s4_codec/index.rs
1//! Frame index — Range GET の partial fetch を可能にするための sidecar object 形式。
2//!
3//! ## 課題
4//!
5//! S4-multipart object は `[S4F2 frame]([S4P1 padding][S4F2 frame])*` のシーケンス。
6//! Range GET (e.g. `bytes=N-M`) を効率的に処理するには、(a) どの frame が
7//! decompressed offset N..M に対応しているか、(b) その frame は object body の
8//! どこ (compressed_offset) から始まるか、を知る必要がある。
9//!
10//! ## 解決策
11//!
12//! `<key>.s4index` という sidecar object に下記の binary index を書く:
13//!
14//! ```text
15//! ┌──── v1 32 byte header ─┐
16//! │ S4IX magic (4) │
17//! │ version u32 (4) │
18//! │ total_frames u64 (8) │
19//! │ total_original u64 (8) │
20//! │ total_padded u64 (8) │ ← S3 上の object サイズ (padding 含む)
21//! └────────────────────────┘
22//! 各 frame について 32 byte:
23//! original_offset u64 LE
24//! original_size u64 LE
25//! compressed_offset u64 LE ← S3 object body における frame header の開始位置
26//! compressed_size u64 LE ← header (28 byte) + payload の合計
27//! ```
28//!
29//! 1000 frame で 32 KB、10000 frame で 320 KB。10 万 frame でも 3.2 MB に収まる。
30//!
31//! ## 使い方
32//!
33//! - PUT: 1 frame の単純 index、PUT 完了後に sidecar 書込
34//! - CompleteMultipartUpload: object 全体を一度 fetch + scan して index を構築
35//! - Range GET: sidecar fetch → `lookup_range(start, end)` で frame 範囲 + S3 byte 範囲を取得
36//! → backend に partial Range GET → frame parse → decompress → slice
37//!
38//! ## v0.8.4 #73 H-2: source object version binding (v2 header)
39//!
40//! v1 では sidecar に source object の identity が無いため、object overwrite 後に
41//! sidecar が stale のままだと Range GET が **間違った frame** を返す危険があった
42//! (古い byte offset で新 object を partial GET する hazard)。攻撃者が backend を
43//! 直接触れる脅威モデルでは、偽 sidecar を仕込めば任意 frame を露呈させ得る。
44//!
45//! 対策として v2 header に `source_etag` と `source_compressed_size` を追加。GET
46//! 側は HEAD で current etag を取って一致確認 → 不一致なら sidecar を信用せず full
47//! GET path に fall back する。
48//!
49//! ```text
50//! ┌──── v2 header (variable) ┐
51//! │ S4IX magic (4) │
52//! │ version u32 (4) = 2 │
53//! │ total_frames u64 (8) │
54//! │ total_original u64 (8) │
55//! │ total_padded u64 (8) │
56//! │ source_compressed_size u64 (8) ← v2 で追加
57//! │ etag_len u32 (4) ← v2 で追加 (UTF-8 byte length, 0 = absent)
58//! │ etag bytes (etag_len) ← v2 で追加 (RFC 7232 entity-tag, quotes 含む)
59//! └──────────────────────────┘
60//! ```
61//!
62//! - **back-compat**: v1 sidecar が backend に既存していれば read-only で `decode_index`
63//! が `source_etag = None`, `source_compressed_size = None` で復元する。GET 側は
64//! `None` を見たら "legacy sidecar — verify skip, full GET にも fallback できる"
65//! と扱う (= 既存挙動保持)。
66//! - **新規 PUT**: 常に v2 を書く。`source_etag` は backend response の e_tag、
67//! `source_compressed_size` は put body 長 (= `total_padded_size`) が原則。
68//!
69//! ## v0.9 #106 encryption-aware sidecar (v3 header)
70//!
71//! v0.8.12 #120 で SSE 有効時の sidecar emission を全 skip にしたため、SSE-S4 /
72//! SSE-KMS / SSE-C いずれかが有効な object の Range GET は **常に buffered fallback**
73//! (full body fetch → 全 decrypt → frame parse → slice) になっていた。5 GiB の
74//! SSE-S4 object に 100 byte の Range GET を投げると 5 GiB 転送が発生する。
75//!
76//! v0.9 #106 はこれを SSE-S4 chunked (S4E6 / `--sse-chunk-size > 0`) **だけ** で
77//! 解消する。S4E6 は per-chunk 独立 decrypt 可能なので、必要な chunk 範囲だけを
78//! backend に partial GET → 該当 chunk(s) を decrypt → frame parse → slice という
79//! partial-fetch 経路が成立する。SSE-KMS / SSE-C / S4E2 buffered は引き続き
80//! v0.8.12 #120 の buffered fallback (= sidecar 全 skip)。
81//!
82//! v3 header は v2 の etag 末尾に SSE chunk geometry block を 30 byte 追加した形:
83//!
84//! ```text
85//! ┌──── v3 header (variable) ──┐
86//! │ S4IX magic (4) │
87//! │ version u32 (4) = 3 │
88//! │ total_frames u64 (8) │
89//! │ total_original u64 (8) │
90//! │ total_padded u64 (8) │ ← S3 上の post-encrypt object サイズ
91//! │ source_compressed_size u64 │ ← v2 から継承
92//! │ etag_len u32 (4) │
93//! │ etag bytes (etag_len) │
94//! │ ── v3 SSE block (30 B) ─── │ ← v3 で追加
95//! │ enc_chunk_size u32 LE (4) │ ← S4E6 plaintext bytes per chunk
96//! │ enc_chunk_count u32 LE (4) │
97//! │ enc_key_id u16 LE (2) │
98//! │ enc_salt [u8; 8] │ ← S4E6 per-PUT salt (nonce derivation 用)
99//! │ enc_plaintext_len u64 LE │ ← pre-encrypt body 長 (= post-compress)
100//! │ enc_header_bytes u32 LE │ ← 24 (S4E6_HEADER_BYTES)
101//! └────────────────────────────┘
102//! ```
103//!
104//! v3 では `compressed_offset` / `compressed_size` は **pre-encrypt body** (=
105//! post-compress framed body) の offset のまま。 GET 側は、その offset を
106//! `enc_chunk_size` で割って enclosing chunk index を計算し、そのチャンク群だけを
107//! backend から partial GET、decrypt、frame parse、slice する。
108//!
109//! - **back-compat**: v1 / v2 sidecar の decode 経路は 1 bit も触らない。
110//! `decode_index` の version dispatch に `v if v == 3` arm を増やすだけ。
111//! v3 sidecar を v0.8.x server (v2 のみ) が GET しても `UnsupportedVersion(3)` で
112//! sidecar 無効化 → 既存 buffered fallback に落ちるので破壊しない。
113//! - **GET path**: v3 sidecar の `enc_chunk_size > 0` を見たら encrypted Range GET
114//! fast-path 起動。`enc_chunk_size == 0` は「非 SSE で v3 を書きたい場合」用の
115//! 将来余地 (現状 server は SSE-S4 chunked 専用に v3 を emit、 他は v2 のまま)。
116//! - **scope out**: SSE-KMS / SSE-C / S4E2 buffered (`--sse-chunk-size 0`) /
117//! multipart は v3 sidecar を emit しない (= 既存 v0.8.12 #120 挙動保持、
118//! buffered fallback 経路)。 v0.10+ の roadmap。
119
120use bytes::{Buf, BufMut, Bytes, BytesMut};
121use thiserror::Error;
122
123pub const INDEX_MAGIC: &[u8; 4] = b"S4IX";
124/// v0.9 #106: bumped 2 → 3. v3 appends a 30-byte SSE chunk-geometry
125/// block (enc_chunk_size, enc_chunk_count, enc_key_id, enc_salt,
126/// enc_plaintext_len, enc_header_bytes) after the v2 etag payload so
127/// the GET path can compute encrypted byte ranges for SSE-S4 chunked
128/// (S4E6) objects and run partial-fetch + per-chunk decrypt without a
129/// full body read. v1 / v2 readers stay as back-compat paths
130/// (`decode_index` dispatches on the version field — a v3 sidecar
131/// read by a v0.8.x server surfaces as `UnsupportedVersion(3)` and
132/// drops out to the existing buffered fallback).
