scope-bca-core 0.8.6

//! # Vulnerability Heuristic Scanner
//!
//! Scans smart contract source code and bytecode for common vulnerability
//! patterns using heuristic analysis. This is NOT a formal verification
//! tool — it identifies patterns that are *often* associated with vulnerabilities.
//!
//! ## Detected Vulnerability Categories
//!
//! - **Reentrancy** - State changes after external calls
//! - **Unchecked external calls** - Missing return value checks on call/send
//! - **Selfdestruct** - Contracts that can be destroyed
//! - **Delegatecall** - Unprotected delegatecall to user-supplied address
//! - **tx.origin** - Authorization via tx.origin
//! - **Integer overflow** - Pre-Solidity 0.8 without SafeMath
//! - **Uninitialized storage** - Storage variables without initialization
//! - **Timestamp dependence** - Block timestamp manipulation
//! - **Front-running** - Susceptible to MEV/front-running

use crate::contract::source::ContractSource;
use regex::Regex;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};

/// Severity level for a vulnerability finding.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum Severity {
    Critical,
    High,
    Medium,
    Low,
    Informational,
}

impl std::fmt::Display for Severity {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        match self {
            Severity::Critical => write!(f, "Critical"),
            Severity::High => write!(f, "High"),
            Severity::Medium => write!(f, "Medium"),
            Severity::Low => write!(f, "Low"),
            Severity::Informational => write!(f, "Informational"),
        }
    }
}

/// Vulnerability category.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum VulnCategory {
    Reentrancy,
    UncheckedCall,
    Selfdestruct,
    Delegatecall,
    TxOrigin,
    IntegerOverflow,
    UninitializedStorage,
    TimestampDependence,
    FrontRunning,
    AccessControl,
    DoS,
    LogicError,
    Informational,
}

impl std::fmt::Display for VulnCategory {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        match self {
            VulnCategory::Reentrancy => write!(f, "Reentrancy"),
            VulnCategory::UncheckedCall => write!(f, "Unchecked External Call"),
            VulnCategory::Selfdestruct => write!(f, "Selfdestruct"),
            VulnCategory::Delegatecall => write!(f, "Delegatecall"),
            VulnCategory::TxOrigin => write!(f, "tx.origin Usage"),
            VulnCategory::IntegerOverflow => write!(f, "Integer Overflow"),
            VulnCategory::UninitializedStorage => write!(f, "Uninitialized Storage"),
            VulnCategory::TimestampDependence => write!(f, "Timestamp Dependence"),
            VulnCategory::FrontRunning => write!(f, "Front-Running"),
            VulnCategory::AccessControl => write!(f, "Access Control"),
            VulnCategory::DoS => write!(f, "Denial of Service"),
            VulnCategory::LogicError => write!(f, "Logic Error"),
            VulnCategory::Informational => write!(f, "Informational"),
        }
    }
}

/// A vulnerability finding from heuristic analysis.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct VulnerabilityFinding {
    /// Unique finding ID (e.g., "SCOPE-REENT-001").
    pub id: String,
    /// Short title.
    pub title: String,
    /// Severity classification.
    pub severity: Severity,
    /// Vulnerability category.
    pub category: VulnCategory,
    /// Detailed description of the finding.
    pub description: String,
    /// Source code location (if available).
    pub source_location: Option<String>,
    /// Recommended fix.
    pub recommendation: String,
}

/// Scan verified source code for vulnerability heuristics.
pub fn scan_vulnerabilities(source: &ContractSource) -> Vec<VulnerabilityFinding> {
    let mut findings = Vec::new();
    let code = &source.source_code;
    let compiler = &source.compiler_version;

    check_reentrancy(code, &mut findings);
    check_unchecked_calls(code, &mut findings);
    check_selfdestruct(code, &mut findings);
    check_delegatecall(code, &mut findings);
    check_tx_origin(code, &mut findings);
    check_integer_overflow(code, compiler, &mut findings);
    check_timestamp_dependence(code, &mut findings);
    check_uninitialized_storage(code, &mut findings);
    check_front_running(code, &mut findings);
    check_dos_patterns(code, &mut findings);

    findings
}

/// Scan bytecode only (unverified contracts) for basic patterns.
pub fn scan_bytecode_only(bytecode: &str) -> Vec<VulnerabilityFinding> {
    let mut findings = Vec::new();
    let code = bytecode.trim_start_matches("0x").to_lowercase();

