supercode-core 0.2.1

//! Tests for built-in tools (P5 capability parity).

use supercode::tools::{
    ApplyPatchTool, PersistentShellTool, ReadFileTool, SandboxPolicy, Tool, ToolContext,
    WriteFileTool,
};

/// Mirrors `builtins::MAX_READ_BYTES` (re-derived here since it's
/// `pub(crate)` and this is a separate integration-test crate).
const MAX_READ_BYTES: usize = 400_000;

fn ctx() -> (ToolContext, std::path::PathBuf) {
    use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
    static N: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);
    let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
        "sc-tools-{}-{}",
        std::process::id(),
        N.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst)
    ));
    std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
    (ToolContext::new(dir.clone()), dir)
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn apply_patch_add_update_delete_move() {
    let (ctx, dir) = ctx();
    let tool = ApplyPatchTool;

    // Seed a file to update and one to delete.
    std::fs::write(dir.join("keep.rs"), "fn main() {\n    old();\n}\n").unwrap();
    std::fs::write(dir.join("gone.txt"), "bye").unwrap();

    let patch = "\
*** Begin Patch
*** Add File: src/new.rs
+pub fn added() -> u8 {
+    42
+}
*** Update File: keep.rs
@@
 fn main() {
-    old();
+    fresh();
 }
*** Delete File: gone.txt
*** End Patch
";

    let out = tool
        .execute(serde_json::json!({ "patch": patch }), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap();
    assert!(out.contains("A src/new.rs"), "{out}");
    assert!(out.contains("U keep.rs"), "{out}");
    assert!(out.contains("D gone.txt"), "{out}");

    // Add wrote the new file.
    let added = std::fs::read_to_string(dir.join("src/new.rs")).unwrap();
    assert!(added.contains("pub fn added") && added.contains("42"));
    // Update replaced the hunk, preserving context.
    let updated = std::fs::read_to_string(dir.join("keep.rs")).unwrap();
    assert!(updated.contains("fresh();") && !updated.contains("old();"));
    assert!(updated.contains("fn main()"));
    // Delete removed the file.
    assert!(!dir.join("gone.txt").exists());

    // A rename via Move to.
    let mv = "\
*** Begin Patch
*** Update File: keep.rs
*** Move to: renamed.rs
@@
-    fresh();
+    fresher();
*** End Patch
";
    let out = tool
        .execute(serde_json::json!({ "patch": mv }), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap();
    assert!(out.contains("M keep.rs -> renamed.rs"), "{out}");
    assert!(!dir.join("keep.rs").exists());
    assert!(std::fs::read_to_string(dir.join("renamed.rs"))
        .unwrap()
        .contains("fresher();"));

    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn apply_patch_reports_unmatched_hunk() {
    let (ctx, dir) = ctx();
    std::fs::write(dir.join("f.txt"), "hello world").unwrap();
    let tool = ApplyPatchTool;
    let patch = "\
*** Begin Patch
*** Update File: f.txt
@@
-not present
+replacement
*** End Patch
";
    let err = tool
        .execute(serde_json::json!({ "patch": patch }), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap_err()
        .to_string();
    assert!(err.contains("did not match"), "{err}");
    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}

// An old-block that matches more than once in the search region, with no
// `@@` anchor (or an anchor that doesn't scope to a unique region), must be
// a hard error rather than a silent edit of the first occurrence.
#[tokio::test]
async fn apply_patch_errors_on_ambiguous_hunk_without_anchor() {
    let (ctx, dir) = ctx();
    let tool = ApplyPatchTool;
    let original = "def foo():\n    return 1\n\ndef bar():\n    return 1\n";
    std::fs::write(dir.join("a.py"), original).unwrap();

    let patch = "\
*** Begin Patch
*** Update File: a.py
@@
-    return 1
+    return 2
*** End Patch
";
    let err = tool
        .execute(serde_json::json!({ "patch": patch }), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap_err()
        .to_string();
    assert!(err.contains("matches file contents"), "{err}");
    assert!(err.contains('2'), "{err}");
    assert!(
        err.contains("context") || err.contains("@@ anchor"),
        "{err}"
    );

    // Neither occurrence was edited — the file on disk is unchanged.
    let after = std::fs::read_to_string(dir.join("a.py")).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(after, original, "ambiguous hunk must not modify the file");

    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn apply_patch_is_registered_as_a_builtin() {
    use supercode::ToolRegistry;
    let reg = ToolRegistry::with_builtins();
    assert!(
        reg.get("apply_patch").is_some(),
        "apply_patch must be a built-in tool"
    );
    assert!(
        reg.get("shell").is_some(),
        "persistent shell must be a built-in tool"
    );
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn persistent_shell_keeps_state_across_calls() {
    let (ctx, dir) = ctx();
    let sh = PersistentShellTool::default();

