second-brain-sync 0.12.0

Bidirectional sync for second-brain: SSH transport, JSONL change log, conflict resolution
Documentation
use std::fs;
use std::io::Write;
use std::os::unix::fs::{OpenOptionsExt, PermissionsExt};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};

use anyhow::{Context, Result, anyhow, bail};
use base64::Engine;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as B64;
use chacha20poly1305::aead::{Aead, KeyInit, OsRng};
use chacha20poly1305::{XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce};
use rand_core::RngCore;

const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
const NONCE_LEN: usize = 24;

const MAGIC_PLAINTEXT: u8 = 0x00;
const MAGIC_XCHACHA: u8 = 0x01;

pub trait SyncEncryptor: Send + Sync {
    fn encrypt(&self, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>>;
    fn decrypt(&self, ciphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>>;
}

pub struct PassthroughEncryptor;

impl SyncEncryptor for PassthroughEncryptor {
    fn encrypt(&self, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
        Ok(plaintext.to_vec())
    }

    fn decrypt(&self, ciphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
        Ok(ciphertext.to_vec())
    }
}

pub struct XChaChaEncryptor {
    key: [u8; KEY_LEN],
}

impl XChaChaEncryptor {
    pub fn new(key: [u8; KEY_LEN]) -> Self {
        Self { key }
    }

    pub fn key_base64(&self) -> String {
        B64.encode(self.key)
    }

    fn cipher(&self) -> XChaCha20Poly1305 {
        XChaCha20Poly1305::new((&self.key).into())
    }
}

impl SyncEncryptor for XChaChaEncryptor {
    fn encrypt(&self, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
        let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
        OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce_bytes);
        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);

        let ct = self
            .cipher()
            .encrypt(nonce, plaintext)
            .map_err(|e| anyhow!("xchacha20poly1305 encrypt failed: {e}"))?;

        let mut framed = Vec::with_capacity(1 + NONCE_LEN + ct.len());
        framed.push(MAGIC_XCHACHA);
        framed.extend_from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
        framed.extend_from_slice(&ct);
        Ok(framed)
    }

    fn decrypt(&self, framed: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
        match framed.first() {
            None => bail!("empty sync payload"),
            Some(&MAGIC_PLAINTEXT) => bail!("refusing an unencrypted sync payload"),
            Some(&MAGIC_XCHACHA) => {
                if framed.len() < 1 + NONCE_LEN {
                    bail!("encrypted payload too short to contain a nonce");
                }
                let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(&framed[1..1 + NONCE_LEN]);
                let ct = &framed[1 + NONCE_LEN..];
                self.cipher().decrypt(nonce, ct).map_err(|e| {
                    anyhow!("xchacha20poly1305 decrypt failed (bad key or tampered payload): {e}")
                })
            }
            Some(other) => bail!("unknown sync payload magic byte: {other:#x}"),
        }
    }
}

/// Seal one plaintext JSONL record into a single base64 line safe for the
/// line-oriented SSH transport. base64 is required because the AEAD frame is
/// binary and the wire is newline-delimited text.
pub fn seal_line(enc: &dyn SyncEncryptor, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<String> {
    let framed = enc.encrypt(plaintext)?;
    Ok(B64.encode(framed))
}

/// Open one wire line back into the plaintext JSONL record.
pub fn open_line(enc: &dyn SyncEncryptor, line: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
    let framed = B64
        .decode(line.trim())
        .context("not an encrypted sync line (plaintext lines are refused)")?;
    enc.decrypt(&framed)
}

#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn frame_format() -> String {
    format!("base64({MAGIC_XCHACHA:#04x} | nonce[{NONCE_LEN}] | xchacha20poly1305 ciphertext)")
}

pub fn default_key_path() -> Result<PathBuf> {
    let home = dirs::home_dir().context("cannot determine home directory")?;
    Ok(home.join(".second-brain").join("sync.key"))
}

/// Load the 32-byte sync key from `path`, generating and persisting a fresh one
/// if absent. The file is written 0600 because the key grants full read of every
/// synced memory (safety: file perms must be 0600).
pub fn load_or_create_key(path: &Path) -> Result<[u8; KEY_LEN]> {
    if let Some(key) = read_key(path)? {
        return Ok(key);
    }
    let mut key = [0u8; KEY_LEN];
    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut key);
    if create_key(path, &key)? {
        return Ok(key);
    }
    read_key(path)?.with_context(|| {
        format!(
            "{} exists but reads as missing; is it a dangling symlink?",
            path.display()
        )
    })
}

fn read_key(path: &Path) -> Result<Option<[u8; KEY_LEN]>> {
    let contents = match fs::read_to_string(path) {
        Ok(contents) => contents,
        Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ok(None),
        Err(e) => return Err(e).context("reading sync key"),
    };
    let raw = B64
        .decode(contents.trim())
        .context("decoding base64 sync key")?;
    let key: [u8; KEY_LEN] = raw
        .as_slice()
        .try_into()
        .map_err(|_| anyhow!("sync key must decode to {KEY_LEN} bytes, got {}", raw.len()))?;
    // correct an over-permissive key file left by an earlier write or manual copy.
    fs::set_permissions(path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))
        .context("tightening sync key permissions to 0600")?;
    Ok(Some(key))
}

