stateset-crypto 0.8.1

VES v1.0 cryptographic operations for StateSet Commerce
Documentation
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//! Payload encryption per VES-ENC-1
//!
//! - AES-256-GCM for payload encryption
//! - X25519 ECDH + HKDF + AES-256-GCM for key wrapping

use std::collections::HashSet;

use aes_gcm::aead::Aead;
use aes_gcm::{Aes256Gcm, Key, KeyInit, Nonce};
use base64::Engine;
use hkdf::Hkdf;
use rand::RngCore;
use sha2::Sha256;
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey, StaticSecret};
use zeroize::Zeroizing;

use crate::CryptoError;
use crate::canonicalize::canonicalize_json;
use crate::hash::{
    PayloadAadParams, PayloadCipherParams, compute_payload_aad, compute_payload_cipher_hash,
    compute_payload_plain_hash, compute_recipients_hash,
};

const NONCE_SIZE: usize = 12;
const SALT_SIZE: usize = 16;
const KEY_SIZE: usize = 32;
const TAG_SIZE: usize = 16;
const ENC_VERSION: u64 = 1;
const AEAD_ALGORITHM: &str = "AES-256-GCM";
const HPKE_MODE: &str = "base";
const HPKE_KEM: &str = "X25519-HKDF-SHA256";
const HPKE_KDF: &str = "HKDF-SHA256";
const HPKE_AEAD: &str = "AES-256-GCM";

/// Recipient key for encryption
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct RecipientKey {
    /// Recipient key identifier
    pub kid: u32,
    /// 32-byte X25519 public key
    pub public_key: [u8; 32],
}

/// Result of payload encryption
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct EncryptionResult {
    /// The encrypted payload structure (serializable to JSON)
    pub payload_encrypted: serde_json::Value,
    /// 16-byte salt used
    pub salt: [u8; 16],
    /// 32-byte `payload_plain_hash`
    pub payload_plain_hash: [u8; 32],
    /// 32-byte `payload_cipher_hash`
    pub payload_cipher_hash: [u8; 32],
}

/// Encrypt payload per VES-ENC-1
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns an error if:
/// - No recipients are provided ([`CryptoError::NoRecipients`])
/// - The payload cannot be canonicalized ([`CryptoError::SerializationError`])
/// - Encryption or key wrapping fails ([`CryptoError::EncryptionError`], [`CryptoError::KeyWrapError`])
pub fn encrypt_payload(
    payload: &serde_json::Value,
    aad_params: &PayloadAadParams<'_>,
    recipient_keys: &[RecipientKey],
) -> Result<EncryptionResult, CryptoError> {
    if recipient_keys.is_empty() {
        return Err(CryptoError::NoRecipients);
    }
    validate_unique_recipient_kids(recipient_keys.iter().map(|recipient| recipient.kid))?;

    let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
    let b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;

    // Generate random values
    let mut salt = [0u8; SALT_SIZE];
    let mut dek = Zeroizing::new([0u8; KEY_SIZE]);
    let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; NONCE_SIZE];
    rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
    rng.fill_bytes(dek.as_mut());
    rng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce_bytes);

    // Compute payload_plain_hash with salt
    let payload_plain_hash = compute_payload_plain_hash(payload, Some(&salt))?;

    // Compute AAD with updated plain hash
    let updated_aad_params =
        PayloadAadParams { payload_plain_hash: &payload_plain_hash, ..*aad_params };
    let payload_aad = compute_payload_aad(&updated_aad_params)?;

    // Prepare plaintext: salt || JCS(payload)
    let canonical = canonicalize_json(payload)?;
    let mut plaintext = Vec::with_capacity(SALT_SIZE + canonical.len());
    plaintext.extend_from_slice(&salt);
    plaintext.extend_from_slice(canonical.as_bytes());

    // Encrypt with AES-256-GCM
    let key = Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from_slice(&*dek);
    let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new(key);
    let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);

    // Use aes_gcm with AAD
    let aead_payload = aes_gcm::aead::Payload { msg: &plaintext, aad: &payload_aad };
    let ciphertext_with_tag = cipher
        .encrypt(nonce, aead_payload)
        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::EncryptionError(e.to_string()))?;
    if ciphertext_with_tag.len() < TAG_SIZE {
        return Err(CryptoError::EncryptionError(
            "AES-GCM output shorter than authentication tag".to_string(),
        ));
    }

