//! Generated by `trust-tasks-codegen` — do not edit by hand.
//!
//! Spec slug: `witness/session/submit`. Version: `0.1`.
#[allow(unused_imports)]
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
/// Error types.
pub mod error {
/// Error from a `TryFrom` or `FromStr` implementation.
pub struct ConversionError(::std::borrow::Cow<'static, str>);
impl ::std::error::Error for ConversionError {}
impl ::std::fmt::Display for ConversionError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), ::std::fmt::Error> {
::std::fmt::Display::fmt(&self.0, f)
}
}
impl ::std::fmt::Debug for ConversionError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), ::std::fmt::Error> {
::std::fmt::Debug::fmt(&self.0, f)
}
}
impl From<&'static str> for ConversionError {
fn from(value: &'static str) -> Self {
Self(value.into())
}
}
impl From<String> for ConversionError {
fn from(value: String) -> Self {
Self(value.into())
}
}
}
/**
A cryptographic digest as a multibase-encoded multihash — the encoding the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 defines for `digestMultibase`, and the one `did:webvh` uses for its SCID and entry hashes.
Multihash carries the hash algorithm in-band, so the value is self-describing and the wire format survives an algorithm change without a schema revision; multibase does the same for the base encoding, so a verifier never infers base58 from base64url by context. A bare hex string or a `sha-256:`-style prefix hard-codes one algorithm into the wire contract and is non-conforming here.
This definition constrains the *encoding only*. What the digest is computed over is stated by each referencing field, because it differs legitimately: a digest over a JSON document is taken over its RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization, while a digest over an opaque artifact is taken over its bytes. A field whose input is a JSON document and which does not name a canonicalization is not reproducible.
Restricted to the two multibase headers W3C Controlled Identifiers 1.0 §2.4 normatively requires — `z` (base58btc) and `u` (base64url-no-pad). CID permits others but states that "interoperability is not guaranteed between implementations using such values", and a registry whose purpose is interoperability should not mint digests a conforming verifier may be unable to read. The alphabets are enforced rather than assumed: base58btc excludes 0, O, I and l, and an earlier permissive pattern let three published examples carry digests that were not valid base58 at all. base58btc is RECOMMENDED, for consistency with `did:key` and `did:webvh`.*/
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "DigestMultibase",
/// "description": "\nA cryptographic digest as a multibase-encoded multihash — the encoding the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 defines for `digestMultibase`, and the one `did:webvh` uses for its SCID and entry hashes.\n\nMultihash carries the hash algorithm in-band, so the value is self-describing and the wire format survives an algorithm change without a schema revision; multibase does the same for the base encoding, so a verifier never infers base58 from base64url by context. A bare hex string or a `sha-256:`-style prefix hard-codes one algorithm into the wire contract and is non-conforming here.\n\nThis definition constrains the *encoding only*. What the digest is computed over is stated by each referencing field, because it differs legitimately: a digest over a JSON document is taken over its RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization, while a digest over an opaque artifact is taken over its bytes. A field whose input is a JSON document and which does not name a canonicalization is not reproducible.\n\nRestricted to the two multibase headers W3C Controlled Identifiers 1.0 §2.4 normatively requires — `z` (base58btc) and `u` (base64url-no-pad). CID permits others but states that \"interoperability is not guaranteed between implementations using such values\", and a registry whose purpose is interoperability should not mint digests a conforming verifier may be unable to read. The alphabets are enforced rather than assumed: base58btc excludes 0, O, I and l, and an earlier permissive pattern let three published examples carry digests that were not valid base58 at all. base58btc is RECOMMENDED, for consistency with `did:key` and `did:webvh`.",
/// "examples": [
/// "zQmbWqxBEKC3P8tqsKc98xmWNzrzDtRLMiMPL8wBuTGsMnR"
/// ],
/// "type": "string",
/// "minLength": 16,
/// "pattern": "^(z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+|u[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$"
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct DigestMultibase(::std::string::String);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for DigestMultibase {
type Target = ::std::string::String;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::string::String {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<DigestMultibase> for ::std::string::String {
fn from(value: DigestMultibase) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for DigestMultibase {
type Err = self::error::ConversionError;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
if value.chars().count() < 16usize {
return Err("shorter than 16 characters".into());
}
static PATTERN: ::std::sync::LazyLock<::regress::Regex> =
::std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| {
::regress::Regex::new("^(z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+|u[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$").unwrap()
});
if PATTERN.find(value).is_none() {
return Err(
"doesn't match pattern \"^(z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+|u[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$\"".into(),
);
}
Ok(Self(value.to_string()))
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for DigestMultibase {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&::std::string::String> for DigestMultibase {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: &::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<::std::string::String> for DigestMultibase {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: ::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl<'de> ::serde::Deserialize<'de> for DigestMultibase {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: ::serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
::std::string::String::deserialize(deserializer)?
