reinhardt-core 0.1.1

//! CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) protection

use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
use rand::Rng;
use sha2::Sha256;

/// CSRF token length (64 characters)
pub const CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;

/// CSRF secret length (32 characters)
pub const CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH: usize = 32;

/// Allowed characters for CSRF tokens (alphanumeric)
pub const CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS: &str =
	"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789";

/// CSRF session key
pub const CSRF_SESSION_KEY: &str = "_csrf_token";

/// Rejection reason: Origin header does not match any trusted origins.
pub const REASON_BAD_ORIGIN: &str = "Origin checking failed - does not match any trusted origins.";
/// Rejection reason: Referer header does not match any trusted origins.
pub const REASON_BAD_REFERER: &str =
	"Referer checking failed - does not match any trusted origins.";
/// Rejection reason: CSRF token is missing from the request.
pub const REASON_CSRF_TOKEN_MISSING: &str = "CSRF token missing.";
/// Rejection reason: CSRF token has an incorrect length.
pub const REASON_INCORRECT_LENGTH: &str = "CSRF token has incorrect length.";
/// Rejection reason: Referer uses HTTP while the host uses HTTPS.
pub const REASON_INSECURE_REFERER: &str =
	"Referer checking failed - Referer is insecure while host is secure.";
/// Rejection reason: CSRF token contains invalid characters.
pub const REASON_INVALID_CHARACTERS: &str = "CSRF token has invalid characters.";
/// Rejection reason: Referer header is malformed.
pub const REASON_MALFORMED_REFERER: &str = "Referer checking failed - Referer is malformed.";
/// Rejection reason: CSRF cookie is not set.
pub const REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE: &str = "CSRF cookie not set.";
/// Rejection reason: Referer header is missing.
pub const REASON_NO_REFERER: &str = "Referer checking failed - no Referer.";

/// CSRF token validation error
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RejectRequest {
	/// Human-readable reason for CSRF rejection.
	pub reason: String,
}

/// Invalid token format error
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct InvalidTokenFormat {
	/// Description of the format error.
	pub reason: String,
}

/// CSRF metadata
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct CsrfMeta {
	/// The CSRF token value.
	pub token: String,
}

/// SameSite cookie attribute
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
pub enum SameSite {
	/// Strict mode - cookie only sent in first-party context
	Strict,
	/// Lax mode - cookie sent with top-level navigation
	#[default]
	Lax,
	/// None mode - cookie sent in all contexts (requires Secure)
	None,
}

/// CSRF configuration
///
/// All tokens are generated using HMAC-SHA256 for cryptographic security.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct CsrfConfig {
	/// Name of the CSRF cookie (default: "csrftoken").
	pub cookie_name: String,
	/// Name of the HTTP header for CSRF token (default: "X-CSRFToken").
	pub header_name: String,
	/// CSRF cookie should NOT be HttpOnly (JavaScript needs access)
	pub cookie_httponly: bool,
	/// Cookie should be Secure in production (HTTPS only)
	pub cookie_secure: bool,
	/// SameSite attribute for CSRF protection
	pub cookie_samesite: SameSite,
	/// Cookie domain (None = current domain only)
	pub cookie_domain: Option<String>,
	/// Cookie path (default: "/")
	pub cookie_path: String,
	/// Cookie max age in seconds (None = session cookie)
	pub cookie_max_age: Option<i64>,
	/// Enable token rotation (security enhancement)
	pub enable_token_rotation: bool,
	/// Token rotation interval in seconds (None = rotate on every request)
	pub token_rotation_interval: Option<u64>,
}

impl Default for CsrfConfig {
	fn default() -> Self {
		Self {
			cookie_name: "csrftoken".to_string(),
			header_name: "X-CSRFToken".to_string(),
			cookie_httponly: false, // CSRF token needs JavaScript access
			cookie_secure: false,   // Development default (set to true in production)
			cookie_samesite: SameSite::Lax,
			cookie_domain: None,
			cookie_path: "/".to_string(),
			cookie_max_age: None,          // Session cookie
			enable_token_rotation: false,  // Development default
			token_rotation_interval: None, // Rotate on every request when enabled
		}
	}
}

