rustango 0.57.7

//! Full JWT lifecycle — access + refresh tokens with revocation.
//!
//! Builds on [`super::auth_backends::JwtBackend`] (which only verifies a
//! single token type) by adding:
//!
//! - **Token pairs**: short-lived access + long-lived refresh
//! - **Token type claim** (`"typ": "access"` or `"typ": "refresh"`)
//! - **JWT ID** (`"jti"`) for individual token revocation
//! - **Sliding refresh**: each `refresh()` issues a new pair (rotates jti)
//! - **In-memory blacklist** for revocations (replace with cache-backed storage in production)
//!
//! ## Quick start
//!
//! ```ignore
//! use rustango::tenancy::jwt_lifecycle::JwtLifecycle;
//!
//! let jwt = JwtLifecycle::new(b"my-signing-key".to_vec());
//!
//! // Login: issue both tokens
//! let pair = jwt.issue_pair(user_id);
//! // Send pair.access to the client (short TTL, in Authorization header)
//! // Send pair.refresh to the client (long TTL, in HttpOnly cookie or secure storage)
//!
//! // Authenticated request:
//! match jwt.verify_access(&access_token) {
//!     Some(claims) => { /* claims.sub is the user id */ }
//!     None => { /* 401 */ }
//! }
//!
//! // Refresh endpoint:
//! match jwt.refresh(&refresh_token) {
//!     Some(new_pair) => { /* return new_pair to client */ }
//!     None => { /* 401 — refresh expired or revoked */ }
//! }
//!
//! // Logout:
//! jwt.revoke(&access_token);   // blacklist the access JTI
//! jwt.revoke(&refresh_token);  // blacklist the refresh JTI
//! ```

use std::sync::Arc;

use base64::Engine;
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;

use crate::jti_store::{InMemoryJtiStore, JtiStore};

/// One issued access+refresh pair.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct JwtTokenPair {
    pub access: String,
    pub refresh: String,
}

/// Claims extracted from a verified token.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct JwtClaims {
    /// Subject — the user id.
    pub sub: i64,
    /// Expiry — unix seconds.
    pub exp: i64,
    /// JWT ID — unique per-token identifier (used for revocation).
    pub jti: String,
    /// Token type — `"access"` or `"refresh"`.
    pub typ: String,
    /// Custom claims set via [`JwtLifecycle::issue_pair_with`] or
    /// [`JwtLifecycle::issue_token_with`]. Empty for tokens issued via
    /// the no-custom variants.
    pub custom: serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value>,
}

impl JwtClaims {
    /// Look up a custom claim by name. Returns `None` when absent or when
    /// the value can't be decoded into `T`.
    ///
    /// ```ignore
    /// let roles: Option<Vec<String>> = claims.get_custom("roles");
    /// let tenant: Option<String> = claims.get_custom("tenant");
    /// ```
    #[must_use]
    pub fn get_custom<T: serde::de::DeserializeOwned>(&self, key: &str) -> Option<T> {
        let v = self.custom.get(key)?;
        serde_json::from_value(v.clone()).ok()
    }

    /// Borrow a custom claim's raw JSON value without decoding.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn custom_value(&self, key: &str) -> Option<&serde_json::Value> {
        self.custom.get(key)
    }
}

/// Reserved claim names — caller-supplied custom payloads cannot use these.
/// Returned by [`reserved_claims`] for inspection.
pub const RESERVED_CLAIM_NAMES: &[&str] = &["sub", "exp", "jti", "typ"];

/// Returned by [`JwtLifecycle::issue_pair_with`] when the custom payload
/// tries to overwrite a reserved framework claim.
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum JwtIssueError {
    #[error("reserved claim `{0}` cannot be set in custom payload")]
    ReservedClaim(String),
}

const ACCESS_TYP: &str = "access";
const REFRESH_TYP: &str = "refresh";