133pub const INDEX_VERSION: u32 = 3;
134/// v0.8.4 #73 H-2 era version. Retained as a write-side option for
135/// non-encrypted single-PUT objects (see [`encode_index`] — emits v3
136/// only when `enc_chunk_size > 0`, i.e. SSE-S4 chunked is active,
137/// otherwise v2). Decode-side keeps reading both.
138pub const INDEX_VERSION_V2: u32 = 2;
139/// Legacy v1 fixed header — kept for tests / back-compat readers.
140pub const INDEX_VERSION_V1: u32 = 1;
141/// v1 fixed header layout (kept for back-compat readers).
142pub const HEADER_FIXED_V1: usize = 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 8; // 32
143/// v2 fixed header layout (`HEADER_FIXED_V1` + `source_compressed_size` u64 +
144/// `etag_len` u32). The variable-length `etag` payload follows.
145pub const HEADER_FIXED_V2: usize = HEADER_FIXED_V1 + 8 + 4; // 44
146/// v0.9 #106: v3 SSE chunk-geometry block size (always appended after the
147/// v2 etag payload when `version == 3`). Fields: `enc_chunk_size u32 +
148/// enc_chunk_count u32 + enc_key_id u16 + enc_salt [u8;8] +
149/// enc_plaintext_len u64 + enc_header_bytes u32`.
150pub const SSE_BLOCK_V3: usize = 4 + 4 + 2 + 8 + 8 + 4; // = 30
151/// v0.8.16 F-15: kept for back-compat with external consumers that
152/// imported the v0.8.10-era constant. **DEPRECATED** — the value
153/// `40` was a typo (it should have been `44` for the v2 fixed
154/// header). Use [`HEADER_FIXED_V1`] / [`HEADER_FIXED_V2`] directly.
155#[deprecated(
156 since = "0.8.16",
157 note = "INDEX_HEADER_BYTES was an off-by-4 typo; use HEADER_FIXED_V1 or HEADER_FIXED_V2 instead"
158)]
159pub const INDEX_HEADER_BYTES: usize = HEADER_FIXED_V2;
160pub const ENTRY_BYTES: usize = 8 + 8 + 8 + 8;
161
162#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
163pub struct FrameIndexEntry {
164 /// この frame が担当する decompressed byte 範囲の開始 (累計、0-based)
165 pub original_offset: u64,
166 /// 解凍後 byte 数 (frame header の original_size と同じ)
167 pub original_size: u64,
168 /// S3 object body 内での frame 開始位置 (S4F2 magic の先頭 byte)
169 pub compressed_offset: u64,
170 /// frame 全体のバイト数 (28 byte header + payload)
171 pub compressed_size: u64,
172}
173
174impl FrameIndexEntry {
175 /// v0.8.15 H-a: was plain `self.original_offset + self.original_size`,
176 /// which panics in `dev` (workspace `overflow_checks = true`) and
177 /// wraps in release on an attacker-supplied sidecar entry with
178 /// `original_offset = u64::MAX - 10` and `original_size = 100`.
179 /// `decode_index` now also pre-validates each entry below, so this
180 /// `saturating_add` is defence-in-depth — a corrupted in-memory
181 /// `FrameIndexEntry` cannot crash the gateway through `binary_search_by`.
182 pub fn original_end(&self) -> u64 {
183 self.original_offset.saturating_add(self.original_size)
184 }
185 pub fn compressed_end(&self) -> u64 {
186 self.compressed_offset.saturating_add(self.compressed_size)
187 }
188}
189
190#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
191pub struct FrameIndex {
192 /// S3 上の object 全体サイズ (padding frame 含む)
193 pub total_padded_size: u64,
194 pub entries: Vec<FrameIndexEntry>,
195 /// v0.8.4 #73 H-2: backend-reported ETag of the source object the
196 /// sidecar describes. Populated by `s4-server::put_object` from the
197 /// backend's PUT response so the matching GET can `head_object` and
198 /// confirm it's still talking about the same body. `None` for legacy
199 /// (v1) sidecars decoded out of an existing backend, in which case
200 /// the GET path treats the partial-fetch as best-effort and falls
201 /// back to a full read on any inconsistency signal.
202 pub source_etag: Option<String>,
203 /// v0.8.4 #73 H-2: backend object's compressed bytes length the sidecar
204 /// was computed against. Cross-check signal alongside `source_etag` —
205 /// some backends (lifecycle moves, multi-object operations) can change
206 /// the bytes without a fresh ETag, so a size mismatch is independently
207 /// load-bearing. `None` on legacy v1 sidecars.
208 pub source_compressed_size: Option<u64>,
209 /// v0.9 #106: SSE-S4 chunked (S4E6) geometry binding. `Some(..)` if
210 /// the source object was encrypted with `--sse-chunk-size > 0` —
211 /// in that case the on-disk body is an S4E6 frame and the GET path
212 /// can map `compressed_offset` (pre-encrypt) → enclosing chunk
213 /// index → encrypted byte range, fetch just those chunks, and
214 /// decrypt them independently. `None` for v1 / v2 sidecars and
215 /// for v3 sidecars written under non-SSE / SSE-KMS / SSE-C /
216 /// S4E2-buffered (which keep the v0.8.12 #120 buffered fallback).
217 pub sse_v3: Option<SseChunkBinding>,
218}
219
220/// v0.9 #106: per-object SSE-S4 chunked (S4E6) geometry, stored in v3
221/// sidecars. The salt + key_id let the GET path derive the per-chunk
222/// AES-GCM nonce + AAD without re-fetching the encrypted body's
223/// header bytes. Salt is **not secret** (it lives in the on-disk
224/// S4E6 header in plaintext anyway); duplicating it here saves one
225/// HEAD/GET round-trip per Range request.
226#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
227pub struct SseChunkBinding {
228 /// S4E6 plaintext bytes per chunk (matches `--sse-chunk-size`).
229 /// Must be `> 0` for an SSE binding to be considered valid.
230 pub enc_chunk_size: u32,
231 /// Total number of S4E6 chunks in the body (= `ceil(plaintext.len() /
232 /// enc_chunk_size)`, always `>= 1`).
233 pub enc_chunk_count: u32,
234 /// Keyring slot the active key was at PUT time. The GET path uses
235 /// it to look up the same key for decrypt.
236 pub enc_key_id: u16,
237 /// 8-byte per-PUT random salt (S4E6). Fed into the nonce + AAD
238 /// derivation; lives in the encrypted body's header in plaintext
239 /// anyway, so duplicating it in the sidecar leaks nothing.
240 pub enc_salt: [u8; 8],
241 /// Pre-encrypt plaintext body length (= post-compress, post-frame
242 /// body length). Used to validate the chunk-walk math against the
243 /// encrypted body length the backend reports.
244 pub enc_plaintext_len: u64,
245 /// Fixed header size of the S4E6 frame (== `S4E6_HEADER_BYTES` =
246 /// 24 today). Carried explicitly so a future S4E7-style bump
247 /// doesn't silently break v3 sidecar decode.
