SSH MCP Server
Capability-bound SSH MCP for autonomous DevOps agents: composable primitives, deterministic long-running jobs, bounded context, and atomic remote edits.
ssh-mcp is a Rust Model Context Protocol server that gives an AI agent secure, narrowly-scoped control of a remote Linux host over a single persistent SSH session. It exposes five base tools plus two explicitly privileged sudo variants and is built to keep agent context small and operations deterministic.
Why
- Capability-bound surface. Five base tools and two optional sudo variants, no open-ended remote API. The agent can only run commands, read files, patch one file, transfer files, and inspect background jobs.
- Deterministic long-running jobs.
background=truereturns{job_id, pid, log_path}immediately; output streams to a local log you poll withcheck_process, avoiding client RPC deadlines. - Bounded context.
readdefaults to a safe preview with token estimates; shell output is capped by--max-output-tokens. Large files cannot bomb the agent's context window. - Atomic remote edits.
apply_patchedits as the SSH user; the separately gatedsudo_apply_patchpreserves the same conflict detection and atomic commit under sudo.
Tools
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
shell |
Run a command via POSIX sh as the connected user; background=true for long tasks. |
sudo_shell |
Same, under sudo (uses --sudo-password); can be disabled with --disable-sudo. |
check_process |
Poll a background job by job_id and read the tail of its local log. |
read |
Read a remote UTF-8 file with preview / head / tail / full modes and token estimates. |
apply_patch |
Create, update, or delete one remote UTF-8 file with an exact patch (atomic, conflict-checked). |
sudo_apply_patch |
Same exact patch flow under sudo; can be disabled with --disable-sudo. |
transfer |
Move files/directories (put/get) via auto → rsync → sftp → scp → exec-raw. |
Full parameter schemas are served to the client at runtime; deeper references live in Docs/.
Installation
Pre-built binaries (recommended)
Download the latest rolling release from the Releases page:
| Platform | Download |
|---|---|
| Linux x86_64 | ssh-mcp-linux-x86_64 |
| Windows x86_64 | ssh-mcp-windows-x86_64.exe |
| macOS ARM64 | ssh-mcp-macos-aarch64 |
&&
Cargo (crates.io)
Build from source
Requires the Rust toolchain plus pkg-config and OpenSSL headers (libssl-dev on Debian/Ubuntu).
&&
Adding to MCP clients
OpenCode
Add to opencode.jsonc (SSH key recommended; password auth uses the exec-raw transfer transport):
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"ssh-remote": {
"type": "local",
"command": [
"/absolute/path/to/ssh-mcp",
"--host=192.168.1.10",
"--port=22",
"--user=agent-nc",
"--key=/path/to/private/key"
],
"enabled": true
}
}
}
Use --password=your-password instead of --key=... for password authentication.
Add to your project's .mcp.json (shared via git) or to ~/.claude.json under the top-level mcpServers key:
Set --strict-host-key-checking=yes and point at a pre-populated known_hosts file (works in any client config):
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"ssh-remote": {
"type": "local",
"command": [
"/absolute/path/to/ssh-mcp",
"--host=example.com",
"--user=alice",
"--key=/home/alice/.ssh/id_ed25519",
"--strict-host-key-checking=yes",
"--known-hosts=/home/alice/.ssh/known_hosts"
],
"enabled": true
}
}
}
Configuration
Every flag also has an SSH_MCP_* environment variable. Required: --host, --user, and one of --password / --key.
| Argument | Env | Description |
|---|---|---|
--host |
SSH_MCP_HOST |
SSH host (required) |
--user |
SSH_MCP_USER |
SSH username (required) |
--port |
SSH_MCP_PORT |
SSH port (default: 22) |
--password |
SSH_MCP_PASSWORD |
SSH password (alternative to key) |
--key |
SSH_MCP_KEY |
Path to private key file |
--sudo-password |
SSH_MCP_SUDO_PASSWORD |
Password for sudo commands |
--timeout |
SSH_MCP_TIMEOUT |
Command timeout in ms (default: 300000) |
--max-output-tokens |
SSH_MCP_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS |
Shell/read output token limit (default: 16000 ≈ 64KB; none to disable) |
--disable-sudo |
SSH_MCP_DISABLE_SUDO |
Disable the sudo_shell and sudo_apply_patch tools |
Run ssh-mcp --help for the full list (logging, keepalive, reconnect, host-key options).
SSH host key verification
ssh-mcp verifies the server host key before authentication to prevent silent man-in-the-middle replacement:
accept-new(default): trust and record an unknown key on first connection; reject later changes.yes: require the key to already exist inknown_hosts; reject unknown or changed keys.no: disable verification; only for disposable test environments.
Long-running jobs
Start potentially long commands with background=true. A foreground timeout_ms is only the server-side SSH wait limit, not the full tool-call deadline. MCP does not expose the client's deadline to the server, so the client may stop waiting earlier. The configured default of 300000 ms therefore does not guarantee that an MCP harness will wait that long. In background mode you immediately get {job_id, pid, log_path}, where log_path is a local log on the MCP server (default /tmp/ssh-mcp/<job_id>.log). Poll with check_process:
For a scheduled one-shot observation, set a local wait in seconds:
check_process first validates and snapshots the job. Errors and terminal states return immediately. A running job waits locally for the full wait_for interval without polling, then returns one fresh snapshot; completion during the interval does not wake the call early. The MCP client deadline must exceed the requested interval and the two SSH probes.
Cancelling the request stops only the passive local wait after its initial snapshot. It does not interrupt an initial SSH probe or a final probe that has already started, send a stop signal, close SSH, or cancel the background streamer. RMCP suppresses the late response to a protocol-cancelled request; call check_process again for authoritative state because the job may still be running or may have completed naturally.
On SIGINT or SIGTERM, the server cancels the MCP service and performs its bounded request drain before closing SSH. Shutdown prevents new SSH connections and reconnects, but closing the session may terminate channel-bound remote commands; no explicit remote kill or survival guarantee is made.
The returned state is always one of running, completed, failed, or state_lost, plus the log tail. completed and failed include an exit_code; state_lost means the server no longer has a trustworthy terminal outcome.
Background tracking requires the MCP server and its SSH session to remain alive; jobs are not guaranteed to survive server shutdown, an SSH disconnect, or an MCP server restart.
Safety
- Stdio transport. JSON-RPC over stdin/stdout — no exposed network ports.
- Credentials in memory only. Passwords and keys are never logged.
- Logs to stderr. Internal logging stays off the MCP protocol channel.
- Path validation. Rejects control characters, traversal (
..), and shell-injection shapes. - Binary protection. Text tools reject non-UTF-8 content to prevent corruption.
- Atomic edits. Staging with automatic cleanup and conflict detection; no silent overwrites.
- Explicit elevation.
apply_patchnever retries under sudo; privileged edits require an explicitsudo_apply_patchcall.
Documentation
Deeper references live in Docs/:
ssh-remote-file-editing-reference.md— the SSH file-editing workflow.diff-generation-reference.md— diff generation for file operations.backup-manager-reference.md— backup manager implementation.rmcp-sdk.md/russh-library.md— SDK and SSH library notes.
License
MIT — see LICENSE for details.