoding only*. What the digest is computed over is stated by each referencing field, because it differs legitimately: a digest over a JSON document is taken over its RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization, while a digest over an opaque artifact is taken over its bytes. A field whose input is a JSON document and which does not name a canonicalization is not reproducible.\n\nRestricted to the two multibase headers W3C Controlled Identifiers 1.0 §2.4 normatively requires — `z` (base58btc) and `u` (base64url-no-pad). CID permits others but states that \"interoperability is not guaranteed between implementations using such values\", and a registry whose purpose is interoperability should not mint digests a conforming verifier may be unable to read. The alphabets are enforced rather than assumed: base58btc excludes 0, O, I and l, and an earlier permissive pattern let three published examples carry digests that were not valid base58 at all. base58btc is RECOMMENDED, for consistency with `did:key` and `did:webvh`.",
/// "examples": [
/// "zQmbWqxBEKC3P8tqsKc98xmWNzrzDtRLMiMPL8wBuTGsMnR"
/// ],
/// "type": "string",
/// "minLength": 16,
/// "pattern": "^(z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+|u[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$"
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct DigestMultibase(::std::string::String);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for DigestMultibase {
type Target = ::std::string::String;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::string::String {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<DigestMultibase> for ::std::string::String {
fn from(value: DigestMultibase) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for DigestMultibase {
type Err = self::error::ConversionError;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
if value.chars().count() < 16usize {
return Err("shorter than 16 characters".into());
}
static PATTERN: ::std::sync::LazyLock<::regress::Regex> =
::std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| {
::regress::Regex::new("^(z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+|u[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$").unwrap()
});
if PATTERN.find(value).is_none() {
return Err(
"doesn't match pattern \"^(z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+|u[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$\"".into(),
);
}
Ok(Self(value.to_string()))
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for DigestMultibase {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&::std::string::String> for DigestMultibase {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: &::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<::std::string::String> for DigestMultibase {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: ::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl<'de> ::serde::Deserialize<'de> for DigestMultibase {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: ::serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
::std::string::String::deserialize(deserializer)?
.parse()
.map_err(|e: self::error::ConversionError| {
<D::Error as ::serde::de::Error>::custom(e.to_string())
})
}
}
///Total byte count of the bundle. A zero-length bundle is not a degenerate success — nothing was serialized — so the floor is 1.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "ExpectedSizeBytes",
/// "description": "Total byte count of the bundle. A zero-length bundle is not a degenerate success — nothing was serialized — so the floor is 1.",
/// "type": "integer",
/// "minimum": 1.0
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct ExpectedSizeBytes(pub ::std::num::NonZeroU64);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for ExpectedSizeBytes {
type Target = ::std::num::NonZeroU64;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::num::NonZeroU64 {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<ExpectedSizeBytes> for ::std::num::NonZeroU64 {
fn from(value: ExpectedSizeBytes) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<::std::num::NonZeroU64> for ExpectedSizeBytes {
fn from(value: ::std::num::NonZeroU64) -> Self {
Self(value)
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for ExpectedSizeBytes {
type Err = <::std::num::NonZeroU64 as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Err> {
Ok(Self(value.parse()?))
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for ExpectedSizeBytes {
type Error = <::std::num::NonZeroU64 as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<String> for ExpectedSizeBytes {
type Error = <::std::num::NonZeroU64 as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn try_from(value: String) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::fmt::Display for ExpectedSizeBytes {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> ::std::fmt::Result {
self.0.fmt(f)
}
}
///After which the bundle is collected: staged bytes discarded, tokens and chunk requests refused. Short by design. For a chunked transfer a recipient may move it later as chunks are exchanged, never past its own ceiling — each chunk response reports the current value.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "ExpiresAt",
/// "description": "After which the bundle is collected: staged bytes discarded, tokens and chunk requests refused. Short by design. For a chunked transfer a recipient may move it later as chunks are exchanged, never past its own ceiling — each chunk response reports the current value.",
/// "type": "string",
/// "format": "date-time"
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct ExpiresAt(pub ::chrono::DateTime<::chrono::offset::Utc>);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for ExpiresAt {
type Target = ::chrono::DateTime<::chrono::offset::Utc>;
fn deref(&self) -> &::chrono::DateTime<::chrono::offset::Utc> {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<ExpiresAt> for ::chrono::DateTime<::chrono::offset::Utc> {
fn from(value: ExpiresAt) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<::chrono::DateTime<::chrono::offset::Utc>> for ExpiresAt {
fn from(value: ::chrono::DateTime<::chrono::offset::Utc>) -> Self {
Self(value)
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for ExpiresAt {
type Err = <::chrono::DateTime<::chrono::offset::Utc> as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Err> {
Ok(Self(value.parse()?))
