Sandlock

Lightweight process sandbox for Linux. Confines untrusted code using Landlock (filesystem + network + IPC), seccomp-bpf (syscall filtering), and seccomp user notification (resource limits, IP enforcement, /proc virtualization). No root, no cgroups, no containers.

sandlock run -w /tmp -r /usr -r /lib -m 512M -- python3 untrusted.py

Why Sandlock?

Containers and VMs are powerful but heavy. Sandlock targets the gap: strict confinement without image builds or root privileges. Built-in COW filesystem protects your working directory automatically.

Feature	Sandlock	Container	MicroVM (Firecracker)
Root required	No	Yes*	Yes (KVM)
Image build	No	Yes	Yes
Startup time	~5 ms	~200 ms	~100 ms
Kernel	Shared	Shared	Separate guest
Filesystem isolation	Landlock + seccomp COW	Overlay	Block-level
Network isolation	Landlock + seccomp notif	Network namespace	TAP device
HTTP-level ACL	Method + host + path rules	N/A	N/A
Syscall filtering	seccomp-bpf	seccomp	N/A
Resource limits	seccomp notif + SIGSTOP	cgroup v2	VM config

* Rootless containers exist but require user namespace support and /etc/subuid configuration.

Architecture

Sandlock is implemented in Rust for performance and safety:

• sandlock-core — Rust library: Landlock, seccomp, supervisor, COW, pipeline
• sandlock-cli — Rust CLI binary (sandlock run ...)
• sandlock-ffi — C ABI shared library (libsandlock_ffi.so)
• Python SDK — ctypes bindings to the FFI library

                    ┌─────────────┐
                    │  Python SDK │  ctypes FFI
                    │  (sandlock) │──────────────┐
                    └─────────────┘              │
                                                 ▼
┌──────────────┐    ┌──────────────────────────────┐
│ sandlock CLI │───>│       libsandlock_ffi.so      │
└──────────────┘    └──────────────┬───────────────┘
                                   │
                    ┌──────────────▼───────────────┐
                    │        sandlock-core          │
                    │  Landlock · seccomp · COW ·   │
                    │  pipeline · policy_fn · vDSO  │
                    └──────────────────────────────┘

Requirements

• Linux 6.12+ (Landlock ABI v6), Rust 1.70+ (to build)
• Python 3.8+ (optional, for Python SDK)
• No root, no cgroups

Feature	Minimum kernel
seccomp user notification	5.6
Landlock filesystem rules	5.13
Landlock TCP port rules	6.7 (ABI v4)
Landlock IPC scoping	6.12 (ABI v6)

Protections can be selectively waived per-policy when needed — see docs/sandbox-reference.md#protection-opt-out.

Install

From source

# Build the Rust binary and shared library
cargo build --release

# Install Python SDK (auto-builds Rust FFI library)
cd python && pip install -e .

CLI only

cargo install --path crates/sandlock-cli

Quick Start

CLI

# Basic confinement
sandlock run -r /usr -r /lib -w /tmp -- ls /tmp

# Interactive shell
sandlock run -i -r /usr -r /lib -r /lib64 -r /bin -r /etc -w /tmp -- /bin/sh

# Resource limits + timeout
sandlock run -m 512M -P 20 -t 30 -- ./compute.sh

# Outbound allowlist — restrict to one host on one port
sandlock run --net-allow api.openai.com:443 -r /usr -r /lib -r /etc -- python3 agent.py

# Multiple ports for one host, plus a separate any-IP port
sandlock run --net-allow github.com:22,443 --net-allow :8080 \
  -r /usr -r /lib -r /etc -- python3 agent.py

# Wildcard port (optional): a bare `host` (or `host:*`) permits every port
sandlock run --net-allow github.com -r /usr -r /lib -r /etc -- ssh user@github.com

# IP, CIDR range, or IPv6 literal as the target (matched by containment,
# no DNS); same grammar as --net-deny
sandlock run --net-allow 10.0.0.0/8:443 --net-allow '[2606:4700::/32]:443' \
  -r /usr -r /lib -r /etc -- python3 agent.py