.parse()
.map_err(|e: self::error::ConversionError| {
<D::Error as ::serde::de::Error>::custom(e.to_string())
})
}
}
///Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "Ext",
/// "description": "Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.",
/// "type": "object",
/// "minProperties": 1,
/// "additionalProperties": true,
/// "propertyNames": {
/// "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$"
/// }
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct Ext(pub ::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value>);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for Ext {
type Target = ::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value>;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value> {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<Ext> for ::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value> {
fn from(value: Ext) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value>> for Ext {
fn from(value: ::std::collections::HashMap<ExtKey, ::serde_json::Value>) -> Self {
Self(value)
}
}
///`ExtKey`
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "type": "string",
/// "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$"
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct ExtKey(::std::string::String);
impl ::std::ops::Deref for ExtKey {
type Target = ::std::string::String;
fn deref(&self) -> &::std::string::String {
&self.0
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<ExtKey> for ::std::string::String {
fn from(value: ExtKey) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl ::std::str::FromStr for ExtKey {
type Err = self::error::ConversionError;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
static PATTERN: ::std::sync::LazyLock<::regress::Regex> =
::std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| {
::regress::Regex::new("^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$").unwrap()
});
if PATTERN.find(value).is_none() {
return Err("doesn't match pattern \"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$\"".into());
}
Ok(Self(value.to_string()))
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&str> for ExtKey {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: &str) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<&::std::string::String> for ExtKey {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: &::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<::std::string::String> for ExtKey {
type Error = self::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(
value: ::std::string::String,
) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, self::error::ConversionError> {
value.parse()
}
}
impl<'de> ::serde::Deserialize<'de> for ExtKey {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: ::serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
::std::string::String::deserialize(deserializer)?
.parse()
.map_err(|e: self::error::ConversionError| {
<D::Error as ::serde::de::Error>::custom(e.to_string())
})
}
}
///A participating party submits its presentation bound to its session challenge; the witness's mandatory response delivers the Verifiable Witness Credential and its digest. The response is the outcome evidence a VWC presentation must ship.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "$id": "https://trusttasks.org/spec/witness/session/submit/0.1",
/// "title": "Payload",
/// "description": "A participating party submits its presentation bound to its session challenge; the witness's mandatory response delivers the Verifiable Witness Credential and its digest. The response is the outcome evidence a VWC presentation must ship.",
/// "type": "object",
/// "required": [
/// "vp"
/// ],
/// "properties": {
/// "ext": {
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/Ext"
/// },
/// "vp": {
/// "description": "A W3C Verifiable Presentation of the submitting party's own relationship credential material (opaque here), bound to the session's challenge and domain. A presentation not bound to this session is rejected with witness/session/submit:challengeMismatch.",
/// "type": "object"
/// }
/// },
/// "additionalProperties": false
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub struct Payload {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "::std::option::Option::is_none")]
pub ext: ::std::option::Option<Ext>,
///A W3C Verifiable Presentation of the submitting party's own relationship credential material (opaque here), bound to the session's challenge and domain. A presentation not bound to this session is rejected with witness/session/submit:challengeMismatch.
pub vp: ::serde_json::Map<::std::string::String, ::serde_json::Value>,
}
impl Payload {
pub fn builder() -> builder::Payload {
Default::default()
}
}
///The Verifiable Witness Credential and its digest, delivered under the REQUIRED proof. This document is the session's terminal success form and the outcome evidence a VWC presentation must ship.
