strict-path 0.2.1

//! Proof test replicating CVE-2025-11001 (7-Zip symlink path traversal)
//!
//! ## Vulnerability Background
//!
//! CVE-2025-11001 and CVE-2025-11002 are critical vulnerabilities in 7-Zip (versions 21.02-24.09)
//! that allow path traversal via malicious symlinks in ZIP archives. The vulnerability exploits
//! flawed absolute path detection and symlink handling in 7-Zip's extraction logic.
//!
//! **Attack Vector:**
//! 1. Attacker creates a ZIP archive containing a Linux-style symlink pointing to a Windows
//!    absolute path like `C:\Users\[Username]\Desktop`
//! 2. 7-Zip misclassifies this as a relative path due to flawed path checking
//! 3. During extraction, 7-Zip creates the symlink and then follows it
//! 4. Subsequent files in the archive are written to the symlink target location
//! 5. This allows arbitrary file writes outside the extraction directory
//!
//! **Exploitation Requirements:**
//! - Windows OS (not exploitable on Linux/macOS)
//! - Elevated privileges, Developer Mode, or elevated service context (for symlink creation)
//! - Vulnerable 7-Zip version (21.02 through 24.09)
//!
//! **References:**
//! - https://github.com/pacbypass/CVE-2025-11001
//! - https://github.com/DK26/CVE-2025-11001 (forK)
//! - https://cybersecuritynews.com/poc-exploit-7-zip-vulnerabilities/
//! - https://pacbypass.github.io/2025/10/16/diffing-7zip-for-cve-2025-11001.html (detailed analysis)
//! - ZDI disclosure: October 7, 2025
//! - CVSS v3.0 Score: 7.0
//!
//! ## The Three 7-Zip Bugs (from pacbypass article)
//!
//! 1. **Issue #1 - Path Type Misclassification**: Linux symlink containing Windows absolute
//!    path `C:\Users\Desktop` is incorrectly labeled as "relative" because 7-Zip uses
//!    Linux-style path checking (`IS_PATH_SEPAR(path[0])` instead of `NName::IsAbsolutePath`)
//!
//! 2. **Issue #2 - Prepended Directory Bypass**: When symlink is in a subdirectory,
//!    7-Zip prepends the directory path before validation:
//!    `isSafePath("data/subdir/" + "C:\Users\Desktop")` incorrectly passes
//!
//! 3. **Issue #3 - Directory Check Bypass**: Final safety check has condition
//!    `if (_item.IsDir)` that only validates directory symlinks, allowing file
//!    symlinks to bypass validation entirely
//!
//! ## How strict-path Prevents This Attack
//!
//! This test demonstrates that `strict-path` prevents CVE-2025-11001 through:
//!
//! 1. **Path Boundary Validation**: All paths must be validated through `strict_join()`
//!    before any filesystem operations, rejecting escape attempts immediately
//!
//! 2. **Symlink Target Validation**: When creating symlinks via `strict_symlink()`,
//!    both the link path AND the target path are validated against the boundary
//!
//! 3. **Canonical Resolution**: Built on `soft-canonicalize`, which resolves symlinks
//!    and detects escape attempts before filesystem operations occur
//!
//! 4. **Fail-Fast Design**: Returns `Err(PathEscapesBoundary)` on escape attempts
//!    rather than silently allowing traversal
//!
//! The key insight: **If you can't create a StrictPath, you can't perform I/O**.
//! This makes the attack impossible at the API level.

// CVE-2025-11001/CVE-2025-11002 are Windows-specific vulnerabilities
// All tests in this module are Windows-only
#![cfg(windows)]

use crate::{PathBoundary, StrictPathError};
use std::path::Path;
/// Test structure mimicking the CVE-2025-11001 exploit
struct MaliciousZipStructure {
    /// Top-level directory in the archive
    top_dir: String,
    /// Symlink entry name that points outside the extraction dir
    link_name: String,
    /// Target path the symlink attempts to point to (absolute Windows path)
    symlink_target: String,
    /// File that would be written via the symlink
    payload_file: String,
}

