sui-rpc 0.3.2

// This file is @generated by prost-build.
/// A node in a Blake2b256 Merkle tree.
///
/// An empty node represents an empty subtree (used as padding for odd-sized
/// levels and as the root of a tree built from zero leaves). A digest node
/// carries a 32-byte Blake2b256 hash of either a leaf or an inner node.
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, ::prost::Message)]
pub struct MerkleNode {
    #[prost(oneof = "merkle_node::Node", tags = "1, 2")]
    pub node: ::core::option::Option<merkle_node::Node>,
}
/// Nested message and enum types in `MerkleNode`.
pub mod merkle_node {
    #[non_exhaustive]
    #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, ::prost::Oneof)]
    pub enum Node {
        /// Marker for an empty subtree.
        #[prost(message, tag = "1")]
        Empty(()),
        /// 32-byte Blake2b256 hash.
        #[prost(bytes, tag = "2")]
        Digest(::prost::bytes::Bytes),
    }
}
/// An inclusion proof for a leaf in a Blake2b256 Merkle tree.
///
/// The proof carries the sibling node hashes on the path from the leaf up
/// to the root, leaf-side first. To verify, hash the leaf bytes with the
/// `0x00` leaf prefix, then walk `path` upward and compute each parent as
/// `BLAKE2b-256(0x01 || left || right)`. The final computed hash must equal
/// the tree root.
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, ::prost::Message)]
pub struct MerkleProof {
    /// Sibling node hashes, leaf-side first.
    #[prost(message, repeated, tag = "1")]
    pub path: ::prost::alloc::vec::Vec<MerkleNode>,
}
/// A non-inclusion proof for a Blake2b256 Merkle tree built over leaves
/// in sorted order.
///
/// The proof carries the absent leaf's would-be position in sort order
/// plus inclusion proofs for the leaves immediately before and after it.
/// A verifier checks that the two neighbours strictly bracket the
/// target's sort key and that they sit at adjacent indices in the tree.
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, ::prost::Message)]
pub struct MerkleNonInclusionProof {
    /// The 0-based index the target would occupy in sort order if it
    /// were present. `left_leaf` is unset iff `index == 0` (the target
    /// would be the very first leaf); `right_leaf` is unset iff the
    /// target would be appended past the last leaf, in which case
    /// `left_leaf.merkle_proof` must identify the tree's right-most leaf.
    #[prost(uint64, optional, tag = "1")]
    pub index: ::core::option::Option<u64>,
    /// Sort-order neighbour with sort key strictly less than the target,
    /// accompanied by its inclusion proof at position `index - 1`.
    #[prost(message, optional, tag = "2")]
    pub left_leaf: ::core::option::Option<MerkleNeighbourLeaf>,
    /// Sort-order neighbour with sort key strictly greater than the
    /// target, accompanied by its inclusion proof at position `index`.
    #[prost(message, optional, tag = "3")]
    pub right_leaf: ::core::option::Option<MerkleNeighbourLeaf>,
}
/// A neighbour leaf in a `MerkleNonInclusionProof`: an object reference
/// at a specific sorted position in the OCS tree, plus the inclusion
/// proof that authenticates it against the tree root.
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, ::prost::Message)]
pub struct MerkleNeighbourLeaf {
    /// The object reference stored at this leaf.
    #[prost(message, optional, tag = "1")]
    pub leaf: ::core::option::Option<super::v2::ObjectReference>,
    /// Inclusion proof for `leaf` at its position in the tree.
    #[prost(message, optional, tag = "2")]
    pub merkle_proof: ::core::option::Option<MerkleProof>,
}
/// An Object Checkpoint State (OCS) inclusion proof.
///
/// The OCS is a Blake2b256 Merkle tree built by each checkpoint over the
/// set of object references it modified (created, mutated, unwrapped, or
/// otherwise written). Each leaf is a BCS-encoded
/// `(ObjectID, SequenceNumber, ObjectDigest)` tuple, with leaves arranged
/// in ascending `ObjectID` order. The tree's root is committed to by the
/// containing `CheckpointSummary` via the `CheckpointArtifacts` variant of
/// its `checkpoint_commitments`.
///
/// An `OcsInclusionProof` proves that a particular leaf appears in this
/// tree. Combined with a verified `CheckpointSummary` it cryptographically
/// authenticates that a specific object reference was written in a specific
/// checkpoint.
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, ::prost::Message)]
pub struct OcsInclusionProof {
    /// Object reference being proven: (object_id, version, digest).