248 pub enc_header_bytes: u32,
249}
250
251impl FrameIndex {
252 pub fn total_original_size(&self) -> u64 {
253 self.entries.last().map(|e| e.original_end()).unwrap_or(0)
254 }
255
256 /// Range request `[start, end_exclusive)` を解決して必要 frame の (start_idx, end_idx_exclusive)
257 /// と S3 上の partial-fetch byte range `[byte_start, byte_end_exclusive)` を返す。
258 ///
259 /// 1 frame でもオーバーラップしていればその frame の **全 byte** を fetch する
260 /// (= 部分 frame は decompress 単位)。
261 pub fn lookup_range(&self, start: u64, end_exclusive: u64) -> Option<RangePlan> {
262 if self.entries.is_empty() || start >= end_exclusive {
263 return None;
264 }
265 let total = self.total_original_size();
266 if start >= total {
267 return None;
268 }
269 let clamped_end = end_exclusive.min(total);
270
271 // start を含む frame を二分探索 (entries は original_offset 昇順)
272 let first_idx = match self.entries.binary_search_by(|e| {
273 if e.original_end() <= start {
274 std::cmp::Ordering::Less
275 } else if e.original_offset > start {
276 std::cmp::Ordering::Greater
277 } else {
278 std::cmp::Ordering::Equal
279 }
280 }) {
281 Ok(i) => i,
282 Err(_) => return None,
283 };
284 // end を含む frame (end-1 を含むもの)
285 let last_inclusive = clamped_end - 1;
286 let last_idx = match self.entries.binary_search_by(|e| {
287 if e.original_end() <= last_inclusive {
288 std::cmp::Ordering::Less
289 } else if e.original_offset > last_inclusive {
290 std::cmp::Ordering::Greater
291 } else {
292 std::cmp::Ordering::Equal
293 }
294 }) {
295 Ok(i) => i,
296 Err(_) => return None,
297 };
298
299 let byte_start = self.entries[first_idx].compressed_offset;
300 let byte_end_exclusive = self.entries[last_idx].compressed_end();
301 Some(RangePlan {
302 first_frame_idx: first_idx,
303 last_frame_idx_inclusive: last_idx,
304 byte_start,
305 byte_end_exclusive,
306 // slice 開始 / 終了の original 内 offset
307 slice_start_in_combined: start - self.entries[first_idx].original_offset,
308 slice_end_in_combined: clamped_end - self.entries[first_idx].original_offset,
309 })
310 }
311}
312
313/// `lookup_range` の結果。`byte_start..byte_end_exclusive` を S3 から fetch、
314/// 該当 frames を decompress し、結果バイト列を `[slice_start_in_combined,
315/// slice_end_in_combined)` で slice すれば最終結果。
316#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
317pub struct RangePlan {
318 pub first_frame_idx: usize,
319 pub last_frame_idx_inclusive: usize,
320 pub byte_start: u64,
321 pub byte_end_exclusive: u64,
322 pub slice_start_in_combined: u64,
323 pub slice_end_in_combined: u64,
324}
325
326/// v0.9 #106: encrypted partial-fetch plan for the SSE-S4 chunked
327/// (S4E6) Range GET fast-path. Given a [`RangePlan`] (which describes
328/// the *pre-encrypt* byte range to fetch) plus the per-object SSE
329/// binding, computes the actual encrypted byte range to send the
330/// backend, the S4E6 chunk index range to walk, and where the
331/// pre-encrypt byte range lands inside the decrypted chunk
332/// concatenation.
333///
334/// Caller workflow:
335///
336/// 1. backend partial GET `body[enc_byte_start..enc_byte_end_exclusive)`
337/// plus the S4E6 fixed header (already cached in the sidecar's
338/// `SseChunkBinding`, no extra fetch).
339/// 2. for `chunk_idx in chunk_idx_start..=chunk_idx_last_inclusive`,
340/// `decrypt_chunk(chunk_idx, &body[..])` — the sidecar's salt +
341/// key_id provide the AAD / nonce material.
342/// 3. concatenate the decrypted plaintext, slice off
343/// `pre_encrypt_slice_start_in_concat..pre_encrypt_slice_end_in_concat`
344/// to land at the [`RangePlan`]'s `byte_start..byte_end_exclusive`
345/// (= pre-encrypt) range.
346/// 4. frame-parse + decompress + final slice via the existing
347/// [`RangePlan`] machinery.
348#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
349pub struct EncryptedRangePlan {
350 /// First S4E6 chunk that overlaps the requested pre-encrypt range
351 /// (inclusive).
352 pub chunk_idx_start: u32,
353 /// Last S4E6 chunk that overlaps the requested pre-encrypt range
354 /// (inclusive).
355 pub chunk_idx_last_inclusive: u32,
356 /// Byte offset within the **encrypted** backend body where the
357 /// fetch starts (covers chunk `chunk_idx_start`'s tag + ciphertext).
358 pub enc_byte_start: u64,
359 /// Byte offset (exclusive) within the encrypted backend body where
360 /// the fetch ends (covers through chunk `chunk_idx_last_inclusive`).
361 pub enc_byte_end_exclusive: u64,
362 /// Offset within the decrypted-chunk concatenation where the
363 /// pre-encrypt slice starts (= `RangePlan.byte_start - chunk_idx_start *
364 /// enc_chunk_size`).
365 pub pre_encrypt_slice_start_in_concat: u64,
366 /// Offset within the decrypted-chunk concatenation where the
367 /// pre-encrypt slice ends (exclusive).
368 pub pre_encrypt_slice_end_in_concat: u64,
369}
370
371impl SseChunkBinding {
372 /// Per-chunk on-disk byte cost: ciphertext (= plaintext bytes,
373 /// AES-GCM is CTR-mode) + 16-byte auth tag. Final chunk may carry
374 /// fewer plaintext bytes; this helper returns the *non-final*
375 /// chunk cost.
376 pub fn enc_chunk_stride(&self) -> u64 {
377 self.enc_chunk_size as u64 + 16
378 }
379
380 /// On-disk byte length of chunk `chunk_idx`. Non-final chunks
381 /// carry `enc_chunk_size` plaintext bytes (+ 16-byte tag); the
382 /// final chunk carries `enc_plaintext_len - (chunk_count - 1) *
383 /// enc_chunk_size` plaintext bytes (+ tag).
384 pub fn enc_chunk_on_disk_size(&self, chunk_idx: u32) -> u64 {
385 if chunk_idx + 1 < self.enc_chunk_count {
386 self.enc_chunk_stride()
387 } else {
388 // Final chunk: total plaintext minus the chunks before it.
389 let prior = (chunk_idx as u64).saturating_mul(self.enc_chunk_size as u64);
390 let final_pt = self.enc_plaintext_len.saturating_sub(prior);
391 final_pt + 16
392 }
393 }
394
395 /// Encrypted-body byte offset of the *start* of chunk `chunk_idx`
396 /// (= the chunk's tag byte). Non-final chunks stride at
397 /// `enc_chunk_stride()`.
398 pub fn enc_chunk_byte_offset(&self, chunk_idx: u32) -> u64 {
399 self.enc_header_bytes as u64 + (chunk_idx as u64).saturating_mul(self.enc_chunk_stride())
400 }
401}
402
403impl FrameIndex {
404 /// v0.9 #106: extend a [`RangePlan`] (pre-encrypt byte range) to
405 /// an [`EncryptedRangePlan`] that names the actual encrypted
406 /// chunks to fetch + decrypt. Returns `None` if the index lacks
407 /// an [`SseChunkBinding`] (= non-SSE / v1 / v2 sidecar), or if
408 /// the [`RangePlan`]'s pre-encrypt range falls outside the SSE
409 /// binding's declared plaintext length (= sidecar / body
410 /// mismatch — caller should fall back to the buffered path).
411 pub fn encrypted_lookup(&self, plan: &RangePlan) -> Option<EncryptedRangePlan> {
412 let sse = self.sse_v3.as_ref()?;
413 if sse.enc_chunk_size == 0 || sse.enc_chunk_count == 0 {
414 return None;
415 }
416 if plan.byte_end_exclusive > sse.enc_plaintext_len
417 || plan.byte_start >= plan.byte_end_exclusive
418 {
419 return None;
420 }
421 let chunk_size = sse.enc_chunk_size as u64;
422 let chunk_idx_start_u64 = plan.byte_start / chunk_size;
423 let chunk_idx_last_u64 = (plan.byte_end_exclusive - 1) / chunk_size;
424 // Belt-and-braces: refuse any chunk index outside the declared
425 // chunk_count window. Either the sidecar is internally
426 // inconsistent or `compressed_offset` exceeded the SSE
427 // plaintext length (caught above) — both mean the sidecar is
428 // not trustworthy for this Range, so the GET path should fall
429 // back to the buffered full read.
