secrets-vault 2.4.1

AES-256-GCM encrypted key-value vault with PBKDF2 key derivation. Store API keys and tokens securely instead of plaintext dotfiles.
Documentation
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//! Project lease — one Touch ID copies a project's declared secrets into a
//! per-project encrypted lease file; reads during the TTL need no further tap,
//! yet the agent can never decrypt the file directly (LEASE_DESIGN.md).
//!
//! The lease file is a standard QVLT v2 container (same parser, same per-entry
//! AES-256-GCM + manifest MAC) whose master secret is a fresh random 32-byte
//! key rather than a PBKDF2 derivation. That key — together with the
//! authoritative expiry — lives in a NON-biometric data-protection Keychain
//! item behind the keychain-access-groups entitlement: tap-free for this
//! signed binary, unreachable for anything else the agent can run. The TTL is
//! deliberately NOT stored in the agent-writable filesystem, and it is
//! enforced on every read (purge-on-touch), not by a cleanup timer.
//!
//! Secure delete = crypto-erase: the Keychain item dies FIRST (ciphertext is
//! dead from that instant), then the file is best-effort overwritten and
//! unlinked (APFS copy-on-write makes the overwrite hygiene, not the
//! guarantee).
//!
//! Residual risk, stated plainly (design §7): tap-free means tap-free for any
//! same-uid caller of the sanctioned CLI path. The lease narrows a same-uid
//! compromise to one project's declared keys, until expiry, one audited read
//! at a time — it is not a new privilege boundary. The agent binding is the
//! same SOFT ancestry layer the registry uses.

use std::io::Write;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};

use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use zeroize::{Zeroize, Zeroizing};

use secrets_vault::{
    is_valid_key, is_valid_project, random_bytes, random_salt, v2_create, MasterSecret,
    VaultError, VaultReader,
};

use crate::keychain;

/// Default lease lifetime when `--ttl` is omitted.
pub const DEFAULT_TTL: &str = "60m";
/// TTLs beyond this print a warning at create (design §8).
pub const TTL_WARN_SECS: u64 = 24 * 3600;

pub fn now() -> u64 {
    SystemTime::now()
        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
        .map(|d| d.as_secs())
        .unwrap_or(0)
}

// ── Keystore: where the lease key + TTL live ──

/// Where lease key material is anchored. `Keychain` is the real design (§2d);
/// `File` is the explicit test/portability mode (`SECRETS_LEASE_KEYSTORE=file`,
/// §7) — a 0600 key file beside the lease, offline-decryptable by any same-uid
/// reader, never a recommendation.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
pub enum Keystore {
    Keychain,
    File,
}

pub fn keystore_from_env() -> Result<Keystore, String> {
    match std::env::var("SECRETS_LEASE_KEYSTORE") {
        Ok(v) if v == "file" => Ok(Keystore::File),
        Ok(v) => Err(format!("unknown SECRETS_LEASE_KEYSTORE '{v}' (only 'file' is recognized)")),
        Err(_) => {
            if cfg!(target_os = "macos") {
                Ok(Keystore::Keychain)
            } else {
                Err("leases anchor their key in the macOS Keychain; on this platform set \
                     SECRETS_LEASE_KEYSTORE=file (test/portability mode — LEASE_DESIGN.md §7)"
                    .into())
            }
        }
    }
}

// ── Paths ──

pub fn leases_dir(dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
    dir.join("leases")
}

pub fn lease_file(dir: &Path, project: &str) -> PathBuf {
    leases_dir(dir).join(format!("{project}.lease"))
}

fn key_file(dir: &Path, project: &str) -> PathBuf {
    leases_dir(dir).join(format!("{project}.key"))
}

fn keychain_account(project: &str) -> String {
    format!("lease:{project}")
}

fn log_path(dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
    dir.join("lease.log")
}

/// Best-effort append to the lease audit log (names and verdicts only — NEVER
/// values). Mirrors the session broker's `session.log`.
fn audit(dir: &Path, line: &str) {
    let path = log_path(dir);
    #[cfg(unix)]
    let file = {
        use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
        std::fs::OpenOptions::new().create(true).append(true).mode(0o600).open(&path)
    };
    #[cfg(not(unix))]
    let file = std::fs::OpenOptions::new().create(true).append(true).open(&path);
    if let Ok(mut f) = file {
        let _ = writeln!(f, "{} {line}", now());
    }
}