    // State set in one call is visible in the next (env var + cwd persist).
    let r = sh
        .execute(serde_json::json!({"command": "MYVAR=hello123"}), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap();
    assert!(r.contains("exit code: 0"), "{r}");

    let r = sh
        .execute(serde_json::json!({"command": "echo $MYVAR"}), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap();
    assert!(r.contains("hello123"), "env var did not persist: {r}");

    // cd persists across calls — the key difference from one-shot bash.
    std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.join("sub")).unwrap();
    sh.execute(serde_json::json!({"command": "cd sub"}), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap();
    let r = sh
        .execute(serde_json::json!({"command": "pwd"}), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap();
    assert!(r.contains("/sub"), "cwd did not persist: {r}");

    // Exit code is reported.
    let r = sh
        .execute(serde_json::json!({"command": "false"}), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap();
    assert!(r.contains("exit code: 1"), "{r}");

    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn persistent_shell_sentinel_cannot_be_spoofed() {
    let (ctx, dir) = ctx();
    let sh = PersistentShellTool::default();

    // A command that echoes the base sentinel string with a fake "0" exit code
    // must not be parsed as completion: the real exit code (7) must be
    // reported, and the echoed text must show up as ordinary output.
    let r = sh
        .execute(
            serde_json::json!({"command": "echo '__SC_SHELL_DONE__ 0'; (exit 7)"}),
            &ctx,
        )
        .await
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        r.contains("exit code: 7"),
        "spoofed exit code accepted: {r}"
    );
    assert!(
        r.contains("__SC_SHELL_DONE__ 0"),
        "echoed sentinel text missing from output: {r}"
    );

    // The shell must not be wedged by the echoed base string: a follow-up
    // command still completes normally with its own (per-call) sentinel.
    let r = sh
        .execute(serde_json::json!({"command": "echo still-alive"}), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap();
    assert!(r.contains("exit code: 0"), "{r}");
    assert!(r.contains("still-alive"), "{r}");

    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_read_only_and_workspace_write() {
    let (mut ctx, dir) = ctx();
    let w = WriteFileTool;

    // read-only: every write is denied.
    ctx.sandbox = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly;
    let err = w
        .execute(serde_json::json!({"path": "a.txt", "content": "x"}), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap_err()
        .to_string();
    assert!(err.contains("read-only"), "{err}");
    assert!(!dir.join("a.txt").exists());

    // workspace-write: inside the workspace is allowed…
    ctx.sandbox = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite;
    w.execute(
        serde_json::json!({"path": "inside.txt", "content": "ok"}),
        &ctx,
    )
    .await
    .unwrap();
    assert_eq!(
        std::fs::read_to_string(dir.join("inside.txt")).unwrap(),
        "ok"
    );

    // …but writing outside the workspace (absolute escape or `..`) is denied.
    let outside = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("sc-escape-{}.txt", std::process::id()));
    let err = w
        .execute(
            serde_json::json!({"path": outside.to_string_lossy(), "content": "no"}),
            &ctx,
        )
        .await
        .unwrap_err()
        .to_string();
    assert!(err.contains("outside the workspace"), "{err}");
    assert!(!outside.exists());

    let err = w
        .execute(
            serde_json::json!({"path": "../escape.txt", "content": "no"}),
            &ctx,
        )
        .await
        .unwrap_err()
        .to_string();
    assert!(err.contains("outside the workspace"), "{err}");

    // danger-full-access (default): writing outside is allowed.
    ctx.sandbox = SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess;
    w.execute(
        serde_json::json!({"path": outside.to_string_lossy(), "content": "yes"}),
        &ctx,
    )
    .await
    .unwrap();
    assert!(outside.exists());
    std::fs::remove_file(&outside).ok();

