tightbeam-rs 0.9.0

A secure, high-performance messaging protocol library
Documentation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
//! ECIES-based client handshake orchestrator.
//!
//! Implements the client side of the TightBeam ECIES handshake protocol.

#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
extern crate alloc;
#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
use alloc::{boxed::Box, vec::Vec};

use crate::asn1::OctetString;
use crate::constants::TIGHTBEAM_AAD_DOMAIN_TAG;
use crate::crypto::aead::{KeyInit, RuntimeAead};
use crate::crypto::ecies::EciesEphemeral;
use crate::crypto::ecies::{encrypt, EciesMessageOps, EciesPublicKeyOps};
use crate::crypto::key::SigningKeyProvider;
use crate::crypto::profiles::{CryptoProvider, SecurityProfileDesc};
use crate::crypto::sign::elliptic_curve::sec1::{FromEncodedPoint, ModulusSize, ToEncodedPoint};
use crate::crypto::sign::elliptic_curve::{AffinePoint, Curve, CurveArithmetic, PublicKey};
use crate::crypto::sign::PrehashVerifier;
use crate::crypto::sign::SignatureEncoding;
use crate::crypto::x509::policy::CertificateValidation;
use crate::crypto::x509::utils::validate_certificate_expiry;
use crate::der::{Decode, Encode};
use crate::random::generate_nonce;
use crate::zeroize::{Zeroize, Zeroizing};

use crate::transport::handshake::error::HandshakeError;
use crate::transport::handshake::negotiation::SecurityOffer;
use crate::transport::handshake::state::HandshakeInvariant;
use crate::transport::handshake::state::{ClientHandshakeState, ClientStateMachine};
use crate::transport::handshake::utils::{
	compute_client_auth_digest, compute_transcript_digest, octet_string_to_32_byte_array, validate_state,
};
use crate::transport::handshake::{Arc, ClientHandshakeProtocol, ClientHello, ClientKeyExchange, ServerHandshake};
use crate::transport::handshake::{HandshakeAlertHandler, HandshakeFinalization}; // for derive_session_aead
use crate::x509::Certificate;

/// Client-side ECIES handshake orchestrator.
///
/// Generic over:
/// - `P: CryptoProvider` which defines the complete cryptographic suite
/// - `M`: ECIES message type (curve-specific)
pub struct EciesHandshakeClient<P, M>
where
	P: CryptoProvider,
{
	state: ClientStateMachine,
	client_random: Option<[u8; 32]>,
	/// Exact DER bytes of the sent `ClientHello`, bound into the transcript so a
	/// MITM cannot rewrite the offer undetected (CWE-757).
	client_hello: Option<Vec<u8>>,
	base_session_key: Option<[u8; 32]>,
	server_random: Option<[u8; 32]>,
	transcript_hash: Option<[u8; 32]>,
	aad_domain_tag: Option<&'static [u8]>,
	security_offer: Option<SecurityOffer>,
	selected_profile: Option<SecurityProfileDesc>,
	certificate_validator: Option<Arc<dyn CertificateValidation>>,
	client_certificate: Option<Arc<Certificate>>,
	client_key_provider: Option<Arc<dyn crate::crypto::key::SigningKeyProvider>>,
	_phantom_provider: ::core::marker::PhantomData<P>,
	_phantom_message: ::core::marker::PhantomData<M>,
	invariants: HandshakeInvariant,
}

/// Helper trait for extracting verifying keys from certificates.
pub trait ExtractVerifyingKey: Sized {
	fn extract_from_certificate(cert: &Certificate) -> Result<Self, HandshakeError>;
}