///
/// <details><summary>JSON schema</summary>
///
/// ```json
///{
/// "title": "Response",
/// "description": "The Verifiable Witness Credential and its digest, delivered under the REQUIRED proof. This document is the session's terminal success form and the outcome evidence a VWC presentation must ship.",
/// "type": "object",
/// "required": [
/// "vwc",
/// "vwcDigestMultibase"
/// ],
/// "properties": {
/// "ext": {
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/Ext"
/// },
/// "vwc": {
/// "description": "A signed Verifiable Witness Credential (opaque here; its schema belongs to DTG Core Credentials). Its taskContext MUST equal the id of the witness/session document that opened this session — the innermost exchange that attests the witnessing (SPEC.md §4.9.1) — and its taskDigestMultibase MUST be that document's task digest (SPEC.md §4.9.3). The id locates the session document; the digest binds it, because an id is a name anyone can reuse on a counterfeit.",
/// "type": "object"
/// },
/// "vwcDigestMultibase": {
/// "description": "Digest over the RFC 8785 canonicalization of the delivered credential, computed by the witness. It binds this evidence to one specific credential rather than to the session alone, so a verifier pairing a presented VWC with this response can check it is the credential this session issued and not another the same witness signed. This covers the credential whole, proof included — unlike the task digest of SPEC.md §4.9.3, which excludes the top-level proof of the Trust Task document it names. The inputs differ because the questions do: this value identifies one delivered artifact, a task digest identifies what a document says whether or not it was signed.",
/// "$ref": "#/definitions/DigestMultibase"
/// }
/// },
/// "additionalProperties": false,
/// "$anchor": "response"
///}
/// ```
/// </details>
#[derive(::serde::Deserialize, ::serde::Serialize, Clone, Debug)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub struct Response {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "::std::option::Option::is_none")]
pub ext: ::std::option::Option<Ext>,
///A signed Verifiable Witness Credential (opaque here; its schema belongs to DTG Core Credentials). Its taskContext MUST equal the id of the witness/session document that opened this session — the innermost exchange that attests the witnessing (SPEC.md §4.9.1) — and its taskDigestMultibase MUST be that document's task digest (SPEC.md §4.9.3). The id locates the session document; the digest binds it, because an id is a name anyone can reuse on a counterfeit.
pub vwc: ::serde_json::Map<::std::string::String, ::serde_json::Value>,
///Digest over the RFC 8785 canonicalization of the delivered credential, computed by the witness. It binds this evidence to one specific credential rather than to the session alone, so a verifier pairing a presented VWC with this response can check it is the credential this session issued and not another the same witness signed. This covers the credential whole, proof included — unlike the task digest of SPEC.md §4.9.3, which excludes the top-level proof of the Trust Task document it names. The inputs differ because the questions do: this value identifies one delivered artifact, a task digest identifies what a document says whether or not it was signed.
#[serde(rename = "vwcDigestMultibase")]
pub vwc_digest_multibase: DigestMultibase,
}
impl Response {
pub fn builder() -> builder::Response {
Default::default()
}
}
/// Types for composing complex structures.
pub mod builder {
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct Payload {
ext: ::std::result::Result<::std::option::Option<super::Ext>, ::std::string::String>,
vp: ::std::result::Result<
::serde_json::Map<::std::string::String, ::serde_json::Value>,
::std::string::String,
>,
}
impl ::std::default::Default for Payload {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
ext: Ok(Default::default()),
vp: Err("no value supplied for vp".to_string()),
}
}
}
impl Payload {
pub fn ext<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::option::Option<super::Ext>>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.ext = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for ext: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn vp<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<
::serde_json::Map<::std::string::String, ::serde_json::Value>,
>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.vp = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for vp: {e}"));
self
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<Payload> for super::Payload {
type Error = super::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: Payload) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, super::error::ConversionError> {
Ok(Self {
ext: value.ext?,
vp: value.vp?,
})
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<super::Payload> for Payload {
fn from(value: super::Payload) -> Self {
Self {
ext: Ok(value.ext),
vp: Ok(value.vp),
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct Response {
ext: ::std::result::Result<::std::option::Option<super::Ext>, ::std::string::String>,
