stochastic-routing-extended 1.0.2

SRX (Stochastic Routing eXtended) — a next-generation VPN protocol with stochastic routing, DPI evasion, post-quantum cryptography, and multi-transport channel splitting
Documentation
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//! Hybrid PQC/ECDH handshake protocol.
//!
//! Wire format v1 (each message): `SRXH` (4) ‖ version (1) ‖ msg_type (1) ‖ payload_len (4 BE) ‖ payload.
//!
//! Flow (3 messages):
//! 1. **ClientHello** — timestamp + session nonce.
//! 2. **ServerHello** — server [`HybridPublicKey`](crate::crypto::HybridPublicKey), optionally ‖ **Ed25519**
//!    signature over `SHA256(client_hello_wire ‖ hybrid_pk_bytes)` when using
//!    [`Handshake::new_responder_with_identity`] / [`Handshake::new_initiator_trust_server`].
//! 3. **ClientFinished** — [`EncapsulatedKey`](crate::crypto::EncapsulatedKey); server decapsulates to `K_master`.

use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};

use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, Verifier};
use rand::Rng;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};

pub use ed25519_dalek::{SigningKey, VerifyingKey};

use crate::crypto::kem::{EncapsulatedKey, HybridKem, HybridKeypair, HybridPublicKey};
use crate::error::Result;
use crate::error::{SessionError, SrxError};

const MAGIC: &[u8; 4] = b"SRXH";
const VERSION: u8 = 1;

const MSG_CLIENT_HELLO: u8 = 1;
const MSG_SERVER_HELLO: u8 = 2;
const MSG_CLIENT_FINISHED: u8 = 3;

const NONCE_LEN: usize = 16;

const ED25519_SIG_LEN: usize = 64;

/// Role of this endpoint in the handshake.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum HandshakeRole {
    Initiator,
    Responder,
}

/// Drives the handshake protocol for session establishment.
pub struct Handshake {
    role: HandshakeRole,
    state: HandshakeState,
    /// Responder-only: keypair until [`Handshake::server_finish`].
    server_kp: Option<HybridKeypair>,
    /// Both sides after completion.
    master_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
    /// Responder: optional long-term Ed25519 key to sign `ServerHello`.
    server_identity: Option<SigningKey>,
    /// Initiator: optional pinned server Ed25519 public key.
    trusted_server: Option<VerifyingKey>,
    /// Responder: raw `ClientHello` bytes (for signing transcript).
    client_hello_wire: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    /// Initiator: raw `ClientHello` bytes we sent (for verifying transcript).
    initiator_client_hello: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}

#[derive(Debug)]
enum HandshakeState {
    Initial,
    AwaitingServerHello,
    AwaitingClientFinished,
    Completed,
}

fn transcript_digest(client_hello_wire: &[u8], hybrid_pk_bytes: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
    let mut h = Sha256::new();
    h.update(client_hello_wire);
    h.update(hybrid_pk_bytes);
    h.finalize().into()
}

fn parse_server_hello_payload(
    data: &[u8],
    expect_sig: bool,
) -> Result<(HybridPublicKey, Option<Signature>)> {
    if data.len() < 2 {
        return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
            "ServerHello payload too short".into(),
        )));
    }
    let kyber_len = u16::from_be_bytes([data[0], data[1]]) as usize;
    let pk_len = 2 + kyber_len + 32;
    if data.len() < pk_len {
        return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
            "ServerHello hybrid key truncated".into(),
        )));
    }
    if data.len() == pk_len {
        if expect_sig {
            return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
                "missing Ed25519 server signature".into(),
            )));
        }
        let pk = HybridPublicKey::from_bytes(&data[..pk_len])?;
        return Ok((pk, None));
    }
    if data.len() == pk_len + ED25519_SIG_LEN {
        let pk = HybridPublicKey::from_bytes(&data[..pk_len])?;
        let sig = Signature::try_from(&data[pk_len..]).map_err(|_| {
            SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
                "invalid Ed25519 signature bytes".into(),
            ))
        })?;
        return Ok((pk, Some(sig)));
    }
    Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
        "bad ServerHello payload length".into(),
    )))
}

impl Handshake {
    /// Create a new handshake initiator (client side).
    pub fn new_initiator() -> Self {
        Self {
            role: HandshakeRole::Initiator,
            state: HandshakeState::Initial,
            server_kp: None,
            master_secret: None,
            server_identity: None,
            trusted_server: None,
            client_hello_wire: None,
            initiator_client_hello: None,
        }
    }