    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}

#[tokio::test]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn sandbox_workspace_write_rejects_a_symlink_escape() {
    // LOWER-URGENCY fix (safe-path consolidation, folded into the
    // permissions-gate CRITICAL fix): `WorkspaceWrite`'s containment check
    // (`crate::tools::path_within`) used to compare only LEXICALLY-
    // normalized paths — `..` traversal was caught, but a pre-existing
    // in-workspace symlink pointing OUTSIDE the workspace was NOT, since
    // the literal joined path (`<root>/link/passwd`) still lexically
    // "starts with" root even though it resolves elsewhere. `path_within`
    // now delegates to `crate::safe_path::contained`, which also resolves
    // symlinks along the longest existing ancestor — this proves the fix
    // through the real `WriteFileTool`/`ToolContext::check_write` path, not
    // just a unit test of the private helper.
    let (mut ctx, dir) = ctx();
    let outside = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
        "sc-symlink-escape-outside-{}-{}",
        std::process::id(),
        std::line!()
    ));
    std::fs::create_dir_all(&outside).unwrap();
    std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&outside, dir.join("link")).unwrap();

    ctx.sandbox = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite;
    let w = WriteFileTool;
    let err = w
        .execute(
            serde_json::json!({"path": "link/passwd", "content": "PWNED"}),
            &ctx,
        )
        .await
        .unwrap_err()
        .to_string();
    assert!(err.contains("outside the workspace"), "{err}");
    assert!(
        !outside.join("passwd").exists(),
        "the write must never actually land outside the workspace root via the symlink"
    );

    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&outside).ok();
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_apply_patch_writes() {
    let (mut ctx, dir) = ctx();
    ctx.sandbox = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly;
    let tool = ApplyPatchTool;
    let patch = "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: blocked.rs\n+x\n*** End Patch\n";
    let err = tool
        .execute(serde_json::json!({"patch": patch}), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap_err()
        .to_string();
    assert!(err.contains("read-only"), "{err}");
    assert!(!dir.join("blocked.rs").exists());
    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn persistent_shell_write_stdin() {
    let (ctx, dir) = ctx();
    let sh = PersistentShellTool::default();
    // The shell reads commands from its stdin, so raw stdin input is executed.
    let out = sh
        .execute(
            serde_json::json!({"write_stdin": "echo from_stdin_pipe\n"}),
            &ctx,
        )
        .await
        .unwrap();
    assert!(out.contains("from_stdin_pipe"), "write_stdin output: {out}");
    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn update_plan_tool() {
    use supercode::tools::UpdatePlanTool;
    let (ctx, dir) = ctx();
    let tool = UpdatePlanTool::default();
    let out = tool
        .execute(
            serde_json::json!({"plan": [
                {"step": "read code", "status": "completed"},
                {"step": "fix bug", "status": "in_progress"},
                {"step": "add test"}
            ]}),
            &ctx,
        )
        .await
        .unwrap();
    assert!(out.contains("[x] read code"));
    assert!(out.contains("[~] fix bug"));
    assert!(out.contains("[ ] add test"));
    assert_eq!(tool.current().len(), 3);
    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}

#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn bash_os_sandbox_blocks_writes() {
    use supercode::tools::BashTool;
    let (mut ctx, dir) = ctx();
    let tool = BashTool::default();

    // read-only: a subprocess write is blocked by the OS sandbox.
    ctx.sandbox = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly;
    let out = tool
        .execute(
            serde_json::json!({"command": "echo hi > blocked.txt; echo done"}),
            &ctx,
        )
        .await
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        !dir.join("blocked.txt").exists(),
        "read-only sandbox must block the write: {out}"
    );

    // workspace-write: writing inside the workspace succeeds…
    ctx.sandbox = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite;
    tool.execute(serde_json::json!({"command": "echo hi > inside.txt"}), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        dir.join("inside.txt").exists(),
        "workspace-write must allow writes inside cwd"
    );

    // …but writing outside the workspace is blocked.
    let outside = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("sc-bash-escape-{}.txt", std::process::id()));
    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&outside);
    let cmd = format!("echo hi > {}", outside.display());
    tool.execute(serde_json::json!({"command": cmd}), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        !outside.exists(),
        "workspace-write must block writes outside cwd"
    );

    // full access (default): unsandboxed, the write goes through.
    ctx.sandbox = SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess;
    tool.execute(serde_json::json!({"command": "echo hi > free.txt"}), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap();
    assert!(dir.join("free.txt").exists());

    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}

// The persistent `shell` tool must honor the same OS sandbox as `bash`, or it
// becomes an unsandboxed escape hatch around the policy.
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn persistent_shell_os_sandbox_blocks_writes() {
    let (mut ctx, dir) = ctx();
    ctx.sandbox = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly;
    let sh = PersistentShellTool::default();
    let out = sh
        .execute(
            serde_json::json!({"command": "echo hi > shell_blocked.txt; echo done"}),
            &ctx,
        )
        .await
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        !dir.join("shell_blocked.txt").exists(),
        "read-only sandbox must block the persistent shell's write: {out}"
    );
    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}