// ── Keystore metadata (the trust anchor, design §3) ──

/// The Keychain item's JSON payload: lease key + the AUTHORITATIVE expiry +
/// the soft agent binding. Lives where the agent's filesystem access can't
/// reach — writable only via `lease create`, which demands a tap.
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct Meta {
    v: u32,
    project: String,
    /// 64 hex chars — the random 32-byte lease master key.
    key: String,
    created: u64,
    expires: u64,
    #[serde(default)]
    agent: Option<String>,
    /// Calendar window (goal 32A45613). Lives HERE — keystore-anchored beside
    /// the key, approved by the tap — so nothing agent-writable can widen it.
    /// Absent on pre-window leases: they stay pure-TTL.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    window: Option<crate::window::Window>,
}

impl Meta {
    /// Extract the raw key bytes, zeroizing the hex string in place.
    fn take_key(&mut self) -> Result<Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>, String> {
        let mut out = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
        let hexs = self.key.as_bytes();
        if hexs.len() != 64 {
            self.key.zeroize();
            return Err("lease key material is malformed".into());
        }
        let nib = |b: u8| -> Result<u8, String> {
            match b {
                b'0'..=b'9' => Ok(b - b'0'),
                b'a'..=b'f' => Ok(b - b'a' + 10),
                b'A'..=b'F' => Ok(b - b'A' + 10),
                _ => Err("lease key material is malformed".into()),
            }
        };
        for i in 0..32 {
            match (nib(hexs[2 * i]), nib(hexs[2 * i + 1])) {
                (Ok(h), Ok(l)) => out[i] = (h << 4) | l,
                _ => {
                    self.key.zeroize();
                    return Err("lease key material is malformed".into());
                }
            }
        }
        self.key.zeroize();
        Ok(out)
    }
}

fn keystore_store(dir: &Path, ks: Keystore, project: &str, meta_json: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
    match ks {
        Keystore::Keychain => keychain::store_plain(&keychain_account(project), meta_json),
        Keystore::File => {
            ensure_leases_dir(dir)?;
            let path = key_file(dir, project);
            #[cfg(unix)]
            {
                use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
                let mut f = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
                    .write(true)
                    .create(true)
                    .truncate(true)
                    .mode(0o600)
                    .open(&path)
                    .map_err(|e| format!("writing lease key file: {e}"))?;
                f.write_all(meta_json.as_bytes())
                    .map_err(|e| format!("writing lease key file: {e}"))?;
            }
            #[cfg(not(unix))]
            std::fs::write(&path, meta_json).map_err(|e| format!("writing lease key file: {e}"))?;
            Ok(())
        }
    }
}

fn keystore_load(dir: &Path, ks: Keystore, project: &str) -> Result<Option<Meta>, String> {
    let raw: Option<Zeroizing<String>> = match ks {
        Keystore::Keychain => keychain::read_plain(&keychain_account(project))?.map(Zeroizing::new),
        Keystore::File => match std::fs::read_to_string(key_file(dir, project)) {
            Ok(s) => Some(Zeroizing::new(s)),
            Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => None,
            Err(e) => return Err(format!("reading lease key file: {e}")),
        },
    };
    match raw {
        None => Ok(None),
        Some(json) => {
            let meta: Meta =
                serde_json::from_str(&json).map_err(|_| "lease metadata is corrupt".to_string())?;
            if meta.v != 1 {
                return Err(format!("unsupported lease metadata version {}", meta.v));
            }
            Ok(Some(meta))
        }
    }
}

fn keystore_delete(dir: &Path, ks: Keystore, project: &str) -> bool {
    match ks {
        Keystore::Keychain => {
            // delete_plain is idempotent; report "existed" via a pre-read.
            let existed = keychain::read_plain(&keychain_account(project))
                .map(|o| o.is_some())
                .unwrap_or(false);
            let _ = keychain::delete_plain(&keychain_account(project));
            existed
        }
        Keystore::File => {
            let path = key_file(dir, project);
            let existed = path.exists();
            if existed {
                secure_delete_file(&path);
            }
            existed
        }
    }
}

fn ensure_leases_dir(dir: &Path) -> Result<(), String> {
    let ld = leases_dir(dir);
    std::fs::create_dir_all(&ld).map_err(|e| format!("creating {}: {e}", ld.display()))?;
    #[cfg(unix)]
    {
        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
        let _ = std::fs::set_permissions(&ld, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700));
        let _ = std::fs::set_permissions(dir, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700));
    }
    Ok(())
}