    // aes-gcm appends the tag to the ciphertext
    let ct_len = ciphertext_with_tag.len() - TAG_SIZE;
    let ciphertext = &ciphertext_with_tag[..ct_len];
    let tag = &ciphertext_with_tag[ct_len..];

    // Wrap DEK for each recipient
    let mut recipients = Vec::with_capacity(recipient_keys.len());
    for rk in recipient_keys {
        let (enc, wrapped_key) = wrap_dek(&dek, &rk.public_key, &payload_aad)?;
        recipients.push(serde_json::json!({
            "recipient_kid": rk.kid,
            "enc_b64u": b64.encode(&enc),
            "ct_b64u": b64.encode(&wrapped_key),
        }));
    }

    // Sort by kid
    recipients.sort_by(|a, b| {
        let a_kid = a.get("recipient_kid").and_then(|v| v.as_u64()).unwrap_or(0);
        let b_kid = b.get("recipient_kid").and_then(|v| v.as_u64()).unwrap_or(0);
        a_kid.cmp(&b_kid)
    });

    // Compute recipients hash
    let recipients_hash = compute_recipients_hash(&recipients)?;

    // Compute payload_cipher_hash
    let cipher_params = PayloadCipherParams {
        nonce: &nonce_bytes,
        payload_aad: &payload_aad,
        ciphertext,
        tag,
        recipients_hash: &recipients_hash,
    };
    let payload_cipher_hash = compute_payload_cipher_hash(Some(&cipher_params));

    let payload_encrypted = serde_json::json!({
        "enc_version": ENC_VERSION,
        "aead": AEAD_ALGORITHM,
        "nonce_b64u": b64.encode(nonce_bytes),
        "ciphertext_b64u": b64.encode(ciphertext),
        "tag_b64u": b64.encode(tag),
        "hpke": {
            "mode": HPKE_MODE,
            "kem": HPKE_KEM,
            "kdf": HPKE_KDF,
            "aead": HPKE_AEAD
        },
        "recipients": recipients,
    });

    Ok(EncryptionResult { payload_encrypted, salt, payload_plain_hash, payload_cipher_hash })
}

/// Decrypt payload per VES-ENC-1
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns an error if:
/// - The recipient is not found ([`CryptoError::RecipientNotFound`])
/// - Decryption fails ([`CryptoError::DecryptionError`])
/// - The payload hash does not match ([`CryptoError::PayloadHashMismatch`])
pub fn decrypt_payload(
    payload_encrypted: &serde_json::Value,
    payload_aad: &[u8; 32],
    recipient_kid: u32,
    recipient_private_key: &[u8; 32],
    expected_plain_hash: &[u8; 32],
) -> Result<serde_json::Value, CryptoError> {
    let b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;

    // Fail fast on envelopes that do not match the declared implementation contract.
    let recipients = validate_encryption_envelope(payload_encrypted)?;

    let recipient = recipients
        .iter()
        .find(|r| r.get("recipient_kid").and_then(|v| v.as_u64()) == Some(u64::from(recipient_kid)))
        .ok_or(CryptoError::RecipientNotFound(recipient_kid))?;

    // Unwrap DEK
    let enc = b64
        .decode(
            recipient
                .get("enc_b64u")
                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
                .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::DecryptionError("Missing enc_b64u".to_string()))?,
        )
        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::DecryptionError(e.to_string()))?;

    let wrapped_key = b64
        .decode(
            recipient
                .get("ct_b64u")
                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
                .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::DecryptionError("Missing ct_b64u".to_string()))?,
        )
        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::DecryptionError(e.to_string()))?;

    if enc.len() != KEY_SIZE {
        return Err(CryptoError::DecryptionError(format!(
            "Invalid enc_b64u length: expected {KEY_SIZE}, got {}",
            enc.len()
        )));
    }

    let mut enc_arr = [0u8; 32];
    enc_arr.copy_from_slice(&enc);
    let dek = unwrap_dek(&enc_arr, &wrapped_key, recipient_private_key, payload_aad)?;