430 if chunk_idx_last_u64 >= sse.enc_chunk_count as u64 {
431 return None;
432 }
433 let chunk_idx_start = chunk_idx_start_u64 as u32;
434 let chunk_idx_last_inclusive = chunk_idx_last_u64 as u32;
435 let enc_byte_start = sse.enc_chunk_byte_offset(chunk_idx_start);
436 let enc_byte_end_exclusive = sse.enc_chunk_byte_offset(chunk_idx_last_inclusive)
437 + sse.enc_chunk_on_disk_size(chunk_idx_last_inclusive);
438 let pre_encrypt_slice_start_in_concat =
439 plan.byte_start - (chunk_idx_start as u64) * chunk_size;
440 let pre_encrypt_slice_end_in_concat =
441 plan.byte_end_exclusive - (chunk_idx_start as u64) * chunk_size;
442 Some(EncryptedRangePlan {
443 chunk_idx_start,
444 chunk_idx_last_inclusive,
445 enc_byte_start,
446 enc_byte_end_exclusive,
447 pre_encrypt_slice_start_in_concat,
448 pre_encrypt_slice_end_in_concat,
449 })
450 }
451}
452
453#[derive(Debug, Error)]
454pub enum IndexError {
455 #[error("index too short: {0} bytes")]
456 TooShort(usize),
457 #[error("bad index magic: {got:?}")]
458 BadMagic { got: [u8; 4] },
459 #[error("unsupported index version {0} (this build supports {INDEX_VERSION})")]
460 UnsupportedVersion(u32),
461 #[error("entry count {claimed} doesn't match buffer remaining {remaining}")]
462 EntryCountMismatch { claimed: u64, remaining: usize },
463 /// v0.8.15 H-a: an entry's `original_offset + original_size` or
464 /// `compressed_offset + compressed_size` overflows `u64`. The
465 /// downstream `binary_search_by` / `lookup_range` machinery
466 /// assumes monotonically-increasing offsets — overflow would let
467 /// a forged sidecar drive the range planner into garbage state.
468 #[error(
469 "frame index entry overflows: original_offset={ooff}, original_size={osize}, \
470 compressed_offset={coff}, compressed_size={csize}"
471 )]
472 EntryOverflow {
473 ooff: u64,
474 osize: u64,
475 coff: u64,
476 csize: u64,
477 },
478 /// v0.8.15 H-c: per-sidecar entry-count cap. Pairs with the v0.8.12
479 /// `#124` `Vec::with_capacity` clamp — refuses pathologically-large
480 /// `n` at parse time even before the `expected_remaining == input.len()`
481 /// guard, so a 32-bit target can't be tricked into running `0..n`
482 /// past the buffer.
483 #[error("frame index entry count {got} exceeds MAX_FRAMES={max}")]
484 TooManyFrames { got: u64, max: u64 },
485 /// v0.8.15 H-c: `etag_len` exceeds the maximum addressable size on
486 /// this target (32-bit) or the operator-configured cap.
487 #[error("sidecar etag_len {got} exceeds MAX_ETAG_BYTES={max}")]
488 EtagTooLong { got: u32, max: u32 },
489 /// v0.8.16 F-2: consecutive entries are not in non-decreasing
490 /// order. `binary_search_by` / `lookup_range` rely on the
491 /// invariant that `entries[i+1].original_offset >=
492 /// entries[i].original_end()` (and the same for `compressed_*`).
493 /// A forged sidecar violating that lets a Range GET drive
494 /// `RangePlan.byte_end_exclusive` to a u64-wrapped value.
495 #[error(
496 "frame index entries out of order: prev_original_end={prev_original_end}, \
497 curr_original_offset={curr_original_offset}, prev_compressed_end={prev_compressed_end}, \
498 curr_compressed_offset={curr_compressed_offset}"
499 )]
500 NonMonotonicEntries {
501 prev_original_end: u64,
502 curr_original_offset: u64,
503 prev_compressed_end: u64,
504 curr_compressed_offset: u64,
505 },
506}
507
508/// v0.8.15 H-c: hard upper bound on the number of entries
509/// [`decode_index`] will accept. 16 M × 32 B = 512 MiB sidecar
510/// body — orders of magnitude over any real workload (a typical
511/// 5 GiB object hits ~1280 frames at the 4 MiB default chunk).
512/// Above this we'd be parsing an attacker payload, not a legitimate
513/// sidecar.
514pub const MAX_FRAMES: u64 = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
515/// v0.8.15 H-c: hard upper bound on the etag-length field. AWS S3
516/// ETags are ≤ 64 bytes including quotes; MinIO / Garage match. The
517/// 4 KiB cap leaves room for non-canonical multipart ETags
518/// (`<hex>-<n>`) without admitting attacker-controlled payloads.
519pub const MAX_ETAG_BYTES: u32 = 4096;
520
521/// v0.8.4 #73 H-2: emit the v2 layout (with `source_etag` /
522/// `source_compressed_size`). Pre-v0.8.4 deployments that PUT under v1 are
523/// still readable (decode_index dispatches on the version field) — only the
524/// writer path is bumped here.
525///
526/// v0.9 #106: when `idx.sse_v3` is `Some(..)` (= source object was
527/// SSE-S4 chunked / S4E6), emit v3 instead — same v2 layout plus a
528/// trailing 30-byte SSE chunk-geometry block before the entries
529/// table. v0.8.x readers ignore unknown versions (`UnsupportedVersion(3)`)
530/// → sidecar is treated as missing → Range GET falls back to the
531/// existing buffered fallback, so v3 is forward-safe.
532pub fn encode_index(idx: &FrameIndex) -> Bytes {
533 let etag_bytes = idx.source_etag.as_deref().unwrap_or("").as_bytes();
534 let (version, fixed_header) = if idx.sse_v3.is_some() {
535 (INDEX_VERSION, HEADER_FIXED_V2 + SSE_BLOCK_V3)
536 } else {
537 (INDEX_VERSION_V2, HEADER_FIXED_V2)
538 };
539 let mut buf =
540 BytesMut::with_capacity(fixed_header + etag_bytes.len() + idx.entries.len() * ENTRY_BYTES);
541 buf.put_slice(INDEX_MAGIC);
542 buf.put_u32_le(version);
543 buf.put_u64_le(idx.entries.len() as u64);
544 buf.put_u64_le(idx.total_original_size());
545 buf.put_u64_le(idx.total_padded_size);
546 // v2 additions
547 buf.put_u64_le(idx.source_compressed_size.unwrap_or(0));
548 buf.put_u32_le(etag_bytes.len() as u32);
549 buf.put_slice(etag_bytes);
550 // v3 SSE block, only when an SSE binding is present.
551 if let Some(sse) = idx.sse_v3.as_ref() {
552 buf.put_u32_le(sse.enc_chunk_size);
553 buf.put_u32_le(sse.enc_chunk_count);
554 buf.put_u16_le(sse.enc_key_id);
555 buf.put_slice(&sse.enc_salt);
556 buf.put_u64_le(sse.enc_plaintext_len);
557 buf.put_u32_le(sse.enc_header_bytes);
558 }
559 for e in &idx.entries {
560 buf.put_u64_le(e.original_offset);
561 buf.put_u64_le(e.original_size);
562 buf.put_u64_le(e.compressed_offset);
563 buf.put_u64_le(e.compressed_size);
564 }
565 buf.freeze()
566}
567
568/// v0.8.4 #73 H-2: legacy v1 encoder retained for the back-compat unit test
569/// (`sidecar_header_back_compat_old_format_no_source_etag`) which has to
570/// synthesize a v1 buffer to prove decode_index still parses it. Production
571/// callers should always go through [`encode_index`] which emits v2.