impl MaliciousZipStructure {
    fn new_desktop_attack(username: &str) -> Self {
        Self {
            top_dir: "data".to_string(),
            link_name: "link_in".to_string(),
            symlink_target: format!("C:\\Users\\{username}\\Desktop"),
            payload_file: "malicious.exe".to_string(),
        }
    }

    fn new_system32_attack() -> Self {
        Self {
            top_dir: "data".to_string(),
            link_name: "link_in".to_string(),
            symlink_target: "C:\\Windows\\System32".to_string(),
            payload_file: "malicious.dll".to_string(),
        }
    }

    fn new_relative_traversal_attack() -> Self {
        Self {
            top_dir: "data".to_string(),
            link_name: "link_in".to_string(),
            // Attempts to traverse up and out of extraction directory
            symlink_target: "..\\..\\..\\sensitive".to_string(),
            payload_file: "payload.txt".to_string(),
        }
    }
}

/// Test replicating the exact attack pattern from pacbypass's article:
/// https://pacbypass.github.io/2025/10/16/diffing-7zip-for-cve-2025-11001.html
///
/// The vulnerability exploits three 7-Zip bugs:
/// 1. Linux symlink with Windows path `C:\` is mislabeled as "relative"
/// 2. Prepending zip directory allows bypass: `data/` + `C:\Users\Desktop` passes check
/// 3. Directory check (`_item.IsDir`) incorrectly skips validation for file symlinks
///
/// Attack structure in ZIP:
/// - data/link_in → symlink to C:\Users\TestUser\Desktop
/// - data/link_in/malicious.exe → file written through symlink
///
/// Result: malicious.exe ends up on Desktop instead of in extraction directory
#[test]
fn test_cve_2025_11001_desktop_symlink_attack_blocked() {
    let attack = MaliciousZipStructure::new_desktop_attack("TestUser");

    let extraction_dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let extraction_sandbox: PathBoundary =
        PathBoundary::try_new_create(extraction_dir.path()).unwrap();

    // Step 1: Attacker attempts to create top-level directory (this succeeds)
    let top_dir_path = extraction_sandbox.strict_join(&attack.top_dir).unwrap();
    top_dir_path.create_dir().unwrap();

    // Step 2: Attacker attempts to create symlink pointing to absolute Windows path
    // In the vulnerable 7-Zip, this would create a symlink to C:\Users\TestUser\Desktop
    //
    // 7-Zip BUG #1: Linux symlink with Windows path is mislabeled as "relative"
    // 7-Zip BUG #2: Prepending "data/" makes check pass: isSafePath("data/C:\Users\Desktop")
    // 7-Zip BUG #3: File symlink bypasses _item.IsDir check

    let top_dir = &attack.top_dir;
    let link_name = &attack.link_name;
    let link_path = extraction_sandbox
        .strict_join(format!("{top_dir}/{link_name}"))
        .unwrap();

    // Attempt to validate the symlink target - THIS IS WHERE strict-path BLOCKS THE ATTACK
    // strict-path does NOT mislabel absolute paths as relative
    let symlink_target_result = extraction_sandbox.strict_join(&attack.symlink_target);

    // SECURITY GUARANTEE: Absolute path to Desktop is rejected
    assert!(
        symlink_target_result.is_err(),
        "strict-path MUST reject absolute path to Desktop"
    );

    match symlink_target_result {
        Err(StrictPathError::PathEscapesBoundary { attempted_path, .. }) => {
            // Verify the error correctly identifies the escape attempt
            let path_str = attempted_path.to_string_lossy();

            // On Windows, the attempted path should reference the Desktop path
            assert!(
                path_str.contains("Users") || path_str.contains("Desktop"),
                "Error should reference the attempted Desktop path, got: {path_str}"
            );
        }
        Err(StrictPathError::PathResolutionError { .. }) => {
            // Also acceptable - path doesn't exist so resolution fails
            // This is what happens on CI where C:\Users\TestUser doesn't exist
        }
        Ok(_) => panic!("strict_join MUST NOT accept absolute path to C:\\Users"),
        Err(other) => panic!("Unexpected error variant: {other:?}"),
    }

    // Even if attacker had a StrictPath to the target (impossible via strict_join),
    // strict_symlink would validate both paths are within the same boundary
    // Demonstrate this with a safe target first - use a directory for junction compatibility
    let safe_target_dir = extraction_sandbox
        .strict_join(format!("{}/safe_target_dir", attack.top_dir))
        .unwrap();
    safe_target_dir.create_dir_all().unwrap();