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for ExpiresAt {
type Error = <::chrono::DateTime<::chrono::offset::Utc> as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<String> for ExpiresAt {
type Error = <::chrono::DateTime<::chrono::offset::Utc> as ::std::str::FromStr>::Err;
fn try_from(value: String) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::fmt::Display for ExpiresAt {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> ::std::fmt::Result {
self.0.fmt(f)
}
}
///Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "Ext",
/// "description": "Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.",
/// "type": "object",
/// "minProperties": 1,
/// "additionalProperties": true,
/// "propertyNames": {
/// "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$"
/// }
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct Ext(pub ::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value>);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for Ext {
type Target = ::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value>;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value> {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<Ext> for ::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value> {
fn from(value: Ext) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value>> for Ext {
fn from(value: ::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value>) -> Self {
Self(value)
}
}
///`ExtKey`
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "type": "string",
/// "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$"
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct ExtKey(::std::string::String);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for ExtKey {
type Target = ::std::string::String;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::string::String {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<ExtKey> for ::std::string::String {
fn from(value: ExtKey) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for ExtKey {
type Err = self::error::ConversionError;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
static PATTERN: ::std::sync::LazyLock<::regress::Regex> =
::std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| {
::regress::Regex::new("^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$").unwrap()
});
if PATTERN.find(value).is_none() {
return Err("doesn't match pattern \"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$\"".into());
}
Ok(Self(value.to_string()))
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for ExtKey {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&::std::string::String> for ExtKey {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: &::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<::std::string::String> for ExtKey {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: ::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl<'de> ::serde::Deserialize<'de> for ExtKey {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: ::serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
::std::string::String::deserialize(deserializer)?
.parse()
.map_err(|e: self::error::ConversionError| {
<D::Error as ::serde::de::Error>::custom(e.to_string())
})
}
}
///Open a download of one blob committed in a data room: the host returns its ciphertext manifest and a handle for fetching its chunks. The outer document members are owned by the framework — SPEC §6.3.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "$id": "https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/blobs/get/0.1",
/// "title": "Payload",
/// "description": "Open a download of one blob committed in a data room: the host returns its ciphertext manifest and a handle for fetching its chunks. The outer document members are owned by the framework — SPEC §6.3.",
/// "type": "object",
/// "required": [
/// "blobRef",
/// "presentation",
/// "roomId"
/// ],
/// "properties": {
/// "blobRef": {
/// "description": "The blob to fetch, as the record's `blobs` member names it.",
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/BlobRef"
/// },
/// "ext": {
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/Ext"
/// },
/// "presentation": {
/// "description": "Must confer the `read` action at this room's scope. Its leaf's subject must be the party the host authenticated for this request.",
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/AuthorityPresentation"
/// },
/// "roomId": {
/// "description": "The room the blob belongs to. The host verifies the presentation against credentials this identifier issued.",
/// "type": "string",
/// "maxLength": 2048
/// }
/// },
/// "additionalProperties": false
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub struct Payload {
///The blob to fetch, as the record's `blobs` member names it.
#[serde(rename = "blobRef")]
pub blob_ref: BlobRef,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "::std::option::Option::is_none")]
pub ext: ::std::option::Option<Ext>,
///Must confer the `read` action at this room's scope. Its leaf's subject must be the party the host authenticated for this request.
pub presentation: AuthorityPresentation,
///The room the blob belongs to. The host verifies the presentation against credentials this identifier issued.
#[serde(rename = "roomId")]
pub room_id: PayloadRoomId,
}
impl Payload {
pub fn builder() -> builder::Payload {
Default::default()
}
}
///The room the blob belongs to. The host verifies the presentation against credentials this identifier issued.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "description": "The room the blob belongs to. The host verifies the presentation against credentials this identifier issued.",
/// "type": "string",
/// "maxLength": 2048
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct PayloadRoomId(::std::string::String);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for PayloadRoomId {
type Target = ::std::string::String;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::string::String {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<PayloadRoomId> for ::std::string::String {
fn from(value: PayloadRoomId) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for PayloadRoomId {
type Err = self::error::ConversionError;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
if value.chars().count() > 2048usize {
return Err("longer than 2048 characters".into());
}
Ok(Self(value.to_string()))
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for PayloadRoomId {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&::std::string::String> for PayloadRoomId {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: &::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<::std::string::String> for PayloadRoomId {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: ::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl<'de> ::serde::Deserialize<'de> for PayloadRoomId {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: ::serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
::std::string::String::deserialize(deserializer)?
.parse()
.map_err(|e: self::error::ConversionError| {
<D::Error as ::serde::de::Error>::custom(e.to_string())
})
}
}
///Success response to rooms/blobs/get. Type https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/blobs/get/0.1#response.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "Response",
/// "description": "Success response to rooms/blobs/get. Type https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/blobs/get/0.1#response.",
/// "type": "object",
/// "required": [
/// "downloadId",
/// "expiresAt",
/// "manifest"
/// ],
/// "properties": {
/// "downloadId": {
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/TransferId"
/// },
/// "expiresAt": {
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/ExpiresAt"
/// },
/// "ext": {
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/Ext"
/// },
/// "manifest": {
/// "description": "The ciphertext manifest committed at upload. A reader MUST check that its digest equals the requested BlobRef before relying on it, and every chunk against it on arrival.",
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/BlobManifest"
/// }
/// },
/// "additionalProperties": false,
/// "$anchor": "response"
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub struct Response {
#[serde(rename = "downloadId")]
pub download_id: TransferId,
#[serde(rename = "expiresAt")]
pub expires_at: ExpiresAt,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "::std::option::Option::is_none")]
pub ext: ::std::option::Option<Ext>,
///The ciphertext manifest committed at upload. A reader MUST check that its digest equals the requested BlobRef before relying on it, and every chunk against it on arrival.
