rite-sdk 0.7.2

//! Backend trait hierarchy for cryptographic hardware abstraction.
//!
//! ## Design philosophy
//!
//! Backends are **orthogonal to roles and participants**. They represent the
//! execution mechanism (how an action is implemented), not the human assignment
//! (who performs the action).
//!
//! The four layers of abstraction:
//! - **Step**: Unit of execution in the workflow
//! - **Role**: WHO performs the step (human/participant)
//! - **Action**: WHAT semantic operation happens
//! - **Backend**: HOW the action is implemented (software/hardware)
//!
//! ## Trait composition
//!
//! Backends implement only the traits they're capable of. There are no universal
//! requirements: traits are composable based on backend capabilities.
//!
//! Example trait support matrix:
//! - Software: `KeyStore + Sign + KeyTransport`
//! - `YubiKey` PIV: `KeyStore + Sign + Piv + Yubikey`
//! - PKCS#11 HSM: `KeyStore + Sign + KeyTransport + Pkcs11`
//! - Mock: All traits (for testing)

use std::collections::BTreeMap;

use zeroize::Zeroizing;

use crate::key_material::PublicKeyDer;
use crate::types::{
    Attestation, CertRef, DataKey, KeyAlgorithm, KeyId, KeyMetadata, KeyPolicy, KeyProtection,
    KeySecurityAttributes, KeySpec, PcrValue, PivDeviceInfo, PivSlot, PivSlotInfo, Pkcs11Mechanism,
    Pkcs11TokenInfo, SignAlgorithm, TpmInfo, WrapScheme, WrappedKey, YubikeySlotMetadata,
};

/// Implement the `as_*_mut` upcasting helpers on a backend struct.
///
/// Each `Backend` implementor must return `Some(self)` for every trait it
/// supports and `None` for those it does not. Without this macro that is four
/// lines of boilerplate per capability. The macro expands to those lines
/// automatically and allows attaching per-capability doc comments.
///
/// # Usage
///
/// ```
/// use rite_sdk::{
///     backend_capabilities, Backend, BackendError, KeyId, RandomBackend, SignAlgorithm,
///     SignBackend,
/// };
///
/// struct MyBackend {
///     name: String,
/// }
///
/// impl Backend for MyBackend {
///     fn name(&self) -> &str { &self.name }
///     fn provider(&self) -> &str { "software" }
///     fn fingerprint(&self) -> String { "sha256:...".to_string() }
///
///     backend_capabilities!(
///         /// Signs with software-held RSA and ECDSA keys.
///         as_sign_mut: SignBackend,
///         /// Draws ceremony randomness from the OS CSPRNG.
///         as_random_mut: RandomBackend,
///     );
/// }
///
/// impl SignBackend for MyBackend {
///     fn sign(&mut self, _key: &KeyId, _msg: &[u8], _alg: SignAlgorithm)
///         -> Result<Vec<u8>, BackendError> { Ok(Vec::new()) }
/// }
///
/// impl RandomBackend for MyBackend {
///     fn generate_random(&mut self, len: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>, BackendError> {
///         Ok(vec![0u8; len])
///     }
/// }
/// ```
///
/// Capabilities not listed here are not overridden, so they inherit the trait's
/// default doc ("Not supported by this backend.") and return `None`.
///
/// The trait names passed to the macro must be in scope at the call site.
///
/// Note: `#[macro_export]` places this macro at the crate root
/// (`rite_sdk::backend_capabilities!`), not in the `backend` module.
/// This is standard Rust macro scoping.
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! backend_capabilities {
    ($($(#[$attr:meta])* $method:ident : $trait:ident),* $(,)?) => {
        $(
            $(#[$attr])*
            fn $method(&mut self) -> Option<&mut dyn $trait> {
                Some(self)
            }
        )*
    };
}

/// Core trait that all backends must implement.
///
/// Provides identity and fingerprinting for audit trails.
///
/// # Capability downcasting
///
/// Rust does not allow downcasting from `dyn Backend` to `dyn KeyStoreBackend`
/// (or any other subtrait) without explicit support. The `as_*_mut` methods
/// implement this pattern manually: a backend returns `Some(self)` for each
/// capability it supports, and `None` for those it does not.
///
/// Use the [`backend_capabilities!`] macro to generate these methods without
/// boilerplate.
pub trait Backend: Send + Sync {
    /// Backend name (unique identifier within a ceremony).
    fn name(&self) -> &str;

