tirith 0.4.1

Terminal security - catches homograph attacks, pipe-to-shell, ANSI injection
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//! `tirith iac guard|check-plan|require-plan-before-apply` (M8 ch3).
//!
//! * `guard on|off|status` — flips `policy.context_guard_enabled` (the shared
//!   M8 ch1 operator switch). The non-prod IaC rules stay tool-only.
//! * `check-plan <tfplan>` — parse a saved Terraform/Pulumi/OpenTofu plan,
//!   record its SHA-256 in `state_dir()/iac_plans/`, and report change counts
//!   plus IAM/SG/public-bucket flags.
//! * `require-plan-before-apply on|off|status` — flips
//!   `policy.iac_require_plan_before_apply` (drives `IacApplyWithoutPlan` /
//!   `IacPlanHashMismatch`).

use std::io::Write;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};

use tirith_core::iac_plan::{self, PlanSummary, PlanTool};
use tirith_core::policy::{self as policy_mod, Policy};

/// `tirith iac guard on|off|status` — flip the shared operational-context
/// switch.
pub fn guard(action: &str, json: bool) -> i32 {
    let enable = match action {
        "on" | "enable" | "true" => true,
        "off" | "disable" | "false" => false,
        "status" => return guard_status(json),
        other => {
            eprintln!("tirith iac guard: unknown action '{other}' (expected on|off|status)");
            return 2;
        }
    };

    let target_path = match resolve_policy_path() {
        Ok(p) => p,
        Err(code) => return code,
    };

    if let Err(e) = update_policy_key(&target_path, "context_guard_enabled", &enable.to_string()) {
        eprintln!(
            "tirith iac guard: failed to update {}: {e}",
            target_path.display()
        );
        return 1;
    }

    if json {
        let out = serde_json::json!({
            "schema_version": 1,
            "guard_enabled": enable,
            "policy_path": target_path.display().to_string(),
        });
        let mut stdout = std::io::stdout().lock();
        if serde_json::to_writer_pretty(&mut stdout, &out).is_err() || writeln!(stdout).is_err() {
            return 1;
        }
    } else {
        eprintln!(
            "tirith iac guard: {} (written to {})",
            if enable { "ON" } else { "OFF" },
            target_path.display(),
        );
    }
    0
}

fn guard_status(json: bool) -> i32 {
    let policy = Policy::discover_partial(None);
    if json {
        let out = serde_json::json!({
            "schema_version": 1,
            "guard_enabled": policy.context_guard_enabled,
            "policy_path": policy.path,
        });
        let mut stdout = std::io::stdout().lock();
        if serde_json::to_writer_pretty(&mut stdout, &out).is_err() || writeln!(stdout).is_err() {
            return 1;
        }
    } else {
        eprintln!(
            "tirith iac guard: {}",
            if policy.context_guard_enabled {
                "ON"
            } else {
                "OFF"
            }
        );
    }
    0
}

/// `tirith iac require-plan-before-apply on|off|status`.
pub fn require_plan_before_apply(action: &str, json: bool) -> i32 {
    let enable = match action {
        "on" | "enable" | "true" => true,
        "off" | "disable" | "false" => false,
        "status" => return require_plan_status(json),
        other => {
            eprintln!(
                "tirith iac require-plan-before-apply: unknown action '{other}' (expected on|off|status)"
            );
            return 2;
        }
    };

    let target_path = match resolve_policy_path() {
        Ok(p) => p,
        Err(code) => return code,
    };

    if let Err(e) = update_policy_key(
        &target_path,
        "iac_require_plan_before_apply",
        &enable.to_string(),
    ) {
        eprintln!(
            "tirith iac require-plan-before-apply: failed to update {}: {e}",
            target_path.display()
        );
        return 1;
    }

    if json {
        let out = serde_json::json!({
            "schema_version": 1,
            "require_plan_before_apply": enable,
            "policy_path": target_path.display().to_string(),
        });
        let mut stdout = std::io::stdout().lock();
        if serde_json::to_writer_pretty(&mut stdout, &out).is_err() || writeln!(stdout).is_err() {
            return 1;
        }
    } else {
        eprintln!(
            "tirith iac require-plan-before-apply: {} (written to {})",
            if enable { "ON" } else { "OFF" },
            target_path.display(),
        );
    }
    0
}