    // Decode encrypted payload
    let nonce_bytes = b64
        .decode(
            payload_encrypted
                .get("nonce_b64u")
                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
                .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::DecryptionError("Missing nonce_b64u".to_string()))?,
        )
        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::DecryptionError(e.to_string()))?;
    if nonce_bytes.len() != NONCE_SIZE {
        return Err(CryptoError::DecryptionError(format!(
            "Invalid nonce length: expected {NONCE_SIZE}, got {}",
            nonce_bytes.len()
        )));
    }

    let ciphertext = b64
        .decode(
            payload_encrypted.get("ciphertext_b64u").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).ok_or_else(|| {
                CryptoError::DecryptionError("Missing ciphertext_b64u".to_string())
            })?,
        )
        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::DecryptionError(e.to_string()))?;

    let tag = b64
        .decode(
            payload_encrypted
                .get("tag_b64u")
                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
                .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::DecryptionError("Missing tag_b64u".to_string()))?,
        )
        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::DecryptionError(e.to_string()))?;
    if tag.len() != TAG_SIZE {
        return Err(CryptoError::DecryptionError(format!(
            "Invalid tag length: expected {TAG_SIZE}, got {}",
            tag.len()
        )));
    }

    // Decrypt with AES-256-GCM
    let key = Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from_slice(&dek);
    let cipher_obj = Aes256Gcm::new(key);
    let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);

    // Reconstruct ciphertext+tag as aes-gcm expects
    let mut ct_with_tag = Vec::with_capacity(ciphertext.len() + tag.len());
    ct_with_tag.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext);
    ct_with_tag.extend_from_slice(&tag);

    let aead_payload = aes_gcm::aead::Payload { msg: &ct_with_tag, aad: payload_aad };
    let plaintext = cipher_obj
        .decrypt(nonce, aead_payload)
        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::DecryptionError(e.to_string()))?;

    // Extract salt and JSON
    if plaintext.len() < SALT_SIZE {
        return Err(CryptoError::DecryptionError("Plaintext too short".to_string()));
    }
    let salt: [u8; 16] = plaintext[..SALT_SIZE].try_into().map_err(|_| CryptoError::InvalidSalt)?;
    let json_bytes = &plaintext[SALT_SIZE..];
    let payload: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(json_bytes)
        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::DecryptionError(e.to_string()))?;

    // Verify payload_plain_hash
    let computed_hash = compute_payload_plain_hash(&payload, Some(&salt))?;
    if computed_hash.ct_eq(expected_plain_hash).unwrap_u8() == 0 {
        return Err(CryptoError::PayloadHashMismatch);
    }

    Ok(payload)
}

fn validate_unique_recipient_kids(
    recipient_kids: impl IntoIterator<Item = u32>,
) -> Result<(), CryptoError> {
    let mut seen = HashSet::new();
    for recipient_kid in recipient_kids {
        if !seen.insert(recipient_kid) {
            return Err(CryptoError::EncryptionError(format!(
                "duplicate recipient_kid: {recipient_kid}"
            )));
        }
    }
    Ok(())
}

fn validate_encryption_envelope(
    payload_encrypted: &serde_json::Value,
) -> Result<&Vec<serde_json::Value>, CryptoError> {
    let enc_version = payload_encrypted
        .get("enc_version")
        .and_then(|value| value.as_u64())
        .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::DecryptionError("Missing enc_version".to_string()))?;
    if enc_version != ENC_VERSION {
        return Err(CryptoError::DecryptionError(format!(
            "Unsupported enc_version: expected {ENC_VERSION}, got {enc_version}"
        )));
    }

    let aead = payload_encrypted
        .get("aead")
        .and_then(|value| value.as_str())
        .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::DecryptionError("Missing aead".to_string()))?;
    if aead != AEAD_ALGORITHM {
        return Err(CryptoError::DecryptionError(format!(
            "Unsupported aead: expected {AEAD_ALGORITHM}, got {aead}"
        )));
    }

    let hpke = payload_encrypted
        .get("hpke")
        .and_then(|value| value.as_object())
        .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::DecryptionError("Missing hpke".to_string()))?;
    validate_hpke_field(hpke, "mode", HPKE_MODE)?;
    validate_hpke_field(hpke, "kem", HPKE_KEM)?;
    validate_hpke_field(hpke, "kdf", HPKE_KDF)?;
    validate_hpke_field(hpke, "aead", HPKE_AEAD)?;

