Tempus DDB

Ninguna acción de un agente sale sin pasar por una política, y si algo falla, se bloquea.

No agent action goes out without passing a policy, and if anything fails, it is blocked.

The B2A (Bot-to-Agent) Security Gate for Autonomous Agent Actions

Zero-trust authorization · Single-use cryptographic permits · Tamper-evident receipts · MCP native

⚡ Quick Install

python -m pip install tempus-ddb     # 0.5.4 ships pre-built wheels: no Rust toolchain needed
tempus --version

0.5.4 is the first PyPI release with default-deny on tempus init, --allow-all-dev and independent verification (verify-receipt, export-bundle, verify-bundle). Every flow in this README works with it. To work on the source, see Install → From Source.

🚀 Try the Live Interactive Trace Demo →

Verify real cryptographic hashes, Ed25519 signatures, and tamper detection directly in your browser.

Status: beta (0.5.4 milestone line). Signed policy, identity lifecycle, Vault-backed signing, mediated executor runtime (GitHub, HTTP, Slack, Payment), hash-linked event streaming, and signed monotonic checkpoints are implemented. Distributed multi-container gate service is in progress (0.6).

Project site · Integration guide · Repository · PyPI · crates.io · docs.rs · tempus-github-app · Architecture Blueprints · Cookbooks · Interactive trace demo · Roadmap · Security · Threat model · Contributing

💡 ¿Qué resuelve Tempus? / What Tempus Solves

When autonomous AI agents take actions (calling external APIs, issuing database writes, creating pull requests, moving funds), they must not approve their own requests or directly hold privileged downstream credentials.

Tempus DDB creates an enforced B2A (Bot-to-Agent / Bot-to-Action) Security Boundary:

🛑 Zero-Trust Authorization Toll: The agent cryptographically signs its intent. It cannot execute directly.
📜 Signed, Deterministic Policy: Tempus evaluates tenant policy and issues an expiring, single-use signed permit (ALLOWED or BLOCKED).
🔒 Credential Isolation: The mediated executor—not the AI agent—holds downstream secrets (e.g. GITHUB_TOKEN, API keys) and only executes when presented with a valid, unconsumed permit.
🧾 Tamper-Evident Receipts: Both the executor and Tempus gate sign the outcome, generating an immutable, mathematically verifiable cryptographic trace.

Product Invariant: No Tempus permit, no effect; every effect produces a verifiable receipt.

⚔️ ¿Por qué Tempus y no un gateway RBAC? / Why Tempus vs Traditional RBAC / MCP Gateways?

En 2026, varios productos de gobernanza MCP (Bifrost, Obot, MCPX, MintMCP) administran el acceso del agente con RBAC. Tempus DDB resuelve un problema distinto. Hoy publica un servidor MCP cuyas herramientas el agente llama de forma voluntaria. No intercepta el tráfico de otras herramientas: un modo proxy está planificado y todavía no forma parte del producto.

In 2026, several MCP governance products (such as Bifrost, Obot, MCPX, MintMCP) manage agent access using role-based access control (RBAC). Tempus DDB solves a different problem. The current product ships an MCP server whose tools the agent calls voluntarily. It does not intercept other tools' traffic: a proxy mode is planned and is not part of the product today.

Dimension	Traditional MCP gateways (RBAC)	Tempus DDB (B2A Toll Gate)
Security Model	Authorize and forward: checks rules, forwards the request, and trusts the agent and the downstream service.	Cryptographic toll: the agent signs intent; the gate issues a single-use permit; the executor consumes that permit atomically.
Credential Boundary	The agent or the gateway holds raw API keys and database credentials.	Strict Credential Isolation: Agent never sees or handles downstream secrets (`GITHUB_TOKEN`, Slack tokens, API keys).
MCP surface	A gateway can sit in front of other tools and forward calls.	Voluntary MCP server. The agent calls Tempus tools. A proxy that would intercept other MCP traffic is planned and is not shipped.
Replay & Loop Prevention	Advisory rate limits; repeated calls within role permissions pass through.	Single-use permits: Each permit can be consumed once: the gate rejects a second, different outcome for the same permit and the executor runtime rejects a reused permit (single-instance deployments; multi-instance consumption is not yet proven).
Tamper Detection	Server application logs (which can be modified, truncated, or forged).	Dual-signed receipts: Cryptographically linked (Ed25519 + SHA-256). Anyone holding the gate's public key can check them offline with `verify-receipt` / `verify-bundle`; this detects altered or forged receipts, not omitted ones (see Independent verification).
Financial / High-Impact Actions	Unstructured JSON payloads.	Universal `money` Contract: Hard limits, currency enforcement, and tenant-scoped asset ceilings.

🔍 Interactive Trace Demo

Inspect how Tempus binds the entire lifecycle (Intent ➔ Authorization ➔ Execution ➔ Receipt) with Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 state hashes:

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                           TEMPUS B2A PROTOCOL FLOW                          │
├─────────────────┬─────────────────┬───────────────────┬─────────────────────┤
│  01 / INTENT    │  02 / POLICY    │  03 / EXECUTION   │  04 / VERIFICATION  │
│  Agent signs    │  Gate issues    │  Executor verifies│  End-to-end receipt │
│  exact payload  │  single-use     │  permit & acts    │  cryptographically │
│                 │  permit         │  with isolated key│  linked & immutable │
│   [ BOUND ]     │   [ ALLOWED ]   │    [ CONSUMED ]   │    [ VERIFIED ]     │
└────────┬────────┴────────┬────────┴─────────┬─────────┴──────────┬──────────┘
         │                 │                  │                    │
         ▼                 ▼                  ▼                    ▼
   Signed Intent ──► Expiring Permit ──► Execution Receipt ──► Auditable Trace

👉 Launch Interactive In-Browser Demo — Test tamper detection, hash validation, and signature verification live.