572#[doc(hidden)]
573pub fn encode_index_v1_for_test(idx: &FrameIndex) -> Bytes {
574 let mut buf = BytesMut::with_capacity(HEADER_FIXED_V1 + idx.entries.len() * ENTRY_BYTES);
575 buf.put_slice(INDEX_MAGIC);
576 buf.put_u32_le(INDEX_VERSION_V1);
577 buf.put_u64_le(idx.entries.len() as u64);
578 buf.put_u64_le(idx.total_original_size());
579 buf.put_u64_le(idx.total_padded_size);
580 for e in &idx.entries {
581 buf.put_u64_le(e.original_offset);
582 buf.put_u64_le(e.original_size);
583 buf.put_u64_le(e.compressed_offset);
584 buf.put_u64_le(e.compressed_size);
585 }
586 buf.freeze()
587}
588
589pub fn decode_index(mut input: Bytes) -> Result<FrameIndex, IndexError> {
590 if input.len() < HEADER_FIXED_V1 {
591 return Err(IndexError::TooShort(input.len()));
592 }
593 let mut magic = [0u8; 4];
594 magic.copy_from_slice(&input[..4]);
595 if &magic != INDEX_MAGIC {
596 return Err(IndexError::BadMagic { got: magic });
597 }
598 input.advance(4);
599 let version = input.get_u32_le();
600 let n = input.get_u64_le();
601 let _total_original = input.get_u64_le();
602 let total_padded_size = input.get_u64_le();
603 // v0.8.15 H-c: hard cap on `n` *before* any size arithmetic. The
604 // existing `expected_remaining == input.len()` check is a
605 // necessary condition but not sufficient — on a 32-bit target,
606 // `n as usize` truncates a 33-bit value and the buffer check
607 // would silently pass with the wrong loop count. Reject early.
608 if n > MAX_FRAMES {
609 return Err(IndexError::TooManyFrames {
610 got: n,
611 max: MAX_FRAMES,
612 });
613 }
614 // Dispatch on version. v1 jumps straight to the entry table; v2
615 // reads the additional fixed fields + variable-length etag before
616 // the entries; v3 reads the v2 layout plus the SSE chunk-geometry
617 // block.
618 let (source_compressed_size, source_etag, sse_v3) = match version {
619 v if v == INDEX_VERSION_V1 => (None, None, None),
620 v if v == INDEX_VERSION_V2 || v == INDEX_VERSION => {
621 // v2 fixed-header tail: source_compressed_size (u64) + etag_len (u32).
622 if input.len() < 8 + 4 {
623 return Err(IndexError::TooShort(input.len()));
624 }
625 let scs = input.get_u64_le();
626 let etag_len_u32 = input.get_u32_le();
627 // v0.8.15 H-c: bound `etag_len` *before* the `as usize`
628 // cast so the buffer check on a 32-bit WASM target can't
629 // be tricked into a usize-truncated value.
630 if etag_len_u32 > MAX_ETAG_BYTES {
631 return Err(IndexError::EtagTooLong {
632 got: etag_len_u32,
633 max: MAX_ETAG_BYTES,
634 });
635 }
636 let etag_len = etag_len_u32 as usize;
637 if input.len() < etag_len {
638 return Err(IndexError::TooShort(input.len()));
639 }
640 // Slice off the etag bytes; treat decode failure as "no etag" so
641 // a corrupted etag field still leaves a usable index (the GET
642 // path will fall back to full read on the missing binding).
643 let etag_bytes = input.split_to(etag_len);
644 let etag = if etag_len == 0 {
645 None
646 } else {
647 std::str::from_utf8(&etag_bytes).ok().map(str::to_owned)
648 };
649 // v0.9 #106: v3 appends the 30-byte SSE chunk-geometry
650 // block after the etag payload (before the entries table).
651 // A v3 sidecar with `enc_chunk_size == 0` is treated as
652 // "no SSE binding" (= equivalent to v2 semantics) so the
653 // writer side has a forward-safe encoding for the
654 // non-SSE-S4-chunked path if it ever needs to bump
655 // version without populating the SSE binding.
656 let sse_binding = if v == INDEX_VERSION {
657 if input.len() < SSE_BLOCK_V3 {
658 return Err(IndexError::TooShort(input.len()));
659 }
660 let enc_chunk_size = input.get_u32_le();
661 let enc_chunk_count = input.get_u32_le();
662 let enc_key_id = input.get_u16_le();
663 let mut enc_salt = [0u8; 8];
664 input.copy_to_slice(&mut enc_salt);
665 let enc_plaintext_len = input.get_u64_le();
666 let enc_header_bytes = input.get_u32_le();
667 if enc_chunk_size == 0 || enc_chunk_count == 0 {
668 None
669 } else {
670 Some(SseChunkBinding {
671 enc_chunk_size,
672 enc_chunk_count,
673 enc_key_id,
674 enc_salt,
675 enc_plaintext_len,
676 enc_header_bytes,
677 })
678 }
679 } else {
680 None
681 };
682 (if scs == 0 { None } else { Some(scs) }, etag, sse_binding)
683 }
684 other => return Err(IndexError::UnsupportedVersion(other)),
685 };
686 // v0.8.15 H-c: `n * ENTRY_BYTES` cannot overflow `usize` here
687 // because `n <= MAX_FRAMES = 16M` and `ENTRY_BYTES = 32`, and on
688 // 32-bit targets the resulting value fits in `usize` (≤ 512
689 // MiB). The `as usize` cast on `n` is now bounded by the same
690 // ceiling.
691 let expected_remaining = (n as usize).saturating_mul(ENTRY_BYTES);
692 if input.len() != expected_remaining {
693 return Err(IndexError::EntryCountMismatch {
694 claimed: n,
695 remaining: input.len(),
696 });
697 }
698 // v0.8.12 HIGH-14 fix: clamp the initial allocation the way the
699 // CpuZstd / CpuGzip decompress path does (see
700 // `DECOMPRESS_BOOTSTRAP_CAPACITY` in `lib.rs`, landed in #89).
701 // A forged sidecar with `n = 100_000_000` paired with a 3.2 GiB
702 // body (the only way the `expected_remaining` check above passes
703 // for that `n`) would otherwise commit ~3.2 GiB of `FrameIndexEntry`
704 // slots up front, on top of the 3.2 GiB body bytes already in
705 // RAM. The honest cap is 4096 entries (128 KiB at
706 // `ENTRY_BYTES = 32`) — large enough that single-PUT framed and
707 // typical multipart objects don't pay any growth cost, small
708 // enough that an adversarial sidecar can't drive multi-GiB
709 // pre-allocations behind the bounded `expected_remaining`
710 // check. The `push` loop below grows the vector naturally and
711 // is itself bounded by `expected_remaining == input.len()`.
712 const BOOTSTRAP_ENTRIES: usize = 4096;
713 let initial_cap = (n as usize).min(BOOTSTRAP_ENTRIES);
714 let mut entries = Vec::with_capacity(initial_cap);
715 for _ in 0..n {
716 let original_offset = input.get_u64_le();
717 let original_size = input.get_u64_le();
718 let compressed_offset = input.get_u64_le();
719 let compressed_size = input.get_u64_le();
720 // v0.8.15 H-a: refuse entries whose `offset + size` overflows
721 // `u64`. The downstream `binary_search_by` / `lookup_range`
722 // machinery relies on monotone offsets — a wrapped value
723 // would let a forged sidecar drive `RangePlan.byte_end_exclusive`
724 // to garbage.
725 if original_offset.checked_add(original_size).is_none()
726 || compressed_offset.checked_add(compressed_size).is_none()
727 {
728 return Err(IndexError::EntryOverflow {
729 ooff: original_offset,
730 osize: original_size,
731 coff: compressed_offset,
732 csize: compressed_size,
733 });
734 }
735 entries.push(FrameIndexEntry {
736 original_offset,
737 original_size,
738 compressed_offset,
739 compressed_size,
740 });
741 }
742 // v0.8.16 F-2: inter-entry monotonicity. v0.8.15 H-a closed the
743 // per-entry `offset + size` overflow but did NOT verify that
744 // entries are in non-decreasing order. The downstream
745 // `binary_search_by` in `lookup_range` assumes sorted entries
746 // — feed it a sidecar with `[ooff=100,...],[ooff=0,...]` and the
747 // partition point logic returns garbage, then `start - entries[
748 // first_idx].original_offset` underflows `u64` (wraps in
749 // release, panics in dev) and the resulting `RangePlan` drives
750 // an arbitrary backend GET range. Reject out-of-order entries
751 // here with a dedicated typed error.
