stdio2http 0.1.0

MCP stdio -> Streamable HTTP proxy
Documentation

stdio2http

crates.io docs.rs CI license

Re-exposes a stdio-only MCP server over MCP Streamable HTTP, so HTTP clients on a container network can use a server that ships no HTTP transport.

It spawns the stdio server as a single long-lived child process and bridges to it with rmcp. Session ids, Mcp-Session-Id, SSE framing, Last-Event-ID, content negotiation, and protocol negotiation are all handled by rmcp — none of that is reimplemented here.

                    ┌──────────────────────────────┐
 HTTP client  ──────▶│ /mcp  StreamableHttpService  │
                    │      (rmcp owns sessions)     │
                    └───────────────┬──────────────┘
                                    │ ServerHandler::call_tool, list_tools, …
                          ┌─────────▼──────────┐
                          │   ProxyHandler     │
                          └─────────┬──────────┘
                                    │ rmcp client Peer (Arc, shared)
                          ┌─────────▼──────────┐
                          │ stdio MCP child    │
                          │ (TokioChildProcess)│
                          └────────────────────┘

One child serves every HTTP session: the service factory clones the Arc<Peer>, so all sessions multiplex over the same process by JSON-RPC request id.

Installation

cargo install stdio2http

For a reproducible build pinned to the lockfile:

cargo install --locked stdio2http

Build and run

cargo build --release
./target/release/stdio2http --command <program> [--arg <arg> ...]

In a container:

docker build -t stdio2http .

docker run --rm -p 8080:8080 stdio2http \
  --command node \
  --arg /app/dist/server.js \
  --arg --stdio

The upstream runtime must exist in the image. stdio2http spawns the upstream as a child process, so whatever interpreter it needs — node, python, go, bun — must be installed in your image too. The proxy binary alone cannot spawn a server that has no interpreter.

Verify it is up:

curl -fsS localhost:8080/healthz   # -> ok

Then point any Streamable HTTP MCP client at http://<host>:8080/mcp.

Configuration

Flags and environment variables, no config file. Every flag has a matching STDIO2HTTP_* variable; flags win over the environment.

Flag Env Default Meaning
--command STDIO2HTTP_COMMAND required Program to spawn
--arg STDIO2HTTP_ARGS — Argument for the child; repeat per argument
--child-env STDIO2HTTP_CHILD_ENV — KEY=VALUE for the child; repeat
--cwd STDIO2HTTP_CWD inherit Working directory for the child
--host STDIO2HTTP_HOST 127.0.0.1 Bind address
--port STDIO2HTTP_PORT 8080 Bind port (0 picks an ephemeral one)
--mcp-path STDIO2HTTP_MCP_PATH /mcp Where the transport is mounted
--allowed-host STDIO2HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS loopback only Accepted Host values; repeat, comma-separated
--allowed-origin STDIO2HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS unset Accepted Origin values; repeat, comma-separated
--auth-mode STDIO2HTTP_AUTH_MODE none none, bearer, or identity-forward
--api-key STDIO2HTTP_API_KEYS — KEY or KEY=SUBJECT; repeat, comma-separated
--log-level STDIO2HTTP_LOG_LEVEL info error, warn, info, debug, trace
--init-timeout-ms STDIO2HTTP_INIT_TIMEOUT_MS 10000 Budget for spawn plus handshake
--disable-allowed-hosts STDIO2HTTP_DISABLE_ALLOWED_HOSTS false Accept every Host header

A concrete example:

docker run --rm -p 8080:8080 stdio2http \
  --command /usr/local/bin/some-mcp-server \
  --child-env SOME_TOKEN=abc123 \
  --host 0.0.0.0 \
  --allowed-host internal.svc \
  --allowed-origin https://console.example.com \
  --auth-mode identity-forward \
  --api-key 'alice-key=alice' \
  --api-key 'bob-key=bob'

Host validation

rmcp defaults allowed_hosts to loopback only, to prevent DNS rebinding against a locally running server. A deployment reachable off-host must set --allowed-host (repeatable) or requests are rejected. --disable-allowed-hosts removes the check entirely; use it only when a trusted proxy in front already validates the header.

Authentication

--auth-mode selects one of three modes. The layer covers /mcp only: /healthz stays open. Keys are compared in constant time, and no configured or presented key is ever logged.

none

No authentication. Callers are anonymous.

bearer

Require a matching key, presented either way:

Authorization: Bearer <key>
X-API-Key: <key>

A missing key and a wrong key produce the identical 401 with WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="mcp", so the response reveals nothing about which keys exist. The upstream sees no caller identity.

identity-forward

Verify exactly as in bearer, then attach the caller's subject to every forwarded request as a namespaced _meta key:

{ "params": { "_meta": { "io.stdio2http/caller": "alice" } } }

Write --api-key 'KEY=SUBJECT' to name the caller. With a bare --api-key KEY, the key itself becomes the subject — which means the secret is forwarded to the upstream; prefer the KEY=SUBJECT form.

The upstream server must actually read that key to act on it. If it does not, this mode degrades to bearer: authenticated, but the child cannot tell callers apart.

Limitations

These are deliberate and load-bearing.

  1. No TLS. The proxy speaks plain HTTP. Run it behind a terminating proxy or on a trusted network. An API key crossing an untrusted network in cleartext is an API key in the wrong hands.
  2. Shared upstream state. One child serves every caller, so any state it keeps per connection is shared across all HTTP callers. Fine for a single-tenant container; not a multi-tenant boundary.
  3. Identity is advisory, not isolation. Identity reaches the child as _meta on a request, not as process isolation or per-caller environment variables. A child that ignores the key cannot tell callers apart, and a malicious caller controls the _meta it sends.

Known gap: notifications and server→client requests do not forward

The bridge proxies requests and responses. Anything the upstream initiates has no path back to the HTTP client:

  • progress — long-running tools appear to hang with no progress reporting
  • notifications/tools/list_changed and the other list-changed notifications
  • logging/message
  • server→client requests: sampling/createMessage, elicitation/create, roots/list

In practice: a long-running tool call will complete, but the client sees no progress events while it runs. A tool that calls sampling will fail. If your upstream depends on any of these, stdio2http is the wrong tool — a bridge that handles these explicitly is a different design.

Operational behavior

  • A child that fails to start is fatal. stdio2http exits non-zero; it does not restart the child. If the child dies later, calls fail with an opaque internal_error and the proxy still does not restart it. Let your orchestrator handle it.
  • SIGTERM/SIGINT shut down gracefully, within about a second, and reap the child. Container stop signals work as expected.
  • Startup logs the child pid, upstream name and version, negotiated protocol version, and tool count. Upstream failures are logged locally and returned to the client as an opaque internal_error — the child's stderr and this process's environment never reach an HTTP caller.

Development

cargo test          # unit + end-to-end
cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings

The end-to-end tests build and spawn a deterministic fixture MCP server from tests/fixtures/mock-mcp-server/, so cargo test needs no network access.

Release

Releases are automated by release-plz (.github/workflows/release.yml): merge to main, then merge the release-pr bot's version-bump PR — publishing to crates.io and the GitHub Release happen automatically.

Registry auth is OIDC Trusted Publishing — no long-lived secrets. Once the crate exists, it lists this repo + workflow as a trusted publisher (crates.io/crates/stdio2http/settings); the release job mints a short-lived token via rust-lang/crates.io-auth-action. crates.io has no "pending publisher" for new crates, so the 0.1.0 bootstrap is one manual cargo publish (after cargo login) plus adding the trusted publisher; everything after that is OIDC.

License

Dual-licensed under MIT OR Apache-2.0. © 2026 Ondřej Súkup.