pub manifest: BlobManifest,
}
impl Response {
pub fn builder() -> builder::Response {
Default::default()
}
}
///Handle for one upload (begin → chunk → commit or abort) or one download (get → chunk). Host-generated and unguessable, which is what lets a reference to another party's transfer be answered as not-found without confirming that it exists. Bound at creation to the party that opened it: the subject the host authenticated for the opening request. Opaque: a producer quotes what it was given.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "TransferId",
/// "description": "Handle for one upload (begin → chunk → commit or abort) or one download (get → chunk). Host-generated and unguessable, which is what lets a reference to another party's transfer be answered as not-found without confirming that it exists. Bound at creation to the party that opened it: the subject the host authenticated for the opening request. Opaque: a producer quotes what it was given.",
/// "type": "string",
/// "pattern": "^[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}$"
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct TransferId(::std::string::String);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for TransferId {
type Target = ::std::string::String;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::string::String {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<TransferId> for ::std::string::String {
fn from(value: TransferId) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for TransferId {
type Err = self::error::ConversionError;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
static PATTERN: ::std::sync::LazyLock<::regress::Regex> =
::std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| {
::regress::Regex::new(
"^[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}$",
)
.unwrap()
});
if PATTERN.find(value).is_none() {
return Err(
"doesn't match pattern \"^[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}$\""
.into(),
);
}
Ok(Self(value.to_string()))
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for TransferId {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&::std::string::String> for TransferId {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: &::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<::std::string::String> for TransferId {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: ::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl<'de> ::serde::Deserialize<'de> for TransferId {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: ::serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
::std::string::String::deserialize(deserializer)?
.parse()
.map_err(|e: self::error::ConversionError| {
<D::Error as ::serde::de::Error>::custom(e.to_string())
})
}
}
/// Types for composing complex structures.
pub mod builder {
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct AuthorityPresentation {
authority:
::std::result::Result<::std::vec::Vec<::std::string::String>, ::std::string::String>,
membership: ::std::result::Result<::std::string::String, ::std::string::String>,
subject_binding: ::std::result::Result<
::std::option::Option<::std::string::String>,
::std::string::String,
>,
}
impl ::std::default::Default for AuthorityPresentation {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
authority: Err("no value supplied for authority".to_string()),
membership: Err("no value supplied for membership".to_string()),
subject_binding: Ok(Default::default()),
}
}
}
impl AuthorityPresentation {
pub fn authority<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::vec::Vec<::std::string::String>>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.authority = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for authority: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn membership<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::string::String>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.membership = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for membership: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn subject_binding<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::option::Option<::std::string::String>>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.subject_binding = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for subject_binding: {e}"));
self
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<AuthorityPresentation> for super::AuthorityPresentation {
type Error = super::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: AuthorityPresentation,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, super::error::ConversionError> {
Ok(Self {
authority: value.authority?,
membership: value.membership?,
subject_binding: value.subject_binding?,
})
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<super::AuthorityPresentation> for AuthorityPresentation {
fn from(value: super::AuthorityPresentation) -> Self {
Self {
authority: Ok(value.authority),
membership: Ok(value.membership),
subject_binding: Ok(value.subject_binding),
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct BlobManifest {
chunks: ::std::result::Result<super::ChunkManifest, ::std::string::String>,
digest: ::std::result::Result<super::DigestMultibase, ::std::string::String>,
size: ::std::result::Result<super::ExpectedSizeBytes, ::std::string::String>,
}
impl ::std::default::Default for BlobManifest {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
chunks: Err("no value supplied for chunks".to_string()),
digest: Err("no value supplied for digest".to_string()),
size: Err("no value supplied for size".to_string()),
}
}
}
impl BlobManifest {
pub fn chunks<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<super::ChunkManifest>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.chunks = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for chunks: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn digest<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<super::DigestMultibase>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.digest = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for digest: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn size<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<super::ExpectedSizeBytes>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.size = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for size: {e}"));
self
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<BlobManifest> for super::BlobManifest {
type Error = super::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: BlobManifest,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, super::error::ConversionError> {
Ok(Self {
chunks: value.chunks?,
digest: value.digest?,
size: value.size?,
})
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<super::BlobManifest> for BlobManifest {
