tide-csrf 0.1.1

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) protection middleware for Tide
Documentation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
#![doc = include_str!("../README.md")]
#![forbid(unsafe_code, future_incompatible)]
#![deny(
    missing_debug_implementations,
    nonstandard_style,
    missing_docs,
    unreachable_pub,
    missing_copy_implementations,
    unused_qualifications,
    clippy::unwrap_in_result,
    clippy::unwrap_used
)]

use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::time::Duration;

use csrf::{
    AesGcmCsrfProtection, CsrfCookie, CsrfProtection, CsrfToken, UnencryptedCsrfCookie,
    UnencryptedCsrfToken,
};
use data_encoding::{BASE64, BASE64URL};
use tide::{
    http::{cookies::SameSite, mime},
    http::{headers::HeaderName, Cookie, Method},
    Body, Middleware, Next, Request, Response, StatusCode,
};

struct CsrfRequestExtData {
    csrf_token: String,
    csrf_header_name: HeaderName,
    csrf_query_param: String,
    csrf_field_name: String,
}

/// Provides access to request-level CSRF values.
pub trait CsrfRequestExt {
    /// Gets the CSRF token for inclusion in an HTTP request header,
    /// a query parameter, or a form field.
    fn csrf_token(&self) -> &str;

    /// Gets the name of the header in which to return the CSRF token,
    /// if the CSRF token is being returned in a header.
    fn csrf_header_name(&self) -> &str;

    /// Gets the name of the query param in which to return the CSRF
    /// token, if the CSRF token is being returned in a query param.
    fn csrf_query_param(&self) -> &str;

    /// Gets the name of the form field in which to return the CSRF
    /// token, if the CSRF token is being returned in a form field.
    fn csrf_field_name(&self) -> &str;
}

impl<State> CsrfRequestExt for Request<State>
where
    State: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
    fn csrf_token(&self) -> &str {
        let ext_data: &CsrfRequestExtData = self
            .ext()
            .expect("You must install CsrfMiddleware to access the CSRF token.");
        &ext_data.csrf_token
    }

    fn csrf_header_name(&self) -> &str {
        let ext_data: &CsrfRequestExtData = self
            .ext()
            .expect("You must install CsrfMiddleware to access the CSRF token.");
        ext_data.csrf_header_name.as_str()
    }

    fn csrf_query_param(&self) -> &str {
        let ext_data: &CsrfRequestExtData = self
            .ext()
            .expect("You must install CsrfMiddleware to access the CSRF token.");
        ext_data.csrf_query_param.as_str()
    }

    fn csrf_field_name(&self) -> &str {
        let ext_data: &CsrfRequestExtData = self
            .ext()
            .expect("You must install CsrfMiddleware to access the CSRF token.");
        ext_data.csrf_field_name.as_str()
    }
}

/// Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) protection middleware.
pub struct CsrfMiddleware {
    cookie_path: String,
    cookie_name: String,
    cookie_domain: Option<String>,
    ttl: Duration,
    header_name: HeaderName,
    query_param: String,
    form_field: String,
    protected_methods: HashSet<Method>,
    protect: AesGcmCsrfProtection,
}

impl std::fmt::Debug for CsrfMiddleware {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        f.debug_struct("CsrfMiddleware")
            .field("cookie_path", &self.cookie_path)
            .field("cookie_name", &self.cookie_name)
            .field("cookie_domain", &self.cookie_domain)
            .field("ttl", &self.ttl)
            .field("header_name", &self.header_name)
            .field("query_param", &self.query_param)
            .field("form_field", &self.form_field)
            .field("protected_methods", &self.protected_methods)
            .finish()
    }
}

impl CsrfMiddleware {
    /// Create a new instance.
    ///
    /// # Defaults
    ///
    /// The defaults for CsrfMiddleware are:
    /// - cookie path: `/`
    /// - cookie name: `tide.csrf`
    /// - cookie domain: None
    /// - ttl: 24 hours
    /// - header name: `X-CSRF-Token`
    /// - query param: `csrf-token`
    /// - form field: `csrf-token`
    /// - protected methods: `[POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE]`
    pub fn new(secret: &[u8]) -> Self {
        let mut key = [0u8; 32];
        derive_key(secret, &mut key);