The 0.5.4 implementation establishes the local permit protocol, signed policy bundles, rotation and revocation, unified mediated ExecutorRuntime (GitHub, HTTP/Webhooks, Slack, and Pluggable Payments), Vault Transit signing, single-instance replay protection, and cryptographically signed monotonic checkpoints for verifiable disaster recovery. Read THREAT_MODEL.md before relying on the current security boundary.

What is implemented

Enterprise Architecture & Product Blueprints: Production implementation guides for DevOps over MCP (OpenClaw, Hermes Agent, Cursor, Claude, Windsurf) and Financial Toll Gates for Multi-Agent Crews (CrewAI, LangGraph, AutoGen).
Stable machine contracts with explicit schema_version values (.v1).
Separate Ed25519 identities for the Tempus gate, requesting agent, and executor.
Immutable, gate-signed agent registration receipts. Registrations cannot be silently overwritten.
Signed, versioned deterministic policy bundles. Each permit binds its policy digest, reproducible evidence digest, closed reason codes, and executor constraints.
Tenant-scoped delegation, signed key rotation and revocation, historical key-at-time verification, and emergency invalidation of unconsumed permits.
A provider-neutral signer boundary shared by the gate and executor. Local Ed25519 and Vault Transit use the same exact-byte contract; a signing timeout, error, unexpected key version or signature that does not verify aborts the operation and no receipt is issued.
ALLOWED or BLOCKED authorization before execution.
Short-lived permits, deterministic action IDs, and idempotency conflict detection.
Single-consumption execution receipts; an identical retry is idempotent and a conflicting second outcome is rejected.
End-to-end verification of intent, gate authorization, executor outcome, and receipt linkage.
A unified mediated ExecutorRuntime with conformance testing for third-party adapters.
Signed executor observations for STARTED, SUCCEEDED, FAILED, and UNKNOWN, with restart recovery that never retries an ambiguous external effect.
Pre-packaged reference executors for GitHub (github.create_issue, github.create_pull_request), HTTP/Webhooks, Slack, and Pluggable Payments.
Money is optional metadata in the same universal action envelope; financial and non-financial actions use the same protocol.
Append-only hash-linked event streams (tempus.event-stream-event.v1) and signed monotonic checkpoints (tempus.checkpoint.v1) for tamper and rollback detection.
Disaster recovery and offline reconciliation tooling (tempus checkpoint create / export / verify).
An autonomous MCP surface that hides administrative, legacy, and destructive tools by default.

B2A flow

agent signs intent
        │
        ▼
Tempus request_action ── BLOCKED ──► signed denial trace
        │ ALLOWED
        ▼
single-use, expiring permit
        │
        ▼
executor performs effect and signs outcome
        │
        ▼
Tempus commit_outcome ──► final signed execution receipt
        │
        ▼
human or machine calls verify_trace

Tempus becomes an unavoidable toll when the executor exclusively holds the downstream credential. The packaged GitHub adapter implements that boundary for its supported actions in a single-instance deployment. Operators must ensure the requesting agent cannot read the executor's environment or key material.

Install

Python 3.10 or newer is required.

1. From PyPI (Standard & Verified)

Tempus DDB is published to PyPI using Trusted Publishing (OIDC) and Sigstore provenance attestations on every artifact:

python -m pip install tempus-ddb

2. From GitHub Release Wheels & SBOM

Download the pre-built native wheel matching your platform or the SBOM files from GitHub Releases v0.5.4. Releases cut by the tag workflow attach an SPDX SBOM and CycloneDX SBOMs for Rust and Python. Verify them with the commands in docs/RELEASING.md.

pip install ./tempus_ddb-0.5.4-<platform>.whl

3. From Source (Development)

Building from source compiles the Rust extension, so you need a Rust toolchain (minimum supported version rust-version = "1.88", see Cargo.toml; the repository pins 1.99.1 in rust-toolchain.toml, which rustup installs for you on first build) plus a C linker (build-essential / Xcode command line tools / MSVC build tools). The PyPI and release wheels above need no Rust.

# Install Rust once (https://rustup.rs), then reopen your shell or: . "$HOME/.cargo/env"
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh

git clone https://github.com/Julio-Patron/tempus-ddb.git
cd tempus-ddb
pip install -e ".[dev]"      # builds the extension with maturin; takes a few minutes
tempus --version

Bootstrap identities

tempus init creates the local gate key and database, then records the gate as the signed delegation root. This is deployment-time bootstrap, not a human approval step for each action.

tempus init
tempus keygen --output agent.keys.json
tempus keygen --output executor.keys.json

tempus register-agent --alias purchasing-agent --agent-keyfile agent.keys.json \
  --metadata '{"tenant_id":"acme"}'
tempus register-agent --alias purchasing-executor --agent-keyfile executor.keys.json \
  --metadata '{"tenant_id":"acme"}'
tempus conformance --signer
# Next: install a policy (below). Until then the gate denies every action and
# `tempus doctor --json` reports `active_policy: FAIL`.

The gate signer configuration is the global --keyfile and defaults to keys.json. Production deployments should use the non-secret Vault Transit configuration described in docs/VAULT_TRANSIT_SIGNER.md; the workload authenticates to Vault without placing a private key in the file.

Install a signed policy bundle

Default-deny. A gate with no installed policy denies every action: the signed receipt is BLOCKED with the reason code POLICY_NOT_INSTALLED. Nothing is seeded by tempus init, by the first registration, or when the database is reopened, and a tenant without its own policy is denied as well. Install a policy before expecting any ALLOWED receipt.

Policies define allowed tenants, agents, actions, resources, rate ceilings, minor-unit currency limits, and authorized executors.