    /// Backend provider name (e.g., "software", "yubikey", "pkcs11").
    fn provider(&self) -> &str;

    /// Fingerprint for audit evidence.
    ///
    /// Format examples:
    /// - Software: `"software-backend=mybackend"`
    /// - `YubiKey`: `"yubikey-serial=12345678+firmware=5.7.1"`
    /// - PKCS#11: `"pkcs11-module=/usr/lib/softhsm2.so+slot=0"`
    fn fingerprint(&self) -> String;

    /// Not supported by this backend, always returns `None`.
    fn as_keystore_mut(&mut self) -> Option<&mut dyn KeyStoreBackend> {
        None
    }

    /// Not supported by this backend, always returns `None`.
    fn as_sign_mut(&mut self) -> Option<&mut dyn SignBackend> {
        None
    }

    /// Not supported by this backend, always returns `None`.
    fn as_verify_mut(&mut self) -> Option<&mut dyn VerifyBackend> {
        None
    }

    /// Not supported by this backend, always returns `None`.
    fn as_attest_mut(&mut self) -> Option<&mut dyn AttestationBackend> {
        None
    }

    /// Not supported by this backend, always returns `None`.
    fn as_piv_mut(&mut self) -> Option<&mut dyn PivBackend> {
        None
    }

    /// Not supported by this backend, always returns `None`.
    fn as_yubikey_mut(&mut self) -> Option<&mut dyn YubikeyBackend> {
        None
    }

    /// Not supported by this backend, always returns `None`.
    fn as_transport_mut(&mut self) -> Option<&mut dyn KeyTransportBackend> {
        None
    }

    /// Not supported by this backend, always returns `None`.
    fn as_certstore_mut(&mut self) -> Option<&mut dyn CertStoreBackend> {
        None
    }

    /// Not supported by this backend, always returns `None`.
    fn as_random_mut(&mut self) -> Option<&mut dyn RandomBackend> {
        None
    }

    /// Not supported by this backend, always returns `None`.
    fn as_pkcs11_mut(&mut self) -> Option<&mut dyn Pkcs11Backend> {
        None
    }

    /// Not supported by this backend, always returns `None`.
    fn as_pkcs11_admin_mut(&mut self) -> Option<&mut dyn Pkcs11AdminBackend> {
        None
    }

    /// Not supported by this backend, always returns `None`.
    fn as_tpm_mut(&mut self) -> Option<&mut dyn TpmBackend> {
        None
    }
}

/// Key generation and storage operations.
///
/// Backends implementing this trait can generate, import, and manage
/// cryptographic keys.
pub trait KeyStoreBackend: Backend {
    /// Generate a new key.
    ///
    /// The backend owns the key and returns metadata including an opaque
    /// `KeyId` reference. For hardware backends, the private key never leaves
    /// the device.
    fn generate_key(&mut self, spec: KeySpec) -> Result<KeyMetadata, BackendError>;

    /// Import an existing key from material the caller holds.
    ///
    /// `spec.algorithm` says how to read `key_bytes`, because nothing in the
    /// bytes distinguishes a 32-byte secret from any other 32 bytes: a symmetric
    /// algorithm takes the raw key, every other one takes a private key, as
    /// PKCS#8 DER or as PEM. The metadata that comes back carries a check value
    /// in the first case and a public key in the second, which is the identity
    /// each kind has.
    ///
    /// `passphrase` opens a private key that is encrypted, in any encoding the
    /// backend reads. Material that needs one and is given none is refused by
    /// name, and so is a passphrase given for material that is not encrypted:
    /// a passphrase the transcript says was used has to have been used.
    ///
    /// Only supported by backends that allow key import (software, some HSMs).
    /// Hardware security modules may reject it for security reasons, and a
    /// device that holds only one kind of key refuses the other by name.
    fn import_key(
        &mut self,
        spec: KeySpec,
        key_bytes: &[u8],
        passphrase: Option<&[u8]>,
    ) -> Result<KeyMetadata, BackendError>;

    /// Export the public key for `key_id`.
    fn export_public_key(&self, key_id: &KeyId) -> Result<PublicKeyDer, BackendError>;

    /// List all keys managed by this backend.
    fn list_keys(&self) -> Result<Vec<KeyMetadata>, BackendError>;