/// Best-effort overwrite + unlink. The crypto-erase (Keychain key deletion,
/// which the callers always do FIRST) is the real guarantee — on APFS/SSDs an
/// overwrite may leave old extents behind (design §5).
fn secure_delete_file(path: &Path) {
    if let Ok(len) = std::fs::metadata(path).map(|m| m.len()) {
        if let Ok(mut f) = std::fs::OpenOptions::new().write(true).open(path) {
            let zeros = vec![0u8; len.min(1 << 20) as usize];
            let mut left = len;
            while left > 0 {
                let n = (left as usize).min(zeros.len());
                if f.write_all(&zeros[..n]).is_err() {
                    break;
                }
                left -= n as u64;
            }
            let _ = f.sync_all();
        }
    }
    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);
}

/// Destroy a lease: keystore first (crypto-erase), then the file. Returns
/// whether anything existed.
fn purge(dir: &Path, ks: Keystore, project: &str) -> bool {
    let had_key = keystore_delete(dir, ks, project);
    let path = lease_file(dir, project);
    let had_file = path.exists();
    if had_file {
        secure_delete_file(&path);
    }
    had_key || had_file
}

// ── TTL parsing ──

/// `30s` / `90m` / `2h` / `1d`, or a bare number (minutes). Returns seconds.
pub fn parse_ttl(s: &str) -> Result<u64, String> {
    let s = s.trim();
    let err = || format!("invalid TTL '{s}' (use e.g. 30s, 90m, 2h, 1d, or minutes)");
    let (digits, mult) = match s.chars().last() {
        Some('s') => (&s[..s.len() - 1], 1u64),
        Some('m') => (&s[..s.len() - 1], 60),
        Some('h') => (&s[..s.len() - 1], 3600),
        Some('d') => (&s[..s.len() - 1], 86400),
        Some(c) if c.is_ascii_digit() => (s, 60),
        _ => return Err(err()),
    };
    let n: u64 = digits.parse().map_err(|_| err())?;
    if n == 0 {
        return Err("TTL must be positive".into());
    }
    n.checked_mul(mult).ok_or_else(err)
}

/// Human form of a remaining duration, for status lines and prompts.
pub fn human_secs(mut secs: u64) -> String {
    if secs >= 86400 && secs % 3600 == 0 && secs / 86400 > 0 && secs % 86400 == 0 {
        return format!("{}d", secs / 86400);
    }
    if secs >= 3600 {
        let h = secs / 3600;
        secs %= 3600;
        if secs == 0 {
            return format!("{h}h");
        }
        return format!("{h}h{}m", secs / 60);
    }
    if secs >= 60 {
        return format!("{}m", secs.div_ceil(60));
    }
    format!("{secs}s")
}

// ── Operations ──

/// Write the lease container + anchor its key. `entries` are the project's
/// declared keys (bare names) with their just-decrypted values — the caller
/// did the ONE tap that authorizes all of this. Any existing lease for the
/// project is destroyed first (fresh key ⇒ hoarded copies of the old file die
/// too). Returns the expiry.
pub fn create(
    dir: &Path,
    ks: Keystore,
    project: &str,
    entries: &[(String, Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>)],
    ttl_secs: u64,
    agent: Option<&str>,
    window: Option<&crate::window::Window>,
    now: u64,
) -> Result<u64, String> {
    if !is_valid_project(project) {
        return Err(format!("invalid project '{project}'"));
    }
    if entries.is_empty() {
        return Err("no values to lease".into());
    }
    for (name, _) in entries {
        if !is_valid_key(name) {
            return Err(format!("invalid key name '{name}'"));
        }
    }

    let replaced = purge(dir, ks, project);

    let key_bytes = {
        let v = Zeroizing::new(random_bytes(32));
        let mut k = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
        k.copy_from_slice(&v);
        k
    };
    let master = MasterSecret::from_raw_key(&key_bytes, &random_salt());
    let image = v2_create(&master, entries).map_err(|e| format!("encrypting lease: {e}"))?;