fn from(value: super::BlobManifest) -> Self {
Self {
chunks: Ok(value.chunks),
digest: Ok(value.digest),
size: Ok(value.size),
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ChunkManifest {
chunk_count: ::std::result::Result<super::ChunkCount, ::std::string::String>,
chunk_digests:
::std::result::Result<::std::vec::Vec<super::DigestMultibase>, ::std::string::String>,
chunk_size: ::std::result::Result<super::ChunkSize, ::std::string::String>,
}
impl ::std::default::Default for ChunkManifest {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
chunk_count: Err("no value supplied for chunk_count".to_string()),
chunk_digests: Err("no value supplied for chunk_digests".to_string()),
chunk_size: Err("no value supplied for chunk_size".to_string()),
}
}
}
impl ChunkManifest {
pub fn chunk_count<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<super::ChunkCount>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.chunk_count = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for chunk_count: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn chunk_digests<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::vec::Vec<super::DigestMultibase>>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.chunk_digests = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for chunk_digests: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn chunk_size<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<super::ChunkSize>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.chunk_size = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for chunk_size: {e}"));
self
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<ChunkManifest> for super::ChunkManifest {
type Error = super::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: ChunkManifest,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, super::error::ConversionError> {
Ok(Self {
chunk_count: value.chunk_count?,
chunk_digests: value.chunk_digests?,
chunk_size: value.chunk_size?,
})
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<super::ChunkManifest> for ChunkManifest {
fn from(value: super::ChunkManifest) -> Self {
Self {
chunk_count: Ok(value.chunk_count),
chunk_digests: Ok(value.chunk_digests),
chunk_size: Ok(value.chunk_size),
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct Payload {
blob_ref: ::std::result::Result<super::BlobRef, ::std::string::String>,
ext: ::std::result::Result<::std::option::Option<super::Ext>, ::std::string::String>,
presentation: ::std::result::Result<super::AuthorityPresentation, ::std::string::String>,
room_id: ::std::result::Result<super::PayloadRoomId, ::std::string::String>,
}
impl ::std::default::Default for Payload {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
blob_ref: Err("no value supplied for blob_ref".to_string()),
ext: Ok(Default::default()),
presentation: Err("no value supplied for presentation".to_string()),
room_id: Err("no value supplied for room_id".to_string()),
}
}
}
impl Payload {
pub fn blob_ref<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<super::BlobRef>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.blob_ref = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for blob_ref: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn ext<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::option::Option<super::Ext>>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.ext = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for ext: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn presentation<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<super::AuthorityPresentation>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.presentation = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for presentation: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn room_id<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<super::PayloadRoomId>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.room_id = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for room_id: {e}"));
self
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<Payload> for super::Payload {
type Error = super::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: Payload) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, super::error::ConversionError> {
Ok(Self {
blob_ref: value.blob_ref?,
ext: value.ext?,
presentation: value.presentation?,
room_id: value.room_id?,
})
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<super::Payload> for Payload {
fn from(value: super::Payload) -> Self {
Self {
blob_ref: Ok(value.blob_ref),
ext: Ok(value.ext),
presentation: Ok(value.presentation),
room_id: Ok(value.room_id),
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct Response {
download_id: ::std::result::Result<super::TransferId, ::std::string::String>,
expires_at: ::std::result::Result<super::ExpiresAt, ::std::string::String>,
ext: ::std::result::Result<::std::option::Option<super::Ext>, ::std::string::String>,
manifest: ::std::result::Result<super::BlobManifest, ::std::string::String>,
}
impl ::std::default::Default for Response {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
download_id: Err("no value supplied for download_id".to_string()),
expires_at: Err("no value supplied for expires_at".to_string()),
ext: Ok(Default::default()),
manifest: Err("no value supplied for manifest".to_string()),
}
}
}
impl Response {
pub fn download_id<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<super::TransferId>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.download_id = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for download_id: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn expires_at<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<super::ExpiresAt>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.expires_at = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for expires_at: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn ext<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::option::Option<super::Ext>>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.ext = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for ext: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn manifest<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<super::BlobManifest>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.manifest = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for manifest: {e}"));
self
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<Response> for super::Response {
type Error = super::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: Response) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, super::error::ConversionError> {
Ok(Self {
download_id: value.download_id?,
expires_at: value.expires_at?,
ext: value.ext?,
manifest: value.manifest?,
})