    /// Delete a key permanently.
    fn delete_key(&mut self, key_id: &KeyId) -> Result<(), BackendError>;
}

/// Signing operations.
pub trait SignBackend: Backend {
    /// Sign `message` with `key_id` using `algorithm`.
    ///
    /// Returns raw signature bytes (format depends on algorithm).
    fn sign(
        &mut self,
        key_id: &KeyId,
        message: &[u8],
        algorithm: SignAlgorithm,
    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, BackendError>;
}

/// Signature verification operations.
///
/// Separate from [`SignBackend`] because the two need different things. Signing
/// needs a secret, so only the device holding it can do the work; verification
/// needs a public key, so anything can. A card that signs and never verifies
/// implements one trait, and a verification-only backend (a notary, an enclave)
/// implements the other without having to refuse `sign`.
///
/// Most ceremonies verify in software and name no backend. Naming one is for a
/// deployment that requires the check inside a validated boundary, or a
/// verifier that is not local.
pub trait VerifyBackend: Backend {
    /// Verify `signature` over `message` under `key`.
    ///
    /// Takes the key rather than a reference to one the backend holds, because
    /// the evidence a ceremony checks usually comes from outside it: a CSR from
    /// another party, a signature made on a card that is no longer present.
    /// There is no handle to name for those.
    ///
    /// `&mut self` because a verifier may need a session to work in. PKCS#11
    /// creates a public key object, verifies against it, and destroys it.
    fn verify_public_key(
        &mut self,
        key: &PublicKeyDer,
        message: &[u8],
        signature: &[u8],
        algorithm: SignAlgorithm,
    ) -> Result<bool, BackendError>;
}

/// Hardware attestation operations.
///
/// Backends that support attestation can cryptographically prove that a key
/// was generated on a specific hardware device.
pub trait AttestationBackend: Backend {
    /// Return a cryptographic proof that `key_id` was generated on this
    /// backend's hardware and has specific properties.
    fn attest_key(&self, key_id: &KeyId) -> Result<Attestation, BackendError>;
}

/// Certificate storage operations.
///
/// Backends implementing this trait can store, read, and delete X.509
/// certificates by reference. This is a unified interface for certificate
/// management across PIV (slot-based), PKCS#11 (label/ID-based), and
/// software backends.
pub trait CertStoreBackend: Backend {
    /// Store a DER-encoded X.509 certificate.
    fn store_cert(&mut self, cert_ref: &CertRef, cert_der: &[u8]) -> Result<(), BackendError>;

    /// Read a DER-encoded X.509 certificate.
    fn read_cert(&self, cert_ref: &CertRef) -> Result<Vec<u8>, BackendError>;

    /// Delete a certificate.
    fn delete_cert(&mut self, cert_ref: &CertRef) -> Result<(), BackendError>;
}

/// Hardware or software random number generation.
///
/// Backends implementing this trait can generate random bytes. For HSM
/// backends, this uses the device's internal RNG (e.g., PKCS#11 `C_GenerateRandom`).
pub trait RandomBackend: Backend {
    /// Generate `len` random bytes.
    fn generate_random(&mut self, len: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>, BackendError>;
}

/// Key transport (wrapping) operations.
///
/// Every method returns a [`WrappedKey`] carrying the scheme it was asked for
/// and a [`WrapDescription`](crate::types::WrapDescription) of what it did, so
/// the caller records an observation rather than a request.
pub trait KeyTransportBackend: Backend {
    /// Wrap `key_id` using `wrapping_key_id` under `scheme`.
    fn wrap(
        &mut self,
        key_id: &KeyId,
        wrapping_key_id: &KeyId,
        scheme: WrapScheme,
    ) -> Result<WrappedKey, BackendError>;

    /// Unwrap `wrapped` using `unwrapping_key_id`, importing the result with
    /// `label` under `policy`.
    ///
    /// The policy is the receiving ceremony's, not the origin's: nothing
    /// travels with a wrapped key that says what it may do, so the step that
    /// imports it declares that, exactly as the step that generated it did.
    ///
    /// `expected` is that same declaration one level down, because nothing
    /// travels with a wrapped key saying what it *is* either. Recovered bytes
    /// are a private key or a bare secret depending on what was wrapped, and
    /// the two are told apart by what the receiving ceremony says it is
    /// restoring rather than by what the bytes happen to parse as. `None` is a
    /// ceremony that declared nothing, which an implementation may serve only
    /// where the recovered form is unambiguous. A declaration that disagrees
    /// with what came out is a failure, not something to reconcile.
    fn unwrap(
        &mut self,
        wrapped: &WrappedKey,
        unwrapping_key_id: &KeyId,
        label: &str,
        policy: KeyPolicy,
        expected: Option<KeyAlgorithm>,
    ) -> Result<KeyMetadata, BackendError>;