fn require_plan_status(json: bool) -> i32 {
    let policy = Policy::discover_partial(None);
    if json {
        let out = serde_json::json!({
            "schema_version": 1,
            "require_plan_before_apply": policy.iac_require_plan_before_apply,
            "policy_path": policy.path,
        });
        let mut stdout = std::io::stdout().lock();
        if serde_json::to_writer_pretty(&mut stdout, &out).is_err() || writeln!(stdout).is_err() {
            return 1;
        }
    } else {
        eprintln!(
            "tirith iac require-plan-before-apply: {}",
            if policy.iac_require_plan_before_apply {
                "ON"
            } else {
                "OFF"
            }
        );
    }
    0
}

/// `tirith iac check-plan <tfplan> [--tool terraform|pulumi|tofu]` —
/// parse a saved plan, record its SHA-256 in `state_dir()/iac_plans/`,
/// and print the change summary.
pub fn check_plan(plan_path: &Path, forced_tool: Option<&str>, json: bool) -> i32 {
    let purged = iac_plan::purge_old_plans();

    // Cap the read at MAX_PLAN_SIZE_BYTES (32 MiB) so a symlink-to-/dev/zero or
    // oversized JSON can't OOM the CLI before parsing (PR-127 review #10).
    match std::fs::metadata(plan_path) {
        Ok(md) if md.len() > iac_plan::MAX_PLAN_SIZE_BYTES => {
            eprintln!(
                "tirith iac check-plan: {} is {} bytes; cap is {} bytes ({} MiB). Refusing to read.",
                plan_path.display(),
                md.len(),
                iac_plan::MAX_PLAN_SIZE_BYTES,
                iac_plan::MAX_PLAN_SIZE_BYTES / (1024 * 1024),
            );
            return 1;
        }
        _ => {}
    }
    // repo-0221: a pre-read metadata length check does not stop a FIFO from
    // blocking forever or /dev/zero from allocating without bound. Read
    // no-follow, regular-file-only, and capped THROUGH the read.
    let bytes = match tirith_core::util::read_text_no_follow_capped(
        plan_path,
        iac_plan::MAX_PLAN_SIZE_BYTES,
    ) {
        Ok(b) => b,
        Err(tirith_core::util::OpenRegularError::TooLarge) => {
            eprintln!(
                "tirith iac check-plan: {} exceeds the {} byte cap ({} MiB). Refusing to parse.",
                plan_path.display(),
                iac_plan::MAX_PLAN_SIZE_BYTES,
                iac_plan::MAX_PLAN_SIZE_BYTES / (1024 * 1024),
            );
            return 1;
        }
        Err(e) => {
            eprintln!(
                "tirith iac check-plan: cannot read {} safely: {e:?}",
                plan_path.display()
            );
            return 1;
        }
    };
    if bytes.len() as u64 > iac_plan::MAX_PLAN_SIZE_BYTES {
        eprintln!(
            "tirith iac check-plan: read {} bytes from {}; cap is {} bytes ({} MiB). Refusing to parse.",
            bytes.len(),
            plan_path.display(),
            iac_plan::MAX_PLAN_SIZE_BYTES,
            iac_plan::MAX_PLAN_SIZE_BYTES / (1024 * 1024),
        );
        return 1;
    }

    let tool = if let Some(name) = forced_tool {
        match name {
            "terraform" => PlanTool::Terraform,
            "pulumi" => PlanTool::Pulumi,
            "tofu" => PlanTool::Tofu,
            other => {
                eprintln!(
                    "tirith iac check-plan: unknown --tool '{other}' (expected terraform | pulumi | tofu)"
                );
                return 2;
            }
        }
    } else {
        iac_plan::detect_plan_tool(plan_path)
    };