// The `@@` header anchors a hunk: it disambiguates which of several identical
// blocks to edit, and gives a pure insertion a real location.
#[tokio::test]
async fn apply_patch_at_at_anchor_disambiguates_and_locates_insertions() {
    let (ctx, dir) = ctx();
    let tool = ApplyPatchTool;
    std::fs::write(
        dir.join("a.py"),
        "def foo():\n    return 1\n\ndef bar():\n    return 1\n",
    )
    .unwrap();

    // Anchor on `bar` so the *second* `return 1` is the one changed.
    let patch = "\
*** Begin Patch
*** Update File: a.py
@@ def bar():
-    return 1
+    return 2
*** End Patch
";
    tool.execute(serde_json::json!({ "patch": patch }), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap();
    let after = std::fs::read_to_string(dir.join("a.py")).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(
        after, "def foo():\n    return 1\n\ndef bar():\n    return 2\n",
        "anchor must target bar, leaving foo untouched: {after:?}"
    );

    // Anchored pure insertion lands right after the anchor line, not at EOF.
    let ins = "\
*** Begin Patch
*** Update File: a.py
@@ def foo():
+    # hello
*** End Patch
";
    tool.execute(serde_json::json!({ "patch": ins }), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap();
    let after = std::fs::read_to_string(dir.join("a.py")).unwrap();
    assert!(
        after.starts_with("def foo():\n    # hello\n    return 1\n"),
        "insertion must follow the anchor line, not append at EOF: {after:?}"
    );

    // A missing anchor is a hard error, not a silent misapply.
    let bad = "\
*** Begin Patch
*** Update File: a.py
@@ def nope():
-    return 1
+    return 9
*** End Patch
";
    assert!(tool
        .execute(serde_json::json!({ "patch": bad }), &ctx)
        .await
        .is_err());

    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}

// ---- read_file: truncate-with-notice (SUP-14) -----------------------------

#[tokio::test]
async fn read_file_oversized_no_slice_truncates_with_notice_instead_of_erroring() {
    let (ctx, dir) = ctx();
    let tool = ReadFileTool;

    // Build a file well over MAX_READ_BYTES out of repeated numbered lines.
    let line = "the quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog\n";
    let mut content = String::with_capacity(MAX_READ_BYTES + 50_000 + line.len());
    while content.len() < MAX_READ_BYTES + 50_000 {
        content.push_str(line);
    }
    let total = content.len();
    std::fs::write(dir.join("big.txt"), &content).unwrap();

    let out = tool
        .execute(serde_json::json!({ "path": "big.txt" }), &ctx)
        .await
        .expect("oversized read_file must succeed, not error");

    assert!(
        out.starts_with("[read_file: file is "),
        "missing truncation notice: {:?}",
        &out[..out.len().min(120)]
    );
    assert!(
        out.contains(&format!("{total} bytes")),
        "notice must state the true file size: {out}"
    );
    assert!(
        out.contains("Pass offset/limit to read more."),
        "notice must hint at offset/limit: {out}"
    );
    assert!(
        out.contains("the quick brown fox"),
        "must contain the head of the file"
    );
    // The tool-layer ceiling still bounds what's returned (notice + head).
    assert!(
        out.len() <= MAX_READ_BYTES + 200,
        "output should stay close to MAX_READ_BYTES, got {} bytes",
        out.len()
    );

    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn read_file_offset_limit_still_works_on_oversized_file_with_no_notice() {
    let (ctx, dir) = ctx();
    let tool = ReadFileTool;

    let mut content = String::new();
    for i in 1..=60_000 {
        content.push_str(&format!("line {i}\n"));
    }
    assert!(
        content.len() > MAX_READ_BYTES,
        "fixture must exceed the cap"
    );
    std::fs::write(dir.join("big.txt"), &content).unwrap();

    let out = tool
        .execute(
            serde_json::json!({ "path": "big.txt", "offset": 5, "limit": 3 }),
            &ctx,
        )
        .await
        .unwrap();

    assert_eq!(out, "line 5\nline 6\nline 7");
    assert!(
        !out.contains("[read_file:"),
        "sliced reads must not carry a truncation notice: {out}"
    );

    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn read_file_small_file_returns_full_content_with_no_notice() {
    let (ctx, dir) = ctx();
    let tool = ReadFileTool;

    let content = "hello\nworld\n";
    std::fs::write(dir.join("small.txt"), content).unwrap();

    let out = tool
        .execute(serde_json::json!({ "path": "small.txt" }), &ctx)
        .await
        .unwrap();

    assert_eq!(out, content, "small file must round-trip byte-for-byte");
    assert!(
        !out.contains("[read_file:"),
        "small file must not carry a truncation notice: {out}"
    );

    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}