/// Default access token TTL — 15 minutes.
pub const DEFAULT_ACCESS_TTL_SECS: i64 = 900;
/// Default refresh token TTL — 7 days.
pub const DEFAULT_REFRESH_TTL_SECS: i64 = 7 * 24 * 3600;

/// JWT manager with access + refresh tokens and a pluggable JTI
/// revocation store. v0.48 — the store is `Arc<dyn JtiStore>` so
/// multi-instance deployments can share state via a Redis- or DB-
/// backed impl. Default ctor wires up [`InMemoryJtiStore`].
pub struct JwtLifecycle {
    secret: Vec<u8>,
    pub access_ttl_secs: i64,
    pub refresh_ttl_secs: i64,
    jti_store: Arc<dyn JtiStore>,
}

impl JwtLifecycle {
    /// Build a new lifecycle with default TTLs (15 min access / 7 day refresh).
    ///
    /// # Panics
    /// If `secret` is shorter than 32 bytes. HMAC accepts any key length,
    /// but a short key is guessable and would let anyone mint tokens —
    /// fail closed rather than sign with one.
    ///
    /// This is the floor `JwtBackend::new` and `auth_routes::build_jwt`
    /// already enforce. It was missing here, on the one path that
    /// *issues* tokens rather than verifying them: a caller could sign
    /// with a two-byte key and every verifier downstream would accept
    /// the result, because the tokens are perfectly valid — just
    /// forgeable by anyone. Audit A-06.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn new(secret: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
        // The message deliberately does NOT carry `secret.len()`.
        // CodeQL's `rust/cleartext-logging` flags the length as a value
        // derived from a secret reaching a log sink, and it is right to:
        // a panic message lands in logs and crash reports, and the exact
        // length of a key is information about that key. `jwt.rs`'s
        // equivalent check already words it this way.
        assert!(
            secret.len() >= 32,
            "JwtLifecycle signing key is too short; need >= 32 bytes (a shorter key is forgeable)",
        );
        Self {
            secret,
            access_ttl_secs: DEFAULT_ACCESS_TTL_SECS,
            refresh_ttl_secs: DEFAULT_REFRESH_TTL_SECS,
            jti_store: Arc::new(InMemoryJtiStore::new()),
        }
    }

    /// Swap the JTI store. v0.48 — pass any `Arc<dyn JtiStore>` for
    /// multi-instance revocation correctness. Without this, two
    /// rustango processes have independent blacklists and a token
    /// revoked on instance A can still be replayed on instance B
    /// within the token's TTL window.
    ///
    /// **Production guidance (audit L5):** the default
    /// [`InMemoryJtiStore`] is single-process and loses all revocations
    /// on restart. Any deployment with more than one replica — or that
    /// needs revocations to survive a restart — MUST install a shared,
    /// durable store here (Redis / database), keyed by `jti` with the
    /// entry's TTL set to the token's remaining lifetime. Otherwise
    /// `/logout` (revoke) is best-effort and a revoked token may still be
    /// accepted elsewhere until it expires naturally.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn with_jti_store(mut self, store: Arc<dyn JtiStore>) -> Self {
        self.jti_store = store;
        self
    }

    /// Override the access token TTL (in seconds).
    #[must_use]
    pub fn with_access_ttl(mut self, secs: i64) -> Self {
        self.access_ttl_secs = secs;
        self
    }

    /// Override the refresh token TTL (in seconds).
    #[must_use]
    pub fn with_refresh_ttl(mut self, secs: i64) -> Self {
        self.refresh_ttl_secs = secs;
        self
    }

    /// Issue an access+refresh pair for `user_id` with no custom claims.
    pub fn issue_pair(&self, user_id: i64) -> JwtTokenPair {
        // Safe to unwrap — empty custom payload can't trigger ReservedClaim.
        self.issue_pair_with(user_id, serde_json::Map::new())
            .expect("empty custom map cannot trigger ReservedClaim")
    }