impl<P, M> EciesHandshakeClient<P, M>
where
	P: CryptoProvider,
	P::Curve: Curve + CurveArithmetic,
	<P::Curve as Curve>::FieldBytesSize: ModulusSize,
	AffinePoint<P::Curve>: FromEncodedPoint<P::Curve> + ToEncodedPoint<P::Curve>,
	PublicKey<P::Curve>: EciesPublicKeyOps,
	<PublicKey<P::Curve> as EciesPublicKeyOps>::SecretKey: EciesEphemeral<PublicKey = PublicKey<P::Curve>>,
	P::Signature: SignatureEncoding,
	for<'a> P::Signature: TryFrom<&'a [u8]>,
	for<'a> <P::Signature as TryFrom<&'a [u8]>>::Error: Into<HandshakeError>,
	P::VerifyingKey: PrehashVerifier<P::Signature> + ExtractVerifyingKey,
	P::AeadCipher: KeyInit,
	M: EciesMessageOps,
{
	/// Create a new ECIES handshake client.
	///
	/// # Parameters
	/// - `aad_domain_tag`: Optional domain tag for ECIES encryption (defaults to `TIGHTBEAM_AAD_DOMAIN_TAG`)
	pub fn new(aad_domain_tag: Option<&'static [u8]>) -> Self {
		Self {
			state: ClientStateMachine::default(),
			client_random: None,
			client_hello: None,
			base_session_key: None,
			server_random: None,
			transcript_hash: None,
			aad_domain_tag: aad_domain_tag.or(Some(TIGHTBEAM_AAD_DOMAIN_TAG)),
			security_offer: None, // No offer = dealer's choice mode
			selected_profile: None,
			certificate_validator: None,
			client_certificate: None,
			client_key_provider: None,
			invariants: HandshakeInvariant::default(),
			_phantom_provider: ::core::marker::PhantomData,
			_phantom_message: ::core::marker::PhantomData,
		}
	}

	/// Create a new ECIES handshake client with optional client identity.
	///
	/// # Parameters
	/// - `aad_domain_tag`: Optional domain tag for ECIES encryption
	/// - `client_certificate`: Optional client certificate for mutual auth
	/// - `client_key_provider`: Optional client key provider for mutual auth
	pub fn new_with_identity(
		aad_domain_tag: Option<&'static [u8]>,
		client_certificate: Option<Arc<Certificate>>,
		client_key_provider: Option<Arc<dyn crate::crypto::key::SigningKeyProvider>>,
	) -> Self {
		Self {
			state: ClientStateMachine::default(),
			client_random: None,
			client_hello: None,
			base_session_key: None,
			server_random: None,
			transcript_hash: None,
			aad_domain_tag: aad_domain_tag.or(Some(TIGHTBEAM_AAD_DOMAIN_TAG)),
			security_offer: None, // No offer = dealer's choice mode
			selected_profile: None,
			certificate_validator: None,
			client_certificate,
			client_key_provider,
			invariants: HandshakeInvariant::default(),
			_phantom_provider: ::core::marker::PhantomData,
			_phantom_message: ::core::marker::PhantomData,
		}
	}

	/// Set a certificate validator for the handshake.
	pub fn with_certificate_validator(mut self, validator: Arc<dyn CertificateValidation>) -> Self {
		self.certificate_validator = Some(validator);
		self
	}

	/// Set client identity for mutual authentication.
	///
	/// # Parameters
	/// - `certificate`: The client's X.509 certificate
	/// - `key_provider`: The client's key provider
	pub fn with_client_identity(
		mut self,
		certificate: Arc<Certificate>,
		key_provider: Arc<dyn SigningKeyProvider>,
	) -> Self {
		self.client_certificate = Some(certificate);
		self.client_key_provider = Some(key_provider);
		self
	}

	/// Set the security profile offer for negotiation.
	/// If not set, server will pick default profile (dealer's choice mode).
	pub fn with_security_offer(mut self, offer: SecurityOffer) -> Self {
		self.security_offer = Some(offer);
		self
	}

	/// Validate that the current state matches the expected state.
	fn validate_expected_state(&self, expected: ClientHandshakeState) -> Result<(), HandshakeError> {
		validate_state(self.state.state(), expected)
	}