Write a policy for your tenant, naming the executor identity you registered above (the public_key field of executor.keys.json), then install it:

EXECUTOR_PUB=$(python -c "import json; print(json.load(open('executor.keys.json'))['public_key'])")
cat > acme-github-policy.json <<EOF
{
  "schema_version": "tempus.policy-bundle.v1",
  "policy_version": "acme-github-v1",
  "tenant_id": "acme",
  "constraints": {
    "allowed_action_types": ["github.create_issue", "github.create_pull_request"],
    "allowed_resources": ["acme/*"],
    "allowed_executors": ["$EXECUTOR_PUB"],
    "max_ttl_seconds": 60,
    "max_input_bytes": 16384,
    "allowed_currencies": ["USD"]
  }
}
EOF

tempus install-policy --policy acme-github-policy.json
tempus list-policies

The same template ships as config/policy.github.example.json in the source tree, with a REPLACE_WITH_EXECUTOR_ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY placeholder that you must replace; install-policy refuses a file that still contains a REPLACE_WITH_ placeholder.

Local development only: `--allow-all-dev`

To try the flow without writing a policy, opt in explicitly. This installs a signed policy that allows every action, resource and executor for every tenant without its own policy. It does not set allowed_currencies, so it does not constrain currency. The CLI prints a warning, tempus doctor reports active_policy: FAIL while it is active, and every receipt carries the tempus.dev-allow-all.v1.* policy_version. Never use it in production.

tempus init --allow-all-dev            # or, on an existing gate:
tempus install-policy --allow-all-dev

Equivalents: TempusDDB.install_allow_all_dev_policy() (Python, emits a UserWarning), SqliteStorage::install_allow_all_dev_policy() and tempus-ddb-core install-allow-all-dev (Rust). It is not exposed through MCP, so an agent cannot switch the gate to allow-all. Installing a real policy for the same tenant * later replaces it; a gate whose active * policy is not the dev one refuses --allow-all-dev (TEMPUS_DEV_ALLOW_ALL_REFUSED).

Upgrading: a database seeded by an older gate still contains tempus.baseline.v1. It is now ignored (the gate denies). Install a real policy, or opt in with --allow-all-dev for development. A dev allow-all policy stored with a non-exact allowed_currencies list fails closed (TEMPUS_POLICY_INVALID) and the gate leaves that signed row unchanged. Run tempus install-policy --allow-all-dev (or TempusDDB.install_allow_all_dev_policy()) to replace it. Until then it is not allowed.

Policy evaluation is deterministic and rejects unknown constraints, floating-point input, oversized input, tenant/resource/action mismatches, excessive TTL, disallowed executors, and money metadata outside the configured currency or minor-unit ceiling. Currency allowlists are exact codes (USD). Payment actions (finance.disburse, finance.transfer, payment.charge) require a money object and a non-zero amount.

End-to-end from the CLI

The whole B2A cycle without Python, continuing from the policy installed above (tenant acme, agent.keys.json, executor.keys.json). Run it in the directory where you ran tempus init.

# 1. The agent's signed intent. `requested_at` is microseconds since the Unix epoch.
AGENT_PUB=$(python -c "import json; print(json.load(open('agent.keys.json'))['public_key'])")
cat > intent.json <<EOF
{
  "schema_version": "tempus.action-intent.v1",
  "tenant_id": "acme",
  "agent_id": "$AGENT_PUB",
  "idempotency_key": "issue-2026-001",
  "action_type": "github.create_issue",
  "resource": "acme/widgets",
  "requested_at": $(python -c "import time; print(time.time_ns() // 1000)"),
  "input": {"title": "Rotate the staging key", "body": "Opened through Tempus."}
}
EOF

# 2. request-action: the gate evaluates the policy and prints the permit
#    (`tempus.authorization-result.v1`, ALLOWED or a signed BLOCKED denial).
#    This file is the `permit.json` the packaged executors consume.
tempus request-action --intent intent.json --agent-keyfile agent.keys.json \
  --ttl-seconds 60 > permit.json
AUTH_ID=$(python -c "import json; print(json.load(open('permit.json'))['authorization']['authorization_id'])")
ACTION_ID=$(python -c "import json; print(json.load(open('permit.json'))['authorization']['action_id'])")
python -c "import json; print(json.load(open('permit.json'))['authorization']['decision'])"   # ALLOWED

# 3. The executor performs the effect (see "Packaged Mediated Executors"), then the
#    outcome it reports is committed to the gate, signed with the executor key.
#    Here the outcome is written by hand to keep the walkthrough offline.
cat > outcome.json <<EOF
{
  "schema_version": "tempus.action-outcome.v1",
  "authorization_id": "$AUTH_ID",
  "action_id": "$ACTION_ID",
  "status": "SUCCEEDED",
  "external_reference": "acme/widgets#17"
}
EOF
tempus commit-outcome --authorization-id "$AUTH_ID" --outcome outcome.json \
  --executor-keyfile executor.keys.json > execution.json

# 4. Verify against the gate public key you pinned out of band (no trust in the database)
GATE_PUB=$(python -c "import json; print(json.load(open('keys.json'))['public_key'])")
tempus trace --action-id "$ACTION_ID" > receipt.json
tempus verify-receipt --receipt receipt.json --gate-public-key "$GATE_PUB" \
  --require-decision ALLOWED --require-execution
tempus verify-trace --action-id "$ACTION_ID" --gate-public-key "$GATE_PUB" --strict \
  --require-decision ALLOWED --require-execution

# 5. One self-contained file for an auditor, verified with only that file and the key
tempus export-bundle --action-id "$ACTION_ID" --out evidence.json --create-checkpoint
tempus verify-bundle --bundle evidence.json --gate-public-key "$GATE_PUB" \
  --require-decision ALLOWED --require-execution --require-checkpoint

request-action signs the intent with --agent-keyfile before the gate sees it. A policy that does not allow the intent still produces a permit file, with "decision": "BLOCKED" and reason codes; it is a signed denial and no executor will act on it. See Independent verification below for what the verify commands do and do not prove.