vwc: ::std::result::Result<
::serde_json::Map<::std::string::String, ::serde_json::Value>,
::std::string::String,
>,
vwc_digest_multibase: ::std::result::Result<super::DigestMultibase, ::std::string::String>,
}
impl ::std::default::Default for Response {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
ext: Ok(Default::default()),
vwc: Err("no value supplied for vwc".to_string()),
vwc_digest_multibase: Err("no value supplied for vwc_digest_multibase".to_string()),
}
}
}
impl Response {
pub fn ext<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<::std::option::Option<super::Ext>>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.ext = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for ext: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn vwc<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<
::serde_json::Map<::std::string::String, ::serde_json::Value>,
>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.vwc = value
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| format!("error converting supplied value for vwc: {e}"));
self
}
pub fn vwc_digest_multibase<T>(mut self, value: T) -> Self
where
T: ::std::convert::TryInto<super::DigestMultibase>,
T::Error: ::std::fmt::Display,
{
self.vwc_digest_multibase = value.try_into().map_err(|e| {
format!("error converting supplied value for vwc_digest_multibase: {e}")
});
self
}
}
impl ::std::convert::TryFrom<Response> for super::Response {
type Error = super::error::ConversionError;
fn try_from(value: Response) -> ::std::result::Result<Self, super::error::ConversionError> {
Ok(Self {
ext: value.ext?,
vwc: value.vwc?,
vwc_digest_multibase: value.vwc_digest_multibase?,
})
}
}
impl ::std::convert::From<super::Response> for Response {
fn from(value: super::Response) -> Self {
Self {
ext: Ok(value.ext),
vwc: Ok(value.vwc),
vwc_digest_multibase: Ok(value.vwc_digest_multibase),
}
}
}
}
impl crate::Payload for Payload {
const TYPE_URI: &'static str = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/witness/session/submit/0.1";
const IS_PROOF_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const IS_ISSUED_AT_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const IS_RECIPIENT_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: Option<&'static str> = Some(
"{\n \"$defs\": {\n \"DigestMultibase\": {\n \"description\": \"A cryptographic digest as a multibase-encoded multihash — the encoding the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 defines for `digestMultibase`, and the one `did:webvh` uses for its SCID and entry hashes.\\n\\nMultihash carries the hash algorithm in-band, so the value is self-describing and the wire format survives an algorithm change without a schema revision; multibase does the same for the base encoding, so a verifier never infers base58 from base64url by context. A bare hex string or a `sha-256:`-style prefix hard-codes one algorithm into the wire contract and is non-conforming here.\\n\\nThis definition constrains the *encoding only*. What the digest is computed over is stated by each referencing field, because it differs legitimately: a digest over a JSON document is taken over its RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization, while a digest over an opaque artifact is taken over its bytes. A field whose input is a JSON document and which does not name a canonicalization is not reproducible.\\n\\nRestricted to the two multibase headers W3C Controlled Identifiers 1.0 §2.4 normatively requires — `z` (base58btc) and `u` (base64url-no-pad). CID permits others but states that \\\"interoperability is not guaranteed between implementations using such values\\\", and a registry whose purpose is interoperability should not mint digests a conforming verifier may be unable to read. The alphabets are enforced rather than assumed: base58btc excludes 0, O, I and l, and an earlier permissive pattern let three published examples carry digests that were not valid base58 at all. base58btc is RECOMMENDED, for consistency with `did:key` and `did:webvh`.\",\n \"examples\": [\n \"zQmbWqxBEKC3P8tqsKc98xmWNzrzDtRLMiMPL8wBuTGsMnR\"\n ],\n \"minLength\": 16,\n \"pattern\": \"^(z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+|u[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$\",\n \"title\": \"DigestMultibase\",\n \"type\": \"string\"\n },\n \"Ext\": {\n \"additionalProperties\": true,\n \"description\": \"Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.\",\n \"minProperties\": 1,\n \"propertyNames\": {\n \"pattern\": \"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$\"\n },\n \"title\": \"Ext\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n },\n \"Response\": {\n \"$anchor\": \"response\",\n \"additionalProperties\": false,\n \"description\": \"The Verifiable Witness Credential and its digest, delivered under the REQUIRED proof. This document is the session's terminal success form and the outcome evidence a VWC presentation must ship.