    /// Issue an access+refresh pair with a custom claim payload embedded
    /// in both tokens. Useful for putting `roles`, `tenant`, `email`, etc.
    /// directly in the JWT so verification doesn't need a DB lookup.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// [`JwtIssueError::ReservedClaim`] if `custom` contains any of the
    /// framework-reserved names: `sub`, `exp`, `jti`, `typ`.
    ///
    /// # Example
    ///
    /// ```ignore
    /// use serde_json::json;
    /// let pair = jwt.issue_pair_with(user_id, json!({
    ///     "roles": ["admin", "editor"],
    ///     "tenant": "acme",
    /// }).as_object().unwrap().clone())?;
    /// ```
    pub fn issue_pair_with(
        &self,
        user_id: i64,
        custom: serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value>,
    ) -> Result<JwtTokenPair, JwtIssueError> {
        check_reserved(&custom)?;
        let access = self.issue_token_inner(user_id, ACCESS_TYP, self.access_ttl_secs, &custom);
        let refresh = self.issue_token_inner(user_id, REFRESH_TYP, self.refresh_ttl_secs, &custom);
        Ok(JwtTokenPair { access, refresh })
    }

    /// Issue a single access token with custom claims. Useful for
    /// short-lived API tokens where the refresh side isn't needed.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// [`JwtIssueError::ReservedClaim`] if `custom` overlaps reserved names.
    pub fn issue_access_with(
        &self,
        user_id: i64,
        custom: serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value>,
    ) -> Result<String, JwtIssueError> {
        check_reserved(&custom)?;
        Ok(self.issue_token_inner(user_id, ACCESS_TYP, self.access_ttl_secs, &custom))
    }

    /// Verify an access token. Returns the claims on success, `None` if
    /// invalid, expired, blacklisted, or wrong type.
    ///
    /// Async since v0.52 — the revocation check consults the
    /// [`crate::jti_store::JtiStore`], which may be a durable backend (#1191).
    #[must_use]
    pub async fn verify_access(&self, token: &str) -> Option<JwtClaims> {
        let claims = self.verify_token(token).await?;
        if claims.typ != ACCESS_TYP {
            return None;
        }
        Some(claims)
    }

    /// Verify a refresh token. Returns the claims on success, `None` if
    /// invalid, expired, blacklisted, or wrong type.
    ///
    /// Async since v0.52 — see [`Self::verify_access`].
    #[must_use]
    pub async fn verify_refresh(&self, token: &str) -> Option<JwtClaims> {
        let claims = self.verify_token(token).await?;
        if claims.typ != REFRESH_TYP {
            return None;
        }
        Some(claims)
    }

    /// Exchange a refresh token for a new access+refresh pair (sliding
    /// expiry). The old refresh token's JTI is blacklisted to prevent reuse.
    ///
    /// **Custom claims (scope, roles, tenant, etc.) are preserved** —
    /// the new pair carries the exact same custom payload as the refresh
    /// token. This means `roles` granted at login persist across refresh
    /// boundaries; if you need to re-evaluate them on every refresh, call
    /// [`Self::refresh_with`] instead and supply fresh claims.
    ///
    /// Returns `None` if the refresh token is invalid, expired, or already
    /// blacklisted.
    pub async fn refresh(&self, refresh_token: &str) -> Option<JwtTokenPair> {
        let claims = self.verify_refresh(refresh_token).await?;
        // Rotate: blacklist the old refresh, issue a new pair carrying the
        // same custom payload (preserves `scope` / `roles` / `tenant`).
        self.blacklist_jti(&claims.jti, claims.exp).await;
        // Safe to unwrap — the custom claims came from a token we ourselves
        // issued, so they can't contain reserved names (issue_pair_with
        // already rejected those at original issuance).
        self.issue_pair_with(claims.sub, claims.custom).ok()
    }