Checkpoints & Disaster Recovery

Tempus allows generating cryptographically signed monotonic checkpoints and exporting hash-linked event streams without database downtime:

# 1. Create a signed monotonic checkpoint for a tenant
tempus checkpoint create --tenant-id acme --out checkpoint-acme.json

# 2. Export the incremental event stream
tempus checkpoint export --tenant-id acme --from-seq 1 --out stream-acme.json

# 3. Cryptographically verify stream integrity and rollback absence offline.
#    Pin the gate public key: without it the check is NOT independent.
tempus checkpoint verify --checkpoint checkpoint-acme.json --stream stream-acme.json \
    --gate-public-key <gate-public-key-hex|file>

See docs/BACKUP_AND_DISASTER_RECOVERY.md for complete disaster recovery, hot backup, and reconciliation procedures.

Python quickstart

import json
import time
from tempus_ddb import TempusDDB, gen_keys

gen_keys("gate.keys.json")
gen_keys("agent.keys.json")
gen_keys("executor.keys.json")

gate = TempusDDB("tempus.db", "gate.keys.json")

with open("gate.keys.json", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
    gate_id = json.load(handle)["public_key"]
with open("agent.keys.json", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
    agent_id = json.load(handle)["public_key"]
with open("executor.keys.json", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
    executor_id = json.load(handle)["public_key"]

gate.register_agent(gate_id, "tempus-gate", '{"can_delegate":true}')
gate.register_agent(agent_id, "purchasing-agent", "{}")
gate.register_agent(executor_id, "purchasing-executor", "{}")

# Default-deny: without an installed policy every request is BLOCKED
# (POLICY_NOT_INSTALLED). Install a signed policy for the tenant first.
gate.install_policy(json.dumps({
    "schema_version": "tempus.policy-bundle.v1",
    "policy_version": "acme-purchasing-v1",
    "tenant_id": "acme",
    "constraints": {
        "allowed_action_types": ["purchase"],
        "allowed_resources": ["vendor-api/*"],
        "allowed_executors": [executor_id],
        "max_ttl_seconds": 60,
        "max_input_bytes": 16384,
        "allowed_currencies": ["USD"],
        "max_money_amount_minor": 5000,
    },
}))
# Development shortcut only: gate.install_allow_all_dev_policy() allows everything.

intent = json.dumps({
    "schema_version": "tempus.action-intent.v1",
    "tenant_id": "acme",
    "agent_id": agent_id,
    "idempotency_key": "purchase-2026-07-16-001",
    "action_type": "purchase",
    "resource": "vendor-api/compute-credits",
    "requested_at": time.time_ns() // 1_000,
    "input": {"sku": "compute-credits"},
    "money": {"amount": "25.00", "asset": "USD", "beneficiary": "vendor-42"},
})

authorization = json.loads(gate.request_action(intent, "agent.keys.json", 60))
permit = authorization["authorization"]
assert permit["decision"] == "ALLOWED"

# The executor performs the external effect only after checking the permit.
outcome = json.dumps({
    "schema_version": "tempus.action-outcome.v1",
    "authorization_id": permit["authorization_id"],
    "action_id": permit["action_id"],
    "status": "SUCCEEDED",
    "external_reference": "vendor-tx-9182",
    "output": {"credits_added": 1000},
})

receipt = gate.commit_outcome(
    permit["authorization_id"],
    outcome,
    "executor.keys.json",
)
verification = json.loads(gate.verify_trace(permit["action_id"]))
assert verification["status"] == "VERIFIED"
assert verification["phase"] == "COMPLETED"

For remote transports, use request_action_signed(...) and commit_outcome_signed(...). The requesting agent and executor sign locally, so their private keys and keyfiles never enter the gate process.

📚 Cookbooks & Framework Integrations

Explore practical integration recipes in the cookbooks/ directory:

🦜🔗 LangChain & LangGraph Guard — Wrap sensitive tools (DB writes, payouts) so they run only with a signed, single-use permit.
👥 CrewAI Multi-Agent Financial Gate — Multi-agent delegation where executors require signed gate permits before executing effects.
🔌 Claude Desktop & Cursor MCP Quickstart — Connect Tempus DDB as an autonomous Model Context Protocol server in 2 minutes.

# Run the LangChain guard recipe
python cookbooks/langchain_agent_guard.py

# Run the CrewAI financial gate recipe
python cookbooks/crewai_action_gate.py

Demos and Scenarios

The repository includes runnable end-to-end demonstrations covering security guards, B2A flow, and tamper detection: Examples create ephemeral databases and keys and remove them when they finish.

1. Commercial Demo (`examples/commercial_demo.py`)

Demonstrates the Phase 2 mediated-executor foundation and bypass prevention against a simulated downstream API.

python examples/commercial_demo.py

Key checks performed:

Direct Bypass Attempt: Rejected (agent lacks downstream API secret token).
Authorized Execution: Agent signs intent → Tempus Gate validates → Mediated Executor verifies permit → API executed.
Replay Guard: Re-using a consumed permit is rejected by the Executor.
Expiry Guard: Expired permits are rejected.
Tamper Guard: Altered permit fields invalidate the signature and are rejected.
Cross-Tenant Guard: Permits issued for a different tenant ID are blocked.
Trace Verification: Full cryptographic audit trace verification passes end-to-end.

2. Decision Chain Scenario (`examples/decision_chain.py`)

Simulates an autonomous bot lifecycle (Genesis → Decision 1 → Decision 2) with chain validation and JSON export:

python examples/decision_chain.py

3. CLI Tamper Detection (`examples/tamper_detection_cli.py`)

Demonstrates tamper detection using the Rust CLI by simulating unauthorized modifications to recorded traces:

python examples/tamper_detection_cli.py

4. Code Examples (`examples/`)

Additional standalone scripts in examples/:

examples/basic_record.py: Basic decision recording.
examples/full_agent_flow.py: Complete multi-agent authorization flow.
examples/verify_chain.py: Cryptographic chain verification.

python examples/full_agent_flow.py

Packaged Mediated Executors

Tempus includes four official, credential-isolated executors out of the box. The requesting AI agent never holds downstream API keys or secrets.