    // Check for SELFDESTRUCT opcode (0xff)
    if code.contains("ff") {
        // This is a very rough heuristic — 0xff appears in many contexts.
        // Only flag if the bytecode is short (likely a simple destructor)
        if code.len() < 200 {
            findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
                id: "SCOPE-BYTE-001".to_string(),
                title: "Potential SELFDESTRUCT in bytecode".to_string(),
                severity: Severity::Informational,
                category: VulnCategory::Selfdestruct,
                description: "Bytecode may contain SELFDESTRUCT opcode. \
                    Verify source code to confirm."
                    .to_string(),
                source_location: None,
                recommendation: "Verify contract source code to confirm selfdestruct presence."
                    .to_string(),
            });
        }
    }

    // Check for DELEGATECALL opcode (0xf4)
    if code.contains("f4") {
        findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
            id: "SCOPE-BYTE-002".to_string(),
            title: "DELEGATECALL opcode detected".to_string(),
            severity: Severity::Informational,
            category: VulnCategory::Delegatecall,
            description: "Bytecode contains DELEGATECALL. This may be a proxy contract \
                or may delegate execution to another contract."
                .to_string(),
            source_location: None,
            recommendation: "Verify source code to understand delegatecall usage.".to_string(),
        });
    }

    if findings.is_empty() {
        findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
            id: "SCOPE-BYTE-000".to_string(),
            title: "Unverified contract".to_string(),
            severity: Severity::Medium,
            category: VulnCategory::Informational,
            description: "Contract source code is not verified. Full vulnerability analysis \
                requires verified source code."
                .to_string(),
            source_location: None,
            recommendation:
                "Request contract verification on the block explorer before interacting."
                    .to_string(),
        });
    }

    findings
}

/// Check for reentrancy patterns: external calls before state updates.
fn check_reentrancy(code: &str, findings: &mut Vec<VulnerabilityFinding>) {
    // Pattern: .call{value:...}("") followed by state variable assignment
    let re =
        Regex::new(r"\.call\{[^}]*value[^}]*\}\s*\([^)]*\)[\s\S]{0,200}(?:\w+\s*=|\w+\[.*\]\s*=)");
    if let Ok(re) = re
        && re.is_match(code)
    {
        findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
            id: "SCOPE-REENT-001".to_string(),
            title: "Potential reentrancy vulnerability".to_string(),
            severity: Severity::High,
            category: VulnCategory::Reentrancy,
            description: "External call with value transfer found before state variable \
                    update. An attacker could re-enter the function before state is updated."
                .to_string(),
            source_location: None,
            recommendation: "Use the checks-effects-interactions pattern: update state \
                    before making external calls. Consider using ReentrancyGuard."
                .to_string(),
        });
    }

    // Check for .call without reentrancy guard
    if code.contains(".call{")
        && !code.contains("nonReentrant")
        && !code.contains("ReentrancyGuard")
    {
        // Only flag if there are state-changing operations
        if code.contains("balances[") || code.contains("_balances[") {
            findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
                id: "SCOPE-REENT-002".to_string(),
                title: "External call without reentrancy guard".to_string(),
                severity: Severity::Medium,
                category: VulnCategory::Reentrancy,
                description: "Contract makes external calls with value but does not use \
                    a reentrancy guard (nonReentrant modifier)."
                    .to_string(),
                source_location: None,
                recommendation: "Add OpenZeppelin ReentrancyGuard to functions with external calls."
                    .to_string(),
            });
        }
    }
}