    // Try creating symlink to safe target directory
    // On Windows: tries symlink first, falls back to junction if privileges unavailable
    // The key security property is that we can't create symlinks to outside paths
    match safe_target_dir.strict_symlink(link_path.interop_path()) {
        Ok(_) => {
            // Symlink created successfully - verify it exists
            assert!(link_path.exists(), "Link should exist after creation");
        }
        Err(e) if e.raw_os_error() == Some(1314) => {
            // Windows: Insufficient privileges for symlink
            // Prefer built-in junction helper (dir-only) when the feature is enabled; otherwise fall back to third-party for the test.
            link_path.create_parent_dir_all().ok();

            // Tests run with all features; fall back to built-in junction helper.
            #[cfg(feature = "junctions")]
            {
                match safe_target_dir.strict_junction(link_path.interop_path()) {
                    Ok(_) => {
                        // Best-effort verification: ensure junction is readable as a directory
                        if let Err(err) = link_path.read_dir() {
                            eprintln!("Warning: Junction created but not readable as dir: {err:?}");
                        }
                    }
                    Err(err) => {
                        eprintln!(
                            "Note: Could not create junction via built-in helper after symlink privilege error: {err:?}"
                        );
                    }
                }
            }

            #[cfg(not(feature = "junctions"))]
            {
                panic!(
                    "This test verifies the junction fallback path but the 'junctions' feature is disabled.\n\
                     Enable it with: cargo test -p strict-path --features junctions (CI/dev runs use --all-features)."
                );
            }
        }
        Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error creating symlink: {e}"),
    }

    // Step 3: Attacker attempts to write payload through the symlink
    // In vulnerable 7-Zip, this would write to Desktop
    // With strict-path, we CANNOT create a StrictPath through a link that escapes boundary

    let top_dir = &attack.top_dir;
    let link_name = &attack.link_name;
    let payload_file = &attack.payload_file;
    let payload_through_link =
        extraction_sandbox.strict_join(format!("{top_dir}/{link_name}/{payload_file}"));

    // SECURITY GUARANTEE: Path traversal through symlink/junction is blocked
    // strict-path will either:
    // 1. Reject the path join entirely (most likely when link points outside), OR
    // 2. Allow it only if canonicalization keeps us within boundary
    match payload_through_link {
        Ok(payload_path) => {
            // If join succeeded, verify we're still within boundary
            assert!(
                payload_path.strictpath_starts_with(extraction_sandbox.interop_path()),
                "Payload path must remain within extraction boundary"
            );

            // If we got here, write is safe - we're still inside boundary
            // However, on Windows with junctions, the write itself might fail
            // due to OS-level restrictions (which is also a defense!)
            match payload_path.write(b"fake malware") {
                Ok(_) => {
                    // Write succeeded - verify Desktop wasn't touched
                    let desktop_path = Path::new(&attack.symlink_target).join(&attack.payload_file);
                    assert!(
                        !desktop_path.exists(),
                        "Desktop must remain untouched even after successful write"
                    );
                }
                Err(e) => {
                    // Write failed - this is also acceptable defense
                    eprintln!("Write blocked by OS: {e}");
                }
            }
        }
        Err(e) => {
            // Path join was rejected - this is the expected defense!
            // The link might point outside, so strict-path blocks traversal through it
            eprintln!("Attack blocked: strict_join rejected path through symlink: {e}");

            // Verify Desktop was not modified
            let desktop_path = Path::new(&attack.symlink_target).join(&attack.payload_file);
            assert!(
                !desktop_path.exists(),
                "Desktop must remain untouched - attack successfully blocked"
            );
        }
    }
}