	/// Validate server handshake and extract components.
	///
	/// Fail-closed (CWE-295): a configured certificate validator is
	/// mandatory. Expiry alone authenticates nobody, so a missing validator
	/// aborts the handshake instead of silently degrading.
	fn validate_and_extract_server_handshake(
		&self,
		server_handshake_der: &[u8],
	) -> Result<ServerHandshake, HandshakeError> {
		let server_handshake = ServerHandshake::from_der(server_handshake_der)?;
		let validator = self.certificate_validator.as_ref().ok_or(HandshakeError::MissingTrustStore)?;

		validate_certificate_expiry(&server_handshake.certificate)?;
		validator.evaluate(&server_handshake.certificate)?;

		Ok(server_handshake)
	}

	/// Extract and store server random from handshake.
	fn extract_server_random(&mut self, server_handshake: &ServerHandshake) -> Result<(), HandshakeError> {
		let server_random = octet_string_to_32_byte_array(&server_handshake.server_random)?;
		self.server_random = Some(server_random);

		Ok(())
	}

	/// Compute and store transcript hash.
	fn compute_and_store_transcript_hash(&mut self, server_handshake: &ServerHandshake) -> Result<(), HandshakeError> {
		let client_hello = self.client_hello.as_deref().ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidState)?;
		let server_random = self.server_random.ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidState)?;
		let spki_bytes = server_handshake
			.certificate
			.tbs_certificate
			.subject_public_key_info
			.subject_public_key
			.raw_bytes();

		// Bind the negotiated profile into the transcript; a tampered
		// security_accept yields a different hash and fails signature verification.
		let accept_der = match &server_handshake.security_accept {
			Some(accept) => accept.to_der()?,
			None => Vec::new(),
		};

		let transcript_digest = self.compute_transcript_hash(client_hello, &server_random, spki_bytes, &accept_der)?;
		self.transcript_hash = Some(transcript_digest);
		// Invariant: transcript becomes immutable after hash computed
		self.invariants.lock_transcript()?;

		Ok(())
	}

	/// Generate and store base session key.
	fn generate_base_session_key(&mut self) -> Result<(), HandshakeError> {
		let base_key = generate_nonce::<32>(None)?;
		self.base_session_key = Some(base_key);

		Ok(())
	}

	/// Build ClientHello message.
	///
	/// # Returns
	/// DER-encoded ClientHello
	pub fn build_client_hello(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, HandshakeError> {
		// 1. Validation
		self.validate_expected_state(ClientHandshakeState::Init)?;

		// 2. Generate client random
		let client_random = generate_nonce::<32>(None)?;
		self.client_random = Some(client_random);

		// 3. Build ClientHello
		let client_hello = ClientHello {
			client_random: OctetString::new(client_random)?,
			security_offer: self.security_offer.clone(),
		};

		// Retain the exact DER for transcript binding: the full
		// ClientHello (offer included) is hashed on both sides.
		let client_hello_der = client_hello.to_der()?;
		self.client_hello = Some(client_hello_der.clone());

		// Transition: mark hello sent
		self.state.transition(ClientHandshakeState::HelloSent)?;
		Ok(client_hello_der)
	}

	/// Process ServerHandshake message and build ClientKeyExchange.
	///
	/// # Parameters
	/// - `server_handshake_der`: DER-encoded ServerHandshake from server
	///
	/// # Returns
	/// DER-encoded ClientKeyExchange
	pub async fn process_server_handshake(&mut self, server_handshake_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, HandshakeError> {
		// 1. Validation: must have sent hello
		self.validate_expected_state(ClientHandshakeState::HelloSent)?;
		let _client_random_check = self.client_random.ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidState)?;

		// 2. Transition to ServerHelloReceived
		self.state.transition(ClientHandshakeState::ServerHelloReceived)?;

		// 3. Decode and validate server handshake
		let server_handshake = self.validate_and_extract_server_handshake(server_handshake_der)?;

		// 4. Validate profile negotiation
		self.validate_profile_selection(&server_handshake)?;

		// 5. Extract server random
		self.extract_server_random(&server_handshake)?;

		// 6. Verify server signature
		self.verify_server_handshake_signature(&server_handshake)?;