752 for win in entries.windows(2) {
753 let prev = &win[0];
754 let curr = &win[1];
755 if curr.original_offset < prev.original_end()
756 || curr.compressed_offset < prev.compressed_end()
757 {
758 return Err(IndexError::NonMonotonicEntries {
759 prev_original_end: prev.original_end(),
760 curr_original_offset: curr.original_offset,
761 prev_compressed_end: prev.compressed_end(),
762 curr_compressed_offset: curr.compressed_offset,
763 });
764 }
765 }
766 Ok(FrameIndex {
767 total_padded_size,
768 entries,
769 source_etag,
770 source_compressed_size,
771 sse_v3,
772 })
773}
774
775/// Object body の bytes 全体を scan して FrameIndex を構築する。
776/// `multipart_e2e.rs` 等で full-scan path として使用。
777pub fn build_index_from_body(body: &Bytes) -> Result<FrameIndex, crate::multipart::FrameError> {
778 let mut entries = Vec::new();
779 let mut original_off: u64 = 0;
780 // FrameIter は padding を skip してしまうので、自前で位置追跡しながら parse する
781 let mut cursor = 0usize;
782 let mut iter_buf = body.clone();
783 while cursor < body.len() {
784 // padding magic を skip
785 if cursor + 4 <= body.len() && &body[cursor..cursor + 4] == crate::multipart::PADDING_MAGIC
786 {
787 // PADDING_HEADER_BYTES = 4 magic + 8 length
788 if cursor + crate::multipart::PADDING_HEADER_BYTES > body.len() {
789 break;
790 }
791 let pad_len = u64::from_le_bytes(body[cursor + 4..cursor + 12].try_into().unwrap());
792 // v0.8.16 F-3: was `pad_len as usize`, silently
793 // truncating on 32-bit. A forged `S4P1 || u64::MAX`
794 // padding header advanced the cursor by `0xFFFF_FFFF`
795 // on 64-bit (skipping past `body.len()` into the next
796 // iteration's break) and by `0xFFFF_FFFF` truncated
797 // on 32-bit (different behaviour by target). Use
798 // try_from + checked_add so a malformed body fails
799 // closed with a typed `FrameError` instead of either
800 // wandering off the end of the buffer or silently
801 // skipping the bad frame.
802 let pad_len_usize = usize::try_from(pad_len)
803 .map_err(|_| crate::multipart::FrameError::PayloadTooLarge(pad_len))?;
804 let next_cursor = cursor
805 .checked_add(crate::multipart::PADDING_HEADER_BYTES)
806 .and_then(|n| n.checked_add(pad_len_usize))
807 .ok_or(crate::multipart::FrameError::PayloadTooLarge(pad_len))?;
808 cursor = next_cursor;
809 if cursor > body.len() {
810 break;
811 }
812 iter_buf = body.slice(cursor..);
813 continue;
814 }
815 // data frame
816 if cursor + crate::multipart::FRAME_HEADER_BYTES > body.len() {
817 break;
818 }
819 let (header, _payload, rest) = crate::multipart::read_frame(iter_buf.clone())?;
820 // v0.8.16 F-3: `header.compressed_size as usize` had the
821 // same 32-bit-truncation hazard as the padding cursor
822 // arithmetic above. Use try_from so a forged 4 GiB+ frame
823 // surfaces as `PayloadTooLarge` instead of wandering off.
824 let compressed_size_usize = usize::try_from(header.compressed_size)
825 .map_err(|_| crate::multipart::FrameError::PayloadTooLarge(header.compressed_size))?;
826 let frame_total = crate::multipart::FRAME_HEADER_BYTES
827 .checked_add(compressed_size_usize)
828 .ok_or(crate::multipart::FrameError::PayloadTooLarge(
829 header.compressed_size,
830 ))?;
831 entries.push(FrameIndexEntry {
832 original_offset: original_off,
833 original_size: header.original_size,
834 compressed_offset: cursor as u64,
835 compressed_size: frame_total as u64,
836 });
837 // v0.8.16 F-3: `original_off +=` was a plain `+`, panicking
838 // in dev / wrapping in release on a forged body whose
839 // cumulative original sizes overflow u64. Use checked_add
840 // → typed error.
841 original_off = original_off.checked_add(header.original_size).ok_or(
842 crate::multipart::FrameError::PayloadTooLarge(header.original_size),
843 )?;
844 cursor = cursor.checked_add(frame_total).ok_or(
845 crate::multipart::FrameError::PayloadTooLarge(header.compressed_size),
846 )?;
847 iter_buf = rest;
848 }
849 Ok(FrameIndex {
850 total_padded_size: body.len() as u64,
851 entries,
852 // The caller (s4-server `put_object`) stamps the version-binding
853 // fields after the backend PUT returns the authoritative ETag —
854 // build_index_from_body itself only sees the post-compress bytes
855 // and cannot fabricate a server-blessed ETag.
856 source_etag: None,
857 source_compressed_size: None,
858 // v0.9 #106: SSE binding is also stamped by the caller after the
859 // S4E6 encrypt path runs (`build_index_from_body` only sees the
860 // pre-encrypt compressed body and cannot know the salt / key_id).
861 sse_v3: None,
862 })
863}
864
865/// `<key>` から sidecar key を生成。
866pub fn sidecar_key(object_key: &str) -> String {
867 format!("{object_key}{SIDECAR_SUFFIX}")
868}
869
870/// v0.8.15 M-1: the per-object sidecar key suffix. Exposed publicly so
871/// the listener-side reserved-name guard
872/// (`s4-server::routing::is_reserved_object_key`) and the list-filter
873/// `ends_with(".s4index")` calls share one source of truth.
874pub const SIDECAR_SUFFIX: &str = ".s4index";
875
876/// v0.8.15 M-1: classify a candidate user-PUT object key as a
877/// reserved sidecar name. The S4 gateway uses `<key>.s4index` for
878/// its internal Range-GET fast-path; a user PUT under that name
879/// would either be hidden from `ListObjectsV2` (the filter strips
880/// `.s4index` suffixes) or get collected by the sidecar-cleanup
881/// path on `DeleteObject`. Returning a reserved-key error at the
882/// listener edge stops both before the user can be surprised.
883pub fn is_reserved_sidecar_key(object_key: &str) -> bool {
884 object_key.ends_with(SIDECAR_SUFFIX)
885}
886
887#[cfg(test)]
888mod tests {
889 use super::*;
890 use crate::CodecKind;
891 use crate::multipart::{FrameHeader, pad_to_minimum, write_frame};
892
893 fn sample_index() -> FrameIndex {
894 FrameIndex {
895 total_padded_size: 200,
896 entries: vec![
897 FrameIndexEntry {
898 original_offset: 0,
899 original_size: 100,
900 compressed_offset: 0,
901 compressed_size: 50,
902 },
903 FrameIndexEntry {
904 original_offset: 100,
905 original_size: 80,
906 compressed_offset: 60, // gap of 10 = padding
907 compressed_size: 40,
908 },
909 FrameIndexEntry {
910 original_offset: 180,
911 original_size: 50,
912 compressed_offset: 100,
913 compressed_size: 30,
914 },
915 ],
916 // Default-constructed in the v0.8.4 #73 H-2 sample so this fixture
917 // still drives the lookup_range / encode_decode / build_from_body
918 // paths that don't care about the version-binding fields.
919 source_etag: None,
920 source_compressed_size: None,
921 // v0.9 #106: default-None so this fixture exercises the v2
922 // emit path (writer only bumps to v3 when an SSE binding
923 // is attached).
924 sse_v3: None,
925 }
926 }
927
928 #[test]
929 fn encode_decode_roundtrip() {
930 let idx = sample_index();
931 let bytes = encode_index(&idx);
932 let decoded = decode_index(bytes).unwrap();
933 assert_eq!(decoded, idx);
934 }
935
936 /// v0.8.4 #73 H-2: v2 round-trip with the `source_etag` /
937 /// `source_compressed_size` fields populated.
938 ///
939 /// v0.9 #106: with `sse_v3 = None` the writer keeps emitting v2 so
940 /// non-SSE-S4-chunked PUTs are bit-for-bit unchanged from v0.8.x
941 /// on-disk.
