rightkit-child-process 0.5.9

Ownership-safe child lifecycle, restart, and health primitives for Right Suite apps.
Documentation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
use std::{
    io,
    os::fd::RawFd,
    sync::atomic::{AtomicI32, Ordering},
};

/// The descriptor policy of a spawned child (Orthic-Labs/rightkit#835): every descriptor above
/// stderr is marked close-on-exec between `fork` and `exec`, except the listed ones, whose
/// close-on-exec flag is cleared so they survive. Descriptors 0, 1 and 2 are never touched:
/// they are the child's stdio, which the spawning `Command` has already wired by the time a
/// `pre_exec` hook runs.
///
/// Everything that allocates, reads a directory or can fail for a reason the caller could act
/// on happens in the constructors, in the parent. [`apply`](Self::apply) is the only part that
/// runs in the forked child.
pub(crate) struct Inheritance {
    allowed: Vec<RawFd>,
    upper_bound: RawFd,
    /// Also honour [`SHARED_BOUND`] (the `SanitizeDescriptors` path, whose registration-time
    /// snapshot can be stale by the time the caller spawns).
    shared: bool,
    validation_error: Option<i32>,
}

/// Descriptors above the highest listed one that the child loop still visits (std's exec-error
/// pipe and descriptors opened between the listing and the fork land just above it).
const SWEEP_MARGIN: RawFd = 256;
/// Safety net for the child loop when the parent cannot list its descriptors.
const FALLBACK_CAP: RawFd = 65_536;

/// Sweep bound last refreshed in the parent by `refresh_shared_bound` (called when a sanitizing
/// hook is registered and by `SanitizeDescriptors::refresh_sanitized`). The hook reads it in
/// the child with one atomic load, which is async-signal-safe.
static SHARED_BOUND: AtomicI32 = AtomicI32::new(0);

/// Re-lists the parent's descriptors and publishes the bound; a failed listing leaves it.
pub(crate) fn refresh_shared_bound() {
    if let Some(highest) = highest_open_descriptor() {
        SHARED_BOUND.store(
            highest.saturating_add(SWEEP_MARGIN).saturating_add(1),
            Ordering::Relaxed,
        );
    }
}

/// Highest descriptor open in this process, from `/proc/self/fd` or `/dev/fd`; `None` when
/// neither can be listed. Runs in the parent only (it allocates).
fn highest_open_descriptor() -> Option<RawFd> {
    ["/proc/self/fd", "/dev/fd"].into_iter().find_map(|path| {
        std::fs::read_dir(path).ok().map(|entries| {
            entries
                .filter_map(Result::ok)
                .filter_map(|entry| entry.file_name().to_str()?.parse::<RawFd>().ok())
                .max()
                .unwrap_or(2)
        })
    })
}

impl Inheritance {
    /// Validating constructor for the `OwnedCommand` path: a listed descriptor that is not open
    /// fails the spawn before anything starts (`EBADF`).
    pub(crate) fn new(allowed: Vec<RawFd>) -> io::Result<Self> {
        let this = Self::build(allowed, false);
        if let Some(code) = this.validation_error {
            return Err(io::Error::from_raw_os_error(code));
        }
        Ok(this)
    }

    /// Constructor for builders that cannot return an error (`SanitizeDescriptors`): a listed
    /// descriptor that is not open (or negative) is recorded in the parent and reported by
    /// the child. Checking before spawn prevents std's newly opened exec-error pipe from
    /// accidentally occupying an invalid keep-list descriptor and becoming inheritable.
    pub(crate) fn unchecked(allowed: Vec<RawFd>) -> Self {
        refresh_shared_bound();
        Self::build(allowed, true)
    }

    fn build(mut allowed: Vec<RawFd>, shared: bool) -> Self {
        allowed.sort_unstable();
        allowed.dedup();
        let validation_error = allowed.iter().find_map(|&fd| {
            if unsafe { libc::fcntl(fd, libc::F_GETFD) } < 0 {
                Some(
                    io::Error::last_os_error()
                        .raw_os_error()
                        .unwrap_or(libc::EBADF),
                )
            } else {
                None
            }
        });
        // The bound is the highest descriptor open in the parent right now plus a small margin,
        // never `_SC_OPEN_MAX`: with a large RLIMIT_NOFILE a limit-sized loop costs hundreds of
        // thousands of `fcntl` calls per spawn in the forked child. Only when no listing works
        // does the loop fall back to the descriptor limit, capped at `FALLBACK_CAP`.
        // Race: a descriptor another thread opens between this listing and the fork, above the
        // bound, is not swept (the same window exists for any listing-based sweep).
        let upper_bound = match highest_open_descriptor() {
            Some(highest) => highest.saturating_add(SWEEP_MARGIN).saturating_add(1),
            None => {
                let maximum = unsafe { libc::sysconf(libc::_SC_OPEN_MAX) };
                let maximum = if maximum < 0 { 4096 } else { maximum };
                maximum.min(FALLBACK_CAP as libc::c_long) as RawFd
            }
        };
        Self {
            allowed,
            upper_bound,
            shared,
            validation_error,
        }
    }