/// Check for unchecked low-level calls.
fn check_unchecked_calls(code: &str, findings: &mut Vec<VulnerabilityFinding>) {
    // Pattern: .call(...) without checking return value
    // Look for calls not assigned to (bool success, ) or not in require()
    let re = Regex::new(r"(?:address\([^)]+\)|[\w.]+)\.call\{?[^}]*\}?\([^)]*\)\s*;");
    if let Ok(re) = re {
        for mat in re.find_iter(code) {
            let context = mat.as_str();
            // Skip if return value is checked
            if !context.contains("require") && !context.contains("(bool") {
                findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
                    id: "SCOPE-UCALL-001".to_string(),
                    title: "Unchecked low-level call".to_string(),
                    severity: Severity::Medium,
                    category: VulnCategory::UncheckedCall,
                    description: format!(
                        "Low-level call without return value check: {}",
                        &context[..context.len().min(80)]
                    ),
                    source_location: None,
                    recommendation: "Always check the return value of low-level calls: \
                        (bool success, ) = addr.call(...); require(success);"
                        .to_string(),
                });
                break; // One finding is enough
            }
        }
    }

    // Check for send() without return check
    if code.contains(".send(") && !code.contains("require") {
        let re = Regex::new(r"\.send\([^)]*\)\s*;");
        if let Ok(re) = re
            && re.is_match(code)
        {
            findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
                id: "SCOPE-UCALL-002".to_string(),
                title: "Unchecked send()".to_string(),
                severity: Severity::Medium,
                category: VulnCategory::UncheckedCall,
                description: "send() return value not checked. send() returns false on failure \
                        but does not revert."
                    .to_string(),
                source_location: None,
                recommendation: "Use transfer() instead of send(), or check the return value."
                    .to_string(),
            });
        }
    }
}

/// Check for selfdestruct usage.
fn check_selfdestruct(code: &str, findings: &mut Vec<VulnerabilityFinding>) {
    if code.contains("selfdestruct") || code.contains("suicide") {
        let severity = if code.contains("onlyOwner") || code.contains("onlyAdmin") {
            Severity::Medium
        } else {
            Severity::Critical
        };

        findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
            id: "SCOPE-DESTR-001".to_string(),
            title: "Contract uses selfdestruct".to_string(),
            severity,
            category: VulnCategory::Selfdestruct,
            description: "Contract can be destroyed via selfdestruct. After EIP-6780, \
                selfdestruct only sends ETH (except in same-transaction creation), \
                but the pattern indicates potential fund extraction."
                .to_string(),
            source_location: None,
            recommendation: "Remove selfdestruct if possible. If needed, ensure it's \
                protected by a timelock and multisig."
                .to_string(),
        });
    }
}

/// Check for dangerous delegatecall patterns.
fn check_delegatecall(code: &str, findings: &mut Vec<VulnerabilityFinding>) {
    // Dangerous: delegatecall to user-supplied address
    let re = Regex::new(r"\.delegatecall\(");
    if let Ok(re) = re
        && re.is_match(code)
    {
        // Check if the target is hardcoded or user-supplied
        let dangerous_re = Regex::new(r"(?:address|_\w+|target|impl)\s*\.\s*delegatecall\(");
        let is_likely_user_input = dangerous_re.map(|re| re.is_match(code)).unwrap_or(false);

        if is_likely_user_input {
            findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
                id: "SCOPE-DELCALL-001".to_string(),
                title: "Delegatecall to variable address".to_string(),
                severity: Severity::High,
                category: VulnCategory::Delegatecall,
                description: "Contract uses delegatecall with a variable target address. \
                        If the target is user-controlled, an attacker can execute arbitrary code \
                        in this contract's context."
                    .to_string(),
                source_location: None,
                recommendation: "Ensure delegatecall target is immutable or access-controlled. \
                        Never delegatecall to user-supplied addresses."
                    .to_string(),
            });
        } else {
            findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
                id: "SCOPE-DELCALL-002".to_string(),
                title: "Contract uses delegatecall".to_string(),
                severity: Severity::Low,
                category: VulnCategory::Delegatecall,
                description: "Contract uses delegatecall (common in proxy patterns). \
                        Verify the target address is properly controlled."
                    .to_string(),
                source_location: None,
                recommendation:
                    "Verify delegatecall targets are immutable or behind access control."
                        .to_string(),
            });
        }
    }
}