\",\n \"properties\": {\n \"ext\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/Ext\"\n },\n \"vwc\": {\n \"description\": \"A signed Verifiable Witness Credential (opaque here; its schema belongs to DTG Core Credentials). Its taskContext MUST equal the id of the witness/session document that opened this session — the innermost exchange that attests the witnessing (SPEC.md §4.9.1) — and its taskDigestMultibase MUST be that document's task digest (SPEC.md §4.9.3). The id locates the session document; the digest binds it, because an id is a name anyone can reuse on a counterfeit.\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n },\n \"vwcDigestMultibase\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/DigestMultibase\",\n \"description\": \"Digest over the RFC 8785 canonicalization of the delivered credential, computed by the witness. It binds this evidence to one specific credential rather than to the session alone, so a verifier pairing a presented VWC with this response can check it is the credential this session issued and not another the same witness signed. This covers the credential whole, proof included — unlike the task digest of SPEC.md §4.9.3, which excludes the top-level proof of the Trust Task document it names. The inputs differ because the questions do: this value identifies one delivered artifact, a task digest identifies what a document says whether or not it was signed.\"\n }\n },\n \"required\": [\n \"vwc\",\n \"vwcDigestMultibase\"\n ],\n \"title\": \"Witness Session Submit — response payload\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n }\n },\n \"$id\": \"https://trusttasks.org/spec/witness/session/submit/0.1\",\n \"$schema\": \"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema\",\n \"additionalProperties\": false,\n \"description\": \"A participating party submits its presentation bound to its session challenge; the witness's mandatory response delivers the Verifiable Witness Credential and its digest. The response is the outcome evidence a VWC presentation must ship.\",\n \"properties\": {\n \"ext\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/Ext\"\n },\n \"vp\": {\n \"description\": \"A W3C Verifiable Presentation of the submitting party's own relationship credential material (opaque here), bound to the session's challenge and domain. A presentation not bound to this session is rejected with witness/session/submit:challengeMismatch.\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n }\n },\n \"required\": [\n \"vp\"\n ],\n \"title\": \"Witness Session Submit — payload\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n}\n",
);
}
impl crate::Payload for Response {
const TYPE_URI: &'static str =
"https://trusttasks.org/spec/witness/session/submit/0.1#response";
const IS_PROOF_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const IS_ISSUED_AT_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const IS_RECIPIENT_REQUIRED: bool = true;
const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: Option<&'static str> = Some(
"{\n \"$defs\": {\n \"DigestMultibase\": {\n \"description\": \"A cryptographic digest as a multibase-encoded multihash — the encoding the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 defines for `digestMultibase`, and the one `did:webvh` uses for its SCID and entry hashes.\\n\\nMultihash carries the hash algorithm in-band, so the value is self-describing and the wire format survives an algorithm change without a schema revision; multibase does the same for the base encoding, so a verifier never infers base58 from base64url by context. A bare hex string or a `sha-256:`-style prefix hard-codes one algorithm into the wire contract and is non-conforming here.\\n\\nThis definition constrains the *encoding only*. What the digest is computed over is stated by each referencing field, because it differs legitimately: a digest over a JSON document is taken over its RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization, while a digest over an opaque artifact is taken over its bytes. A field whose input is a JSON document and which does not name a canonicalization is not reproducible.\\n\\nRestricted to the two multibase headers W3C Controlled Identifiers 1.0 §2.4 normatively requires — `z` (base58btc) and `u` (base64url-no-pad). CID permits others but states that \\\"interoperability is not guaranteed between implementations using such values\\\", and a registry whose purpose is interoperability should not mint digests a conforming verifier may be unable to read. The alphabets are enforced rather than assumed: base58btc excludes 0, O, I and l, and an earlier permissive pattern let three published examples carry digests that were not valid base58 at all. base58btc is RECOMMENDED, for consistency with `did:key` and `did:webvh`.\",\n \"examples\": [\n \"zQmbWqxBEKC3P8tqsKc98xmWNzrzDtRLMiMPL8wBuTGsMnR\"\n ],\n \"minLength\": 16,\n \"pattern\": \"^(z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+|u[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$\",\n \"title\": \"DigestMultibase\",\n \"type\": \"string\"\n },\n \"Ext\": {\n \"additionalProperties\": true,\n \"description\": \"Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.