# Unrestricted outbound: `*` opens any host and any TCP port (`:*` / `*:*`
# are equivalent). For full egress add a UDP wildcard, `udp://*`.
sandlock run --net-allow '*' --net-allow 'udp://*' \
  -r /usr -r /lib -r /etc -- ./client

# UDP — scheme prefix gates the protocol and scopes the destination
# (e.g. DNS to 1.1.1.1, plus TCP HTTPS to anywhere)
sandlock run --net-allow udp://1.1.1.1:53 --net-allow :443 \
  -r /usr -r /lib -r /etc -- ./client

# Ping — kernel ping socket (SOCK_DGRAM) gated by net.ipv4.ping_group_range
sandlock run --net-allow icmp://github.com -r /usr -r /lib -r /etc -- ping github.com

# Denylist: default-allow networking, block specific IPs/CIDRs/ports
# (inverse of --net-allow; mutually exclusive with it). Port is optional.
sandlock run --net-deny 169.254.169.254 --net-deny 10.0.0.0/8 \
  -r /usr -r /lib -r /etc -- python3 agent.py

# HTTP-level ACL (method + host + path rules via transparent proxy)
# HTTP rules with concrete hosts auto-extend --net-allow with host:80,443
sandlock run \
  --http-allow "GET docs.python.org/*" \
  --http-allow "POST api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions" \
  --http-deny "* */admin/*" \
  -r /usr -r /lib -r /etc -- python3 agent.py

# HTTPS MITM, zero-config: sandlock generates an ephemeral CA and splices it
# into the trust bundle(s) you name. No openssl, no manual install.
sandlock run \
  --http-allow "POST api.openai.com/v1/*" \
  --http-inject-ca /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
  -r /usr -r /lib -r /etc -- python3 agent.py

# Node and other runtimes with a compiled-in CA list: export the cert and
# wire the runtime's own env var.
sandlock run \
  --http-allow "POST api.example.com/*" \
  --http-inject-ca /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
  --http-ca-out /tmp/sandlock-ca.pem \
  --env NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=/tmp/sandlock-ca.pem \
  -r /usr -r /lib -r /etc -- node agent.js

# HTTPS MITM with your own CA (still supported)
sandlock run \
  --http-allow "POST api.openai.com/v1/*" \
  --http-ca ca.pem --http-key ca-key.pem \
  -r /usr -r /lib -r /etc -- python3 agent.py

# Server listening on ports (Landlock --net-allow-bind, separate from --net-allow;
# accepts comma-separated ports and lo-hi ranges, repeatable)
sandlock run --net-allow-bind 8080,9000-9005 -r /usr -r /lib -r /etc -- python3 server.py

# Clean environment
sandlock run --clean-env --env CC=gcc \
  -r /usr -r /lib -w /tmp -- make

# Deterministic execution (frozen time + seeded randomness)
sandlock run --time-start "2000-01-01T00:00:00Z" --random-seed 42 -- ./build.sh

# Port virtualization (multiple sandboxes can bind the same port)
sandlock run --port-remap --net-allow-bind 6379 -r /usr -r /lib -r /etc -- redis-server --port 6379

# Port virtualization with named sandboxes (enables network discovery)
sandlock run --name api.local --port-remap --net-allow-bind 8080 -r /usr -r /lib -r /etc -- python3 server.py
sandlock run --name web.local --port-remap --net-allow-bind 8080 -r /usr -r /lib -r /etc -- python3 server.py

# List all running sandboxes
sandlock list

# Kill a running sandbox by name
sandlock kill web.local

# Chroot with per-sandbox mount (no kernel bind mount needed)
sandlock run --chroot ./rootfs --fs-mount /work:/tmp/sandbox/work -- /bin/sh

# COW filesystem (writes captured, committed on success)
sandlock run --workdir /opt/project -r /usr -r /lib -- python3 task.py

# Dry-run (show what files would change, then discard)
sandlock run --dry-run --workdir . -w . -r /usr -r /lib -r /bin -r /etc -- make build

# Use a saved profile
sandlock run -p build -- make -j4

# No-supervisor mode (Landlock + deny-only seccomp, no supervisor process)
sandlock run --no-supervisor -r /usr -r /lib -r /lib64 -r /bin -w /tmp -- ./script.sh