        Self {
            cookie_path: "/".into(),
            cookie_name: "tide.csrf".into(),
            cookie_domain: None,
            ttl: Duration::from_secs(24 * 60 * 60),
            header_name: "X-CSRF-Token".into(),
            query_param: "csrf-token".into(),
            form_field: "csrf-token".into(),
            protected_methods: vec![Method::Post, Method::Put, Method::Patch, Method::Delete]
                .iter()
                .cloned()
                .collect(),
            protect: AesGcmCsrfProtection::from_key(key),
        }
    }

    /// Sets the protection ttl. This will be used for both the cookie
    /// expiry and the time window over which CSRF tokens are considered
    /// valid.
    ///
    /// The default for this value is one day.
    pub fn with_ttl(mut self, ttl: Duration) -> Self {
        self.ttl = ttl;
        self
    }

    /// Sets the name of the HTTP header where the middleware will look
    /// for the CSRF token.
    ///
    /// Defaults to "X-CSRF-Token".
    pub fn with_header_name(mut self, header_name: impl AsRef<str>) -> Self {
        self.header_name = header_name.as_ref().into();
        self
    }

    /// Sets the name of the query parameter where the middleware will
    /// look for the CSRF token.
    ///
    /// Defaults to "csrf-token".
    pub fn with_query_param(mut self, query_param: impl AsRef<str>) -> Self {
        self.query_param = query_param.as_ref().into();
        self
    }

    /// Sets the name of the form field where the middleware will look
    /// for the CSRF token.
    ///
    /// Defaults to "csrf-token".
    pub fn with_form_field(mut self, form_field: impl AsRef<str>) -> Self {
        self.form_field = form_field.as_ref().into();
        self
    }

    /// Sets the list of methods that will be protected by this
    /// middleware
    ///
    /// Defaults to `[POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE]`
    pub fn with_protected_methods(mut self, methods: &[Method]) -> Self {
        self.protected_methods = methods.iter().cloned().collect();
        self
    }

    fn build_cookie(&self, secure: bool, cookie_value: String) -> Cookie<'static> {
        let mut cookie = Cookie::build(self.cookie_name.clone(), cookie_value)
            .http_only(true)
            .same_site(SameSite::Strict)
            .path(self.cookie_path.clone())
            .secure(secure)
            .expires((std::time::SystemTime::now() + self.ttl).into())
            .finish();

        if let Some(cookie_domain) = self.cookie_domain.clone() {
            cookie.set_domain(cookie_domain);
        }

        cookie
    }

    fn generate_token(
        &self,
        existing_cookie: Option<&UnencryptedCsrfCookie>,
    ) -> (CsrfToken, CsrfCookie) {
        let existing_cookie_bytes = existing_cookie.and_then(|c| {
            let c = c.value();
            if c.len() < 64 {
                None
            } else {
                let mut buf = [0; 64];
                buf.copy_from_slice(c);
                Some(buf)
            }
        });

        self.protect
            .generate_token_pair(existing_cookie_bytes.as_ref(), self.ttl.as_secs() as i64)
            .expect("couldn't generate token/cookie pair")
    }

    fn find_csrf_cookie<State>(&self, req: &Request<State>) -> Option<UnencryptedCsrfCookie>
    where
        State: Clone + Send + Sync + 'static,
    {
        req.cookie(&self.cookie_name)
            .and_then(|c| BASE64.decode(c.value().as_bytes()).ok())
            .and_then(|b| self.protect.parse_cookie(&b).ok())
    }

    async fn find_csrf_token<State>(
        &self,
        req: &mut Request<State>,
    ) -> Result<Option<UnencryptedCsrfToken>, tide::Error>
    where
        State: Clone + Send + Sync + 'static,
    {
        // A bit of a strange flow here (with an early exit as well),
        // because we do not want to do the expensive parsing (form,
        // body specifically) if we find a CSRF token in an earlier
        // location. And we can't use `or_else` chaining since the
        // function that searches through the form body is async. Note
        // that if parsing the body fails then we want to return an
        // InternalServerError, hence the `?`. This is not the same as
        // what we will do later, which is convert failures to *parse* a
        // found CSRF token into Forbidden responses.
        let csrf_token = if let Some(csrf_token) = self.find_csrf_token_in_header(req) {
            csrf_token
        } else if let Some(csrf_token) = self.find_csrf_token_in_query(req) {
            csrf_token
        } else if let Some(csrf_token) = self.find_csrf_token_in_form(req).await? {
            csrf_token
        } else {
            return Ok(None);
        };