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<super::Response> for Response {
fn from(value: super::Response) -> Self {
Self {
download_id: Ok(value.download_id),
expires_at: Ok(value.expires_at),
ext: Ok(value.ext),
manifest: Ok(value.manifest),
}
}
}
}
impl crate::Payload for Payload {
const TYPE_URI: &'static str = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/blobs/get/0.1";
const IS_PROOF_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const IS_ISSUED_AT_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const IS_RECIPIENT_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: Option<&'static str> = Some(
"{\n \"$defs\": {\n \"AuthorityPresentation\": {\n \"additionalProperties\": false,\n \"description\": \"What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\",\n \"properties\": {\n \"authority\": {\n \"description\": \"The authority chain, LEAF FIRST: the first element is the credential being relied on and the last MUST be one issued by the room itself. Every link the presenter relies on is present, because the host will not fetch one. Capped at 8: verification is linear in chain length and runs on every operation, so an unbounded chain is a denial-of-service surface against the host. The known uses need 2 to 3 — a person attenuating to an agent, and that agent to a sub-agent.\",\n \"items\": {\n \"type\": \"string\"\n },\n \"maxItems\": 8,\n \"minItems\": 1,\n \"type\": \"array\"\n },\n \"membership\": {\n \"description\": \"The presenter's membership credential for this room, or — on a `private` room — a zero-knowledge presentation of it. Serialized per the governing profile.\",\n \"type\": \"string\"\n },\n \"subjectBinding\": {\n \"description\": \"REQUIRED on a `private` room, where the subject identifier is withheld: a proof that the membership credential and the authority chain's leaf describe the SAME subject. Without it two parties pool credentials — one contributes membership, the other authority — and the combination verifies as a single party holding both. A host MUST refuse a private-room presentation that omits this.\",\n \"type\": \"string\"\n }\n },\n \"required\": [\n \"membership\",\n \"authority\"\n ],\n \"title\": \"AuthorityPresentation\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n },\n \"BlobManifest\": {\n \"additionalProperties\": false,\n \"description\": \"The ciphertext manifest of one blob, committed by the uploader before any byte moves. Its digest is the BlobRef. Every chunk is checked against `chunks.chunkDigests` on arrival and the reassembled blob against `digest`, so a host can neither accept nor serve bytes the uploader did not commit to. The manifest also appears, by its BlobRef, inside the sealed FileManifest the author signs; a reader who opens the record therefore knows which ciphertext its author meant, and a host cannot substitute a different blob under the same record.\\n\\nConsistency rules JSON Schema cannot state: `chunks.chunkCount` MUST equal ceil(size / chunks.chunkSize), and `chunks.chunkDigests` MUST have exactly `chunkCount` items. A party receiving a manifest violating either MUST refuse it.\\n\\nEach transfer chunk is exactly one sealed STREAM segment (see FileManifest): every chunk but the last is `chunkSize` bytes, and `chunkSize` is the plaintext segment size plus the 16-byte AEAD tag. The 262144-byte ceiling of ChunkSize therefore puts the largest plaintext segment at 262128 bytes, and the 4096-chunk ceiling of ChunkCount puts the largest blob at 1 GiB of ciphertext.\",\n \"properties\": {\n \"chunks\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/ChunkManifest\"\n },\n \"digest\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/DigestMultibase\",\n \"description\": \"Digest of the whole ciphertext, over its bytes. Checked after reassembly, so a correct set of chunks in the wrong order is still caught.\"\n },\n \"size\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/ExpectedSizeBytes\",\n \"description\": \"Ciphertext bytes, padding included. What the host stores, and what every limit and usage figure is stated in.\"\n }\n },\n \"required\": [\n \"size\",\n \"chunks\",\n \"digest\"\n ],\n \"title\": \"BlobManifest\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n },\n \"BlobRef\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/DigestMultibase\",\n \"description\": \"The name of one blob: the digest of its BlobManifest, taken over the manifest's RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization. sha2-256 is RECOMMENDED and MUST be implemented. Content addressing over ciphertext, never plaintext, so a BlobRef says nothing about what the file contains, and two uploads of one file have different BlobRefs (a fresh `fileId` gives a different key, and so different ciphertext). Rooms cannot be correlated by the files they share. Compared as decoded multihash bytes, never as encoded strings. A BlobRef is defined over the manifest's JSON, as this schema states it and RFC 8785 canonicalizes it, never over any binding's generated type: two bindings that model the manifest as distinct types still compute the same BlobRef from the same JSON.\",\n \"title\": \"BlobRef\"\n },\n \"ChunkCount\": {\n \"description\": \"Number of chunks in the bundle, equal to ceil(expectedSizeBytes / chunkSize). Bounded at 4096 so that the manifest itself — one digest per chunk — fits in the single document that carries it under the same message-size reasoning as a chunk.\",\n \"maximum\": 4096,\n \"minimum\": 1,\n \"title\": \"ChunkCount\",\n \"type\": \"integer\"\n },\n \"ChunkManifest\": {\n \"additionalProperties\": false,\n \"description\": \"The terms of a `chunkedTrustTask` transfer, committed before any chunk moves. On export the recipient states them in the descriptor; on import the producer pre-commits them in the request and the recipient echoes them. Either way the manifest arrives in a document whose proof is REQUIRED, so the per-chunk digests are authenticated by the party that computed them and each chunk can be verified — and a single bad chunk re-fetched or refused — on arrival rather than only after reassembly.\\n\\nConsistency rules JSON Schema cannot state: `chunkCount` MUST equal ceil(expectedSizeBytes / chunkSize) for the bundle the manifest describes, and `chunkDigests` MUST have exactly `chunkCount` items. A party receiving a manifest violating either MUST refuse it.\",\n \"properties\": {\n \"chunkCount\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/ChunkCount\"\n },\n \"chunkDigests\": {\n \"description\": \"Digest of each chunk's raw bytes (not of its base64url encoding), in index order. Compared as decoded multihash bytes, never as encoded strings. sha2-256 is RECOMMENDED and MUST be implemented by every party; a party that does not implement the hash a digest names MUST treat the manifest as unverifiable rather than skip the check.