# Nested sandboxing: confine sandlock's own supervisor
sandlock run --no-supervisor -r /proc -r /usr -r /lib -r /lib64 -r /bin -r /etc -w /tmp -- \
  sandlock run -r /usr -w /tmp -- untrusted-command

Python API

from sandlock import Sandbox, confine

sandbox = Sandbox(
    fs_writable=["/tmp/sandbox"],
    fs_readable=["/usr", "/lib", "/etc"],
    max_memory="256M",
    max_processes=10,
    clean_env=True,
)

# Run a command (with optional timeout in seconds)
result = sandbox.run(["python3", "-c", "print('hello')"], timeout=30)
assert result.success
assert b"hello" in result.stdout

# HTTP ACL: only allow specific API calls
agent = Sandbox(
    fs_readable=["/usr", "/lib", "/etc"],
    http_allow=["POST api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions"],
    http_deny=["* */admin/*"],
)
result = agent.run(["python3", "agent.py"])

# Chroot with per-sandbox mount (Docker-style -v, no root needed)
chrooted = Sandbox(
    chroot="/opt/rootfs",
    fs_mount={"/work": "/tmp/sandbox-1/work"},  # maps /work inside chroot
    fs_readable=["/usr", "/bin", "/lib", "/etc"],
    cwd="/work",
)
result = chrooted.run(["python3", "task.py"])

# Port virtualization: query port mappings while sandbox is running
sb = Sandbox(port_remap=True, fs_readable=["/usr", "/lib", "/etc"], name="api.local")
# sb.ports() returns {virtual_port: real_port} while running

# Confine the current process (Landlock filesystem only, irreversible)
confine(Sandbox(fs_readable=["/usr", "/lib"], fs_writable=["/tmp"]))

# Dry-run: see what files would change, then discard
sandbox = Sandbox(fs_writable=["."], workdir=".", fs_readable=["/usr", "/lib", "/bin", "/etc"])
result = sandbox.dry_run(["make", "build"])
for c in result.changes:
    print(f"{c.kind}  {c.path}")  # A=added, M=modified, D=deleted

Pipeline

Chain sandboxed stages with the | operator — each stage has its own independent sandbox config. Data flows through kernel pipes.

from sandlock import Sandbox

trusted = Sandbox(fs_readable=["/usr", "/lib", "/bin", "/etc", "/opt/data"])
restricted = Sandbox(fs_readable=["/usr", "/lib", "/bin", "/etc"])

# Reader can access data, processor cannot
result = (
    trusted.cmd(["cat", "/opt/data/secret.csv"])
    | restricted.cmd(["tr", "a-z", "A-Z"])
).run()
assert b"SECRET" in result.stdout

XOA pattern (eXecute Only Agents): planner generates code, executor runs it with data access but no network:

planner = Sandbox(fs_readable=["/usr", "/lib", "/bin", "/etc"])
executor = Sandbox(fs_readable=["/usr", "/lib", "/bin", "/etc", "/data"])

result = (
    planner.cmd(["python3", "-c", "print('cat /data/input.txt')"])
    | executor.cmd(["sh"])
).run()

Dynamic Policy (policy_fn)

Inspect syscall events at runtime and adjust permissions on the fly. Events carry syscall name, category, PID, network destination (for connect/sendto/bind), and argv (for execve). The callback returns a verdict to allow, deny, or audit.

from sandlock import Sandbox
import errno

def on_event(event, ctx):
    # Block download tools by argv
    if event.syscall == "execve" and event.argv_contains("curl"):
        return True  # deny

    # Deny connections to a specific IP
    if event.syscall == "connect" and event.host == "10.0.0.5":
        return errno.EACCES

    # Lock down once the program has finished starting up
    if event.syscall == "execve":
        ctx.restrict_network([])           # block all network
        ctx.deny_path("/etc/shadow")       # dynamic fs deny

    # Audit every file access (allow but flag)
    if event.category == "file":
        return "audit"

    return 0  # allow

sandbox = Sandbox(
    fs_readable=["/usr", "/lib", "/etc"],
    net_allow=["api.example.com:443"],
    policy_fn=on_event,
)
result = sandbox.run(["python3", "agent.py"])

Verdicts: 0/False = allow, True/-1 = deny (EPERM), positive int = deny with errno, "audit"/-2 = allow + flag.