        Ok(Some(self.protect.parse_token(&csrf_token).map_err(
            |err| tide::Error::new(StatusCode::Forbidden, err),
        )?))
    }

    fn find_csrf_token_in_header<State>(&self, req: &Request<State>) -> Option<Vec<u8>>
    where
        State: Clone + Send + Sync + 'static,
    {
        req.header(&self.header_name).and_then(|vs| {
            vs.iter()
                .find_map(|v| BASE64URL.decode(v.as_str().as_bytes()).ok())
        })
    }

    fn find_csrf_token_in_query<State>(&self, req: &Request<State>) -> Option<Vec<u8>>
    where
        State: Clone + Send + Sync + 'static,
    {
        req.url().query_pairs().find_map(|(key, value)| {
            if key == self.query_param {
                BASE64URL.decode(value.as_bytes()).ok()
            } else {
                None
            }
        })
    }

    async fn find_csrf_token_in_form<State>(
        &self,
        req: &mut Request<State>,
    ) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>, tide::Error>
    where
        State: Clone + Send + Sync + 'static,
    {
        // We only try to look for the CSRF token in a form field if the
        // body is in fact a form.
        if req.content_type() != Some(mime::FORM) {
            return Ok(None);
        }

        // Get a copy of the body as a byte array. Note that the request
        // is essentially unusable if this fails and we return an error
        // (since the body has been taken and not replaced).
        let body = req.take_body().into_bytes().await?;

        // Try to find the CSRF token. This could fail for multiple
        // reasons (such as an inability to parse the body as a form
        // body), but we convert all of those failures to a `None`
        // result since we do not want to block the request at this
        // point. The caller will decide if/how to block the request
        // based on missing/mismatched CSRF tokens. This is unlike what
        // happens if we cannot read the body at all (above), where our
        // only option is to completely fail the request.
        //
        // Note that an important subtlety in this function is that we
        // *must* put the body back after we try to find the CSRF token,
        // so we cannot fail directly out of this decoding step, but
        // must instead compute the result, put the body back into the
        // request, then return whatever resulted was computed.
        let csrf_token = serde_urlencoded::from_bytes::<Vec<(String, String)>>(&body)
            .unwrap_or_default()
            .into_iter()
            .find_map(|(key, value)| {
                if key == self.form_field {
                    BASE64URL.decode(value.as_bytes()).ok()
                } else {
                    None
                }
            });

        // Put a new body, backed by our copied byte array, into the
        // request.
        req.set_body(Body::from_bytes(body));

        // Return the CSRF token (which may be None, if we didn't actually
        // find a CSRF token in the form).
        Ok(csrf_token)
    }
}

#[tide::utils::async_trait]
impl<State> Middleware<State> for CsrfMiddleware
where
    State: Clone + Send + Sync + 'static,
{
    async fn handle(&self, mut req: Request<State>, next: Next<'_, State>) -> tide::Result {
        // We always begin by trying to find the existing CSRF cookie,
        // even if we do not need to protect this method. A new token is
        // generated on every request *based on the encrypted key in the
        // cookie* and so we always want to find the existing cookie in
        // order to generate a token that uses the same underlying key.
        let existing_cookie = self.find_csrf_cookie(&req);

        // Is this a protected method? If so, we need to find the token
        // and verify it against the cookie before we can allow the
        // request.
        if self.protected_methods.contains(&req.method()) {
            if let Some(cookie) = &existing_cookie {
                if let Some(token) = self.find_csrf_token(&mut req).await? {
                    if self.protect.verify_token_pair(&token, cookie) {
                        tide::log::debug!("Verified CSRF token.");
                    } else {
                        tide::log::debug!(
                            "Rejecting request due to invalid or expired CSRF token."
                        );
                        return Ok(Response::new(StatusCode::Forbidden));
                    }
                } else {
                    tide::log::debug!("Rejecting request due to missing CSRF token.",);
                    return Ok(Response::new(StatusCode::Forbidden));
                }
            } else {
                tide::log::debug!("Rejecting request due to missing CSRF cookie.",);
                return Ok(Response::new(StatusCode::Forbidden));
            }
        }

        // Generate a new cookie and token (using the existing cookie if
        // present).
        let (token, cookie) = self.generate_token(existing_cookie.as_ref());

        // Add the token to the request for use by the application.
        let secure_cookie = req.url().scheme() == "https";
        req.set_ext(CsrfRequestExtData {
            csrf_token: token.b64_url_string(),
            csrf_header_name: self.header_name.clone(),
            csrf_query_param: self.query_param.clone(),
            csrf_field_name: self.form_field.clone(),
        });