		// 7. Generate and encrypt session key
		let encrypted_bytes = self.generate_and_encrypt_session_key(&server_handshake)?;

		// 8. Handle mutual authentication (signature commits to encrypted_bytes)
		let (client_certificate, client_signature) =
			self.prepare_client_auth(&server_handshake, &encrypted_bytes).await?;

		// 10. Build and encode ClientKeyExchange
		let client_kex = ClientKeyExchange {
			encrypted_data: OctetString::new(encrypted_bytes)?,
			#[cfg(feature = "x509")]
			client_certificate,
			#[cfg(feature = "x509")]
			client_signature,
		};

		// 11. Advance to KeyExchangeSent (ServerHelloReceived was entered in step 2)
		self.state.transition(ClientHandshakeState::KeyExchangeSent)?;

		Ok(client_kex.to_der()?)
	}

	/// Validate server's profile selection against client's offer.
	///
	/// Handles both negotiation mode (client sent offer) and dealer's choice mode (no offer).
	fn validate_profile_selection(&mut self, server_handshake: &ServerHandshake) -> Result<(), HandshakeError> {
		let accept = server_handshake.security_accept.as_ref().ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidState)?;
		match &self.security_offer {
			Some(offer) => {
				// Mode 1: Negotiation - verify server's selection is from our offer
				if !offer.profiles.contains(&accept.profile) {
					return Err(HandshakeError::InvalidProfileSelection);
				}
				self.selected_profile = Some(accept.profile);
			}
			None => {
				// Mode 2: Dealer's choice - accept whatever server picked
				self.selected_profile = Some(accept.profile);
			}
		}

		Ok(())
	}

	/// Verify server's signature over the transcript hash.
	fn verify_server_handshake_signature(&mut self, server_handshake: &ServerHandshake) -> Result<(), HandshakeError> {
		let verifying_key = self.extract_verifying_key(&server_handshake.certificate)?;
		self.compute_and_store_transcript_hash(server_handshake)?;

		let transcript_digest = self.transcript_hash.ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidState)?;
		self.verify_server_signature(&verifying_key, &transcript_digest, server_handshake.signature.as_bytes())
	}

	/// Generate base session key and encrypt with server's public key.
	fn generate_and_encrypt_session_key(
		&mut self,
		server_handshake: &ServerHandshake,
	) -> Result<Vec<u8>, HandshakeError> {
		self.generate_base_session_key()?;
		let base_key = self.base_session_key.ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidState)?;
		let client_random = self.client_random.ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidState)?;

		self.perform_ecies_encryption(&base_key, &client_random, &server_handshake.certificate, self.aad_domain_tag)
	}

	/// Prepare client authentication materials if required or available.
	///
	/// The signature covers `Digest(transcript_hash || encrypted_data || cert_der)`
	/// so it cannot be spliced onto a different key exchange or identity.
	///
	/// Returns tuple of (optional certificate, optional signature).
	async fn prepare_client_auth(
		&self,
		server_handshake: &ServerHandshake,
		encrypted_data: &[u8],
	) -> Result<(Option<Certificate>, Option<OctetString>), HandshakeError> {
		let transcript_digest = self.transcript_hash.ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidState)?;

		let cert = match (&self.client_certificate, server_handshake.client_cert_required) {
			(Some(cert), _) => cert,
			(None, true) => return Err(HandshakeError::MutualAuthRequired),
			(None, false) => return Ok((None, None)),
		};
		let key_provider = match (&self.client_key_provider, server_handshake.client_cert_required) {
			(Some(provider), _) => provider,
			(None, true) => return Err(HandshakeError::MutualAuthRequired),
			(None, false) => return Err(HandshakeError::InvalidState),
		};

		let cert_der = cert.to_der()?;
		let auth_digest = compute_client_auth_digest::<P::Digest>(&transcript_digest, encrypted_data, &cert_der)?;
		let signature_bytes = key_provider.sign_prehash(&auth_digest).await?;

		let cert = Certificate::clone(cert);
		let signature = OctetString::new(signature_bytes)?;
		Ok((Some(cert), Some(signature)))
	}
	/// Complete the handshake and derive the final session key.
	///
	/// # Returns
	/// AEAD cipher session key from the provider
	pub fn complete(&mut self) -> Result<P::AeadCipher, HandshakeError> {
		// 1. Validation
		self.validate_expected_state(ClientHandshakeState::KeyExchangeSent)?;