Where permit.json comes from. It is the output of tempus request-action (see End-to-end from the CLI): tempus request-action --intent intent.json --agent-keyfile agent.keys.json > permit.json. --gate-id is the gate's public key (the public_key in the gate's keys.json, also printed by tempus whoami), --tenant-id must match the permit's tenant, and --executor-keyfile must be the identity that the policy lists in allowed_executors. The executor verifies the permit, consumes it once in its own --executor-db (a second run of the same permit is refused), performs the action with the credential only it holds, and prints its signed result. Reporting that outcome to the gate (so it appears in the trace) is the separate tempus commit-outcome step, as the cookbooks do. An expired permit (--ttl-seconds) or a BLOCKED one is rejected.

1. GitHub Executor (`tempus-github-executor`)

Performs audited GitHub REST writes with an isolated GITHUB_TOKEN:

github.create_issue: owner/repository with allowlisted title, body, labels.
github.create_pull_request: owner/repository with allowlisted title, head, base, body, draft.

tempus-github-executor \
  --permit permit.json \
  --executor-db github-executor.db \
  --executor-keyfile executor.keys.json \
  --gate-id <gate-public-key> \
  --tenant-id acme

2. HTTP & Webhook Executor (`tempus-http-executor`)

Executes HTTPS POST/PUT webhooks and external API mutations while isolating authorization headers:

Supported actions: http.post, http.put, webhook.send.

tempus-http-executor \
  --permit permit.json \
  --executor-db http-executor.db \
  --executor-keyfile executor.keys.json \
  --gate-id <gate-public-key> \
  --tenant-id acme \
  --allowed-domains api.example.com \
  --auth-header "Bearer <isolated-api-secret>"

Credentials need an allowlist. The Authorization header is added to every request, so the executor refuses to start with --auth-header (or HTTP_EXECUTOR_AUTH_HEADER) unless --allowed-domains / allowed_domains / HTTP_EXECUTOR_ALLOWED_DOMAINS names the hosts that may receive it (* accepts every host, explicitly). Pattern matching now respects component boundaries: an entry matches that host only, and *.domain matches labels under that domain but not the apex. An exact host does not include its subdomains. A * glued to text matches nothing.
Policy patterns match whole components. allowed_resources, allowed_action_types, allowed_executors, allowed_currencies and allowed_beneficiaries split on / and .. A * matches only as a whole component, so a path pattern such as https://api.example.com/* or acme/* covers what follows that separator, and *.domain covers labels under that domain. A * glued to the surrounding text matches nothing. tempus install-policy prints a WARNING for http(s) patterns with no / before the *.
Ports are not restricted by the allowlist (:8443 on an allowed host is still allowed). A policy pattern matches the URL text, so a pattern without the port does not match a URL that includes one. Pin the port in the pattern when it matters (https://api.example.com:8443/*).
No ./.. path segments, plain or percent-encoded (%2e%2e, %252e%252e, ..%2f), and no backslashes: the policy matches the URL text, so /v1/../admin would pass https://api.example.com/v1/* while the server serves /admin.
The SSRF filter is a guard, not complete protection. It refuses localhost names, and any host that is or resolves to a loopback, private, link-local, CGNAT, unspecified, multicast or reserved address or a known cloud-metadata address, in any spelling (127.1, 2130706433, 0x7f000001, [::ffff:127.0.0.1], ...). The name is resolved once, every answer is checked and the connection goes to that validated IP (TLS still verifies the certificate for the name), which closes DNS rebinding for direct connections. It does not cover: ports (above); an HTTPS_PROXY/https_proxy in the environment (the proxy resolves the target, so the name is checked but not pinned, and the proxy's own reachability is yours to restrict); internal names you put in the allowlist (they are refused too if they resolve to private space; this executor has no opt-out); public services that are themselves open relays; or a compromised DNS that answers consistently with a public attacker address. Keep network egress rules as the real boundary.
Known limits (informational, not fixed): ports are not restricted (H4, above); the conversion of an adapter's output has a size/node budget but no time limit (D2-a: a hostile custom adapter whose __repr__ sleeps or never returns blocks the executor; the packaged adapters are not affected); and a very large legitimate output is recorded as a degraded summary with no digest of the full output (D2-b).
The executor sends exactly the URL the policy matched, with no whitespace, control characters, backslashes or credentials in it.
An ambiguous transport outcome is recorded as UNKNOWN and is not retried. Classification uses the exception type. A validation failure is FAILED.

3. Slack Executor (`tempus-slack-executor`)

Dispatches channel alerts and notifications while isolating SLACK_BOT_TOKEN:

Supported actions: slack.post_message, slack.send_alert.
The permit resource is the channel and must be exactly one: an ID (C, G or D + uppercase letters/digits, e.g. C0123ABCD) or a #channel-name (lowercase letters, digits, -, _). Slack reads a comma-separated channel as several, so C0123,C9999 is rejected (TEMPUS_SLACK_BINDING_REJECTED) before anything is sent. Policy patterns match whole components. Put the exact channel in allowed_resources.

tempus-slack-executor \
  --permit permit.json \
  --executor-db slack-executor.db \
  --executor-keyfile executor.keys.json \
  --gate-id <gate-public-key> \
  --tenant-id acme \
  --token "xoxb-<isolated-slack-bot-token>"

4. Pluggable Financial Adapter (`tempus-payment-executor`)

Reference pluggable executor that enforces the universal money envelope (amount or amount_minor, asset or currency, beneficiary; fields that disagree are refused) and minor-unit limits with credential isolation:

Supported actions: finance.disburse, finance.transfer, payment.charge. Each one requires a money object and a non-zero amount; a missing, null, or zero amount is refused (TEMPUS_INVALID_CONTRACT) and nothing is signed.
Bring Your Own Provider: Implements a pluggable PaymentTransport interface. Shipped with a deterministic mock transport for verification and testing; plug in your real Stripe/Wise API client at the transport boundary without exposing payment keys to the AI agent.

