# stdio2http
[](https://crates.io/crates/stdio2http)
[](https://docs.rs/stdio2http)
[](https://github.com/mimi1vx/stdio2http/actions)
[](LICENSE-MIT)
Re-exposes a **stdio-only MCP server** over **MCP Streamable HTTP**, so HTTP
clients on a container network can use a server that ships no HTTP transport.
It spawns the stdio server as a single long-lived child process and bridges to
it with [`rmcp`](https://crates.io/crates/rmcp). Session ids, `Mcp-Session-Id`,
SSE framing, `Last-Event-ID`, content negotiation, and protocol negotiation are
all handled by rmcp — none of that is reimplemented here.
```text
┌──────────────────────────────┐
HTTP client ──────▶│ /mcp StreamableHttpService │
│ (rmcp owns sessions) │
└───────────────┬──────────────┘
│ ServerHandler::call_tool, list_tools, …
┌─────────▼──────────┐
│ ProxyHandler │
└─────────┬──────────┘
│ rmcp client Peer (Arc, shared)
┌─────────▼──────────┐
│ stdio MCP child │
│ (TokioChildProcess)│
└────────────────────┘
```
One child serves every HTTP session: the service factory clones the `Arc<Peer>`,
so all sessions multiplex over the same process by JSON-RPC request id.
## Installation
```sh
cargo install stdio2http
```
For a reproducible build pinned to the lockfile:
```sh
cargo install --locked stdio2http
```
## Build and run
```sh
cargo build --release
./target/release/stdio2http --command <program> [--arg <arg> ...]
```
In a container:
```sh
docker build -t stdio2http .
docker run --rm -p 8080:8080 stdio2http \
--command node \
--arg /app/dist/server.js \
--arg --stdio
```
> **The upstream runtime must exist in the image.** `stdio2http` spawns the
> upstream as a child process, so whatever interpreter it needs — node, python,
> go, bun — must be installed in your image too. The proxy binary alone cannot
> spawn a server that has no interpreter.
Verify it is up:
```sh
curl -fsS localhost:8080/healthz # -> ok
```
Then point any Streamable HTTP MCP client at `http://<host>:8080/mcp`
(or `https://<host>:8080/mcp` when TLS is configured — see below).
## Configuration
Flags and environment variables, no config file. Every flag has a matching
`STDIO2HTTP_*` variable; flags win over the environment.
| `--command` | `STDIO2HTTP_COMMAND` | *required* | Program to spawn |
| `--arg` | `STDIO2HTTP_ARGS` | — | Argument for the child; repeat per argument |
| `--child-env` | `STDIO2HTTP_CHILD_ENV` | — | `KEY=VALUE` for the child; repeat |
| `--cwd` | `STDIO2HTTP_CWD` | inherit | Working directory for the child |
| `--host` | `STDIO2HTTP_HOST` | `127.0.0.1` | Bind address |
| `--port` | `STDIO2HTTP_PORT` | `8080` | Bind port (`0` picks an ephemeral one) |
| `--mcp-path` | `STDIO2HTTP_MCP_PATH` | `/mcp` | Where the transport is mounted |
| `--allowed-host` | `STDIO2HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS` | loopback only | Accepted `Host` values; repeat, comma-separated |
| `--allowed-origin` | `STDIO2HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` | unset | Accepted `Origin` values; repeat, comma-separated |
| `--auth-mode` | `STDIO2HTTP_AUTH_MODE` | `none` | `none`, `bearer`, or `identity-forward` |
| `--api-key` | `STDIO2HTTP_API_KEYS` | — | `KEY` or `KEY=SUBJECT`; repeat, comma-separated |
| `--log-level` | `STDIO2HTTP_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | `error`, `warn`, `info`, `debug`, `trace` |
| `--init-timeout-ms` | `STDIO2HTTP_INIT_TIMEOUT_MS` | `10000` | Budget for spawn plus handshake |
| `--disable-allowed-hosts` | `STDIO2HTTP_DISABLE_ALLOWED_HOSTS` | `false` | Accept every `Host` header |
| `--tls-cert` | `STDIO2HTTP_TLS_CERT` | — | Server cert chain (PEM file); pairs with `--tls-key` |
| `--tls-key` | `STDIO2HTTP_TLS_KEY` | — | Server private key (PEM file); pairs with `--tls-cert` |
| `--tls-cert-pem` | `STDIO2HTTP_TLS_CERT_PEM` | — | Inline server cert PEM; exclusive with `--tls-cert` |
| `--tls-key-pem` | `STDIO2HTTP_TLS_KEY_PEM` | — | Inline server key PEM; exclusive with `--tls-key` |
| `--tls-client-ca` | `STDIO2HTTP_TLS_CLIENT_CA` | — | Client CA bundle (PEM file); enables mTLS |
| `--tls-client-ca-pem` | `STDIO2HTTP_TLS_CLIENT_CA_PEM` | — | Inline client CA PEM; exclusive with `--tls-client-ca` |
| `--acme-email` | `STDIO2HTTP_ACME_EMAIL` | — | Contact email for the ACME account |
| `--acme-domain` | `STDIO2HTTP_ACME_DOMAINS` | — | Domain to issue for; repeat or comma-separate |