    // Pulumi plans are already JSON; terraform's binary plan needs a shell-out
    // to `terraform show -json <plan>`.
    let plan_json: Vec<u8> = if iac_plan::looks_like_json(&bytes) {
        bytes.clone()
    } else {
        match iac_plan::run_terraform_show_json_bytes(&bytes, tool) {
            Ok(out) => out,
            Err(e) => {
                eprintln!(
                    "tirith iac check-plan: could not render {} via `{} show -json`: {e}",
                    plan_path.display(),
                    tool.as_str(),
                );
                eprintln!(
                    "  Hint: install the {} CLI, OR pass the JSON output of `{} show -json <plan>` directly.",
                    tool.as_str(),
                    tool.as_str(),
                );
                return 1;
            }
        }
    };

    let summary = match iac_plan::parse_plan_json(&plan_json) {
        Ok(s) => s,
        Err(e) => {
            eprintln!("tirith iac check-plan: plan parse failed: {e}");
            return 1;
        }
    };

    // Hash the ORIGINAL plan-file bytes (what the engine hashes at apply-time),
    // not the JSON rendering — they differ for terraform binary plans.
    let sha = match iac_plan::record_plan_hash(&bytes, plan_path, &summary) {
        Ok(h) => h,
        Err(e) => {
            eprintln!("tirith iac check-plan: failed to record plan hash: {e}");
            return 1;
        }
    };

    if json {
        emit_check_plan_json(plan_path, &sha, &summary, purged)
    } else {
        emit_check_plan_human(plan_path, &sha, &summary, purged);
        0
    }
}

fn emit_check_plan_human(plan_path: &Path, sha: &str, summary: &PlanSummary, purged: usize) {
    eprintln!("tirith iac check-plan:");
    eprintln!(
        "  plan:        {}",
        super::sanitize_for_human_output(&plan_path.display().to_string(), false)
    );
    eprintln!("  tool:        {}", summary.tool.as_str());
    eprintln!("  sha256:      {}", sha);
    eprintln!(
        "  changes:     create={} update={} destroy={} (total={})",
        summary.create, summary.update, summary.destroy, summary.total_changes,
    );
    if summary.has_high_risk_changes() {
        // Resource addresses are parsed from the (untrusted) plan file, so a crafted
        // module/resource name could carry escapes; sanitize each joined list.
        eprintln!("  high-risk categories:");
        if !summary.iam_changes.is_empty() {
            eprintln!(
                "    iam:                {}",
                super::sanitize_for_human_output(&summary.iam_changes.join(", "), false)
            );
        }
        if !summary.security_group_changes.is_empty() {
            eprintln!(
                "    security_groups:    {}",
                super::sanitize_for_human_output(&summary.security_group_changes.join(", "), false)
            );
        }
        if !summary.public_bucket_changes.is_empty() {
            eprintln!(
                "    public_buckets:     {}",
                super::sanitize_for_human_output(&summary.public_bucket_changes.join(", "), false)
            );
        }
        if !summary.db_changes.is_empty() {
            eprintln!(
                "    db_instances:       {}",
                super::sanitize_for_human_output(&summary.db_changes.join(", "), false)
            );
        }
        if !summary.lb_changes.is_empty() {
            eprintln!(
                "    load_balancers:     {}",
                super::sanitize_for_human_output(&summary.lb_changes.join(", "), false)
            );
        }
    }
    if purged > 0 {
        eprintln!("  purged {} old plan(s) from the cache", purged);
    }
    eprintln!("  recorded in: {}", iac_plan::iac_plans_dir_display(),);
}

fn emit_check_plan_json(plan_path: &Path, sha: &str, summary: &PlanSummary, purged: usize) -> i32 {
    let out = serde_json::json!({
        "schema_version": 1,
        "plan_path": plan_path.display().to_string(),
        "sha256": sha,
        "summary": summary,
        "high_risk": summary.has_high_risk_changes(),
        "purged": purged,
        "store_dir": iac_plan::iac_plans_dir_display(),
    });
    let mut stdout = std::io::stdout().lock();
    if serde_json::to_writer_pretty(&mut stdout, &out).is_err() || writeln!(stdout).is_err() {
        return 1;
    }
    0
}

fn resolve_policy_path() -> Result<PathBuf, i32> {
    if let Some(existing) = policy_mod::discover_local_policy_path(None) {
        return Ok(existing);
    }
    let user = policy_mod::config_dir().ok_or_else(|| {
        eprintln!("tirith iac: could not resolve user config dir");
        1
    })?;
    Ok(user.join("policy.yaml"))
}