        // Call the downstream middleware.
        let mut res = next.run(req).await;

        // Add the CSRF cookie to the response.
        let cookie = self.build_cookie(secure_cookie, cookie.b64_string());
        res.insert_cookie(cookie);

        // Return the response.
        Ok(res)
    }
}

fn derive_key(secret: &[u8], key: &mut [u8; 32]) {
    let hk = hkdf::Hkdf::<sha2::Sha256>::new(None, secret);
    hk.expand(&[0u8; 0], key)
        .expect("Sha256 should be able to produce a 32 byte key.");
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use tide::{
        http::headers::{COOKIE, SET_COOKIE},
        Request,
    };
    use tide_testing::{surf::Response, TideTestingExt};

    const SECRET: [u8; 32] = *b"secrets must be >= 32 bytes long";

    #[async_std::test]
    async fn middleware_exposes_csrf_request_extensions() -> tide::Result<()> {
        let mut app = tide::new();
        app.with(CsrfMiddleware::new(&SECRET));

        app.at("/").get(|req: Request<()>| async move {
            assert_ne!(req.csrf_token(), "");
            assert_eq!(req.csrf_header_name(), "x-csrf-token");
            Ok("")
        });

        let res = app.get("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);

        Ok(())
    }

    #[async_std::test]
    async fn middleware_adds_csrf_cookie_sets_request_token() -> tide::Result<()> {
        let mut app = tide::new();
        app.with(CsrfMiddleware::new(&SECRET));

        app.at("/")
            .get(|req: Request<()>| async move { Ok(req.csrf_token().to_string()) });

        let mut res = app.get("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);

        let csrf_token = res.body_string().await?;
        assert_ne!(csrf_token, "");

        let cookie = get_csrf_cookie(&res).expect("Expected CSRF cookie in response.");
        assert_eq!(cookie.name(), "tide.csrf");

        Ok(())
    }

    #[async_std::test]
    async fn middleware_validates_token_in_header() -> tide::Result<()> {
        let mut app = tide::new();
        app.with(CsrfMiddleware::new(&SECRET));

        app.at("/")
            .get(|req: Request<()>| async move { Ok(req.csrf_token().to_string()) })
            .post(|_| async { Ok("POST") });

        let mut res = app.get("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        let csrf_token = res.body_string().await?;
        let cookie = get_csrf_cookie(&res).expect("Expected CSRF cookie in response.");
        assert_eq!(cookie.name(), "tide.csrf");

        let res = app.post("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Forbidden);

        let mut res = app
            .post("/")
            .header(COOKIE, cookie.to_string())
            .header("X-CSRF-Token", csrf_token)
            .await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        assert_eq!(res.body_string().await?, "POST");

        Ok(())
    }

    #[async_std::test]
    async fn middleware_validates_token_in_alternate_header() -> tide::Result<()> {
        let mut app = tide::new();
        app.with(CsrfMiddleware::new(&SECRET).with_header_name("X-MyCSRF-Header"));

        app.at("/")
            .get(|req: Request<()>| async move {
                assert_eq!(req.csrf_header_name(), "x-mycsrf-header");
                Ok(req.csrf_token().to_string())
            })
            .post(|_| async { Ok("POST") });

        let mut res = app.get("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        let csrf_token = res.body_string().await?;
        let cookie = get_csrf_cookie(&res).expect("Expected CSRF cookie in response.");

        let mut res = app
            .post("/")
            .header(COOKIE, cookie.to_string())
            .header("X-MyCSRF-Header", csrf_token)
            .await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        assert_eq!(res.body_string().await?, "POST");

        Ok(())
    }

    #[async_std::test]
    async fn middleware_validates_token_in_alternate_query() -> tide::Result<()> {
        // tide::log::with_level(tide::log::LevelFilter::Trace);
        let mut app = tide::new();
        app.with(CsrfMiddleware::new(&SECRET).with_query_param("my-csrf-token"));

        app.at("/")
            .get(|req: Request<()>| async move { Ok(req.csrf_token().to_string()) })
            .post(|_| async { Ok("POST") });

        let mut res = app.get("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        let csrf_token = res.body_string().await?;
        let cookie = get_csrf_cookie(&res).expect("Expected CSRF cookie in response.");
        assert_eq!(cookie.name(), "tide.csrf");

        let res = app.post("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Forbidden);

        let mut res = app
            .post(format!("/?a=1&my-csrf-token={}&b=2", csrf_token))
            .header(COOKIE, cookie.to_string())
            .await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        assert_eq!(res.body_string().await?, "POST");