942 #[test]
943 fn encode_decode_roundtrip_v2_with_source_binding() {
944 let mut idx = sample_index();
945 idx.source_etag = Some("\"deadbeefcafe\"".into());
946 idx.source_compressed_size = Some(987_654);
947 let bytes = encode_index(&idx);
948 assert_eq!(&bytes[..4], INDEX_MAGIC);
949 let version = u32::from_le_bytes(bytes[4..8].try_into().unwrap());
950 assert_eq!(
951 version, INDEX_VERSION_V2,
952 "writer must emit v2 when no SSE binding is attached"
953 );
954 let decoded = decode_index(bytes).unwrap();
955 assert_eq!(decoded, idx);
956 }
957
958 /// v0.9 #106: v3 round-trip with an SSE chunked binding. Writer
959 /// must emit v3 exactly when `sse_v3 = Some(..)`; decode must
960 /// restore the binding byte-for-byte.
961 #[test]
962 fn encode_decode_roundtrip_v3_with_sse_binding() {
963 let mut idx = sample_index();
964 idx.source_etag = Some("\"abc123\"".into());
965 idx.source_compressed_size = Some(2048);
966 idx.sse_v3 = Some(SseChunkBinding {
967 enc_chunk_size: 1024,
968 enc_chunk_count: 2,
969 enc_key_id: 7,
970 enc_salt: [0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88],
971 enc_plaintext_len: 2048,
972 enc_header_bytes: 24,
973 });
974 let bytes = encode_index(&idx);
975 let version = u32::from_le_bytes(bytes[4..8].try_into().unwrap());
976 assert_eq!(
977 version, INDEX_VERSION,
978 "writer must emit v3 when SSE binding is attached"
979 );
980 let decoded = decode_index(bytes).unwrap();
981 assert_eq!(decoded, idx);
982 assert!(decoded.sse_v3.is_some());
983 }
984
985 /// v0.9 #106: a v3 sidecar with `enc_chunk_size = 0` decodes
986 /// with `sse_v3 = None` (= forward-safe encoding for a future
987 /// non-SSE v3 use case).
988 #[test]
989 fn v3_with_zero_enc_chunk_size_decodes_as_no_sse() {
990 let mut bytes_mut = bytes::BytesMut::new();
991 bytes_mut.put_slice(INDEX_MAGIC);
992 bytes_mut.put_u32_le(INDEX_VERSION); // 3
993 bytes_mut.put_u64_le(0); // n entries
994 bytes_mut.put_u64_le(0); // total_original
995 bytes_mut.put_u64_le(0); // total_padded
996 bytes_mut.put_u64_le(0); // source_compressed_size
997 bytes_mut.put_u32_le(0); // etag_len
998 // SSE block — all zero
999 bytes_mut.put_u32_le(0); // enc_chunk_size
1000 bytes_mut.put_u32_le(0); // enc_chunk_count
1001 bytes_mut.put_u16_le(0); // enc_key_id
1002 bytes_mut.put_slice(&[0u8; 8]); // enc_salt
1003 bytes_mut.put_u64_le(0); // enc_plaintext_len
1004 bytes_mut.put_u32_le(0); // enc_header_bytes
1005 let decoded = decode_index(bytes_mut.freeze()).unwrap();
1006 assert!(decoded.sse_v3.is_none());
1007 }
1008
1009 /// v0.9 #106: back-compat — a real v0.8.x server hands a v2
1010 /// sidecar to a v0.9 decoder unchanged. Writer side already
1011 /// covered by `encode_decode_roundtrip_v2_with_source_binding`
1012 /// (no SSE binding → v2 layout), but this test also synthesizes
1013 /// raw v2 bytes via `encode_index_v1_for_test`-style spelling to
1014 /// prove the on-wire format hasn't drifted.
1015 #[test]
1016 fn v2_sidecar_decoded_by_v3_reader_with_no_sse_binding() {
1017 let mut idx = sample_index();
1018 idx.source_etag = Some("\"v2-only\"".into());
1019 idx.source_compressed_size = Some(123);
1020 let v2_bytes = encode_index(&idx); // sse_v3 = None → v2 emit
1021 let v2_version = u32::from_le_bytes(v2_bytes[4..8].try_into().unwrap());
1022 assert_eq!(v2_version, INDEX_VERSION_V2);
1023 let decoded = decode_index(v2_bytes).unwrap();
1024 assert!(decoded.sse_v3.is_none());
1025 assert_eq!(decoded.source_etag.as_deref(), Some("\"v2-only\""));
1026 }
1027
1028 /// v0.9 #106: `encrypted_lookup` covers a Range that lands inside
1029 /// a single chunk (no chunk-boundary crossing). Verifies the
1030 /// computed enc byte range targets exactly one chunk.
1031 #[test]
1032 fn encrypted_lookup_single_chunk() {
1033 let idx = FrameIndex {
1034 total_padded_size: 0,
1035 entries: vec![],
1036 source_etag: None,
1037 source_compressed_size: None,
1038 sse_v3: Some(SseChunkBinding {
1039 enc_chunk_size: 1024,
1040 enc_chunk_count: 4,
1041 enc_key_id: 1,
1042 enc_salt: [0u8; 8],
1043 enc_plaintext_len: 4096,
1044 enc_header_bytes: 24,
1045 }),
1046 };
1047 let plan = RangePlan {
1048 first_frame_idx: 0,
1049 last_frame_idx_inclusive: 0,
1050 byte_start: 100,
1051 byte_end_exclusive: 500,
1052 slice_start_in_combined: 0,
1053 slice_end_in_combined: 400,
1054 };
1055 let enc = idx.encrypted_lookup(&plan).unwrap();
1056 assert_eq!(enc.chunk_idx_start, 0);
1057 assert_eq!(enc.chunk_idx_last_inclusive, 0);
1058 assert_eq!(enc.enc_byte_start, 24);
1059 // Non-final chunk: 1024 + 16 = 1040 bytes on disk
1060 assert_eq!(enc.enc_byte_end_exclusive, 24 + 1040);
1061 assert_eq!(enc.pre_encrypt_slice_start_in_concat, 100);
1062 assert_eq!(enc.pre_encrypt_slice_end_in_concat, 500);
1063 }
1064
1065 /// v0.9 #106: `encrypted_lookup` covers a Range that crosses two
1066 /// chunks. Verifies the fetched enc range covers both chunks.
1067 #[test]
1068 fn encrypted_lookup_crossing_chunk_boundary() {
1069 let idx = FrameIndex {
1070 total_padded_size: 0,
1071 entries: vec![],
1072 source_etag: None,
1073 source_compressed_size: None,
1074 sse_v3: Some(SseChunkBinding {
1075 enc_chunk_size: 1024,
1076 enc_chunk_count: 4,
1077 enc_key_id: 1,
1078 enc_salt: [0u8; 8],
1079 enc_plaintext_len: 4096,
1080 enc_header_bytes: 24,
1081 }),
1082 };
1083 let plan = RangePlan {
1084 first_frame_idx: 0,
1085 last_frame_idx_inclusive: 0,
1086 byte_start: 900, // chunk 0
1087 byte_end_exclusive: 1200, // chunk 1
1088 slice_start_in_combined: 0,
1089 slice_end_in_combined: 300,
1090 };
1091 let enc = idx.encrypted_lookup(&plan).unwrap();
1092 assert_eq!(enc.chunk_idx_start, 0);
1093 assert_eq!(enc.chunk_idx_last_inclusive, 1);
1094 assert_eq!(enc.enc_byte_start, 24);
1095 assert_eq!(enc.enc_byte_end_exclusive, 24 + 2 * 1040);
1096 assert_eq!(enc.pre_encrypt_slice_start_in_concat, 900);
1097 assert_eq!(enc.pre_encrypt_slice_end_in_concat, 1200);
1098 }
1099
1100 /// v0.9 #106: `encrypted_lookup` for the final (possibly smaller)
1101 /// chunk computes its on-disk size from `enc_plaintext_len` not
1102 /// the stride.
1103 #[test]
1104 fn encrypted_lookup_final_chunk_uses_residual_size() {
1105 // 3 chunks of 1024 bytes plus a final chunk of 500 bytes (4 chunks,
1106 // 3572 byte plaintext total).