    let recipients = payload_encrypted
        .get("recipients")
        .and_then(|value| value.as_array())
        .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::DecryptionError("Missing recipients".to_string()))?;

    let mut seen = HashSet::new();
    for recipient in recipients {
        let Some(recipient_kid) = recipient.get("recipient_kid").and_then(|value| value.as_u64())
        else {
            return Err(CryptoError::DecryptionError("Missing recipient_kid".to_string()));
        };
        if !seen.insert(recipient_kid) {
            return Err(CryptoError::DecryptionError(format!(
                "Duplicate recipient_kid entry: {recipient_kid}"
            )));
        }
    }

    Ok(recipients)
}

fn validate_hpke_field(
    hpke: &serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value>,
    field: &str,
    expected: &str,
) -> Result<(), CryptoError> {
    let value = hpke
        .get(field)
        .and_then(|value| value.as_str())
        .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::DecryptionError(format!("Missing hpke.{field}")))?;
    if value != expected {
        return Err(CryptoError::DecryptionError(format!(
            "Unsupported hpke.{field}: expected {expected}, got {value}"
        )));
    }
    Ok(())
}

/// Wrap DEK using X25519 ECDH + HKDF + AES-256-GCM
fn wrap_dek(
    dek: &[u8; 32],
    recipient_public_key: &[u8; 32],
    info: &[u8],
) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>), CryptoError> {
    // Generate ephemeral X25519 key pair
    let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
    let ephemeral_secret = EphemeralSecret::random_from_rng(&mut rng);
    let ephemeral_public = PublicKey::from(&ephemeral_secret);
    let enc = ephemeral_public.as_bytes().to_vec();

    // Compute shared secret via ECDH
    let recipient_pk = PublicKey::from(*recipient_public_key);
    let shared_secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&recipient_pk);

    // Derive wrapping key using HKDF
    let hk = Hkdf::<Sha256>::new(None, shared_secret.as_bytes());
    let mut wrapping_key = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
    hk.expand(info, wrapping_key.as_mut()).map_err(|e| CryptoError::KeyWrapError(e.to_string()))?;

    // Wrap DEK with AES-256-GCM
    let mut wrap_nonce_bytes = [0u8; NONCE_SIZE];
    rng.fill_bytes(&mut wrap_nonce_bytes);

    let key = Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from_slice(&*wrapping_key);
    let wrap_cipher = Aes256Gcm::new(key);
    let wrap_nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&wrap_nonce_bytes);

    let wrapped = wrap_cipher
        .encrypt(wrap_nonce, dek.as_ref())
        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::KeyWrapError(e.to_string()))?;

    // wrappedKey = nonce || ciphertext_with_tag
    let mut wrapped_key = Vec::with_capacity(NONCE_SIZE + wrapped.len());
    wrapped_key.extend_from_slice(&wrap_nonce_bytes);
    wrapped_key.extend_from_slice(&wrapped);

    Ok((enc, wrapped_key))
}

/// Unwrap DEK using X25519 ECDH + HKDF + AES-256-GCM
fn unwrap_dek(
    enc: &[u8; 32],
    wrapped_key: &[u8],
    recipient_private_key: &[u8; 32],
    info: &[u8],
) -> Result<[u8; 32], CryptoError> {
    // Compute shared secret
    let ephemeral_pk = PublicKey::from(*enc);
    let recipient_sk = StaticSecret::from(*recipient_private_key);
    let shared_secret = recipient_sk.diffie_hellman(&ephemeral_pk);

    // Derive wrapping key
    let hk = Hkdf::<Sha256>::new(None, shared_secret.as_bytes());
    let mut wrapping_key = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
    hk.expand(info, wrapping_key.as_mut()).map_err(|e| CryptoError::KeyWrapError(e.to_string()))?;