    /// Produce a fresh content-encryption key protected by `kek`.
    ///
    /// Two copies of one key come back: the plaintext, for the caller to
    /// encrypt content with and then drop, and a copy only `kek` opens, which
    /// the container carries to the recipient.
    ///
    /// Content does not appear here. No key-protection
    /// device Rite talks to is a cipher you hand a file to: a cloud KMS caps a
    /// direct encrypt at a few kilobytes, a TPM takes a kilobyte per call over
    /// a slow bus, and a smart card is slower still. Every one of them offers
    /// this operation instead, so a backend implements what it can actually do
    /// and the content pipeline stays in one place above it.
    ///
    /// `algorithm` must be a symmetric one, since a data key is a secret the
    /// caller encrypts with directly. It is the length request AWS KMS spells
    /// `KeySpec: AES_256 | AES_128`.
    ///
    /// The result carries a [`KeyProtection`] because the caller has to declare
    /// the key-encryption algorithm in the container it assembles, and only the
    /// backend knows which one it used.
    ///
    /// # Not yet a parameter
    ///
    /// An **encryption context**, which AWS calls `EncryptionContext` and Azure
    /// calls `aad`, binds a data key to the purpose it was issued for: the same
    /// value must be supplied to open it again, or the open fails. AWS
    /// recommends it on every call. It is absent here because supplying it would
    /// oblige the ceremony to store it somewhere a later run can read it back,
    /// and CMS has no slot for it that the tag covers except `authAttrs`, which
    /// is deferred. Adding it is the next widening this pair needs, and it wants
    /// the transcript question answered first.
    fn generate_data_key(
        &mut self,
        kek: &KeyId,
        algorithm: KeyAlgorithm,
    ) -> Result<DataKey, BackendError>;

    /// Recover a data key from the protected copy a container carries.
    ///
    /// The counterpart of [`generate_data_key`](Self::generate_data_key), and
    /// the half of the pair almost every backend implements: protecting a data
    /// key needs only a public key or a shared secret, while opening one always
    /// needs the device that holds the other half.
    ///
    /// `protection` says how `wrapped` was protected, taken from the container
    /// rather than assumed, because the bytes say nothing about themselves and
    /// the backend may implement several. An implementation that was not asked
    /// which one to use could only guess, and a wrong guess on key material is
    /// silent. A backend refuses a protection it does not implement rather than
    /// decrypting under an assumption.
    fn open_data_key(
        &mut self,
        kek: &KeyId,
        wrapped: &[u8],
        protection: KeyProtection,
    ) -> Result<Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>, BackendError>;

    /// Wrap `key_id` to an external recipient's public key.
    ///
    /// Default implementation returns `UnsupportedOperation`.
    fn wrap_to_public(
        &mut self,
        key_id: &KeyId,
        recipient_pub_key: &PublicKeyDer,
        scheme: WrapScheme,
    ) -> Result<WrappedKey, BackendError> {
        let _ = (key_id, recipient_pub_key, scheme);
        Err(BackendError::UnsupportedOperation(
            "wrap_to_public not supported".to_string(),
        ))
    }
}

/// PKCS#11 token operations.
///
/// Provides access to PKCS#11-specific functionality: token info, key
/// security attributes, mechanism enumeration, and session login/logout.
pub trait Pkcs11Backend: Backend {
    /// Get token information (label, manufacturer, serial, flags).
    fn token_info(&self) -> Result<Pkcs11TokenInfo, BackendError>;

    /// Read security attributes for `key_id` (`CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE`, etc.).
    fn key_security_attributes(
        &self,
        key_id: &KeyId,
    ) -> Result<KeySecurityAttributes, BackendError>;

    /// List mechanisms supported by this token.
    fn supported_mechanisms(&self) -> Result<Vec<Pkcs11Mechanism>, BackendError>;

