rightkit-sync 0.2.2

Brand-neutral desktop/mobile cloud sync engine: change tokens, tombstones, last-writer-wins conflicts, resumable batches, offline queue, retry/backoff.
Documentation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
//! Record cipher: construction properties (round trip, binding, tampering, key versions) and
//! the `EncryptingBackend` wrapper under real engines over a `MemoryBackend` zone.
//!
//! There is no externally computed known-answer vector here: the primitives (ChaCha20-Poly1305,
//! HKDF-SHA256) come from `ring`, which carries its own; these tests pin the envelope layout,
//! determinism under a fixed salt, and every rejection path.

mod common;

use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};

use common::*;
use rightkit_sync::cipher::*;
use rightkit_sync::*;

fn key(b: u8) -> CipherKey {
    CipherKey::from_bytes([b; 32])
}

fn keys(version: u8, b: u8) -> Arc<StaticKeys> {
    Arc::new(StaticKeys::new(version, key(b)))
}

fn note_record() -> RawRecord {
    let mut r = RawRecord::new("Note", "n1");
    r.set("id", FieldValue::Text("n1".into()));
    r.set("createdAt", FieldValue::Date(100));
    r.set("updatedAt", FieldValue::Date(500));
    r.set("text", FieldValue::Text("secret transcript".into()));
    r.set(
        "tags",
        FieldValue::Strings(vec!["a".into(), "b\u{e9}".into()]),
    );
    r.set("empty", FieldValue::Strings(vec![]));
    r.set("ratio", FieldValue::F64(1.5));
    r.set("count", FieldValue::I64(-7));
    r.set("blob", FieldValue::Bytes(vec![0, 1, 2, 255]));
    r.change_tag = Some("7".into());
    r
}

fn contains(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> bool {
    haystack.windows(needle.len()).any(|w| w == needle)
}

fn enc_bytes(r: &RawRecord) -> Vec<u8> {
    match r.get(ENC_FIELD) {
        Some(FieldValue::Bytes(b)) => b.clone(),
        other => panic!("no sealed field: {other:?}"),
    }
}

#[test]
fn seal_open_round_trip_keeps_only_ordering_fields_in_clear() {
    let c = RecordCipher::new("notes", keys(3, 1));
    let rec = note_record();
    let sealed = c.seal(&rec).unwrap();
    let names: Vec<&str> = sealed.fields.keys().map(String::as_str).collect();
    assert_eq!(names, vec!["enc", "updatedAt"]);
    assert_eq!(sealed.record_name, "n1");
    assert_eq!(sealed.record_type, "Note");
    assert_eq!(sealed.change_tag.as_deref(), Some("7"));
    assert_eq!(sealed.date_ms("updatedAt"), Some(500));
    let enc = enc_bytes(&sealed);
    assert!(!contains(&enc, b"secret transcript"));
    assert_eq!(c.open(&sealed), Ok(rec));
}

#[test]
fn tombstone_keeps_deleted_at_in_clear_and_restores_id() {
    let c = RecordCipher::new("notes", keys(1, 1));
    let mut rec = RawRecord::new("Note", "n1");
    write_tombstone(&mut rec, "n1", 900, &[]);
    let sealed = c.seal(&rec).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(sealed.date_ms("deletedAt"), Some(900));
    assert_eq!(sealed.date_ms("updatedAt"), Some(900));
    assert!(sealed.get("id").is_none());
    let opened = c.open(&sealed).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(read_tombstone(&opened), Some(("n1".to_string(), 900)));
    assert_eq!(opened, rec);
}

#[test]
fn envelope_layout_and_salt_determinism() {
    let c = RecordCipher::new("notes", keys(3, 1));
    let rec = note_record();
    let a = c.seal_with_salt(&rec, [9; 16]).unwrap();
    let b = c.seal_with_salt(&rec, [9; 16]).unwrap();
    let other = c.seal_with_salt(&rec, [8; 16]).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(a, b, "same key, salt and record seal identically");
    assert_ne!(enc_bytes(&a), enc_bytes(&other));
    let env = enc_bytes(&a);
    assert_eq!(env[0], 1, "format");
    assert_eq!(env[1], 3, "key version");
    assert_eq!(&env[2..18], &[9u8; 16], "salt");
    assert!(env.len() > 18 + 16, "ciphertext and tag follow the header");
    let r1 = c.seal(&rec).unwrap();
    let r2 = c.seal(&rec).unwrap();
    assert_ne!(enc_bytes(&r1), enc_bytes(&r2), "random salt per write");
}

