rustnetconf
A Rust network automation platform: async NETCONF client library, YANG code generation, vendor profiles, connection pooling, and a Terraform-like CLI for declarative network config management.
Built on tokio, russh, and rustls — pure Rust, no OpenSSL, no libssh2.
Workspace
| Crate | Description |
|---|---|
| rustnetconf | Async NETCONF 1.0/1.1 client library |
| rustnetconf-yang | YANG model code generation (compile-time config validation) |
| rustnetconf-cli | Terraform-like CLI tool (netconf binary) |
What's New in v0.10.0
Breaking changes:
HostKeyVerificationno longer implementsDefault— callers must explicitly choose a host key policySshAuth::PasswordandSshAuth::KeyFile { passphrase }now useZeroizing<String>instead ofString- User-provided XML content (RPC bodies, filters, configs) is now validated for well-formedness before sending
Security fixes:
- Shell injection via ProxyCommand
%h/%psubstitution — values are now shell-escaped - Credentials (passwords, passphrases) zeroized on drop via the
zeroizecrate - XML fragment validation prevents injection through malformed RPC content
- TLS
danger_accept_invalid_certsnow emits a detailed warning about the full scope of the bypass - CLI device names validated to prevent path traversal; state files written with
0600permissions
New features:
- Configurable RPC timeout (
.rpc_timeout(Duration)) — prevents indefinite blocking on unresponsive devices - Configurable read buffer size (
.max_read_buffer(bytes)) — defaults to 100 MB - IPv6 address support — bracket notation (
[::1]:830) and bare IPv6 addresses - Capability normalization — legacy Junos capability URIs are mapped to standard URIs during session establishment
Quality improvements:
- Connection pool health checks — dead connections are discarded on checkout and drop instead of being recycled
- Blocking
std::fs::read_to_stringin async context replaced withtokio::fs - Unnecessary
Arc<Mutex<>>removed fromSshTransport AtomicU64message counter replaced with plainu64(Session is&mut selfonly)- YANG codegen: full container/list XML serialization, complete Rust keyword list, hard error on module load failure
- CLI: plan summary fixed for non-JSON mode, diff engine compares all list elements
- Removed unused
futuresdependency andquick-xmlserialize feature ErrorTagimplementsstd::str::FromStr;Session::validate()checks:validatecapability- Dependency updates: russh 0.60.2, rustls 0.23.40, tokio 1.52.2, rustls-webpki 0.103.13
RFC Support
| RFC | Feature | Status |
|---|---|---|
| RFC 6241 | Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) | ✅ supported |
| RFC 6242 | NETCONF over SSH | ✅ supported |
| RFC 7589 | NETCONF over TLS | ✅ supported (feature flag tls) — needs physical SRX or non-vSRX for TLS test |
| RFC 5277 | Event Notifications | ✅ supported — tested on Junos 24.4 vSRX (subscription + capability; interleave limited by device) |
| RFC 5717 | Partial Lock RPC | 💡 planned |
| RFC 8071 | NETCONF Call Home | 💡 planned |
| RFC 6243 | With-defaults Capability | 💡 planned |
| RFC 6022 | YANG Module for NETCONF Monitoring | 💡 planned |
| RFC 8526 | NETCONF Extensions for NMDA | 💡 planned |
| RFC 6470 | NETCONF Base Notifications | 💡 planned |
| RFC 8040 | RESTCONF | 💡 planned |
CLI Tool — netconf
Declarative network config management. Write desired state as XML files, the CLI diffs against the device and applies changes with confirmed-commit safety.
Project Structure
my-network/
├── inventory.toml # Device connection details
├── desired/
│ └── spine-01/
│ ├── interfaces.xml # Desired interface config
│ └── system.xml # Desired system config
└── .netconf/state/ # Rollback snapshots (auto-managed)
inventory.toml
[]
= 60
[]
= "10.0.0.1:830"
= "admin"
= "~/.ssh/id_ed25519"
# vendor auto-detected from device hello
Library — Quick Start
[]
= { = "https://github.com/fastrevmd-lab/rustnetconf.git" }
= { = "1", = ["full"] }
For TLS transport (RFC 7589), enable the tls feature:
[]
= { = "https://github.com/fastrevmd-lab/rustnetconf.git", = ["tls"] }
Fetch running config
use ;
async
Edit config (full round trip)
use ;
async
Connect through a jump host (ProxyJump)
use ;
use ;
async
Connect using your ~/.ssh/config
use ;
async
Connect over TLS (RFC 7589)
Note: vSRX 24.4 has a known TLS handshake issue where the PKI engine cannot present a self-signed certificate chain. TLS testing requires a physical SRX, MX, or EX device with a CA-signed certificate. The code compiles and passes unit tests but has not been validated against a live TLS-capable device.