    /// Like [`Self::refresh`] but lets the caller substitute a fresh
    /// custom payload — useful when permissions may have changed since
    /// the refresh token was issued (e.g. role revoked, scope downgraded).
    ///
    /// The old refresh JTI is still blacklisted to prevent replay.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// [`JwtIssueError::ReservedClaim`] if `new_custom` overlaps reserved names.
    /// Returns `Ok(None)` if the refresh token is invalid / expired / blacklisted.
    pub async fn refresh_with(
        &self,
        refresh_token: &str,
        new_custom: serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value>,
    ) -> Result<Option<JwtTokenPair>, JwtIssueError> {
        let Some(claims) = self.verify_refresh(refresh_token).await else {
            return Ok(None);
        };
        self.blacklist_jti(&claims.jti, claims.exp).await;
        self.issue_pair_with(claims.sub, new_custom).map(Some)
    }

    /// Revoke a token by adding its JTI to the blacklist. Subsequent
    /// `verify_*` calls for this token will return `None` until the
    /// token's natural expiry passes.
    pub async fn revoke(&self, token: &str) -> bool {
        let Some(claims) = self.decode_unchecked(token) else {
            return false;
        };
        self.blacklist_jti(&claims.jti, claims.exp).await;
        true
    }

    /// Approximate number of currently blacklisted JTIs (for tests
    /// / monitoring). Stores that don't cheaply expose a count
    /// (e.g. a Redis-backed [`JtiStore`]) return 0. v0.48.
    #[must_use]
    pub async fn blacklist_size(&self) -> usize {
        self.jti_store.approx_size().await.unwrap_or(0)
    }

    // ------------------------------------------------------------------ internals

    /// Build + sign a token with the given reserved claims and an optional
    /// custom payload merged in.
    fn issue_token_inner(
        &self,
        user_id: i64,
        typ: &str,
        ttl_secs: i64,
        custom: &serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value>,
    ) -> String {
        let exp = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() + ttl_secs;
        let jti = random_jti();
        let mut payload = serde_json::Map::new();
        // Custom claims first — reserved claims set below CANNOT be
        // overridden (defense-in-depth; check_reserved already ran).
        for (k, v) in custom {
            payload.insert(k.clone(), v.clone());
        }
        payload.insert("sub".into(), serde_json::Value::from(user_id));
        payload.insert("exp".into(), serde_json::Value::from(exp));
        payload.insert("jti".into(), serde_json::Value::String(jti));
        payload.insert("typ".into(), serde_json::Value::String(typ.into()));

        // Three segments, with the JOSE header, signed over
        // `header.payload` — i.e. an actual JWT (#1397).
        //
        // This used to emit `base64(payload).base64(sig)`: two segments,
        // no header, no `alg`, signed over the payload alone. Nothing
        // outside rustango could read it — not jwt.io, not any language's
        // standard library, not an API gateway asked to validate a JWT,
        // and not `rustango::jwt::decode`, which rejected the framework's
        // own tokens as malformed. Meanwhile every doc, the type names
        // and the route all said JWT.
        let header_b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(
            serde_json::to_vec(&serde_json::json!({"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}))
                .unwrap_or_default(),
        );
        let payload_b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
            .encode(serde_json::to_vec(&payload).unwrap_or_default());
        let signing_input = format!("{header_b64}.{payload_b64}");
        let sig = self.sign(signing_input.as_bytes());
        let sig_b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(sig);
        format!("{signing_input}.{sig_b64}")
    }

    async fn verify_token(&self, token: &str) -> Option<JwtClaims> {
        let claims = self.decode_unchecked(token)?;
        // Expiry — checked before the store, so an expired token never costs
        // a round trip to a durable backend.
        if chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() >= claims.exp {
            return None;
        }
        // Blacklist
        if self.is_blacklisted(&claims.jti).await {
            return None;
        }
        Some(claims)
    }