    // Atomic file write (0600 temp → fsync → rename → dir fsync), then the
    // keystore anchor. If anchoring fails, the file is removed — never leave a
    // lease file whose key was not durably stored.
    ensure_leases_dir(dir)?;
    let path = lease_file(dir, project);
    let tmp = leases_dir(dir).join(format!(".{project}.lease.tmp"));
    {
        #[cfg(unix)]
        let mut f = {
            use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
            std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
                .write(true)
                .create(true)
                .truncate(true)
                .mode(0o600)
                .open(&tmp)
                .map_err(|e| format!("writing lease: {e}"))?
        };
        #[cfg(not(unix))]
        let mut f = std::fs::File::create(&tmp).map_err(|e| format!("writing lease: {e}"))?;
        f.write_all(&image).map_err(|e| format!("writing lease: {e}"))?;
        let _ = f.sync_all();
    }
    std::fs::rename(&tmp, &path).map_err(|e| format!("writing lease: {e}"))?;
    if let Ok(d) = std::fs::File::open(leases_dir(dir)) {
        let _ = d.sync_all();
    }

    if let Some(w) = window {
        w.validate()?;
    }
    let expires = now.saturating_add(ttl_secs);
    let meta = Meta {
        v: 1,
        project: project.to_string(),
        key: to_hex(key_bytes.as_ref()),
        created: now,
        expires,
        agent: agent.map(String::from),
        window: window.cloned(),
    };
    let mut json = Zeroizing::new(
        serde_json::to_string(&meta).map_err(|e| format!("serializing lease metadata: {e}"))?,
    );
    let stored = keystore_store(dir, ks, project, &json);
    json.zeroize();
    if let Err(e) = stored {
        secure_delete_file(&path);
        return Err(format!("anchoring lease key: {e}"));
    }

    audit(
        dir,
        &format!(
            "CREATE project={project} keys={} ttl={}s agent={} window={}{}",
            entries.iter().map(|(n, _)| n.as_str()).collect::<Vec<_>>().join(","),
            ttl_secs,
            agent.unwrap_or("-"),
            window.map(|w| w.describe()).unwrap_or_else(|| "-".into()),
            if replaced { " (replaced prior lease)" } else { "" },
        ),
    );
    Ok(expires)
}

/// One lease read, normative order (design §5): keystore → TTL (purge on
/// expiry) → agent binding → MAC-verified single-record decrypt.
pub enum ReadOutcome {
    Served(Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>),
    /// No lease for this project (or its file vanished — purged if so).
    NoLease,
    /// TTL passed — the lease was destroyed by this touch.
    Expired,
    /// Agent binding mismatch.
    Denied,
    /// Live lease, but this key was not in the approved set.
    NotInLease,
    /// Corrupt/tampered lease or keystore — never served.
    Error(String),
}