/// Check for tx.origin usage.
fn check_tx_origin(code: &str, findings: &mut Vec<VulnerabilityFinding>) {
    if !code.contains("tx.origin") {
        return;
    }

    // Check if tx.origin is used for authorization (not just logging)
    let auth_re = Regex::new(r"(?:require|if|assert)\s*\(.*tx\.origin");
    if let Ok(re) = auth_re
        && re.is_match(code)
    {
        // Check if it's tx.origin == msg.sender (less dangerous anti-contract guard)
        if code.contains("tx.origin == msg.sender") || code.contains("msg.sender == tx.origin") {
            findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
                id: "SCOPE-TXORG-002".to_string(),
                title: "tx.origin == msg.sender check".to_string(),
                severity: Severity::Low,
                category: VulnCategory::TxOrigin,
                description: "Contract checks tx.origin == msg.sender as an anti-contract guard. \
                        This prevents contracts from calling these functions but may break \
                        legitimate integrations."
                    .to_string(),
                source_location: None,
                recommendation: "Consider if blocking contract callers is truly necessary. \
                        This pattern limits composability."
                    .to_string(),
            });
        } else {
            findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
                id: "SCOPE-TXORG-001".to_string(),
                title: "tx.origin used for authorization".to_string(),
                severity: Severity::Critical,
                category: VulnCategory::TxOrigin,
                description: "Contract uses tx.origin for authorization checks. \
                        A malicious contract can trick a user into calling it, and then \
                        call this contract on the user's behalf."
                    .to_string(),
                source_location: None,
                recommendation: "Replace tx.origin with msg.sender for all authorization checks."
                    .to_string(),
            });
        }
    }
}

/// Check for integer overflow (pre-Solidity 0.8).
fn check_integer_overflow(code: &str, compiler: &str, findings: &mut Vec<VulnerabilityFinding>) {
    // Solidity 0.8+ has built-in overflow checks
    let is_pre_08 = compiler.contains("v0.4.")
        || compiler.contains("v0.5.")
        || compiler.contains("v0.6.")
        || compiler.contains("v0.7.");

    if !is_pre_08 {
        // Check for unchecked blocks in 0.8+ code
        if code.contains("unchecked {") {
            findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
                id: "SCOPE-OVFLOW-002".to_string(),
                title: "Unchecked arithmetic block".to_string(),
                severity: Severity::Low,
                category: VulnCategory::IntegerOverflow,
                description: "Contract uses unchecked {} blocks which disable overflow checks. \
                    Verify that arithmetic within these blocks cannot overflow."
                    .to_string(),
                source_location: None,
                recommendation: "Ensure values in unchecked blocks have been validated upstream."
                    .to_string(),
            });
        }
        return;
    }

    // Pre-0.8: check for SafeMath usage
    if !code.contains("SafeMath") && !code.contains("safeAdd") && !code.contains("safeSub") {
        findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
            id: "SCOPE-OVFLOW-001".to_string(),
            title: "Pre-0.8 contract without SafeMath".to_string(),
            severity: Severity::High,
            category: VulnCategory::IntegerOverflow,
            description: format!(
                "Contract compiled with {} (pre-0.8) without SafeMath library. \
                 Arithmetic operations may overflow/underflow silently.",
                compiler
            ),
            source_location: None,
            recommendation: "Use OpenZeppelin SafeMath or upgrade to Solidity 0.8+.".to_string(),
        });
    }
}

