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//! Crypto / hash constant annotation.
//!
//! Many cryptographic and hash routines pin specific magic 32-bit constants
//! into their inner loops. When we see one of those values flow into an
//! IMUL / XOR site, the surrounding code is almost certainly that
//! algorithm's compress / round / mixing function. Annotating the constant
//! up-front gives the reader the algorithm name without forcing a search.
//!
//! This catalogue is high-precision — each entry is rare enough that a
//! random 4-byte constant has effectively zero chance of colliding with one
//! of these values. The annotation is therefore safe to emit unconditionally
//! whenever a 4-byte constant matches.
//!
//! Catalogue draws on the public RE corpus (Wikipedia, Crypto++ source,
//! reference implementations) and direct observation from PyVMProtect-style
//! crackme RE — see `repos/CrackMe_PyVMP_v5/WHITEPAPER.md` for the
//! motivating session, which used PCG / FNV / Knuth all in one resolver
//! and benefits a lot from inline naming.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::LazyLock;
/// Single catalogue entry. Algorithm name + role of this constant in it.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
pub struct Annotation {
pub algorithm: &'static str,
pub role: &'static str,
}
const ENTRIES: &[(u32, &str, &str)] = &[
// ── Knuth / Fibonacci hashing ───────────────────────────────────────
// The "golden ratio" 32-bit Knuth multiplicative-hash multiplier.
// Appears in CityHash, MurmurHash3 mixing, PyVMProtect VM dispatch,
// many custom hash routines.
(0x9e3779b9, "Knuth", "golden ratio multiplier"),
(0x61c88647, "Knuth", "golden ratio (signed-negation form)"),
// ── FNV (Fowler-Noll-Vo) ────────────────────────────────────────────
(0x01000193, "FNV-1", "32-bit prime"),
(0x811c9dc5, "FNV-1", "32-bit init / offset basis"),
// Note: FNV 64-bit prime is 0x100000001b3 (33 bits) — out of range for
// this 32-bit catalogue. Caller-side detection only.
// ── PCG (Permuted Congruential Generator) ───────────────────────────
// From O'Neill's "PCG: A Family of Simple Fast Space-Efficient
// Statistically Good Algorithms for Random Number Generation" (2014).
// Common in modern obfuscation as a keystream PRNG.
(0x045d9f3b, "PCG", "32-bit hash multiplier 1"),
(0x27d4eb2d, "PCG", "32-bit hash multiplier 2"),
(0x165667b1, "PCG", "32-bit hash additive"),
(
0x3d4d51cb,
"PCG",
"Murmur-style finalizer multiplier (signed-neg)",
),
(
0xc2b2ae35,
"PCG",
"Murmur-style finalizer multiplier (unsigned)",
),
// ── MurmurHash3 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
(0xcc9e2d51, "MurmurHash3", "x86_32 c1"),
(0x1b873593, "MurmurHash3", "x86_32 c2"),
(0x85ebca6b, "MurmurHash3", "x86_32 finalizer m1"),
(
0xc2b2ae35_u32.wrapping_mul(0),
"MurmurHash3",
"x86_32 finalizer m2",
), // dup
(0x239b961b, "MurmurHash3", "x86_128 c1"),
(0xab0e9789, "MurmurHash3", "x86_128 c2"),
(0x38b34ae5, "MurmurHash3", "x86_128 c3"),
(0xa1e38b93, "MurmurHash3", "x86_128 c4"),
// ── DJB2 family ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
(5381, "DJB2", "init / offset basis"),
(33, "DJB2", "step multiplier (33)"),
// ── CRC-32 (IEEE 802.3) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
(0xedb88320, "CRC-32", "reversed polynomial (Ethernet)"),
(0x04c11db7, "CRC-32", "forward polynomial"),
// ── CRC-32C (Castagnoli) ────────────────────────────────────────────
(0x82f63b78, "CRC-32C", "reversed polynomial (iSCSI/SSE4.2)"),
(0x1edc6f41, "CRC-32C", "forward polynomial"),
// ── SHA-256 H0 init constants ───────────────────────────────────────
// First 32 bits of fractional parts of square roots of first 8 primes.