use ;
async
Event notifications (RFC 5277)
use ;
async
Note: Some devices (e.g., Junos vSRX 24.4) advertise
:interleavebut do not respond to RPCs on a session with an active subscription. On these devices, use a dedicated session for notifications and a separate session for RPCs. Notifications arriving during RPCs on interleave-capable devices are automatically buffered and available viadrain_notifications().
Connection pooling
use ;
use SshAuth;
use Datastore;
use Zeroizing;
let pool = builder
.max_connections
.add_device
.build;
let mut conn = pool.checkout.await?;
let config = conn.get_config.await?;
// connection auto-returned to pool on drop
Features
NETCONF Client
- Async-first — tokio-based, push config to 500 devices concurrently
- SSH + TLS transports — SSH (RFC 6242) by default, TLS (RFC 7589) via
tlsfeature flag - SSH bastion support —
ProxyJump(multi-hop),ProxyCommand(shell-escaped), and OpenSSH~/.ssh/configalias resolution - NETCONF 1.0 + 1.1 — EOM and chunked framing with auto-negotiation
- All core RPCs — get, get-config, edit-config, lock/unlock, commit, validate, close/kill-session, discard-changes
- Confirmed commit — auto-rollback safety net (RFC 6241 §8.4)
- Event notifications —
create-subscription, inline notification demux, buffered drain/recv API (RFC 5277) - RPC timeout — configurable per-session deadline prevents indefinite blocking on unresponsive devices
- XML fragment validation — user-provided RPC content is validated before insertion to prevent XML injection
- CommitUnknown detection — distinguishes "commit failed" from "maybe committed, connection lost"
- Stale lock recovery —
lock_or_kill_stale()kills crashed sessions holding locks - Framing mismatch detection — catches firmware bugs where devices send wrong framing
- IPv6 support — connect to devices using bracket notation (
[::1]:830) or bare IPv6 addresses
Vendor Profiles
- Auto-detection from device
<hello>capabilities - Junos — config wrapping, namespace normalization, discard-before-close
- Generic — standard RFC 6241 for any compliant device
- Extensible — implement
VendorProfiletrait for custom vendors
Connection Pool
- Tokio semaphore-based concurrency limiting
- Checkout with timeout (no blocking forever)
- Auto-checkin on drop with health check — dead connections are discarded, not recycled
- Connection reuse from idle pool
YANG Code Generation
- Build-time generation from
.yangmodel files via libyang2 - Typed Rust structs with serde Serialize/Deserialize
- Full XML serialization — leaves, containers, and lists
- Correct type mapping (string, bool, uint32, etc.)
- Complete Rust keyword escaping for YANG node names
- Bundled IETF models: ietf-interfaces, ietf-ip, ietf-yang-types, ietf-inet-types
Authentication
| Method | Transport | Builder API |
|---|---|---|
| Password | SSH | .password("secret") |
| Key file | SSH | .key_file("~/.ssh/id_ed25519") |
| SSH agent | SSH | .ssh_agent() |
| Server-only TLS | TLS | TlsConfig { ca_cert, .. } |
| Mutual TLS (mTLS) | TLS | TlsConfig { client_cert, client_key, .. } |
SSH Connection Options
| Option | Builder API | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Direct TCP | (default) | No proxy |
ProxyJump (bastion chain) |
.jump_hosts(Vec<JumpHostConfig>) |
Each hop has its own credentials and host-key policy |
ProxyCommand |
.proxy_command("ssh -W %h:%p bastion") |
%h/%p shell-escaped and substituted; runs under sh -c |
~/.ssh/config alias |
Client::connect_via_ssh_config("alias")? |
Resolves HostName, Port, User, IdentityFile, ProxyJump, ProxyCommand, Include |
jump_hosts and proxy_command are mutually exclusive at connect time.