    /// For a deletion or wrap, `digest` is a framework sentinel value
    /// and `object_data` is absent. Consumers that only care whether
    /// the object is live after the change can check `object_data`
    /// presence instead of inspecting the digest.
    #[prost(message, optional, tag = "1")]
    pub object_ref: ::core::option::Option<super::v2::ObjectReference>,
    /// Merkle inclusion proof for the leaf.
    #[prost(message, optional, tag = "2")]
    pub merkle_proof: ::core::option::Option<MerkleProof>,
    /// Position of the leaf in the modified-objects tree.
    #[prost(uint64, optional, tag = "3")]
    pub leaf_index: ::core::option::Option<u64>,
    /// 32-byte Merkle root of the modified-objects tree.
    #[prost(bytes = "bytes", optional, tag = "4")]
    pub tree_root: ::core::option::Option<::prost::bytes::Bytes>,
    /// BCS-encoded `Object` data at the version committed by this
    /// checkpoint. Present iff the modification left the object live
    /// (created, mutated, or unwrapped). Absent if the modification was
    /// a deletion or wrap.
    #[prost(bytes = "bytes", optional, tag = "5")]
    pub object_data: ::core::option::Option<::prost::bytes::Bytes>,
}
/// An Object Checkpoint State (OCS) non-inclusion proof.
///
/// Proves that no leaf with a given object id appears in the OCS Merkle
/// tree -- i.e. that the checkpoint did not modify the object id at all.
/// The proof's bracketing neighbours must have object ids strictly
/// flanking the target id, which combined with the neighbours being at
/// adjacent indices in the sorted tree proves that no leaf with any
/// version or digest under the target id can be in the tree.
///
/// As with `OcsInclusionProof`, this is anchored at the containing
/// `CheckpointSummary`'s `CheckpointArtifacts` commitment.
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, ::prost::Message)]
pub struct OcsNonInclusionProof {
    /// Merkle non-inclusion proof over the OCS tree.
    #[prost(message, optional, tag = "1")]
    pub non_inclusion_proof: ::core::option::Option<MerkleNonInclusionProof>,
    /// 32-byte Merkle root of the modified-objects tree.
    #[prost(bytes = "bytes", optional, tag = "2")]
    pub tree_root: ::core::option::Option<::prost::bytes::Bytes>,
}
/// Request for a `GetCheckpointObjectProof` call.
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, ::prost::Message)]
pub struct GetCheckpointObjectProofRequest {
    /// Required. The object id to prove a checkpoint outcome for
    /// (hex-encoded address).
    #[prost(string, optional, tag = "1")]
    pub object_id: ::core::option::Option<::prost::alloc::string::String>,
    /// Required. The checkpoint sequence number to query.
    #[prost(uint64, optional, tag = "2")]
    pub checkpoint: ::core::option::Option<u64>,
}
/// Response containing a checkpoint-object proof and the materials needed
/// to verify it end-to-end.
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, ::prost::Message)]
pub struct GetCheckpointObjectProofResponse {
    /// BCS-encoded `CertifiedCheckpointSummary` for the requested
    /// checkpoint, carrying the `checkpoint_artifacts_digest` that the
    /// proof's `tree_root` must reconstruct, plus the BLS aggregate
    /// signature attesting to it.
    #[prost(bytes = "bytes", optional, tag = "1")]
    pub checkpoint_summary: ::core::option::Option<::prost::bytes::Bytes>,
    /// The proof itself: either an inclusion or a non-inclusion proof.
    #[prost(oneof = "get_checkpoint_object_proof_response::Proof", tags = "2, 3")]
    pub proof: ::core::option::Option<get_checkpoint_object_proof_response::Proof>,
}
/// Nested message and enum types in `GetCheckpointObjectProofResponse`.
pub mod get_checkpoint_object_proof_response {
    /// The proof itself: either an inclusion or a non-inclusion proof.
    #[non_exhaustive]
    #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, ::prost::Oneof)]
    pub enum Proof {
        /// The object id was modified in this checkpoint.
        #[prost(message, tag = "2")]
        Inclusion(super::OcsInclusionProof),
        /// The object id was not modified in this checkpoint.
        #[prost(message, tag = "3")]
        NonInclusion(super::OcsNonInclusionProof),
    }
}
/// Generated client implementations.
pub mod proof_service_client {
    #![allow(
        unused_variables,
        dead_code,
        missing_docs,
        clippy::wildcard_imports,
        clippy::let_unit_value,
    )]
    use tonic::codegen::*;
    use tonic::codegen::http::Uri;
    /// ProofService provides cryptographic proofs of blockchain state.