    /// Decode + verify signature only — does NOT check expiry or blacklist.
    /// Used for `revoke` so we can blacklist even an already-expired token's JTI.
    fn decode_unchecked(&self, token: &str) -> Option<JwtClaims> {
        // Accepts both shapes (#1397). Three segments is what we issue
        // now; two is the pre-#1397 format, still verified so that
        // upgrading the framework does not log out everyone holding a
        // token that has not expired yet.
        //
        // This is a compatibility path with an end date, not a permanent
        // one — remove it in 0.58, by which time every token minted in
        // the old shape has aged out. It weakens nothing in the
        // meantime: both shapes are verified with the same HMAC key, and
        // an attacker who cannot forge one cannot forge the other.
        let parts: Vec<&str> = token.split('.').collect();
        let (signing_input, payload_b64, sig_b64) = match parts.as_slice() {
            [header, payload, sig] => {
                // Pin the algorithm from the header rather than trusting
                // it. Belt-and-braces — we verify HS256 over the whole
                // `header.payload` with our own key regardless, so a
                // swapped `alg` cannot validate — but refusing it here
                // means `alg: none` is rejected as such instead of as a
                // signature mismatch.
                let header_bytes = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
                    .decode(header)
                    .ok()?;
                let header_json: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&header_bytes).ok()?;
                if header_json.get("alg").and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str) != Some("HS256") {
                    return None;
                }
                (format!("{header}.{payload}"), *payload, *sig)
            }
            [payload, sig] => ((*payload).to_owned(), *payload, *sig),
            _ => return None,
        };

        let expected = self.sign(signing_input.as_bytes());
        let provided = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
            .decode(sig_b64)
            .ok()?;
        if expected.ct_eq(&provided[..]).unwrap_u8() == 0 {
            return None;
        }
        let payload_bytes = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
            .decode(payload_b64)
            .ok()?;
        let mut payload: serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value> =
            serde_json::from_slice(&payload_bytes).ok()?;

        // Extract reserved claims first
        let sub = payload.get("sub")?.as_i64()?;
        let exp = payload.get("exp")?.as_i64()?;
        let jti = payload.get("jti")?.as_str()?.to_owned();
        let typ = payload.get("typ")?.as_str()?.to_owned();

        // Whatever's left is the custom payload — strip the reserved keys
        for reserved in RESERVED_CLAIM_NAMES {
            payload.remove(*reserved);
        }

        Some(JwtClaims {
            sub,
            exp,
            jti,
            typ,
            custom: payload,
        })
    }

    fn sign(&self, msg: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
        use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
        use sha2::Sha256;
        let mut mac = <Hmac<Sha256>>::new_from_slice(&self.secret).expect("HMAC accepts any key");
        mac.update(msg);
        mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec()
    }

    async fn blacklist_jti(&self, jti: &str, expires_at: i64) {
        // v0.48 — delegate to the pluggable JtiStore. We ignore the
        // returned `bool` (newly-inserted vs already-present) because
        // re-revoking an already-revoked token is idempotent here:
        // either way the JTI is in the store on return. Pruning is
        // the store's responsibility (`InMemoryJtiStore` does it
        // opportunistically inside `mark_used`).
        //
        // v0.52 (#1191) — awaited, so a durable store writes the revocation
        // before we return. Previously the trait was sync, which forced
        // durable stores into a write-behind cache with a window where a
        // revoked token was still accepted on another instance.
        let _ = self.jti_store.mark_used(jti, expires_at).await;
    }

    async fn is_blacklisted(&self, jti: &str) -> bool {
        // v0.48 — `JtiStore::is_used` doesn't filter by the entry's
        // expiry the way the pre-v0.48 in-line map did. That's a
        // tighter behaviour (a revoked-but-not-yet-pruned JTI stays
        // unusable for slightly longer), and harmless: the token
        // verify path rejects expired tokens before this check is
        // ever consulted.
        self.jti_store.is_used(jti).await
    }
}

fn random_jti() -> String {
    // v0.42 — OsRng (OS CSPRNG) for JWT identifier material. A
    // predictable JTI lets an attacker pre-mint blacklist entries
    // and bypass token revocation.
    use rand::{rngs::OsRng, RngCore};
    let mut bytes = [0u8; 16];
    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes);
    base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(bytes)
}