tempus-payment-executor \
  --permit permit.json \
  --executor-db pay-executor.db \
  --executor-keyfile executor.keys.json \
  --gate-id <gate-public-key> \
  --tenant-id acme \
  --secret-key "sk_live_<isolated-payment-key>"

Minor units assume two decimals. amount_minor and the max_money_amount_minor limit are read as hundredths ("25.5" is 2550) for every currency. That is wrong for zero- decimal currencies (JPY: "500" means 500 yen, but the limit sees 50 000 minor units) and for three-decimal ones (BHD, KWD). Express limits per currency with that in mind, or keep such currencies out of allowed_currencies.
money.beneficiary must be a non-empty string; it is paid exactly as written.
An ambiguous payment-transport outcome is recorded as UNKNOWN. A definitive provider or validation error is FAILED. The transport must raise the real exception (or AmbiguousTransportError) when the outcome is not known. allowed_currencies accepts only exact 3-letter codes.
This executor is not a complete payment control. It checks, per intent, the currency, the beneficiary pattern and one maximum amount, with the same component patterns as the policy for the beneficiary; it has no cumulative, daily or velocity limits, no sanctions/KYC checks, no confirmation of the provider's settlement, and the shipped transport is a mock. Put the real controls (provider-side limits, approvals, reconciliation) at the provider.

Performance Benchmarks

Tempus DDB includes a benchmarking tool to evaluate transaction throughput and validation latency:

python examples/benchmark.py --records 1000

To output machine-readable JSON:

python examples/benchmark.py --records 1000 --json

Optimizations active in v0.2.1+:

SQLite Write-Ahead Logging (WAL mode) with PRAGMA synchronous = NORMAL and busy_timeout = 5000.
In-memory key caching to prevent disk I/O bottlenecks during hot-path transactions.
Max LTO release compilation (opt-level = 3, lto = true, codegen-units = 1).

Stable contracts

Contract	Schema
Agent intent	`tempus.action-intent.v1`
Authorization response	`tempus.authorization-result.v1`
Signed permit	`tempus.authorization-receipt.v1`
Signed deterministic policy	`tempus.policy-bundle.v1`
Policy evidence	`tempus.policy-evidence.v1`
Identity lifecycle event	`tempus.identity-lifecycle-event.v1`
Executor outcome	`tempus.action-outcome.v1`
Execution response	`tempus.execution-result.v1`
Signed execution receipt	`tempus.execution-receipt.v1`
Executor state observation	`tempus.executor-observation.v1`
Complete trace	`tempus.action-trace.v1`
Verification result	`tempus.trace-verification.v1`

Authorization decisions are ALLOWED or BLOCKED. Execution outcomes are SUCCEEDED or FAILED. Executor observations are STARTED, SUCCEEDED, FAILED, or UNKNOWN. Trace verification is VERIFIED or INVALID.

Phase 3 fields are additive to the v1 authorization contracts. Executors require and verify them, while historical Phase 2 receipts keep their original signature semantics. See COMPATIBILITY.md for support/deprecation rules and MIGRATION_0.4.md for the 0.3.x upgrade procedure.

MCP autonomous mode

The default MCP surface exposes only machine-to-machine execution and read-only audit operations. The agent and executor must sign their own payloads; the gate never receives their keyfile paths:

Tool	Purpose
`tempus_request_action_signed`	Verify a locally signed intent and obtain a signed, expiring permit
`tempus_commit_outcome_signed`	Consume a permit with an executor-signed result
`tempus_get_trace`	Read authorization and execution evidence
`tempus_verify_trace`	Verify the complete action trace
`tempus_list_agents`	Read signed agent identities
`tempus_list_policies`	Read active and retired signed policy bundles
`tempus_list_identity_events`	Read signed rotation and revocation events

Configuration:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "tempus": {
      "command": "tempus",
      "args": ["mcp", "start"],
      "env": {
        "TEMPUS_MODE": "autonomous",
        "TEMPUS_GATE_KEYFILE": "keys.json"
      }
    }
  }
}

Provisioning should run separately from the agent-facing MCP process. The following flags are deliberately off by default:

Flag	Unlocks
`TEMPUS_ADMIN_TOOLS=1`	init, key generation, signed agent registration, whoami
`TEMPUS_LEGACY_TOOLS=1`	old voluntary `record`, list, export, count, validate tools
`TEMPUS_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS=1`	demo-only cleanup
`TEMPUS_LOCAL_KEYFILE_TOOLS=1`	development-only `tempus_request_action` and `tempus_commit_outcome` tools that accept local keyfile paths

Human audit

Humans are readers, not approvers:

tempus trace --action-id <action-id>
tempus verify-trace --action-id <action-id> --gate-public-key <hex|file>
tempus list-agents
tempus list-policies
tempus identity-events

The public trace demo is a synthetic, browser-only illustration of hashes, signatures and record binding. A future read-only audit console must derive its views from these contracts; it is not in the current source line.

Independent verification (pinned gate key)

verify-trace without a key checks the database against its own root of trust, so a completely forged database (attacker keys, fake payment) verifies against itself. The output says so ("trust": {"independent": false} plus a warning). To verify independently, pin the gate's public key, obtained out of band (the operator publishes the output of tempus whoami), instead of trusting the database:

# Operator: publish the gate PUBLIC key (never the key file) and hand out receipts
tempus whoami                                   # prints the gate "Public Key"
tempus trace --action-id <action-id> > receipt.json

# Verifier: no database, no gate private key; the key is pinned by you
tempus verify-receipt --receipt receipt.json --gate-public-key <64-hex|file>
tempus verify-receipt --receipt receipt.json --gate-public-key <hex> \
    --executor-public-key <executor-hex>        # optionally pin the executor too
tempus verify-trace --action-id <id> --gate-public-key <hex> --strict
tempus checkpoint verify --checkpoint chk.json --stream stream.json --gate-public-key <hex>

verify-receipt takes a trace (tempus.action-trace.v1), a permit (tempus.authorization-result.v1) or an outcome (tempus.execution-result.v1); - reads stdin. Exit code 0 is VERIFIED, 2 is INVALID (tampered receipt, wrong key, or a database signed by someone else) and 1 is a usage or I/O error (a missing or invalid argument, an unreadable file, an empty key); the two never share a code. --strict refuses to run without --gate-public-key. Python: verify_receipt(json, gate_pub, executor_pubs=None), verify_checkpoint(chk, stream, gate_pub) and TempusDDB.verify_trace(id, gate_pub).