    ///
    /// Proofs in this service are anchored at a checkpoint summary's
    /// `checkpoint_artifacts_digest`, which commits to the Object Checkpoint
    /// State (OCS) -- the per-checkpoint Merkle tree of object references
    /// written in that checkpoint. "OCS" appears throughout this file to refer
    /// to that commitment scheme; see the doc on `OcsInclusionProof` below for
    /// the full definition.
    #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
    pub struct ProofServiceClient<T> {
        inner: tonic::client::Grpc<T>,
    }
    impl ProofServiceClient<tonic::transport::Channel> {
        /// Attempt to create a new client by connecting to a given endpoint.
        pub async fn connect<D>(dst: D) -> Result<Self, tonic::transport::Error>
        where
            D: TryInto<tonic::transport::Endpoint>,
            D::Error: Into<StdError>,
        {
            let conn = tonic::transport::Endpoint::new(dst)?.connect().await?;
            Ok(Self::new(conn))
        }
    }
    impl<T> ProofServiceClient<T>
    where
        T: tonic::client::GrpcService<tonic::body::Body>,
        T::Error: Into<StdError>,
        T::ResponseBody: Body<Data = Bytes> + std::marker::Send + 'static,
        <T::ResponseBody as Body>::Error: Into<StdError> + std::marker::Send,
    {
        pub fn new(inner: T) -> Self {
            let inner = tonic::client::Grpc::new(inner);
            Self { inner }
        }
        pub fn with_origin(inner: T, origin: Uri) -> Self {
            let inner = tonic::client::Grpc::with_origin(inner, origin);
            Self { inner }
        }
        pub fn with_interceptor<F>(
            inner: T,
            interceptor: F,
        ) -> ProofServiceClient<InterceptedService<T, F>>
        where
            F: tonic::service::Interceptor,
            T::ResponseBody: Default,
            T: tonic::codegen::Service<
                http::Request<tonic::body::Body>,
                Response = http::Response<
                    <T as tonic::client::GrpcService<tonic::body::Body>>::ResponseBody,
                >,
            >,
            <T as tonic::codegen::Service<
                http::Request<tonic::body::Body>,
            >>::Error: Into<StdError> + std::marker::Send + std::marker::Sync,
        {
            ProofServiceClient::new(InterceptedService::new(inner, interceptor))
        }
        /// Compress requests with the given encoding.
        ///
        /// This requires the server to support it otherwise it might respond with an
        /// error.
        #[must_use]
        pub fn send_compressed(mut self, encoding: CompressionEncoding) -> Self {
            self.inner = self.inner.send_compressed(encoding);
            self
        }
        /// Enable decompressing responses.
        #[must_use]
        pub fn accept_compressed(mut self, encoding: CompressionEncoding) -> Self {
            self.inner = self.inner.accept_compressed(encoding);
            self
        }
        /// Limits the maximum size of a decoded message.
        ///
        /// Default: `4MB`
        #[must_use]
        pub fn max_decoding_message_size(mut self, limit: usize) -> Self {
            self.inner = self.inner.max_decoding_message_size(limit);
            self
        }
        /// Limits the maximum size of an encoded message.
        ///
        /// Default: `usize::MAX`
        #[must_use]
        pub fn max_encoding_message_size(mut self, limit: usize) -> Self {
            self.inner = self.inner.max_encoding_message_size(limit);
            self
        }
        /// Returns a cryptographic proof attesting to what (if anything) a
        /// specific checkpoint did to a specific object id.
        ///
        /// If the object id appears in the checkpoint's set of modified
        /// objects (the OCS Merkle tree's leaves), the response carries an
        /// `OcsInclusionProof` and -- when the modification left the object
        /// live -- the BCS-encoded object data. If the object id does not
        /// appear in the modified set, the response carries an
        /// `OcsNonInclusionProof`.