		// 2. Derive final session key
		let base_key = self.base_session_key.as_ref().ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidState)?;
		let client_random = self.client_random.as_ref().ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidState)?;
		let server_random = self.server_random.as_ref().ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidState)?;

		// Concatenate client_random || server_random as salt for AEAD derivation
		let mut salt = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 64]);
		salt[..32].copy_from_slice(client_random);
		salt[32..].copy_from_slice(server_random);
		let session_key = self.derive_session_aead(base_key, salt.as_slice())?;
		// Invariant: AEAD key derivation occurs exactly once after transcript locked
		self.invariants.derive_aead_once()?;

		// 3. Transition to complete
		self.state.transition(ClientHandshakeState::Completed)?;

		// 4. Clear sensitive data in place (Option impl zeroes payload, then None)
		self.base_session_key.zeroize();
		self.client_random.zeroize();
		self.server_random.zeroize();

		Ok(session_key)
	}

	/// Get the current handshake state.
	pub fn state(&self) -> ClientHandshakeState {
		self.state.state()
	}

	/// Check if handshake is complete.
	pub fn is_complete(&self) -> bool {
		self.state.state().is_completed()
	}

	/// Get the transcript hash (if available).
	pub fn transcript_hash(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
		self.transcript_hash
	}

	// Helper methods

	fn extract_verifying_key(&self, cert: &Certificate) -> Result<P::VerifyingKey, HandshakeError> {
		P::VerifyingKey::extract_from_certificate(cert)
	}

	fn compute_transcript_hash(
		&self,
		client_hello: &[u8],
		server_random: &[u8; 32],
		spki_bytes: &[u8],
		accept_der: &[u8],
	) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandshakeError> {
		let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(client_hello.len() + 32 + spki_bytes.len() + accept_der.len());
		data.extend_from_slice(client_hello);
		data.extend_from_slice(server_random);
		data.extend_from_slice(spki_bytes);
		data.extend_from_slice(accept_der);

		compute_transcript_digest::<P::Digest>(&data)
	}

	fn verify_server_signature(
		&self,
		verifying_key: &P::VerifyingKey,
		digest: &[u8; 32],
		signature_bytes: &[u8],
	) -> Result<(), HandshakeError> {
		let signature = P::Signature::try_from(signature_bytes).map_err(|e| e.into())?;

		verifying_key.verify_prehash(digest, &signature)?;

		Ok(())
	}

	fn perform_ecies_encryption(
		&self,
		base_key: &[u8; 32],
		client_random: &[u8; 32],
		server_certificate: &Certificate,
		associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
	) -> Result<Vec<u8>, HandshakeError> {
		let mut plaintext = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 64]);
		plaintext[..32].copy_from_slice(base_key);
		plaintext[32..].copy_from_slice(client_random);

		let recipient_pubkey = PublicKey::<P::Curve>::from_sec1_bytes(
			server_certificate
				.tbs_certificate
				.subject_public_key_info
				.subject_public_key
				.raw_bytes(),
		)?;

		// TODO decouple OsRng
		let encrypted_message = encrypt::<_, _, _, M, P::Kdf, P::AeadCipher>(
			&recipient_pubkey,
			plaintext.as_slice(),
			associated_data,
			Some(&mut rand_core::OsRng),
		)?;

		Ok(encrypted_message.to_bytes())
	}
}

// ============================================================================
// Common Handshake Trait Implementations
// ============================================================================

impl<P, M> HandshakeFinalization<P> for EciesHandshakeClient<P, M>
where
	P: CryptoProvider,
{
	fn selected_profile(&self) -> Option<SecurityProfileDesc> {
		self.selected_profile
	}
}

impl<P, M> HandshakeAlertHandler for EciesHandshakeClient<P, M> where P: CryptoProvider {}