| `--acme-cache-dir` | `STDIO2HTTP_ACME_CACHE_DIR` | — | Dir holding the ACME account + cert cache |
| `--acme-directory-url` | `STDIO2HTTP_ACME_DIRECTORY_URL` | LE prod | ACME directory URL; staging override for tests |
| `--acme-http-port` | `STDIO2HTTP_ACME_HTTP_PORT` | `80` | Port for the ACME HTTP-01 challenge listener |
A concrete example:
```sh
docker run --rm -p 8080:8080 stdio2http \
--command /usr/local/bin/some-mcp-server \
--child-env SOME_TOKEN=abc123 \
--host 0.0.0.0 \
--allowed-host internal.svc \
--allowed-origin https://console.example.com \
--auth-mode identity-forward \
--api-key 'alice-key=alice' \
--api-key 'bob-key=bob'
```
### Host validation
rmcp defaults `allowed_hosts` to loopback only, to prevent DNS rebinding against
a locally running server. **A deployment reachable off-host must set
`--allowed-host`** (repeatable) or requests are rejected. `--disable-allowed-hosts`
removes the check entirely; use it only when a trusted proxy in front already
validates the header.
## Authentication
`--auth-mode` selects one of three modes. The layer covers `/mcp` only:
`/healthz` stays open. Keys are compared in
constant time, and no configured or presented key is ever logged.
### `none`
No authentication. Callers are anonymous.
### `bearer`
Require a matching key, presented either way:
```http
Authorization: Bearer <key>
X-API-Key: <key>
```
A missing key and a wrong key produce the identical `401` with
`WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="mcp"`, so the response reveals nothing about
which keys exist. The upstream sees no caller identity.
### `identity-forward`
Verify exactly as in `bearer`, then attach the caller's subject to every
forwarded request as a namespaced `_meta` key:
```json
{ "params": { "_meta": { "io.stdio2http/caller": "alice" } } }
```
Write `--api-key 'KEY=SUBJECT'` to name the caller. With a bare `--api-key KEY`,
the key itself becomes the subject — which means **the secret is forwarded to the
upstream**; prefer the `KEY=SUBJECT` form.
The upstream server must actually read that key to act on it. If it does not,
this mode degrades to `bearer`: authenticated, but the child cannot tell callers
apart.
## TLS / HTTPS
Without TLS flags the listener speaks plain HTTP. Set any TLS input — a
manual cert, ACME, or a client CA — and the same `host:port` speaks HTTPS
only: plain-HTTP clients on that port fail at the TLS handshake; nothing is
redirected. Startup logs the certificate subject, expiry, and SHA-256
fingerprint plus `mtls`/`acme` flags. Key material is never logged.
Flag combinations are validated at startup: cert and key must pair, file and
inline sources are mutually exclusive per side, manual certs cannot be
combined with ACME, and mTLS needs a server certificate or ACME.
### Manual certificate (files)
```sh
stdio2http --command /usr/local/bin/some-mcp-server \
--tls-cert /certs/fullchain.pem \
--tls-key /certs/privkey.pem
```
Verify:
```sh
curl -k https://localhost:8080/healthz # -> ok
```
### Inline certificate (secret injection)
For orchestrators that inject secrets as environment variables rather than
files, pass the PEM bodies directly. Values start with `-----BEGIN`, so on
the CLI use the `=` form — a space-separated value would parse as a flag —
or set the environment variables:
```sh
stdio2http --command /usr/local/bin/some-mcp-server \
--tls-cert-pem="$(cat /run/secrets/fullchain.pem)" \
--tls-key-pem="$(cat /run/secrets/privkey.pem)"
```
```sh
export STDIO2HTTP_TLS_CERT_PEM="$(cat /run/secrets/fullchain.pem)"
export STDIO2HTTP_TLS_KEY_PEM="$(cat /run/secrets/privkey.pem)"
```
### mTLS (client certificates)
Pass a client CA bundle to require and verify client certificates:
```sh
stdio2http --command /usr/local/bin/some-mcp-server \
--tls-cert /certs/fullchain.pem \
--tls-key /certs/privkey.pem \
--tls-client-ca /certs/client-ca.pem
```
Verification happens at the TLS handshake, so it covers every path —
`/healthz` included, not just `/mcp`. Kubernetes probes must therefore
present a client certificate too:
```sh
curl -k --cert /certs/probe.pem --key /certs/probe-key.pem \
https://localhost:8080/healthz # -> ok
```
`--auth-mode` applies unchanged on top of mTLS (defense in depth). If
per-path verification matters — open `/healthz`, authenticated `/mcp` —
terminate mTLS at a reverse proxy instead.