    // Unwrap DEK
    if wrapped_key.len() < NONCE_SIZE + TAG_SIZE {
        return Err(CryptoError::KeyWrapError("Wrapped key too short".to_string()));
    }
    let wrap_nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&wrapped_key[..NONCE_SIZE]);
    let ciphertext_tag = &wrapped_key[NONCE_SIZE..];

    let key = Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from_slice(&*wrapping_key);
    let wrap_cipher = Aes256Gcm::new(key);

    let dek_bytes = wrap_cipher
        .decrypt(wrap_nonce, ciphertext_tag)
        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::KeyWrapError(e.to_string()))?;
    if dek_bytes.len() != KEY_SIZE {
        return Err(CryptoError::KeyWrapError(format!(
            "Invalid unwrapped DEK length: expected {KEY_SIZE}, got {}",
            dek_bytes.len()
        )));
    }

    let mut dek = Zeroizing::new([0u8; KEY_SIZE]);
    dek.copy_from_slice(&dek_bytes);
    Ok(*dek)
}

/// Generate an X25519 keypair for key wrapping
///
/// Returns (`private_key`, `public_key`) as 32-byte arrays.
pub fn generate_x25519_keypair() -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
    let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
    let secret = StaticSecret::random_from_rng(&mut rng);
    let public = PublicKey::from(&secret);
    (secret.to_bytes(), *public.as_bytes())
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use crate::hash::PayloadAadParams;
    use serde_json::json;

    const TEST_UUID: &str = "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000";

    fn test_aad_params(plain_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> PayloadAadParams<'_> {
        PayloadAadParams {
            ves_version: 1,
            tenant_id: TEST_UUID,
            store_id: TEST_UUID,
            event_id: TEST_UUID,
            source_agent_id: TEST_UUID,
            agent_key_id: 1,
            entity_type: "order",
            entity_id: "ord_001",
            event_type: "order.created",
            created_at: "2026-02-21T00:00:00Z",
            payload_plain_hash: plain_hash,
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn dek_wrap_unwrap_roundtrip() {
        let (private_key, public_key) = generate_x25519_keypair();
        let dek = [42u8; 32];
        let info = b"test_info";

        let (enc, wrapped) = wrap_dek(&dek, &public_key, info).unwrap();

        let mut enc_arr = [0u8; 32];
        enc_arr.copy_from_slice(&enc);
        let recovered = unwrap_dek(&enc_arr, &wrapped, &private_key, info).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(recovered, dek);
    }

    #[test]
    fn dek_unwrap_wrong_key_fails() {
        let (_, public_key) = generate_x25519_keypair();
        let (wrong_private, _) = generate_x25519_keypair();
        let dek = [42u8; 32];
        let info = b"test_info";

        let (enc, wrapped) = wrap_dek(&dek, &public_key, info).unwrap();
        let mut enc_arr = [0u8; 32];
        enc_arr.copy_from_slice(&enc);
        assert!(unwrap_dek(&enc_arr, &wrapped, &wrong_private, info).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn encrypt_decrypt_roundtrip() {
        let payload = json!({"order_id": "ord_001", "amount": 99.99});
        let plain_hash = [0u8; 32]; // placeholder, will be computed inside
        let aad_params = test_aad_params(&plain_hash);

        let (private_key, public_key) = generate_x25519_keypair();
        let recipients = vec![RecipientKey { kid: 1, public_key }];

        let enc_result = encrypt_payload(&payload, &aad_params, &recipients).unwrap();

        // Compute AAD for decryption
        let dec_aad_params =
            PayloadAadParams { payload_plain_hash: &enc_result.payload_plain_hash, ..aad_params };
        let dec_payload_aad = crate::hash::compute_payload_aad(&dec_aad_params).unwrap();

        let decrypted = decrypt_payload(
            &enc_result.payload_encrypted,
            &dec_payload_aad,
            1,
            &private_key,
            &enc_result.payload_plain_hash,
        )
        .unwrap();

        assert_eq!(decrypted, payload);
    }

    #[test]
    fn encrypt_no_recipients_fails() {
        let payload = json!({"key": "value"});
        let plain_hash = [0u8; 32];
        let aad_params = test_aad_params(&plain_hash);
        assert!(encrypt_payload(&payload, &aad_params, &[]).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn encrypt_duplicate_recipient_kids_fail() {
        let payload = json!({"key": "value"});
        let plain_hash = [0u8; 32];
        let aad_params = test_aad_params(&plain_hash);

        let (_, public_key) = generate_x25519_keypair();
        let recipients =
            vec![RecipientKey { kid: 7, public_key }, RecipientKey { kid: 7, public_key }];

