rustnet-sandbox 0.6.0

Post-initialization sandboxing and root privilege dropping for rustnet: Landlock + capability drops on Linux, Seatbelt on macOS, restricted token + job object on Windows, and a shared uid drop on Linux/macOS/FreeBSD
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rustnet-sandbox

Post-initialization sandboxing and root privilege dropping for rustnet, usable by any front-end (the TUI binary or a headless tool) built on the rustnet crates.

One apply_sandbox(&SandboxConfig) -> Result<SandboxReport> entry point with a platform backend behind it:

  • Linux: PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, capability drops (CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON), the root uid drop, and Landlock filesystem/network/scope restrictions (behind the landlock feature).
  • macOS: the root uid drop, then a Seatbelt profile restricting outbound network, credential reads, and writes under user home directories (behind the macos-sandbox feature).
  • Windows: dangerous token privileges removed and a job object blocking child process creation.
  • FreeBSD: the root uid drop (Capsicum is planned).

The privdrop module (Linux/macOS/FreeBSD) resolves the drop target from SUDO_UID/SUDO_GID (falling back to nobody), chowns pre-created output files to it, and performs the verified, irreversible drop.

A requested UID/GID drop is mandatory in both strict and best-effort modes. Failures carry PrivilegeDropError; callers must abort startup before spawning workers instead of treating them as optional sandbox failures. A missing drop target or disabled sandbox still skips the identity transition.

Sandboxing is a post-initialization step: open capture handles, load eBPF programs, and pre-create output files first, apply the sandbox on the main thread, and only then spawn the worker threads that should inherit the restrictions. See the crate docs for the full ordering contract.

RustNet retains its securely opened output descriptors across this transition. The sandbox grants no pathname write exceptions; outputs are not reopened after sandboxing.

The crate deliberately depends on no other rustnet crate: callers pass in paths and an optional drop target, nothing else.

apply_sandbox_allowing_dns adds a narrow exception when network restrictions are enabled. Linux allows reads of the exact libc resolver files and TCP connections only to destination port 53. Linux Landlock does not yet mediate UDP. macOS allows outbound TCP and UDP only to destination port 53. All other configured network restrictions remain active.