    /// Initiator that verifies [`ServerHello`] using a pinned Ed25519 server public key.
    pub fn new_initiator_trust_server(trusted_server: VerifyingKey) -> Self {
        Self {
            role: HandshakeRole::Initiator,
            state: HandshakeState::Initial,
            server_kp: None,
            master_secret: None,
            server_identity: None,
            trusted_server: Some(trusted_server),
            client_hello_wire: None,
            initiator_client_hello: None,
        }
    }

    /// Create a new handshake responder (server side).
    pub fn new_responder() -> Self {
        Self {
            role: HandshakeRole::Responder,
            state: HandshakeState::Initial,
            server_kp: None,
            master_secret: None,
            server_identity: None,
            trusted_server: None,
            client_hello_wire: None,
            initiator_client_hello: None,
        }
    }

    /// Responder that signs `ServerHello` with a long-term Ed25519 key (hybrid KEM pk is still ephemeral).
    pub fn new_responder_with_identity(server_identity: SigningKey) -> Self {
        Self {
            role: HandshakeRole::Responder,
            state: HandshakeState::Initial,
            server_kp: None,
            master_secret: None,
            server_identity: Some(server_identity),
            trusted_server: None,
            client_hello_wire: None,
            initiator_client_hello: None,
        }
    }

    /// Role of this instance.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn role(&self) -> HandshakeRole {
        self.role
    }

    /// `K_master` after a successful exchange ([`None`] until then).
    #[must_use]
    pub fn master_secret(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
        self.master_secret
    }

    /// Generate **ClientHello** (initiator only).
    pub fn client_hello(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
        if self.role != HandshakeRole::Initiator {
            return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
                "only initiator sends ClientHello".into(),
            )));
        }
        match self.state {
            HandshakeState::Initial => {}
            _ => {
                return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
                    "invalid initiator state for ClientHello".into(),
                )));
            }
        }

        let timestamp = SystemTime::now()
            .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
            .map(|d| d.as_secs())
            .unwrap_or(0);

        let mut nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
        rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut nonce);

        let mut payload = Vec::with_capacity(8 + NONCE_LEN);
        payload.extend_from_slice(&timestamp.to_be_bytes());
        payload.extend_from_slice(&nonce);

        let wire = encode_msg(MSG_CLIENT_HELLO, &payload);
        self.initiator_client_hello = Some(wire.clone());
        self.state = HandshakeState::AwaitingServerHello;
        Ok(wire)
    }

    /// Process **ClientHello** and return **ServerHello** (responder only).
    pub fn server_hello(&mut self, client_hello: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
        if self.role != HandshakeRole::Responder {
            return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
                "only responder handles ClientHello".into(),
            )));
        }
        match self.state {
            HandshakeState::Initial => {}
            _ => {
                return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
                    "invalid responder state for server_hello".into(),
                )));
            }
        }

        let _payload = decode_msg(MSG_CLIENT_HELLO, client_hello)?;
        self.client_hello_wire = Some(client_hello.to_vec());

        let server_kp = HybridKem::generate_keypair();
        let pk_bytes = server_kp.public.to_bytes();

        self.server_kp = Some(server_kp);
        self.state = HandshakeState::AwaitingClientFinished;

        let payload = if let Some(ref sk) = self.server_identity {
            let ch = self.client_hello_wire.as_ref().ok_or_else(|| {
                SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
                    "client hello wire missing".into(),
                ))
            })?;
            let digest = transcript_digest(ch, &pk_bytes);
            let sig = sk.sign(&digest);
            let mut p = pk_bytes;
            p.extend_from_slice(&sig.to_bytes());
            p
        } else {
            pk_bytes
        };

        Ok(encode_msg(MSG_SERVER_HELLO, &payload))
    }

    /// Process **ServerHello** and return **ClientFinished** bytes (initiator only).
    pub fn finalize(&mut self, server_hello: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
        if self.role != HandshakeRole::Initiator {
            return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
                "only initiator calls finalize".into(),
            )));
        }
        match self.state {
            HandshakeState::AwaitingServerHello => {}
            _ => {
                return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
                    "initiator not awaiting ServerHello".into(),
                )));
            }
        }

        let raw = decode_msg(MSG_SERVER_HELLO, server_hello)?;
        let expect_sig = self.trusted_server.is_some();
        let (server_pk, sig) = parse_server_hello_payload(raw, expect_sig)?;