        ///
        /// IMPORTANT: a non-inclusion proof attests only that this checkpoint
        /// did NOT modify the requested object id. It does NOT attest that the
        /// object doesn't exist on chain: an object that was last modified in
        /// some earlier checkpoint and remained unchanged here will produce a
        /// non-inclusion proof. Clients that need the object's state at this
        /// checkpoint when it wasn't modified here must use a separate query
        /// (e.g. ratchet back to the most recent modification).
        pub async fn get_checkpoint_object_proof(
            &mut self,
            request: impl tonic::IntoRequest<super::GetCheckpointObjectProofRequest>,
        ) -> std::result::Result<
            tonic::Response<super::GetCheckpointObjectProofResponse>,
            tonic::Status,
        > {
            self.inner
                .ready()
                .await
                .map_err(|e| {
                    tonic::Status::unknown(
                        format!("Service was not ready: {}", e.into()),
                    )
                })?;
            let codec = tonic_prost::ProstCodec::default();
            let path = http::uri::PathAndQuery::from_static(
                "/sui.rpc.v2alpha.ProofService/GetCheckpointObjectProof",
            );
            let mut req = request.into_request();
            req.extensions_mut()
                .insert(
                    GrpcMethod::new(
                        "sui.rpc.v2alpha.ProofService",
                        "GetCheckpointObjectProof",
                    ),
                );
            self.inner.unary(req, path, codec).await
        }
    }
}
/// Generated server implementations.
pub mod proof_service_server {
    #![allow(
        unused_variables,
        dead_code,
        missing_docs,
        clippy::wildcard_imports,
        clippy::let_unit_value,
    )]
    use tonic::codegen::*;
    /// Generated trait containing gRPC methods that should be implemented for use with ProofServiceServer.
    #[async_trait]
    pub trait ProofService: std::marker::Send + std::marker::Sync + 'static {
        /// Returns a cryptographic proof attesting to what (if anything) a
        /// specific checkpoint did to a specific object id.
        ///
        /// If the object id appears in the checkpoint's set of modified
        /// objects (the OCS Merkle tree's leaves), the response carries an
        /// `OcsInclusionProof` and -- when the modification left the object
        /// live -- the BCS-encoded object data. If the object id does not
        /// appear in the modified set, the response carries an
        /// `OcsNonInclusionProof`.
        ///
        /// IMPORTANT: a non-inclusion proof attests only that this checkpoint
        /// did NOT modify the requested object id. It does NOT attest that the
        /// object doesn't exist on chain: an object that was last modified in
        /// some earlier checkpoint and remained unchanged here will produce a
        /// non-inclusion proof. Clients that need the object's state at this
        /// checkpoint when it wasn't modified here must use a separate query
        /// (e.g. ratchet back to the most recent modification).
        async fn get_checkpoint_object_proof(
            &self,
            request: tonic::Request<super::GetCheckpointObjectProofRequest>,
        ) -> std::result::Result<
            tonic::Response<super::GetCheckpointObjectProofResponse>,
            tonic::Status,
        > {
            Err(tonic::Status::unimplemented("Not yet implemented"))
        }
    }
    /// ProofService provides cryptographic proofs of blockchain state.
    ///
    /// Proofs in this service are anchored at a checkpoint summary's
    /// `checkpoint_artifacts_digest`, which commits to the Object Checkpoint
    /// State (OCS) -- the per-checkpoint Merkle tree of object references
    /// written in that checkpoint. "OCS" appears throughout this file to refer
    /// to that commitment scheme; see the doc on `OcsInclusionProof` below for
    /// the full definition.
    #[derive(Debug)]
    pub struct ProofServiceServer<T> {
        inner: Arc<T>,
        accept_compression_encodings: EnabledCompressionEncodings,
        send_compression_encodings: EnabledCompressionEncodings,
        max_decoding_message_size: Option<usize>,
        max_encoding_message_size: Option<usize>,
    }
    impl<T> ProofServiceServer<T> {
        pub fn new(inner: T) -> Self {
            Self::from_arc(Arc::new(inner))
        }
        pub fn from_arc(inner: Arc<T>) -> Self {
            Self {
                inner,
                accept_compression_encodings: Default::default(),
                send_compression_encodings: Default::default(),
                max_decoding_message_size: None,
                max_encoding_message_size: None,
            }
        }
        pub fn with_interceptor<F>(
            inner: T,
            interceptor: F,
        ) -> InterceptedService<Self, F>
        where
            F: tonic::service::Interceptor,
        {
            InterceptedService::new(Self::new(inner), interceptor)
        }
        /// Enable decompressing requests with the given encoding.
        #[must_use]
        pub fn accept_compressed(mut self, encoding: CompressionEncoding) -> Self {
            self.accept_compression_encodings.enable(encoding);
            self
        }
        /// Compress responses with the given encoding, if the client supports it.