/// Reject custom payloads that try to set framework-reserved claim names.
fn check_reserved(
    custom: &serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value>,
) -> Result<(), JwtIssueError> {
    for reserved in RESERVED_CLAIM_NAMES {
        if custom.contains_key(*reserved) {
            return Err(JwtIssueError::ReservedClaim((*reserved).to_owned()));
        }
    }
    Ok(())
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    /// 32 bytes, because that is the floor `new` enforces.
    ///
    /// This helper signed with an 11-byte `b"test-secret"` — a key the
    /// framework's own verifier-side constructors have refused since
    /// audit N5. The module's tests were the reason nobody noticed the
    /// issuing path had no floor: they exercised it exclusively with a
    /// key it should never have accepted.
    fn jwt() -> JwtLifecycle {
        JwtLifecycle::new(b"test-secret-at-least-32-bytes-ok!".to_vec())
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn issue_and_verify_access() {
        let j = jwt();
        let pair = j.issue_pair(42);
        let claims = j
            .verify_access(&pair.access)
            .await
            .expect("access verifies");
        assert_eq!(claims.sub, 42);
        assert_eq!(claims.typ, "access");
        assert!(!claims.jti.is_empty());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn issue_and_verify_refresh() {
        let j = jwt();
        let pair = j.issue_pair(42);
        let claims = j
            .verify_refresh(&pair.refresh)
            .await
            .expect("refresh verifies");
        assert_eq!(claims.sub, 42);
        assert_eq!(claims.typ, "refresh");
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn access_token_rejected_as_refresh() {
        let j = jwt();
        let pair = j.issue_pair(1);
        assert!(j.verify_refresh(&pair.access).await.is_none());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn refresh_token_rejected_as_access() {
        let j = jwt();
        let pair = j.issue_pair(1);
        assert!(j.verify_access(&pair.refresh).await.is_none());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn refresh_returns_new_pair() {
        let j = jwt();
        let pair = j.issue_pair(7);
        let new_pair = j.refresh(&pair.refresh).await.expect("refresh succeeds");
        assert_ne!(pair.access, new_pair.access);
        assert_ne!(pair.refresh, new_pair.refresh);

        let claims = j.verify_access(&new_pair.access).await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(claims.sub, 7);
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn refresh_blacklists_old_refresh_token() {
        let j = jwt();
        let pair = j.issue_pair(7);
        let _new = j.refresh(&pair.refresh).await.unwrap();
        // The old refresh token can no longer be used.
        assert!(j.refresh(&pair.refresh).await.is_none());
        assert!(j.verify_refresh(&pair.refresh).await.is_none());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn revoke_invalidates_access_token() {
        let j = jwt();
        let pair = j.issue_pair(1);
        assert!(j.verify_access(&pair.access).await.is_some());
        assert!(j.revoke(&pair.access).await);
        assert!(j.verify_access(&pair.access).await.is_none());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn revoke_invalid_token_returns_false() {
        let j = jwt();
        assert!(!j.revoke("not-a-valid-token").await);
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn tampered_signature_fails_verification() {
        let j = jwt();
        let pair = j.issue_pair(1);
        let mut bytes = pair.access.into_bytes();
        // Flip a byte in the signature
        let last = bytes.len() - 1;
        bytes[last] ^= 0x01;
        let tampered = String::from_utf8(bytes).unwrap();
        assert!(j.verify_access(&tampered).await.is_none());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn wrong_secret_fails_verification() {
        let j1 = jwt();
        let j2 = JwtLifecycle::new(b"a-different-secret-32-bytes-long!".to_vec());
        let pair = j1.issue_pair(5);
        assert!(j2.verify_access(&pair.access).await.is_none());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn unique_jti_per_issuance() {
        let j = jwt();
        let pair1 = j.issue_pair(1);
        let pair2 = j.issue_pair(1);
        let c1 = j.verify_access(&pair1.access).await.unwrap();
        let c2 = j.verify_access(&pair2.access).await.unwrap();
        assert_ne!(c1.jti, c2.jti);
    }