impl CsrfConfig {
	/// Production-ready configuration with security hardening
	///
	/// # Examples
	///
	/// ```
	/// use reinhardt_core::security::csrf::CsrfConfig;
	///
	/// let config = CsrfConfig::production();
	/// assert!(config.cookie_secure);
	/// assert_eq!(config.cookie_path, "/");
	/// assert!(config.enable_token_rotation);
	/// ```
	pub fn production() -> Self {
		Self {
			cookie_name: "csrftoken".to_string(),
			header_name: "X-CSRFToken".to_string(),
			cookie_httponly: false, // CSRF token needs JavaScript access
			cookie_secure: true,    // HTTPS only in production
			cookie_samesite: SameSite::Strict,
			cookie_domain: None,
			cookie_path: "/".to_string(),
			cookie_max_age: Some(31449600),      // 1 year
			enable_token_rotation: true,         // Enable rotation in production
			token_rotation_interval: Some(3600), // Rotate every hour
		}
	}

	/// Enable token rotation
	///
	/// # Examples
	///
	/// ```
	/// use reinhardt_core::security::csrf::CsrfConfig;
	///
	/// let config = CsrfConfig::default().with_token_rotation(Some(1800));
	/// assert!(config.enable_token_rotation);
	/// assert_eq!(config.token_rotation_interval, Some(1800));
	/// ```
	pub fn with_token_rotation(mut self, interval: Option<u64>) -> Self {
		self.enable_token_rotation = true;
		self.token_rotation_interval = interval;
		self
	}
}

/// CSRF middleware
pub struct CsrfMiddleware {
	// Allow dead_code: config stored for future middleware request/response processing; not yet consumed by HTTP pipeline
	#[allow(dead_code)]
	config: CsrfConfig,
}

impl CsrfMiddleware {
	/// Creates a new `CsrfMiddleware` with default configuration.
	pub fn new() -> Self {
		Self {
			config: CsrfConfig::default(),
		}
	}

	/// Creates a new `CsrfMiddleware` with the given configuration.
	pub fn with_config(config: CsrfConfig) -> Self {
		Self { config }
	}
}

impl Default for CsrfMiddleware {
	fn default() -> Self {
		Self::new()
	}
}

/// CSRF token
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct CsrfToken(pub String);

impl CsrfToken {
	/// Creates a new `CsrfToken` from a token string.
	pub fn new(token: String) -> Self {
		Self(token)
	}

	/// Returns the token value as a string slice.
	pub fn as_str(&self) -> &str {
		&self.0
	}
}

/// HMAC-SHA256 type alias
type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;

/// Generate HMAC-SHA256 based CSRF token
///
/// Creates a cryptographically secure token using HMAC-SHA256.
/// This is more secure than the legacy masking approach.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `secret` - Secret key for HMAC (should be at least 32 bytes)
/// * `message` - Message to authenticate (typically timestamp or session ID)
///
/// # Returns
///
/// Hex-encoded HMAC token (64 characters)
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// use reinhardt_core::security::csrf::generate_token_hmac;
///
/// let secret = b"my-secret-key-at-least-32-bytes-long";
/// let message = "session-id-12345";
/// let token = generate_token_hmac(secret, message);
/// assert_eq!(token.len(), 64); // HMAC-SHA256 produces 32 bytes = 64 hex chars
/// ```
pub fn generate_token_hmac(secret: &[u8], message: &str) -> String {
	let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(secret).expect("HMAC can take key of any size");
	mac.update(message.as_bytes());
	let result = mac.finalize();
	hex::encode(result.into_bytes())
}