pub fn read(
    dir: &Path,
    ks: Keystore,
    project: &str,
    key: &str,
    caller_agent: Option<&str>,
    now: u64,
) -> ReadOutcome {
    if !is_valid_project(project) || !is_valid_key(key) {
        return ReadOutcome::Error("invalid project/key".into());
    }
    let mut meta = match keystore_load(dir, ks, project) {
        Ok(Some(m)) => m,
        Ok(None) => return ReadOutcome::NoLease,
        Err(e) => return ReadOutcome::Error(e),
    };
    if now >= meta.expires {
        purge(dir, ks, project);
        audit(dir, &format!("EXPIRE project={project} (on read of {key})"));
        return ReadOutcome::Expired;
    }
    if let Some(w) = &meta.window {
        let open = match w.state(now) {
            Ok(crate::window::State::Open { .. }) => true,
            Ok(crate::window::State::Closed { .. }) => false,
            Err(e) => {
                // A window that cannot be evaluated must fail CLOSED.
                audit(dir, &format!("DENY-WINDOW project={project} key={key} (unevaluable: {e})"));
                false
            }
        };
        if !open {
            // Indistinguishable from "no lease" to the caller — a distinct
            // error would tell a prober when the window is. The audit line
            // keeps the truth for the owner. The tap path still works: an
            // attended off-hours read falls through to Touch ID.
            audit(
                dir,
                &format!(
                    "DENY-WINDOW project={project} key={key} caller={} (reported as no-lease)",
                    caller_agent.unwrap_or("-")
                ),
            );
            return ReadOutcome::NoLease;
        }
    }
    if let Some(bound) = &meta.agent {
        if caller_agent != Some(bound.as_str()) {
            audit(
                dir,
                &format!(
                    "DENY project={project} key={key} caller={} bound={bound}",
                    caller_agent.unwrap_or("-")
                ),
            );
            return ReadOutcome::Denied;
        }
    }
    let data = match std::fs::read(lease_file(dir, project)) {
        Ok(d) => d,
        Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
            // Orphan keystore item — the file is gone; kill the key too.
            purge(dir, ks, project);
            audit(dir, &format!("PURGE-ORPHAN project={project} (key without file)"));
            return ReadOutcome::NoLease;
        }
        Err(e) => return ReadOutcome::Error(format!("reading lease: {e}")),
    };
    let key_bytes = match meta.take_key() {
        Ok(k) => k,
        Err(e) => return ReadOutcome::Error(e),
    };
    let salt = match secrets_vault::v2_salt(&data) {
        Ok(s) => s,
        Err(e) => {
            audit(dir, &format!("TAMPER project={project} ({e})"));
            return ReadOutcome::Error(format!("lease file failed verification: {e}"));
        }
    };
    let master = MasterSecret::from_raw_key(&key_bytes, &salt);
    let reader = match VaultReader::open(data, &master) {
        Ok(r) => r,
        Err(e) => {
            audit(dir, &format!("TAMPER project={project} ({e})"));
            return ReadOutcome::Error(format!("lease file failed verification: {e}"));
        }
    };
    match reader.decrypt_one(&master, key) {
        Ok(v) => {
            audit(
                dir,
                &format!(
                    "SERVE project={project} key={key} caller={}",
                    caller_agent.unwrap_or("-")
                ),
            );
            ReadOutcome::Served(v)
        }
        Err(VaultError::NotFound) => {
            audit(dir, &format!("NOT-IN-LEASE project={project} key={key}"));
            ReadOutcome::NotInLease
        }
        Err(e) => {
            audit(dir, &format!("TAMPER project={project} ({e})"));
            ReadOutcome::Error(format!("lease record failed verification: {e}"))
        }
    }
}

/// One lease's state as seen by `lease status` (expired/orphaned leases are
/// purged by the scan itself — status is also the janitor).
pub enum LeaseState {
    Active {
        expires: u64,
        agent: Option<String>,
        keys: Vec<String>,
        window: Option<crate::window::Window>,
    },
    ExpiredPurged,
    /// Lease file without a keystore anchor — dead ciphertext, removed.
    OrphanPurged,
    Corrupt(String),
}

pub fn status(dir: &Path, ks: Keystore, now: u64) -> Vec<(String, LeaseState)> {
    let mut out = Vec::new();
    let Ok(rd) = std::fs::read_dir(leases_dir(dir)) else {
        return out;
    };
    let mut projects: Vec<String> = rd
        .flatten()
        .filter_map(|e| {
            let name = e.file_name().to_string_lossy().into_owned();
            name.strip_suffix(".lease").map(String::from)
        })
        .collect();
    projects.sort();
    for project in projects {
        let state = match keystore_load(dir, ks, &project) {
            Ok(None) => {
                secure_delete_file(&lease_file(dir, &project));
                audit(dir, &format!("PURGE-ORPHAN project={project} (file without key)"));
                LeaseState::OrphanPurged
            }
            Err(e) => LeaseState::Corrupt(e),
            Ok(Some(mut meta)) => {
                if now >= meta.expires {
                    purge(dir, ks, &project);
                    audit(dir, &format!("EXPIRE project={project} (on status)"));
                    LeaseState::ExpiredPurged
                } else {
                    match meta.take_key() {
                        Err(e) => LeaseState::Corrupt(e),
                        Ok(key_bytes) => match std::fs::read(lease_file(dir, &project))
                            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())
                            .and_then(|data| {
                                let salt =
                                    secrets_vault::v2_salt(&data).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
                                let m = MasterSecret::from_raw_key(&key_bytes, &salt);
                                VaultReader::open(data, &m).map_err(|e| e.to_string())
                            }) {
                            Ok(reader) => LeaseState::Active {
                                expires: meta.expires,
                                agent: meta.agent.clone(),
                                window: meta.window.clone(),
                                keys: reader.names().map(String::from).collect(),
                            },
                            Err(e) => LeaseState::Corrupt(format!("failed verification: {e}")),
                        },
                    }
                }
            }
        };
        out.push((project, state));
    }
    out
}