Event fields: syscall, category (file/network/process/memory), pid, parent_pid, host, port, argv, denied.

TOCTOU NOTE Per seccomp_unotify(2), the kernel re-reads user-memory pointers after Continue. Sandlock handles this in two places:

• Path strings are not exposed on events. Path-based access control belongs in static Landlock rules (fs_readable / fs_writable / fs_denied) — kernel-enforced and TOCTOU-immune. Use ctx.deny_path() for runtime additions.
• event.argv is exposed and TOCTOU-safe. Before exposing argv to policy_fn or returning Continue for an execve, the supervisor freezes every task in ProcessIndex, including peer processes that may alias argv through shared memory. With policy_fn active, fork-like syscalls are traced for one ptrace creation event, so children are registered in ProcessIndex before they can run user code. If the freeze or creation tracking cannot be established (e.g., YAMA blocks ptrace), the syscall is denied with EPERM; the safety invariant is never silently relaxed.

Context methods:

• ctx.restrict_network(ips) / ctx.grant_network(ips) — network control
• ctx.restrict_max_memory(bytes) / ctx.restrict_max_processes(n) — resource limits
• ctx.deny_path(path) / ctx.allow_path(path) — dynamic filesystem restriction
• ctx.restrict_pid_network(pid, ips) — per-PID network override

Held syscalls (child blocked until callback returns): execve, connect, sendto, bind, openat.

Rust API

use sandlock_core::{confine, Confinement, Sandbox, Stage};
use sandlock_core::sandbox::ByteSize;
use sandlock_core::policy_fn::Verdict;

// Basic run
let mut sandbox = Sandbox::builder()
    .fs_read("/usr").fs_read("/lib")
    .fs_write("/tmp")
    .max_memory(ByteSize::mib(256))
    .name("hello-box")
    .build()?;
let result = sandbox.run(&["echo", "hello"]).await?;
assert!(result.success());

// HTTP ACL: restrict API access at the HTTP level
let mut agent = Sandbox::builder()
    .fs_read("/usr").fs_read("/lib").fs_read("/etc")
    .http_allow("POST api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions")
    .http_deny("* */admin/*")
    .name("agent-box")
    .build()?;
let result = agent.run(&["python3", "agent.py"]).await?;

// Confine the current process (Landlock filesystem only, irreversible)
let confinement = Confinement::builder()
    .fs_read("/usr").fs_read("/lib")
    .fs_write("/tmp")
    .build();
confine(&confinement)?;

// Pipeline
let producer = Sandbox::builder()
    .fs_read("/usr").fs_read("/lib").fs_read("/bin")
    .build()?;
let consumer = producer.clone();
let result = (
    Stage::new(&producer, &["echo", "hello"])
    | Stage::new(&consumer, &["tr", "a-z", "A-Z"])
).run(None).await?;

// Dynamic policy
let mut dynamic = Sandbox::builder()
    .fs_read("/usr").fs_read("/lib")
    .policy_fn(|event, ctx| {
        if event.argv_contains("curl") {
            return Verdict::Deny;
        }
        if event.syscall == "execve" {
            ctx.restrict_network(&[]);
            ctx.deny_path("/etc/shadow");
        }
        Verdict::Allow
    })
    .build()?;
let result = dynamic.run(&["python3", "agent.py"]).await?;

Profiles

Save reusable sandbox profiles as TOML files in ~/.config/sandlock/profiles/. Profiles use a sectioned schema; top-level flat keys such as fs_readable = [...] are rejected. Pass a sandbox instance name with --name when you need a stable virtual hostname.

