# Security Policy: sheet-engine
## Supported versions
| 0.1.x | ✅ |
## Reporting a vulnerability
Report privately via [GitHub security advisories] for this repository, or
email **wyatt_au@protonmail.com**. Do **not** open a public issue for
security reports.
You will receive an acknowledgement within **72 hours**. Coordinated
disclosure: we ask for up to 90 days before public disclosure while a
patch ships.
## Scope notes
`sheet-engine` renders metrics derived from in-process counters. Security
considerations for integrators:
- Formulas are parsed with bound resources (`formula-lang` caps nesting
depth and rejects unbounded references), but hosts should still cap
*workbook* size before calling `set_cell` in a loop: the engine does
not impose a cell-count budget.
- XLSX input is untrusted ZIP + XML; the codec (`sheet-xlsx`) rejects
malformed archives with typed errors. `from_xlsx` on attacker-supplied
bytes should be treated like any file-format parse: allocate against a
known budget upstream.
- Formula text round-trips verbatim; systems that re-emit formulas into
other tools own the escaping there.
- `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]`: no unsafe blocks exist in this crate.
[GitHub security advisories]:
https://github.com/WyattAu/sheet-engine/security/advisories/new