    /// Runs in the forked child, between `fork` and `exec`.
    ///
    /// Async-signal-safety invariant (code review, not a runtime check): this function and
    /// [`exclude`](Self::exclude) call only `fcntl` and `syscall(SYS_close_range)`, read
    /// `self.allowed` and `self.upper_bound` (plain integers and a `Vec` that is only
    /// iterated), and build `io::Error` values from an errno, which stores the code in the
    /// error itself and allocates nothing. No allocation, no lock, no directory traversal, no
    /// destructor with side effects, no use of `std::env` or any other global state.
    pub(crate) fn apply(&self) -> io::Result<()> {
        if let Some(code) = self.validation_error {
            return Err(io::Error::from_raw_os_error(code));
        }
        let mut first = 3u32;
        for &fd in self.allowed.iter().filter(|fd| **fd >= 3) {
            self.exclude(first, fd as u32 - 1)?;
            first = fd as u32 + 1;
        }
        self.exclude(first, u32::MAX)?;
        for &fd in self.allowed.iter().filter(|fd| **fd >= 3) {
            let flags = unsafe { libc::fcntl(fd, libc::F_GETFD) };
            if flags < 0 || unsafe { libc::fcntl(fd, libc::F_SETFD, flags & !libc::FD_CLOEXEC) } < 0
            {
                return Err(io::Error::last_os_error());
            }
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Marks every open descriptor in `first..=last` close-on-exec. Never closes one: a
    /// descriptor that is already close-on-exec (std's exec-error pipe among them) must stay
    /// open until `exec`, or a failed exec would look like a successful spawn.
    fn exclude(&self, first: u32, last: u32) -> io::Result<()> {
        if first > last {
            return Ok(());
        }
        #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
        {
            // CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC (Linux 5.11) marks the whole range in one call. A kernel or
            // seccomp policy that refuses it (ENOSYS, EINVAL, EPERM) falls through to the loop.
            const CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC: libc::c_uint = 4;
            if unsafe { libc::syscall(libc::SYS_close_range, first, last, CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC) }
                == 0
            {
                return Ok(());
            }
        }
        let bound = if self.shared {
            self.upper_bound.max(SHARED_BOUND.load(Ordering::Relaxed))
        } else {
            self.upper_bound
        };
        let end = last.min(bound.saturating_sub(1) as u32);
        for fd in first..=end {
            let fd = fd as RawFd;
            let flags = unsafe { libc::fcntl(fd, libc::F_GETFD) };
            if flags < 0 {
                let error = io::Error::last_os_error();
                if error.raw_os_error() != Some(libc::EBADF) {
                    return Err(error);
                }
            } else if flags & libc::FD_CLOEXEC == 0
                && unsafe { libc::fcntl(fd, libc::F_SETFD, flags | libc::FD_CLOEXEC) } < 0
            {
                return Err(io::Error::last_os_error());
            }
        }
        Ok(())
    }
}

/// Raises the child's nice value to at least `floor`, between `fork` and `exec`. It only ever
/// lowers priority, which an unprivileged process may do: a value already at or above `floor`
/// is left alone. Async-signal-safe: `getpriority` and `setpriority` only, no allocation.
pub(crate) fn raise_nice_to(floor: libc::c_int) -> io::Result<()> {
    // SAFETY: getpriority takes no pointers. On error it returns -1, which is a valid nice
    // value below any floor used here, so the raise below still runs and is always permitted.
    let current = unsafe { libc::getpriority(libc::PRIO_PROCESS, 0) };
    if current >= floor {
        return Ok(());
    }
    // SAFETY: setpriority takes no pointers; `0` names the calling process.
    if unsafe { libc::setpriority(libc::PRIO_PROCESS, 0, floor) } < 0 {
        return Err(io::Error::last_os_error());
    }
    Ok(())
}

