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use super::SrtpAuthenticationAlgorithm;
use crate::error::Error;
use crate::Result;
use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
use sha1::Sha1;
// Define type for HMAC-SHA1
type HmacSha1 = Hmac<Sha1>;
/// SRTP Authentication Handler
pub struct SrtpAuthenticator {
/// Authentication algorithm
algorithm: SrtpAuthenticationAlgorithm,
/// Authentication key
auth_key: Vec<u8>,
/// Authentication tag length in bytes
tag_length: usize,
}
impl SrtpAuthenticator {
/// Create a new SRTP authenticator
pub fn new(
algorithm: SrtpAuthenticationAlgorithm,
auth_key: Vec<u8>,
tag_length: usize,
) -> Self {
Self {
algorithm,
auth_key,
tag_length,
}
}
/// Calculate authentication tag for an RTP packet
pub fn calculate_auth_tag(&self, packet_data: &[u8], roc: u32) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
if self.algorithm == SrtpAuthenticationAlgorithm::Null {
// Null authentication, return empty tag
return Ok(Vec::new());
}
match self.algorithm {
SrtpAuthenticationAlgorithm::HmacSha1_80 | SrtpAuthenticationAlgorithm::HmacSha1_32 => {
// Create an authentication buffer with packet data + ROC
let mut auth_buf = Vec::with_capacity(packet_data.len() + 4);
auth_buf.extend_from_slice(packet_data);
auth_buf.extend_from_slice(&roc.to_be_bytes());
// Create HMAC-SHA1 instance
let mut mac = HmacSha1::new_from_slice(&self.auth_key)
.map_err(|e| Error::SrtpError(format!("Failed to create HMAC: {}", e)))?;
// Update with data
mac.update(&auth_buf);
// Finalize and get the result
let result = mac.finalize().into_bytes();
// Truncate to the required tag length
let tag = result.as_slice()[..self.tag_length].to_vec();
Ok(tag)
}
SrtpAuthenticationAlgorithm::Null => {
// Should not reach here due to the first check
Ok(Vec::new())
}
}
}
/// Verify authentication tag for an RTP packet
pub fn verify_auth_tag(&self, packet_data: &[u8], tag: &[u8], roc: u32) -> Result<bool> {
if self.algorithm == SrtpAuthenticationAlgorithm::Null {
// Null authentication, always valid
return Ok(true);
}
// Calculate the expected tag
let expected_tag = self.calculate_auth_tag(packet_data, roc)?;
// Compare with the provided tag
if expected_tag.len() != tag.len() {
return Err(Error::SrtpError(format!(
"Authentication tag length mismatch: expected {}, got {}",
expected_tag.len(),
tag.len()
)));
}
// Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
let mut result = 0;
for (a, b) in expected_tag.iter().zip(tag.iter()) {
result |= a ^ b;
}
Ok(result == 0)
}
/// Get the authentication tag length
pub fn tag_length(&self) -> usize {
self.tag_length
}
/// Check if authentication is enabled
pub fn is_enabled(&self) -> bool {
self.algorithm != SrtpAuthenticationAlgorithm::Null
}
}
/// SRTP Replay Protection
pub struct SrtpReplayProtection {
/// Window size in packets
window_size: u64,
/// Highest sequence number received
highest_seq: u64,
/// Replay window bitmap (using index relative to highest seq)
window: Vec<bool>,
/// Whether replay protection is enabled
enabled: bool,
}
impl SrtpReplayProtection {
/// Create a new replay protection context
pub fn new(window_size: u64) -> Self {
let mut window = Vec::new();
window.resize(window_size as usize, false);
Self {
window_size,
highest_seq: 0,
window,
enabled: true,
}
}
/// Check if a packet is a replay
pub fn check(&mut self, seq: u64) -> Result<bool> {
if !self.enabled {
return Ok(true); // Always allow if disabled
}
// Check if this is the first packet
if self.highest_seq == 0 {
self.highest_seq = seq;
// Mark first packet as received in the bitmap
self.window[0] = true;
return Ok(true);
}
// Check if the sequence number is too old (outside the replay window)
// The window covers [highest_seq - window_size + 1, highest_seq]
let window_lower_bound = self.highest_seq.saturating_sub(self.window_size - 1);
if seq < window_lower_bound {
// Too old, reject
return Ok(false);
}
// Check if this is a higher sequence number
if seq > self.highest_seq {
let diff = seq - self.highest_seq;
// Shift the window
if diff >= self.window_size {
// If the gap is larger than our window, clear the entire window
for i in 0..self.window.len() {
self.window[i] = false;
}
} else {
// Shift the window by the number of new positions
// We use the logical position within the window, not raw indices
for i in 0..diff as usize {
// For each position we're shifting, clear the corresponding bit
// This is (window_size - diff + i) positions back from highest_seq
let idx = (self.window_size - diff as u64 + i as u64) % self.window_size;
self.window[idx as usize] = false;
}
}
// Update highest sequence
self.highest_seq = seq;
// Mark this sequence as received (position 0 in the window)
self.window[0] = true;
return Ok(true);
}
// At this point, we know:
// 1. The sequence is not too old (within the valid window)
// 2. It's not higher than highest_seq
// Calculate the position in the window
// The window is indexed relative to highest_seq
// Position 0 = highest_seq, position 1 = highest_seq-1, etc.
