structured-cms 0.2.3

Borrowed CMS SignedData processing with explicit providers and resource accounting
Documentation

structured-cms

CMS SignedData and RFC 3161 timestamp mechanisms over borrowed ASN.1 ranges, explicit resource accounts and injected cryptographic providers. Applications supply content and own trust, policy, acquisition and reporting. The library performs no implicit I/O and includes no cryptographic engine.

The implemented surface covers SignedData rather than encrypted CMS content types. Use the coordinated ASN.1/PKIX/CMS API family:

The registry snippets below target the first coordinated 0.2 release and resolve only after that version is published. A source checkout alone does not establish registry availability; see the current registry version.

[dependencies]
structured-asn1 = "0.2"
structured-pkix = "0.2"
structured-cms = "0.2"
  • ContentInfo and SignedData preserve original BER encodings, signer identifiers, certificate/revocation choices and signed attributes.
  • prepare, verify and provider support explicit raw-message and prehashed verification, full algorithm identities and a shared payload pass. Provider and input failures remain distinct from invalid or unsupported signatures.
  • ess checks independent signing-certificate attributes; counter walks countersignatures using original parent signature content.
  • timestamp::Request reads original TimeStampReq. timestamp::Token separates readable inspection from complete signature, ESS, TSA, imprint, request and time checking. The caller supplies UTC information and request windows.

Borrowed views keep original document ranges. Independently retained results use accounted storage that remains charged until its capacity is freed. Fallible copies reserve additional storage; moving a result does not copy it. Producing reader operations enforce both local and aggregate work ceilings. Lazy queries preserve original provenance and fund work through the current operation.

Constructed content can have several physical ranges. SourceMap retains that mapping independently of temporary joins. Nested timestamp checking preserves separate CMS-envelope and TSTInfo coordinate contexts. A foreign-reader refusal occurs before map admission; it is caller misuse, not malformed document data.

timestamp::Evidence records successful common checks, not a trust decision. Applications must validate the TSA certification path and status, enforce signed ESS path restrictions and apply their algorithm/security policy. Malformed inspection faults do not produce evidence. Content discovery, replay history, networking, clocks and product timelines remain outside this crate.

The runtime supports no_std + alloc; std is optional. Cryptographic test adapters are development-only oracles, not qualified production providers or proof of their internal resource accounting.