    /// Log in to the token with a PIN.
    fn login(&mut self, pin: &[u8]) -> Result<(), BackendError>;

    /// Log out of the token.
    fn logout(&mut self) -> Result<(), BackendError>;
}

/// PKCS#11 Security Officer (SO) role operations.
///
/// These operations require SO authentication and are typically performed
/// only during initial token setup.
pub trait Pkcs11AdminBackend: Backend {
    /// Initialize a token (`C_InitToken`).
    fn init_token(&mut self, so_pin: &[u8], label: &str) -> Result<(), BackendError>;

    /// Initialize the user PIN (`C_InitPIN`). Requires SO session.
    fn init_user_pin(&mut self, so_pin: &[u8], user_pin: &[u8]) -> Result<(), BackendError>;
}

/// TPM 2.0 operations.
///
/// Provides TPM-specific functionality: device info, PCR operations, and
/// quote generation.
pub trait TpmBackend: Backend {
    /// Get TPM information (version, manufacturer, firmware).
    fn tpm_info(&mut self) -> Result<TpmInfo, BackendError>;

    /// Read PCR (Platform Configuration Register) values for the given PCR indices.
    ///
    /// Returns a `BTreeMap` keyed by PCR index for deterministic ordering in transcripts.
    fn read_pcrs(&mut self, pcrs: &[u8]) -> Result<BTreeMap<u8, PcrValue>, BackendError>;

    /// Extend a PCR register with new data.
    fn extend_pcr(&mut self, pcr: u8, data: &[u8]) -> Result<(), BackendError>;

    /// Generate a TPM quote (signed attestation over PCR values).
    fn generate_quote(&mut self, pcrs: &[u8], nonce: &[u8]) -> Result<Attestation, BackendError>;
}

/// Personal Identity Verification (PIV) smart card operations.
///
/// Models the PIV card application interface defined by FIPS 201-3 and
/// NIST SP 800-73-5. Methods in this trait correspond to PIV card commands
/// and data model operations; their semantics are defined by the standard
/// and should not diverge.
///
/// Backends implementing `PivBackend` should also implement the generic traits
/// (`KeyStoreBackend`, `SignBackend`) for interoperability with non-PIV-aware actions.
///
/// # Standard references
/// - FIPS 201-3: Personal Identity Verification of Federal Employees and Contractors
/// - NIST SP 800-73-5 Part 1: PIV Card Application Data Model
/// - NIST SP 800-73-5 Part 2: PIV Card Application Card Command Interface
/// - NIST SP 800-78-5: Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for PIV
pub trait PivBackend: Backend {
    /// List populated PIV slots with metadata.
    ///
    /// Enumerates key references defined in SP 800-73-5 Part 1, Table 4b.
    fn list_slots(&self) -> Result<Vec<PivSlotInfo>, BackendError>;

    /// Verify the PIV Card Application PIN.
    ///
    /// Required before private key operations on slots with PIN access rules.
    /// The PIN is typically 6–8 digits (ASCII-encoded).
    /// [SP 800-73-5 Part 2, §3.3: VERIFY command]
    fn verify_pin(&mut self, pin: &[u8]) -> Result<(), BackendError>;

    /// Change the PIV Card Application PIN.
    ///
    /// [SP 800-73-5 Part 2, §3.4: CHANGE REFERENCE DATA command]
    fn change_pin(&mut self, current: &[u8], new: &[u8]) -> Result<(), BackendError>;

    /// Get remaining PIN retry count before lockout.
    fn pin_retries(&mut self) -> Result<u32, BackendError>;

    /// Reset a blocked PIN using the PUK (PIN Unblocking Key).
    ///
    /// [SP 800-73-5 Part 2, §3.4: RESET RETRY COUNTER command]
    fn unblock_pin(&mut self, puk: &[u8], new_pin: &[u8]) -> Result<(), BackendError>;

    /// Return device identity (serial, firmware version, form factor).
    ///
    /// Not all fields are available on every PIV card. Serial number
    /// retrieval is vendor-specific (not standardized by NIST SP 800-73).
    fn device_info(&self) -> Result<PivDeviceInfo, BackendError>;
}