### ACME auto-issuance
Zero-touch certificates via HTTP-01. Requires a binary built with the
`acme` cargo feature (`cargo build --features acme`); without it, startup
bails telling you to rebuild:
```sh
stdio2http --command /usr/local/bin/some-mcp-server --host 0.0.0.0 \
--acme-email ops@example.com \
--acme-domain mcp.example.com \
--acme-cache-dir /var/lib/stdio2http/acme
```
The HTTP-01 challenge listener binds `0.0.0.0:<acme-http-port>` (default
`80`) for the process lifetime, so that port must be reachable from the
internet. Certificates renew below 30 days of expiry (plus up to 6h of jitter),
and the cache dir (created `0700`, files `0600`) lets restarts reuse the
account and certificate instead of re-issuing. While testing, point at the
staging directory to stay clear of rate limits:
```sh
--acme-directory-url https://acme-staging-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory
```
### Reverse proxy instead
If you prefer termination in front, run the proxy itself without TLS flags
and let the proxy handle certificates. Caddy:
```caddy
mcp.example.com {
reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8080
}
```
Minimal nginx:
```nginx
server {
listen 443 ssl;
server_name mcp.example.com;
ssl_certificate /etc/ssl/fullchain.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /etc/ssl/privkey.pem;
location / {
proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8080;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
}
}
```
## Limitations
These are deliberate and load-bearing.
1. **TLS is opt-in per listener.** Without TLS flags the proxy speaks plain
HTTP — run it behind a terminating proxy or on a trusted network. An API
key crossing an untrusted network in cleartext is an API key in the wrong
hands. With a certificate (manual or ACME) configured, that `host:port`
speaks HTTPS only. Remaining caveats: mTLS verification is
handshake-wide, so `/healthz` also requires a client cert; ACME only does
HTTP-01 on `--acme-http-port`; there is no dual HTTP+HTTPS listener.
2. **Shared upstream state.** One child serves every caller, so any state it
keeps per connection is shared across all HTTP callers. Fine for a
single-tenant container; not a multi-tenant boundary.
3. **Identity is advisory, not isolation.** Identity reaches the child as
`_meta` on a request, not as process isolation or per-caller environment
variables. A child that ignores the key cannot tell callers apart, and a
malicious caller controls the `_meta` it sends.
## Known gap: notifications and server→client requests do not forward
The bridge proxies requests and responses. Anything the **upstream initiates** has
no path back to the HTTP client:
- `progress` — long-running tools appear to hang with no progress reporting
- `notifications/tools/list_changed` and the other list-changed notifications
- `logging/message`
- server→client requests: `sampling/createMessage`, `elicitation/create`, `roots/list`
In practice: a long-running tool call will complete, but the client sees no
progress events while it runs. A tool that calls `sampling` will fail. If your
upstream depends on any of these, `stdio2http` is the wrong tool — a bridge that
handles these explicitly is a different design.
## Operational behavior
- **A child that fails to start is fatal.** `stdio2http` exits non-zero; it does not restart the
child. If the child dies later, calls fail with an opaque `internal_error`
and the proxy still does not restart it. Let your orchestrator handle it.
- **`SIGTERM`/`SIGINT` shut down gracefully**, within about a second, and reap
the child. Container stop signals work as expected.
- **Startup logs** the child pid, upstream name and version, negotiated protocol
version, and tool count. Upstream failures are logged locally and returned to
the client as an opaque `internal_error` — the child's stderr and this
process's environment never reach an HTTP caller.
## Development
```sh
cargo test # unit + end-to-end
cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
```
The end-to-end tests build and spawn a deterministic fixture MCP server from
`tests/fixtures/mock-mcp-server/`, so `cargo test` needs no network access.
Dependencies update via weekly grouped Dependabot PRs (`cargo` +
`github-actions` + `docker`, see `.github/dependabot.yml`); merge bar is
green CI, with the `rmcp` streamable-feature check noted in `AGENTS.md`.
### Release
Releases are automated by release-plz (`.github/workflows/release.yml`):
merge to `main`, then merge the `release-pr` bot's version-bump PR —
publishing to crates.io and the GitHub Release happen automatically.
Registry auth is OIDC Trusted Publishing — no long-lived secrets.
Once the crate exists, it lists this repo + workflow as a trusted
publisher (`crates.io/crates/stdio2http/settings`); the `release` job
mints a short-lived token via `rust-lang/crates.io-auth-action`.
crates.io has no "pending publisher" for new crates, so the `0.1.0`
bootstrap is one manual `cargo publish` (after `cargo login`) plus
adding the trusted publisher; everything after that is OIDC.
## License
Dual-licensed under MIT OR Apache-2.0. © 2026 Ondřej Súkup.