        #[must_use]
        pub fn send_compressed(mut self, encoding: CompressionEncoding) -> Self {
            self.send_compression_encodings.enable(encoding);
            self
        }
        /// Limits the maximum size of a decoded message.
        ///
        /// Default: `4MB`
        #[must_use]
        pub fn max_decoding_message_size(mut self, limit: usize) -> Self {
            self.max_decoding_message_size = Some(limit);
            self
        }
        /// Limits the maximum size of an encoded message.
        ///
        /// Default: `usize::MAX`
        #[must_use]
        pub fn max_encoding_message_size(mut self, limit: usize) -> Self {
            self.max_encoding_message_size = Some(limit);
            self
        }
    }
    impl<T, B> tonic::codegen::Service<http::Request<B>> for ProofServiceServer<T>
    where
        T: ProofService,
        B: Body + std::marker::Send + 'static,
        B::Error: Into<StdError> + std::marker::Send + 'static,
    {
        type Response = http::Response<tonic::body::Body>;
        type Error = std::convert::Infallible;
        type Future = BoxFuture<Self::Response, Self::Error>;
        fn poll_ready(
            &mut self,
            _cx: &mut Context<'_>,
        ) -> Poll<std::result::Result<(), Self::Error>> {
            Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
        }
        fn call(&mut self, req: http::Request<B>) -> Self::Future {
            match req.uri().path() {
                "/sui.rpc.v2alpha.ProofService/GetCheckpointObjectProof" => {
                    #[allow(non_camel_case_types)]
                    struct GetCheckpointObjectProofSvc<T: ProofService>(pub Arc<T>);
                    impl<
                        T: ProofService,
                    > tonic::server::UnaryService<super::GetCheckpointObjectProofRequest>
                    for GetCheckpointObjectProofSvc<T> {
                        type Response = super::GetCheckpointObjectProofResponse;
                        type Future = BoxFuture<
                            tonic::Response<Self::Response>,
                            tonic::Status,
                        >;
                        fn call(
                            &mut self,
                            request: tonic::Request<
                                super::GetCheckpointObjectProofRequest,
                            >,
                        ) -> Self::Future {
                            let inner = Arc::clone(&self.0);
                            let fut = async move {
                                <T as ProofService>::get_checkpoint_object_proof(
                                        &inner,
                                        request,
                                    )
                                    .await
                            };
                            Box::pin(fut)
                        }
                    }
                    let accept_compression_encodings = self.accept_compression_encodings;
                    let send_compression_encodings = self.send_compression_encodings;
                    let max_decoding_message_size = self.max_decoding_message_size;
                    let max_encoding_message_size = self.max_encoding_message_size;
                    let inner = self.inner.clone();
                    let fut = async move {
                        let method = GetCheckpointObjectProofSvc(inner);
                        let codec = tonic_prost::ProstCodec::default();
                        let mut grpc = tonic::server::Grpc::new(codec)
                            .apply_compression_config(
                                accept_compression_encodings,
                                send_compression_encodings,
                            )
                            .apply_max_message_size_config(
                                max_decoding_message_size,
                                max_encoding_message_size,
                            );
                        let res = grpc.unary(method, req).await;
                        Ok(res)
                    };
                    Box::pin(fut)
                }
                _ => {
                    Box::pin(async move {
                        let mut response = http::Response::new(
                            tonic::body::Body::default(),
                        );
                        let headers = response.headers_mut();
                        headers
                            .insert(
                                tonic::Status::GRPC_STATUS,
                                (tonic::Code::Unimplemented as i32).into(),
                            );
                        headers
                            .insert(
                                http::header::CONTENT_TYPE,
                                tonic::metadata::GRPC_CONTENT_TYPE,
                            );
                        Ok(response)
                    })
                }
            }
        }
    }
    impl<T> Clone for ProofServiceServer<T> {
        fn clone(&self) -> Self {
            let inner = self.inner.clone();
            Self {
                inner,
                accept_compression_encodings: self.accept_compression_encodings,
                send_compression_encodings: self.send_compression_encodings,
                max_decoding_message_size: self.max_decoding_message_size,
                max_encoding_message_size: self.max_encoding_message_size,
            }
        }
    }
    /// Generated gRPC service name
    pub const SERVICE_NAME: &str = "sui.rpc.v2alpha.ProofService";
    impl<T> tonic::server::NamedService for ProofServiceServer<T> {
        const NAME: &'static str = SERVICE_NAME;
    }
}