/// `YubiKey`-specific extensions to the PIV interface.
///
/// Operations in this trait are Yubico vendor extensions that go beyond
/// the NIST SP 800-73 standard. They are specific to `YubiKey` hardware
/// and will not work with generic PIV smart cards.
///
/// # Vendor references
/// - Yubico PIV documentation: <https://developers.yubico.com/PIV/>
/// - `YubiKey` attestation: key reference F9 (Yubico-proprietary)
/// - Touch/PIN policy configuration: Yubico-proprietary extensions
///   to the GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR command
pub trait YubikeyBackend: PivBackend {
    /// Generate an attestation certificate for a key in `slot`.
    ///
    /// Proves the key was generated on-device (not imported).
    /// Uses `YubiKey`'s attestation key (slot F9) to sign a certificate
    /// over the public key in the target slot.
    /// This is a Yubico extension, not available on generic PIV cards.
    fn attest_slot(&self, slot: PivSlot) -> Result<Vec<u8>, BackendError>;

    /// Authenticate with the management key (3DES or AES).
    ///
    /// Required before administrative operations: key generation,
    /// certificate import, PIN/PUK retry configuration.
    fn authenticate_management(&mut self, mgm_key: &[u8]) -> Result<(), BackendError>;

    /// Change the management key.
    fn change_management_key(&mut self, current: &[u8], new: &[u8]) -> Result<(), BackendError>;

    /// Get `YubiKey`-specific metadata for `slot`.
    ///
    /// Returns touch policy, PIN policy, and key origin: information
    /// not available through standard PIV commands.
    fn slot_metadata(&self, slot: PivSlot) -> Result<YubikeySlotMetadata, BackendError>;

    /// Block PUK permanently (prevents PIN unblock forever).
    ///
    /// High-security operation: once blocked, a forgotten PIN requires
    /// full device reset (destroying all keys). Irreversible.
    fn block_puk(&mut self) -> Result<(), BackendError>;
}

/// Whether an error may be re-executed by retrying the step.
///
/// A `Transient` error means the world wasn't ready and the step's work did not
/// happen, so re-running it is meaningful (token reinserted, cable reseated). A
/// `Fatal` error means re-execution is either meaningless or unsafe: a procedural
/// result, a broken definition, or a terminal device state.
///
/// The classification lives on the error type, not in the ceremony definition: a
/// ceremony author must not be able to mark, say, a signature mismatch retriable.
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Retriability {
    /// Environmental and recoverable; retrying the step may succeed.
    Transient,
    /// Not retriable; the run must stop or escalate.
    Fatal,
}

impl Retriability {
    /// Convenience predicate for callers that only need a yes/no answer.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn is_retriable(self) -> bool {
        matches!(self, Retriability::Transient)
    }
}

/// Backend-specific errors.
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum BackendError {
    /// Authentication required (not logged in).
    #[error("Authentication required")]
    AuthRequired,

    /// PIN required to access backend.
    #[error("PIN required")]
    PinRequired,

    /// PIN verification failed (wrong PIN). Contains remaining retries if known.
    #[error("PIN verification failed ({0} retries remaining)")]
    PinFailed(u32),

    /// PIN is blocked (too many failed attempts).
    #[error("PIN blocked")]
    PinBlocked,

    /// User PIN not initialized (PKCS#11: `C_InitPIN` not yet called).
    #[error("User PIN not initialized")]
    UserPinNotInitialized,

    /// Management key authentication required.
    #[error("Management key authentication required")]
    ManagementKeyRequired,

    /// Key not found in backend storage.
    #[error("Key not found: {0}")]
    KeyNotFound(String),

    /// Object not found (PKCS#11: `find_objects` returned empty).
    #[error("Object not found: {0}")]
    ObjectNotFound(String),

    /// PIV slot is empty (no key or certificate).
    #[error("Slot empty: {0}")]
    SlotEmpty(String),

    /// Backend storage capacity exceeded.
    #[error("Capacity exceeded")]
    CapacityExceeded,

    /// Operation not permitted (key usage flags don't allow this).
    #[error("Operation not permitted: {0}")]
    OperationNotPermitted(String),

    /// Attribute is read-only (e.g., tried to set `CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE`).
    #[error("Attribute is read-only: {0}")]
    AttributeReadOnly(String),

    /// Algorithm not supported by this backend.
    #[error("Unsupported algorithm: {0}")]
    UnsupportedAlgorithm(String),

    /// Operation not supported by this backend.
    #[error("Unsupported operation: {0}")]
    UnsupportedOperation(String),