/// The live lease's expiry, if one is anchored (no TTL side effects — display
/// only; enforcement stays in [`read`]).
pub fn expires_at(dir: &Path, ks: Keystore, project: &str) -> Option<u64> {
    keystore_load(dir, ks, project).ok().flatten().map(|m| m.expires)
}

/// Destroy one project's lease. No tap — destroying access is always free.
pub fn revoke(dir: &Path, ks: Keystore, project: &str) -> bool {
    let existed = purge(dir, ks, project);
    if existed {
        audit(dir, &format!("REVOKE project={project}"));
    }
    existed
}

/// Destroy every lease (lock / rekey). Returns how many projects were revoked.
pub fn revoke_all(dir: &Path, ks: Keystore) -> usize {
    let Ok(rd) = std::fs::read_dir(leases_dir(dir)) else {
        return 0;
    };
    let projects: Vec<String> = rd
        .flatten()
        .filter_map(|e| {
            let name = e.file_name().to_string_lossy().into_owned();
            name.strip_suffix(".lease")
                .or_else(|| name.strip_suffix(".key"))
                .map(String::from)
        })
        .collect();
    let mut n = 0;
    let mut seen = std::collections::BTreeSet::new();
    for p in projects {
        if seen.insert(p.clone()) && revoke(dir, ks, &p) {
            n += 1;
        }
    }
    n
}

fn to_hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
    use std::fmt::Write as _;
    let mut s = String::with_capacity(bytes.len() * 2);
    for b in bytes {
        let _ = write!(s, "{b:02x}");
    }
    s
}

// ── Tests (file keystore — no Keychain, no tap, deterministic clock) ──

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    fn tmp_dir(tag: &str) -> PathBuf {
        let d = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
            "secrets-lease-test-{}-{tag}",
            std::process::id()
        ));
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&d);
        std::fs::create_dir_all(&d).unwrap();
        d
    }

    fn zv(s: &str) -> Zeroizing<Vec<u8>> {
        Zeroizing::new(s.as_bytes().to_vec())
    }

    fn entries() -> Vec<(String, Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>)> {
        vec![("DATABASE_URL".into(), zv("postgres://x")), ("API_KEY".into(), zv("sk-1"))]
    }

    const T0: u64 = 1_750_000_000;

    #[test]
    fn window_gates_reads_as_no_lease() {
        let dir = tmp_dir("window-gate");
        // NYSE-shaped window, ±30m grace, evaluated in the named zone.
        let w = crate::window::Window {
            hours: "09:30-16:00".into(),
            tz: "America/New_York".into(),
            days: Some("mon-fri".into()),
            grace_before_secs: 1800,
            grace_after_secs: 1800,
            until: None,
        };
        let wed_10am_edt: u64 = 1784124000; // 2026-07-15 10:00 EDT
        let wed_3am_edt: u64 = 1784098800; // 2026-07-15 03:00 EDT
        let sat_noon: u64 = 1784390400; // 2026-07-18 12:00 EDT
        create(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", &entries(), 30 * 86400, None, Some(&w), wed_3am_edt)
            .unwrap();