// ============================================================================
// ClientHandshakeProtocol Implementation
// ============================================================================

impl<P, M> ClientHandshakeProtocol for EciesHandshakeClient<P, M>
where
	P: CryptoProvider + Send + Sync,
	P::Curve: Curve + CurveArithmetic,
	<P::Curve as Curve>::FieldBytesSize: ModulusSize,
	AffinePoint<P::Curve>: FromEncodedPoint<P::Curve> + ToEncodedPoint<P::Curve>,
	PublicKey<P::Curve>: EciesPublicKeyOps,
	<PublicKey<P::Curve> as EciesPublicKeyOps>::SecretKey: EciesEphemeral<PublicKey = PublicKey<P::Curve>>,
	P::Signature: SignatureEncoding + Send + Sync,
	for<'a> P::Signature: TryFrom<&'a [u8]>,
	for<'a> <P::Signature as TryFrom<&'a [u8]>>::Error: Into<HandshakeError>,
	P::VerifyingKey: PrehashVerifier<P::Signature> + ExtractVerifyingKey + Send + Sync,
	P::AeadCipher: KeyInit + Send + Sync + 'static,
	M: EciesMessageOps + Send + Sync,
{
	type Error = HandshakeError;

	fn start<'a>(
		&'a mut self,
	) -> core::pin::Pin<Box<dyn core::future::Future<Output = Result<Vec<u8>, Self::Error>> + Send + 'a>> {
		Box::pin(async move { self.build_client_hello() })
	}

	fn handle_response<'a, 'b>(
		&'a mut self,
		msg: &'b [u8],
	) -> core::pin::Pin<Box<dyn core::future::Future<Output = Result<Option<Vec<u8>>, Self::Error>> + Send + 'a>>
	where
		'b: 'a,
	{
		Box::pin(async move {
			// Process server handshake and build client key exchange
			let client_kex = self.process_server_handshake(msg).await?;
			Ok(Some(client_kex))
		})
	}

	#[cfg(feature = "aead")]
	fn complete<'a>(
		&'a mut self,
	) -> core::pin::Pin<Box<dyn core::future::Future<Output = Result<RuntimeAead, Self::Error>> + Send + 'a>> {
		Box::pin(async move {
			let profile = self.selected_profile.ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidState)?;
			let aead_oid = profile.aead.ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidState)?;

			// Delegate to the inherent method: single source of truth for state
			// validation, AEAD derivation, invariants, and cleanup.
			let cipher = EciesHandshakeClient::complete(self)?;

			Ok(RuntimeAead::new(cipher, aead_oid))
		})
	}

	fn is_complete(&self) -> bool {
		self.state.state().is_completed()
	}

	fn selected_profile(&self) -> Option<SecurityProfileDesc> {
		self.selected_profile
	}
}

// Implement helper trait for secp256k1 verifying key
#[cfg(feature = "secp256k1")]
impl ExtractVerifyingKey for crate::crypto::sign::ecdsa::Secp256k1VerifyingKey {
	fn extract_from_certificate(cert: &Certificate) -> Result<Self, HandshakeError> {
		let public_key_bytes = crate::crypto::x509::utils::extract_verifying_key_bytes(cert);
		let public_key = k256::PublicKey::from_sec1_bytes(public_key_bytes)?;
		Ok(Self::from(public_key))
	}
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
	use super::*;
	use crate::crypto::ecies::Secp256k1EciesMessage;
	use crate::crypto::profiles::{DefaultCryptoProvider, SecurityProfileDesc};
	use crate::crypto::sign::ecdsa::Secp256k1Signature;
	use crate::crypto::sign::PrehashSigner;
	use crate::der::Encode;
	use crate::transport::handshake::negotiation::{SecurityAccept, SecurityOffer};
	use crate::transport::handshake::tests::*;
	use crate::transport::handshake::ServerHandshake;

	use crate::oids::{
		AES_256_GCM, AES_256_WRAP, CURVE_SECP256K1, HASH_SHA3_256, HASH_SHA3_384, HASH_SHA3_512,
		SIGNER_ECDSA_WITH_SHA3_512,
	};