\",\n \"minProperties\": 1,\n \"propertyNames\": {\n \"pattern\": \"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$\"\n },\n \"title\": \"Ext\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n },\n \"Response\": {\n \"$anchor\": \"response\",\n \"additionalProperties\": false,\n \"description\": \"The Verifiable Witness Credential and its digest, delivered under the REQUIRED proof. This document is the session's terminal success form and the outcome evidence a VWC presentation must ship.\",\n \"properties\": {\n \"ext\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/Ext\"\n },\n \"vwc\": {\n \"description\": \"A signed Verifiable Witness Credential (opaque here; its schema belongs to DTG Core Credentials). Its taskContext MUST equal the id of the witness/session document that opened this session — the innermost exchange that attests the witnessing (SPEC.md §4.9.1) — and its taskDigestMultibase MUST be that document's task digest (SPEC.md §4.9.3). The id locates the session document; the digest binds it, because an id is a name anyone can reuse on a counterfeit.\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n },\n \"vwcDigestMultibase\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/DigestMultibase\",\n \"description\": \"Digest over the RFC 8785 canonicalization of the delivered credential, computed by the witness. It binds this evidence to one specific credential rather than to the session alone, so a verifier pairing a presented VWC with this response can check it is the credential this session issued and not another the same witness signed. This covers the credential whole, proof included — unlike the task digest of SPEC.md §4.9.3, which excludes the top-level proof of the Trust Task document it names. The inputs differ because the questions do: this value identifies one delivered artifact, a task digest identifies what a document says whether or not it was signed.\"\n }\n },\n \"required\": [\n \"vwc\",\n \"vwcDigestMultibase\"\n ],\n \"title\": \"Witness Session Submit — response payload\",\n \"type\": \"object\"\n }\n },\n \"$ref\": \"#/$defs/Response\",\n \"$schema\": \"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema\"\n}\n",
);
}
impl crate::RequestPayload for Payload {
type Response = Response;
}
/// The extended error codes this specification declares (SPEC §7.3 item 9,
/// §8.5), in declaration order. Empty when it declares none.
pub const ERROR_CODES: &[crate::DeclaredErrorCode] = &[
error_codes::CHALLENGE_MISMATCH,
error_codes::PRESENTATION_INVALID,
];
/// One constant per extended error code this specification declares
/// (SPEC §7.3 item 9), named for its local part.
///
/// Emit these rather than a string literal: the code is read from the
/// specification, so it cannot name a code the specification never
/// declared.
pub mod error_codes {
/// `witness/session/submit:challengeMismatch`
///
/// The presentation is not bound to this session's challenge and domain — a replay from another session, or a stale binding.
///
/// Declared `retryable: false`.
pub const CHALLENGE_MISMATCH: crate::DeclaredErrorCode = crate::DeclaredErrorCode {
code: "witness/session/submit:challengeMismatch",
retryable: false,
};
/// `witness/session/submit:presentationInvalid`
///
/// The presentation failed verification — its own proof, its holder binding, or its party bindings against the session.
///
/// Declared `retryable: false`.
pub const PRESENTATION_INVALID: crate::DeclaredErrorCode = crate::DeclaredErrorCode {
code: "witness/session/submit:presentationInvalid",
retryable: false,
};
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod conformance {
//! Round-trip tests harvested from the spec's `spec.md`,
//! plus a `rejects_invalid_examples` test for any fixtures
//! in `payload.invalid-examples.json` (validate feature).
/// Each fixture in `payload.invalid-examples.json` MUST be
/// rejected by at least one of: serde deserialization, or
/// JSON-Schema validation under the `validate` feature. The
/// fixture file documents the producer-side bug class that
/// each payload exemplifies; this generated test pins it.
#[cfg(feature = "validate")]
#[test]
fn rejects_invalid_examples() {
use crate::validate::ValidatedPayload;
let fixtures: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
(
"vp is required — a submission with no presentation gives the witness nothing to verify.",
"{}",
),
(
"Unknown top-level member is rejected; ecosystem data belongs under `ext` (SPEC.md §4.5.1). Attestation evidence rides inside the presentation or under a namespaced ext, never as an ad-hoc member.",
"{\n \"attestation\": \"secure-enclave\",\n \"vp\": {}\n}",
),
];
for (i, (note, raw)) in fixtures.iter().enumerate() {
let value: serde_json::Value = match serde_json::from_str(raw) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(_) => continue,
};
let serde_ok = serde_json::from_value::<super::Payload>(value.clone()).is_ok();
let schema_ok = super::Payload::validate_value(&value).is_ok();
assert!(
!(serde_ok && schema_ok),
"invalid-example #{} ({:?}) was accepted by both serde and JSON Schema; \
the fixture's stated failure class is no longer caught:\n{}",
i + 1,
note,
raw
);
}
}
}