/// macOS: request the utility quality of service for the calling thread, which becomes the
/// child's initial thread across exec. Advisory: a refusal is ignored. Called between fork and
/// exec; it is a thin kernel call with no allocation.
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
pub(crate) fn set_utility_qos() {
    // SAFETY: takes a class value and a relative priority only.
    unsafe { libc::pthread_set_qos_class_self_np(libc::qos_class_t::QOS_CLASS_UTILITY, 0) };
}

/// How long the macOS watchdog waits for the child to leave after `SIGTERM` before `SIGKILL`.
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
const WATCHDOG_GRACE_STEPS: u32 = 40; // 40 steps of 50 ms: 2 s
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
const WATCHDOG_STEP_NANOS: libc::c_long = 50_000_000;
/// How long the spawning side waits for the watchdog to report that it is armed.
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
const WATCHDOG_ARM_TIMEOUT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(5);

/// macOS parent-death tie. macOS has no `PR_SET_PDEATHSIG`, so a small watchdog process is
/// started for `child` (a direct, unreaped child of this process that leads its own process
/// group). The watchdog is forked twice (the middle process exits at once and is reaped here,
/// so the watchdog is re-parented to launchd and never becomes a zombie of this process), calls
/// `setsid`, closes every inherited descriptor but its report pipe, and then blocks in a kqueue
/// holding two `EVFILT_PROC | NOTE_EXIT` knotes: one on this process (the supervisor), one on
/// the child. It acts as follows:
///
/// - the child exits first: the watchdog exits, nothing is signalled;
/// - the supervisor exits first (including `SIGKILL`, with no cleanup): unless the child has
///   exited meanwhile, `SIGTERM` goes to the child's process group, and `SIGKILL` two seconds
///   later if the child is still there, then the watchdog exits.
///
/// This function returns only after the watchdog reported that both knotes are registered
/// (the report pipe), while the child is still this process's unreaped child, so its pid cannot
/// have been recycled when it was registered. A child that already exited when the knote was
/// registered (`ESRCH`) needs no tie and counts as armed. On any failure the caller must stop
/// the child: it has no tie.
///
/// Only async-signal-safe calls run in the forked processes (`fork`, `setsid`, `open`, `dup2`,
/// `close`, `kqueue`, `kevent`, `kill`, `write`, `_exit`); nothing allocates there.
///
/// Residual windows, documented in the changelog: the child runs untied between its spawn and
/// the moment this returns; and the watchdog's final `kill` names a pid after the supervisor
/// died, so a child that exits and whose number is recycled inside that gap (microseconds, and
/// the number space must wrap) could be mistaken for the child (the user-space gap
/// [`crate::identity`] describes).
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
pub(crate) fn arm_parent_death_watch(child: u32) -> io::Result<()> {
    // SAFETY: getpid has no preconditions.
    let supervisor = unsafe { libc::getpid() };
    let child = child as libc::pid_t;
    let mut ends = [0 as libc::c_int; 2];
    // SAFETY: `ends` holds the two descriptors pipe(2) writes.
    if unsafe { libc::pipe(ends.as_mut_ptr()) } < 0 {
        return Err(io::Error::last_os_error());
    }
    let [ack_read, ack_write] = ends;
    for fd in ends {
        // SAFETY: fcntl on descriptors created just above.
        unsafe {
            let flags = libc::fcntl(fd, libc::F_GETFD);
            if flags >= 0 {
                libc::fcntl(fd, libc::F_SETFD, flags | libc::FD_CLOEXEC);
            }
        }
    }
    // Listed before the fork (allocation is not allowed after it) so the watchdog can close
    // every descriptor it inherited: holding another child's pipe end would stop its reader
    // from ever seeing EOF.
    let inherited = open_descriptors();
    // SAFETY: the forked processes only make the async-signal-safe calls listed above.
    let middle = unsafe { libc::fork() };
    if middle < 0 {
        let error = io::Error::last_os_error();
        // SAFETY: closing the two descriptors created above.
        unsafe {
            libc::close(ack_read);
            libc::close(ack_write);
        }
        return Err(error);
    }
    if middle == 0 {
        // SAFETY: as above; the middle process only forks and exits.
        let watchdog = unsafe { libc::fork() };
        if watchdog == 0 {
            run_watchdog(supervisor, child, ack_read, ack_write, &inherited);
        }
        // SAFETY: _exit is async-signal-safe and runs no destructors.
        unsafe { libc::_exit(if watchdog < 0 { 1 } else { 0 }) }
    }
    // SAFETY: closing this process's copy of the write end; the watchdog has its own.
    unsafe { libc::close(ack_write) };
    let mut status: libc::c_int = 0;
    let reaped = loop {
        // SAFETY: `middle` is a child this function just forked and nothing else reaps.
        let result = unsafe { libc::waitpid(middle, &mut status, 0) };
        if result >= 0 {
            break true;
        }
        match io::Error::last_os_error().raw_os_error() {
            Some(libc::EINTR) => continue,
            // Collected elsewhere (a foreign waitpid(-1)): the report pipe still decides.
            _ => break false,
        }
    };
    let middle_ok = !reaped || (libc::WIFEXITED(status) && libc::WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0);
    let armed = middle_ok && read_ack(ack_read);
    // SAFETY: closing the read end created above.
    unsafe { libc::close(ack_read) };
    if armed {
        Ok(())
    } else {
        Err(io::Error::other(
            "the macOS parent-death watchdog could not be armed",
        ))
    }
}