/// Verify HMAC-SHA256 based CSRF token
///
/// Verifies that the token was generated with the given secret and message.
/// Uses constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `token` - Hex-encoded HMAC token to verify
/// * `secret` - Secret key used for HMAC generation
/// * `message` - Original message that was authenticated
///
/// # Returns
///
/// `true` if the token is valid, `false` otherwise
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// use reinhardt_core::security::csrf::{generate_token_hmac, verify_token_hmac};
///
/// let secret = b"my-secret-key-at-least-32-bytes-long";
/// let message = "session-id-12345";
/// let token = generate_token_hmac(secret, message);
///
/// assert!(verify_token_hmac(&token, secret, message));
/// assert!(!verify_token_hmac(&token, secret, "different-message"));
/// assert!(!verify_token_hmac("invalid-token", secret, message));
/// ```
pub fn verify_token_hmac(token: &str, secret: &[u8], message: &str) -> bool {
	// Decode hex token
	let Ok(token_bytes) = hex::decode(token) else {
		return false;
	};

	// Generate expected HMAC
	let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(secret).expect("HMAC can take key of any size");
	mac.update(message.as_bytes());

	// Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
	mac.verify_slice(&token_bytes).is_ok()
}

/// Get CSRF secret as bytes (32 bytes)
///
/// Generates a cryptographically secure random secret suitable for HMAC.
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// use reinhardt_core::security::csrf::get_secret_bytes;
///
/// let secret = get_secret_bytes();
/// assert_eq!(secret.len(), 32);
/// ```
pub fn get_secret_bytes() -> Vec<u8> {
	let mut rng = rand::rng();
	let mut secret = vec![0u8; 32];
	rng.fill(&mut secret[..]);
	secret
}

/// Get CSRF token using HMAC-SHA256
///
/// Generates a CSRF token using the HMAC-SHA256 approach.
/// This is the recommended method for new implementations.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `secret_bytes` - 32-byte secret key
/// * `session_id` - Session identifier or timestamp
///
/// # Returns
///
/// Hex-encoded HMAC token (64 characters)
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// use reinhardt_core::security::csrf::{get_secret_bytes, get_token_hmac};
///
/// let secret = get_secret_bytes();
/// let session_id = "user-session-12345";
/// let token = get_token_hmac(&secret, session_id);
/// assert_eq!(token.len(), 64);
/// ```
pub fn get_token_hmac(secret_bytes: &[u8], session_id: &str) -> String {
	generate_token_hmac(secret_bytes, session_id)
}

/// Check HMAC-based CSRF token validity
///
/// Verifies a CSRF token generated with HMAC-SHA256.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `request_token` - Token from the request
/// * `secret_bytes` - Secret key used for generation
/// * `session_id` - Session identifier or timestamp
///
/// # Returns
///
/// `Ok(())` if valid, `Err(RejectRequest)` if invalid
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// use reinhardt_core::security::csrf::{get_secret_bytes, get_token_hmac, check_token_hmac};
///
/// let secret = get_secret_bytes();
/// let session_id = "user-session-12345";
/// let token = get_token_hmac(&secret, session_id);
///
/// assert!(check_token_hmac(&token, &secret, session_id).is_ok());
/// assert!(check_token_hmac("invalid", &secret, session_id).is_err());
/// ```
pub fn check_token_hmac(
	request_token: &str,
	secret_bytes: &[u8],
	session_id: &str,
) -> Result<(), RejectRequest> {
	if !verify_token_hmac(request_token, secret_bytes, session_id) {
		return Err(RejectRequest {
			reason: "CSRF token mismatch (HMAC verification failed)".to_string(),
		});
	}
	Ok(())
}

/// Check origin header
pub fn check_origin(origin: &str, allowed_origins: &[String]) -> Result<(), RejectRequest> {
	if !allowed_origins.iter().any(|o| o == origin) {
		return Err(RejectRequest {
			reason: REASON_BAD_ORIGIN.to_string(),
		});
	}
	Ok(())
}