        Ok(())
    }

    #[async_std::test]
    async fn middleware_validates_token_in_query() -> tide::Result<()> {
        // tide::log::with_level(tide::log::LevelFilter::Trace);
        let mut app = tide::new();
        app.with(CsrfMiddleware::new(&SECRET));

        app.at("/")
            .get(|req: Request<()>| async move { Ok(req.csrf_token().to_string()) })
            .post(|_| async { Ok("POST") });

        let mut res = app.get("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        let csrf_token = res.body_string().await?;
        let cookie = get_csrf_cookie(&res).expect("Expected CSRF cookie in response.");
        assert_eq!(cookie.name(), "tide.csrf");

        let res = app.post("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Forbidden);

        let mut res = app
            .post(format!("/?a=1&csrf-token={}&b=2", csrf_token))
            .header(COOKIE, cookie.to_string())
            .await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        assert_eq!(res.body_string().await?, "POST");

        Ok(())
    }

    #[async_std::test]
    async fn middleware_validates_token_in_form() -> tide::Result<()> {
        // tide::log::with_level(tide::log::LevelFilter::Trace);
        let mut app = tide::new();
        app.with(CsrfMiddleware::new(&SECRET));

        app.at("/")
            .get(|req: Request<()>| async move { Ok(req.csrf_token().to_string()) })
            .post(|mut req: Request<()>| async move {
                // Deserialize our part of the form in order to verify that
                // the CsrfMiddleware does not break form parsing since it
                // also had to parse the form in order to find its CSRF field.
                #[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
                struct Form {
                    a: String,
                    b: i32,
                }
                let form: Form = req.body_form().await?;
                assert_eq!(form.a, "1");
                assert_eq!(form.b, 2);

                Ok("POST")
            });

        let mut res = app.get("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        let csrf_token = res.body_string().await?;
        let cookie = get_csrf_cookie(&res).expect("Expected CSRF cookie in response.");
        assert_eq!(cookie.name(), "tide.csrf");

        let res = app.post("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Forbidden);

        let mut res = app
            .post("/")
            .header(COOKIE, cookie.to_string())
            .content_type("application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
            .body(format!("a=1&csrf-token={}&b=2", csrf_token))
            .await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        assert_eq!(res.body_string().await?, "POST");

        Ok(())
    }

    #[async_std::test]
    async fn middleware_ignores_non_form_bodies() -> tide::Result<()> {
        // tide::log::with_level(tide::log::LevelFilter::Trace);
        let mut app = tide::new();
        app.with(CsrfMiddleware::new(&SECRET));

        app.at("/")
            .get(|req: Request<()>| async move { Ok(req.csrf_token().to_string()) })
            .post(|_| async { Ok("POST") });

        let mut res = app.get("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        let csrf_token = res.body_string().await?;
        let cookie = get_csrf_cookie(&res).expect("Expected CSRF cookie in response.");
        assert_eq!(cookie.name(), "tide.csrf");

        let res = app.post("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Forbidden);

        // Include the CSRF token in what *looks* like a form body, but
        // the Content-Type is `text/html` and so the middleware will
        // ignore the body.
        let res = app
            .post("/")
            .header(COOKIE, cookie.to_string())
            .content_type("text/html")
            .body(format!("a=1&csrf-token={}&b=2", csrf_token))
            .await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Forbidden);

        Ok(())
    }

    #[async_std::test]
    async fn middleware_allows_different_generation_cookies_and_tokens() -> tide::Result<()> {
        let mut app = tide::new();
        app.with(CsrfMiddleware::new(&SECRET));

        app.at("/")
            .get(|req: Request<()>| async move { Ok(req.csrf_token().to_string()) })
            .post(|req: Request<()>| async move { Ok(req.csrf_token().to_string()) });

        let mut res = app.get("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        let csrf_token = res.body_string().await?;
        let cookie = get_csrf_cookie(&res).expect("Expected CSRF cookie in response.");
        assert_eq!(cookie.name(), "tide.csrf");

        let res = app.post("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Forbidden);

        // Send a valid CSRF token and verify that we get back a
        // *different* token *and* cookie (which is how the `csrf` crate
        // works; each response generates a different token and cookie,
        // but all related -- part of the same request/response flow --
        // tokens and cookies are compatible with each other until they
        // expire).
        let mut res = app
            .post("/")
            .header(COOKIE, cookie.to_string())
            .header("X-CSRF-Token", &csrf_token)
            .await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        let new_csrf_token = res.body_string().await?;
        assert_ne!(new_csrf_token, csrf_token);
        let new_cookie = get_csrf_cookie(&res).expect("Expected CSRF cookie in response.");
        assert_eq!(new_cookie.name(), "tide.csrf");
        assert_ne!(new_cookie.to_string(), cookie.to_string());