        let err = encrypt_payload(&payload, &aad_params, &recipients)
            .expect_err("duplicate recipient ids should be rejected");
        match err {
            CryptoError::EncryptionError(message) => {
                assert!(message.contains("duplicate recipient_kid"))
            }
            other => panic!("unexpected error variant: {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn encrypt_multiple_recipients() {
        let payload = json!({"key": "value"});
        let plain_hash = [0u8; 32];
        let aad_params = test_aad_params(&plain_hash);

        let (priv1, pub1) = generate_x25519_keypair();
        let (priv2, pub2) = generate_x25519_keypair();
        let recipients = vec![
            RecipientKey { kid: 1, public_key: pub1 },
            RecipientKey { kid: 2, public_key: pub2 },
        ];

        let enc_result = encrypt_payload(&payload, &aad_params, &recipients).unwrap();

        let dec_aad_params =
            PayloadAadParams { payload_plain_hash: &enc_result.payload_plain_hash, ..aad_params };
        let dec_payload_aad = crate::hash::compute_payload_aad(&dec_aad_params).unwrap();

        // Both recipients can decrypt
        let d1 = decrypt_payload(
            &enc_result.payload_encrypted,
            &dec_payload_aad,
            1,
            &priv1,
            &enc_result.payload_plain_hash,
        );
        let d2 = decrypt_payload(
            &enc_result.payload_encrypted,
            &dec_payload_aad,
            2,
            &priv2,
            &enc_result.payload_plain_hash,
        );
        assert!(d1.is_ok());
        assert!(d2.is_ok());
        assert_eq!(d1.unwrap(), payload);
        assert_eq!(d2.unwrap(), payload);
    }

    #[test]
    fn decrypt_wrong_recipient_fails() {
        let payload = json!({"key": "value"});
        let plain_hash = [0u8; 32];
        let aad_params = test_aad_params(&plain_hash);

        let (_, pub_key) = generate_x25519_keypair();
        let recipients = vec![RecipientKey { kid: 1, public_key: pub_key }];

        let enc_result = encrypt_payload(&payload, &aad_params, &recipients).unwrap();
        let dec_aad_params =
            PayloadAadParams { payload_plain_hash: &enc_result.payload_plain_hash, ..aad_params };
        let dec_payload_aad = crate::hash::compute_payload_aad(&dec_aad_params).unwrap();

        // Try with wrong kid
        let (wrong_priv, _) = generate_x25519_keypair();
        let result = decrypt_payload(
            &enc_result.payload_encrypted,
            &dec_payload_aad,
            99,
            &wrong_priv,
            &enc_result.payload_plain_hash,
        );
        assert!(result.is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn decrypt_rejects_invalid_ephemeral_key_length() {
        let payload = json!({"key": "value"});
        let plain_hash = [0u8; 32];
        let aad_params = test_aad_params(&plain_hash);

        let (private_key, public_key) = generate_x25519_keypair();
        let recipients = vec![RecipientKey { kid: 1, public_key }];
        let enc_result = encrypt_payload(&payload, &aad_params, &recipients).unwrap();

        let dec_aad_params =
            PayloadAadParams { payload_plain_hash: &enc_result.payload_plain_hash, ..aad_params };
        let dec_payload_aad = crate::hash::compute_payload_aad(&dec_aad_params).unwrap();

        let b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
        let mut tampered = enc_result.payload_encrypted.clone();
        tampered["recipients"][0]["enc_b64u"] = serde_json::Value::String(b64.encode([7u8; 31]));

        let err = decrypt_payload(
            &tampered,
            &dec_payload_aad,
            1,
            &private_key,
            &enc_result.payload_plain_hash,
        )
        .expect_err("invalid enc length should error");

        match err {
            CryptoError::DecryptionError(msg) => assert!(msg.contains("Invalid enc_b64u length")),
            other => panic!("unexpected error variant: {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn decrypt_rejects_invalid_nonce_length() {
        let payload = json!({"key": "value"});
        let plain_hash = [0u8; 32];
        let aad_params = test_aad_params(&plain_hash);

        let (private_key, public_key) = generate_x25519_keypair();
        let recipients = vec![RecipientKey { kid: 1, public_key }];
        let enc_result = encrypt_payload(&payload, &aad_params, &recipients).unwrap();