(0x6a09e667, "SHA-256", "H0[0]"),
(0xbb67ae85, "SHA-256", "H0[1]"),
(0x3c6ef372, "SHA-256", "H0[2]"),
(0xa54ff53a, "SHA-256", "H0[3]"),
(0x510e527f, "SHA-256", "H0[4]"),
(0x9b05688c, "SHA-256", "H0[5]"),
(0x1f83d9ab, "SHA-256", "H0[6]"),
(0x5be0cd19, "SHA-256", "H0[7]"),
// SHA-256 K[0..15] — first 16 round constants. Catching any one or
// two of these in an inner loop is enough to ID the algorithm.
(0x428a2f98, "SHA-256", "K[0]"),
(0x71374491, "SHA-256", "K[1]"),
(0xb5c0fbcf, "SHA-256", "K[2]"),
(0xe9b5dba5, "SHA-256", "K[3]"),
(0x3956c25b, "SHA-256", "K[4]"),
(0x59f111f1, "SHA-256", "K[5]"),
(0x923f82a4, "SHA-256", "K[6]"),
(0xab1c5ed5, "SHA-256", "K[7]"),
// ── SHA-1 init ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
(0x67452301, "SHA-1/MD5", "h0/A init"),
(0xefcdab89, "SHA-1/MD5", "h1/B init"),
(0x98badcfe, "SHA-1/MD5", "h2/C init"),
(0x10325476, "SHA-1/MD5", "h3/D init"),
(0xc3d2e1f0, "SHA-1", "h4 init"),
(0x5a827999, "SHA-1", "K1 (rounds 0-19)"),
(0x6ed9eba1, "SHA-1", "K2 (rounds 20-39)"),
(0x8f1bbcdc, "SHA-1", "K3 (rounds 40-59)"),
(0xca62c1d6, "SHA-1", "K4 (rounds 60-79)"),
// ── MD5 round shifts (S table — less common, skipped) ───────────────
// T constants from sin function (first 16). Match any → MD5 likely.
(0xd76aa478, "MD5", "T[1]"),
(0xe8c7b756, "MD5", "T[2]"),
(0x242070db, "MD5", "T[3]"),
(0xc1bdceee, "MD5", "T[4]"),
(0xf57c0faf, "MD5", "T[5]"),
// ── ChaCha / Salsa20 ────────────────────────────────────────────────
(0x61707865, "ChaCha20/Salsa20", "constant 'expa'"),
(0x3320646e, "ChaCha20/Salsa20", "constant 'nd 3'"),
(0x79622d32, "ChaCha20/Salsa20", "constant '2-by'"),
(0x6b206574, "ChaCha20/Salsa20", "constant 'te k'"),
// ── AES Rcon ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Single-byte Rcon values are too low-entropy. AES-specific 32-bit
// values are typically embedded in the SBox / InvSBox tables which we
// don't catalogue at constant level.
// ── XXH (xxHash) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
(0x9e3779b1, "xxHash", "PRIME32_2"),
(0x85ebca77, "xxHash", "PRIME32_3"),
(0xc2b2ae3d, "xxHash", "PRIME32_4"),
(0x27d4eb2f, "xxHash", "PRIME32_5"),
// ── Adler-32 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
(65521, "Adler-32", "modulus"),
// ── Mersenne Twister (MT19937) ──────────────────────────────────────
(0x9908b0df, "MT19937", "twist matrix MAGIC"),
(0x6c078965, "MT19937", "init multiplier"),
// ── PyVMProtect-specific (observed in v5) ──────────────────────────
(0x6b43a9b1, "PyVMProtect", "string-rotation XOR multiplier"),
(0x12cf2b23, "PyVMProtect", "seed integrity-check XOR"),
(0x56951cea, "PyVMProtect", "bytecode pass-1 mix"),
(0xa96ae315, "PyVMProtect", "bytecode pass-2 mix A"),
(0xac6d77ca, "PyVMProtect", "bytecode pass-2 mix B"),
(0xaeb27f1a, "PyVMProtect", "aux pass-1 seed-13c tweak"),
(0xad27fd3c, "PyVMProtect", "aux pass-1 mix"),
(0x52d802c3, "PyVMProtect", "aux pass-2 mix A"),
(0x7986b27c, "PyVMProtect", "aux pass-2 mix B"),
// ── LCG multipliers (Numerical Recipes / glibc rand) ────────────────
(0x019660D, "Numerical-Recipes-LCG", "multiplier"),
(0x3c6ef35f, "Numerical-Recipes-LCG", "increment"),
(1103515245, "glibc-rand", "LCG multiplier"),
(12345, "glibc-rand", "LCG increment"),
];
static CATALOGUE: LazyLock<HashMap<u32, Annotation>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
let mut m: HashMap<u32, Annotation> = HashMap::new();
for &(val, alg, role) in ENTRIES {
// Skip fully-zero entries from broken duplicates above.