Error Handling
Layered errors matching the protocol stack:
match result
Supported Operations
| Operation | RFC 6241 | Status |
|---|---|---|
get |
§7.7 | Done |
get-config |
§7.1 | Done |
edit-config |
§7.2 | Done |
lock / unlock |
§7.4-7.5 | Done |
close-session |
§7.8 | Done |
kill-session |
§7.9 | Done |
commit |
§8.4 | Done |
confirmed-commit |
§8.4 | Done |
validate |
§8.6 | Done |
discard-changes |
§8.3 | Done |
Testing
197 tests across the workspace:
- Unit tests — framing, RPC serialization, capability parsing, vendor profiles, diff engine, inventory parsing, IPv6 address parsing, XML fragment validation, capability normalization
- Mock transport tests — session state machine, CommitUnknown detection, lock recovery
- Integration tests — 32 tests against a live Juniper vSRX including full edit-config round trips, vendor auto-detection, connection pooling, and concurrent sessions
SKIP_INTEGRATION=1
Security
Known Issues
-
RSA timing sidechannel (RUSTSEC-2023-0071) — The
rsacrate (transitive dependency viarussh → internal-russh-forked-ssh-key → rsa) has a known timing sidechannel that could theoretically allow RSA key recovery. No upstream fix is available. Mitigation: Use Ed25519 or ECDSA keys instead of RSA for SSH authentication. -
Debug logs may contain file paths — When SSH key file loading fails, the key file path is included in
tracing::debug!output. This is not exposed at info/warn/error levels. Mitigation: Disable debug-level logging in production, or filterrustnetconf::transportlogs.
Security Features
- Credential zeroization — Passwords and key passphrases use
Zeroizing<String>(via thezeroizecrate) and are securely erased from memory on drop. - SSH host key verification —
HostKeyVerificationmust be set explicitly (noDefaultimpl). UseFingerprint("SHA256:...")to pin host keys in production.AcceptAllis available for lab use but emits atracing::warn!. - Shell-escaped ProxyCommand —
%hand%psubstitutions are shell-escaped to prevent command injection via malicious hostnames. - XML fragment validation — All user-provided RPC content is validated for well-formedness before insertion, preventing XML injection.
- XML attribute escaping — All message-id values are escaped to prevent XML attribute injection.
- TLS bypass warnings —
danger_accept_invalid_certsemits a detailed warning explaining that ALL certificate validation is bypassed (trust chain, signatures, hostname, and expiry). - Read buffer limits — Session read buffers default to 100 MB (configurable via
.max_read_buffer()) to prevent memory exhaustion. - RPC timeout — Configurable via
.rpc_timeout()to prevent indefinite blocking on unresponsive devices. - CLI input validation — Device names are validated to prevent path traversal; state files are written with
0600permissions on Unix. - Typed error hierarchy — Structured error types (
ChannelClosed,SessionExpired,MessageIdMismatch) enable precise error handling without string matching. - No unsafe code — The entire codebase uses safe Rust.
Security Best Practices
- Use Ed25519 SSH keys (not RSA) for device authentication
- Set
host_key_verification(HostKeyVerification::Fingerprint(...))in production —HostKeyVerificationhas no default, so you must choose explicitly - Set
.rpc_timeout(Duration::from_secs(30))to prevent hanging on unresponsive devices - Prefer SSH agent auth over inline passwords
- Store credentials in inventory.toml with restricted file permissions (
chmod 600) - Run the CLI on trusted management networks with direct device connectivity
- Use
confirmed-commit(the default fornetconf apply) so the device auto-reverts if something goes wrong - Disable debug-level logging in production environments
To report a security vulnerability, please open an issue on GitHub.
Dependencies
| Crate | Version | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
async-trait |
0.1 | Async trait support |
quick-xml |
0.37 | XML parsing (NETCONF RPC encode/decode) |
russh |
0.60 | SSH transport (pure Rust, no libssh2) |
thiserror |
2 | Error derive macros |
tokio |
1 | Async runtime |
tracing |
0.1 | Structured logging/tracing |
zeroize |
1 | Secure credential erasure on drop |
Optional (behind tls feature):
| Crate | Version | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
rustls |
0.23 | TLS transport (pure Rust, no OpenSSL) |
tokio-rustls |
0.26 | Async TLS stream adapter |
webpki-roots |
0.26 | Mozilla CA root certificates |
Dev-only:
| Crate | Version | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
tokio-test |
0.4 | Async test utilities |
tracing-subscriber |
0.3 | Log subscriber for tests |
tempfile |
3 | Temporary directories for tests |
License
MIT OR Apache-2.0
Contributing
Contributions welcome! See ARCHITECTURE.md for the codebase design and TODOS.md for tracked work items.