        // Now send another request with the *first* token and the
        // *second* cookie and verify that the older token still works.
        // (because the token hasn't expired yet, and all unexpired
        // tokens are compatible with all related cookies).
        let res = app
            .post("/")
            .header(COOKIE, new_cookie.to_string())
            .header("X-CSRF-Token", csrf_token)
            .await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);

        // Finally, one more check that does the opposite of what we
        // just did: a new token with an old cookie.
        let res = app
            .post("/")
            .header(COOKIE, cookie.to_string())
            .header("X-CSRF-Token", new_csrf_token)
            .await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);

        Ok(())
    }

    #[async_std::test]
    async fn middleware_rejects_short_token() -> tide::Result<()> {
        // tide::log::with_level(tide::log::LevelFilter::Trace);
        let mut app = tide::new();
        app.with(CsrfMiddleware::new(&SECRET));

        app.at("/")
            .get(|req: Request<()>| async move { Ok(req.csrf_token().to_string()) })
            .post(|_| async { Ok("POST") });

        let res = app.get("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        let cookie = get_csrf_cookie(&res).expect("Expected CSRF cookie in response.");
        assert_eq!(cookie.name(), "tide.csrf");

        let res = app.post("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Forbidden);

        // Send a CSRF token that is not a token (instead, it is the
        // Base64 string "hello") and verify that we get a Forbidden
        // response (and not a server error or anything like that, since
        // the server is operating fine, it is the request that we are
        // rejecting).
        let res = app
            .post("/")
            .header(COOKIE, cookie.to_string())
            .header("X-CSRF-Token", "aGVsbG8=")
            .await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Forbidden);

        Ok(())
    }

    #[async_std::test]
    async fn middleware_rejects_invalid_base64_token() -> tide::Result<()> {
        // tide::log::with_level(tide::log::LevelFilter::Trace);
        let mut app = tide::new();
        app.with(CsrfMiddleware::new(&SECRET));

        app.at("/")
            .get(|req: Request<()>| async move { Ok(req.csrf_token().to_string()) })
            .post(|_| async { Ok("POST") });

        let res = app.get("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        let cookie = get_csrf_cookie(&res).expect("Expected CSRF cookie in response.");
        assert_eq!(cookie.name(), "tide.csrf");

        let res = app.post("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Forbidden);

        // Send a corrupt Base64 string as the CSRF token and verify
        // that we get a Forbidden response (and not a server error or
        // anything like that, since the server is operating fine, it is
        // the request that we are rejecting).
        let res = app
            .post("/")
            .header(COOKIE, cookie.to_string())
            .header("X-CSRF-Token", "aGVsbG8")
            .await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Forbidden);

        Ok(())
    }

    #[async_std::test]
    async fn middleware_rejects_mismatched_token() -> tide::Result<()> {
        let mut app = tide::new();
        app.with(CsrfMiddleware::new(&SECRET));

        app.at("/")
            .get(|req: Request<()>| async move { Ok(req.csrf_token().to_string()) })
            .post(|_| async { Ok("POST") });

        // Make two requests, keep the token from the first and the
        // cookie from the second. This ensures that we have a
        // validly-formatted token, but one that will be rejected if
        // provided with the wrong cookie.
        let mut res = app.get("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        let csrf_token = res.body_string().await?;

        let res = app.get("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Ok);
        let cookie = get_csrf_cookie(&res).expect("Expected CSRF cookie in response.");
        assert_eq!(cookie.name(), "tide.csrf");

        let res = app.post("/").await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Forbidden);

        // Send a valid (but mismatched) CSRF token and verify that we
        // get a Forbidden response.
        let res = app
            .post("/")
            .header(COOKIE, cookie.to_string())
            .header("X-CSRF-Token", csrf_token)
            .await?;
        assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::Forbidden);

        Ok(())
    }

    fn get_csrf_cookie(res: &Response) -> Option<Cookie> {
        if let Some(values) = res.header(SET_COOKIE) {
            if let Some(value) = values.get(0) {
                Cookie::parse(value.to_string()).ok()
            } else {
                None
            }
        } else {
            None
        }
    }
}