        let dec_aad_params =
            PayloadAadParams { payload_plain_hash: &enc_result.payload_plain_hash, ..aad_params };
        let dec_payload_aad = crate::hash::compute_payload_aad(&dec_aad_params).unwrap();

        let b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
        let mut tampered = enc_result.payload_encrypted.clone();
        tampered["nonce_b64u"] = serde_json::Value::String(b64.encode([1u8; 11]));

        let err = decrypt_payload(
            &tampered,
            &dec_payload_aad,
            1,
            &private_key,
            &enc_result.payload_plain_hash,
        )
        .expect_err("invalid nonce length should error");

        match err {
            CryptoError::DecryptionError(msg) => assert!(msg.contains("Invalid nonce length")),
            other => panic!("unexpected error variant: {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn decrypt_rejects_invalid_tag_length() {
        let payload = json!({"key": "value"});
        let plain_hash = [0u8; 32];
        let aad_params = test_aad_params(&plain_hash);

        let (private_key, public_key) = generate_x25519_keypair();
        let recipients = vec![RecipientKey { kid: 1, public_key }];
        let enc_result = encrypt_payload(&payload, &aad_params, &recipients).unwrap();

        let dec_aad_params =
            PayloadAadParams { payload_plain_hash: &enc_result.payload_plain_hash, ..aad_params };
        let dec_payload_aad = crate::hash::compute_payload_aad(&dec_aad_params).unwrap();

        let b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
        let mut tampered = enc_result.payload_encrypted.clone();
        tampered["tag_b64u"] = serde_json::Value::String(b64.encode([9u8; 8]));

        let err = decrypt_payload(
            &tampered,
            &dec_payload_aad,
            1,
            &private_key,
            &enc_result.payload_plain_hash,
        )
        .expect_err("invalid tag length should error");

        match err {
            CryptoError::DecryptionError(msg) => assert!(msg.contains("Invalid tag length")),
            other => panic!("unexpected error variant: {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn decrypt_rejects_tampered_metadata() {
        let payload = json!({"key": "value"});
        let plain_hash = [0u8; 32];
        let aad_params = test_aad_params(&plain_hash);

        let (private_key, public_key) = generate_x25519_keypair();
        let recipients = vec![RecipientKey { kid: 1, public_key }];
        let enc_result = encrypt_payload(&payload, &aad_params, &recipients).unwrap();

        let dec_aad_params =
            PayloadAadParams { payload_plain_hash: &enc_result.payload_plain_hash, ..aad_params };
        let dec_payload_aad = crate::hash::compute_payload_aad(&dec_aad_params).unwrap();

        let mut tampered = enc_result.payload_encrypted.clone();
        tampered["aead"] = serde_json::Value::String("CHACHA20-POLY1305".to_string());

        let err = decrypt_payload(
            &tampered,
            &dec_payload_aad,
            1,
            &private_key,
            &enc_result.payload_plain_hash,
        )
        .expect_err("tampered metadata should be rejected");

        match err {
            CryptoError::DecryptionError(message) => assert!(message.contains("Unsupported aead")),
            other => panic!("unexpected error variant: {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn decrypt_rejects_duplicate_recipient_entries() {
        let payload = json!({"key": "value"});
        let plain_hash = [0u8; 32];
        let aad_params = test_aad_params(&plain_hash);

        let (private_key, public_key) = generate_x25519_keypair();
        let recipients = vec![RecipientKey { kid: 1, public_key }];
        let enc_result = encrypt_payload(&payload, &aad_params, &recipients).unwrap();

        let dec_aad_params =
            PayloadAadParams { payload_plain_hash: &enc_result.payload_plain_hash, ..aad_params };
        let dec_payload_aad = crate::hash::compute_payload_aad(&dec_aad_params).unwrap();

        let mut tampered = enc_result.payload_encrypted.clone();
        let duplicate = tampered["recipients"][0].clone();
        tampered["recipients"].as_array_mut().unwrap().push(duplicate);

        let err = decrypt_payload(
            &tampered,
            &dec_payload_aad,
            1,
            &private_key,
            &enc_result.payload_plain_hash,
        )
        .expect_err("duplicate recipients should be rejected");

        match err {
            CryptoError::DecryptionError(message) => {
                assert!(message.contains("Duplicate recipient_kid entry"))
            }
            other => panic!("unexpected error variant: {other:?}"),
        }
    }
}