if val == 0 {
continue;
}
// First-write-wins: earlier entries take precedence on collision
// so we keep the most canonical/common interpretation.
m.entry(val).or_insert(Annotation {
algorithm: alg,
role,
});
}
m
});
/// Look up a 32-bit constant in the crypto catalogue. Returns
/// `Some(annotation)` when the value is a known cryptographic / hash magic.
pub fn resolve(val: u32) -> Option<&'static Annotation> {
CATALOGUE.get(&val).map(|a| a as &'static Annotation)
}
/// Cheap pre-filter: most crypto constants are large random-looking
/// 32-bit values. Skip cataloguing very small numbers, page-aligned
/// addresses, and printable ASCII so the inline annotation doesn't fire
/// on common loop counters / flags.
pub fn worth_checking(val: u32) -> bool {
// Below 1024: too low-entropy (loop counters, masks, flag fields).
// EXCEPT: a few catalogue entries are intentionally low (5381 DJB2 init,
// 12345 glibc, 33 DJB2 step, 65521 Adler-32). Those are checked
// explicitly in resolve() — worth_checking just gates the broad scan.
if val < 1000 {
return false;
}
// ASCII-printable packed: 0x20..0x7e per byte. Probably a string fragment.
let bytes = val.to_le_bytes();
let printable = bytes
.iter()
.filter(|&&b| (0x20..=0x7e).contains(&b))
.count();
if printable == 4 {
return false;
}
true
}
/// Generate a stable C-style identifier for a crypto constant. Used by
/// `--annotate-crypto` to replace raw hex literals with named symbols.
/// Format: `<ALG_UPPER>_<HEX>` where ALG is upper-snake, HEX is 8 chars.
pub fn symbol(val: u32) -> Option<String> {
let ann = resolve(val)?;
let mut alg = String::new();
for c in ann.algorithm.chars() {
if c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() {
alg.push(c.to_ascii_uppercase());
} else if !alg.is_empty() && !alg.ends_with('_') {
alg.push('_');
}
}
let alg = alg.trim_matches('_').to_string();
Some(format!("{}_{:08X}", alg, val))
}
/// Rewrite a decompile output blob, replacing any hex literal whose
/// value matches a crypto-catalogue entry with a stable symbolic name.
/// Constants embedded in `/* ... */` annotation comments are left
/// untouched so the comment still reads naturally.
pub fn rewrite_text(input: &str) -> String {
let mut out = String::with_capacity(input.len());
let bytes = input.as_bytes();
let mut i = 0;
let mut in_comment = false;
while i < bytes.len() {
// Track /* ... */ block-comment depth so we don't rewrite
// constants inside the inline-annotation comment we already
// emit.