/// Check referer header
pub fn check_referer(
	referer: Option<&str>,
	allowed_origins: &[String],
	is_secure: bool,
) -> Result<(), RejectRequest> {
	let referer = referer.ok_or_else(|| RejectRequest {
		reason: REASON_NO_REFERER.to_string(),
	})?;

	if referer.is_empty() {
		return Err(RejectRequest {
			reason: REASON_MALFORMED_REFERER.to_string(),
		});
	}

	if is_secure && referer.starts_with("http://") {
		return Err(RejectRequest {
			reason: REASON_INSECURE_REFERER.to_string(),
		});
	}

	if !allowed_origins.iter().any(|o| referer.starts_with(o)) {
		return Err(RejectRequest {
			reason: REASON_BAD_REFERER.to_string(),
		});
	}

	Ok(())
}

/// Check if two domains are the same
pub fn is_same_domain(domain1: &str, domain2: &str) -> bool {
	domain1 == domain2
}

/// Generate token timestamp
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// use reinhardt_core::security::csrf::get_token_timestamp;
///
/// let timestamp = get_token_timestamp();
/// assert!(timestamp > 0);
/// ```
pub fn get_token_timestamp() -> u64 {
	std::time::SystemTime::now()
		.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
		.unwrap_or_default()
		.as_secs()
}

/// Check if token rotation is due
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// use reinhardt_core::security::csrf::{should_rotate_token, get_token_timestamp};
///
/// let current_time = get_token_timestamp();
/// let token_time = current_time - 3700; // 1 hour and 1 minute ago
/// assert!(should_rotate_token(token_time, current_time, Some(3600)));
/// assert!(!should_rotate_token(token_time, current_time, None)); // No rotation without interval
/// ```
pub fn should_rotate_token(
	token_timestamp: u64,
	current_timestamp: u64,
	rotation_interval: Option<u64>,
) -> bool {
	match rotation_interval {
		Some(interval) => current_timestamp.saturating_sub(token_timestamp) >= interval,
		None => false, // Never rotate when interval is not specified
	}
}

/// Generate token with timestamp
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// use reinhardt_core::security::csrf::{get_secret_bytes, generate_token_with_timestamp};
///
/// let secret = get_secret_bytes();
/// let session_id = "user-session-12345";
/// let token_data = generate_token_with_timestamp(&secret, session_id);
/// assert!(token_data.contains(':'));
/// ```
pub fn generate_token_with_timestamp(secret_bytes: &[u8], session_id: &str) -> String {
	let timestamp = get_token_timestamp();
	let message = format!("{}:{}", session_id, timestamp);
	let token = generate_token_hmac(secret_bytes, &message);
	format!("{}:{}", token, timestamp)
}

/// Verify token with timestamp
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// use reinhardt_core::security::csrf::{get_secret_bytes, generate_token_with_timestamp, verify_token_with_timestamp};
///
/// let secret = get_secret_bytes();
/// let session_id = "user-session-12345";
/// let token_data = generate_token_with_timestamp(&secret, session_id);
///
/// assert!(verify_token_with_timestamp(&token_data, &secret, session_id).is_ok());
/// ```
pub fn verify_token_with_timestamp(
	token_data: &str,
	secret_bytes: &[u8],
	session_id: &str,
) -> Result<u64, RejectRequest> {
	if token_data.is_empty() {
		return Err(RejectRequest {
			reason: "Invalid token format (empty token)".to_string(),
		});
	}

	// Use rsplitn to split from the right, ensuring the timestamp is always
	// the last segment even if the token portion somehow contains ':'
	let mut parts = token_data.rsplitn(2, ':');
	let timestamp_str = parts.next().ok_or_else(|| RejectRequest {
		reason: "Invalid token format (missing timestamp)".to_string(),
	})?;
	let token = parts.next().ok_or_else(|| RejectRequest {
		reason: "Invalid token format (missing delimiter)".to_string(),
	})?;

	if token.is_empty() {
		return Err(RejectRequest {
			reason: "Invalid token format (empty token value)".to_string(),
		});
	}

	if timestamp_str.is_empty() {
		return Err(RejectRequest {
			reason: "Invalid token format (empty timestamp)".to_string(),
		});
	}