# ~/.config/sandlock/profiles/build.toml
[program]
exec = "make"
args = ["-j4"]
clean_env = true
env = { CC = "gcc", LANG = "C.UTF-8" }

[filesystem]
read = ["/usr", "/lib", "/lib64", "/bin", "/etc"]
write = ["/tmp/work"]

[limits]
memory = "512M"
processes = 50

[syscalls]
extra_deny = []

sandlock profile list
sandlock profile show build
sandlock run -p build        # uses [program].exec + args
sandlock run -p build -- make test  # trailing command overrides [program]

How It Works

Sandlock applies confinement in sequence after fork():

Parent                              Child
  │  fork()                           │
  │──────────────────────────────────>│
  │                                   ├─ 1. setpgid(0,0)
  │                                   ├─ 2. Optional: chdir(cwd)
  │                                   ├─ 3. NO_NEW_PRIVS
  │                                   ├─ 4. Landlock (fs + net + IPC)
  │                                   ├─ 5. seccomp filter (deny + notif)
  │                                   │     └─ send notif fd ──> Parent
  │  receive notif fd                 ├─ 6. Wait for "ready" signal
  │  start supervisor (tokio)         ├─ 7. Close fds 3+
  │  optional: vDSO patching          └─ 8. exec(cmd)
  │  optional: policy_fn thread
  │  optional: CPU throttle task

Seccomp Supervisor

The async notification supervisor (tokio) handles intercepted syscalls:

Syscall	Handler
clone/fork/vfork	Process count enforcement
mmap/munmap/brk/mremap	Memory limit tracking
connect/sendto/sendmsg	IP allowlist + on-behalf execution + HTTP ACL redirect
bind	On-behalf bind + port remapping
openat	/proc virtualization, COW interception
unlinkat/mkdirat/renameat2	COW write interception
execve/execveat	policy_fn hold + vDSO re-patching
getrandom	Deterministic PRNG injection
clock_nanosleep/timer_settime	Timer adjustment for frozen time
getdents64	PID filtering, COW directory merging
getsockname	Port remap translation

Custom Handlers

Downstream Rust crates can append their own seccomp-notification handlers to the supervisor chain alongside the builtins, registering for any syscall they care about via the Handler trait and Sandbox::run_with_handlers. The builtin chain runs first, so user handlers cannot subvert confinement; the registration step also rejects handlers on syscalls in the default blocklist or extra_deny_syscalls. See docs/extension-handlers.md for the full API, ordering semantics, and state patterns.

COW Filesystem

Copy-on-write filesystem isolation via seccomp notification: when workdir is set, sandlock intercepts filesystem syscalls and stages writes in an upper directory; reads resolve upper-then-lower. No mount namespace, no user namespace, no root. Committed on exit, aborted on error.

Dry-run mode: --dry-run runs the command, inspects the COW layer for changes (added/modified/deleted files), prints a summary, then aborts — leaving the workdir completely untouched. Useful for previewing what a command would do before committing.

COW Fork & Map-Reduce

Initialize expensive state once, then fork COW clones that share memory. Each clone uses raw fork(2) with shared copy-on-write pages. 1000 clones in ~530ms, ~1,900 forks/sec.

Each clone's stdout is captured via its own pipe. reduce() reads all pipes and feeds combined output to a reducer's stdin — fully pipe-based data flow with no temp files.

from sandlock import Sandbox

def init():
    global model, data
    model = load_model()          # 2 GB, loaded once
    data = preprocess_dataset()

def work(clone_id):
    shard = data[clone_id::4]
    print(sum(shard))             # stdout → per-clone pipe

# Map: fork 4 clones with a separate sandbox config
mapper = Sandbox(
    fs_readable=["/usr", "/lib", "/bin", "/etc", "/data"],
    init_fn=init,
    work_fn=work,
)
clones = mapper.fork(4)

# Reduce: pipe clone outputs to reducer stdin
reducer = Sandbox(fs_readable=["/usr", "/lib", "/bin", "/etc"])
result = reducer.reduce(
    ["python3", "-c", "import sys; print(sum(int(l) for l in sys.stdin))"],
    clones,
)
print(result.stdout)  # b"total\n"

let mut mapper = Sandbox::builder()
    .fs_read("/usr").fs_read("/lib").fs_read("/bin").fs_read("/etc")
    .fs_read("/data")
    .name("mapper")
    .init_fn(|| { load_data(); })
    .work_fn(|id| { println!("{}", compute(id)); })
    .build()?;
let mut clones = mapper.fork(4).await?;

let reducer = Sandbox::builder()
    .fs_read("/usr").fs_read("/lib").fs_read("/bin").fs_read("/etc")
    .name("reducer")
    .build()?;
let result = reducer.reduce(
    &["python3", "-c", "import sys; print(sum(int(l) for l in sys.stdin))"],
    &mut clones,
).await?;

Map and reduce run in separate sandboxes with independent configs — the mapper has data access, the reducer doesn't. Each clone inherits Landlock + seccomp confinement. CLONE_ID=0..N-1 is set automatically.