#[test]
fn every_tamper_is_refused() {
    let c = RecordCipher::new("notes", keys(1, 1));
    let sealed = c.seal(&note_record()).unwrap();
    let auth = Err(OpenError::Authentication);

    let mut t = sealed.clone();
    let mut env = enc_bytes(&t);
    let last = env.len() - 1;
    env[last] ^= 1;
    t.set(ENC_FIELD, FieldValue::Bytes(env));
    assert_eq!(c.open(&t), auth, "flipped ciphertext bit");

    let mut t = sealed.clone();
    t.record_name = "n2".into();
    assert_eq!(c.open(&t), auth, "moved to another record name");

    let mut t = sealed.clone();
    t.record_type = "Other".into();
    assert_eq!(c.open(&t), auth, "moved to another record type");

    let mut t = sealed.clone();
    t.set("updatedAt", FieldValue::Date(501));
    assert_eq!(c.open(&t), auth, "changed version");

    let mut t = sealed.clone();
    t.fields.remove("updatedAt");
    assert_eq!(c.open(&t), auth, "removed version");

    let mut t = sealed.clone();
    t.set("deletedAt", FieldValue::Date(500));
    assert_eq!(c.open(&t), auth, "live record turned into a tombstone");

    let other_zone = RecordCipher::new("other", keys(1, 1));
    assert_eq!(other_zone.open(&sealed), auth, "moved to another zone");

    let wrong_key = RecordCipher::new("notes", keys(1, 2));
    assert_eq!(wrong_key.open(&sealed), auth, "wrong key, right version");

    let mut t = sealed.clone();
    let mut env = enc_bytes(&t);
    env[1] = 2;
    t.set(ENC_FIELD, FieldValue::Bytes(env));
    assert_eq!(
        c.open(&t),
        Err(OpenError::UnknownKeyVersion(2)),
        "key version is also bound, and unknown to this provider"
    );
}

#[test]
fn a_sealed_tombstone_cannot_be_revived() {
    let c = RecordCipher::new("notes", keys(1, 1));
    let mut rec = RawRecord::new("Note", "n1");
    write_tombstone(&mut rec, "n1", 900, &[]);
    let mut t = c.seal(&rec).unwrap();
    t.fields.remove("deletedAt");
    assert_eq!(c.open(&t), Err(OpenError::Authentication));
}

#[test]
fn malformed_envelopes_and_foreign_fields() {
    let c = RecordCipher::new("notes", keys(1, 1));
    let rec = note_record();
    let sealed = c.seal(&rec).unwrap();

    let plain = note_record();
    assert!(matches!(c.open(&plain), Err(OpenError::Malformed(_))));

    let mut t = sealed.clone();
    t.set(ENC_FIELD, FieldValue::Bytes(vec![1, 1, 2, 3]));
    assert!(matches!(c.open(&t), Err(OpenError::Malformed(_))));

    let mut t = sealed.clone();
    let mut env = enc_bytes(&t);
    env[0] = 2;
    t.set(ENC_FIELD, FieldValue::Bytes(env));
    assert!(matches!(c.open(&t), Err(OpenError::Malformed(_))));

    let mut t = sealed.clone();
    t.set("updatedAt", FieldValue::Text("x".into()));
    assert!(matches!(c.open(&t), Err(OpenError::Malformed(_))));

    // Fields a server adds beside the sealed one never reach the engine.
    let mut t = sealed.clone();
    t.set("text", FieldValue::Text("injected".into()));
    t.set("extra", FieldValue::Text("injected".into()));
    let opened = c.open(&t).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(opened.text("text").as_deref(), Some("secret transcript"));
    assert!(opened.get("extra").is_none());
}