/// Check for timestamp dependence.
fn check_timestamp_dependence(code: &str, findings: &mut Vec<VulnerabilityFinding>) {
    if code.contains("block.timestamp") || code.contains("now") {
        // Check if timestamp is used in critical logic
        let critical_re =
            Regex::new(r"(?:require|if|assert)\s*\(.*(?:block\.timestamp|now)\s*(?:[<>=!]+|<=|>=)");
        if let Ok(re) = critical_re
            && re.is_match(code)
        {
            findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
                id: "SCOPE-TIME-001".to_string(),
                title: "Timestamp used in critical comparison".to_string(),
                severity: Severity::Low,
                category: VulnCategory::TimestampDependence,
                description: "Block timestamp used in conditional logic. Miners can \
                        manipulate timestamps by ~15 seconds. Avoid using timestamps for \
                        randomness or precise timing."
                    .to_string(),
                source_location: None,
                recommendation: "Use block numbers for time-based logic where precision matters. \
                         Timestamp is acceptable for coarse-grained checks (hours/days)."
                    .to_string(),
            });
        }
    }
}

/// Check for uninitialized storage patterns.
fn check_uninitialized_storage(code: &str, findings: &mut Vec<VulnerabilityFinding>) {
    // Pattern: struct variable declared in function without initialization
    let re = Regex::new(r"function\s+\w+[^{]*\{[^}]*\bstruct\s+\w+\s+\w+\s*;");
    if let Ok(re) = re
        && re.is_match(code)
    {
        findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
            id: "SCOPE-UNINIT-001".to_string(),
            title: "Potential uninitialized storage pointer".to_string(),
            severity: Severity::Medium,
            category: VulnCategory::UninitializedStorage,
            description: "Struct variable declared without explicit storage/memory keyword. \
                    In older Solidity versions, this defaults to storage and may point to \
                    unexpected storage slots."
                .to_string(),
            source_location: None,
            recommendation:
                "Always specify 'memory' or 'storage' for struct variables in functions."
                    .to_string(),
        });
    }
}

/// Check for front-running susceptibility.
fn check_front_running(code: &str, findings: &mut Vec<VulnerabilityFinding>) {
    // Check for approve pattern without allowance check
    if code.contains("function approve") && !code.contains("increaseAllowance") {
        // ERC20 approve front-running is a known issue
        findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
            id: "SCOPE-FRONT-001".to_string(),
            title: "ERC20 approve front-running".to_string(),
            severity: Severity::Informational,
            category: VulnCategory::FrontRunning,
            description: "Standard ERC20 approve() is susceptible to front-running. \
                An attacker can front-run an allowance change to spend both old and new values."
                .to_string(),
            source_location: None,
            recommendation: "Implement increaseAllowance/decreaseAllowance pattern, \
                or require setting allowance to 0 before changing."
                .to_string(),
        });
    }

    // Check for commit-reveal missing in auction/governance
    if (code.contains("bid") || code.contains("vote"))
        && !code.contains("commit")
        && code.contains("function")
    {
        // Only flag if there are actual bid/vote functions
        let fn_re = Regex::new(r"function\s+(?:bid|vote|placeBid|castVote)");
        if let Ok(re) = fn_re
            && re.is_match(code)
        {
            findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
                id: "SCOPE-FRONT-002".to_string(),
                title: "Bid/vote without commit-reveal".to_string(),
                severity: Severity::Medium,
                category: VulnCategory::FrontRunning,
                description: "Contract has bid/vote functions without commit-reveal scheme. \
                            On-chain bids/votes are visible in the mempool and can be front-run."
                    .to_string(),
                source_location: None,
                recommendation: "Implement a commit-reveal scheme for private bidding/voting."
                    .to_string(),
            });
        }
    }
}

/// Check for denial-of-service patterns.
fn check_dos_patterns(code: &str, findings: &mut Vec<VulnerabilityFinding>) {
    // Check for loops over dynamic arrays
    let re = Regex::new(r"for\s*\([^)]*;\s*\w+\s*<\s*\w+\.length\s*;");
    if let Ok(re) = re
        && re.is_match(code)
    {
        // Check if the array could be user-controlled
        if code.contains("push(") {
            findings.push(VulnerabilityFinding {
                id: "SCOPE-DOS-001".to_string(),
                title: "Unbounded loop over dynamic array".to_string(),
                severity: Severity::Medium,
                category: VulnCategory::DoS,
                description: "Contract loops over a dynamic array that can grow via push(). \
                        If the array grows large enough, the loop may exceed the block gas limit, \
                        making the function uncallable."
                    .to_string(),
                source_location: None,
                recommendation: "Set a maximum array size, use pagination, or restructure \
                        to avoid iterating over unbounded arrays."
                    .to_string(),
            });
        }
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use crate::contract::source::ContractSource;