Network Model

Outbound traffic is gated by an endpoint list naming protocol × destination. --net-allow (allowlist) and --net-deny (denylist) share one grammar and are mutually exclusive:

<spec>     repeatable; the port is optional (a bare target = all ports)
  target   host | <ip> | <cidr> | *           (`*` or empty target = any IP)
  forms    target[:port[,port,...]] · :port · host:* · :* · *:*
           [<ipv6|cidr>]:port                  (bracket IPv6 when a port follows)
  scheme   tcp:// (default) · udp:// (`udp://*` = any UDP) · icmp:// (no port)

  --net-allow  target may also be a hostname, resolved via DNS at start
  --net-deny   target must be a literal IP/CIDR (no hostnames; use --http-deny)

A comma groups ports within one spec (host:80,443); to pass multiple rules, repeat the flag. IP and CIDR targets are matched by containment with no DNS (an IP literal is a /32 or /128); only hostnames resolve.

Multiple rules are OR'd. A destination is permitted iff some rule matches the same protocol as the socket plus the destination IP and port (port is N/A for ICMP).

Protocol gating falls out of rule presence per scheme:

• No UDP rule → UDP socket creation is denied at the seccomp layer.
• No ICMP rule → kernel ping socket creation (SOCK_DGRAM + IPPROTO_ICMP) is denied at the seccomp layer.
• Raw ICMP (SOCK_RAW + IPPROTO_ICMP) is never exposed — packet crafting is out of scope. Workloads that need ping should rely on the host's net.ipv4.ping_group_range and use the dgram path above (--net-allow icmp://...).
• TCP is always permitted at the syscall level; destinations are governed by Landlock and/or the on-behalf path.

Defaults. With no --net-allow and no HTTP ACL flags, Landlock denies every TCP connect(), UDP / ICMP / raw socket creation are denied at the seccomp layer, and there is no on-behalf path active. For unrestricted TCP egress, opt in explicitly with --net-allow '*'; for any UDP, add --net-allow 'udp://*'.

Denylist (--net-deny). The inverse of the allowlist: networking is default-allow and the listed targets are blocked. It uses the same grammar as --net-allow above, the only difference being that targets must be literal IPs/CIDRs (hostnames are rejected; use --http-deny for domains). Examples:

--net-deny 10.0.0.0/8               # all ports on a CIDR (all protocols)
--net-deny 169.254.169.254:80      # one IP, one port
--net-deny 169.254.169.254:80,443  # comma-separated ports in one rule
--net-deny '*'                     # any IP, all ports (TCP)
--net-deny 'udp://192.168.0.0/16'  # any UDP to a CIDR

Resolution. Only hostname targets touch DNS: they are resolved once at sandbox start and pinned in a synthetic /etc/hosts (across all protocols). IP and CIDR targets are matched by containment directly, so they never resolve and never appear in /etc/hosts. The synthetic file replaces the real one only when at least one rule has a concrete hostname; rules made purely of IPs/CIDRs, :port, udp://*, or icmp://* leave the real /etc/hosts and DNS visible.

Wildcards. Hostnames are matched literally — --net-allow *.example.com:443 is not supported, list each domain you need (or use a CIDR/IP target for an address range). The * token is allowed as the target (alias for empty: *:port ≡ :port) and as the port for TCP/UDP rules (host:*, :*, *:*). The port is optional: omitting it means all ports, so host ≡ host:* and * ≡ :* ≡ *:* (and udp://* ≡ udp://*:*). Mixing * with concrete ports (host:80,*) is rejected. When any TCP rule uses the all-ports wildcard, Landlock no longer filters TCP connect at the kernel level (it cannot express "every port" without enumerating 65535 rules); the on-behalf path becomes the sole enforcer, and for :* it short-circuits to allow-all.