#[test]
fn key_versions_rotate_without_losing_old_records() {
    let old = RecordCipher::new("notes", keys(1, 1));
    let sealed_old = old.seal(&note_record()).unwrap();

    let rotated = Arc::new(StaticKeys::new(2, key(2)).with_key(1, key(1)));
    let c = RecordCipher::new("notes", rotated);
    assert_eq!(c.open(&sealed_old), Ok(note_record()));
    let sealed_new = c.seal(&note_record()).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(
        enc_bytes(&sealed_new)[1],
        2,
        "new writes use the current version"
    );
    assert_eq!(c.open(&sealed_new), Ok(note_record()));

    let only_new = RecordCipher::new("notes", keys(2, 2));
    assert_eq!(
        only_new.open(&sealed_old),
        Err(OpenError::UnknownKeyVersion(1))
    );
}

/// Key provider whose keys the test can swap.
struct SwitchKeys(Mutex<StaticKeys>);
impl SwitchKeys {
    fn new(k: StaticKeys) -> Arc<Self> {
        Arc::new(Self(Mutex::new(k)))
    }
    fn set(&self, k: StaticKeys) {
        *self.0.lock().unwrap() = k;
    }
}
impl KeyProvider for SwitchKeys {
    fn current(&self) -> SyncResult<(u8, CipherKey)> {
        self.0.lock().unwrap().current()
    }
    fn key_for(&self, version: u8) -> SyncResult<Option<CipherKey>> {
        self.0.lock().unwrap().key_for(version)
    }
}

fn enc_backend(zone: &MemoryBackend, keys: Arc<dyn KeyProvider>) -> Arc<EncryptingBackend> {
    Arc::new(EncryptingBackend::new(
        Arc::new(zone.clone()),
        "notes",
        keys,
    ))
}

#[test]
fn two_devices_converge_through_the_cipher_and_the_zone_holds_no_plaintext() {
    let zone = MemoryBackend::new();
    let k = keys(1, 5);
    let (ea, eb) = (enc_backend(&zone, k.clone()), enc_backend(&zone, k.clone()));
    let (mut a, mut b) = (device(ea.clone(), false), device(eb.clone(), false));
    a.local.put("n1", "secret transcript one", 100, 100);
    a.local.put("n2", "secret transcript two", 101, 101);
    assert_eq!(a.pass().outcome, PassOutcome::Synced);

    let stored = zone.record("n1").unwrap();
    let names: Vec<&str> = stored.fields.keys().map(String::as_str).collect();
    assert_eq!(names, vec!["enc", "updatedAt"]);
    assert!(!contains(&enc_bytes(&stored), b"secret transcript"));

    assert_eq!(b.pass().downloaded, 2);
    assert_eq!(b.local.text("n1").as_deref(), Some("secret transcript one"));

    // B edits n1; A deletes n2. Both reach both sides.
    b.local.put("n1", "edited secret", 100, 900);
    a.local.delete("n2");
    a.engine.note_deleted("n2").unwrap();
    b.pass();
    a.pass();
    b.pass();
    assert_eq!(a.local.text("n1").as_deref(), Some("edited secret"));
    assert!(b.local.text("n2").is_none());

    let tomb = zone.record("n2").unwrap();
    assert!(
        tomb.date_ms("deletedAt").is_some(),
        "tombstone flag stays in clear"
    );
    let names: Vec<&str> = tomb.fields.keys().map(String::as_str).collect();
    assert_eq!(names, vec!["deletedAt", "enc", "updatedAt"]);
    assert!(ea.stats().sealed >= 3 && eb.stats().opened >= 2);
}

#[test]
fn a_conflict_outcome_carries_a_decrypted_server_record() {
    let zone = MemoryBackend::new();
    let k = keys(1, 5);
    let mut a = device(enc_backend(&zone, k.clone()), false);
    a.local.put("n1", "v1", 100, 100);
    assert_eq!(a.pass().outcome, PassOutcome::Synced);