Evidence bundle: one file, verified offline

# Operator: one file per action (add --create-checkpoint to sign a fresh checkpoint
# first so the bundle can show ledger inclusion)
tempus export-bundle --action-id <action-id> --out evidence.json --create-checkpoint

# Verifier: only the file and the pinned gate public key; no database, no private keys
tempus verify-bundle --bundle evidence.json --gate-public-key <64-hex|file> \
    [--executor-public-key <hex>]

The bundle (tempus.evidence-bundle.v1) holds the trace (intent, agent signature, permit, signed policy used to reproduce the decision, outcome and signed receipts) and, if one covers the action, the gate-signed checkpoint with the tenant's event stream. It contains no private keys: every field is a public document or a hash. The verifier re-checks every signature and hash against the pinned key, reproduces the decision from the signed policy, and, with a checkpoint, checks that the permit and outcome events are in the signed ledger. Same exit codes as above (0 VERIFIED, 2 INVALID, 1 usage). Python: TempusDDB.export_bundle(id) and verify_bundle(json, gate_pub, executor_pubs=None).

What VERIFIED means, and how strict it is

A document that repeats a JSON object key anywhere is refused with DUPLICATE_JSON_KEY. Verifiers report the document INVALID. The gate applies the same rule when it receives an intent, outcome, policy or metadata (parse_canonical), and the Rust executor and the Python executor runtime reject a permit that repeats a key before consuming it. Do not generate JSON with repeated keys.
Fields outside the schema at the top level of a bundle, in its trace or in its checkpoint wrapper are INVALID (UNKNOWN_FIELD (<path>)): they would be unsigned text travelling inside a verified file.
A key file (--gate-public-key FILE) is the root of trust, so it is read strictly: bare hex, or a JSON object whose public_key / gate_public_key (one, or both with the same value) is a non-empty string. Repeated keys, an empty or non-string field, or two fields with different keys are usage errors (exit 1).
Numbers in signed documents must be integers in the i64/u64 range. A float, or a larger integer, can be spelled several ways for one stored value (0.1 / 1e-1, ...567890 / ...567891), so the gate refuses it when it arrives (NON_EXACT_NUMBER) and the verifiers report a document containing one as INVALID. Send decimals and large values as strings ("amount": "25.00"). The packaged executors convert such numbers in a downstream answer to strings before signing the outcome.
output_degraded in the result tells you when the executor runtime could not represent the adapter's result in full (too large, too deep, cyclic, conversion error) and recorded a bounded summary under _tempus_output_degraded with the adapter's own status. It is true / false, or null when nothing verified; the CLI prints a NOTE on stderr. The marker is written by the executor: anyone holding the executor key can sign one by hand, so it is a visible signal, not proof of how the output was produced.
--gate-public-key and --executor-public-key must not be empty: an empty value (for example an unset shell variable) is a usage error (exit 1), never "unpinned".
VERIFIED alone does not say that the action was allowed or executed: a BLOCKED decision, a FAILED outcome, or a permit with no outcome or checkpoint all verify. The result shows decision and execution_status (both null unless the result is VERIFIED), and these flags turn an unmet expectation into exit 2 (INVALID, REQUIREMENT_NOT_MET (...)): --require-decision ALLOWED|BLOCKED, --require-execution (a verified outcome with status SUCCEEDED) and, on verify-bundle, --require-checkpoint. A script that only looks at the exit code should pass the ones that matter to it.

What a pinned verification (receipt or bundle) does not show; the result lists these in trust.not_checked:

Completeness. A bundle that leaves out the outcome is still a valid permit-only bundle (the verifier reports phase: AUTHORIZED or EXPIRED, execution: NOT_PRESENT). Nothing proves that other actions, retries or outcomes are not hidden from you.
Single use across the system. Whether the permit was consumed only once is gate state; a document cannot prove it, even with a checkpoint.
Agent registration at issue time and, unless you pin it, the executor identity: the pinned gate signature attests both.
Ledger inclusion without a checkpoint. Only a bundle with a checkpoint shows the events are in the gate's signed ledger, and only as of that checkpoint's time. A gate that signs two diverging ledgers is not detected from one bundle.
Gate key compromise. The guarantee is only as good as the secrecy of the gate key and the out-of-band way you obtained its public key.
Privacy. The bundle includes the intent and outcome as recorded, and the checkpoint stream exposes ids, types, timestamps and hashes (not contents) of every event of that tenant up to the checkpoint. Streams over --max-stream-events (default 10000) are omitted, not truncated.