        // Inside the window: served.
        match read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "API_KEY", None, wed_10am_edt) {
            ReadOutcome::Served(_) => {}
            _ => panic!("in-window read must serve"),
        }
        // 3am and Saturday: the caller sees exactly NoLease — the refusal must
        // be indistinguishable from a lease that does not exist (no oracle).
        assert!(matches!(
            read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "API_KEY", None, wed_3am_edt),
            ReadOutcome::NoLease
        ));
        assert!(matches!(
            read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "API_KEY", None, sat_noon),
            ReadOutcome::NoLease
        ));
        // The lease itself survives an out-of-window refusal (unlike expiry).
        match read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "API_KEY", None, wed_10am_edt) {
            ReadOutcome::Served(_) => {}
            _ => panic!("lease must survive out-of-window refusals"),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn create_read_round_trip() {
        let dir = tmp_dir("roundtrip");
        let exp = create(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", &entries(), 3600, None, None, T0).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(exp, T0 + 3600);
        match read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "DATABASE_URL", None, T0 + 10) {
            ReadOutcome::Served(v) => assert_eq!(&*v, b"postgres://x"),
            _ => panic!("expected Served"),
        }
        // Unknown key in a live lease: NotInLease, never a value.
        assert!(matches!(
            read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "OTHER", None, T0 + 10),
            ReadOutcome::NotInLease
        ));
        // Unknown project: NoLease.
        assert!(matches!(
            read(&dir, Keystore::File, "nope", "DATABASE_URL", None, T0 + 10),
            ReadOutcome::NoLease
        ));
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
    }

    #[test]
    fn ttl_enforced_on_read_and_self_destructs() {
        let dir = tmp_dir("ttl");
        create(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", &entries(), 60, None, None, T0).unwrap();
        // One second before expiry: served.
        assert!(matches!(
            read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "API_KEY", None, T0 + 59),
            ReadOutcome::Served(_)
        ));
        // At expiry: refused AND both artifacts destroyed by the touch.
        assert!(matches!(
            read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "API_KEY", None, T0 + 60),
            ReadOutcome::Expired
        ));
        assert!(!lease_file(&dir, "proj").exists(), "lease file survived expiry");
        assert!(!key_file(&dir, "proj").exists(), "lease key survived expiry");
        // Subsequent reads: NoLease (already gone).
        assert!(matches!(
            read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "API_KEY", None, T0 + 61),
            ReadOutcome::NoLease
        ));
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
    }

    #[test]
    fn agent_binding_is_enforced() {
        let dir = tmp_dir("agent");
        create(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", &entries(), 3600, Some("claude"), None, T0).unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "API_KEY", Some("claude"), T0 + 1),
            ReadOutcome::Served(_)
        ));
        assert!(matches!(
            read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "API_KEY", Some("grok"), T0 + 1),
            ReadOutcome::Denied
        ));
        assert!(matches!(
            read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "API_KEY", None, T0 + 1),
            ReadOutcome::Denied
        ));
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
    }

    #[test]
    fn revoke_destroys_both_artifacts() {
        let dir = tmp_dir("revoke");
        create(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", &entries(), 3600, None, None, T0).unwrap();
        assert!(revoke(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj"));
        assert!(!lease_file(&dir, "proj").exists());
        assert!(!key_file(&dir, "proj").exists());
        assert!(matches!(
            read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "API_KEY", None, T0 + 1),
            ReadOutcome::NoLease
        ));
        // Idempotent: second revoke reports nothing to do.
        assert!(!revoke(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj"));
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
    }

    #[test]
    fn tampered_lease_never_serves() {
        let dir = tmp_dir("tamper");
        create(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", &entries(), 3600, None, None, T0).unwrap();
        let path = lease_file(&dir, "proj");
        let mut data = std::fs::read(&path).unwrap();
        let n = data.len();
        data[n / 2] ^= 0xFF;
        std::fs::write(&path, &data).unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "API_KEY", None, T0 + 1),
            ReadOutcome::Error(_)
        ));
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
    }

    #[test]
    fn cross_project_transplant_fails() {
        // Copying project A's lease file over project B's must fail: each
        // lease has its own random key, so B's key can't verify A's MAC.
        let dir = tmp_dir("transplant");
        create(&dir, Keystore::File, "aaa", &entries(), 3600, None, None, T0).unwrap();
        create(&dir, Keystore::File, "bbb", &entries(), 3600, None, None, T0).unwrap();
        std::fs::copy(lease_file(&dir, "aaa"), lease_file(&dir, "bbb")).unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            read(&dir, Keystore::File, "bbb", "API_KEY", None, T0 + 1),
            ReadOutcome::Error(_)
        ));
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
    }

