sozu-command-lib, tools to communicate with the Sōzu proxy
The sozu proxy can receive dynamic configuration changes through a unix socket. This library defines the communication protocol, the message format, the required structures, serialization and deserialization code.
Command messages are defined in protobuf
Protobuf is a language-agnostic, binary serialization format used to efficiently transmit structured data between different systems and languages.
The idea is to define the data once in this format, so that various libraries of various languages can translate it to their own.
All types are defined in the command.proto file.
At build time, prost-build generates command.rs in Cargo's OUT_DIR; the
public proto::command module includes it from there. Building a source archive
requires protoc and leaves the source tree unchanged.
There are two main types received by, and sent from, Sōzu:
RequestResponse
They look like this, in protobuf:
// A message received by Sōzu to change its state or query information
message Request {
oneof request_type {
// save Sōzu's parseable state as a file, with a path
string save_state = 1;
// load a state file, given its path
string load_state = 2;
/*
many more — see command/src/command.proto
*/
}
}
// Response to a request
message Response {
// wether the request was a success, a failure, or is processing
required ResponseStatus status = 1 [default = FAILURE];
// a success or error message
required string message = 2;
// response data, if any
optional ResponseContent content = 3;
}
These are serialized in binary, NOT in plain text formats like JSON.
A response can have 3 possible status:
Ok: the task was doneFailure: there was an unrecoverable errorProcessing: the task was started but may not finish right away
As an example, in a soft shutdown, the shutdown message is sent to all
the workers, and they acknowledge the message by sending an answer
with the Processing status: in a soft shutdown, a worker stops accepting
new connections but keeps the active ones and exits when they are no longer
active. Once all connections are done, a worker will send an answer
with the same id and the Ok status.
Protected health-check headers
An HTTP health check can carry custom request headers whose values are
credentials. HealthCheckConfig.headers (field 10) holds metadata only:
HealthCheckHeader { name, fingerprint }, with a fingerprint of the form
sozu-hc-hmac-sha256:v1:<32 lowercase hex epoch>:<64 lowercase hex tag>. The
clear values travel in HealthCheckHeaderValue inside
SetProtectedHealthCheck, a request distinct from SetHealthCheck, which never
carries a value. The carriers refuse to serialize or print a value, and the
values stay in memory, never in the saved state or a query.
A generic integrator of this library must do the orchestration itself; the library types do not add it:
- Send
QueryProtectedHealthCheckSupportfirst, and read no secret source and send no value until the main process answers with exactly the positiveProtectedHealthCheckReplycapability reply. ThesozuCLI waits for it for a fixed five seconds, unaffected by its generic timeout. Treat a failure, a late answer, silence or any other reply as a refusal. The query before file or standard-input I/O is a guarantee of the CLI; the hardened main may readvalue_filereferences of its configuration into protected memory before it launches the workers, without that query. - Validate the headers with
validate_health_check_configand the values withvalidate_health_check_header_values, then send oneSetProtectedHealthCheck.secret::read_header_valueis the reader the CLI uses: it removes one finalLFand theCRright before it, nothing else. - The main process applies the change on the workers with the acknowledged
Prepare,Commit,AbortandReleaseexchange ofProtectedHealthCheckOrder, and fences other changes to the same cluster in the meantime. An error before everyCommitis acknowledged retains or restores the previous configuration; after everyCommitacknowledgement, a refused or timed-outReleaseis a retention or cleanup failure and cannot roll back a before-image the workers already destroyed. A replacement or respawned worker receives and acknowledges the values before it is Running or probes. This applies to this change only; it is not a global transaction.
Peers older than 2.3.2 ignore the unknown field 10 instead of failing, so the
capability query is the only protection against sending a credential to one.
See doc/health_checks.md#custom-request-headers for the limits, the cold
restart and the upgrade behaviour.
Control-plane audit log
Every privileged mutation accepted by the unix command socket is mirrored to a
dedicated audit envelope rendered in the canonical [session req cluster backend]\tAUDIT\tCommand(...) layout. Two optional sinks ship today:
audit_logs_target (text, ANSI-stripped, mirrors the info! line) and
audit_logs_json_target (one stable-schema JSON object per line, ready for SIEM
ingest). Both sinks open O_APPEND | O_CREAT | chmod 0640 and create new parent
directories with mode 0o750 so PCI-DSS 10.5 remains enforceable across
restarts. Free-form fields (target, actor.user, actor.comm, socket,
extras.reason) are sanitised before render so attacker-influenced input cannot
forge additional audit lines via embedded \t / \n / ANSI escapes.
The optional command_allowed_uids: Vec<u32> config field rejects any
SO_PEERCRED UID outside the list at the top of Server::handle_client_request
(defence in depth on top of the socket mode, command_socket_mode, 0o600
by default). Actor identity is captured via SO_PEERCRED and enriched on accept with /proc/<pid>/comm and
NSS getpwuid_r(uid); peer_comm opens /proc/<pid>/stat first so a recycled
PID returns None rather than the new owner's comm, and peer_user caches
results in a 16-entry process-local LRU so an SSSD/LDAP wedge cannot stall the
main event loop.
The full schema, retention policy, and supervisor-side lifecycle (accept loop,
fan-out across workers, FD-passing for hot upgrades) live in
doc/observability.md and the module-level comments in bin/src/command/.