    /// Token not present in slot.
    #[error("Token not present")]
    TokenNotPresent,

    /// Hardware failure (device disconnected, I/O error, etc.).
    #[error("Hardware failure: {0}")]
    HardwareFailure(String),

    /// Invalid key format or data.
    #[error("Invalid key format: {0}")]
    InvalidKeyFormat(String),

    /// Invalid data (malformed input, unexpected encoding, etc.).
    #[error("Invalid data: {0}")]
    InvalidData(String),

    /// Backend not found in registry.
    #[error("Backend not found: {0}")]
    NotFound(String),

    /// Configuration error (missing or invalid settings).
    #[error("Configuration error: {0}")]
    Configuration(String),

    /// Generic backend error.
    #[error("Backend error: {0}")]
    Other(String),
}

impl BackendError {
    /// Classify whether a step that failed with this error may be retried.
    ///
    /// The match is exhaustive with no wildcard arm on purpose: adding a new
    /// `BackendError` variant fails to compile until it is deliberately
    /// classified here.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn retriability(&self) -> Retriability {
        match self {
            // Environmental: the world wasn't ready, the work didn't happen.
            // The operator can fix the precondition (log in, enter a PIN,
            // insert the right token, initialize the device) and retry.
            BackendError::AuthRequired
            | BackendError::PinRequired
            | BackendError::PinFailed(_)
            | BackendError::ManagementKeyRequired
            | BackendError::UserPinNotInitialized
            | BackendError::KeyNotFound(_)
            | BackendError::ObjectNotFound(_)
            | BackendError::SlotEmpty(_)
            | BackendError::TokenNotPresent
            | BackendError::HardwareFailure(_)
            | BackendError::Configuration(_) => Retriability::Transient,

            // Fatal: re-execution is meaningless or unsafe. A terminal device
            // state (PIN budget exhausted, capacity full), a definition that
            // asks for something the backend cannot do, or malformed/unknown
            // input that retrying cannot resolve.
            BackendError::PinBlocked
            | BackendError::CapacityExceeded
            | BackendError::OperationNotPermitted(_)
            | BackendError::AttributeReadOnly(_)
            | BackendError::UnsupportedAlgorithm(_)
            | BackendError::UnsupportedOperation(_)
            | BackendError::InvalidKeyFormat(_)
            | BackendError::InvalidData(_)
            | BackendError::NotFound(_)
            | BackendError::Other(_) => Retriability::Fatal,
        }
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn retriability_is_retriable_predicate() {
        assert!(Retriability::Transient.is_retriable());
        assert!(!Retriability::Fatal.is_retriable());
    }

    #[test]
    fn environmental_errors_are_transient() {
        let transient = [
            BackendError::AuthRequired,
            BackendError::PinRequired,
            BackendError::PinFailed(2),
            BackendError::ManagementKeyRequired,
            BackendError::UserPinNotInitialized,
            BackendError::KeyNotFound("k".into()),
            BackendError::ObjectNotFound("o".into()),
            BackendError::SlotEmpty("9a".into()),
            BackendError::TokenNotPresent,
            BackendError::HardwareFailure("cable".into()),
            BackendError::Configuration("missing".into()),
        ];
        for err in transient {
            assert_eq!(
                err.retriability(),
                Retriability::Transient,
                "expected transient: {err:?}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn fatal_errors_are_not_retriable() {
        let fatal = [
            BackendError::PinBlocked,
            BackendError::CapacityExceeded,
            BackendError::OperationNotPermitted("usage".into()),
            BackendError::AttributeReadOnly("attr".into()),
            BackendError::UnsupportedAlgorithm("rsa1".into()),
            BackendError::UnsupportedOperation("wrap".into()),
            BackendError::InvalidKeyFormat("pem".into()),
            BackendError::InvalidData("bytes".into()),
            BackendError::NotFound("backend".into()),
            BackendError::Other("boom".into()),
        ];
        for err in fatal {
            assert_eq!(
                err.retriability(),
                Retriability::Fatal,
                "expected fatal: {err:?}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn pin_failed_retriable_but_pin_blocked_terminal() {
        // The hardware budget: a wrong PIN can be retried; an exhausted one cannot.
        assert!(BackendError::PinFailed(1).retriability().is_retriable());
        assert!(!BackendError::PinBlocked.retriability().is_retriable());
    }
}