    #[test]
    fn recreate_replaces_and_old_copy_is_dead() {
        let dir = tmp_dir("recreate");
        create(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", &entries(), 3600, None, None, T0).unwrap();
        let hoarded = std::fs::read(lease_file(&dir, "proj")).unwrap();
        create(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", &entries(), 3600, None, None, T0 + 5).unwrap();
        // Restore the hoarded old file: the NEW key can't open it.
        std::fs::write(lease_file(&dir, "proj"), &hoarded).unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "API_KEY", None, T0 + 6),
            ReadOutcome::Error(_)
        ));
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
    }

    #[test]
    fn status_reports_and_purges() {
        let dir = tmp_dir("status");
        create(&dir, Keystore::File, "live", &entries(), 3600, Some("claude"), None, T0).unwrap();
        create(&dir, Keystore::File, "old", &entries(), 60, None, None, T0).unwrap();
        // Orphan: a lease file with no keystore anchor.
        std::fs::copy(lease_file(&dir, "live"), lease_file(&dir, "orphan")).unwrap();

        let rows = status(&dir, Keystore::File, T0 + 120);
        let by_name: std::collections::BTreeMap<_, _> =
            rows.iter().map(|(p, s)| (p.as_str(), s)).collect();
        match by_name["live"] {
            LeaseState::Active { expires, agent, keys, window } => {
                assert!(window.is_none());
                assert_eq!(*expires, T0 + 3600);
                assert_eq!(agent.as_deref(), Some("claude"));
                assert_eq!(keys, &["API_KEY".to_string(), "DATABASE_URL".to_string()]);
            }
            _ => panic!("live lease not Active"),
        }
        assert!(matches!(by_name["old"], LeaseState::ExpiredPurged));
        assert!(matches!(by_name["orphan"], LeaseState::OrphanPurged));
        assert!(!lease_file(&dir, "old").exists());
        assert!(!lease_file(&dir, "orphan").exists());
        assert!(lease_file(&dir, "live").exists());
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
    }

    #[test]
    fn revoke_all_sweeps() {
        let dir = tmp_dir("revokeall");
        create(&dir, Keystore::File, "one", &entries(), 3600, None, None, T0).unwrap();
        create(&dir, Keystore::File, "two", &entries(), 3600, None, None, T0).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(revoke_all(&dir, Keystore::File), 2);
        assert_eq!(status(&dir, Keystore::File, T0).len(), 0);
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
    }

    #[test]
    fn ttl_grammar() {
        assert_eq!(parse_ttl("30s").unwrap(), 30);
        assert_eq!(parse_ttl("90m").unwrap(), 5400);
        assert_eq!(parse_ttl("2h").unwrap(), 7200);
        assert_eq!(parse_ttl("1d").unwrap(), 86400);
        assert_eq!(parse_ttl("45").unwrap(), 2700); // bare number = minutes
        assert!(parse_ttl("0m").is_err());
        assert!(parse_ttl("").is_err());
        assert!(parse_ttl("h").is_err());
        assert!(parse_ttl("-5m").is_err());
        assert!(parse_ttl("1w").is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn audit_log_never_contains_values() {
        let dir = tmp_dir("audit");
        create(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", &entries(), 3600, Some("claude"), None, T0).unwrap();
        let _ = read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "API_KEY", Some("claude"), T0 + 1);
        let _ = read(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj", "API_KEY", Some("grok"), T0 + 2);
        revoke(&dir, Keystore::File, "proj");
        let log = std::fs::read_to_string(log_path(&dir)).unwrap();
        assert!(log.contains("CREATE project=proj"));
        assert!(log.contains("SERVE project=proj key=API_KEY caller=claude"));
        assert!(log.contains("DENY project=proj key=API_KEY caller=grok bound=claude"));
        assert!(log.contains("REVOKE project=proj"));
        assert!(!log.contains("sk-1"), "audit log leaked a value");
        assert!(!log.contains("postgres"), "audit log leaked a value");
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
    }
}