\",\n \"items\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/DigestMultibase\"\n },\n \"maxItems\": 4096,\n \"minItems\": 1,\n \"type\": \"array\"\n },\n \"chunkSize\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/ChunkSize\"\n }\n },\n \"required\": [\n \"chunkSize\",\n \"chunkCount\",\n \"chunkDigests\"\n ],\n \"title\": \"ChunkManifest\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n },\n \"ChunkSize\": {\n \"description\": \"Size in bytes of every chunk except the last, which carries the remainder and is between 1 and this value inclusive. The ceiling of 262144 (256 KiB) is normative and is derived in `vta/backup/initiate-export/1.1` under Chunked transfer: it is the largest power of two whose `get-chunk` or `put-chunk` document still fits a 1 MiB mediator message after base64url encoding of `data`, DIDComm authcrypt encoding, and two nested forward wrappers. The floor of 16384 keeps a 1 GiB bundle within `ChunkCount`'s ceiling at sizes a constrained transport can still choose.\",\n \"maximum\": 262144,\n \"minimum\": 16384,\n \"title\": \"ChunkSize\",\n \"type\": \"integer\"\n },\n \"DigestMultibase\": {\n \"description\": \"A cryptographic digest as a multibase-encoded multihash — the encoding the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 defines for `digestMultibase`, and the one `did:webvh` uses for its SCID and entry hashes.\\n\\nMultihash carries the hash algorithm in-band, so the value is self-describing and the wire format survives an algorithm change without a schema revision; multibase does the same for the base encoding, so a verifier never infers base58 from base64url by context. A bare hex string or a `sha-256:`-style prefix hard-codes one algorithm into the wire contract and is non-conforming here.\\n\\nThis definition constrains the *encoding only*. What the digest is computed over is stated by each referencing field, because it differs legitimately: a digest over a JSON document is taken over its RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization, while a digest over an opaque artifact is taken over its bytes. A field whose input is a JSON document and which does not name a canonicalization is not reproducible.\\n\\nRestricted to the two multibase headers W3C Controlled Identifiers 1.0 §2.4 normatively requires — `z` (base58btc) and `u` (base64url-no-pad). CID permits others but states that \\\"interoperability is not guaranteed between implementations using such values\\\", and a registry whose purpose is interoperability should not mint digests a conforming verifier may be unable to read. The alphabets are enforced rather than assumed: base58btc excludes 0, O, I and l, and an earlier permissive pattern let three published examples carry digests that were not valid base58 at all. base58btc is RECOMMENDED, for consistency with `did:key` and `did:webvh`.\",\n \"examples\": [\n \"zQmbWqxBEKC3P8tqsKc98xmWNzrzDtRLMiMPL8wBuTGsMnR\"\n ],\n \"minLength\": 16,\n \"pattern\": \"^(z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+|u[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$\",\n \"title\": \"DigestMultibase\",\n \"type\": \"string\"\n },\n \"ExpectedSizeBytes\": {\n \"description\": \"Total byte count of the bundle. A zero-length bundle is not a degenerate success — nothing was serialized — so the floor is 1.\",\n \"minimum\": 1,\n \"title\": \"ExpectedSizeBytes\",\n \"type\": \"integer\"\n },\n \"ExpiresAt\": {\n \"description\": \"After which the bundle is collected: staged bytes discarded, tokens and chunk requests refused. Short by design. For a chunked transfer a recipient may move it later as chunks are exchanged, never past its own ceiling — each chunk response reports the current value.\",\n \"format\": \"date-time\",\n \"title\": \"ExpiresAt\",\n \"type\": \"string\"\n },\n \"Ext\": {\n \"additionalProperties\": true,\n \"description\": \"Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.\",\n \"minProperties\": 1,\n \"propertyNames\": {\n \"pattern\": \"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$\"\n },\n \"title\": \"Ext\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n },\n \"Response\": {\n \"$anchor\": \"response\",\n \"additionalProperties\": false,\n \"description\": \"Success response to rooms/blobs/get. Type https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/blobs/get/0.1#response.\",\n \"properties\": {\n \"downloadId\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/TransferId\"\n },\n \"expiresAt\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/ExpiresAt\"\n },\n \"ext\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/Ext\"\n },\n \"manifest\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/BlobManifest\",\n \"description\": \"The ciphertext manifest committed at upload. A reader MUST check that its digest equals the requested BlobRef before relying on it, and every chunk against it on arrival.\"\n }\n },\n \"required\": [\n \"manifest\",\n \"downloadId\",\n \"expiresAt\"\n ],\n \"title\": \"Rooms Blobs — Get — response payload\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n },\n \"TransferId\": {\n \"description\": \"Handle for one upload (begin → chunk → commit or abort) or one download (get → chunk). Host-generated and unguessable, which is what lets a reference to another party's transfer be answered as not-found without confirming that it exists. Bound at creation to the party that opened it: the subject the host authenticated for the opening request. Opaque: a producer quotes what it was given.\",\n \"pattern\": \"^[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}$\",\n \"title\": \"TransferId\",\n \"type\": \"string\"\n }\n },\n \"$id\": \"https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/blobs/get/0.1\",\n \"$schema\": \"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema\",\n \"additionalProperties\": false,\n \"description\": \"Open a download of one blob committed in a data room: the host returns its ciphertext manifest and a handle for fetching its chunks. The outer document members are owned by the framework — SPEC §6.3.\",\n \"properties\": {\n \"blobRef\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/BlobRef\",\n \"description\": \"The blob to fetch, as the record's `blobs` member names it.\"\n },\n \"ext\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/Ext\"\n },\n \"presentation\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/AuthorityPresentation\",\n \"description\": \"Must confer the `read` action at this room's scope. Its leaf's subject must be the party the host authenticated for this request.\"\n },\n \"roomId\": {\n \"description\": \"The room the blob belongs to. The host verifies the presentation against credentials this identifier issued.\",\n \"maxLength\": 2048,\n \"type\": \"string\"\n }\n },\n \"required\": [\n \"roomId\",\n \"presentation\",\n \"blobRef\"\n ],\n \"title\": \"Rooms Blobs — Get — payload\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n}\n",
