structured-pkix 0.2.4

use super::*;
use crate::fixtures::{
    CertificateParts, bits, context, extension, generalized_time, octets, seq, tlv,
};
use crate::ocsp::{
    AuthorityBinding, AuthoritySource, DigestAlgorithm, ResolvedDigest, SignatureAuthentication,
};
use crate::path::{Verified, Verify, WorkingKey};
use core::{cell::Cell, num::NonZeroUsize};
use structured_asn1::{BitString, Parser};

struct Provider<'a> {
    key: &'a [u8],
    name: &'a [u8],
    signed: &'a [u8],
    calls: Cell<usize>,
    fail: Cell<bool>,
}
impl Digest for Provider<'_> {
    type Handle = ();
    type Error = &'static str;
    fn resolve(
        &self,
        _: DigestAlgorithm<'_>,
        _: &Memory,
    ) -> core::result::Result<Option<ResolvedDigest<()>>, Self::Error> {
        if self.fail.get() {
            return Err("hash refusal");
        }
        Ok(Some(ResolvedDigest {
            handle: (),
            width: NonZeroUsize::new(20).unwrap(),
        }))
    }
    fn matches(
        &self,
        (): (),
        input: &[u8],
        expected: &[u8],
        _: &Memory,
    ) -> core::result::Result<bool, Self::Error> {
        let original = if expected == [0x11; 20] {
            self.name
        } else {
            self.key
        };
        assert_eq!(input.as_ptr(), original.as_ptr());
        assert_eq!(input, original);
        Ok(true)
    }
}
impl Verify for Provider<'_> {
    type Error = core::convert::Infallible;
    fn verify(
        &self,
        _: &crate::AlgorithmIdentifier<'_>,
        _: WorkingKey<'_>,
        signed: &[u8],
        _: BitString<'_>,
        _: &Memory,
    ) -> core::result::Result<Verified, Self::Error> {
        assert_eq!(signed.as_ptr(), self.signed.as_ptr());
        assert_eq!(signed, self.signed);
        self.calls.set(self.calls.get() + 1);
        Ok(Verified::Yes)
    }
}

fn inspect(
    repeat: bool,
    check: impl FnOnce(ScopedResponse<'_, '_>, &Certificate<'_>, &Provider<'_>, Evaluation<'_>),
) {
    let target_parts = CertificateParts::default();
    let issuer_bytes = CertificateParts {
        subject: target_parts.issuer.clone(),
        ..CertificateParts::default()
    }
    .build();
    let id = seq(&[
        target_parts.outer_algorithm.clone(),
        octets(&[0x11; 20]),
        octets(&[0x22; 20]),
        target_parts.serial.clone(),
    ]);
    let timestamp = generalized_time("20250101000000Z");
    let single = seq(&[
        id,
        tlv(0x80, &[]),
        timestamp.clone(),
        context(0, &[generalized_time("20250102000000Z")]),
    ]);
    let assertions = if repeat {
        seq(&[single.clone(), single])
    } else {
        seq(&[single])
    };
    let data = seq(&[
        context(2, &[octets(&[0x33; 20])]),
        timestamp,
        assertions,
        context(
            1,
            &[seq(&[extension(
                crate::oid::OCSP_NONCE,
                false,
                &octets(&[0x61; 32]),
            )])],
        ),
    ]);
    let bytes = seq(&[data, target_parts.outer_algorithm.clone(), bits(&[0xab])]);
    let target_bytes = target_parts.build();
    let execution = crate::fixtures::memory();
    let parser = Parser::der(execution.clone());
    let target = Certificate::read(&parser, &target_bytes, 100).unwrap();
    let issuer = Certificate::read(&parser, &issuer_bytes, 300).unwrap();
    let mut reader = parser.read(&bytes, 700).unwrap();
    let root = reader.next_element().unwrap().unwrap();
    let response = crate::ocsp::read_basic(&reader, &root).unwrap();
    let provider = Provider {
        key: issuer.tbs().public_key().key().as_bytes(),
        name: target.tbs().issuer().as_bytes(),
        signed: response.signed_bytes(),
        calls: Cell::new(0),
        fail: Cell::new(false),
    };
    let key = WorkingKey::standing(issuer.tbs().public_key());
    let SignatureAuthentication::Signed(signed) = response
        .authenticate_signature(&issuer, key, &provider, &provider, &execution)
        .unwrap()
    else {
        panic!("signature fixture refused");
    };
    let AuthorityBinding::Bound(scoped) = signed.bind_issuer(&issuer, key, &execution).unwrap()
    else {
        panic!("issuer fixture refused");
    };
    let start = response.responses()[0].this_update().instant();
    let utc = LeapTable::new(start.seconds() - 10, start.seconds() + 100_000, &[]).unwrap();
    check(
        scoped,
        &target,
        &provider,
        Evaluation {
            now: start.into(),
            utc: &utc,
            execution: &execution,
        },
    );
}

