secure-gate

Zero-cost, no_std-compatible wrappers for handling sensitive data in memory.

Fixed<T> – stack-allocated, zero-cost wrapper.
Dynamic<T> – heap-allocated wrapper that forwards to the inner type.
When the zeroize feature is enabled, FixedZeroizing<T> and DynamicZeroizing<T> provide automatic zeroing on drop.

Installation

[dependencies]

secure-gate = "0.5.1"

With automatic zeroing (recommended for most use cases):

secure-gate = { version = "0.5.1", features = ["zeroize"] }

Features

Feature	Description
`zeroize`	Enables `zeroize` integration (`Zeroizing`, `SecretBox`)
`serde`	Optional serialization support
`alloc`	Required for `Dynamic<T>` (enabled by default)
`std`	Not required – works in `no_std` environments

Quick Start

use secure_gate::{secure, fixed_alias, dynamic_alias};

// Type aliases
fixed_alias!(Aes256Key, 32);
fixed_alias!(Nonce12, 12);
dynamic_alias!(Password, String);

// Construction
let key: Aes256Key = secure!([u8; 32], rng.gen());
let nonce: Nonce12 = secure!([u8; 12], rng.gen());

let mut password: Password = secure!(String, "hunter2".to_string());
password.push('!');
password.finish_mut(); // shrink_to_fit() on String/Vec<u8>

// Auto-zeroing variants (requires `zeroize` feature)
let temp_key = secure_gate::secure_zeroizing!([u8; 32], derive_key());
let secret_vec = secure_gate::secure_zeroizing!(heap Vec<u8>, Box::new(secret_bytes));

Memory Guarantees (`zeroize` feature enabled)

Type	Allocation	Auto-zero on drop	Full capacity wiped	Slack memory eliminated	Notes
`Fixed<T>`	Stack	Yes (via `Zeroizing`)	Yes	Yes (no heap)	No allocation
`Dynamic<T>`	Heap	Yes (via `SecretBox`)	Yes	No (until drop)	Use `finish_mut()` to shrink
`FixedZeroizing<T>`	Stack	Yes	Yes	Yes	RAII wrapper
`DynamicZeroizing<T>`	Heap	Yes	Yes	No (until drop)	`SecretBox` prevents copies

All zeroing uses zeroize::Zeroize (volatile writes + compiler fence).
Vec<u8> and String have their full current capacity zeroed and are truncated to length zero.
The underlying allocation is freed on drop (standard Rust behavior); capacity is not forcibly reduced unless finish_mut() / shrink_to_fit() is called.
Past reallocations may leave copies of data elsewhere in memory. Pre-allocate with the final expected size to avoid reallocations.

Important: DynamicZeroizing<T> (i.e. SecretBox<T>) is accessed via .expose_secret() and .expose_secret_mut() — it does not implement Deref.

Macros

secure!([u8; 32], rng.gen())           // Fixed<[u8; 32]>
secure!(String, "pw".into())           // Dynamic<String>
secure!(Vec<u8>, data.to_vec())        // Dynamic<Vec<u8>>

secure_zeroizing!([u8; 32], key)       // FixedZeroizing<[u8; 32]> (zeroize feature)
secure_zeroizing!(heap Vec<u8>, Box::new(data))  // DynamicZeroizing<Vec<u8>>

fixed_alias!(MyKey, 32)
dynamic_alias!(MySecret, Vec<u8>)

Example Aliases

fixed_alias!(Aes128Key, 16);
fixed_alias!(Aes256Key, 32);
fixed_alias!(XChaCha20Nonce, 24);
dynamic_alias!(Password, String);
dynamic_alias!(JwtSigningKey, Vec<u8>);

Migration from v0.4.x

SecureGate<T> → Fixed<T> (stack) or Dynamic<T> (heap)
.expose_secret() → direct deref (&*value or &mut *value) for Fixed/Dynamic
Automatic zeroing → FixedZeroizing<T> or DynamicZeroizing<T> (with zeroize feature)

Changelog

See CHANGELOG.md

License

MIT OR Apache-2.0

secure-gate 0.5.1