/// Test demonstrating protection against Issue #2 from the pacbypass article:
/// 7-Zip vulnerability where prepending directory path bypasses safety check
///
/// Vulnerable 7-Zip logic:
/// ```
/// if (linkInfo.isRelative) // TRUE due to Bug #1
///     relatPath = GetDirPrefixOf(_item.Path); // "data/"
/// relatPath += linkInfo.linkPath; // "data/" + "C:\Users\Desktop"
/// if (!IsSafePath(relatPath)) // BUG: This passes!
/// ```
///
/// strict-path defense: Absolute paths are NEVER treated as relative,
/// regardless of what directory they're joined to
#[test]
fn test_cve_2025_11001_issue2_prepended_directory_bypass_blocked() {
    let extraction_dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let extraction_sandbox: PathBoundary =
        PathBoundary::try_new_create(extraction_dir.path()).unwrap();

    // Create nested directory structure like in the exploit
    let nested_dir = extraction_sandbox
        .strict_join("data/subdir/nested")
        .unwrap();
    nested_dir.create_dir_all().unwrap();

    // Simulate 7-Zip's vulnerable pattern: prepending directory to absolute path
    // In 7-Zip, this would become: "data/subdir/" + "C:\Users\Desktop"
    let absolute_targets = &[
        "C:\\Users\\Public\\Desktop",
        "C:\\Windows\\System32",
        "C:\\ProgramData\\sensitive.txt",
    ];

    for &target in absolute_targets {
        // Try to join from nested directory context
        let result = extraction_sandbox.strict_join(format!("data/subdir/{target}"));

        // SECURITY GUARANTEE: Prepending directory does NOT bypass validation
        // strict-path recognizes absolute paths regardless of prefix
        assert!(
            result.is_err(),
            "strict-path MUST reject absolute path even with prepended directory: {target}"
        );

        match result {
            Err(StrictPathError::PathEscapesBoundary { .. })
            | Err(StrictPathError::PathResolutionError { .. }) => {
                // Expected - absolute path detected and rejected
            }
            Ok(_) => {
                panic!("Prepended directory MUST NOT bypass absolute path detection: {target}")
            }
            Err(other) => panic!("Unexpected error for '{target}': {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    // Also test that the symlink target itself is validated independently
    // of what directory the symlink is created in
    for &target in absolute_targets {
        let target_result = extraction_sandbox.strict_join(target);

        assert!(
            target_result.is_err(),
            "Symlink target validation MUST reject absolute paths: {target}"
        );
    }
}

#[test]
fn test_cve_2025_11001_system32_attack_blocked() {
    let attack = MaliciousZipStructure::new_system32_attack();

    let extraction_dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let extraction_sandbox: PathBoundary =
        PathBoundary::try_new_create(extraction_dir.path()).unwrap();

    // Attempt to validate symlink target pointing to System32
    let symlink_target_result = extraction_sandbox.strict_join(&attack.symlink_target);

    // SECURITY GUARANTEE: Absolute path to System32 is rejected
    assert!(
        symlink_target_result.is_err(),
        "strict-path MUST reject absolute path to System32"
    );

    match symlink_target_result {
        Err(StrictPathError::PathEscapesBoundary { .. })
        | Err(StrictPathError::PathResolutionError { .. }) => {
            // Expected - absolute paths or non-existent paths are rejected
        }
        Ok(_) => panic!("strict_join MUST NOT accept absolute path to C:\\Windows\\System32"),
        Err(other) => panic!("Unexpected error variant: {other:?}"),
    }
}

/// Mirrors 7-Zip's forward-slash absolute path misclassification on Windows.
///
/// Some vulnerable 7-Zip versions treated `C:/...` style paths as relative on Windows
/// due to forward slash handling. Our validator must treat these as absolute and reject
/// them when they escape the boundary.
#[test]
fn test_cve_2025_11001_forward_slash_absolute_windows_paths_blocked() {
    let extraction_dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let extraction_sandbox: PathBoundary =
        PathBoundary::try_new_create(extraction_dir.path()).unwrap();

    // Representative absolute Windows paths using forward slashes
    let absolute_targets = vec!["C:/Windows/System32", "C:/Users/Public/Desktop"];

    for target in absolute_targets {
        let result = extraction_sandbox.strict_join(target);
        assert!(
            result.is_err(),
            "strict-path MUST reject forward-slash absolute path: {target}"
        );

        match result {
            Err(StrictPathError::PathEscapesBoundary { .. })
            | Err(StrictPathError::PathResolutionError { .. }) => {
                // Expected: treated as absolute/escaping and rejected.
            }
            Ok(p) => panic!("strict_join MUST NOT accept forward-slash absolute path: {p:?}"),
            Err(other) => panic!("Unexpected error variant: {other:?}"),
        }
    }
}