/// Largest policy file we will read-modify-write for a policy-key toggle. A
/// policy YAML is hand-authored and tiny; 1 MiB bounds a hostile or
/// symlinked-to-huge target so the read cannot be turned into an unbounded
/// slurp.
const MAX_POLICY_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 1024;

/// Idempotent append-or-rewrite of a single policy key. Mirrors the
/// helper used by `cli::ssh` / `cli::context` for `context_guard_enabled`.
///
/// Symlink-hardened (repo-0387, mirrors the F16 pattern in
/// `cli::exec::update_policy_guard_key`): the policy path is a repo-discovered
/// `<repo>/.tirith/policy.yaml` (or `<config>/tirith/policy.yaml`), so an
/// attacker who can plant a symlink there could otherwise redirect this
/// truncating write onto an arbitrary file. A retained directory capability is
/// traversed from the trusted grandparent without following repo-controlled
/// symlinks, then used for both the bounded read and atomic 0600 publication.
/// Any read error other than genuine absence aborts rather than becoming an
/// empty baseline.
pub(super) fn update_policy_key(path: &Path, key: &str, value: &str) -> std::io::Result<()> {
    // The containment root is the grandparent: <repo>/.tirith/policy.yaml →
    // <repo>, <config>/tirith/policy.yaml → <config>. A policy path is always
    // at least three components deep; refuse a malformed shallower path rather
    // than guess.
    let containment_root = path.parent().and_then(|p| p.parent()).ok_or_else(|| {
        std::io::Error::new(
            std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
            "policy path must be <root>/<dir>/policy.yaml",
        )
    })?;

    let policy = Policy::discover_local_only(containment_root.to_str());
    let contained = super::prepare_config_destination_permitted(
        containment_root,
        path,
        true,
        &policy,
        true,
        true,
    )?;

    // Read the current contents WITHOUT following a symlinked final component.
    // An absent file is an empty baseline (the key is then appended); any other
    // read failure (symlinked, oversized, I/O) aborts rather than clobbering
    // blind.
    let existing = match contained.read_capped(MAX_POLICY_SIZE) {
        Ok(bytes) => String::from_utf8(bytes).map_err(|_| {
            std::io::Error::new(
                std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
                "policy file is not UTF-8; refusing to rewrite it",
            )
        })?,
        Err(tirith_core::util::OpenRegularError::NotFound) => String::new(),
        Err(e) => return Err(open_regular_io_error(e)),
    };
    let new_line = format!("{key}: {value}");

    let prefix = format!("{key}:");

    let mut out = String::new();
    let mut replaced = false;
    for line in existing.lines() {
        let trimmed = line.trim_start();
        if trimmed.starts_with(&prefix) {
            out.push_str(&new_line);
            out.push('\n');
            replaced = true;
        } else {
            out.push_str(line);
            out.push('\n');
        }
    }
    if !replaced {
        if !out.is_empty() && !out.ends_with('\n') {
            out.push('\n');
        }
        out.push_str(&new_line);
        out.push('\n');
    }

    super::write_prepared_config_file_permitted(
        containment_root,
        path,
        contained,
        out.as_bytes(),
        true,
        &policy,
        true,
    )
}

/// Map an `OpenRegularError` from the no-follow policy read onto an `io::Error`
/// so the policy-key read-modify-write surfaces a single failure type to the
/// caller.
fn open_regular_io_error(e: tirith_core::util::OpenRegularError) -> std::io::Error {
    match e {
        tirith_core::util::OpenRegularError::Io(io) => io,
        tirith_core::util::OpenRegularError::NotRegularFile => std::io::Error::new(
            std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
            "policy path is not a regular file (symlink or special file)",
        ),
        tirith_core::util::OpenRegularError::TooLarge => std::io::Error::new(
            std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
            "policy file exceeds the size cap",
        ),
        tirith_core::util::OpenRegularError::NotFound => {
            std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound, "policy file not found")
        }
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use tempfile::tempdir;