#[test]
fn composed_evidence_retains_policy_facts_and_original_ranges_without_reverification() {
    // Provider observation qualifies dispatch/provenance, not crypto accuracy.
    // Evaluation must keep nonce/recipient/time facts rather than bless Good.
    inspect(false, |source, target, provider, time| {
        let retained = time.execution.used();
        let request = Request {
            target,
            nonce: RequestNonce::new(&[0x61; 32]),
            intended_signer: Some(source.signed().signer()),
        };
        let TargetEvidence::Evidence(evidence) =
            source.evaluate(&request, &time, provider).unwrap()
        else {
            panic!("target evidence refused");
        };
        assert_eq!(evidence.nonce(), NonceBinding::Matches);
        assert_eq!(evidence.recipient(), RecipientBinding::Matches);
        assert_eq!(evidence.window(), UpdateWindow::Within);
        assert_eq!(evidence.source().source(), AuthoritySource::Issuer);
        assert!(core::ptr::eq(
            evidence.assertion(),
            &raw const source.signed().response().responses()[0]
        ));
        assert_eq!(provider.calls.get(), 1);
        assert_eq!(time.execution.used(), retained);
        let request = Request {
            nonce: None,
            intended_signer: None,
            ..request
        };
        let TargetEvidence::Evidence(evidence) =
            source.evaluate(&request, &time, provider).unwrap()
        else {
            panic!("missing recipient became implicit rejection");
        };
        assert_eq!(evidence.recipient(), RecipientBinding::NotSpecified);
        assert_eq!(evidence.nonce(), NonceBinding::Unsolicited);
        let request = Request {
            intended_signer: Some(target),
            ..request
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            source.evaluate(&request, &time, provider).unwrap(),
            TargetEvidence::UnexpectedSigner
        ));
        assert_eq!(provider.calls.get(), 1);
    });
}

#[test]
fn duplicate_identity_provider_and_resource_refusals_never_become_missing_or_good() {
    // Duplicate identity stays ambiguous, and callback/resource failures must
    // retain their origin instead of becoming absent/mismatch certificates.
    inspect(true, |source, target, provider, time| {
        let request = Request {
            target,
            nonce: None,
            intended_signer: None,
        };
        assert!(matches!(
            source.evaluate(&request, &time, provider).unwrap(),
            TargetEvidence::Lookup(Lookup::Ambiguous { .. })
        ));
        provider.fail.set(true);
        assert!(matches!(
            source.evaluate(&request, &time, provider),
            Err(crate::error::CallbackError::Callback("hash refusal"))
        ));
        provider.fail.set(false);
        let unfunded = Memory::new(alloc::sync::Arc::new(
            structured_asn1::memory::MemoryAccount::new(0, 0),
        ));
        let time = Evaluation {
            execution: &unfunded,
            ..time
        };
        assert!(
            matches!(source.evaluate(&request, &time, provider), Err(crate::error::CallbackError::Processing(error)) if error.is_resource() && error.offset() == 700)
        );
    });
}