if !in_comment && i + 1 < bytes.len() && bytes[i] == b'/' && bytes[i + 1] == b'*' {
in_comment = true;
out.push('/');
out.push('*');
i += 2;
continue;
}
if in_comment && i + 1 < bytes.len() && bytes[i] == b'*' && bytes[i + 1] == b'/' {
in_comment = false;
out.push('*');
out.push('/');
i += 2;
continue;
}
if !in_comment
&& bytes[i] == b'0'
&& i + 1 < bytes.len()
&& (bytes[i + 1] == b'x' || bytes[i + 1] == b'X')
{
let mut j = i + 2;
while j < bytes.len() && bytes[j].is_ascii_hexdigit() {
j += 1;
}
if j > i + 2 && j - (i + 2) <= 8 {
let hex = &input[i + 2..j];
if let Ok(v) = u32::from_str_radix(hex, 16) {
if let Some(sym) = symbol(v) {
out.push_str(&sym);
i = j;
continue;
}
}
}
// Not a crypto match — emit verbatim.
out.push_str(&input[i..j]);
i = j;
continue;
}
// Printer renders large immediate constants as `DAT_<hex>` data
// labels when the value isn't decodable as a known data type.
// For crypto magic, that re-render is misleading — the bytes are
// the constant itself, not a pointer. Replace the matching
// `DAT_<hex>` with the canonical symbol.
if !in_comment
&& i + 4 < bytes.len()
&& &bytes[i..i + 4] == b"DAT_"
&& bytes[i + 4].is_ascii_hexdigit()
{
let mut j = i + 4;
while j < bytes.len() && bytes[j].is_ascii_hexdigit() {
j += 1;
}
if j - (i + 4) <= 8 {
let hex = &input[i + 4..j];
if let Ok(v) = u32::from_str_radix(hex, 16) {
if let Some(sym) = symbol(v) {
out.push_str(&sym);
i = j;
continue;
}
}
}
out.push_str(&input[i..j]);
i = j;
continue;
}
out.push(bytes[i] as char);
i += 1;
}
out
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn knuth_golden_resolves() {
let a = resolve(0x9e3779b9).expect("knuth");
assert_eq!(a.algorithm, "Knuth");
}
#[test]
fn sha256_h0_resolves() {
assert!(resolve(0x6a09e667).is_some());
assert!(resolve(0x428a2f98).is_some());
}
#[test]
fn pyvmp_constant_resolves() {
assert!(resolve(0x12cf2b23).is_some());
assert!(resolve(0x6b43a9b1).is_some());
}
#[test]
fn random_value_does_not_resolve() {
assert!(resolve(0xdeadbeef).is_none());
assert!(resolve(0x12345678).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn symbol_for_known_constant() {
assert_eq!(symbol(0x9e3779b9).as_deref(), Some("KNUTH_9E3779B9"));
assert_eq!(symbol(0x01000193).as_deref(), Some("FNV_1_01000193"));
assert_eq!(symbol(0x6a09e667).as_deref(), Some("SHA_256_6A09E667"));
assert!(symbol(0xdeadbeef).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn rewrite_replaces_known_const() {
let out = rewrite_text("EAX *= 0x9e3779b9;\n");
assert!(out.contains("KNUTH_9E3779B9"));
assert!(!out.contains("0x9e3779b9"));
}
#[test]
fn rewrite_leaves_unknowns_alone() {
let s = "var = 0x12345678 + 0xdeadbeef;\n";
assert_eq!(rewrite_text(s), s);
}
#[test]
fn rewrite_replaces_dat_label() {
let out = rewrite_text("x = y * DAT_45d9f3b;\n");
assert!(out.contains("PCG_045D9F3B"));
assert!(!out.contains("DAT_45d9f3b"));
}
#[test]
fn rewrite_leaves_dat_address_alone() {
let s = "ptr = DAT_1800639d8;\n";
assert_eq!(rewrite_text(s), s);
}
#[test]
fn rewrite_skips_inline_annotation_comment() {
let s = "x = 0x9e3779b9 /* Knuth golden ratio multiplier */;\n";
let out = rewrite_text(s);
// Hex outside the comment got replaced; identical text inside
// the existing inline annotation block stays untouched.
assert!(out.contains("KNUTH_9E3779B9"));
assert!(out.contains("Knuth golden ratio multiplier"));
}
#[test]
fn worth_checking_filter() {
assert!(!worth_checking(42));
assert!(!worth_checking(0x20202020)); // four spaces
assert!(worth_checking(0x9e3779b9));
}
}