1107 let idx = FrameIndex {
1108 total_padded_size: 0,
1109 entries: vec![],
1110 source_etag: None,
1111 source_compressed_size: None,
1112 sse_v3: Some(SseChunkBinding {
1113 enc_chunk_size: 1024,
1114 enc_chunk_count: 4,
1115 enc_key_id: 1,
1116 enc_salt: [0u8; 8],
1117 enc_plaintext_len: 3572,
1118 enc_header_bytes: 24,
1119 }),
1120 };
1121 let plan = RangePlan {
1122 first_frame_idx: 0,
1123 last_frame_idx_inclusive: 0,
1124 byte_start: 3100,
1125 byte_end_exclusive: 3500,
1126 slice_start_in_combined: 0,
1127 slice_end_in_combined: 400,
1128 };
1129 let enc = idx.encrypted_lookup(&plan).unwrap();
1130 assert_eq!(enc.chunk_idx_start, 3);
1131 assert_eq!(enc.chunk_idx_last_inclusive, 3);
1132 // Final chunk on disk: (3572 - 3*1024) + 16 = 500 + 16 = 516
1133 let expected_start = 24 + 3 * 1040;
1134 assert_eq!(enc.enc_byte_start, expected_start);
1135 assert_eq!(enc.enc_byte_end_exclusive, expected_start + 516);
1136 }
1137
1138 /// v0.9 #106: when the SSE binding is absent, `encrypted_lookup`
1139 /// returns `None` (caller falls back to buffered path).
1140 #[test]
1141 fn encrypted_lookup_without_binding_returns_none() {
1142 let idx = sample_index();
1143 let plan = RangePlan {
1144 first_frame_idx: 0,
1145 last_frame_idx_inclusive: 0,
1146 byte_start: 0,
1147 byte_end_exclusive: 10,
1148 slice_start_in_combined: 0,
1149 slice_end_in_combined: 10,
1150 };
1151 assert!(idx.encrypted_lookup(&plan).is_none());
1152 }
1153
1154 /// v0.8.4 #73 H-2: a sidecar produced by a pre-v0.8.4 deployment
1155 /// (= raw v1 bytes) must still decode cleanly under the v2/v3
1156 /// reader with `source_etag = None` / `source_compressed_size =
1157 /// None` / `sse_v3 = None`. The GET path treats the `None` shape
1158 /// as "legacy — verify skip" so existing on-disk sidecars keep
1159 /// serving partial fetches without a flag day. This locks in the
1160 /// `decode_index` dispatch on the `version` field that makes the
1161 /// back-compat path real.
1162 #[test]
1163 fn sidecar_header_back_compat_old_format_no_source_etag() {
1164 let v2_idx = {
1165 let mut idx = sample_index();
1166 idx.source_etag = Some("\"unused\"".into());
1167 idx.source_compressed_size = Some(42);
1168 idx
1169 };
1170 // Round-trip through the v1 encoder — i.e. simulate decoding a
1171 // sidecar that was written by a pre-v0.8.4 server. The version-
1172 // binding fields are dropped on the way through (v1 has no slot
1173 // for them) and must come back as `None`.
1174 let v1_bytes = encode_index_v1_for_test(&v2_idx);
1175 // Sanity: the on-wire version field is v1.
1176 let version = u32::from_le_bytes(v1_bytes[4..8].try_into().unwrap());
1177 assert_eq!(version, INDEX_VERSION_V1);
1178 let decoded = decode_index(v1_bytes).expect("v1 sidecar must still decode");
1179 // Frame entries + total_padded_size survive (the partial-fetch
1180 // logic still works), but the newer fields surface as None so
1181 // the GET path knows it cannot do an etag-bind verify and
1182 // applies the legacy "best-effort + fallback to full GET" rule.
1183 assert_eq!(decoded.entries, v2_idx.entries);
1184 assert_eq!(decoded.total_padded_size, v2_idx.total_padded_size);
1185 assert_eq!(decoded.source_etag, None);
1186 assert_eq!(decoded.source_compressed_size, None);
1187 assert!(decoded.sse_v3.is_none());
1188 }
1189
1190 #[test]
1191 fn lookup_range_within_single_frame() {
1192 let idx = sample_index();
1193 // 元 byte [10, 50) は frame 0 (original 0..100) の中
1194 let plan = idx.lookup_range(10, 50).unwrap();
1195 assert_eq!(plan.first_frame_idx, 0);
1196 assert_eq!(plan.last_frame_idx_inclusive, 0);
1197 assert_eq!(plan.byte_start, 0);
1198 assert_eq!(plan.byte_end_exclusive, 50); // frame 0 全体
1199 assert_eq!(plan.slice_start_in_combined, 10);
1200 assert_eq!(plan.slice_end_in_combined, 50);
1201 }
1202
1203 #[test]
1204 fn lookup_range_spans_frames() {
1205 let idx = sample_index();
1206 // [50, 150) は frame 0 後半 + frame 1 前半
1207 let plan = idx.lookup_range(50, 150).unwrap();
1208 assert_eq!(plan.first_frame_idx, 0);
1209 assert_eq!(plan.last_frame_idx_inclusive, 1);
1210 assert_eq!(plan.byte_start, 0);
1211 assert_eq!(plan.byte_end_exclusive, 100); // frame 0 (0..50) + frame 1 (60..100)
1212 assert_eq!(plan.slice_start_in_combined, 50);
1213 assert_eq!(plan.slice_end_in_combined, 150);
1214 }
1215
1216 #[test]
1217 fn lookup_range_at_end_clamps() {
1218 let idx = sample_index();
1219 // total original = 100 + 80 + 50 = 230、要求 200..1000 → 200..230 にクランプ
1220 let plan = idx.lookup_range(200, 1000).unwrap();
1221 assert_eq!(plan.first_frame_idx, 2);
1222 assert_eq!(plan.last_frame_idx_inclusive, 2);
1223 // frame 2 全体 (compressed_offset=100, size=30 → byte 100..130)
1224 assert_eq!(plan.byte_start, 100);
1225 assert_eq!(plan.byte_end_exclusive, 130);
1226 }
1227
1228 #[test]
1229 fn lookup_range_out_of_bounds_returns_none() {
1230 let idx = sample_index();
1231 assert!(idx.lookup_range(500, 600).is_none());
1232 }
1233
1234 #[test]
1235 fn build_index_from_real_body_skips_padding() {
1236 // 2 frame + 中間 padding を組んで、index が正しく構築されることを確認
1237 let mut buf = BytesMut::new();
1238 let p1 = Bytes::from_static(b"AAAA");
1239 write_frame(
1240 &mut buf,
1241 FrameHeader {
1242 codec: CodecKind::Passthrough,
1243 original_size: 100,
1244 compressed_size: p1.len() as u64,
1245 crc32c: 0,
1246 },
1247 &p1,
1248 );
1249 let frame1_end = buf.len();
1250 // pad to 5000 bytes
1251 pad_to_minimum(&mut buf, 5000);
1252 let pad_end = buf.len();
1253 let p2 = Bytes::from_static(b"BBBB");
1254 write_frame(
1255 &mut buf,
1256 FrameHeader {
1257 codec: CodecKind::Passthrough,
1258 original_size: 80,
1259 compressed_size: p2.len() as u64,
1260 crc32c: 0,
1261 },
1262 &p2,
1263 );
1264
1265 let idx = build_index_from_body(&buf.freeze()).unwrap();
1266 assert_eq!(idx.entries.len(), 2);
1267 assert_eq!(idx.entries[0].original_offset, 0);
1268 assert_eq!(idx.entries[0].compressed_offset, 0);
1269 assert_eq!(idx.entries[0].original_size, 100);
1270 assert_eq!(idx.entries[0].compressed_size, frame1_end as u64);
1271 assert_eq!(idx.entries[1].original_offset, 100);
1272 assert_eq!(idx.entries[1].compressed_offset, pad_end as u64);
1273 assert_eq!(idx.entries[1].original_size, 80);
1274 assert_eq!(idx.total_original_size(), 180);
1275 }
1276}