    #[test]
    fn custom_ttls() {
        let j = JwtLifecycle::new(b"custom-ttl-secret-32-bytes-long!!".to_vec())
            .with_access_ttl(60)
            .with_refresh_ttl(3600);
        assert_eq!(j.access_ttl_secs, 60);
        assert_eq!(j.refresh_ttl_secs, 3600);
    }

    // -------------------------------------------------------------- custom payload tests

    fn map(value: serde_json::Value) -> serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value> {
        value.as_object().unwrap().clone()
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn issue_pair_with_embeds_custom_claims() {
        let j = jwt();
        let pair = j
            .issue_pair_with(
                42,
                map(serde_json::json!({"roles": ["admin", "editor"], "tenant": "acme"})),
            )
            .unwrap();
        let claims = j.verify_access(&pair.access).await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(claims.sub, 42);
        let roles: Vec<String> = claims.get_custom("roles").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(roles, vec!["admin", "editor"]);
        let tenant: String = claims.get_custom("tenant").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(tenant, "acme");
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn issue_pair_no_custom_returns_empty_custom_map() {
        let j = jwt();
        let pair = j.issue_pair(7);
        let claims = j.verify_access(&pair.access).await.unwrap();
        assert!(claims.custom.is_empty());
        let missing: Option<String> = claims.get_custom("anything");
        assert!(missing.is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn issue_pair_with_rejects_reserved_claims() {
        let j = jwt();
        for reserved in RESERVED_CLAIM_NAMES {
            let custom = map(serde_json::json!({ *reserved: "evil" }));
            let r = j.issue_pair_with(1, custom);
            assert!(
                matches!(r, Err(JwtIssueError::ReservedClaim(_))),
                "should reject {reserved}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn refresh_preserves_custom_claims() {
        let j = jwt();
        let pair = j
            .issue_pair_with(
                7,
                map(serde_json::json!({"scope": "read:posts write:posts"})),
            )
            .unwrap();
        let new_pair = j.refresh(&pair.refresh).await.unwrap();

        let new_access_claims = j.verify_access(&new_pair.access).await.unwrap();
        let new_refresh_claims = j.verify_refresh(&new_pair.refresh).await.unwrap();

        assert_eq!(new_access_claims.sub, 7);
        let scope: String = new_access_claims.get_custom("scope").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(scope, "read:posts write:posts");

        // Refresh side carries the same payload
        let scope_r: String = new_refresh_claims.get_custom("scope").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(scope_r, "read:posts write:posts");
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn refresh_with_substitutes_new_custom_claims() {
        let j = jwt();
        let pair = j
            .issue_pair_with(7, map(serde_json::json!({"roles": ["admin"]})))
            .unwrap();
        // Role got revoked since login — issue new pair with downgraded scope
        let new_pair = j
            .refresh_with(&pair.refresh, map(serde_json::json!({"roles": ["viewer"]})))
            .await
            .unwrap()
            .unwrap();

        let claims = j.verify_access(&new_pair.access).await.unwrap();
        let roles: Vec<String> = claims.get_custom("roles").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(roles, vec!["viewer"]);
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn refresh_with_invalid_token_returns_ok_none() {
        let j = jwt();
        let r = j
            .refresh_with("not-a-token", map(serde_json::json!({})))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert!(r.is_none());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn refresh_with_rejects_reserved_claims() {
        let j = jwt();
        let pair = j.issue_pair(1);
        let r = j
            .refresh_with(&pair.refresh, map(serde_json::json!({"sub": 999})))
            .await;
        assert!(matches!(r, Err(JwtIssueError::ReservedClaim(_))));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn issue_access_with_returns_single_token() {
        let j = jwt();
        let token = j
            .issue_access_with(42, map(serde_json::json!({"key_id": "abc"})))
            .unwrap();
        let claims = j.verify_access(&token).await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(claims.sub, 42);
        assert_eq!(claims.typ, "access");
        let key_id: String = claims.get_custom("key_id").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(key_id, "abc");
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn custom_value_returns_raw_json() {
        let j = jwt();
        let token = j
            .issue_access_with(1, map(serde_json::json!({"nested": {"x": 1}})))
            .unwrap();
        let claims = j.verify_access(&token).await.unwrap();
        let raw = claims.custom_value("nested").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(raw["x"], 1);
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn refresh_blacklists_old_refresh_even_with_custom_claims() {
        let j = jwt();
        let pair = j
            .issue_pair_with(7, map(serde_json::json!({"role": "admin"})))
            .unwrap();
        let _new = j.refresh(&pair.refresh).await.unwrap();
        // Original refresh token can no longer be used
        assert!(j.refresh(&pair.refresh).await.is_none());
    }