	// Validate that the token is a valid hex string of the expected length
	if token.len() != CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH {
		return Err(RejectRequest {
			reason: format!(
				"Invalid token format (expected {} hex characters, got {})",
				CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH,
				token.len()
			),
		});
	}

	if !token.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
		return Err(RejectRequest {
			reason: "Invalid token format (token contains non-hex characters)".to_string(),
		});
	}

	let timestamp: u64 = timestamp_str.parse().map_err(|_| RejectRequest {
		reason: "Invalid token format (timestamp is not a valid number)".to_string(),
	})?;

	let message = format!("{}:{}", session_id, timestamp);
	if !verify_token_hmac(token, secret_bytes, &message) {
		return Err(RejectRequest {
			reason: "CSRF token mismatch (HMAC verification failed)".to_string(),
		});
	}

	Ok(timestamp)
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
	use super::*;
	use rstest::rstest;

	fn test_secret() -> Vec<u8> {
		b"test-secret-key-at-least-32-bytes".to_vec()
	}

	#[rstest]
	fn test_verify_token_with_timestamp_valid_token() {
		// Arrange
		let secret = test_secret();
		let session_id = "user-session-12345";
		let token_data = generate_token_with_timestamp(&secret, session_id);

		// Act
		let result = verify_token_with_timestamp(&token_data, &secret, session_id);

		// Assert
		assert!(result.is_ok(), "Expected valid token to pass verification");
		assert!(result.unwrap() > 0, "Expected positive timestamp");
	}

	#[rstest]
	fn test_verify_token_with_timestamp_rejects_empty_input() {
		// Arrange
		let secret = test_secret();

		// Act
		let result = verify_token_with_timestamp("", &secret, "session");

		// Assert
		assert!(result.is_err());
		assert_eq!(
			result.unwrap_err().reason,
			"Invalid token format (empty token)"
		);
	}

	#[rstest]
	#[case("no-delimiter-at-all")]
	#[case("abcdef")]
	fn test_verify_token_with_timestamp_rejects_missing_delimiter(#[case] input: &str) {
		// Arrange
		let secret = test_secret();

		// Act
		let result = verify_token_with_timestamp(input, &secret, "session");

		// Assert
		assert!(result.is_err());
		assert_eq!(
			result.unwrap_err().reason,
			"Invalid token format (missing delimiter)"
		);
	}

	#[rstest]
	fn test_verify_token_with_timestamp_rejects_empty_token_value() {
		// Arrange
		let secret = test_secret();

		// Act
		let result = verify_token_with_timestamp(":12345", &secret, "session");

		// Assert
		assert!(result.is_err());
		assert_eq!(
			result.unwrap_err().reason,
			"Invalid token format (empty token value)"
		);
	}

	#[rstest]
	fn test_verify_token_with_timestamp_rejects_empty_timestamp() {
		// Arrange
		let secret = test_secret();

		// Act
		let result = verify_token_with_timestamp(
			"a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2:",
			&secret,
			"session",
		);

		// Assert
		assert!(result.is_err());
		assert_eq!(
			result.unwrap_err().reason,
			"Invalid token format (empty timestamp)"
		);
	}

	#[rstest]
	#[case("short:12345")]
	#[case("ab:12345")]
	fn test_verify_token_with_timestamp_rejects_wrong_token_length(#[case] input: &str) {
		// Arrange
		let secret = test_secret();

		// Act
		let result = verify_token_with_timestamp(input, &secret, "session");

		// Assert
		assert!(result.is_err());
		assert!(
			result
				.unwrap_err()
				.reason
				.contains("expected 64 hex characters"),
			"Expected token length error"
		);
	}