    // Another device's write lands between A's fetch and A's save.
    let mut other = RawRecord::new("Note", "n1");
    other.set("id", FieldValue::Text("n1".into()));
    other.set("createdAt", FieldValue::Date(100));
    other.set("updatedAt", FieldValue::Date(150));
    other.set("text", FieldValue::Text("other".into()));
    let sealed_other = RecordCipher::new("notes", k.clone()).seal(&other).unwrap();
    zone.concurrent_write_before_next_save(sealed_other);

    a.local.put("n1", "a-edit", 100, 200);
    let r = a.pass();
    assert_eq!(
        r.outcome,
        PassOutcome::Synced,
        "the conflict was resolved from a decrypted server record: {r:?}"
    );

    let mut b = device(enc_backend(&zone, k), false);
    b.pass();
    assert_eq!(b.local.text("n1").as_deref(), Some("a-edit"));
}

#[test]
fn a_missing_key_fails_the_pass_and_never_advances_the_cursor() {
    let zone = MemoryBackend::new();
    let mut a = device(enc_backend(&zone, keys(1, 7)), false);
    a.local.put("n1", "one", 100, 100);
    a.local.put("n2", "two", 101, 101);
    a.pass();

    let provider = SwitchKeys::new(StaticKeys::new(2, key(9)));
    let backend = enc_backend(&zone, provider.clone());
    let mut c = device(backend.clone(), false);
    let r = c.pass();
    assert!(
        matches!(r.outcome, PassOutcome::Unavailable(_)),
        "{:?}",
        r.outcome
    );
    assert!(
        c.engine.ledger().change_token.is_none(),
        "cursor stayed put"
    );
    assert_eq!(c.local.len(), 0);
    assert_eq!(
        c.engine.ledger().quarantined_total,
        0,
        "nothing was quarantined"
    );
    assert!(backend.stats().key_unavailable >= 1);

    // The key arrives; the same pass resumes from the start without any replay request.
    provider.set(StaticKeys::new(2, key(9)).with_key(1, key(7)));
    let r = c.pass();
    assert_eq!(r.outcome, PassOutcome::Synced);
    assert_eq!(r.downloaded, 2);
    assert_eq!(c.local.text("n2").as_deref(), Some("two"));
}

#[test]
fn a_locked_key_provider_fails_the_pass_too() {
    struct Locked;
    impl KeyProvider for Locked {
        fn current(&self) -> SyncResult<(u8, CipherKey)> {
            Err(SyncError::Unavailable("keychain locked".into()))
        }
        fn key_for(&self, _: u8) -> SyncResult<Option<CipherKey>> {
            Err(SyncError::Unavailable("keychain locked".into()))
        }
    }
    let zone = MemoryBackend::new();
    let mut a = device(enc_backend(&zone, keys(1, 7)), false);
    a.local.put("n1", "one", 100, 100);
    a.pass();
    let mut c = device(enc_backend(&zone, Arc::new(Locked)), false);
    let r = c.pass();
    assert!(
        matches!(r.outcome, PassOutcome::Unavailable(_)),
        "{:?}",
        r.outcome
    );
    assert!(c.engine.ledger().change_token.is_none());
}

#[test]
fn corrupt_records_are_quarantined_and_never_block_the_page() {
    let zone = MemoryBackend::new();
    let k = keys(1, 7);
    let mut a = device(enc_backend(&zone, k.clone()), false);
    a.local.put("n1", "one", 100, 100);
    a.local.put("n2", "two", 101, 101);
    a.pass();

    let mut bad = zone.record("n1").unwrap();
    let mut env = enc_bytes(&bad);
    let last = env.len() - 1;
    env[last] ^= 1;
    bad.set(ENC_FIELD, FieldValue::Bytes(env));
    zone.put_record(bad);
    // A legacy plaintext record in the same zone.
    let mut plain = RawRecord::new("Note", "n3");
    plain.set("id", FieldValue::Text("n3".into()));
    plain.set("text", FieldValue::Text("plain".into()));
    zone.put_record(plain);

    let backend = enc_backend(&zone, k);
    let mut b = device(backend.clone(), false);
    let r = b.pass();
    assert_eq!(r.outcome, PassOutcome::Synced);
    assert_eq!(r.quarantined, 2);
    assert_eq!(
        b.local.snapshot(),
        vec![("n2".to_string(), "two".to_string())]
    );
    let s = backend.stats();
    assert_eq!((s.authentication_failed, s.malformed), (1, 1));
}