);
}
impl crate::Payload for Response {
const TYPE_URI: &'static str = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/blobs/get/0.1#response";
const IS_ISSUED_AT_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const IS_RECIPIENT_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: Option<&'static str> = Some(
"{\n \"$defs\": {\n \"AuthorityPresentation\": {\n \"additionalProperties\": false,\n \"description\": \"What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\",\n \"properties\": {\n \"authority\": {\n \"description\": \"The authority chain, LEAF FIRST: the first element is the credential being relied on and the last MUST be one issued by the room itself. Every link the presenter relies on is present, because the host will not fetch one. Capped at 8: verification is linear in chain length and runs on every operation, so an unbounded chain is a denial-of-service surface against the host. The known uses need 2 to 3 — a person attenuating to an agent, and that agent to a sub-agent.\",\n \"items\": {\n \"type\": \"string\"\n },\n \"maxItems\": 8,\n \"minItems\": 1,\n \"type\": \"array\"\n },\n \"membership\": {\n \"description\": \"The presenter's membership credential for this room, or — on a `private` room — a zero-knowledge presentation of it. Serialized per the governing profile.\",\n \"type\": \"string\"\n },\n \"subjectBinding\": {\n \"description\": \"REQUIRED on a `private` room, where the subject identifier is withheld: a proof that the membership credential and the authority chain's leaf describe the SAME subject. Without it two parties pool credentials — one contributes membership, the other authority — and the combination verifies as a single party holding both. A host MUST refuse a private-room presentation that omits this.\",\n \"type\": \"string\"\n }\n },\n \"required\": [\n \"membership\",\n \"authority\"\n ],\n \"title\": \"AuthorityPresentation\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n },\n \"BlobManifest\": {\n \"additionalProperties\": false,\n \"description\": \"The ciphertext manifest of one blob, committed by the uploader before any byte moves. Its digest is the BlobRef. Every chunk is checked against `chunks.chunkDigests` on arrival and the reassembled blob against `digest`, so a host can neither accept nor serve bytes the uploader did not commit to. The manifest also appears, by its BlobRef, inside the sealed FileManifest the author signs; a reader who opens the record therefore knows which ciphertext its author meant, and a host cannot substitute a different blob under the same record.\\n\\nConsistency rules JSON Schema cannot state: `chunks.chunkCount` MUST equal ceil(size / chunks.chunkSize), and `chunks.chunkDigests` MUST have exactly `chunkCount` items. A party receiving a manifest violating either MUST refuse it.\\n\\nEach transfer chunk is exactly one sealed STREAM segment (see FileManifest): every chunk but the last is `chunkSize` bytes, and `chunkSize` is the plaintext segment size plus the 16-byte AEAD tag. The 262144-byte ceiling of ChunkSize therefore puts the largest plaintext segment at 262128 bytes, and the 4096-chunk ceiling of ChunkCount puts the largest blob at 1 GiB of ciphertext.\",\n \"properties\": {\n \"chunks\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/ChunkManifest\"\n },\n \"digest\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/DigestMultibase\",\n \"description\": \"Digest of the whole ciphertext, over its bytes. Checked after reassembly, so a correct set of chunks in the wrong order is still caught.\"\n },\n \"size\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/ExpectedSizeBytes\",\n \"description\": \"Ciphertext bytes, padding included. What the host stores, and what every limit and usage figure is stated in.\"\n }\n },\n \"required\": [\n \"size\",\n \"chunks\",\n \"digest\"\n ],\n \"title\": \"BlobManifest\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n },\n \"BlobRef\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/DigestMultibase\",\n \"description\": \"The name of one blob: the digest of its BlobManifest, taken over the manifest's RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization. sha2-256 is RECOMMENDED and MUST be implemented. Content addressing over ciphertext, never plaintext, so a BlobRef says nothing about what the file contains, and two uploads of one file have different BlobRefs (a fresh `fileId` gives a different key, and so different ciphertext). Rooms cannot be correlated by the files they share. Compared as decoded multihash bytes, never as encoded strings. A BlobRef is defined over the manifest's JSON, as this schema states it and RFC 8785 canonicalizes it, never over any binding's generated type: two bindings that model the manifest as distinct types still compute the same BlobRef from the same JSON.\",\n \"title\": \"BlobRef\"\n },\n \"ChunkCount\": {\n \"description\": \"Number of chunks in the bundle, equal to ceil(expectedSizeBytes / chunkSize). Bounded at 4096 so that the manifest itself — one digest per chunk — fits in the single document that carries it under the same message-size reasoning as a chunk.\",\n \"maximum\": 4096,\n \"minimum\": 1,\n \"title\": \"ChunkCount\",\n \"type\": \"integer\"\n },\n \"ChunkManifest\": {\n \"additionalProperties\": false,\n \"description\": \"The terms of a `chunkedTrustTask` transfer, committed before any chunk moves. On export the recipient states them in the descriptor; on import the producer pre-commits them in the request and the recipient echoes them. Either way the manifest arrives in a document whose proof is REQUIRED, so the per-chunk digests are authenticated by the party that computed them and each chunk can be verified — and a single bad chunk re-fetched or refused — on arrival rather than only after reassembly.\\n\\nConsistency rules JSON Schema cannot state: `chunkCount` MUST equal ceil(expectedSizeBytes / chunkSize) for the bundle the manifest describes, and `chunkDigests` MUST have exactly `chunkCount` items. A party receiving a manifest violating either MUST refuse it.\",\n \"properties\": {\n \"chunkCount\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/ChunkCount\"\n },\n \"chunkDigests\": {\n \"description\": \"Digest of each chunk's raw bytes (not of its base64url encoding), in index order. Compared as decoded multihash bytes, never as encoded strings. sha2-256 is RECOMMENDED and MUST be implemented by every party; a party that does not implement the hash a digest names MUST treat the manifest as unverifiable rather than skip the check.