Implementation. Two enforcement paths:

• Direct path — pure :port TCP policies (any IP, no concrete host/IP/CIDR) and no HTTP ACL. Landlock enforces the TCP port allowlist at the kernel level; no per-syscall overhead. UDP and ICMP are not covered by Landlock and always use the on-behalf path when allowed.
• On-behalf path — any host, IP, or CIDR target, any HTTP ACL rule, or any UDP / ICMP rule (the destination IP must be checked, which Landlock cannot do). Seccomp traps connect(), sendto(), sendmsg(), and sendmmsg(); the supervisor dups the child fd, queries getsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_PROTOCOL) to learn whether the socket is TCP / UDP / ICMP, then checks the destination against that protocol's resolved allowlist before performing the syscall. The HTTP/HTTPS proxy redirect (when configured) happens here too.

HTTP / HTTPS interception. --http-allow / --http-deny route matching ports through a transparent proxy. Each rule with a concrete host auto-extends --net-allow with host:80 (and host:443 when --http-ca is set) so the proxy's intercept ports are reachable; wildcard hosts auto-add :80 / :443 (any IP). All auto-added entries are TCP. HTTPS MITM is enabled two ways: pass --http-ca <cert> and --http-key <key> to bring your own CA, or pass --http-inject-ca <bundle> to have sandlock generate an ephemeral CA (private key in memory only) and splice its public cert into each named trust bundle at open time, so the workload trusts the proxy with no manual install. For runtimes with a compiled-in CA store such as Node, --http-ca-out <path> writes the public cert so you can point the runtime's own env var at it (e.g. NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS). Without any of these, port 443 is not intercepted: --net-allow host:443 permits raw TLS to the host with no content inspection.

Bind. --net-allow-bind <ports> is independent from --net-allow and governs server-side bind() as a default-deny allowlist. Each value is a comma-separated list of single ports or inclusive lo-hi ranges (e.g. --net-allow-bind 8080,9000-9005), and the flag repeats. Landlock enforces it (TCP only); --port-remap adds on-behalf virtualization for binding. --net-deny-bind <ports> is the inverse: default-allow binding, deny the listed TCP ports (same port syntax, mutually exclusive with --net-allow-bind). Because Landlock is allowlist-only, a deny-bind relaxes the Landlock BIND_TCP hook and enforces the denylist on the on-behalf seccomp bind() path instead.

AF_UNIX sockets are governed by Landlock's LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET, independent from --net-allow.

Port Virtualization

Each sandbox gets a full virtual port space. Multiple sandboxes can bind the same port without conflicts. The supervisor performs bind() on behalf of the child via pidfd_getfd (TOCTOU-safe). When a port conflicts, a different real port is allocated transparently. /proc/net/tcp is filtered to only show the sandbox's own ports.

When --port-remap is enabled, the sandbox registers its state in a shared registry (/dev/shm). Use sandlock list to see all running sandboxes and sandlock kill to stop them:

$ sandlock list
NAME                    PID  PORTS
api.local            12345  8080
web.local            12346  8080 -> 35299

$ sandlock kill web.local
Killed sandbox 'web.local' (PID 12346)

This enables external reverse proxies (nginx, envoy) to route traffic by name to the correct real port.

Performance

Benchmarked on a typical Linux workstation:

Workload	Bare metal	Sandlock	Docker	Sandlock overhead
/bin/echo startup	2 ms	7 ms	307 ms	5 ms (44x faster than Docker)
Redis SET (100K ops)	82K rps	80K rps	52K rps	97.1% of bare metal
Redis GET (100K ops)	79K rps	77K rps	53K rps	97.1% of bare metal
Redis p99 latency	0.5 ms	0.6 ms	1.5 ms	~2.5x lower than Docker
COW fork ×1000	—	530 ms	—	530μs/fork, ~1,900 forks/sec

Testing

# Rust tests
cargo test --release

# Python tests
cd python && pip install -e . && pytest tests/

Sandbox Reference

The full Sandbox configuration reference — every field, default, and grouping — lives in docs/sandbox-reference.md.