	#[tokio::test]
	async fn test_client_state_flow() -> Result<(), Box<dyn core::error::Error>> {
		// Given: A client in init state that trusts the test server certificate
		let test_cert = create_test_certificate();
		let mut client = TestEciesClientBuilder::new()
			.with_trusted_certificate(test_cert.certificate.clone())
			.build();
		assert_eq!(client.state(), ClientHandshakeState::Init);

		// When: Client builds client hello
		let client_hello_der = client.build_client_hello()?;
		assert_eq!(client.state(), ClientHandshakeState::HelloSent); // Hello sent
		assert!(client.client_random.is_some());

		// And: Server creates a valid server handshake response
		let server_random = crate::random::generate_nonce::<32>(None)?;
		let accept_der = SecurityAccept::new(create_default_test_profile()).to_der()?;
		let transcript_hash = compute_test_transcript_hash(
			&client_hello_der,
			&server_random,
			test_cert
				.certificate
				.tbs_certificate
				.subject_public_key_info
				.subject_public_key
				.raw_bytes(),
			&accept_der,
		);

		let signature_bytes: Secp256k1Signature = test_cert.signing_key.sign_prehash(&transcript_hash)?;
		let server_handshake_der =
			create_test_server_handshake(&test_cert.certificate, &server_random, &signature_bytes.to_bytes())?;

		// When: Client processes the server handshake
		let client_kex_der = client.process_server_handshake(&server_handshake_der).await?;
		assert_eq!(client.state(), ClientHandshakeState::KeyExchangeSent);
		assert!(client.base_session_key.is_some());
		assert!(client.transcript_hash.is_some());

		// And: Client key exchange message is valid
		let _client_kex = ClientKeyExchange::from_der(&client_kex_der)?;
		// When: Client completes the handshake
		let _session_key = client.complete()?;

		// Then: Handshake is complete
		assert!(client.is_complete());
		assert_eq!(client.state(), ClientHandshakeState::Completed);

		Ok(())
	}

	/// A client without a certificate validator must abort instead of
	/// degrading to expiry-only server authentication (CWE-295).
	#[tokio::test]
	async fn test_missing_validator_fails_closed() -> Result<(), Box<dyn core::error::Error>> {
		let mut client = TestEciesClientBuilder::new().build();
		let client_hello_der = client.build_client_hello()?;

		let test_cert = create_test_certificate();
		let server_random = crate::random::generate_nonce::<32>(None)?;
		let accept_der = SecurityAccept::new(create_default_test_profile()).to_der()?;
		let transcript_hash = compute_test_transcript_hash(
			&client_hello_der,
			&server_random,
			test_cert
				.certificate
				.tbs_certificate
				.subject_public_key_info
				.subject_public_key
				.raw_bytes(),
			&accept_der,
		);
		let signature_bytes: Secp256k1Signature = test_cert.signing_key.sign_prehash(&transcript_hash)?;
		let server_handshake_der =
			create_test_server_handshake(&test_cert.certificate, &server_random, &signature_bytes.to_bytes())?;

		let result = client.process_server_handshake(&server_handshake_der).await;
		assert!(matches!(result, Err(HandshakeError::MissingTrustStore)));
		Ok(())
	}

	#[tokio::test]
	async fn test_invalid_state_transitions() -> Result<(), Box<dyn core::error::Error>> {
		// Given: A fresh client in init state
		let mut client = TestEciesClientBuilder::new().build();

		// When: Trying to process server handshake before building client hello
		let result = client.process_server_handshake(&[]).await;
		assert!(result.is_err());

		// When: Client builds client hello
		let _client_hello = client.build_client_hello()?;
		assert_eq!(client.state(), ClientHandshakeState::HelloSent);