\",\n \"items\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/DigestMultibase\"\n },\n \"maxItems\": 4096,\n \"minItems\": 1,\n \"type\": \"array\"\n },\n \"chunkSize\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/ChunkSize\"\n }\n },\n \"required\": [\n \"chunkSize\",\n \"chunkCount\",\n \"chunkDigests\"\n ],\n \"title\": \"ChunkManifest\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n },\n \"ChunkSize\": {\n \"description\": \"Size in bytes of every chunk except the last, which carries the remainder and is between 1 and this value inclusive. The ceiling of 262144 (256 KiB) is normative and is derived in `vta/backup/initiate-export/1.1` under Chunked transfer: it is the largest power of two whose `get-chunk` or `put-chunk` document still fits a 1 MiB mediator message after base64url encoding of `data`, DIDComm authcrypt encoding, and two nested forward wrappers. The floor of 16384 keeps a 1 GiB bundle within `ChunkCount`'s ceiling at sizes a constrained transport can still choose.\",\n \"maximum\": 262144,\n \"minimum\": 16384,\n \"title\": \"ChunkSize\",\n \"type\": \"integer\"\n },\n \"DigestMultibase\": {\n \"description\": \"A cryptographic digest as a multibase-encoded multihash — the encoding the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 defines for `digestMultibase`, and the one `did:webvh` uses for its SCID and entry hashes.\\n\\nMultihash carries the hash algorithm in-band, so the value is self-describing and the wire format survives an algorithm change without a schema revision; multibase does the same for the base encoding, so a verifier never infers base58 from base64url by context. A bare hex string or a `sha-256:`-style prefix hard-codes one algorithm into the wire contract and is non-conforming here.\\n\\nThis definition constrains the *encoding only*. What the digest is computed over is stated by each referencing field, because it differs legitimately: a digest over a JSON document is taken over its RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization, while a digest over an opaque artifact is taken over its bytes. A field whose input is a JSON document and which does not name a canonicalization is not reproducible.\\n\\nRestricted to the two multibase headers W3C Controlled Identifiers 1.0 §2.4 normatively requires — `z` (base58btc) and `u` (base64url-no-pad). CID permits others but states that \\\"interoperability is not guaranteed between implementations using such values\\\", and a registry whose purpose is interoperability should not mint digests a conforming verifier may be unable to read. The alphabets are enforced rather than assumed: base58btc excludes 0, O, I and l, and an earlier permissive pattern let three published examples carry digests that were not valid base58 at all. base58btc is RECOMMENDED, for consistency with `did:key` and `did:webvh`.\",\n \"examples\": [\n \"zQmbWqxBEKC3P8tqsKc98xmWNzrzDtRLMiMPL8wBuTGsMnR\"\n ],\n \"minLength\": 16,\n \"pattern\": \"^(z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+|u[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$\",\n \"title\": \"DigestMultibase\",\n \"type\": \"string\"\n },\n \"ExpectedSizeBytes\": {\n \"description\": \"Total byte count of the bundle. A zero-length bundle is not a degenerate success — nothing was serialized — so the floor is 1.\",\n \"minimum\": 1,\n \"title\": \"ExpectedSizeBytes\",\n \"type\": \"integer\"\n },\n \"ExpiresAt\": {\n \"description\": \"After which the bundle is collected: staged bytes discarded, tokens and chunk requests refused. Short by design. For a chunked transfer a recipient may move it later as chunks are exchanged, never past its own ceiling — each chunk response reports the current value.\",\n \"format\": \"date-time\",\n \"title\": \"ExpiresAt\",\n \"type\": \"string\"\n },\n \"Ext\": {\n \"additionalProperties\": true,\n \"description\": \"Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.\",\n \"minProperties\": 1,\n \"propertyNames\": {\n \"pattern\": \"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$\"\n },\n \"title\": \"Ext\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n },\n \"Response\": {\n \"$anchor\": \"response\",\n \"additionalProperties\": false,\n \"description\": \"Success response to rooms/blobs/get. Type https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/blobs/get/0.1#response.\",\n \"properties\": {\n \"downloadId\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/TransferId\"\n },\n \"expiresAt\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/ExpiresAt\"\n },\n \"ext\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/Ext\"\n },\n \"manifest\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/BlobManifest\",\n \"description\": \"The ciphertext manifest committed at upload. A reader MUST check that its digest equals the requested BlobRef before relying on it, and every chunk against it on arrival.\"\n }\n },\n \"required\": [\n \"manifest\",\n \"downloadId\",\n \"expiresAt\"\n ],\n \"title\": \"Rooms Blobs — Get — response payload\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n },\n \"TransferId\": {\n \"description\": \"Handle for one upload (begin → chunk → commit or abort) or one download (get → chunk). Host-generated and unguessable, which is what lets a reference to another party's transfer be answered as not-found without confirming that it exists. Bound at creation to the party that opened it: the subject the host authenticated for the opening request. Opaque: a producer quotes what it was given.\",\n \"pattern\": \"^[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}$\",\n \"title\": \"TransferId\",\n \"type\": \"string\"\n }\n },\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/Response\",\n \"$schema\": \"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema\"\n}\n",
);
}
impl crate::RequestPayload for Payload {
type Response = Response;
}
/// The extended error codes this specification declares (SPEC §7.3 item 9,
/// §8.5), in declaration order. Empty when it declares none.
pub const ERROR_CODES: &[crate::DeclaredErrorCode] = &[error_codes::NOT_FOUND];
/// One constant per extended error code this specification declares
/// (SPEC §7.3 item 9), named for its local part.
///
/// Emit these rather than a string literal: the code is read from the
/// specification, so it cannot name a code the specification never
/// declared.
pub mod error_codes {
/// `rooms/blobs/get:notFound`
///
/// No blob with this BlobRef is committed in this room. Says nothing about whether one exists in another room.
///
/// Declared `retryable: false`.
pub const NOT_FOUND: crate::DeclaredErrorCode = crate::DeclaredErrorCode {
code: "rooms/blobs/get:notFound",
retryable: false,
details_schema: ::core::option::Option::None,
};
}