#[test]
fn wrong_keys_quarantine_and_a_replay_recovers_after_the_keys_are_fixed() {
    let zone = MemoryBackend::new();
    let mut a = device(enc_backend(&zone, keys(1, 7)), false);
    a.local.put("n1", "one", 100, 100);
    a.local.put("n2", "two", 101, 101);
    a.pass();

    let provider = SwitchKeys::new(StaticKeys::new(1, key(66)));
    let mut d = device(enc_backend(&zone, provider.clone()), false);
    let r = d.pass();
    assert_eq!(r.outcome, PassOutcome::Synced);
    assert_eq!(r.quarantined, 2);
    assert_eq!(d.local.len(), 0);
    assert!(
        d.engine.ledger().change_token.is_some(),
        "the cursor moved on"
    );

    provider.set(StaticKeys::new(1, key(7)));
    d.engine.request_full_replay_once("keys-fixed");
    let r = d.pass();
    assert_eq!(r.outcome, PassOutcome::Synced);
    assert_eq!(r.downloaded, 2);
}

#[test]
fn a_forged_tombstone_on_a_sealed_record_does_not_delete_local_data() {
    let zone = MemoryBackend::new();
    let k = keys(1, 7);
    let mut a = device(enc_backend(&zone, k.clone()), false);
    a.local.put("n1", "one", 100, 100);
    a.pass();
    let mut b = device(enc_backend(&zone, k), false);
    b.pass();
    assert_eq!(b.local.len(), 1);

    let mut forged = zone.record("n1").unwrap();
    forged.set("deletedAt", FieldValue::Date(5_000));
    zone.put_record(forged);
    let r = b.pass();
    assert_eq!(r.quarantined, 1);
    assert_eq!(b.local.text("n1").as_deref(), Some("one"));
}

#[test]
fn a_tombstone_without_enc_is_quarantined_and_the_local_record_survives() {
    let zone = MemoryBackend::new();
    let k = keys(1, 7);
    let mut a = device(enc_backend(&zone, k.clone()), false);
    let backend_b = enc_backend(&zone, k);
    let mut b = device(backend_b.clone(), false);
    a.local.put("n1", "one", 100, 100);
    a.pass();
    b.pass();
    assert_eq!(b.local.len(), 1);

    a.local.delete("n1");
    a.engine.note_deleted("n1").unwrap();
    a.pass();
    // A server strips the sealed field of the tombstone: ordering fields kept, no `enc`.
    let mut stripped = zone.record("n1").unwrap();
    assert!(stripped.date_ms("deletedAt").is_some());
    stripped.fields.remove(ENC_FIELD);
    zone.put_record(stripped);

    let r = b.pass();
    assert_eq!(r.quarantined, 1);
    assert_eq!(r.tombstones_applied, 0);
    assert_eq!(
        b.local.text("n1").as_deref(),
        Some("one"),
        "the local record survives"
    );
    let s = backend_b.stats();
    assert_eq!(s.unauthenticated_tombstones, 1);
    assert_eq!(s.malformed, 0, "counted once, under its own reason");
}

#[test]
fn a_tombstone_that_keeps_enc_through_compaction_is_an_authenticated_deletion() {
    let zone = MemoryBackend::new();
    let k = keys(1, 7);
    let mut a = device(enc_backend(&zone, k.clone()), false);
    let backend_b = enc_backend(&zone, k);
    let mut b = device(backend_b.clone(), false);
    a.local.put("n1", "one", 100, 100);
    a.pass();
    b.pass();
    assert_eq!(b.local.len(), 1);

    a.local.delete("n1");
    a.engine.note_deleted("n1").unwrap();
    a.pass();
    // Compaction keeps the sealed `enc` on the tombstone (only out-of-line bodies go).
    let kept = zone.record("n1").unwrap();
    assert!(kept.date_ms("deletedAt").is_some());
    assert!(kept.fields.contains_key(ENC_FIELD));

    let r = b.pass();
    assert_eq!(r.quarantined, 0);
    assert_eq!(r.tombstones_applied, 1);
    assert_eq!(b.local.len(), 0);
    assert_eq!(backend_b.stats().unauthenticated_tombstones, 0);
}