    // v0.48 — `with_jti_store` lets two JwtLifecycle handles share
    // revocation state. This is the multi-instance hook: in a
    // horizontally-scaled deployment process A revokes a token,
    // process B sees the revocation. The default in-memory store
    // can't span processes, but this test uses an `Arc<dyn JtiStore>`
    // shared between two in-process handles to prove the wire is
    // wired. A Redis-backed JtiStore in production gives the same
    // semantics across actual replicas.

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn shared_jti_store_makes_revoke_visible_across_handles() {
        use crate::jti_store::{InMemoryJtiStore, JtiStore};
        let secret = b"shared-test-secret-32-bytes-long".to_vec();
        let shared: std::sync::Arc<dyn JtiStore> = std::sync::Arc::new(InMemoryJtiStore::new());

        let j_a = JwtLifecycle::new(secret.clone()).with_jti_store(std::sync::Arc::clone(&shared));
        let j_b = JwtLifecycle::new(secret).with_jti_store(std::sync::Arc::clone(&shared));

        let pair = j_a.issue_pair(7);
        // Both instances accept the token before revocation.
        assert!(j_a.verify_access(&pair.access).await.is_some());
        assert!(j_b.verify_access(&pair.access).await.is_some());

        // Revoke on A.
        assert!(j_a.revoke(&pair.access).await);

        // B must now reject the token even though revocation
        // happened on A. The shared store is the single source of
        // truth.
        assert!(
            j_a.verify_access(&pair.access).await.is_none(),
            "instance A must reject its own revoked token"
        );
        assert!(
            j_b.verify_access(&pair.access).await.is_none(),
            "instance B must see the revocation from A via the shared store"
        );
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn blacklist_size_uses_jti_store_approx_size() {
        // Confirms blacklist_size delegates to JtiStore::approx_size
        // rather than peeking at a private map.
        let j = jwt();
        assert_eq!(j.blacklist_size().await, 0);
        let pair = j.issue_pair(1);
        j.revoke(&pair.access).await;
        assert_eq!(j.blacklist_size().await, 1);
        j.revoke(&pair.refresh).await;
        assert_eq!(j.blacklist_size().await, 2);
    }

    /// A short signing key is refused, not quietly accepted.
    ///
    /// `JwtBackend::new` and `auth_routes::build_jwt` both enforced this
    /// floor; the constructor that actually *signs* did not. A two-byte
    /// key produced perfectly valid tokens that anyone could forge, and
    /// every verifier downstream accepted them — there was nothing to
    /// notice. Audit A-06.
    #[test]
    #[should_panic(expected = "need >= 32")]
    fn a_short_signing_key_is_refused() {
        let _ = JwtLifecycle::new(b"too-short".to_vec());
    }

    /// And exactly 32 bytes is accepted, so the boundary is `>=` rather
    /// than `>`. A test that only checked the panic would pass with the
    /// comparison inverted.
    #[test]
    fn a_thirty_two_byte_key_is_accepted() {
        let life = JwtLifecycle::new(vec![7u8; 32]);
        assert_eq!(life.access_ttl_secs, DEFAULT_ACCESS_TTL_SECS);
    }
}