ssb-validate 1.4.2

Verify Secure Scuttlebutt (SSB) hash chains (in parallel)
Documentation 
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//! Helper functions used during validation computations.
use lazy_static::lazy_static;
use regex::{bytes::Regex as RegexBytes, Regex};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use snafu::ResultExt;
use ssb_legacy_msg_data::json;
use ssb_multiformats::multihash::Multihash;

use crate::error::{InvalidMessageCouldNotSerializeValue, Result};
use crate::message_value::SsbMessageValue;

/// Check that the given string represents canonical base64.
///
/// A Regex pattern is used to match on canonical base64 for private messages. This has been
/// implemented according to the [`is-canonical-base64` JS module](https://www.npmjs.com/package/is-canonical-base64) by Dominic Tarr.
pub fn is_canonical_base64(private_msg: &str) -> bool {
    lazy_static! {
        static ref RE: Regex = Regex::new(r"^(?:[a-zA-Z0-9/+]{4})*(?:[a-zA-Z0-9/+](?:(?:[AQgw]==)|(?:[a-zA-Z0-9/+][AEIMQUYcgkosw048]=)))?.box.*$").unwrap();
    }
    RE.is_match(private_msg)
}

/// Check that the length of the given message - when serialized as JSON - is less than 8192 UTF-16 code units.
pub fn is_correct_length(msg_value: &SsbMessageValue) -> Result<bool> {
    // the second arg is used to set `compact` to `false` (preserves whitespace)
    let msg_value_str =
        json::to_string(msg_value, false).context(InvalidMessageCouldNotSerializeValue)?;
    let msg_len: usize = msg_value_str.chars().map(|ch| ch.len_utf16()).sum();
    if msg_len > 8192 {
        Ok(false)
    } else {
        Ok(true)
    }
}

/// Check that the top-level fields (keys) comprising the given message value are in the correct
/// order.
///
/// The message value is expected to be provided in the form of a byte array. A regular expression
/// is used to match on the order of the fields. The order of the second and third fields (`"author"` and
/// `"sequence"`) can be reversed. For more information on this and other quirks, you may wish to peruse the issues and code for the JavaScript [ssb-validate library](https://github.com/ssb-js/ssb-validate).
pub fn is_correct_order(bytes: &[u8]) -> bool {
    lazy_static! {
        static ref RE_B: RegexBytes = RegexBytes::new(r#""previous"[\s\S]*("author"|"sequence")[\s\S]*("author"|"sequence")[\s\S]*"timestamp"[\s\S]*"hash"[\s\S]*"content"[\s\S]*"signature""#).unwrap();
    }
    RE_B.is_match(bytes)
}

/// Generate a hash for a given message value.
///
/// The message value is expected to be provided in the form of a byte array. The string of the
/// bytes is first encoded to UTF-16 before the hash is computed. Note that the hash is
/// this case is sometimes referred to as a `key` (as in, `KVT` - key, value, timestamp) or as a
/// `Multihash`. More information can be found in the [`Multihash` documentation](https://spec.scuttlebutt.nz/feed/datatypes.html#multihash).
pub fn multihash_from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Multihash {
    let value_bytes_latin = node_buffer_binary_serializer(std::str::from_utf8(bytes).unwrap());
    let value_hash = Sha256::digest(value_bytes_latin.as_slice());
    Multihash::Message(value_hash.into())
}

/// FML, scuttlebutt is miserable.
///
/// This is what node's `Buffer.new(messageString, 'binary')` does. Who knew?
/// So, surprise, but the way ssb encodes messages for signing vs the way it encodes them for
/// hashing is different.
pub fn node_buffer_binary_serializer(text: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
    text.encode_utf16()
        .map(|word| (word & 0xFF) as u8)
        .collect()
}