/// True when the watchdog wrote its `A` (armed) byte within [`WATCHDOG_ARM_TIMEOUT`].
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
fn read_ack(fd: libc::c_int) -> bool {
    let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + WATCHDOG_ARM_TIMEOUT;
    loop {
        let left = deadline.saturating_duration_since(std::time::Instant::now());
        if left.is_zero() {
            return false;
        }
        let mut entry = libc::pollfd {
            fd,
            events: libc::POLLIN,
            revents: 0,
        };
        let millis = left.as_millis().min(libc::c_int::MAX as u128) as libc::c_int;
        // SAFETY: one valid pollfd, as counted.
        let ready = unsafe { libc::poll(&mut entry, 1, millis.max(1)) };
        if ready < 0 {
            if io::Error::last_os_error().raw_os_error() == Some(libc::EINTR) {
                continue;
            }
            return false;
        }
        if ready == 0 {
            continue; // re-check the deadline
        }
        let mut byte = 0u8;
        // SAFETY: reading one byte into a local.
        let count = unsafe { libc::read(fd, (&mut byte as *mut u8).cast(), 1) };
        return count == 1 && byte == b'A';
    }
}

/// The descriptors this process has open, for the watchdog to close.
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
fn open_descriptors() -> Vec<RawFd> {
    let listed: Option<Vec<RawFd>> = std::fs::read_dir("/dev/fd").ok().map(|entries| {
        entries
            .filter_map(Result::ok)
            .filter_map(|entry| entry.file_name().to_str()?.parse::<RawFd>().ok())
            .collect()
    });
    listed.unwrap_or_else(|| {
        // SAFETY: getdtablesize has no preconditions.
        let limit = unsafe { libc::getdtablesize() }.clamp(3, 65_536);
        (3..limit).collect()
    })
}

#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
fn proc_exit_change(pid: libc::pid_t, tag: usize) -> libc::kevent {
    libc::kevent {
        ident: pid as usize,
        filter: libc::EVFILT_PROC,
        flags: libc::EV_ADD | libc::EV_RECEIPT,
        fflags: libc::NOTE_EXIT,
        data: 0,
        udata: tag as *mut libc::c_void,
    }
}