Common cases that now break, and how to fix them

Since signed documents may only hold integers in the i64/u64 range as numbers, code written for earlier versions can hit NON_EXACT_NUMBER (the message names the path, for example $.requested_at). The usual causes:

What you send	Result	Fix
`requested_at` from `time.time()` (a float, seconds)	`NON_EXACT_NUMBER ... $.requested_at`	An integer in microseconds: `time.time_ns() // 1000`
`money.amount` as a number (`25.5`)	`NON_EXACT_NUMBER ... $.money.amount`; an integer (`25`) gives `money.amount must be a decimal string`	A string with at most two decimals: `"25.50"` (or an integer `amount_minor` in minor units; if you send both, or both `currency` and `asset`, they must agree or the intent is refused with `TEMPUS_INVALID_CONTRACT`)
A float in `input` (`{"price": 19.99}`)	`NON_EXACT_NUMBER ... $.input.price` (it used to produce a signed `BLOCKED`)	A string (`"19.99"`) or an integer in minor units (`1999`)
A decimal in agent `metadata`, a policy or an outcome `output`	`NON_EXACT_NUMBER` at its path	A string (`"0.5"`); policy limits such as `max_money_amount_minor` are already integers
`NaN`, `Infinity`, `1e400` or `-0` from the CLI (`--intent`, `--outcome`, `--policy`, `--metadata`)	`NON_EXACT_NUMBER` (raw text given to the Python/Rust API: `1e400` is `NON_EXACT_NUMBER`; `NaN`/`Infinity` are "must be valid JSON", they are not JSON)	Send a string, or write `0` for `-0`

Pattern matching now respects component boundaries (. and /). A * matches only as a whole component. Glued stars become denials; a * that is already its own leading or middle component (*.example.com) used to be a dead literal and now matches, so review such entries before upgrading:

What you had	Result	Fix
A policy pattern whose `*` is glued to the surrounding text (a textual prefix) in `allowed_resources`, `allowed_action_types`, `allowed_executors`, or `allowed_beneficiaries` (`allowed_currencies` takes exact codes only, see below)	The pattern matches nothing, so that entry authorizes nobody	Put `` in its own component, after `.` or `/` (`name/`, `.domain`), or list the exact value. `` alone still matches everything
An HTTP allowlist entry that was meant to include subdomains (`example.com` used to allow labels under it)	Only that exact host matches	Add `.domain` for the labels under it, and keep the apex as its own entry if it should still match. `` still means every host
A payment allowlist entry (`allowed_beneficiaries` or `PAYMENT_ALLOWED_BENEFICIARIES`) that used `*` as a textual prefix	The entry authorizes nobody. The policy field of the same name uses the same rule	An exact beneficiary, ``, or a `` that is its own component

A transport failure where the effect may already have happened is no longer a definitive FAILED. The runtime classifies that by exception type, not by words in the message:

What you had	Result	Fix
An HTTP, payment, or Slack transport outcome that is ambiguous	Signed `UNKNOWN`. The permit is not retried. Connection refused stays `FAILED`	Reconcile the external effect before a new action. Raise `AmbiguousTransportError`, or the real exception type, when the outcome is unknown
A validation error or any other definitive adapter exception	Stays `FAILED`. Classification uses the exception type	Raise the original error. Raise `AmbiguousTransportError` when the outcome is unknown
Upgrading from 0.5.3, these also break:

What you send	Result	Fix
A currency pattern or wildcard in `allowed_currencies`	`TEMPUS_POLICY_INVALID`: entries must be exact currency codes. A stored dev allow-all policy with a non-exact list fails the same way and the gate does not rewrite it	Exact codes (`USD`), or omit the list. Replace a stored dev allow-all policy by running `tempus install-policy --allow-all-dev` (or `TempusDDB.install_allow_all_dev_policy()`). Any other such policy is rejected until you install a valid one.
A lowercase currency code	Refused: `money.currency` / `money.asset` must be an exact 3-letter code, and the same rule applies to `allowed_currencies`	An uppercase exact code (`USD`)
A payment action (`finance.disburse`, `finance.transfer`, `payment.charge`) with no `money`, null money, or amount 0	`TEMPUS_INVALID_CONTRACT` (a money object, or a non-zero amount). Nothing is signed	A `money` object whose amount is greater than zero
JSON with a repeated object key	`DUPLICATE_JSON_KEY` from the gate (`parse_canonical`), the Rust executor and the Python runtime	Emit each object key once
A permit whose only intent was `authorization.intent`	The runtime does not execute that field	Put the intent at the top level of the permit (the verified `intent`)

Custom executors do not need to convert their results: the packaged runtime records floats, huge integers, Decimal and datetime as strings, and a result it cannot represent in a degraded form (with the adapter's own status) instead of recording FAILED. An exception the adapter itself raises is still recorded as FAILED (or UNKNOWN for ambiguous transport errors): the runtime cannot know whether the effect happened. Bundles signed by older versions that contain a float verify as INVALID (AUTHORIZATION_NON_EXACT_NUMBER / EXECUTION_NON_EXACT_NUMBER) even if untouched.

Legacy ledger

The original record, validate, list, count, and export interfaces remain for compatibility and migration. They are a voluntary flight recorder and do not enforce the B2A toll. New autonomous integrations should use the signed action authorization flow; local keyfile MCP tools are development compatibility only.

The legacy ledger is not verifiable evidence. It does not apply the exact-number rule of the gate (floats and integers beyond 64 bits are accepted by tempus record), and its hash is computed over the parsed payload, so tempus verify still reports a ledger as valid after a number in a stored payload is edited to another spelling of the same f64 (1e2 -> 100.0, ...567890 -> ...567891 for a 30-digit integer). Do not present a legacy ledger to an auditor as proof; use the signed flow (verify-receipt, export-bundle / verify-bundle) for that.

Security boundary

This implementation detects receipt, policy, evidence, and trace alteration; rejects unregistered or revoked actors; prevents conflicting idempotent requests; and prevents two outcomes from consuming one permit. It does not yet prevent deletion or rollback of the entire local database, nor bypass by an agent that still possesses downstream credentials. Read THREAT_MODEL.md before using Tempus for high-impact production actions.

Roadmap

The 0.5 line, published as design-partner beta 0.5.4, already includes large-ledger streaming, durable receipt events, independent rollback detection, and the backup procedure. The next release line is 0.6, a transport-neutral gate service, and it is not part of the current offer. See ROADMAP.md for milestones and explicit exit criteria.

Development

See CONTRIBUTING.md for setup, security reporting, and pull-request requirements. The complete local verification set is:

cargo fmt --check
cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
cargo test --all-targets
ruff check .
pytest -p no:cacheprovider
python -m maturin build

License

MIT. See LICENSE.

tempus-ddb 0.5.4