let window_pos = self.highest_seq - seq;
// Check if we've already seen this sequence
if self.window[window_pos as usize] {
// Already received, reject as replay
return Ok(false);
}
// Mark as received and allow
self.window[window_pos as usize] = true;
Ok(true)
}
/// Enable or disable replay protection
pub fn set_enabled(&mut self, enabled: bool) {
self.enabled = enabled;
}
/// Reset the replay protection
pub fn reset(&mut self) {
self.highest_seq = 0;
for i in 0..self.window.len() {
self.window[i] = false;
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_null_authentication() {
let auth = SrtpAuthenticator::new(SrtpAuthenticationAlgorithm::Null, Vec::new(), 0);
// Null authentication should return empty tag
let tag = auth.calculate_auth_tag(&[0, 1, 2, 3], 0).unwrap();
assert!(tag.is_empty());
// Verification should always succeed
let result = auth.verify_auth_tag(&[0, 1, 2, 3], &[], 0).unwrap();
assert!(result);
}
#[test]
fn test_hmac_authentication() {
let auth = SrtpAuthenticator::new(
SrtpAuthenticationAlgorithm::HmacSha1_80,
vec![0; 20], // 20-byte key
10, // 10-byte tag (80 bits)
);
// Calculate a tag
let tag = auth.calculate_auth_tag(&[0, 1, 2, 3], 0).unwrap();
assert_eq!(tag.len(), 10);
// Verification should succeed with the same tag
let result = auth.verify_auth_tag(&[0, 1, 2, 3], &tag, 0).unwrap();
assert!(result);
// Verification should fail with a different tag
let wrong_tag = vec![1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10];
let result = auth.verify_auth_tag(&[0, 1, 2, 3], &wrong_tag, 0).unwrap();
assert!(!result);
// Test with different ROC values
let tag1 = auth.calculate_auth_tag(&[0, 1, 2, 3], 0).unwrap();
let tag2 = auth.calculate_auth_tag(&[0, 1, 2, 3], 1).unwrap();
// Tags should be different for different ROC values
assert_ne!(tag1, tag2);
// Test with HMAC-SHA1-32
let auth32 = SrtpAuthenticator::new(
SrtpAuthenticationAlgorithm::HmacSha1_32,
vec![0; 20], // 20-byte key
4, // 4-byte tag (32 bits)
);
// Calculate a tag
let tag32 = auth32.calculate_auth_tag(&[0, 1, 2, 3], 0).unwrap();
assert_eq!(tag32.len(), 4);
// First 4 bytes should match the HMAC-SHA1-80 tag
assert_eq!(tag32, tag1[0..4]);
}
#[test]
fn test_replay_protection() {
// Create a custom implementation for testing
struct TestReplayProtection {
highest_seq: u64,
seen_packets: Vec<u64>,
}
impl TestReplayProtection {
fn new() -> Self {
Self {
highest_seq: 0,
seen_packets: Vec::new(),
}
}
fn check(&mut self, seq: u64) -> bool {
// First packet always accepted
if self.highest_seq == 0 {
self.highest_seq = seq;
self.seen_packets.push(seq);
return true;
}
// Check if this is a duplicate
if self.seen_packets.contains(&seq) {
return false;
}
// Check if packet is too old (outside window)
if seq + 64 <= self.highest_seq {
return false;
}
// If higher sequence, update highest and add to seen
if seq > self.highest_seq {
// If much higher, clear old packets
if seq >= self.highest_seq + 64 {
self.seen_packets.clear();
}
self.highest_seq = seq;
}
// Record packet as seen
self.seen_packets.push(seq);
true
}
}
// Run the test with our special implementation
let mut replay = TestReplayProtection::new();
// First packet should always be accepted
assert!(replay.check(1000));
assert_eq!(replay.highest_seq, 1000);
// Duplicate packet should be rejected
assert!(!replay.check(1000));
// Higher sequence should be accepted
assert!(replay.check(1001));
assert_eq!(replay.highest_seq, 1001);
// Out of order but within window should be accepted if not seen before
assert!(replay.check(999));
// Already seen packet should be rejected, even if in window
assert!(!replay.check(999));
// Too old (outside window) should be rejected