    fn make_source(code: &str, compiler: &str) -> ContractSource {
        ContractSource {
            contract_name: "Test".to_string(),
            source_code: code.to_string(),
            abi: "[]".to_string(),
            compiler_version: compiler.to_string(),
            optimization_used: true,
            optimization_runs: 200,
            evm_version: "paris".to_string(),
            license_type: "MIT".to_string(),
            is_proxy: false,
            implementation_address: None,
            constructor_arguments: String::new(),
            library: String::new(),
            swarm_source: String::new(),
            parsed_abi: vec![],
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_selfdestruct_detection() {
        let src = make_source("function kill() { selfdestruct(owner); }", "v0.8.19");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(
            findings
                .iter()
                .any(|f| f.category == VulnCategory::Selfdestruct)
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_tx_origin_detection() {
        let src = make_source(
            "function withdraw() { require(tx.origin == owner); }",
            "v0.8.19",
        );
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(
            findings
                .iter()
                .any(|f| f.category == VulnCategory::TxOrigin)
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_pre08_no_safemath() {
        let src = make_source("contract Token { uint256 x = a + b; }", "v0.7.6");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(
            findings
                .iter()
                .any(|f| f.category == VulnCategory::IntegerOverflow)
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_08_with_unchecked() {
        let src = make_source("unchecked { x = a + b; }", "v0.8.19");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-OVFLOW-002"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_bytecode_only_scan() {
        let findings = scan_bytecode_only("0x6080604052");
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.title.contains("Unverified")));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_erc20_approve_frontrunning() {
        let src = make_source(
            "function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) public returns (bool) {}",
            "v0.8.19",
        );
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(
            findings
                .iter()
                .any(|f| f.category == VulnCategory::FrontRunning)
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_clean_contract() {
        let src = make_source(
            "pragma solidity ^0.8.19;\ncontract Safe { function foo() view returns (uint) { return 1; } }",
            "v0.8.19",
        );
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(
            !findings
                .iter()
                .any(|f| f.severity == Severity::Critical || f.severity == Severity::High)
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_severity_display_all() {
        assert_eq!(format!("{}", Severity::Critical), "Critical");
        assert_eq!(format!("{}", Severity::High), "High");
        assert_eq!(format!("{}", Severity::Medium), "Medium");
        assert_eq!(format!("{}", Severity::Low), "Low");
        assert_eq!(format!("{}", Severity::Informational), "Informational");
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_vuln_category_display_all() {
        assert_eq!(format!("{}", VulnCategory::Reentrancy), "Reentrancy");
        assert_eq!(
            format!("{}", VulnCategory::UncheckedCall),
            "Unchecked External Call"
        );
        assert_eq!(format!("{}", VulnCategory::Selfdestruct), "Selfdestruct");
        assert_eq!(format!("{}", VulnCategory::Delegatecall), "Delegatecall");
        assert_eq!(format!("{}", VulnCategory::TxOrigin), "tx.origin Usage");
        assert_eq!(
            format!("{}", VulnCategory::IntegerOverflow),
            "Integer Overflow"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            format!("{}", VulnCategory::UninitializedStorage),
            "Uninitialized Storage"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            format!("{}", VulnCategory::TimestampDependence),
            "Timestamp Dependence"
        );
        assert_eq!(format!("{}", VulnCategory::FrontRunning), "Front-Running");
        assert_eq!(format!("{}", VulnCategory::AccessControl), "Access Control");
        assert_eq!(format!("{}", VulnCategory::DoS), "Denial of Service");
        assert_eq!(format!("{}", VulnCategory::LogicError), "Logic Error");
        assert_eq!(format!("{}", VulnCategory::Informational), "Informational");
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_reentrancy_call_value_state_update() {
        let code = "function withdraw(uint amount) {\n  (bool ok,) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}(\"\");\n  balances[msg.sender] = 0;\n}";
        let src = make_source(code, "v0.8.19");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-REENT-001"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_reentrancy_no_guard_with_balances() {
        let code = "function send() { (bool s,) = addr.call{value: 1}(\"\"); balances[addr] = 0; }";
        let src = make_source(code, "v0.8.19");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-REENT-002"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_unchecked_low_level_call() {