#[test]
fn test_cve_2025_11001_relative_traversal_blocked() {
    let attack = MaliciousZipStructure::new_relative_traversal_attack();

    let extraction_dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let extraction_sandbox: PathBoundary =
        PathBoundary::try_new_create(extraction_dir.path()).unwrap();

    // Create top-level directory
    let top_dir_path = extraction_sandbox.strict_join(&attack.top_dir).unwrap();
    top_dir_path.create_dir().unwrap();

    // Attempt to validate symlink target with relative traversal
    let symlink_target_result = extraction_sandbox.strict_join(&attack.symlink_target);

    // SECURITY GUARANTEE: Relative traversal is rejected
    assert!(
        symlink_target_result.is_err(),
        "strict-path MUST reject relative path traversal"
    );

    match symlink_target_result {
        Err(StrictPathError::PathEscapesBoundary { attempted_path, .. }) => {
            // Verify the error identifies the traversal attempt
            let path_str = attempted_path.to_string_lossy();
            assert!(
                path_str.contains("..") || path_str.contains("sensitive"),
                "Error should reference the attempted traversal: {path_str}"
            );
        }
        Err(StrictPathError::PathResolutionError { .. }) => {
            // Also acceptable - non-existent path
        }
        Ok(_) => panic!("strict_join MUST NOT accept path with parent directory components"),
        Err(other) => panic!("Unexpected error variant: {other:?}"),
    }
}

#[test]
fn test_cve_2025_11001_unc_path_attack_blocked() {
    // CVE-2025-11002 involves UNC path symlinks for network targets
    let unc_targets = vec![
        "\\\\malicious-server\\share\\payload.exe",
        "\\\\192.168.1.100\\c$\\Windows\\System32",
        "//network-share/sensitive/data.db",
    ];

    let extraction_dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let extraction_sandbox: PathBoundary =
        PathBoundary::try_new_create(extraction_dir.path()).unwrap();

    for unc_path in unc_targets {
        let result = extraction_sandbox.strict_join(unc_path);

        // SECURITY GUARANTEE: UNC paths are rejected
        assert!(
            result.is_err(),
            "strict-path MUST reject UNC path: {unc_path}"
        );

        match result {
            Err(StrictPathError::PathEscapesBoundary { .. })
            | Err(StrictPathError::PathResolutionError { .. }) => {
                // Expected - UNC paths are absolute and/or escape the boundary
            }
            Ok(_) => panic!("strict_join MUST NOT accept UNC path: {unc_path}"),
            Err(other) => panic!("Unexpected error for UNC path '{unc_path}': {other:?}"),
        }
    }
}

#[test]
fn test_cve_2025_11001_mixed_encoding_attack_blocked() {
    // Test URL-encoded traversal attempts (mentioned in the article)
    let encoded_attacks = vec![
        "..%2F..%2F..%2FUsers%2FPublic",
        "..%5C..%5C..%5CWindows%5CSystem32",
        "%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd", // Unix-style for completeness
    ];

    let extraction_dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let extraction_sandbox: PathBoundary =
        PathBoundary::try_new_create(extraction_dir.path()).unwrap();

    for encoded_path in encoded_attacks {
        let result = extraction_sandbox.strict_join(encoded_path);

        // Note: URL decoding is typically done at a higher layer (ZIP library)
        // strict-path handles the decoded path. This test verifies that even
        // if URL-encoded paths slip through, the literal strings are contained
        match result {
            Ok(validated_path) => {
                // If accepted (literal percent signs), verify containment
                assert!(
                    validated_path.strictpath_starts_with(extraction_sandbox.interop_path()),
                    "Even literal encoded string must stay within boundary"
                );
            }
            Err(StrictPathError::PathEscapesBoundary { .. })
            | Err(StrictPathError::PathResolutionError { .. }) => {
                // Also acceptable - rejected as traversal
            }
            Err(other) => panic!("Unexpected error for encoded path '{encoded_path}': {other:?}"),
        }
    }
}