    #[test]
    fn update_policy_key_creates_file() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let path = dir.path().join("policy.yaml");
        update_policy_key(&path, "iac_require_plan_before_apply", "true").unwrap();
        let content = std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap();
        assert!(content.contains("iac_require_plan_before_apply: true"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn update_policy_key_replaces_existing() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let path = dir.path().join("policy.yaml");
        std::fs::write(
            &path,
            "paranoia: 2\niac_require_plan_before_apply: true\nfail_mode: open\n",
        )
        .unwrap();
        update_policy_key(&path, "iac_require_plan_before_apply", "false").unwrap();
        let content = std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap();
        assert!(content.contains("iac_require_plan_before_apply: false"));
        assert!(content.contains("paranoia: 2"));
        assert!(!content.contains("iac_require_plan_before_apply: true"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn update_policy_key_distinct_keys_dont_collide() {
        // Prefix-matching must use `key:`, not just `key`.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let path = dir.path().join("policy.yaml");
        std::fs::write(
            &path,
            "context_guard_enabled: false\niac_require_plan_before_apply: false\n",
        )
        .unwrap();
        update_policy_key(&path, "iac_require_plan_before_apply", "true").unwrap();
        let content = std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap();
        assert!(content.contains("context_guard_enabled: false"));
        assert!(content.contains("iac_require_plan_before_apply: true"));
    }

    /// repo-0387: a symlinked containing directory (planted `.tirith`) that
    /// escapes the repo must abort the update BEFORE any read/write, and the
    /// external target must stay untouched.
    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn update_policy_key_refuses_symlinked_containing_dir() {
        let root = tempdir().unwrap();
        let outside = tempdir().unwrap();
        let repo = root.path().join("repo");
        std::fs::create_dir_all(&repo).unwrap();
        std::os::unix::fs::symlink(outside.path(), repo.join(".tirith")).unwrap();

        let path = repo.join(".tirith").join("policy.yaml");
        let err = update_policy_key(&path, "iac_require_plan_before_apply", "true").unwrap_err();
        assert_eq!(err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied, "{err}");
        assert!(
            !outside.path().join("policy.yaml").exists(),
            "no policy file may be created outside the repo"
        );
    }

    /// repo-0387: a symlinked FINAL component must be refused; the link
    /// target's bytes must be preserved (the old code truncated it blind via
    /// `unwrap_or_default` + a following write).
    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn update_policy_key_refuses_symlinked_final_component() {
        let root = tempdir().unwrap();
        let outside = tempdir().unwrap();
        let victim = outside.path().join("victim.yaml");
        std::fs::write(&victim, "SENTINEL: do not truncate\n").unwrap();
        let dir = root.path().join("repo").join(".tirith");
        std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
        let path = dir.join("policy.yaml");
        std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&victim, &path).unwrap();

        assert!(update_policy_key(&path, "iac_require_plan_before_apply", "true").is_err());
        assert_eq!(
            std::fs::read_to_string(&victim).unwrap(),
            "SENTINEL: do not truncate\n",
            "symlink target must not be read-modify-written"
        );
    }

    /// repo-0387: a read error other than genuine absence (here: the policy
    /// path is a directory) must abort the update, not fall back to an empty
    /// baseline that then truncates the target.
    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn update_policy_key_aborts_on_non_regular_policy() {
        let root = tempdir().unwrap();
        let dir = root.path().join("repo").join(".tirith");
        let path = dir.join("policy.yaml");
        std::fs::create_dir_all(&path).unwrap();

        assert!(update_policy_key(&path, "iac_require_plan_before_apply", "true").is_err());
        assert!(path.is_dir(), "the directory must remain, not be replaced");
    }
}