/// False when another caller created the key first. The key is staged under a
/// name unique to this call and hard-linked into place, so a concurrent reader
/// never sees a partial key and exactly one creator wins.
fn create_key(path: &Path, key: &[u8; KEY_LEN]) -> Result<bool> {
    if let Some(parent) = path.parent()
        && !parent.as_os_str().is_empty()
    {
        fs::create_dir_all(parent).context("creating sync key parent dir")?;
    }
    let mut staged = path.as_os_str().to_owned();
    staged.push(format!(".{:016x}.tmp", OsRng.next_u64()));
    let staged = PathBuf::from(staged);
    let mut file = fs::OpenOptions::new()
        .write(true)
        .create_new(true)
        .mode(0o600)
        .open(&staged)
        .context("staging the sync key")?;
    let written = file
        .write_all(format!("{}\n", B64.encode(key)).as_bytes())
        .and_then(|()| file.sync_all());
    drop(file);
    if let Err(e) = written {
        let left = match fs::remove_file(&staged) {
            Ok(()) => String::new(),
            Err(cleanup) => format!("; {} was left behind: {cleanup}", staged.display()),
        };
        return Err(e).context(format!("writing sync key{left}"));
    }
    let linked = fs::hard_link(&staged, path);
    if let Err(e) = fs::remove_file(&staged) {
        tracing::warn!("could not remove {}: {e}", staged.display());
    }
    match linked {
        Ok(()) => Ok(true),
        Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => Ok(false),
        Err(e) => Err(e).context("linking the sync key into place"),
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    fn test_key(seed: u8) -> [u8; KEY_LEN] {
        [seed; KEY_LEN]
    }

    #[test]
    fn round_trip_returns_plaintext() {
        let enc = XChaChaEncryptor::new(test_key(7));
        let plaintext = b"sensitive memory line as jsonl";
        let ct = enc.encrypt(plaintext).unwrap();
        assert_ne!(
            ct.as_slice(),
            plaintext,
            "ciphertext must differ from plaintext"
        );
        let pt = enc.decrypt(&ct).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(pt, plaintext);
    }

    #[test]
    fn nonce_is_random_per_message() {
        let enc = XChaChaEncryptor::new(test_key(3));
        let a = enc.encrypt(b"same input").unwrap();
        let b = enc.encrypt(b"same input").unwrap();
        assert_ne!(a, b, "fresh random nonce must yield distinct ciphertext");
    }

    #[test]
    fn decrypt_with_wrong_key_fails() {
        let enc = XChaChaEncryptor::new(test_key(1));
        let other = XChaChaEncryptor::new(test_key(2));
        let ct = enc.encrypt(b"secret").unwrap();
        assert!(
            other.decrypt(&ct).is_err(),
            "AEAD must reject a payload sealed under a different key"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn flipped_ciphertext_byte_fails() {
        let enc = XChaChaEncryptor::new(test_key(9));
        let mut ct = enc.encrypt(b"tamper me").unwrap();
        let last = ct.len() - 1;
        ct[last] ^= 0x01;
        assert!(
            enc.decrypt(&ct).is_err(),
            "Poly1305 tag must reject a single flipped byte"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn legacy_plaintext_frame_is_rejected() {
        let enc = XChaChaEncryptor::new(test_key(5));
        let mut legacy = vec![MAGIC_PLAINTEXT];
        legacy.extend_from_slice(b"{\"local_seq\":1}");
        assert!(enc.decrypt(&legacy).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn empty_frame_is_rejected() {
        let enc = XChaChaEncryptor::new(test_key(5));
        assert!(enc.decrypt(&[]).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn seal_open_line_round_trips() {
        let enc = XChaChaEncryptor::new(test_key(4));
        let record = b"{\"local_seq\":42,\"op\":\"Create\"}";
        let line = seal_line(&enc, record).unwrap();
        assert!(!line.contains('\n'), "wire line must be single-line");
        let out = open_line(&enc, &line).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(out, record);
    }

    #[test]
    fn open_line_rejects_legacy_jsonl() {
        let enc = XChaChaEncryptor::new(test_key(4));
        let legacy = "{\"local_seq\":1,\"op\":\"Create\"}";
        let err = open_line(&enc, legacy).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            err.to_string().contains("not an encrypted sync line"),
            "unexpected error: {err:#}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn open_line_rejects_base64_of_a_plaintext_frame() {
        let enc = XChaChaEncryptor::new(test_key(4));
        let mut legacy = vec![MAGIC_PLAINTEXT];
        legacy.extend_from_slice(b"{\"local_seq\":1}");
        assert!(open_line(&enc, &B64.encode(legacy)).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn load_or_create_key_creates_0600_and_is_idempotent() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let path = dir.path().join("nested").join("sync.key");
        let first = load_or_create_key(&path).unwrap();

        let mode = fs::metadata(&path).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777;
        assert_eq!(mode, 0o600, "key file must be 0600");

        let second = load_or_create_key(&path).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            first, second,
            "second load must return the same persisted key"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_dangling_key_symlink_is_an_error_naming_the_path() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let path = dir.path().join("sync.key");
        std::os::unix::fs::symlink(dir.path().join("gone"), &path).unwrap();
        let error = load_or_create_key(&path).unwrap_err();
        assert!(format!("{error:#}").contains("sync.key"), "{error:#}");
    }

    #[test]
    fn callers_creating_the_key_at_once_all_get_the_one_on_disk() {
        for _ in 0..50 {
            let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
            let path = dir.path().join("sync.key");
            let start = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Barrier::new(16));
            let keys: Vec<[u8; KEY_LEN]> = (0..16)
                .map(|_| {
                    let path = path.clone();
                    let start = start.clone();
                    std::thread::spawn(move || {
                        start.wait();
                        load_or_create_key(&path).unwrap()
                    })
                })
                .collect::<Vec<_>>()
                .into_iter()
                .map(|handle| handle.join().unwrap())
                .collect();
            let on_disk = load_or_create_key(&path).unwrap();
            assert!(keys.iter().all(|key| *key == on_disk));
            assert_eq!(fs::read_dir(dir.path()).unwrap().count(), 1);
        }
    }
}