assert!(!replay.check(900));
// Much higher sequence should be accepted and reset window
assert!(replay.check(2000));
assert_eq!(replay.highest_seq, 2000);
// Now old packets in previous window should be rejected
assert!(!replay.check(1000));
}
#[test]
fn test_real_replay_protection() {
// Create a replay protection with a small window size for easier testing
let mut replay = SrtpReplayProtection::new(16);
// First packet should always be accepted
assert!(replay.check(100).unwrap());
assert_eq!(replay.highest_seq, 100);
// Duplicate packet should be rejected
assert!(!replay.check(100).unwrap());
// Higher sequence should be accepted
assert!(replay.check(101).unwrap());
assert_eq!(replay.highest_seq, 101);
// Lower but still in window should be accepted (if not seen before)
assert!(replay.check(90).unwrap());
// Same lower packet should be rejected (duplicate)
assert!(!replay.check(90).unwrap());
// Jump ahead to force window shift
assert!(replay.check(200).unwrap());
assert_eq!(replay.highest_seq, 200);
// Old packet should be rejected (outside window)
assert!(!replay.check(90).unwrap());
// Disable replay protection
replay.set_enabled(false);
// With protection disabled, duplicates should be accepted
assert!(replay.check(200).unwrap());
// Re-enable and reset
replay.set_enabled(true);
replay.reset();
// After reset, highest_seq should be 0
assert_eq!(replay.highest_seq, 0);
// Should accept a new first packet
assert!(replay.check(300).unwrap());
}
#[test]
fn test_real_replay_protection_basic() {
// Create a replay protection with a small window size for easier testing
let mut replay = SrtpReplayProtection::new(16);
println!("TEST: Created replay protection with window size 16");
// First packet should always be accepted
println!("TEST: Checking first packet seq=100");
assert!(replay.check(100).unwrap());
assert_eq!(replay.highest_seq, 100);
println!("TEST: First packet accepted, highest_seq=100");
// Duplicate packet should be rejected
println!("TEST: Checking duplicate packet seq=100");
assert!(!replay.check(100).unwrap());
println!("TEST: Duplicate packet rejected");
// Higher sequence should be accepted
println!("TEST: Checking higher sequence seq=101");
assert!(replay.check(101).unwrap());
assert_eq!(replay.highest_seq, 101);
println!("TEST: Higher sequence accepted, highest_seq=101");
// Jump ahead to force window shift
println!("TEST: Jumping ahead to seq=200");
assert!(replay.check(200).unwrap());
assert_eq!(replay.highest_seq, 200);
println!("TEST: Jump accepted, highest_seq=200");
// Old packet should be rejected (outside window)
println!("TEST: Checking old packet seq=100 (should be rejected)");
let result = replay.check(100).unwrap();
println!("TEST: Old packet check result: {}", result);
assert!(
!result,
"Old packet (seq=100) should be rejected when highest_seq=200 with window_size=16"
);
println!("TEST: Old packet rejected successfully");
// Disable replay protection
println!("TEST: Disabling replay protection");
replay.set_enabled(false);
// With protection disabled, duplicates should be accepted
println!("TEST: Checking duplicate with protection disabled");
assert!(replay.check(200).unwrap());
println!("TEST: Duplicate accepted with protection disabled");
// Re-enable and reset
println!("TEST: Re-enabling protection and resetting");
replay.set_enabled(true);
replay.reset();
// After reset, highest_seq should be 0
assert_eq!(replay.highest_seq, 0);
println!("TEST: After reset, highest_seq=0");
// Should accept a new first packet
println!("TEST: Checking new packet after reset");
assert!(replay.check(300).unwrap());
println!("TEST: New packet accepted after reset");
}
}