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// Copyright 2020 Nym Technologies SA
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
// Ideally we would have used pure x25519_dalek implementation and created a wrapper for
// it, but unfortunately it's not an option as what we're doing here is not 'pure'
// x25519, as we require (in form of optimization, TODO: WHICH WE MUST ACTUALLY LEARN IF ITS
// NOT A VULNERABILITY) multiplying scalars together before exponentiation, i.e.
// to obtain g^{xyz} we compute `tmp = x*y*z` followed by g^tmp rather than
// G1 = g^x, G2 = G1^y, G3 = G2^z
use curve25519_dalek::{
constants::ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE, montgomery::MontgomeryPoint, scalar::Scalar,
};
use rand::{rngs::OsRng, CryptoRng, RngCore};
pub const PRIVATE_KEY_SIZE: usize = 32;
pub const PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE: usize = 32;
pub const SHARED_SECRET_SIZE: usize = PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
// this is specific to our keys being on curve25519;
// if not done, it could introduce attacks involving use
// of small-order points (and some side-channel attacks I think?).
// TODO: could an ECC 'expert' verify those claims?
pub fn clamp_scalar_bytes(mut scalar_bytes: [u8; PRIVATE_KEY_SIZE]) -> Scalar {
scalar_bytes[0] &= 248;
scalar_bytes[31] &= 127;
scalar_bytes[31] |= 64;
#[allow(deprecated)]
Scalar::from_bits(scalar_bytes)
}
// TODO: similarly to what x25519_dalek is doing, we should probably
// derive zeroize::Zeroize on drop here
pub struct PrivateKey(Scalar);
// Because the lint below was renamed in nightly but not in stable, making this problematic in CI
// which tests both, for a brief period we allow renamed lints.
#[allow(renamed_and_removed_lints)] // TODO: remove this in next version
#[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // TODO: we must be careful about that one if anything changes in the future
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
pub struct PublicKey(MontgomeryPoint);
// type aliases for easier reasoning
pub type EphemeralSecret = PrivateKey;
pub type SharedSecret = PublicKey;
impl PrivateKey {
/// Perform a key exchange with another public key
pub fn diffie_hellman(&self, remote_public_key: &PublicKey) -> SharedSecret {
PublicKey(self.0 * remote_public_key.0)
}
// Do not expose this. It can lead to serious security issues if used incorrectly.
pub(crate) fn clone(&self) -> Self {
PrivateKey(self.0)
}
// honestly, this method shouldn't really exist, but right now we have no decent
// rng propagation in the library
pub fn new() -> Self {
let mut rng = OsRng;
Self::new_with_rng(&mut rng)
}
pub fn new_with_rng<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self {
let mut bytes = [0u8; PRIVATE_KEY_SIZE];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes);
PrivateKey(clamp_scalar_bytes(bytes))
}
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> [u8; PRIVATE_KEY_SIZE] {
self.0.to_bytes()
}
}
impl Default for PrivateKey {
fn default() -> Self {
PrivateKey::new()
}
}
// TODO: is this 'safe' ?
impl<'a, 'b> std::ops::Mul<&'b Scalar> for &'a EphemeralSecret {
type Output = EphemeralSecret;
fn mul(self, rhs: &'b Scalar) -> EphemeralSecret {
PrivateKey(self.0 * rhs)
}
}
impl<'b> std::ops::MulAssign<&'b Scalar> for EphemeralSecret {
fn mul_assign(&mut self, _rhs: &'b Scalar) {
self.0.mul_assign(_rhs)
}
}
impl From<Scalar> for EphemeralSecret {
fn from(scalar: Scalar) -> EphemeralSecret {
// TODO: should we ensure it's a valid scalar by performing
// montgomery reduction and/or clamping?
PrivateKey(scalar)
}
}
impl From<[u8; PRIVATE_KEY_SIZE]> for PrivateKey {
fn from(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> PrivateKey {
// TODO: do we have to clamp it here?
PrivateKey(clamp_scalar_bytes(bytes))
}
}
impl PublicKey {
pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] {
self.0.as_bytes()
}
}
impl<'a> From<&'a PrivateKey> for PublicKey {
fn from(private_key: &'a PrivateKey) -> PublicKey {
// multiplication in edwards using the precomputed ed25519 basepoint table is over 3x quicker
// than multiplication inside montgomery using the curve generator
PublicKey((ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE * &private_key.0).to_montgomery())
}
}
impl From<[u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]> for PublicKey {
fn from(bytes: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]) -> PublicKey {
PublicKey(MontgomeryPoint(bytes))
}
}
impl PartialEq for PublicKey {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
self.0.eq(&other.0)
}
}
impl Eq for PublicKey {}
pub fn keygen() -> (PrivateKey, PublicKey) {
let private_key = PrivateKey::new();
let public_key = PublicKey::from(&private_key);
(private_key, public_key)
}