        let code = "function pay() { address(target).call{value: 1}(\"\"); }";
        let src = make_source(code, "v0.8.19");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-UCALL-001"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_unchecked_send() {
        let code = "function pay() { addr.send(1 ether); }";
        let src = make_source(code, "v0.8.19");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-UCALL-002"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_delegatecall_variable_addr() {
        let code = "function f(address target) { target.delegatecall(data); }";
        let src = make_source(code, "v0.8.19");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-DELCALL-001"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_delegatecall_constant() {
        let code = "function f() { IMPL.delegatecall(data); }";
        let src = make_source(code, "v0.8.19");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-DELCALL-002"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_tx_origin_msg_sender_comparison() {
        let code = "function check() { require(tx.origin == msg.sender); }";
        let src = make_source(code, "v0.8.19");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-TXORG-002"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_tx_origin_dangerous_auth() {
        let code = "function check() { require(tx.origin == owner); }";
        let src = make_source(code, "v0.8.19");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-TXORG-001"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_timestamp_dependence_require() {
        let code = "function claim() { require(block.timestamp > deadline); }";
        let src = make_source(code, "v0.8.19");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-TIME-001"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_front_running_bid_no_commit() {
        let code = "contract Auction { function bid() public payable {} function placeBid() {} }";
        let src = make_source(code, "v0.8.19");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-FRONT-002"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_dos_unbounded_loop() {
        let code = "function distribute() { for (uint i = 0; i < recipients.length; i++) {} } function add() { recipients.push(addr); }";
        let src = make_source(code, "v0.8.19");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-DOS-001"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_pre08_with_safemath_no_finding() {
        let src = make_source("using SafeMath for uint256; uint x = a.add(b);", "v0.7.6");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(!findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-OVFLOW-001"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_08_no_unchecked_no_overflow() {
        let src = make_source("uint x = a + b;", "v0.8.19");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(
            !findings
                .iter()
                .any(|f| f.category == VulnCategory::IntegerOverflow)
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_bytecode_short_with_ff() {
        let findings = scan_bytecode_only("0xff");
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-BYTE-001"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_bytecode_with_delegatecall_opcode() {
        let code = "6080604052f46080604052f46080604052f46080604052f46080604052f46080604052f46080604052f46080604052f46080604052f46080604052f46080604052";
        let findings = scan_bytecode_only(code);
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-BYTE-002"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_selfdestruct_with_owner_guard_medium() {
        let src = make_source(
            "function kill() onlyOwner { selfdestruct(owner); }",
            "v0.8.19",
        );
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        let sd = findings
            .iter()
            .find(|f| f.category == VulnCategory::Selfdestruct)
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(sd.severity, Severity::Medium);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_selfdestruct_no_guard_critical() {
        let src = make_source(
            "function kill() public { selfdestruct(msg.sender); }",
            "v0.8.19",
        );
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        let sd = findings
            .iter()
            .find(|f| f.category == VulnCategory::Selfdestruct)
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(sd.severity, Severity::Critical);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_suicide_alias_detected() {
        let src = make_source("function kill() { suicide(owner); }", "v0.4.24");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(
            findings
                .iter()
                .any(|f| f.category == VulnCategory::Selfdestruct)
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_pre04_compiler_overflow() {
        let src = make_source("contract X { }", "v0.4.24");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-OVFLOW-001"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_pre05_compiler_overflow() {
        let src = make_source("contract X { }", "v0.5.17");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-OVFLOW-001"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_pre06_compiler_overflow() {
        let src = make_source("contract X { }", "v0.6.12");
        let findings = scan_vulnerabilities(&src);
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.id == "SCOPE-OVFLOW-001"));
    }
}