        if let Some(ref vk) = self.trusted_server {
            let sig = sig.ok_or_else(|| {
                SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
                    "server signature missing".into(),
                ))
            })?;
            let ch = self.initiator_client_hello.as_ref().ok_or_else(|| {
                SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
                    "client hello wire missing".into(),
                ))
            })?;
            let digest = transcript_digest(ch, &server_pk.to_bytes());
            vk.verify(&digest, &sig).map_err(|_| {
                SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
                    "Ed25519 server signature verification failed".into(),
                ))
            })?;
        } else if sig.is_some() {
            return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
                "unexpected server signature (no pinned server key)".into(),
            )));
        }

        let (encap, master) = HybridKem::encapsulate(&server_pk)?;
        self.master_secret = Some(master);
        self.state = HandshakeState::Completed;

        let fin = encap.to_bytes();
        Ok(encode_msg(MSG_CLIENT_FINISHED, &fin))
    }

    /// Process **ClientFinished** and derive `K_master` (responder only).
    pub fn server_finish(&mut self, client_finished: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
        if self.role != HandshakeRole::Responder {
            return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
                "only responder calls server_finish".into(),
            )));
        }
        match self.state {
            HandshakeState::AwaitingClientFinished => {}
            _ => {
                return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
                    "responder not awaiting ClientFinished".into(),
                )));
            }
        }

        let enc_raw = decode_msg(MSG_CLIENT_FINISHED, client_finished)?;
        let encap = EncapsulatedKey::from_bytes(enc_raw)?;

        let mut server_kp = self.server_kp.take().ok_or_else(|| {
            SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
                "server keypair missing".into(),
            ))
        })?;

        let master = HybridKem::decapsulate(&mut server_kp, &encap)?;
        self.master_secret = Some(master);
        self.server_kp = None;
        self.state = HandshakeState::Completed;
        Ok(())
    }
}

fn encode_msg(msg_type: u8, payload: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
    let mut v = Vec::with_capacity(4 + 1 + 1 + 4 + payload.len());
    v.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
    v.push(VERSION);
    v.push(msg_type);
    v.extend_from_slice(&(payload.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
    v.extend_from_slice(payload);
    v
}

fn decode_msg(expected_type: u8, data: &[u8]) -> Result<&[u8]> {
    if data.len() < 10 {
        return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
            "message too short".into(),
        )));
    }
    if data[..4] != *MAGIC {
        return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
            "bad magic".into(),
        )));
    }
    if data[4] != VERSION {
        return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
            "bad version".into(),
        )));
    }
    if data[5] != expected_type {
        return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
            "unexpected message type".into(),
        )));
    }
    let len = u32::from_be_bytes(data[6..10].try_into().expect("len")) as usize;
    if data.len() != 10 + len {
        return Err(SrxError::Session(SessionError::HandshakeFailed(
            "length mismatch".into(),
        )));
    }
    Ok(&data[10..])
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use rand::Rng;

    fn random_signing_key() -> SigningKey {
        let mut seed = [0u8; 32];
        rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut seed);
        SigningKey::from_bytes(&seed)
    }

    #[test]
    fn full_handshake_matches_master_secret() {
        let mut client = Handshake::new_initiator();
        let mut server = Handshake::new_responder();

        let ch = client.client_hello().unwrap();
        let sh = server.server_hello(&ch).unwrap();
        let cf = client.finalize(&sh).unwrap();
        server.server_finish(&cf).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(
            client.master_secret().expect("client master"),
            server.master_secret().expect("server master")
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn signed_server_hello_roundtrip() {
        let sk = random_signing_key();
        let vk = sk.verifying_key();

        let mut client = Handshake::new_initiator_trust_server(vk);
        let mut server = Handshake::new_responder_with_identity(sk);

        let ch = client.client_hello().unwrap();
        let sh = server.server_hello(&ch).unwrap();
        let cf = client.finalize(&sh).unwrap();
        server.server_finish(&cf).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(
            client.master_secret().expect("client master"),
            server.master_secret().expect("server master")
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn wrong_server_identity_fails() {
        let sk = random_signing_key();
        let other = random_signing_key();

        let mut client = Handshake::new_initiator_trust_server(other.verifying_key());
        let mut server = Handshake::new_responder_with_identity(sk);

        let ch = client.client_hello().unwrap();
        let sh = server.server_hello(&ch).unwrap();
        assert!(client.finalize(&sh).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn wrong_message_type_fails() {
        let mut client = Handshake::new_initiator();
        let ch = client.client_hello().unwrap();
        let bad = {
            let mut m = ch.clone();
            if m.len() > 5 {
                m[5] = 99;
            }
            m
        };
        let mut server = Handshake::new_responder();
        assert!(server.server_hello(&bad).is_err());
    }
}