	#[rstest]
	fn test_verify_token_with_timestamp_rejects_non_hex_token() {
		// Arrange
		let secret = test_secret();
		// 64 characters but contains non-hex 'g' and 'z'
		let bad_token = "g1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6z1b2";
		let input = format!("{}:12345", bad_token);

		// Act
		let result = verify_token_with_timestamp(&input, &secret, "session");

		// Assert
		assert!(result.is_err());
		assert_eq!(
			result.unwrap_err().reason,
			"Invalid token format (token contains non-hex characters)"
		);
	}

	#[rstest]
	#[case("a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2:not_a_number")]
	#[case("a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2:-1")]
	#[case("a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2:12.34")]
	fn test_verify_token_with_timestamp_rejects_invalid_timestamp(#[case] input: &str) {
		// Arrange
		let secret = test_secret();

		// Act
		let result = verify_token_with_timestamp(input, &secret, "session");

		// Assert
		assert!(result.is_err());
		assert_eq!(
			result.unwrap_err().reason,
			"Invalid token format (timestamp is not a valid number)"
		);
	}

	#[rstest]
	fn test_verify_token_with_timestamp_rejects_tampered_token() {
		// Arrange
		let secret = test_secret();
		let session_id = "user-session-12345";
		let token_data = generate_token_with_timestamp(&secret, session_id);

		// Act - verify with a different session ID
		let result = verify_token_with_timestamp(&token_data, &secret, "different-session");

		// Assert
		assert!(result.is_err());
		assert_eq!(
			result.unwrap_err().reason,
			"CSRF token mismatch (HMAC verification failed)"
		);
	}

	#[rstest]
	fn test_verify_token_with_timestamp_rejects_wrong_secret() {
		// Arrange
		let secret = test_secret();
		let wrong_secret = b"wrong-secret-key-at-least-32-byte".to_vec();
		let session_id = "user-session-12345";
		let token_data = generate_token_with_timestamp(&secret, session_id);

		// Act
		let result = verify_token_with_timestamp(&token_data, &wrong_secret, session_id);

		// Assert
		assert!(result.is_err());
		assert_eq!(
			result.unwrap_err().reason,
			"CSRF token mismatch (HMAC verification failed)"
		);
	}

	#[rstest]
	fn test_verify_token_with_timestamp_handles_extra_colons_in_crafted_input() {
		// Arrange
		let secret = test_secret();
		// Attacker crafts a token with extra colons - rsplitn ensures only the
		// last segment is treated as timestamp
		let input = "a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2:extra:12345";

		// Act
		let result = verify_token_with_timestamp(input, &secret, "session");

		// Assert - rsplitn splits "...a1b2:extra" as token and "12345" as timestamp.
		// The token portion "...a1b2:extra" has wrong length, so it is rejected.
		assert!(result.is_err());
	}

	#[rstest]
	fn test_should_rotate_token_normal_case() {
		// Arrange
		let token_timestamp = 1000u64;
		let current_timestamp = 4700u64; // 3700 seconds later
		let interval = 3600u64; // 1 hour

		// Act
		let result = should_rotate_token(token_timestamp, current_timestamp, Some(interval));

		// Assert
		assert!(result, "Token older than interval should trigger rotation");
	}

	#[rstest]
	fn test_should_rotate_token_future_timestamp_no_panic() {
		// Arrange
		let token_timestamp = 5000u64; // Future: token_timestamp > current_timestamp
		let current_timestamp = 1000u64;
		let interval = 3600u64;

		// Act
		let result = should_rotate_token(token_timestamp, current_timestamp, Some(interval));

		// Assert
		assert!(!result, "Future-dated token should not trigger rotation");
	}

	#[rstest]
	fn test_should_rotate_token_equal_timestamps() {
		// Arrange
		let timestamp = 1000u64;
		let interval = 3600u64;

		// Act
		let result = should_rotate_token(timestamp, timestamp, Some(interval));

		// Assert
		assert!(
			!result,
			"Equal timestamps (0 elapsed) should not trigger rotation"
		);
	}
}