/// The watchdog process body. Never returns and never allocates. See
/// [`arm_parent_death_watch`].
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
fn run_watchdog(
    supervisor: libc::pid_t,
    child: libc::pid_t,
    ack_read: libc::c_int,
    ack_write: libc::c_int,
    inherited: &[RawFd],
) -> ! {
    const PARENT_TAG: usize = 1;
    const CHILD_TAG: usize = 2;
    // SAFETY: only async-signal-safe libc calls, on descriptors and values owned by this
    // process; every path ends in `_exit`.
    unsafe {
        let report = |byte: u8| {
            libc::write(ack_write, (&byte as *const u8).cast(), 1);
            libc::close(ack_write);
        };
        libc::signal(libc::SIGPIPE, libc::SIG_IGN);
        libc::setsid();
        libc::close(ack_read);
        let null = libc::open(c"/dev/null".as_ptr(), libc::O_RDWR);
        if null >= 0 {
            for target in 0..3 {
                libc::dup2(null, target);
            }
            if null > 2 {
                libc::close(null);
            }
        }
        for &fd in inherited {
            if fd > 2 && fd != ack_write {
                libc::close(fd);
            }
        }
        let kq = libc::kqueue();
        if kq < 0 {
            report(b'F');
            libc::_exit(1);
        }
        let changes = [
            proc_exit_change(supervisor, PARENT_TAG),
            proc_exit_change(child, CHILD_TAG),
        ];
        let mut receipts: [libc::kevent; 2] = std::mem::zeroed();
        let no_wait = libc::timespec {
            tv_sec: 0,
            tv_nsec: 0,
        };
        let count = libc::kevent(kq, changes.as_ptr(), 2, receipts.as_mut_ptr(), 2, &no_wait);
        if count != 2 {
            report(b'F');
            libc::_exit(1);
        }
        let (mut parent_error, mut child_error) = (-1, -1);
        for receipt in &receipts {
            let error = if receipt.flags & libc::EV_ERROR != 0 {
                receipt.data as i32
            } else {
                0
            };
            match receipt.udata as usize {
                PARENT_TAG => parent_error = error,
                CHILD_TAG => child_error = error,
                _ => {}
            }
        }
        // The child already exited (the number is released only when it is reaped, which has not
        // happened, but XNU hides an exiting process from registration): nothing to tie.
        if child_error == libc::ESRCH {
            report(b'A');
            libc::_exit(0);
        }
        if child_error != 0 || (parent_error != 0 && parent_error != libc::ESRCH) {
            report(b'F');
            libc::_exit(1);
        }
        report(b'A');
        // `ESRCH` for the supervisor: it died before registration, so act at once.
        let mut parent_dead = parent_error == libc::ESRCH;
        let mut out: [libc::kevent; 2] = std::mem::zeroed();
        while !parent_dead {
            let count = libc::kevent(
                kq,
                std::ptr::null(),
                0,
                out.as_mut_ptr(),
                2,
                std::ptr::null(),
            );
            if count < 0 {
                if *libc::__error() == libc::EINTR {
                    continue;
                }
                libc::_exit(1);
            }
            let events = &out[..count as usize];
            if events.iter().any(|e| e.ident == child as usize) {
                libc::_exit(0); // the child left first: nothing to do
            }
            if events.iter().any(|e| e.ident == supervisor as usize) {
                parent_dead = true;
            }
        }
        // One last non-blocking look: a child that exited with the supervisor is left alone.
        let count = libc::kevent(kq, std::ptr::null(), 0, out.as_mut_ptr(), 2, &no_wait);
        if count > 0
            && out[..count as usize]
                .iter()
                .any(|e| e.ident == child as usize)
        {
            libc::_exit(0);
        }
        // The child leads its own group (setpgid/setsid before exec), so -child is its group.
        libc::kill(-child, libc::SIGTERM);
        let step = libc::timespec {
            tv_sec: 0,
            tv_nsec: WATCHDOG_STEP_NANOS,
        };
        for _ in 0..WATCHDOG_GRACE_STEPS {
            let count = libc::kevent(kq, std::ptr::null(), 0, out.as_mut_ptr(), 2, &step);
            if count > 0
                && out[..count as usize]
                    .iter()
                    .any(|e| e.ident == child as usize)
            {
                libc::_exit(0);
            }
        }
        libc::kill(-child, libc::SIGKILL);
        libc::_exit(0);
    }
}

/// Linux: `PR_SET_PDEATHSIG(SIGTERM)` on the direct child, called in the new process between
/// `fork` and `exec` (async-signal-safe: `prctl` and `getppid` only). The kernel fires it when
/// the thread that forked the child exits, and it targets only that child:
///
/// - it signals the direct child only, never the rest of its process group, so grandchildren
///   the child started survive unless the child cleans them up;
/// - it is a catchable `SIGTERM`, so a child that ignores or handles it can keep running, and
///   there is no `SIGKILL` escalation;
/// - the kernel keys it to the forking *thread*, so a supervisor that spawns from a short-lived
///   thread terminates its children when that thread ends.
///
/// `supervisor` is the pid of the process that spawned the child.
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
pub(crate) fn die_with_parent(supervisor: libc::pid_t) -> io::Result<()> {
    // SAFETY: PR_SET_PDEATHSIG takes a signal number and no pointers.
    if unsafe { libc::prctl(libc::PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, libc::SIGTERM as libc::c_ulong) } < 0 {
        return Err(io::Error::last_os_error());
    }
    // The supervisor may have died between fork and prctl. The death signal would then never
    // arrive, so fail the spawn rather than run untied.
    // SAFETY: getppid has no preconditions.
    if unsafe { libc::getppid() } != supervisor {
        return Err(io::Error::from_raw_os_error(libc::ESRCH));
    }
    Ok(())
}