		// When: Trying to complete before processing server handshake
		let result = client.complete();
		assert!(result.is_err());

		Ok(())
	}

	/// Test client-side profile validation
	#[tokio::test]
	async fn test_client_profile_validation() -> Result<(), Box<dyn core::error::Error>> {
		let mk_profile = |id: u8| SecurityProfileDesc {
			digest: Some(match id {
				1 => HASH_SHA3_256,
				2 => HASH_SHA3_384,
				_ => HASH_SHA3_512,
			}),
			aead: Some(AES_256_GCM),
			aead_key_size: Some(32),
			signature: Some(SIGNER_ECDSA_WITH_SHA3_512),
			kdf: Some(HASH_SHA3_256), // HKDF-SHA3-256
			curve: Some(CURVE_SECP256K1),
			key_wrap: Some(AES_256_WRAP),
			kem: None,
		};

		let (p_a, p_b, p_c) = (mk_profile(1), mk_profile(2), mk_profile(3));
		let test_cert = create_test_certificate();

		// Helper to create client with security offer and build hello
		#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
		let setup_client = |offer: Option<SecurityOffer>| -> Result<
			(EciesHandshakeClient<DefaultCryptoProvider, Secp256k1EciesMessage>, Vec<u8>),
			Box<dyn std::error::Error>,
		> {
			let mut client = TestEciesClientBuilder::new()
				.with_trusted_certificate(test_cert.certificate.clone())
				.build();
			if let Some(offer) = offer {
				client = client.with_security_offer(offer);
			}
			let hello = client.build_client_hello()?;
			Ok((client, hello))
		};

		// Helper to create signed server handshake
		let create_server_response = |client_hello_der: &[u8],
		                              server_random: [u8; 32],
		                              accepted_profile: &SecurityProfileDesc|
		 -> Result<Vec<u8>, Box<dyn core::error::Error>> {
			let accept_der = SecurityAccept::new(*accepted_profile).to_der()?;
			let transcript_hash = compute_test_transcript_hash(
				client_hello_der,
				&server_random,
				test_cert
					.certificate
					.tbs_certificate
					.subject_public_key_info
					.subject_public_key
					.raw_bytes(),
				&accept_der,
			);
			let signature: Secp256k1Signature = test_cert.signing_key.sign_prehash(&transcript_hash)?;
			let signature_bytes = signature.to_bytes().to_vec();

			let response = ServerHandshake {
				certificate: test_cert.certificate.clone(),
				server_random: OctetString::new(server_random)?,
				signature: OctetString::new(signature_bytes)?,
				security_accept: Some(SecurityAccept::new(*accepted_profile)),
				client_cert_required: false,
			};
			Ok(response.to_der()?)
		};

		// Test 1: Client offers [A, B], server accepts B -> OK
		{
			let (mut client, client_hello_der) = setup_client(Some(SecurityOffer::new(vec![p_a, p_b])))?;
			let server_response = create_server_response(&client_hello_der, [2u8; 32], &p_b)?;
			let _kex = client.process_server_handshake(&server_response).await?;
			assert_eq!(client.selected_profile, Some(p_b));
		}

		// Test 2: Client offers [A, B], server accepts C (not in offer) -> FAIL
		{
			let (mut client, client_hello_der) = setup_client(Some(SecurityOffer::new(vec![p_a, p_b])))?;
			let server_response = create_server_response(&client_hello_der, [3u8; 32], &p_c)?;
			let result = client.process_server_handshake(&server_response).await;
			assert!(matches!(result, Err(HandshakeError::InvalidProfileSelection)));
		}

		// Test 3: No offer, server picks -> OK (dealer's choice)
		{
			let (mut client, client_hello_der) = setup_client(None)?;
			let server_response = create_server_response(&client_hello_der, [4u8; 32], &p_a)?;
			let _kex = client.process_server_handshake(&server_response).await?;
			assert_eq!(client.selected_profile, Some(p_a));
		}

		Ok(())
	}
}